Malmö Högskola

School of International Migration and Ethnic Relations (IMER)
Faculty of Culture and Society
Department of Global Political Studies
Master Programme in Global Political Studies
International Relations

Possibilities and Constraints Facing the
International Cooperation in Negotiating
Global Climate Change Regimes

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Author: Mohamad Zakaria

Supervisor: Dr Gunnhildur Lily Magnúsdóttir

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Abstract

This thesis analysis the problems facing the negotiators during their international efforts to create global climate change regimes. Without understanding why such negotiations failed in the past, it is difficult to learn how to negotiate them successfully in the future. The US and China are responsible for emitting almost half of the greenhouse emissions to the atmosphere. However, they are still laggards in the efforts to create an effective global climate change regime and are running away from their global responsibility by blaming each other for the failure to reach a global climate change deal. The EU has been taking the leadership in efforts to negotiate global climate change regimes. However, they can not influence and force the main two hegemonic powers to follow their leadership. This is because the EU is not hegemony in the global political arena. The EU persistence to find compromises during negotiations for future global climate change regimes is a source of hope to humankind. Flexibility during negotiations, openness to consider the views of other global actors to find optimum solutions, and the understanding that no one is secure from the threats of climate change are essential to bring the world leaders into a compromise global climate change regime.

Keywords: Kyoto Protocol; Copenhagen Accord, Hegemony; Sustainability; Negotiations;
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Acronyms and Abbreviations

UNFCCC  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
GHG    Greenhouse Gases
CoP    Conference of the Parties
OECD   Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
EIT    European Institute for Innovation and Technology
CDM    Clean Development Mechanism
JI     Joint Implementation
CFC    Chlorofluorocarbons
IPCC   International Panel on Climate Change
PPM    Parts per million
EU     European Union
UNEP   United Nations Environmental Programme
EPA    Environmental Protection Agency
JUSSCANNZ Japan, the USA, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway and New Zealand
1. Introduction

Globalization has its positive as well as its negative effects on the humans and the environment. However, the human activities have created more pressure on the environment than the era before globalization process has intensified. The release of CO2 due to transportation, energy production among other factors, has remarkably increased in the last few decades. This has led to global climate change which science believes that CO2 is a major contributor to. Such climate change is global in nature since anthropogenic pollutants travels in the atmosphere far away from the place they were originally produced. The problem of Climate Change is much broader in scope and difficult to deal with than any single nation’s ability to solve it (Volger, 2008, 353).

Globalization has been one of the major direct reasons for environmental degradation and thus global efforts are required to minimise the level of the negative impacts globalization has caused (Volger, 2008, p.352). Nowadays, environmental threats are identified as ‘non-military’ threats to national and international peace and security (Baker, 1993). Environmental degradation is considered as a possible cause of increased national and international tensions through the increase of socio-political tensions and environmental inequities both within and between states (Elliot, 1998). Over the past 100 years, global mean temperature has increased by 0.6 °C, and in Europe it has increased by about 1.2 °C (European Environment Agency, 2010). There are increasing scientific evidences that most of this warming can be attributed to the emission of greenhouse gases (GHG) and aerosols by human activities (Volger, 2008, p.362). Changes in temperatures and rainfall may have negative impacts on agriculture and may cause disturbance to the natural ecosystems. Moreover, rising sea levels and wild storms may erode coastal zones.

Climate change is not the only environmental hazard in the world. There are also many environmental problems in many parts of the world such as the problems of pollution and unsustainable land use. However, climate change is considered as high priority threat to deal with on the political agenda. With growing consensus and necessity for immediate action, the global community has been facing the challenges of an effective policy response for security reasons and for the sustainability of the future generations. According to Agniew (Agniew, 1998, pp. 82-83), geopolitical threats can not only be solved by military power and “the impact of distant events (oil spills, burning forests, etc) on the prospects of life at ‘home’” do not have simple military solutions to them. Thus international cooperation is needed to
prevent environmental threats at international but also at national level. Thus, it is of each
country’s national interest to cooperate to find policies to reduce the impacts of climate
change and enforce policies to limit its deterioration.

The US and China combined are contributing to almost half of the GHGs global emissions
(Giddens, 2009, p.225). There are three possible explanations related to the rise in carbon
emissions since 1990 (National Energy Foundation of U.K., 2010). One of them has been
until recently the fast economic growth during the 1990s in Europe and the USA which
required energy consumption and therefore has led to energy-related emissions increase.
Another one was that many of the gains in energy efficiency that were realized in the 1980s as
consequences of oil price shocks of the 1970’s had started to decline. Low gasoline prices
have encouraged many drivers especially Americans to purchase big cars, minivans, or sport
cars which are naturally less fuel efficient than small cars. Additional to that, electricity
production from the United States’ two almost emissions-free energy sources which are the
nuclear power and hydropower have stagnated since the early 1990s and thus increasing the
reliance on fossil fuels. These reasons are almost similar in the entire developed world.

The Kyoto Protocol is one of the international cooperation products in finding policies to
tackle the climate change problem. It was adopted at the Third Session of the Conference of
the Parties (CoP) of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Kyoto
of Japan in 1997. It includes binding commitments additional to those included in the
UNFCCC. Most OECD countries and EITs have agreed to reduce their anthropogenic
emissions of greenhouse gases including carbon dioxide by 5.2 per cent in average below
the target of GHG emissions reduction by 7 per cent and the EU agreed to cut its GHG
emissions by 8 per cent in the period between 2008 and 2012. Three mechanisms were agreed
upon to achieve these targets: emission trading, joint implementation (JI), and the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) (Ibid, 362). However, the United States which is largest
emitters of carbon dioxide in the world has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol citing threats to its
economy and global competitiveness. In 1998 the Clinton administration signed on to the
Kyoto Protocol. In the year 2001, the Bush administration withdrew the US signature,
claiming that the treaty was "fatally flawed". This is despite that by the year 1999 the US
emissions had risen about 12% above 1990 levels and it is said to have raised even higher by
today (Byrne et al, 2007, pp.4557-4558). It was until 2005 that the Protocol came into effect since it was required that 55 countries producing 55% of the GHG emissions should ratify the Kyoto Protocol to come into effect. Russia ratified the Kyoto Protocol in late 2004 and thus paved the way for Kyoto Protocol implementation. The delay in its ratification and the opposition of Bush administration to ratify it weakened the progress of Kyoto Protocol.

The Kyoto Protocol expires by the end of the year 2012 and thus a new climate change regime is negotiated. In December 2009, the CoP 15 took place in Copenhagen and it was hoped that the conference would produce a new global climate change binding regime for after the year 2012. However, the conference only managed to come up with the Copenhagen Accord which is non-binding climate change document that might be a basis for further international negotiations for finding a global climate change regime and hopefully a legally binding one. National self-interests, power struggle, lack of entrepreneurial leadership, too ambitious or too little GHG emission cuts targets, hindered the negotiations at CoP15. But efforts should continue to form a new global climate change regime. Lessons from the past should be helpful to avoid mistakes done during the negotiations both at Kyoto and Copenhagen and to create new possibilities.

1.1. Aim of the thesis

The aim of this thesis is to analyse some of the important factors that may influence the international climate change negotiations for the establishment of global climate change regimes. The role of factors such as science, leadership, security, power relations, among others in creating global climate change regimes are to be in focus for analysis throughout this thesis.

1.2. Research question

The main research question is: What factors should be taken into consideration when negotiating international climate change policy regimes?
1.3. Methodology

This is a qualitative research that analyses already written theoretical material by prominent scholars in global climate change regime politics in order to answer the main research question of this thesis. Those theories are analysed from the events throughout past international efforts for global climate change regime negotiations and also thoroughly reflected throughout the discussion of the three main global actors’ in international climate change politics as well as national ones I have chosen to analyse. This will show how internal politics and international politics regarding climate change policies are intertwined.

The role of the US in forming the Kyoto Protocol climate change regime is to be discussed as the main example for possibilities and constraints facing international climate change regimes formation. Furthermore, I will discuss the role of China and EU policies in this aspect to analyse similarities and differences in their possibilities and constraints in the process of negotiating and adopting international climate change regimes. The latest Copenhagen Accord formation and the negotiations that led to its formation is also given in this thesis as an example of how international power and hegemony influence international climate change politics.

In my analysis throughout this thesis, I will just analyse climate change regime formations without using much of the environmental activism arguments. This is because this work aims to be of academic nature and thus objectively analysing possibilities and constraints in international climate change regime politics.

1.3.1. Limitations

I will not discuss much in this thesis the role of international organizations in the global climate change regime formation. I have chosen to focus on the role of global states and hegemonies that play vital role in forming international organizations. Qualitative interviews are one of the most important sources for case study analysis (Yin, 2003, p. 50). It would have been much of support for my analysis if I had the possibility to conduct interviews with many national negotiators who represented their nations in the international negotiations of climate change regimes and agenda setting. This would have added more credibility to my analysis. However, I hope I will do this in my future research on this topic if given the possibility to do so. I am also not focusing on the power struggle between India and China which may also be one of the claimed reasons of why China rejected a binding global climate
change agreement so far since India has totally rejected any idea to bind itself to reduce its
GHG emissions. The reason for this limitation is that I wanted to focus more on the power
struggle between the both hegemony powers the US and China.

1.3.2. Primary and secondary material
The literature used in this thesis is mainly books, peer-reviewed articles, and edited books
chapters. These are primary data I use in this thesis. These scientific sources are written by
well known international relations academics and academics of climate change politics to
have academically reliable master thesis. Moreover, I refer to websites of international
organizations, international newspapers and well-known magazines in collecting empirical
material that I use the theories to reflect upon. These are my secondary data.

I write this thesis in simple but still academic language to enable most of readers both
specialised and non-specialised in the global climate change regime to benefit from it. I avoid
using complex scientific language for the sake of just showing off my academic skills in
thesis writing because I believe such work shall be written not only for limited scientific
audience but for broader ones and by thus increasing the awareness and knowledge related to
international climate change regime formation.

1.3.3. Perspective
A thesis is affected by the perspective chosen for analysis. My approach is driven by the
importance of problem recognised since climate change is affecting everyone on this planet
and will even affect more the future generations if no effective international cooperation and
national efforts are done.

All research is based originally on pre-comprehension of researchers. I use the hermeneutical
research ideal in this thesis. In hermeneutical research, both theories and data should
contribute to interpretation and conclusions not one over the other (Alvesson and Sköldberg,
2000, p.56). The theory will be utilised as a framework and that is the base of my analysis.

There are two principal approach methods: the deductive and the inductive ones (Backman,
1998, p.40). In this thesis, I choose the deductive approach because it enhances understanding
of the whole issue of my research topic.
1.3.4. Line of approach

It is advised to use case study when the research is at small scale (Denscombe, 2000, p.15). Since this thesis is rather of small scale, I use the case study approach as well. The US, China, and the EU are case studies I use to reflect on my theoretical analysis. Since I am analysing already existing theories and not bringing new theories, I use the qualitative method to better understand and interpret the study objective.

I choose to integrate the theoretical and empirical material in this research analysis. The reason is to enhance the readers’ value and interest in my research. It also helps me to identify non-value adding information to avoid the using of.

1.3.5. Disposition

This thesis consists of four chapters including this introduction and a general conclusion. In the introduction, I mention the aim of this thesis, the research question, and the methodology I am using to guide the reader throughout this thesis on what to expect from each chapter and to smoothly show the flow of analysis.

The second chapter discusses different international relations theories related to international environmental regimes formations and particularly the climate change ones. It also incorporates theories with empirical data. This will provide the reader with some theoretical knowledge about the basic necessities that are required to successfully negotiate and form international environmental regime including climate change ones.

The third chapter analyses case studies from the experiences of previous international climate regimes politics and the impact of internal, ideological, and power politics in influencing international climate change regime formation. The policies of the US politics and US presidents in the last two decades are extensively discussed to reflect on the discussion of the second chapter. China and the EU climate change politics and their roles in global climate change regime are also taken as case studies to compare with the US ones and give the reader the evidence of how hegemony and nations’ self-interest are central in any international cooperation to form global climate change regimes.

The last chapter is summary and a general conclusion of the entire thesis. Each chapter starts with a brief introduction and a short summary.
Chapter 2
Theoretical Framework and Empirical Analysis

In this chapter, I use some of the major international relations theories to analyse the possibilities and constraints in the international negotiations in finding a global climate change regime. I also integrate the empirical material with the theoretical framework in my analysis to attract the interest and attention of the readers while reading this thesis.

2.1. International regimes formation requirements
The globalization has led to the creation of international regimes which have become increasingly important in the contemporary international system (Little, 2008, p.298). Such regimes function to facilitate the collaboration among governments and to minimise the effects of hierarchic construction of global political system. Krasner (1983, p.2) defines regimes as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”. Power and state position in the hierarchical global political system usually influence the fate of regime formation (Volger, 2008, p.356). As an example, we see such struggle during the climate change negotiations where struggle between national and organizational interest usually persist. This has happened before, during, and after the Kyoto international climate change negotiations and most recently during the negotiations at CoP15. The same will happen in any future climate change negotiations for forming a binding regime.

There are four major elements of any regimes: principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures (Little, 2008, p.300). Principles include well defined statements on how the world functions. Norms clarify the obligations and rights of states and show them clearly how to behave in certain situations. Rules clarify the ambiguity and solve the conflicting understandings between norms and principles. Decision-making procedures guide the behaviour of the regime and these procedures might change with time and circumstances upon agreement of the involved parties that are forming the regime. If there is no formal agreement, then there is actually no regime. However, there exists something called “tacit regime” where there can be expectations that informal rules can be respected. Contrary to that, there are
situations where formal rules were set but nothing has been applied and in such situations the
regime is named as dead-letter regime. Full-blown regimes are those regimes where high
expectations that rules will be respected and observed (Little, 2008, p.301). We can find
established international regimes such as security regimes, economic regimes, and
environmental regimes.

Both realists and neoliberal institutionalists believe that regimes promote international order.
However, they have differences in their understanding of the role as well as the function of
such regimes (Little, 2008, p.298-299). According to Little (2008, p. 299), the neoliberal
institutionalists believe that regimes help states to cooperate, promote the common benefits,
function best when are supported by a hegemony, and that regimes eventually promote liberal
world order. However, according to the same author, realists believe that regimes promote
states to coordinate their efforts; that regimes give different benefits to different states; and
that power is the core of regime formation and its sustainability, where their norms and
principles influence the nature of the world order. Since the end of the 1980’s, the US has
been the sole hegemonic power but it has not been so much supportive in the practice of
creating functioning international climate change regimes. This has led to the failure of many
attempts to effectively cooperate for binding international climate change cooperation
policies.

International sustainability related regimes usually have capacity building in the core of their
formation. This is due to the economic possibilities between developed and developing
countries. Such regimes can not be established or successfully implemented without the
participation of developing countries and therefore capacity building is required. Capacity
building is the process of giving the developing countries the capability of achieving their
obligations by providing funds, expertise, and technology from the other international partners
who have these possibilities. As we see, international environmental regimes usually use the
capacity building to achieve successful implementation from the part of the developing
countries. As an example, after two years of tough negotiations and to have the developing
world agree to participate in the stratospheric ozone regime (The Montreal Protocol),
financing was given to developing countries to be able to finance non Chlorofluorocarbons
(CFC) technologies (Volger, 2008, p.360). Kyoto climate change regime included capacity
building policies as well. In the year 2009 the Copenhagen Accord of the UNFCCC CoP15
also included capacity building policies.
According to Volger (2008, p.358), shared scientific understanding is fundamental for establishing international environmental regimes. Preliminary framework conventions function as alarm of existing problem and establish the necessity for collecting and disseminating more scientific data on that problem. It provides “the basis for taking action in a control protocol” (Volger, 2008, p.358). Antarctic science formed the solid basis for creating the Montreal Protocol and stratospheric ozone regime when British Antarctic Survey balloon provided uncontested scientific data about thinning of stratospheric ozone layer to critical extent. That prompt international action and thus effective international regime, the Montreal Protocol was formed. The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is another example of such international scientific bodies that disseminate new solid scientific about climate change science through reports written by world’s leading scientists in the field.

However, the science of climate change and the GHGs effects were debated for a long time until some sufficient consensus was provided to prompt action (Volger, 2008, p.361). The IPCC report of 2007 conclusion was that “warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global sea level” and that this “is very likely to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations” (IPCC Report, 2007, p.4). According to the IPCC 2007 report, if people continue with this trend of fossil fuel burning and no action will be taken the earth temperature will rise in the range of 2.4-6.4°C by the year 2099 and that the consequences are not known but most likely that extreme weather conditions, rise of sea level may be expected (Volger, 2008, p.361). However, the flaws in the 2007 IPCC report which were revealed in the beginning of 2010 are threats to its credibility and reputation. The report was basing its science on scientific data that are not published in peer-reviewed scientific journals and thus scientifically unreliable enough to be the basis for IPCC conclusions (Gray and Leach, 2010, Telegraph website). Even though these errors might be minor, they can create mistrust towards the IPCC and may change the public opinion that has been so far in favour of international climate change regime. People are basing their opinion of such regime need on science that is mainly provided by well known scientific organization like the IPCC. Such mistakes can also embarrass and undermine efforts of state leaders in establishing national policies and cooperating.
internationally for climate regime. Activism should not be mixed with solid scientific data in such reliable reports further.

Furthermore, the EU has established its own scientific conclusions that the earth temperature should be less than 2°C by keeping the level of CO2 below 550 ppm which is already over 400 ppm (Volger, 2008, p.361). This believe in their available scientific data has prompted EU to take the lead for establishing international climate change regimes and why they set higher demand on CO2 cut on themselves and urges the world to do so. In any case, any international environmental framework should have solid internationally recognised scientific basic and targeted approach (Depledge and Yamin, 2009, p.435).

2.2. Power and climate change regime negotiations

Many of those NGOs and developing countries negotiators leading their nations’ climate change international negotiations believe in the necessity of international cooperation in combating the climate change are mostly constructivists and neoliberal institutionalists. Realists are known to be against any international agreement that may limit their sovereignty over their resources and policies at home or force them to lose the economic competitiveness.

According to Ceckel (2008, p.72) “constructivists see the world around as socially constructed, where constructed means that the constructivists understand the world as coming into being constructed through a process of interaction between agents (individual, state, non-state)”. They believe in using soft power in exerting pressure on the politicians at home using persuasion and media powers to form public opinion that can be influential to reach their goals. According to Nye (2004, p. 142), “soft power is the ability to get what you want by attracting and persuading others to adopt your goals”. Thus, media performs agenda setting role (Robinsson, 2008, pp.146-147). Moreover, realists argue that foreign policy is generated by forces external to state rather than internal to state such as media and public opinion (Robinsson, 2008, p.146). Thus, media plays a very important role as soft power. It is used by environmentalist and neoliberal institutionalists to increase environmental awareness, to warn citizens about the climate change threat to security. But it is also being used by realists and conservative groups to raise public suspicion about science of climate change, to show threats of any binding international climate change agreement to the national economy, and also to campaign for industrialisation neglecting its negative impacts on the environment.
During the international climate change negotiations, neoliberal institutionalists believed they can persuade the others in adapting a view that is for a legal binding agreement that forces nations to implement the internationally agreed policies to tackle the climate change through mitigation and adaptation instruments. However, they failed to seriously take into account the power relations and to use more diplomacy and flexibility to achieve important parts of their climate change agenda (Checkel, 2008, pp.72-79). They distracted themselves from taking into account that powerful countries will overcome the pressure exerted on them during negotiations because they have the power to do so whether that power is economic, political, military or all combined like in the case of the US and China. Such powerful actors would not do anything that might influence their interests negatively especially when there are power struggles in different forms like the economic power struggle between the US and China. India, China, and the US are competitors that have to agree on some basics if any agreement concerning international climate change politics can be found and effectively implemented. Trying to convince one of them without putting similar efforts in pursuing the others is a grave mistake which may lead to negotiations’ failure to bring up an internationally binding agreement. Before the CoP15 meeting, the leaders of China and the US met and discussed their positions from an international agreement and it was obvious that both were not ready yet for that additional to India’s opposition to any such agreement that may slow its economic growth. Each of them had its own reasons for that and thus without them there was no legally binding climate change agreement being achieved. The EU, however, was the only actor who seems was constructively doing its best to reach an agreement. But since the EU has the economic power but not the military power or being hegemony, it could not do much.

2.3. Climate change and international cooperation

Since climate change is a global phenomenon it needs global policies and international cooperation to try to deal with its causes and also its consequences. Although national and regional actions are vital, global environmental governance is a must for climate change efforts success (Volger, p.353). It is of importance to learn from the previous experiences of international environmental cooperation to know what constraints and possibilities might be expected during negotiations and later implementation although the severity of the problems and intensity of cooperation might vary much. Some of the well known international environmental conventions and treaties are: International Convention for the Regulation of

The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) was established as a result of the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) that took place in Stockholm. This conference was a major event in making it clear that environmental problems need international actions to achieve sustainable solutions and policies. It also shows that environmental awareness regarding environmental degradation pressured their leaderships to cooperate globally additional to working locally to solve environmental problems. Although the UNEP has had many failures, it has also managed to take important steps for international cooperation for sustainable development and made efforts for the necessity of cooperation. UNEP in joint cooperation with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) established the International Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) (Depledge and Yamin, 2009, p.436). The UN Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 or what is known as the “Earth Summit” was the major international conference leading to Kyoto negotiations. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), which is a global climate change regime, was actually founded at the “Earth Summit” as a response to the scientific findings of the IPCC.

2.4. Leadership and international climate change regimes formation
Understanding the role of leadership in negotiating international climate change regimes is an important factor to understand the constraints and possibilities that may arise during the climate negotiation. Leadership is defined in the Dictionary of Political Analysis as what “enables an individual to shape the collective behavioural pattern of a group in a direction determined by his or her own values” (Andersen and Agrawala, 2002, p. 41). According to Andersen and Agrawala (2002, p.41), the meaning of “leadership” concept and the role of leaders are sources of disagreement between IR scholars. Some scholars believe that leadership is essential to reach an agreement during international negotiations. However, some others might claim that a leader “has no independent influence on international politics” and that leadership reflects only a manifestation of exercising structural power (as cited in Andersen and Agrawala, 2002, p.41).

According to Oran R. Young, there are three forms of leadership that are vital of establishing international institutions: structural leadership, entrepreneurial leadership, and intellectual
leadership (Young, 1991, p.281). The structural leader is the person who represents a party or act as party agent during negotiations to form institutions and leads by “devising effective ways to bring that party structural power to bear in the form of bargaining leverage over the issues at stake in specific interaction” (Ibid, 1991, p.288). Thus they do every bargain that suits the state they represent. Furthermore, structural leadership is partly “a matter of timing and the ability to deploy threats or promises in ways that are both carefully crafted and credible” (Ibid, 1991, p.290). The leaders of negotiation teams who were negotiating the international climate change regime before and at Kyoto and later at CoP15 negotiating the Copenhagen Accord can be considered as structural leaders since they were representing the interest of their state threatening and promising according to their level of power of hegemonic power. The US, Chinese, Indian negotiating team leaders that were directly involved in the negotiations for the climate change regime formation are actually clear examples of structural leadership though might be sorted as “negative leadership”.

The second form or type of leadership is the entrepreneurial leadership. Entrepreneurial leader is the “individual who relies on negotiating skill to frame issues on ways that foster integrative bargaining and to put together deals that would otherwise elude participants endeavouring to form international regimes through institutional bargaining” (Young, 1991, p.293). Bargaining surplus, which is usually available at international negotiations for regime formation, combined with constraints in collective actions are pre conditions that can such kind of leader utilise for institutional bargaining. Agenda settings, popularizing and attracting attention about the importance of the issues to be negotiated, innovators creating policies to overcome bargaining constraints, and brokers able to make acceptable compromises are all the roles of the entrepreneur leaders (Young, 1991, p.294). Being an agent of a powerful state and thus being able to have “strong elements of both arm-twisting and bribery” during the negotiation of regimes is usually a factor of success for the entrepreneur leader enabling them to gain the bargaining process (Ibid, p.295). During the Kyoto negotiation, Al Gore is said to have been instrumental in brokering the Kyoto Protocol regime after negotiations were stuck before his arrival. His seventeen hours of negotiations with world leaders could eventually manage to broker the Kyoto climate change deal satisfying many of the international parties involved and making it possible for Kyoto Protocol to exist despite of all its shortcomings. According to the definition above, I consider Al Gore as an entrepreneur leader in forming the climate change Kyoto regime. President Obama’s role was also crucial in brokering the Copenhagen Accord at CoP15. After the international negotiations were almost failing, he
managed in his 7 hours of meetings and diplomacy to save the conference from total failure and could bring together a deal that might be a basis for future binding climate change regime. He definitely twisted arms, as also did the Chinese premier, and used his negotiation skills and creative ideas to be the main architect of the Copenhagen Accord though the regime itself is far from perfect. President Obama may be considered as entrepreneur leader in this case.

Intellectual leader “is an individual who produces intellectual capital or generative system of thoughts that shape the perspectives of those who participate in institutional bargaining and, in doing so, plays an important role in determining the success or failure of efforts to reach agreements on terms of constitutional contracts in international society” (Young, 2001, p.298). Leading climate change scientists are such intellectual leaders. Structural and entrepreneur leaders usually base their negotiations on the intellectual knowledge provided by intellectual leaders and thus intellectual leaders are crucial in finding the basis for international climate change regimes. They are usually advisors to the structural and entrepreneurial leaders during negotiations and thus are directly or indirectly important actors of finding any climate change regime deal.

According to Andersen and Agrawala (2002, p.42), agenda formation, negotiation and operationalisation are the three stages necessary for the formation of international climate change regimes. Each of these stages requires different types of actors: NGO’s, IGOs, states, individuals, and so on. Sometimes, a stage can be divided into phases or sub-stages. For example, the agenda formation for climate change regime started from the late 1950s and ended in the early 1991 with the formal start of intergovernmental negotiations (Ibid, p.42). This stage of climate regime agenda formation can be divided into two periods. The first one was dominated by non-states actors and ended with the 1988 Toronto Conference during which the idea of emission cut was successfully accepted for the first time. Afterwards states began gradually being active in informal negotiation between 1988 until early 1991. The main negotiation stage began in 1991 when the Climate Convention was adopted until December 1997 when Kyoto Protocol was adopted. Young (1998, p.5) writes that “the operationalization stage covers those steps needed to move the provisions of an international regime from paper to practice”. This period is in fact the period after Kyoto Protocol was adopted in December 1997. According to Young (1998, p.21), “intellectual leadership is particularly prominent during agenda formation, entrepreneurial leadership looms large during the stage of negotiations and structural (power based) leadership is important throughout”.
2.5. Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the different factors that might hinder the successful global climate change regime formation. It has also discussed the basic requirements for regime formation, the role of science, leadership, power-relations, among others. The next chapter will use case studies and more empirical materials to further analyse the theories I used within the framework of this chapter.
Chapter 3
Case studies in analysis possibilities and constraints facing global climate change regime formation

This chapter considers three global actors as case studies to analyse the constraints global climate change regime negotiations have previously faced. It reflects on the material used in the previous chapters, but adds significant value to the topic analysed in this thesis. The lessons learned from the policies and negotiations efforts of these three global actors give us more insight of what factors may affect negotiating and establishing a global climate change regime.

3.1. US and global climate change regime formation
This section is divided into many subsections representing different periods and presidents administrations in the US in the last 50 years or so.

3.1.1 US environmental policies 1960-1980
During this period, the US environmental policy was more of national than of international since the international cooperation on environmental issues was not much developed yet. The US national policy could be used as a successful model worldwide for establishing national environmental legislations (Harris, 2009, p. 966). From the beginning of the 1960 until the end of 1970’s, the US had a period of positive response to environmental issues and had an increase in environmental awareness. During the 1960’s many national environmental legislations were established. Such legislations were the Clean Air Act in 1963 and the Wilderness Act in 1964 (Harris, 2009, p. 967).

Rosenbaum (1998, p. 11) writes about the activities and enthusiasm regarding environmental policy making in the 1970’s by stating that it “created the legal, political, and institutional foundation of the nation’s environmental policies. It promoted an enduring public consciousness of environmental degradation and fashioned a broad public agreement on the need of governmental restoration and protection of environmental quality that has become part of the American public policy consensus. It mobilised, organized, and educated a generation of environmental activists. The environmental movement prospered in a benign
political climate assured by the succession of White House occupants tolerant, if not always sympathetic, to its objectives”.

3.1.2 US environmental policies 1980-1990

During the Reagan presidency, the policy of the White House had changed and started confronting environmentalists. Although it could not abolish the environmental legislations adopted earlier in the 1970’s, it delayed or neglected their implementations (Harris, 2009, p. 967). In regards to international environmental cooperation and agreements during that period, the Montreal Protocol was signed in 1987 that established cooperation policies to protect the stratosphere ozone layer from depletion.

3.1.3. President George HW Bush and his administration policies

Initially, George HW Bush’s administration was working in favour of amendments to the Clean Air Act and the ozone treaty. He was considered to be relatively less hostile to environmental cooperation than President Reagan. However, his administration was against any agreement that might force the US to reduce its GHG because of ideological reasons and fearing on the impact of any binding agreement on the US economy (Andersen and Agrawala, 2002, p. 45). John Sununu, Chief of Staff at the White House then, was an influential figure within the George HW Bush administration nationally and internationally. He used his power to block any successful attempts of cooperation regarding climate change (Andersen and Agrawala, 2002, p. 45). From a leadership perspective, Sununu is regarded as the negative leadership type with regards to climate change international cooperation (Ibid, p. 45). He acted against the Congress who was then dominated by the Democratic Party and also against the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the US. George HW Bush announced during the Earth Summit that “the American way of life is not negotiable” (cited in Shabecoff, 1996, p. 152). The only climate related international convention it agreed to participate in after long hesitation and that fact it was clear that it will not legally bind the US was the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). UNFCCC left each country to voluntarily reduce its GHG emission by the year 2000 according to the level these emissions were in the year 1990. Moreover, George HW Bush Administration had never recognised the credibility of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
3.1.4 President Clinton and his administration policies

When President Clinton was elected as the president of the US many people inside and outside the US raised hope and optimism that there would be drastic changes in the US attitude hoping that it would be in favour of the climate change international cooperation (Harris, 2009, p. 967). This was due to his campaign and the promises he had given to his electorates. President Clinton gave a promise regarding his ambitious plans and commitments for a non-binding agreement to reduce the emissions to the levels of 1990 by the year 2000 (Lacy, 2005, p.101).

One key positive leader in the climate change cooperation in Clinton’s administration was Vice President Al Gore. He is considered to have played major role in putting and pushing forward the response policies to climate change within the Clinton Administration though he had to do this behind the scene because of the Republican majority Congress many of whom were fiercely opposing any binding international agreement to respond climate change threats (Andersen and Agrawala, 2002, p.48). During a keynote address at the UN Commission on Sustainable Development, Al Gore said that the United States: “has a disproportionate impact on the global environment. We have less than a quarter of the world’s raw materials and create three-quarters of all solid waste…A child born in the United States will have 30 times more impact on the earth’s environment during his or her lifetime than a child born in India. The affluent of the world have a responsibility to deal with their disproportionate impact”. The flexibility the US delegation to the Kyoto meeting was given mainly because of Al Gore wanted that. Al Gore himself was very instrumental in making the final negotiation efforts work at Kyoto for agreeing on the Kyoto deal. His 16 hours visit to the Kyoto conference and his flexibility during the negotiations with the other world negotiation leaders broke the negotiations deadlock and led to the formulation of the substance of the Kyoto Protocol (Harris, 2009, 9.967).

Tmothy Wirth, State Department counsellor, was one of the most supportive figures for international climate change policies cooperation in the first Clinton Administration. Wirth gave high hope that US will lead the world in regards to climate change international cooperation during the 1996 conference of the parties at the UNFCCC when he said: “The United States once again resumes the leadership that the world expect of us…The United
States was viewed as a country not fulfilling its responsibilities, and now we are, on these most difficult issues, once again in the lead” (cited in Harris, 2009, p. 967).

What makes this era remarkable is that the Clinton administration was supportive of the scientists’ views about the effect of human on climate change and also agreed with the IPCC findings. President Clinton also acknowledged that the problem of climate change is affecting the globe and no country will avoid its consequences. During his speech at the United Nations in 1997, President Clinton said. “We humans are changing the global climate. No nation can escape this danger. None can evade its responsibility to confront it, and we must all do our part” (cited in Mckibben, 1998, p. 115). However, some of the critiques to Clinton’s administration were that it had not stressed enough that climate change is a threat to the US security and that Clinton was not disciplined or having a clear strategies in pushing his climate change policies and thus effectively preparing his nation through policies of continuous debates but sporadic actions (Lacy, 2005, p.105).

In October 1997, President Clinton’s administration arranged a conference at the White House during which he declared its vision and principles regarding the need to act and cooperate to tackle the climate change phenomenon. During this conference, principles related to climate change were declared by the administration. The acknowledgement that the climate change science has proven to be sound and that “the potential for serious climate disruption is real” was one of them (Harris, 2009, p. 968). Moreover, it was said that developed countries should commit themselves to reduce GHGs emissions by setting “realistic and binding goals” and that the US is contributing to climate change disproportionally. During the conference, President Clinton said “if we expect other nations to act on the problem, we must show leadership” and that the US should “honour its global responsibility” (cited in Harris, 2009, p.969). Flexible market based approaches as well as technology improvements were some of the ways the US planned to fulfil its commitments regarding this matter. Meaningful though equitable commitments should also be promised by developing countries though in a way not harm their economic development, Clinton announced during that conference. China was amongst the most prominent countries that Clinton indicated to. Although developing countries were expected to commit themselves to cooperate and to bind themselves to reduction of GHGs emissions under international agreement at Kyoto, such commitment would be “common but yet differentiated responsibilities” (Harris, 2003, p.969). The last point is seen as a response to the passed Byrd-Hagel’s Senate’s Resolution of July 1997 which
called Clinton not to reject any legally binding agreement that commits the US to reduce its GHG unless “new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gases emissions for Developing country Parties within the same compliance period” since not doing so would “result in serious harm to the economy of the United States” (Congressional Record, 25 July 1997: S8138). The developing countries have rejected to commit themselves to such binding agreements to reduce its GHG blaming the developed countries, particularly the US, to have polluted the environment during their path to development and industrialisation. Thus the US could not manage to make the developing world commit itself for reducing GHG at Kyoto Conference as the US Congress had wanted. Nevertheless, in November 1998 the Kyoto Protocol was signed by the Clinton administration in Buenos Aires committing itself to reduce GHGs emissions by 7 percent below 1990 levels by the year 2012. Market mechanism including emission trading schemes and joint implementation programmes were among the policy tools the US have proposed to achieve such goals at the Kyoto Conference.

However, shortly after President Clinton took office, Republicans won the majority of seats in the Congress and the Senate. They were opposing the promised policies of Clinton administration to cooperate internationally and lead the climate change policies. Even in the Democratic Party itself, there was a wide division within the administration regarding Kyoto (Lacy, 2005, p. 106). Timothy Wirth and the head of delegation to Kyoto negotiations were having different views in policy formation from some of the Clinton’s main economic advisors like Lawrence Summers (the Deputy of Treasury) who were not encouraging Clinton to translate the rhetoric to political will and clear pro Kyoto negotiation deal strategies. Organised labour movement within the party were against the Kyoto negotiations as well. Even the delegation Clinton sent to Kyoto negotiation was not having clear negotiation strategies and they were divided in their views (Lacy, 2005, p. 2007). Lacy (2005, p. 107) explain the division and hesitation of President Clinton’s administration partly due to the presidential campaign funding Clinton had received for the 2006 presidential election from the oil industry as well from the other energy industries. Al Gore also was trying to balance his environmental vision with his plans to run for presidential elections in the year 2000 and thus he was also trying to keep good contacts with industries to provide his campaign with donations and financial support. Thus Clinton could not fulfil the ambitious plans he and his administration have promised earlier. However, he continued trying while at the same time trying to satisfy all parties.
Both Clinton and Al Gore tried also to encourage national policies to have their backing at home among their citizens and businesses (Lacy, 2005, p.103). As a part of their National Energy Policy, the Clinton Administration announced a number of programs that had been designed to reduce US emissions of greenhouse gasses which included energy efficiency strategy that deals with energy efficiency standards for washing machines and water heaters (U.S. Energy Information Center, 2004). Moreover, it was during the Clinton’s presidency that the US delegation at Kyoto had agreed to reduce US carbon emissions by 7% from 1990 levels by 2008-2012 (Balaam, 2001). The United States signed the Kyoto Protocol in November of 1998 in Buenos Aires, Argentina, where the signatory of the treaty gave themselves two additional years to develop operational rules for the treaty and to solve a number of problems associated with it (Balaam, 2001). However, in 1997, the U.S. Senate had already passed a resolution compelling president Clinton not to sign any treaty unless the same limitations are put on developing countries commitment to a complex scheme for trading emission permits and credits (Balaam, 2001). The US Congress had received the Kyoto initiatives with some scepticism and disagreed with the Administration as to how urgent and how severe the threat posed by climate change really is (U.S. Energy Research, 2004). Congress scaled back many of the proposals the Clinton Administration had put forward to address climate change, which could conceivably, reduced the hoped-for effectiveness of these programs as tools for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. One area, however, in which there was some level of agreement between the Clinton administration and the congress, was on the need for further research to understand the science of climate change (Balaam, 2001).

After signing the Kyoto protocol, Clinton and his administration were under well organized campaign from anti Kyoto agreement groups. The Global Climate Coalition was among those powerful groups that try to communicate with the US citizens about Kyoto agreement as a threat to the economy and superiority of the US. The chairman of the Global Climate Coalition wrote on the organization website on 9 December 2007 that “this is not an issue of action or inaction but an issue of responsible action that does not turn the American dream into a nightmare”. Later on he wrote: “for the first time in history, the United States would allow a foreign body dominated by developing countries to restrict and control the economy of the United States. UN bureaucrats would decide where business would invest, where jobs will be developed; US sovereignty has been surrendered” (Global Climate Coalition website, 2010). The realists, such as Gail Macdonald, also intensified their action against the Kyoto
agreement claiming there are other ways to deal with the problem if it existed. Macdonald said: “We are fortunate to live in a country that has developed more solutions to complex problems than any country on earth. While the President considers tax breaks to encourage the development of new technologies to combat human influences suspected of causing a global warming, we suggest he reconsider this agreement which in the end will turn the clock back for the United States rather than lead it into the 21st century” (Bauman, 2000, p. 215). Other conservatives, ex. Phyllis Schlafly, through forums criticised Al Gore and made suspicion about his agenda and tried to make the US citizens against him because of the Kyoto negotiation and agreement:

“To promote the presidential candidacy of Al Gore, who has staked his political future on a platform prioritizing the planed above people? Or to redistribute US wealth and jobs to foreign countries because the Clintonian liberals support income redistribution? Or to con the American people into accepting increased federal taxes, regulations and even rationing? Or, is this the answer: to reduce our standard of living because other countries are envious of our automobiles and our single-family dwellings that are heated in winter and cooled in summer? Or to save face for the social scientists who have been predicting climate catastrophe? Or to provide politically correct “cover” for the multinationals that want to move their planets o low-labour-cost Asian counties? Or- All of the above” (Eagleforum Org, website, 1998).

All these efforts by anti-Kyoto Protocol groups undermined the Kyoto Protocol agreement within the US. Their propaganda was influential enough to gather efforts and resources to prevent Al Gore from winning the 2000 Presidential elections. Thus they supported the candidacy of the Republican George W. Bush.

3.1.5. George W. Bush Administration

During his presidential campaign, President George W. Bush promised to put regulations to the emissions produced by the energy production industry. However, two months after taking his office he changed his mind and started acting only in favour of US business (Harris, 2009, 969). It seems he used his claims favouring environmental issues during his campaign for the presidency just to show that he also and not just Al Gore, the US Democratic Party presidential candidate, was planning to deal with environmental problems and cooperation. President George W. Bush rejected the Kyoto treaty in 2001, arguing he could not back any agreement that would damage the U.S. economy. President Bush commented on the reasons of rejecting the Kyoto Protocol: "This is the American position because it's right for America"
and, just to be totally clear, he added: "We will not do anything that harms our economy, because first things first are the people who live in America" (Speech at Stanford University, 2004). Bush, in justifying his action, commented that the Protocol would cost the USA millions of jobs and that it could have added too much stress on developing nations. Bush added, "Kyoto also failed to address two major pollutants that have an impact on warming, black soot and Tropospheric ozone. Both are proven health hazards. Reducing both would not only address climate change, but also dramatically improve people's health" (Speech at Stanford University, 2004). Bush administration was sceptical about the climate change science and called for more research that may show whether the climate change science was reliable or not (Harris, 2009, p.969). Bush administration was in favour of voluntary national policies, more research for finding better environmental and energy efficient technologies to deal with environmental concern while rejected any international cooperation that might bind the US.

Having rejected Kyoto, The Bush administration had tried unsuccessfully to justify and to persuade other countries that the USA science and long-term technology initiatives represent a genuine effort and act as an alternative to Kyoto Protocol to address climate change. He also tried to persuade the international society and his own nation that ratifying Kyoto Protocol would disturb the economy development of the United States. He used a 1998 study by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) which reported that the Kyoto treaty would cost the U.S. economy $400 billion per year, raise electric utility bills by 86%, hike the cost of heating oil by 76% and impose a permanent "Kyoto gasoline tax" of 66 cents per gallon (Energy Information Administration, 2010). According to that report, if Kyoto was adopted each U.S. household would have to spend an extra $1,740 per year on energy in total (Energy Information Administration, 2010). Another reason behind his rejection was that scientific research had not make it clear that CO$_2$ emissions is the only cause of climate change and claimed that NASA weather satellites showed that the Earth has slightly cooled since 1979. To use the scientists opinion as argument, the administration had chosen one of the leading scientists promoting the global warming theory, Dr. James Hansen when he said that he sees no evidence that carbon dioxide is even responsible for any global warming that occurred over the last several decades (Carlisle, 2004).

Moreover, Bush's administration had a fear that developing countries would increase their economic competitiveness on the expense of the USA and that Kyoto protocol did not
adequately address the international community particularly India and China which were included as developing countries and were thus not held to the same emissions reduction standards as developed countries. The Bush administration argument was that nations that represent an ever-increasing proportion of total world emissions should be having the same treatment as countries already polluting. The Bush administration also stated that it would not sign on to the protocol unless it allowed for emissions trading between nations that had exceeded their emissions goals and those that had not (Wallace, 2004). Additional to all that, the power groups within the USA which represented fossil-fuel producers as well as the coal and auto industries had been also skeptical of the treaty related to the costs related with implementing Kyoto (Balaam, 2001).

To show that he is working for the environment despite of disagreeing with the global society by rejecting Kyoto protocol signature, President Bush unveiled his own administration Global Climate Change policy to combat global warming as alternative to Kyoto. Such a national programme was known as the “Clear Skies Initiatives” would utilise a “cap and trade” system that allow companies to trade emission credits (Energy Information Administration, 2004). In addition, the Bush Administration envisions reduction in U.S. “greenhouse gas intensity”, that is the amount of greenhouse gases emitted per dollar of GDP, by 18% over 10 years (i.e. by 2012) (Energy Information Administration, 2004). To achieve this reduction, the plan sets up a "voluntary" scheme to reduce these emissions (Energy Information Administration, 2010). It suggested that some additional measures, such as a mandatory “cap and trade” regulatory program for carbon dioxide will be imposed on businesses if they fail to meet this goal (Charlie, 2004).

As an attempt to show that they do care about the environment and energy issues, in April 2001, the White House affirmed Clinton Administration’s energy efficiency standards for washing machines and water heaters. Later, in January 2002, former Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham announced an initiative, known as “Freedom CAR”, to help automakers produce fuel-cell-powered electric vehicles (Energy Information Administration, 2004). Additionally, President Bush proposed a new hydrogen fuel cell vehicle initiative. On 1 April 2004, the Energy Department agreed to require new central air conditioners and heat pumps to be 30% more efficient beginning by 2006 (Energy Information Administration, 2004). As we see, President Bush tried to improve his image both nationally and internationally by
marketing his own administration policies to combat climate change and to show that he is environmentally friendly even though he rejected Kyoto protocol.

At the national level, he wanted to assure the business leaders especially the multinational and oil companies that he would not do anything to harm their business. Those leaders were probably among the people who supported his presidential election campaign financially and thus he probably had obligations for them. At the same time, he knew there is a strong environmental movement in the USA and he wanted to appease them and control their anger related to rejection of Kyoto protocol. Rejecting the Kyoto Protocol has feared to bring economic setback to the US, as well as the support of US close trade allies. Unlike the late twentieth century, "...being an American company in Europe is a liability these days" (Kraft, 2000). US trading partners already see the United States' continued rejection of worldwide initiatives as a sign of arrogance and disdain for worldwide initiatives. So, thinking locally he wanted to act globally to minimize the damage his rejection to Kyoto has made to the USA.

At the international level, he wanted to show that he was contributing to environmental policies in improving the environment and reducing the anthropogenic pollutants in the atmosphere and that the USA could still be the leader in global environmental policies despite of his administration to Kyoto rejection. He realised that the international community was not satisfied with the reasons behind his rejection to the Kyoto protocol and thus this might threaten the leadership of the USA at the international arena. He took into consideration that most European leaders with whom the USA do business with and have mutual interests including his closest allies were openly or secretly angry at his stand and rejectionist policies in the international efforts to combat climate change. He wanted the whole world to follow him even when he was oddly doing things outside of the main stream international environmental policy by applying the realism policies relying on the fact the USA was the only super power (economically, militarily, and politically) and nothing can harm it if it did not support the international protocol in combating climate change.

Later on, in July 2005 and during the Group of 8 (G8) summit, George W. Bush recognised that “the surface of the Earth is warmer and that an increase in greenhouse gases caused by humans is contributing to the problem” (cited in Revkin, 2007) and that human inhabitants on this earth activities “to some extent” might have contributed to the problem (BBC News, 2005). But a month later Bush again repeated his opposition to Kyoto Protocol or any
potential international agreement that will bind the US to cut its GHG emissions (Harris, 2009, p. 970). As the Bush administration felt that the US anti-environmental cooperation policies is destroying the US image abroad, George W. Bush tried to show the world that he might be more cooperative. In May 2007, invited the most polluting states in the world to cooperate and work together to address the climate change. Among those countries invited to cooperate were China and India which Bush has insisted that they should be obliged to reduce GHG in any future binding international agreement to combat climate change. In June 2007, and at the G8 meeting, he and the other G8 leaders accepted to reduce their countries GHG emissions in the year 2050 by 50 percent (Harris, 2009, p. 970). I see this change in Bush’s strategy to cooperate as a reaction of the international pressure and dismay over Bush administration anti climate change cooperation policies.

He attempted to prelude Bali Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC that was to be held in December 2007. To move Climate change issues away from the UNFCCC framework to avoid international binding agreement, Bush decided to organize his own conference of major emitters at the White House. That attempt was received with scepticism from international organizations and the EU (Harris, 2009, p.970). On the Bali conference the US delegation, upon other nations’ delegations pressure, had to agree on a road map “Bali Roadmap” for a more comprehensive international GHG reduction agreement at CoP15. As an example of international anger, during the Bali conference Kevin Conrad who was part of the delegation team from Papua New Guinea told the US delegation to the conference that “We seek your leadership, but if for some reason you are not willing to lead, leave it to the rest of us. Please get out of the way” (cited in Time website, 21 December 2009).

The world has realised the severity of risk climate change is posing to the whole world. According to Agnew that “Slowly and fitfully a sense of global fate has started to grow” (Agnew, 1998, p.82). He also mentions that “what is more likely to meet with success is if societies collaborate multilaterally to regulate the socially disruptive consequences of globalization” (Agnew, 1998, p.85). So, the world has to work together to minimise this risk before it is too late since their nations future is under threat. The global reaction to President Bush’s global warming package was largely negative especially the reactions of the environmentalists and the conservatives (Paul Georgia, Competitive Enterprise Institute website, 2002). With the exception to that, only some industry trade associations, the Australian, and also the Japanese governments reaction was to some extent supportive (Paul
Georgia, Competitive Enterprise Institute website, 2002). This is because of the similarities and close ties his government and those two governments had and their common strategies at the international arena.

The Europeans were the most critical though from the beginning. Among the comments political leaders have said on Bush alternative policy, a former German Environment Minister, Juergen Trittin, commented calling the plan as "disappointing" according to (Paul Georgia, Competitive Enterprise Institute website, 2002). Trittin further said that "The goal has to remain to re-integrate the world’s biggest polluter into this system. The door should not be closed to an eventual U.S. return to the Kyoto framework," (Paul Georgia, Competitive Enterprise Institute website, 2002). Another example of politician’s reaction is the reaction of former British Environment Minister, Michael Meacher, who mentioned that the EU couldn’t be happy by the offered plan of President Bush (Paul Georgia, Competitive Enterprise Institute website, 2002).

In further critiques to Bush administration policies, Aja Binette who was a senior researcher from the Pennsylvania State University stated that:

“Bush is not talking about reducing emissions of GHGs, only emissions intensity - that is, the level of emissions per unit of economic output. That is utterly inadequate as a target, as the 1990s showed, since it is a virtual guarantee of much higher absolute levels of Green House Gases emissions in a decade;” as the economy grows (Binette, 2004).

Those national critiques of Bush administration climate change policies at the national levels claimed that American individuals have been slow in warming up to the highly fuel-efficient hybrid cars even though they are economically beneficial in the long term (Loewenburg, 2003). According to Loewenburg (2003), Economic incentives can and should play a factor in emissions reduction, but they will not have a significant impact without accompanying regulatory initiatives. Thus regulatory initiatives were lacking at the national levels showing that the administration was not serious enough in its climate change policies and it was just saying it for internal image making. Moreover, the United States government's response to individual wastefulness in fossil fuel consumption had been equally uncreative. Automobile emissions make up over half of all CO\textsubscript{2} emissions nationally. However, few measures beyond a few fuel efficiency token gestures have been made to seriously decrease the impact of cars on the environment (Kraft, 2000). Despite the introduction of highly fuel-efficient consumer
vehicles to the market, they make up such a small percentage of the market that, with gas-
guzzling SUVs taking up an ever-increasing chunk, the average fuel efficiency per car for
many auto companies has actually decreased since 1999 (Kraft, 2000).

From the discussion above regarding US Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush policies
towards climate change, neither of them could actually do that freely to the extent they
wanted originally. While Clinton could not go as far as he wanted in GHG emissions cut and
related international cooperation, George W. Bush had to gradually adjust his policies to be
less hostile to international cooperation. We can conclude from that both national and
international factors have to be taken into consideration in shaping any country’s climate
change international policies.

3.1.6. Barack Obama climate change policies
Agnew (1998, p. 50) mentions that “any moment the system’s shape as a whole is determined
by the number and relations between the Great powers (the ones with most resources and
capacities) and that balance of power between the Great powers is the key mechanism in
world politics”. President Obama seems to have understood that and have learnt from the
experiences of his processors’ regarding climate change cooperation. Barack Obama and his
administration has adopted a policy to join the international policy in making efforts to
coordinate the actions for cooperation over the climate change rather than confronting the
whole international community as President George W. Bush mostly did. During his
presidential election campaign, Obama promised to work a strategy to reduce climate-altering
carbon dioxide emissions by 80 percent by the year 2050 and also promised to invest $150
billion in new energy-saving technologies. He also agrees that the USA has in the past failed
to meet its responsibilities regarding climate change international efforts. Moreover, he
promised that the USA will take the leadership in tackling the climate change by putting fairly
ambitious policies in cooperation with the other nations (CNN, 10 July 2009). Among what
Obama has said regarding that:

“Now is the time to confront this challenge once and for all...Delay is no longer an option.
Denial is no longer an acceptable response.” Moreover, he further said: “My presidency will
mark a new chapter in America’s leadership on climate change that will strengthen our
security and create millions of new jobs in the process” (New America Foundation website,
2008).
Addressing the world leaders at the UN headquarters in New York, Barack Obama has shown the willing of the US to take leadership in its efforts to deal with climate, acknowledged that during the past decade the US did not do enough, and called for the other leaders to cooperate in climate change policies. He said:

“That so many of us are here today is a recognition that the threat from climate change is serious, it is urgent, and it is growing. Our generation’s response to this challenge will be judged by history, for if we fail to meet it - boldly, swiftly, and together - we risk consigning future generations to an irreversible catastrophe. No nation, however large or small, wealthy or poor, can escape the impact of climate change. Rising sea levels threaten every coastline. More powerful storms and floods threaten every continent. More frequent drought and crop failures breed hunger and conflict in places where hunger and conflict already thrive. On shrinking islands, families are already being forced to flee their homes as climate refugees. The security and stability of each nation and all peoples -- our prosperity, our health, our safety -- are in jeopardy. And the time we have to reverse this tide is running out. And yet, we can reverse it. John F Kennedy once observed that 'our problems are man-made; therefore they may be solved by man.' It is true that for too many years, mankind has been slow to respond to or even recognize the magnitude of the climate threat. It is true of my own country as well. We recognize that. But this is a new day. It is a new era. And I am proud to say that the United States has done more to promote clean energy and reduce carbon pollution in the last eight months than at any other time in our history” (Timesonline website, 22 September 2009).

During the COP15, President Barack Obama showed instrumental and entrepreneurial leadership in being the agreement architect. When President Obama arrived to Copenhagen to lead his country’s delegation, he found that the whole summit was about to collapse and more than two weeks of negotiations are at standstill. He held seven hours tough negotiations with the leaders of three important emerging economies of China, Brazil, South India plus South Africa representing the African continent that climate change may affect negatively the most. The outcome of this meeting was the basis of the climate change agreement at CoP15. This kind of agreement was the kind of “take it or leaves it” agreement but it was the only option available other than the total collapse of the summit. Obama admitted that what was agreed upon is “not enough” adding that “we have a long way to go” (Time website, 21 December 2009). The CoP15 agreement shows that without a hegemony state, negotiations might not
produce any agreement and that its implementation also depends on the credibility on the hegemonic state and its leadership.

Indeed, Barack Obama and the US Environmental Protection Agency have come up with many legislations and directives for combating the GHG emission from the energy industries at national level. EPA had the ruling that GHG’s, referring to the IPCC scientific findings, are source of human health problems and thus EPA wants to take all the measures to protect the US citizens through regulations. However, again, some Congressmen and business leaders have shown concern that those policies might be costly to the economy of the USA especially during the ongoing economic crisis. The flaws in the 2007 IPCC report that has, among others, included some exaggerations of climate threats to Himalayan glaciers melting by the year 2035 citing scientifically unreliable sources have been used by those anti Obama’s and anti EPA national policies to tackle the climate change. As an example of those conservative realists challenging Obama and the EPA directories is Greg Abbott, the Attorney general of Taxes where oil industries has strong hold. In February 2010, he has filed a law suit against the EPA’s new regulations and decisions after the flaws in the IPCC 2007 report were revealed. Greg Abbott challenges the EPA and Obama’s directives claiming:

"With billions of dollars at stake, EPA outsourced the scientific basis for its greenhouse gas regulation to a scandal-plagued international organization that cannot be considered objective or trustworthy. Prominent climate scientists associated with the IPCC were engaged in an ongoing, orchestrated effort to violate freedom of information laws, exclude scientific research, and manipulate temperature data. In light of the parade of controversies and improper conduct that has been uncovered, we know that the IPCC cannot be relied upon for objective, unbiased science - so EPA should not rely upon it to reach a decision that will hurt small businesses, farmers, ranchers, and the larger Texas economy" (Telegraph website, 20 February 2010).

It is a bit too early to judge the leadership of President Obama in climate change negotiations. However, he has already done some notable efforts both nationally and internationally. He is by far more committed to climate change cooperation than George W. Bush though. We have to remember that he has also been trying to deal successfully with the global economic crisis and its consequences. This limits his abilities to prioritise further the climate change problem at the top of his top agenda. President Reagan ignored the environmental issues when he started his presidency prioritising only to deal with economic crisis of the end of 1970’s and
to deal with the Soviet Union Cold War rival. Obama is dealing with both as important though he is aware that without making economic progress nationally, his climate change agenda might be challenged and weakened. Moreover, he has successfully led efforts for the US Health Reforms, the Wall Street Reforms regardless of fierce opposition from the Republicans and some of Democrats. Additional to that, the US is holding in few months its mid term elections and thus the leadership will be busy with campaigning. Taking all that into account, Obama might have chosen to deal with his climate change agenda further after the midterm elections. However, taking about if and when there will be a binding international climate change agreement for after the year 2012, I expect it to be most probably at the COP17 by the end of the year 2011. By that time he hopefully would have successfully dealt with many of the economic crisis’ consequences, with his big national and international plans, and thus he will be more credible as a leader and appreciated by his citizens at home and by most of the world citizens as well. Then he may be more willing and succeeding to lead the negotiation for international climate change binding agreement which is more powerful than the Kyoto Protocol.

3.2. China and global climate change regime formation

According to Andersen and Agrawala (2002, p.41), “the role of leadership can be exerted by individuals, institutions and nation-states at various stages of the global climate change regime”. When analysing the role of leadership China plays in global climate change negotiations, I take China’s leadership as a state. Taking into account the number of populations in China and the decision making complexity of the ruling political party, it is hard to talk about China’s individual leadership in climate change negotiations.

China is one of the largest developing economies and is now counted as the number one most GHGs emitter in the world. Together with the US, they consume almost half of the coal consumption in the world (Giddens, 2009, p.225). This shows that both countries emit large amount of GHGs during their energy production activities and thus it is their responsibility to take adequate actions. Although China was clearly having fast economic development pace during the Kyoto negotiations, it was fiercely resisting any binding commitments to reduce its GHGs arguing that Chinese per capita emissions are relatively low if compared to major developed countries (Giddens, 2009, p.221) and it emphasis that it does not take responsibility of the GHGs emissions produced by the industrialised countries for more than half a decade earlier. In the year 2007 at the meeting of G8 with the 8 largest developing economies,
President Hu Jintao of China rejecting any binding agreement to cut its GHGs emissions announced that “China’s central task now is to develop the economy and make life better for the people” (Waugh, 2008, p.27).

Although it does not want to bind itself to any legally binding agreement to reduce its GHGs emissions, the Chinese government seems to be aware of the negative impacts of climate change on its well-being and security. Many Chinese depend on the major rivers in China for their livelihood and thus if the glaciers start melting at high paces, this will affect water availability for them and consequently endangers economic competitiveness additionally posing environmental security threats. Hydroelectric plants ambitious projects in China will be threatened if glaciers will be melting at high speed. According to Volger (2008, p.352), local actions remain vital aspect of responses to many of environmental problems including climate change and that even though one should think globally, acting locally is of utmost importance and urgency in finding solutions to global climate change problems. China has taken local steps to deal with the problem. In the year 2006 the Chinese government announced the Climate Change Plan which is a comprehensive plan aiming at switching to environmentally sustainable energy production sources with the aim to produce 15 per cent of its electricity production from renewable energy sources by the year 2020 (Giddens, 2009, p.223). Moreover, in 2008, three Chinese companies including China state owned “China Mobile” joined non-profit international group “Climate Group”. This shows the increase of public and business awareness and the state willingness to address the issue of climate change locally at every state level. “China Mobile” has set for itself a target to “reduce the energy intensity of its activities by 40 per cent by 2020” (Ibid, 225).

China has signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1998 and has ratified it in 2002. At the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002, Chinese Premier then Zhu Rongji announced: “China has completed the domestic procedure for the approval of the Kyoto Protocol with a view to taking an active part in multilateral environmental cooperation” and later the Chinese Foreign Ministry press commented on the approval that "The approval manifests China's positive stance towards international environmental cooperation and world sustainable development" (China Daily, 4 September 2002). However, China may have only participated in the Kyoto Protocol as a developing country because “the agreement does not require that it reduces its emissions” (Barrett, 2009, p.61). China has also been having bilateral cooperation with global powers to deal with climate change. EU-China Climate
change partnership with the goal to speed up technology transfer to China is such an example (Ibid, p.225). China, which is treated as developing country according to the Kyoto Protocol, is also a leading recipient of investments of technology and funding for clean energy projects. As one of the Kyoto Protocol application mechanism, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) “allows industrial countries to get credits to put forward their Kyoto targets by funding clean energy projects in developing countries” (Ibid, p.190). The CDM has collected 59 billion USD since its establishment in 2007 financing 700 projects mainly in the four major developing economies which are China, Brazil, India, and South Africa (Henson, 2008, pp. 292-293). But because Kyoto Protocol is about to expire and because of the economic crisis, such investments might have been much lower in 2009 and this year. This means that China needs also to find its own resources to implement its environmentally sound strategies at home.

It is known by now that without China’s approval, there will be no legally binding agreement after Kyoto. That is because the US together with some other developed countries will not agree to ratify any international climate change regime without the active participation of China. Therefore China was at the centre of attention along with the US during the CoP15 negotiations and they both were blamed for the limited success at Copenhagen Conference. Great Britain’s Ed Milliband as well as Nicolas Sarkozy of France both accused mainly China for the failure to achieve a binding climate change regime at Copenhagen Conference. They say that China Prime Minister refused to personally attend the last minute negotiations himself. However, Wen Jiabao, China Prime Minister commented that he did not know of the meeting since it was not pre-planned and that insufficient trust among nations is to be blamed for the outcome of the conference. He said that "to meet the climate change challenge, the international community must strengthen confidence, build consensus, make vigorous efforts and enhance co-operation" (Vidal, in The Guardian, 19 December 2009). Hence we may see that China has been seen as a laggard and as a negative leader for legally binding international climate change regime that should replace Kyoto protocol after the year 2012.

3.3. The EU and global climate change regime formation

From the start, the EU has been practicing a positive leadership position in the global politics of climate change. It takes the issue of climate change policy in a broader strategic term as it realized that the US did not want to take this leadership role. Andersen and Agrawala (2002, p. 45) argue that this EU position is not necessarily only out of concern about global climate change, but also because this position makes it seen as a unified and strong actor in the global
politics. The EU comprises over 20 per cent of world GDP and has historic responsibility for emitting GHGs into the atmosphere (Helm, 2009, p.222). Before 1985 when the Single European Act (SEA) was found, European environmental policy had no treaty basis and could not be considered as a European policy area in its own right” (Zito and Jacobs, 2009, p.105). The EU played a central role in making the Berlin Mandate possible at the First Conference of the Parties to the Climate Convention (CoP1) in 1995 where the GHGs emission cut commitments beyond the year 2000 (Andersen and Agrawala, 2002, p.47). The EU countries had their internal negotiations to have a unified stand at CoP3 at Kyoto and the outcome was a burden-sharing agreement facilitating the EU goal of 15% reduction of GHGs emission by the year 2010 (Ibid, 47). This internal agreement enabled the EU to have a unified stand in being pushers for climate change regime and to show leadership during the Kyoto negotiation by exerting pressure on the other parties involved to take leadership and responsibility. Kyoto Protocol was a compromise agreement because “the EU got their numbers, the US got their institutions, Japan got prestige as a host, the JUSSCANNZ countries got their differentiation and the developing countries avoided commitments” (Andersen, 1998, p. 28).

Although the Kyoto Protocol was a successful compromise between the actors, some authors believe that the US and not the EU that had the main leadership role in creating its substance (Grubb et al., 1999, p. 112). According to Sjolseth (1999, p.3), the already formed united decision of the EU may have given less flexibility for creative regime bargain and given that the US delegation wanted an agreement that can be accepted domestically in the US and accepted internationally, that made the US negotiators more creative in finding the compromise Protocol. The EU negotiating team first opposed the US proposal for Kyoto mechanism but later has become enthusiastic about it (Volger, 2008, p.364). Nevertheless, the EU took the leadership afterwards in negotiating and making the Kyoto Protocol come into force after the US withdrew its support of the Protocol and also in working its details (Ibid, p. 364). The EU also pioneered the climate change science by making it as its priority research topic and thus provided funding to relevant projects during the period 2002-2005.

The EU, based on credible climate change science, has convinced the other global delegations negotiating international climate change regime at CoP 15 that every effort should be done to keep the earth temperature below the 2°C otherwise this may threaten the global environmental security and peace on earth. Thus the security threat concept was recognized largely due to the EU efforts and based on scientific evidence giving thus a re-definition of
security to involve the environmental security. The EU took the leadership in making its goal to reduce CO$_2$ emissions by 30% in 2020. Karl-Heinz Florenz, the vice-chair European Parliament delegation to CoP 15 said: "Copenhagen is also important for the technical competence and the innovation of our economy. Remaining leader in climate protection will create employment in our industries and help us to become less dependent on energy imports". He added: "Climate protection is no 'green dream', it is an economic imperative!" (European Parliament press release, 8 December 2009). Although there was no legally binding climate change regime adopted at CoP 15, the EU facilitated and hosted the negotiations. It has also forced its view by convincing the other global delegations that the earth temperature should be kept below 2°C otherwise the climate change consequences might bring even more threats to global security and peace on earth. This was reflected in the Copenhagen Accord. However, since the EU is not a globally a powerful hegemony, its influence in enforcing its vision into global environmental governance is limited mainly to economic power and to a much less extent to political power.

The ongoing economic crisis that has been hitting Europe and the rest of the world will have negative impacts on the ambitions of the EU regarding global climate change regime for after Kyoto Protocol. Public opinion, partly formed by mostly pro global cooperation for finding climate change regime in Europe and thus helping the agenda setting, has been strongly environmentally conscious in the EU and that what might have played an important factor in pushing their leadership to be in favor of ambitious international climate change regimes. However, with the many financial problems nowadays, the interest for the global cooperation for climate change regime may change and thus making it of less priority. Also with the ongoing financial crisis, there will not be enough financial resources to support the developing world in investing in the green technology or in implementing the previously adopted ambitious plans for environmental technologies and sustainable energy production at home as well. However, this might also be an opportunity for the EU to reach its Kyoto set targets by the end of the year 2012 because of the need of less energy production and industrial activities.
3.4. Conclusion
This chapter has empirically reflected on the theoretical discussion and analysis in the previous chapter. The roles of the US, China, and the EU in the leadership of establishing a global climate change regime has been discussed and analyzed. The internal politics within each of these global actors influence have significant impact on its leadership in the international cooperation for establishing a global climate change regime. International politics and the competition among states for power in the global arena also hinder the international efforts in establishing a global climate change regime. Without hegemony, trust, feeling of security threat, and without flexibility during international climate change regime negotiations, it is unlikely to produce a well functioning global climate change regimes.
Chapter 4
General Conclusion

This thesis has answered the main research question throughout the analysis. It identified the problems, constraints, possibilities, and responsibilities of different actors in cooperating for future global climate change regimes. Lessons from the past negotiations should be taken to have more efficient and successful international climate change regime in the future is one of the conclusions of this thesis.

The world must cooperate to find solutions for the global climate change problem. There is no country that can be safe from the potential damage the climate change will cause. This will affect every country’s national security and also a threat to international security. The previous attempts for cooperation in finding effective global climate change regime were not successful but were steps forward in the right direction. The Kyoto Protocol itself, for example, is significant in the fact that nations officially started recognizing that the climate change has no boarder and thus global cooperation is needed to stop it and minimize its effects.

Countries have been cooperating to fight terrorism and it is time for them to cooperate equally if not more to combat the threat of global warming since this might be a greater threat not only for the sustainability of this generation but also a greater threat for the sustainability of the future generations and the national and international security.

The US and China should be more responsible global actors in finding global. Their lack of positive cooperation so that due to their self-interests is threatening the world peace the climate change is causing. The have more responsibility because they produce about half of the GHG emissions produced globally. The US is the most responsible actor for GHG because per capita it has been producing the most GHGs emissions. They have to take the positive leadership in finding global climate change regime. Until recently, it has been the main laggard in this aspect. Its change of positions affected negatively by delaying the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and minimizing the hopes from it. China can not continue denying its part of the responsibility for the climate change problem and should start
positive cooperation with the other global actors to tackle the problems of climate change and stop the heating of the earth. It can not continue pumping GHGs emissions to the atmosphere without paying the price and continue arguing that the Western countries have been doing so for long time. The earth does not understand such argument and climate change will further threaten China’s national security. The extreme weather conditions in China recently like the snow fall that froze China in 2007 and 2009, additional to the floods and glaciers melting are such examples of potentially more extreme threats.

The EU negotiators have to be more flexible and creative during the negotiations for future global climate change regime. They should not expect that the other global to always follow their “ambitious” plans. Moreover, they should be more ready to open dialogue to assess what the other actors are willing to offer, how far they can compromise, and also negotiate to find innovative solutions in establishing new global climate change regimes.

The climate change is the only single threat to everyone on this earth. The power of earth can not be challenged by any global power since any global power doing that will be defeated. To have global security, we need to have more environmental security through international cooperation for finding climate change regimes.
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