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FROM WELFARISM TO PRUDENTIALISM: EURO-TURKS AND THE POWER OF THE WEAK

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FROM WELFARISM TO PRUDENTIALISM: EURO-TURKS AND THE POWER OF THE WEAK

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This paper aims to shed light upon the dynamics of community construction by migrants of Turkish origin, or what I call Euro-Turks, and their descendants residing in European countries such as Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands.¹ A retrospective analysis of the dynamics of community construction among the Euro-Turks reveals that they have always been engaged in producing and reproducing communities deriving from various needs. The construction of communities is sometimes a response to social-economic deprivation, sometimes to the form of affiliation with the homeland, and sometimes to the transition of the welfare state into post-social prudentialist state. This paper claims that Euro-Turks have become more occupied with the construction and

¹ For detailed information on the research, see Kaya and Kentel (2005; and 2007). The research included in-depth interviews and focus-group discussions, as well as 1,065 structured interviews with ninety questions in Germany, 600 interviews in France, and 400 in Belgium. The research in Germany and France was held in 2004 and the one in Belgium in 2007. The research on the Dutch-Turks, conducted in the winter of 2007, consists of only qualitative research techniques.
articulation of ethno-cultural and religious communities in the last two decades due to the ascendancy of culturalist and civilizationist discourse along with neo-liberal forms of governmentality (Foucault, 1979) essentializing ethnic, cultural and religious boundaries, and generating an Islamophobic, migrantphobic and xenophobic climate in the west. As Wendy Brown (2010: 33) rightly stated the civilizationist discourse brought two disparate images together in order to produce a single figure of danger justifying exclusion and closure: “the hungry masses” and “cultural-religious aggression toward Western values.” The growing stream of citizenship tests, attitude tests, zero-tolerance policy towards unqualified migrants, and negative public opinion vis-a-vis migrants, in general, results in that the European countries are recently inclined to be more assimilationist vis-a-vis Muslim origin migrant populations, who are perceived to be hostile toward Western values. Social, political and economic changes at global level have brought about the revitalization of an Islamophobic discourse in a way that leads to the redefinition of community boundaries through nationalist and religious lines.

“I fear that we are approaching a situation resembling the tragic fate of Christianity in northern Africa in Islam’s early days”, these are the words of a German Lutheran Bishop uttered in 2006 (Carle, 2006). Migrants of Muslim origin are increasingly represented by the advocates of the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis as members of a “precarious transnational society” in which people only want to ‘stone women’, ‘cut throats’, ‘be suicide bombers’, ‘beat their wives’ and ‘commit honour crimes’. These prejudiced perceptions about Islam and Muslim migrants have been reinforced by the impact of previous events ranging from the Iranian Revolution to the Cartoon Crisis in Denmark in 2006, or from the Arab – Israel war in 1973 to the notorious book by German economist Thilo Sarrazin (2010), who was likely to explain the integration problems of migrants of Muslim origin through genetic factors.

This working paper argues that Muslim origin migrants in general, and Euro-Turks in particular, tactically become more engaged in constructing communities to protect themselves against the evils of the contemporary world as well as to pursue an alternative form of politics for the purpose of raising their claims in public. It will also be claimed that what distinguishes the ways in which communities are being reproduced by migrant-origin individuals since the early 1990s is that the reconfiguration of welfare policies by the neo-liberal states is no longer directed towards ‘society’, but towards ‘communities’. In other words, while migrants used to construct their own communities to protect themselves against the detrimental effects of the outside world such as
capitalism, racism, exclusion, poverty and xenophobia, the construction of those communities is now being encouraged by the neo-liberal states within the framework of a prudentialist form of governmentality. Hence, the work will discuss the main parameters of the politics of honour and search for purity posed by various Muslim origin migrants and their descendants to tackle with the structural constraints of exclusion, poverty and Islamophobia. However, it will also be argued there are Euro-Turks with appropriate education and qualification, who attempt to abandon their communities in order to mobilize themselves upward.

**Migrants in Post-Social State: From Welfarism to Prudentialism**

The fact that migrant communities and their descendants form their own ethno-religious solidarity networks in their countries of settlement seems to be encouraged by the post-social state, which has already left her major responsibilities of education, health, security and pension services to a multitude of specific actors such as individuals, families, communities, localities, charities and so forth (Inda, 2006: 12). The post-social state requires individual actors, families, migrants, excluded and subordinated groups who are expected to secure their well-being by themselves. The market is believed to be playing a crucial role in assuring the life of the population with respect to prevention of the risks related to old age, ill health, sickness, poverty, illiteracy, accidents and so forth. Thus, the rationality of the post-social state, or market state, is extended to all kinds of domains of welfare, security and health, which were formerly governed by social and bureaucratic state (Inda, 2006: 13). Public provision of welfare and social protection ceases to exist as an indispensable part of governing the well-being of the population. Heteronomous communities of all sorts have become essential in the age of post-social state, because as Jonathan X. Inda (2006) rightfully claims the post-social form of governmentality requires the fragmentation of the social into a multitude of communities, markets and the new prudentialisms. This implies that individuals are expected to take proper care of themselves within the framework of existing free market conditions; social welfare state is no longer there to finance and to secure the well-being of the population as the prudent, responsible, self-managing and ethical political subjects are in charge to take over her role. This is what Inda (2006) calls the transition from welfarism to prudentialism.

As a consequence of the shift from welfarism to prudentialism, social policy now is increasingly based upon the notion of stakeholdership, promoting the idea that individuals can be responsibilised and empowered by social policy to become a part of the club of stakeholders
(O’Malley, 2000; and Gilling, 2001). The logic of stakeholdership is to pathologise and blame those who fail to become stakeholders. From the nineteenth century onwards, O’Malley argues that being a respectable working man required to be acting in a prudent way. Being prudent refers to joining insurance schemes, making regular payments in order to insure his/her own life, and that of his/her family members against any possible misfortune (Defert, 1991). Prudence is a modern phenomenon. Prior to the sixteenth century, prudence was socially frowned upon, associated primarily with cowardliness, lowliness, frugality, selfishness, lack of honour, etc. Only from the sixteenth century onwards did prudence gradually emerge to become a sign of wisdom and was accepted as a proper moral obligation (Hacking, 2003: 25-26).

Nikolas Rose states that this new prudentialism uses the technologies of consumption such as advertising, market research and niche marketing to aggravate anxieties about one’s own future and that of one’s loved ones, to encourage us to subdue these risks and to repress our fate by purchasing insurance tailored specifically for our needs and individual situation (Rose, 1999: 159). What is actually promoted here is individual consumption to reduce the risks embedded in everyday life. Active individual citizens must then be responsible for a variety of risks ranging from the risk of sexually acquired disease to the risk of physical/mental disorder. This kind of prudentialism can actually be considered as a technology of governmentality that responsibilizes individuals for their own risks of unemployment, health, poverty, security, crime and so on. It can be seen as a practice producing individuals who are responsible of their own destiny with the assistance of a variety of private enterprises and independent experts that are the indispensable actors of free market economy.

Universal welfare policies are no longer announced by the nation-states. What we are witnessing is a reconfiguration of welfare policies, which are no longer directed toward ‘society’, but toward ‘communities’: ‘...it seems as if we are seeing the emergence of a range of rationalities and techniques that seek to govern without governing society, to govern through regulated choices made by discrete and anonymous actors in the context of their particular commitments to families and communities’ (Rose, 1996: 328).

Furthermore: “...‘the social’ may be giving way to ‘the community’ as a new territory for the administration of individual and collective existence, a new place, or surface, upon which micro-moral relations among persons are conceptualized and administered” (Rose, 1996: 331). Currently, Rose
identifies a strategic shift regarding politics of security. Once again we are supposed to take responsibility for our own and our family’s situation by insuring ourselves against risks, e.g. through private health insurance, private pensions, etc. This has been labelled the ‘new prudentialism’ where the middle classes are expected to take care of themselves through various mutual arrangements, and welfare policy becomes something quite different:

“In this new configuration, ‘social insurance’ is no longer a key technical component for a general rationality of social solidarity: taxation for the purposes of general welfare becomes, instead, the minimum price that respectable individuals and communities are prepared to pay for insuring themselves against the riskiness now seen to be concentrated within certain problematic sectors” (Rose, 1996: 343).

We, hence, need management of what has developed into ‘new territories of exclusion’ and this is being done through various policies of activity for the marginalised, so that they can learn to be responsible, make calculated choices and live up to community obligations. In other words, the neo-liberal form of governmentality follows a two-way strategy to challenge the “state-dependency” generated by the social welfare state politics: technologies of agency; and technologies of community. The former engages us as freely acting individuals, who take decisions and manage our own risks. The latter, on the other hand, engages us as members of a collective identity such as community and family, who rely upon its protective shield rather than that of the state (Larner, 2000: 246; Scourfield, 2007: 112).

In the neo-liberal ideology, objectives of equality and social justice are no longer concerned with material outcomes, but with opportunity structures. The primary role of social policy is not the distribution of resources to provide for people’s needs, but to diminish risk and to enable people individually to manage risk. Old forms of liberal governance are therefore giving way to what Rose (1999) calls ‘advanced liberalism’ that is based upon promoting self-provisioning, prudentialism and an individualistic ethic of self-responsibility. Post-materialist subjects are constituted as consumers whose capacity for long-term self-sufficiency and responsible self-management is to be promoted, enabled or regulated. Advanced liberalism has a desire to enforce the responsibilities of the poor to sustain themselves. This approach has been aptly characterised as ‘the new paternalism’ (Mead, 1997).
Social policy is characterised by a creeping conditionality not only in the developed world but also in some parts of the developing world. This is also the case in the migration context. Provision of social benefits for the poor is made conditional upon their willingness to seek employment, undertake training, attend health clinics, and/or send their children to school. Neo-liberal economics is harnessed to an illiberal paternalist social agenda that associates poverty with individual irresponsibility, or with the failure to manage risk. It represents the final challenge to material dependency upon the welfare state, a renewed assault upon the fantasy of dependency culture and an attempt to establish and consolidate an alternative ethical basis for the workfare state era.

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Table 1. A schematic account of the evolution of liberal welfare regime (Source: Dean, 2006: 2)

Recent welfare reforms in countries such as the UK, Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the US and Australia reflect an incremental change in the principles that inform welfare provision. Hartley Dean (2006) presents a schematic account of the evolution of the welfare system in the UK, as a liberal welfare regime being transformed from welfare state to workfare state, a transformation which started during the Thatcher period and continued during the Blair period. The workfare state also became visible in the United States during the Clinton era. Comparing the Blair and Clinton administrations’ shift to
workfare state, it is remarkable to see how much emphasis has been placed in ideational claims about the failure of existing policies due to “their creating dependency”, the need to direct the dependent towards compulsory activities in a paternalistic way, and the reconceptualization of Marshallian citizenship arguments from the traditional focus on rights to one on obligations (Peters, Pierre and King, 2005).

In the meantime, another important element of the workfare state, or prudentialist state, is the fact that the Keynesian macroeconomic policies of the welfare state are now replaced with the monetarist policies. Instead of implementing socially embedded macroeconomic policies catering not only to goals of economic growth but also to labour market and redistributive justice, leaving inflation to be the end result of the equation, monetarist policies work the other way around departing from the desired annual inflation and growth rates and defining all other economic variables from there (Peters, Pierre and King, 2005: 1294). Although the table is designed to display the way the liberal state incrementally changes, it could also be extended to portray other western liberal states (Table 1). In fact, this table is a very eloquent summary of the transition of the modern liberal state from welfarism to prudentialism.

During the 1960s, migration was a source of content in Western Europe. More recently, however, migration has been framed as a source of discontent, fear and instability for nation-states in the West. Why has there been this shift in the framing of migration? The answer of such a question lies in the very heart of the changing global social-political context I assume. Several different reasons such as de-industrialization, unemployment, poverty, exclusion, violence, supremacy of culturalism, globalization and neo-liberal political economy turning the uneducated and unqualified masses into the new ‘wretched of the earth’ to use Frantz Fanon’s (1965) terminology, can be enumerated to answer such a critical question. In what follows, I will scrutinize the ways in which migrant origin groups construct communities in order to cope with the detrimental effects of the age of neo-liberal prudentialism leaving the uneducated, unskilled and excluded migrants unattended and unprotected.

Euro-Turks have always constructed communities in a similar way to the other migrant origin populations. Communities are constructed because of the comfort of familiarity, sameness, security, friendship and fellowship they offer to individuals. However, in the age of neo-liberalism, communities are not simply set up by individuals; prudentialist states also prefer to promote the construction of communities rather than reproducing what is social. It seems that the social is giving way to the community as a new territory for the
administration of individual and collective existence. Thatcherite little-Englandism of the 1970s in the United Kingdom is a popular example of the neo-liberal governmentality reproducing the power of community. The history of a post-colonial assertion of ‘Englishness’ and a dislike of ‘foreigners’, coupled with a contemporary, politically primitive and quite desperate hard working class masculinity in a world which no longer seemed to prize the manual working class, presents the importance of the generation of a feeling of community by the state to equip its citizens to struggle against the structural ills of everyday life such as unemployment, poverty and deindustrialization (Mercer, 1990). In contrast to the members of the majority nation, the members of migrant-origin populations are also encouraged by the neo-liberal states to remain within the boundaries of their own already-existing communities. In what follows, I shall delineate the ways in which communities have been constructed by the Euro-Turks in the past. Subsequently, I shall discuss about the ways in which Euro-Turks rebuild their communities as an outcome of the feeling of insecurity, loneliness, and alienation reinforced by neo-liberal political economy, which associates poverty with individual irresponsibility and the failure to manage risk, rather than with the failure of the capitalist state to provide its citizens with justice, equality and social security. The sections on the politics of honour and search for purity will address at the main motivations of community construction stemming from the feeling of growing material insecurity, unemployment, poverty, and social-economic exclusion. Eventually, the work will end up portraying the attempts of young generations of qualified and educated Euro-Turks to abandon their communities, which they feel as suffocating them.

**Constructing communities: A retrospective analysis of the Euro-Turks**

Migrant origin individuals and their descendants tend to generate tactics in their everyday life in order to adapt themselves with the regulations of the prudentialist post-social state. Being rather uneducated, unqualified, and socially, economically and politically unintegrated, postmigrants are not accurately equipped to come to terms with the present conditions. Making communities becomes one of the ways for them to cope with uncertainty, insecurity, unemployment, exclusion and poverty in the age of deindustrialization, or post-industrialism. Ethno-cultural communities refer to symbolic walls of protection, cohesion and solidarity for migrant origin groups. On the one hand, it is comforting for them to band together away from the homeland, communicating through the same languages, norms and values. On the other hand, their growing
affiliation with culture, authenticity, ethnicity, nationalism, religiosity and traditions provides them with an opportunity to establish solidarity networks against structural problems. Accordingly, the revival of honour, religion and authenticity emerges on a symbolic, but not essentialist level, as a symptom. Such a revival comes from their structural exclusion from political and social-economic resources.

Community making is nothing new among the migrant origin populations. For instance, since the beginning of the migratory process in the early 1960s, Euro-Turks have generated various survival strategies based on the acts of community building. Communities may always be there, but their driving forces often change. The first generation migrants in the 1960s and 1970s developed a discourse revolving around economic issues: migrant strategy. Their ultimate aim was to return after saving enough money to provide them with social-economic upward mobility in Turkey. Their motivation for an eventual return to Turkey and the unwillingness of the receiving societies to integrate them into the public space prompted them to construct their own solidarity networks based on their quest of return to the homeland. The second generation in the 1980s generated an ideological and political discourse originating from issues related to the homeland. The quest for return to the homeland of the first generation became a myth of return for the second generation. Their survival strategy was to try to make an impact on the political life of their homeland country, which was going through a social, political and economic turmoil in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup. Hence, the second generation created different communities of sentiments shaped by their ideological inclinations: minority strategy. Lastly, the third generation has left aside the myth of return and started to explicitly express their will to stay as equal members of their countries of settlement trying to benefit from the welfare schemes: transnational strategy. Since the 1990s, they have developed a culture-specific discourse stressing their multicultural competence, intercultural dialogue, symbolic capital, cultural capital, difference, diversity, and tolerance (Kaya, 2001).

Migrant Strategy: Early days of migration makes migrants’ family relations, or local community relations, both in the country of origin and of immigration more vital and instrumental. When the migrants arrive in the receiving country they are given shelter, advice and support by their kin and former neighbours. Their previous social group status and class, lack of language, exclusionist incorporation regimes as well as the segregationist housing policies of the receiving countries make them stick together and develop a web of solidarity by means of informal
local networks. What defines the boundaries of community here is not necessarily ethnicity, but the material conditions (Wimmer, 2009). Their desperate will to return makes them invest at home rather than in the new destination. The migrant strategy is formed in their own local neighbourhood in which they stick together, isolated from the rest of the society. Most socialising has been carried out with other Turks, preferably hemsebris (fellow-villagers, Landsmannschaften), in private homes, mosques, public restaurants, and coffee houses (the exclusive domain of men), and on structured occasions such as the large parties frequently held in rented halls to celebrate engagements, weddings and circumcision ceremonies (Mandel, 1990: 155). It is the development of social networks, based on kinship or common area of origin and the need for mutual help in the new environment that made the construction of migrant strategy possible (Castles and Miller, 1993: 25).

Minority Strategy: Despite the existence of a modern welfare state which provides the most basic social services in terms of health, education and social security, Turks found it necessary and opportune to set up their own services to mediate between the members of the community and the formal institutions of the receiving societies. Turks may have previously accepted the advocates of the host nations; recently, “they are finding their own voice, their own advocates, and their own understanding of what it means and what it should mean to be of Turkish-origin in the host society” (Horrocks and Kolinsky, 1996: xx). The emergence of ethnic communities with their own institutions such as ethnic associations, cultural associations, youth clubs, cafés, agencies, and professions give rise to the birth of a new ethnic-based political strategy, i.e. a minority strategy. The permanent settlement brings about the necessity of a long-live strategy, rather than the migrant strategy, in order, not only to maintain culture, but more importantly to cope with disadvantage, to improve life chances against political exclusion and socio-economic marginalization, and to provide protection from racism (Castles and Miller, 1993: 114).

Diaspora Strategy: The changing nature of space and time in the age of globalism facilitates the emergence of transnational and diasporic identities. Globalisation, which appears in the form of global capitalism, the rise of communications and transportation, the rise of migration, modern diasporas, internationalisation of world financial markets, de-monopolisation of national legal systems, growing prudentialism, new international division of labour, and the emergence of a global culture empowers the minorities against the hegemony of nation-state, and breaks up the conventional power relations between majority and
minority. The modern “communicative circuitry has enabled dispersed populations to converse, interact and even symbolise significant elements of their social and cultural lives” (Gilroy, 1994: 211). For instance, the Turkish TV programmes are easily received in Europe by the Turkish diaspora. The official TRT International channel and several other private channels and newspapers spread out the official ideology of the Turkish nation-state through the diaspora.

Turkish official ideology which has recently become more hegemonic and nationalist has a very important role on the construction of Turkish diaspora nationalism at the imaginary level, which gives a special emphasis on Turkishness. For instance, during the intervention of the Turkish Armed Forces into the Northern Iraq in the winter of 1996 to prevent the logistic settlement of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in the region, the Turkish TV channels organised an international campaign to collect money for the Turkish Armed Forces. This is the evidence of transnational exploitation of the masses by the nation-state, and of the power of the ideology of nationalism. This change in the homeland's orientation to the diaspora is a part of the realpolitik because the homeland governments tend to exploit diaspora sentiments for their purposes (Safran, 1991: 93; Kaya, 2009).

These changes in the global network, international politics, and internal politics have played an important role in the making of diaspora consciousness. The diaspora consciousness seems to be supplementing minority strategy by means of these global transformations. As Clifford (1994: 310-311) rightfully states, transnational connections with homeland, other members of diaspora in various geographies, and/or with a world-political force (such as Islam) break the binary relation of minority communities with majority societies as well as giving added weight to claims against an oppressive national hegemony. Through the agency of these connections, diasporic subjects have the chance to create a home away from the homeland, a home which is surrounded by rhythms, figures and images of the homeland provided by TV, video cassettes, tapes, radio, blogs, Facebook, Twitter, websites, and by the local network they developed in time.

The contemporary diaspora discourses are developed on two paramount dimensions: universalism and particularism. The universalist axis refers us to the model of diasporic transnationalism, in the form of ‘third space’ (Bhabha, 1990), or ‘process of heterogenesis’ (Guattari, 1990).

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2 For a detailed map of Turkish TV channels and the spread of Turkish official ideology, see Aksoy and Robins (1997); and Kosnick (2007).
The universalist dimension, which contains the use of all the aspects of globalism and transnationalism, refers to that the diasporic consciousness constitutes a post-national identity. The members of the post-national diasporic communities can escape the power of the nation-state to inform their sense of collective identity. In this new space it is possible to evade the politics of polarity and emerge as ‘the others of our selves’ (Bhabha, 1988: 22). This is the cultural space where the quest for knowing and othering the Other becomes irrelevant, and cultures merge together in a way that leads to the construction of syncretic cultural forms. On the other hand, the particularist axis presents the model of cultural essentialism, or diasporic nationalism. The process of home-seeking, as Clifford offers, might result with the existence of a kind of diaspora nationalism which is, in itself, critical to the majority nationalism, and an anti-nationalist nationalism (Clifford, 1994: 307). The nature of diaspora nationalism is cultural, which is based on alienation, and celebration of the past and authenticity. For migrants as well as for anybody else, fear of the present leads to mystification of the past (Berger, 1972: 11) in a way that constructs ‘imaginary homelands’ as Salman Rushdie (1991: 9) has pointed out in his work *Imaginary Homelands*:

It is my present that is foreign, and... the past is home, albeit a lost home in a lost city in the mists of lost time... [Thus,], we will, in short, create fictions, not actual cities or villages, but invisible ones, imaginary homelands.

As Clifford rightly states, those migrant and/or minority groups who are alienated by the system, and swept up in a destiny dominated by the capitalist West, no longer invent local futures. What is different about them remains tied to traditional pasts (Clifford, 1988: 5).

**Communities: Tactics of the Weak**

These solidarity networks, built in the form of communities, may lead to two antithetical formations for individuals, *autonomy* and *heteronomy* (Bauman, 2001). On the one hand, community structures provide their members with necessary equipment to struggle against the destabilising effects of globalization such as insecurity, ambiguity, poverty, loneliness and unemployment. In other words, community serves a platform to their members whereby they could perform a politics of identity in a way that corresponds to what Ulrich Beck (1996) calls ‘sub-politics’, or
what Anthony Giddens (1994: 14-15) calls “life politics”. This provides the members of the community with a kind of politics through which they could emancipate themselves from the arbitrary hold of material deprivation and the feeling of insecurity. This sort of politics of identity is not a politics of life chances, as Giddens (1994: 14) phrased, but of life style. It is concerned with how individuals (as rational actors) should live in a world where what used to be fixed either by nature or tradition is now subject to human decisions. Such a politics of identity refers to a shield, which makes the members of community attempt to develop their autonomy. Whereas community formation could also be interpreted as a survival strategy for their members developed against the feeling of insecurity, isolation and loneliness. These groups have what Michel Maffesoli (1996: 1) calls puissance, an inherent energy and vital force of the people, as opposed to the power of formal institutions. Thus, while the community formation, on the one hand, embodies autonomous self, it also gives rise to what Zygmunt Bauman (2001) calls heteronomy in a way that pleases individuals in the safe environment of community.

In order to provide reasons for the failure of the integration movement in the European countries, one should look into the ways in which “communities” are producing and reproducing themselves in the socio-economically deprived localities. Kreuzberg (Berlin), Schaerbeek, Port Namur (Brussels), Keupstrasse (Cologne), Villier le Bel, La Courneuve, St. Dennis or Crétil (Paris) and Bos en Lommer (Amsterdam) provide good examples of a location where one can find diasporic communities of Muslim origin. Euro-Muslims dwelling in those segregated ethnic enclaves are truly disadvantaged. The world not only continues to be segregated for them, but in some cases there is evidence of greater levels of segregation than in the past, leading some researchers to refer to this as hypersegregation (Massey and Denton, 1993). For instance, inner-city Turks residing in such neighbourhoods attend segregated schools, worship in their own mosques, or Cemevis (Alevi communion houses), shop in segregated stores, generate their niche economies, and so forth. The exodus of the Turkish middle-class from inner cities to new neighbourhoods has left behind only the poorest of the poor in communities increasingly disconnected from the larger urban economy and bereft of the institutional support that once helped ghetto dwellers to survive in a hostile world. These are communities hard hit by deindustrialization, where residents are forced to cope with the consequences of what happens to neighbourhoods when work disappears (Kivisto, 2002).
Muslim origin migrants mostly live in poverty neighbourhoods, and they are less likely to leave such neighbourhoods. Euro-Muslims experience a structural segregation, which is reinforced through two separate mechanisms: chain migration and institutionalization. As Douglas S. Massey (1985) stated earlier, immigrants often arrive as chain migrants and tend to choose an ethnic enclave where they take advantage of the solidarity of their fellow countrymen and where they can maintain the lifestyle they had in their country of origin. Constant flow of immigrants is also expected to slow down the assimilation/integration period of longer-established community members as the new immigrants bring about the maintenance of an active link to the culture and the language of the homeland. Similarly, the newcomers strengthen the possibilities of maintaining and even expanding ethnic niches in the labour market (Bolt and van Kempen, 2003: 210; Wimmer, 2009: 248). When diasporic ethnic settlement reaches a critical mass of people, a process of institutionalization starts, ethnic stores opened, worship houses founded, foreign language press begins to publish, and all kinds of formal and informal organizations boom up. The potency of ethnic services and organizations in diaspora is not only dependent on the size of an ethnic group, but also on the cultural distance to the majority society. The larger this distance is, the greater the pressure upon the minority to establish their cultural infrastructure is (Massey, 1985; Bolt and van Kempen, 2003; and Jelen, 2007).

The first thing that a flaneur of such diasporic spaces will notice is that the symbols, colours, languages, sounds, figures, postures and dress-codes are all almost like replicas of what exists in the homeland. Such diasporic spaces provide the members of diasporic communities with a symbolic ‘fortress’ protecting them against structural problems. To put it differently, such places serve as a security valve for diasporic subjects to soften the blows coming from the external world in the form of unemployment, poverty, inequality, exclusion and discrimination. A middle-aged-man interviewed in Schaerbeek said that “Schaerbeek is a place where ‘an ignorant peasant’ from Emirdag arrived just after he had put his shepherd’s stick on the shelf.” The Schaerbeek community is a shelter, even a fortress, for the vulnerable individual actor. One of the interlocutors interviewed in the winter of 2007 articulates the advantages of living in Schaerbeek:

“According to me, the advantages of living in Schaerbeek are a lot more than the disadvantages. At least we are not dispersing and vanishing. If we dispersed and lived separately, our
children would be in a worse situation: they would be exposed
to degeneration. This way, at least they are familiar with our
traditions.”

Because the wider society in which they live is an ‘alien’ society and full
of ‘dangers’, the community provides them with a kind of social control
(Bauman, 2000). A young man in Schaerbeek with Turkish origin states:

“Let me be frank, it is very easy for a young man to obtain
whatever he wants here. Let me be more frank, he can get women,
alcohol, whatever he desires anytime. Prostitution is widespread.
Drugs are available and legal in certain areas. Young people who
came here from Turkey have also experienced deviation. But
I cannot say that this is true for the majority. Maybe you will
call it tribalisation, but I tell you there is an advantage in living
together: it prevents us from dispersal.”

The community essentially presents a collective need. The community
strategy of keeping people together is counteracted by some individuals
through a kind of what François Dubet (2002) calls “necessary
conformism.” Conformism is a ‘tactic’ deployed by some individuals
in order to comply with the rules of the game, set out by the power of
the community. The strategies and tactics used in everyday life are
explicated very well by Michel de Certeau (1984). ‘Strategies‘ would entail
deliberate and reflexive attempts to position the subjects in relation to
the broader political-ideological space. ‘Tactics’, by contrast, constitute
more subversive ‘third spaces‘ (Soja, 1996), in so far as they represent the
becoming of identities in the absence of a central reference point. Tactics
are characterized by improvisation, spontaneity and geographies of the
now.3 Michel De Certeau (1984: 35-36) defines a strategy as

“the calculation (or manipulation) of power relationships that
becomes possible as soon as a subject with will and power (...) can be isolated. It postulates a place that can be delimited as its
own and serves as a base from which relations with an exteriority
composed of targets or threats (...) can be managed.”

3 For further information about the strategic and tactic positionings of everyday
life, see De Certeau (1984). For further information about formal and informal
nationalism, see Eriksen (1993).
Strategies, thus, are the conceptual instruments of a rationality that operates within a model of centre. A tactic, meanwhile, is defined by de Certeau (1984: 36) as a calculated action determined by the absence of a proper locus:

“... A tactic is an art of the weak... The more a power grows, the less it can allow itself to mobilize part of its means in the service of deception. Power is bound by its very visibility. In contrast, trickery is possible for the weak, and often it is his only possibility as a last resort” (1984: 37).

Thus, the stronger the central power (the state) becomes though its coercive instruments such as the army, the police and undemocratic laws, the less effective and persuasive it becomes for its subjects. In this case, the subjects try to create their own centres of resistance. Accordingly, subordinated subjects such as individuals of migrant origin with working-class or underclass backgrounds, who feel themselves to be structurally excluded and neglected, become more oriented toward their homeland, ethnicity, culture, religion and past. For migrants as well as for anybody else, fear of the present leads to mystification of the past.

**Politics of honour and constructing communities**

Recently, Islam is, by and large, considered and represented as a threat to the European way of life. It is frequently believed that Islamic fundamentalism is the source of current xenophobic, racist and violent attitudes directed against Muslim origin migrants and their children in the west. Conversely, this work claims that ethno-cultural and religious resurgence could also be interpreted as a symptom of the existing structural social and political problems such as unemployment, racism, xenophobia, exclusion, and assimilation. Scientific data uncover that migrant origin groups tend to get affiliated with a politics of identity, ethnicity and religiosity in order to tackle such structural constraints (Clifford, 1988; Gilroy, 1994; Ganguly, 1992, Connoly, 2003; and Kaya, 2009). This is actually a form of politics initiated by outsider groups as opposed to the kind of politics generated by “those within” as Alistair MacIntyre (1971) decoded earlier. According to MacIntyre (1971) there are two forms of politics: *politics of those within* and *politics of those excluded*. Those *within* tend to employ legitimate political institutions (parliament, political parties, the media) in pursuing their goals, and those *excluded* resort to honour, culture, ethnicity, religion and tradition to achieve their goals. It should be noted here that MacIntyre does not place culture in the private space; culture is rather inherently located in
the public space. Therefore, the main motive behind the development of ethno-cultural and religious inclinations by migrant and minority groups can be perceived as their concern to be attached to the political-public sphere. Similarly, Robert Young (2001) also sheds light on the ways in which the discourse of culturalism has recently become salient. Referring to Mao, Fanon, Cabral, Nkrumah, Senghor and many other Tricontinentalists, he accurately explicates that culture turns out to be a political strategy for subordinated masses to resist ideological infiltrations in both colonial and postcolonial context. Thus, the quest for identity, authenticity and religiosity should not be reduced to an attempt to essentialize the so-called purity. It is rather a form of politics generated by subordinated subjects. Islam is no longer simply a religion, but also a counter hegemonic global political movement, which prompts Muslims to stand up for justice and against tyranny – whether in Palestine, Kosovo, Kashmir, Iraq, Lebanon, or elsewhere.

Individuals, or groups, tend to use the languages that they know best in order to raise their daily concerns such as poverty, exclusion, unemployment and racism. If they are not equipped with the language of deliberative democratic polity, then they are inclined to use the languages they think they know by heart, i.e., religion, ethnicity, and even sometimes violence. In an age of insecurity and uncertainty, those wretched of the earth become more engaged in the protection of their honour, which, they believe, is the only thing left. In understanding the growing significance of honour, Akbar S. Ahmed (2003) draws our attention to the collapse of what Mohammad Ibn Khaldun (1969), a 14th century sociologist in North Africa, once called asabiyya, an Arabic word which refers to group loyalty, social cohesion or solidarity. Asabiyya binds groups together through a common language, culture and code of behaviour. Ahmed establishes a direct negative correlation between asabiyya and the revival of honour. The collapse of asabiyya on a global scale prompts Muslims to revitalize honour. Ahmed (2003: 81) claims that asabiyya is collapsing for the following reasons:

“Massive urbanization, dramatic demographic changes, a population explosion, large scale migrations to the West, the gap between rich and poor, the widespread corruption and mismanagement of rulers, the rampant materialism coupled with the low premium on education, the crisis of identity, and, perhaps, most significantly new and often alien ideas and images, at once seductive and repellent, and instantly communicated from the West, ideas and images which challenge traditional values and customs.”
The collapse of *asabiyya* also implies for Muslims the breakdown of *adl* (justice), and *ihsan* (compassion and balance). Global disorder characterized by the lack of *asabiyya*, *adl*, and *ihsan* seems to trigger the celebration of honour by Muslims. Remaking the past, or celebrating honour, serves at least a dual purpose for the diasporic communities. Firstly, it is a way of coming to terms with the present without being seen to criticise the existing status quo. The ‘glorious’ past and the preservation of honour is, here, handled by the diasporic subject as a strategic tool absorbing the destructiveness of the present which is defined with structural outsiderism. Secondly, it also helps to recuperate a sense of the self not dependent on criteria handed down by others - the past is what the diasporic subjects can claim as their own (Ganguly, 1992: 40).

For instance, honour crimes in the Muslim context illustrate the way honour becomes instrumentalized and essentialized. Recent honour crimes among Euro-Turks seem to have prompted some of the conservative political elite and academics in the West to explain honour crimes as an indispensable element of Islam. However one should note that honour crimes are not unique to the Islamic culture: they are also visible in the Judeo-Christian world (Elman and Eduard, 1991; Seager, 1997; and Mojad and Abdo, 2004). Honour crimes are rather structurally constrained. The traumatic acts of migration, exclusion, and poverty experienced by uneducated subaltern migrant workers without work prepare a viable ground for domestic violence, honour crimes and delinquency. Here is the way a Belgian-Turkish interlocutor perceived ‘honour’ among the Turks and the way he distances himself from that state of mind:

“There are cultural differences between the two societies in terms of the way they live. I used to have a Belgian acquaintance. He was around 65 years old. He used to come to work from 15 km outside of Brussels. One day he was complaining. I asked ‘What’s up? ‘Is there a problem?’ and he replied ‘I have a daughter of 19 years old. She brought home a guy two months ago.’ I thought he was angry at her because she had stayed with the guy outside marriage. He said ‘I am 65 years old and working. Now there is one more plate on the table. He will exploit me too.’ Can you imagine? In our culture, we would take it as an offence to our honour, wouldn’t we? Imagine that a 19-year-old girl brought home a guy and wanted to stay together. How many fathers could accept this? The financial aspect is the last concern for a Turk. But the main concern of the Belgian father is money.” (Kaya and Kentel, 2007: 77)
Generally speaking, although women of Turkish origin are not as visible as men in the public space, they have an essential role in the construction and protection of the community in diaspora. A woman’s honour, which is perceived by patriarchal men as something to be protected, seems to be tacit cement that keeps the community intact. The dominant discourse of community may be mostly based on ethnicity, religiosity and nationalism, but the discourse of protecting the honour of women cuts across all other discourses.

Another remarkable strategy to keep the community alive is the attitude of parents in preventing their daughters from marrying ‘European’ men. In coffee houses around Germany, Belgium, France and the Netherlands, one often hears comments such as “How could a father look into the others’ faces?” Not only parents but also other members of the extended family still seem to be influential in deciding who their children will marry. The way children are raised within their families puts pressure on them to be more inward looking in order not to lose the comfort provided for them by the community. Their upbringing prevents them from taking counter-hegemonic decisions, which may eventually outlaw them from within their community. A young woman reported her discomfort concerning marriage outside the community with a German: “If we get married to a German man, then we risk losing all our family and relatives.”

During a focus group discussion with married women from Turkish origin, a debate started following the question whether these women, at the time of the interview already in motherhood, would consider it a problem if their daughters would want to marry with a non-Turk, a Belgian. One participant in the discussion summarized the discussion as follows:

“Most of the women are scared that they will lose their prestige in the eyes of the people who surround them, and therefore [in the case of their daughters having a relation with a Belgian] they would ignore their child for a while... In the beginning the parents fear the criticisms from their surroundings, because this is important for them. If they lose this surrounding they become isolated, thus, what will they do? They’ll ignore their child and after a while, when the people surrounding them have come to forget about it, little by little they’ll pick up contact with their child again.” (Zemni, et al. 2006: 60, translation from the original text in French)
Women become even more isolated in their private space when they are married. A woman’s role then becomes even more determined by the community: that of being a mother and a decent woman. From the perspective of the community, women become truly ‘private women’ when they marry, a very different status from the ‘public women’ that describes European women. Women become active agents in replicating the community through complying with its customs, traditions and values. They do not even question why they cannot go beyond the boundaries of the community. It is just “not possible”.

Despite all, however, the boundaries of the community are not so rigid and there is always a way out. Here is a dialogue held by Zemni, et al. (2006:49) with the Muslim origin women in Belgium:

Suzan: “My mother is someone who wants it to be a Turk. Not a Moroccan or so. My mother would not want it, and maybe I myself would not want it either.”

Researcher: “Does this count for you as well?”

Sevilay: “I heard my father say ones: ‘inside here, in this house, not one guy can have his foot inside the door if he is not a Turk’, and I thought by myself: ‘Shit!’, as I was going out with someone at that time who was not a Turk, but who was a Muslim. I found this so strange that he was saying this, as if he wanted to warn me, as if he knew that I was going out with him. Thus they are against it. However, I don’t think that, if I would come home with someone [who is not a Turk] that they would throw me out of the house.”

Tansu: “No Sevilay, I could not believe that!”

Sevilay: “No, no, I know my father, he is not like that. He is not so religious.”

Tansu: “I don’t know.” (Zemni, et al., 2006:49)

It seems that the Belgian-Turkish women in this case are imprisoned in the boundaries of the community. Here, one might describe the masculine power of man within the community as ‘hard power’, and the power of

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4 The difference between ‘private women’ and ‘public women’ has been very successfully drawn by Claire E. Alexander. She used this classification in mapping out the modes of courtship of black male Londoners (Alexander, 1996: 157-186).
the *habitus*\(^5\) of the community as ‘soft power’. Individuals usually have the capacity to escape from the restraints of both hard power and soft power, using their ‘*fugitive power*’.\(^6\) Fugitive power is elusive, mobile, shifty and slippery; it is used by individuals to reposition themselves against the power of strategies and ideologies that operate at the social and communal level. Compared to men, women in the community are much more resistant, diversified and elusive in their daily life. Their successful tactics provide them with spaces in which they can occasionally detach themselves from the restrictive power of communal strategies and ideologies intertwined with the politics of honour.

‘*Imported*’ brides and bride-grooms: Search for Purity

Migrants of Muslim origin residing in the West have also developed another tactic to reinforce their community boundaries in trying to cope with the destabilizing effects of neo-liberalism, globalization, racism and Islamophobia: marriages with someone from the homeland. A significant issue among Euro-Turks is the increasing number of spouses brought to Europe from Turkey. Such partners are known as ‘imported brides and bride-grooms’. Such marriages are usually preferred by conservative families, who believe that brides from the homeland are culturally ‘pure’ and thus capable of raising ‘better-educated’ children.\(^7\) Bride-grooms on the other hand are usually chosen from candidates who fit the occupational prospects required by the extended family in question. For these families, marriage seems to be more a question of purely economic prospects, and/or that of an appropriate childbearing institution. However, sometimes the young women too prefer to marry a young man from the country of origin, as they expect these men to show more responsibility

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5 The term habitus is coined by Pierre Bourdieu (1984) to refer to a system of durable, transposable dispositions which function as the generative basis of structured practices.

6 The concept of “fugitive power’ is used by Zygmunt Bauman (2000), Katherine N. Farrell (2004) and Robin Cohen (2007). The notion of ‘fugitive power’ describes the modes of democratic power operating beyond the reach of ‘hard power’ (guns and laws), and of ‘soft power’ (norms, customs, culture industry, ideology).

7 It should be stated here that one needs to make a distinction between arranged marriages and forced marriages. The data used in this text does not include anything related to forced marriages. Arranged marriage is a term to describe a marriage in which both parties consent to the assistance of their parents or a third party in identifying a spouse. However, in a forced marriage, one or more of the parties is married without his or her consent or against his or her will. For a more elaborate distinction between the two, see Zemni et al. (2006).
and maturity than the boys they have grown up with. The following excerpt from a focus group discussion describes this idea:

Researcher: “Thus you think that the boys in Turkey are better than the Turkish boys who have grown up here?”

Suzan: “Yes, when I look at most of the boys here, everything they are doing... Yes, that is why. And in Turkey, for example, my parents used to live in a village and when I see boys over there, there are decent boys, and real boys, you know...”

Nalan: “Their education is different.”

Suzan: “Yes, their education is different.”

Nalan: “They are entirely concentrated on going to school. School comes first.”

Researcher: “For the boys in Turkey?”

Nalan: “Yes, how the boys in Turkey think...”

Tansu: “They are thinking more realistically.”

Nalan: “And they look at the future. The boys here, they live from day to day. Do you understand? They think that they can carry on living with the money of their fathers and mothers.”

Researcher: “Is that why you would want to marry someone from Turkey?”


Two thirds of all the women of Turkish origin living in Belgium for example marry someone from the country of origin (Reniers and Lievens, 1997). Similar numbers are to be found in the Netherlands (Hooghiemstra, 2003). The preference to marry someone who has grown up in the country of origin is present with parents and with the young brides themselves, referring to the importance of sharing the same culture, traditions and language, which are considered important to ‘get along with each other’ and to ‘integrate the partner into the family’ (Zemni, et al. 2006).

The family remains one of the most important spaces of protection for Euro-Turks, but it also produces constant tension and crises. The family provides transnational individuals with a sense of being protected, because it is where the socialization of diasporic culture starts. A Belgian-Turkish married couple, who displayed a multicultural capital, conveyed how Turkish culture provides an ideal intimate family atmosphere: “The best
thing about the Turks is that they are attached to their families. I often see my parents, for instance.” Similarly, German-Turks and French-Turks also underlined the significance of family during the field research conducted in the aftermath of the 2003 summer resulting with the death of thousands of elderly people in both countries due to the extraordinary heat. Their common argument about these deaths was that contemporary western societies lack some essential values such as solidarity, respect for the elderly, family, and warmth. They made it clear that Euro-Turks still maintain such values, which give them what Bourdieu (1984) calls *distinction vis-à-vis* the majority society. Similarly, contradictory moral values have been reported by the Euro-Turks as the most important problem faced in everyday life in their countries of settlement (Kaya and Kentel, 2005 and 2007).

Zemni *et al.* (2006: 93-100) reveal that there are some major motives behind pressure initiated by parents to get their children married without their consent: they are concerned about the morality and good behaviour of their children who are believed to have come to the age of marriage; they are concerned about the risk of their daughter losing her virginity; parents believe that they make the best choice for their children; they are convinced that this is the ongoing tradition; they are concerned that their daughter shall not be able to marry if she exceeds the age of 25 or so; and finally they may be motivated to help someone in the country of origin with a lower social economic background, who is willing to go abroad through marriage. What is also striking is that parents present arranged marriages as a religious order, a manoeuvre which leaves no room for the youngsters to act. However, recently youngsters have the potential power to challenge their parents trying to convince them that this has nothing to do with Islam, but with the traditions. In the mean time, Gaby Strassburger (2004) claims that the issue of parental suppression is relevant to a certain degree among Euro-Turks: young people sometimes decide of their own free will to marry someone from their country of origin. For instance, marrying a man from Turkey may in fact provide some women of Turkish origin with some advantages, such as the man becoming dependent on the bride because of a lack of competence in German, French, Belgian, or Dutch and the loosening of parental authority on both sides. Similarly, in the research on partner choice and marriage of Muslim women in Belgium, Zemni *et al.* found that some young women opt in particular to marry someone grown up in the home country, as it sets them free from the social control exerted by the family of the groom and gives them more responsibilities in public life as the relation of dependency is one in which the newly arrived husband is very much depending upon the knowledge and social ties of his wife, instead of vice versa (Zemni *et al.*, 2006).
Resistance Against Community: Willing to leave the ghettos

Both quantitative and qualitative data reveal that qualified and educated youngsters tend to leave their ethno-cultural, religious and diasporic communities for the purpose of upward social mobility (Kaya and Kentel, 2005 and 2007; Kaya, 2009). The distinction between strategy and tactic, as put forward by Michel De Certeau (1984), implies that the compliance of individual members of a community with the communal rules does not necessarily mean that they internalize the community. Islam is one of the key elements in helping the communities with Muslim background conform. The community provides its members with an opportunity not to lose their religion or ethics, and at the same time it also keeps the mother tongue alive. However, if the community is not properly regulated and governed, this may bring about a failure to learn the language of the country of settlement:

“The children know neither Turkish nor French... But the education is more serious in Flemish schools. I am sending my children to Flemish schools. The Turkish parents want to have money... It seems that if the children earn money, the difficulties will end... I am advising the children here to go to school. But at the same time, they should learn the Turkish culture. For this reason we go to Turkey in the summer holidays with the children. They get bored in Eskisehir. They go out but after 2 hours they get bored. They want to come back here as soon as possible. Here is their place [...].

Despite all of the protection provided by the community, its members bear other risks, in addition to failing to learn the language(s) of the host society. One of the female interlocutors interviewed in Berlin in 2005 say the following words:

“There is no way that you can suffer economically in Europe. But what is essential is the peace at home. The Turkish community is getting more restless. They experience the difficulties of being inward-looking. They cannot make their children attend school. The children envy the world outside [...].”

It seems that the communities in diasporic spaces are going through a ‘transition process’ and their ‘ghetto’ qualities are dissolving. It is the younger generations who go through this process to a greater extent, and it is they who feel the difficulties of ghettoization. As the young
generations are loyal to their parents and families, they cannot get away from the restraints of their community, but their presence in the community is somewhat symbolic. Their mind and behaviour transcend the boundaries of the community. They always feel the tension between the community and the wider society in the process of individuation.

Those who are aware of the crisis of the community and are experiencing the dangers and limitations of the ghetto are gradually leaving communities in order to ‘protect their children’. They tend to move to other districts. Both qualitative and quantitative data gathered in the Euro-Turks research (Kaya and Kentel, 2005 and 2007; Kaya, 2009) reveal that immigrants with lower educational capital and less economic resources are likely to end up in ethnically defined niches in the labour market, while better skilled immigrants are much less dependent on such niches. Departure from the community is regarded as a path to success by the schooled generations, but this also creates certain problems. The traditional methods of older generations to ‘protect’ their children have proven to be unsuccessful. Those interviewed during the field research explained this by stories of ‘lost generations’, ‘insecurity’ and ‘crime’: A mother interviewed in one of the banlieues of Paris:

“If parents are strict, then the children escape from their homes… You cannot achieve what you want by locking them in. If you prevent your daughter from going out, she will run away as soon as she has the chance and become a prostitute […].”

As De Certeau (1984: 37) reminds us, a tactic is an art of the weak. The more a power grows, the less it can allow itself to mobilize part of its means in the service of deception. Power is bound by its very visibility. In this case, subjects tend to create their own centres of resistance in the form of a ‘fugitive power’ to fight against the ‘hard power’ and ‘soft power’ of the community (Bauman, 2000; Farrell, 2004; and Cohen, 2007).

Failures continue along with the success stories. Despite all the limitations of the ghetto, many people try to find solutions to overcome their failures. It is possible to see several individuals who are traditional, modern, outgoing, introvert, democratic, nationalist and communitarian in the same person. For instance, a 17-year-old teenager who was born in Schaerbeek and goes to Turkey every year explained the difficulties of overcoming problems experienced in Turkey and Belgium:

“Here, we are deprived of the tastes that exist in Turkey. The Belgians think that there is happiness, money and everything in
Belgium, in Europe, but on the contrary, here everything is more difficult. This is not the kind of life I want. How can I explain? The place we live in is very disordered. There is filth... The environment is not good. Everybody is after money. What are they doing for money? They either sell joints, or steal, or cheat the ‘gavurs’ (a Turkish word for unbelievers). The Belgians and the others are afraid of us, and they say ‘They are foreigners and they rob us.’ The Flemish are afraid of Turks. When they realize that you are a Turk, they begin to fear. When I go somewhere, Belgians do not even turn and look at me. When a Belgian walks by right there at night, the policeman does not even look at him. But when we pass by, he keeps on looking at us and chases us to find out what we are doing there at night.”

For this young man, all Belgians are *gavur* (unbelievers). He uses such a categorization of ‘exclusion’ and ‘othering’ with ease. Nevertheless, he also knows that he is subject to the same kind of categorization when he is in Turkey. As a response to this categorization of exclusion, he tends to demonstrate stronger loyalty to Turkey and Turkishness. This state of feeling even more Turkish is actually an individual tactic to overcome exclusion from within the Turkish nation:

“...When we go to Turkey, we are not regarded as Turks. The neighbours in the village call us ‘gavur’. But despite this, Turkey is different. They say ‘the Gavurs have arrived’. They sell us things in the market at very high prices, they cheat us. Despite all these things, everything is different in Turkey. You are ready to pay 100 Euros for something which actually costs 5 TL. The taste of things is different. You do not want to spend money here. But it has a different taste when you spend money in Turkey.”

Although they prefer ‘the taste’ of Turkey to that of Europe, life seems to be imprisoned within a limited space for the youth who live in such ghettos. Many of them do not have German, Belgian, French or Dutch friends except those at school. In fact, they have no ties outside the ghetto. In contrast to the ways in which young males affirm the attitudes of the older generations towards them, young females feel rather confined. The fact that the young women are not allowed to go out at night gives us some clues about a male-dominated world. This ‘male to male world’ bears no hope for the future.
The formation of a community could be based on various components such as religion, tradition, ethnicity, fellowship, solidarity, class, networking and nation (Wimmer, 2009). When such a community experiences a crisis, the traditional idea of community is replaced by another form of imagined community, i.e. ‘an essentialist and ethnicist national identity’ that is characterized by a concrete understanding of nation. A female interlocutor (28) in Charleroi draws attention to the increasing level of isolation among the Belgian-Turks:

“What we heard from our parents is very different from what we experience now. When I look at my parents’ pictures I see that they were dancing with their Flemish landlords, neighbouring with the Greeks, having assistance from the Belgians. They had solidarity with the outside people then. Now, Turks are becoming more and more isolated in comparison to the past.”

The quotations extracted from the in-depth interviews display the existence of a reflexive relationship between the ‘nationalist construction’ created in the homeland and diaspora, and demonstrate how the externally imposed nationalist identity fills the gap resulting from weakening communal ties due to the social, political and cultural changes – both generational and structural – within the community. This transformation corresponds to a transition from religiosity towards nationalism.

Since 2005 there has been an alliance among many Euro-Turks on issues such as the position of Turks in Europe, Turkey’s situation vis-à-vis the European Union, the “Armenian Genocide,” etc. Conferences are held in the mosques on special days such as the anniversary of the establishment of the Republic (29th October), or 18th March, the Commemoration Day of Martyrs. Although the people attending such conferences and gatherings have different political affiliations, everyone is ideologically inclined to agree on the survival of the state, the nation and the flag. The modern global networks of communication and transportation have partly erased the boundaries between homeland and diaspora. Hence, diasporic identities are subject to the constant interplay of the two locations, which have become almost overlapping in the symbolic world of migrants.
Conclusion

The attempts of many transmigrants to celebrate their ethno-cultural and religious identities partly derives from their feeling of insecurity and ambiguity stimulated by structural constraints such as poverty, unemployment, unschooling, and institutional racism, and partly from the neo-liberal forms of governmentality generated by modern states essentializing the technologies of community as a new territory for the administration of individual and collective existence. Reification of culture and religion seems to be a practical tactic to be employed by migrants and their children in order to create a safe haven for themselves in transnational space. Emphasizing honour and ‘importing brides and bride-grooms’ also serve for the same purpose, to protect what is deemed to be left in the age of insecurity: culture, ethnicity, honour, religion and past. It is believed by migrant communities that brides and bride-grooms brought from their homeland can sustain the power of their community as they are considered to have remained ‘pure’. The discourse of purity seems to be the last resort for migrants where they believe that they can defend their norms, values and families. However, one should not forget that the discourse of purity is to be found in the representational space of reality. Everyday life of Euro-Turks displays that they are nevertheless competent in developing hyphenated identities, combining different traditions, cultures, norms and values in a way that prompts the young generations to break through the borders of the community.

The paper has also argued that the essentialization of communities by migrant origin individuals is also a symptom of the neo-liberal forms of governmentality generated by the receiving states, which discipline and control their populations by recruiting both technologies of agency and technologies of community. As explained in detail the technologies of agency engages the citizens as freely acting individuals, who take decisions and manage their own risks. On the other hand, the technologies of community, engages the citizens as members of a collective identity such as community and family who no longer rely on the state, but on the community. Euro-Turks as well as other Muslim origin migrants and their descendants, be irrespective of being the citizens, or non-citizens of their countries of settlement, are also prompted by the neo-liberal states to remain within the limits of their communities in a way that contributes to the control and discipline of the whole population by the state.
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