Securitization as a modern strategy of constructing identity: ‘Negative proof identity’ in the European Union

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The present paper considers securitization a modern strategy of identity making in the European Union. It is supposed that European identity is being constructed not so much on a basis of ‘internal’ belonging of people to the community as by contradiction to ‘external’ identities and exercised by the securitization practices of creation and exclusion of the ‘other’ embodied in a figure of the ‘alien’ (terrorist, migrant, offender, et cetera). By means of the negative proof method the interrelation of security and identity concepts and practices in the EU is analysed. It is revealed that ‘other’ identities are the main solidarizing factor used for constructing European identity; therefore, securitization becomes a powerful mechanism of identification through rejection. At the same time, such an identity ‘by contradiction’, without congruous construction of identity ‘on the inside’ based on the practices of political inclusion and recognition, present a threat to the community in itself.

Keywords
Security studies, securitization, European Union, identity, ‘other’, surveillance studies

Introduction
Security is one of the most addressed notions in contemporary international relations, in academic works, in multilateral treaties and national documents. In spite of this, the academic discourse concerning the European Union’s security sphere consists considerably from research on historical development of European Security and Defence Policy with chronological, institutional and/or operational focus (e.g. Oakes, 2000; Taylor, 2006; European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2009), ‘civilian power’ – ‘military power’ contradictions (e.g. Harnisch, 2000; Salmon and Shepherd, 2003; Schroedter, 2003; Dembinski, 2003; Manners, 2006) and transatlantic security (e.g. Hatjiadoniu, 2000; Gärtner, 2001; Howorth and Keeler, 2003; Rühl, 2007). In many cases, the security notion is used in the context of the struggle against existing and potential threats and without clarifying of how an issue is being defined as a threat, where the line of division between security and defence, security and security policy is. In consequence of such indefiniteness, security becomes ‘universalized’, notably it obtains the same sense in relation to every problematic issue. In case of the EU, migration, crime, regional conflicts are proclaimed a priori insecure to European values, and, accordingly, every individual or group whose views and actions contradict these values, is attributed to insecurity. Thereby, an image of the ‘alien’ is created, and the struggle against it becomes articulated in the security sphere. On the one hand, a goal of this struggle is to secure society and its values. On the other hand, practices of securitization are directed at intensifying exclusion of the ‘alien’ and thus do not favour society as a collective identity of people acting according to the principles of inclusion and mutual recognition. The interrelation between security and identity can be discovered through analysis of the Copenhagen School’s concept of securitization (Wæver, 1993; Buzan et al., 1998; Buzan and Wæver, 2003) as well as the Paris School’s approach (Bigo, 2006; McCall, 2007; Lyon, 2009) that considers security in the context of identification with insecurity. Alongside with this, scientific findings of Iver Neumann (1996, 1998), Bo Petersson (2003) and Raymond Taras (2010), considering formation of identities in the context of ‘othering’, comprise important contributions to the security-identity nexus. At last, for understanding the identity notion, the concepts of Jürgen Habermas (1992) and Ernest Gellner (1983) can be embraced.

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The paper takes neither the presence nor the absence of European identity for granted. It has to be highlighted that the notion of European identity belongs to the history of the 20th century and correlates with development of the European Community and later – of the European Union. Precisely the necessity of solidarizing the newly created community preconditioned a search for common identity. Therefore, European identity minds identity of the EU; with this interpretation it will be used in the paper. What is investigated is the current mechanism of identity making. Without denying a possibility of European identity as such I suppose that exactly securitization can be a dominant mechanism of its formation nowadays. This research contributes thereby to the interrelation of the securitization and identity practices.

The hypothesis suggested here is that identity of the European Union is not being constructed as ‘identity on the inside’ based on belonging of people to the community and the practices of inclusion and recognition. The ‘negative proof method’ or ‘proof by contradiction’, used to prove this hypothesis, considers the following sequence of statements:

- proposition A is reckoned to be true/false;
- proposition B, which is the antithesis to the proposition A, is assumed to be true/false;
- if proposition B is proved as false/true,
- then proposition A is proved as true/false.

This means that the truth of the proposition A is being established by demonstrating that B’s being false leads to a contradiction and proves that A is true. Vice versa, proposition’s A fallibility can be proved by proposition’s B, which is the antithesis to the proposition A, being true.

The antithesis to my hypothesis is thus that identity in the European Union is not being constructed by contradiction to external identities, notably by the securitization practices of creation and exclusion of the ‘alien’. Therefore, the aim of the present paper is to prove the hypothesis by refuting the statement that European identity is being constructed on common belonging and the practices of inclusion and recognition and by proving instead that the identity is being created by means of securitization that provides for availability of a threat – or – an identity to secure against.

The paper is divided in three parts. The first part is based on theoretical considerations of the securitization and identity issues and presents an exploration of their interrelation. The second part elaborates the empirical aspect of the securitization and identity practices in the EU. The last part draws a conclusion regarding the interrelation of the European securitization and identity construction; it develops two alternatives of further developments and their possible consequences.

Securitization, identity and their interrelation

Security and securitization

In the 1970–80s, the urgency of moving beyond the classical realist/neorealist interpretation of international and regional security in political-military terms and applying a comprehensive understanding of security became obvious. As a result, there appeared several schools of security studies that broadened the traditional approach to security. As two of them represent the core interest for this paper, I will fix on them namely.

The Copenhagen School of security studies has been one of the first providing security with a new comprehensive definition. The researchers have stressed the priority of the political and separated it from security. Consequently, security has become continuation of politics allowing the use of emergency measures beyond the political game (Buzan et al., 1998: 23). Securitization is then continuation of politicization, the process of transformation of an issue into a security matter through its presentation and acceptance as a threat to a ‘valued referent object’, i.e. an object survival of which is threatened (Buzan et al., 1998; Buzan and Wæver, 2003). The need for
securitization occurs with securitising actor’s laying a claim to priority and urgency of a particular threat. Acceptance of the threat as such by an audience allows the actor to go beyond the established decision-making procedures and, accordingly, to apply all possible measures for its elimination (Buzan et al., 1998: 34).

When considering societal security, its inseparability from the identity notion has to be accentuated. In fact, it can also be called ‘identity security’, meaning security of not just a state, or population, or a group of people with rational characteristics, but security of the community that might be characterized as ‘we’-identity (Waever, 1993; Buzan et al., 1998). The main referent objects here are collective identities, i.e. groups with specific ethnic, national, racial, religious and other features, in other words, communities with which their members identify themselves. The context of societal security is being transformed depending on whether a collective identity defines the need for being secured against existing or potential threats. Regarding the European Union, it is characterized by a low level of political securitization as many political issues, e.g. sovereignty and national minorities problems, have moved to the field of societal security, namely – national identity (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 357).

One more school of security studies, the Paris School, considers security in terms of production of knowledge about insecurity. Specifically, ‘(in)security professionals’ determine the ‘regime of truth’ about what security is, what insecurity is and what causes threats, fear, uncertainty (Bigo, 2006: 8). Securitization correlates here with the use of techniques of power, where power is not a repressive but disciplinary instrument of identifying an ‘alien’. The Paris School gives a rise to the Surveillance Studies approach that investigates internal security through the problem of new forms of social control and formation of disciplinary/surveillance society (e.g. Bigo, 2006; McCahill, 2007; Lyon, 2009). A distinctive feature of Surveillance Studies is the reference to criticism of power elaborated by Michel Foucault, in particular, to the phenomena of bio-politics, panopticon and governmentality. The researchers agree that contemporary security policy is closely connected with intensification of control, exclusion of ‘abnormal’ individuals and automatic functioning of power. Specifically, banopticon of Didier Bigo (2006) goes even beyond Foucauldian panopticon, supposing that there are the individuals who are tracked, detected and excluded more certainly than others. Mike McCahill in ‘Globalization, Surveillance and the “War” on Terror’ (2007) has accentuated a categorization of people depending on their identification by surveillance technologies. David Lyon in his book Identifying Citizens: ID Cards as Surveillance (2009) has researched the interrelation between surveillance, citizenship, identification and democracy, paying attention on the threats to democracy and citizenship caused by intensified surveillance.

Identity and securitization

Identity has been referred to in the context of the ‘politics of belonging’ (C.A.S.E Collective, 2006: 470) that consists of two processes. The first of them includes objectivation (‘external’ identification by the use of ID cards, passports, biometrics, et cetera) and subjectivation (‘internal’ individual or group identification) and aims at securing an identity characterized by particular identificators. The second process is directed at elaboration of security discourses and practices.

Such a duality is quite usual for identity interpretations. Identity can be understood in general terms of self-consciousness of an individual or a group that is founded on a particular relation to ‘others’. The ‘other’ is primarily a discursive phenomenon, a constructed concept or image, by which and through which consciousness of the individual or the group is formed. The significance of the ‘other’ in identity formation is not to be underestimated – it can affect identity both in contradiction to the ‘alien’ and in connection with the community of belonging.

Can the phenomenon of the ‘other’ be used for constructing European identity, i.e. Europe as the community – not just as a sum of individual or group belongings to it but as a collective organism? Iver Neumann in his work Uses of the Other: ‘The East’ in European Identity Formation (1998) has
affirmed that an image of the ‘other’ has always been used for creating European identity. Throughout the history, Europe’s ‘others’ were Turkey and Russia whose social and cultural values were regarded as contradictory to the European ones. The former ‘other’ was considered non-Christian, i.e. uncivilized. The latter ‘other’ demonstrated the authoritative rule associated with cruelty and barbarianism. Therefore, they were always set against the democratic Christian civilization – the basis for European identity.

The biggest influence on the notion of ‘other’ has been made by the modern-time concept of national identity. Ernest Gellner (1983) has considered national identity being founded on culture, that is, common language, history and folklore. He has asserted that nation is a product of human beliefs and inclinations, thus people belong to one nation only if they recognize one another’s belonging to this nation. Nationalism, therefore, is an idea that provides the core for uniting people in the community. At the same time, homogeneity of culture can be preserved only by a state; the borders of culture should correspond to the state borders, while the rulers and the ‘ruled’ should have the same national origin.

Vice versa, Jürgen Habermas (1992) has thought of the ‘other’ not as an opposition but as just a difference and depreciated national identity and nationalism as political principles. Identity is not belonging to the community integrated on a basis of common ethnic and cultural backgrounds, but a practice of citizenship in solidary communicative society with a democratic constitution. Citizenship (not nationalism) is the political phenomenon that relates directly to the exercise of the citizens’ democratic right to political participation, regardless of their ethnic and cultural differences. This understanding of citizenship is derived from Aristotelian doctrine of a state – precisely a polis as the political community founded on the principle of active citizenship, i.e. inclusion of every citizen in political life of the community, is the prototype used by Jürgen Habermas. On the contrary to the ‘external’ existence of a citizen in relation to a state, which does not provide political involvement in community life, but a legal status, political citizenship is actualized in the community of the equals, where individual identity of each is identity in the collective with common political traditions and institutions. With this respect, political identity is inseparably linked with realization of the practices of inclusion of the ‘other’ that creates the potential for common accomplishment of initially different positions.

On the one hand, as has fairly been stated by Iver Neumann (1996: 199), identities exist in the context of each other because the self-image is always founded on the image of the ‘other’ that ‘self’ has chosen as own enemy or opponent. Raymond Taras (2010) has accented that because our understanding of what is good and what is evil creates a virtue, based in turn on prejudices, a prejudice is a basis for constructing identity at the individual level. Therefore, it is important to recognize that the use of the ‘other’ as an opposition can be a powerful constructive instrument at the societal level. Thereby, creation and polishing of dichotomies according to the scheme ‘we’-‘they’ becomes an integral part of societal existence. Bo Petersson (2003) has named this phenomenon ‘scapegoating’ – a specific kind of image construction aimed at solidarizing society against the ‘alien’. It is built upon such a negative rejection of the ‘scapegoats’ that, according to the scientist, is much easier to create than positive criteria of belonging to the community; therefore, ‘scapegoating’ becomes the precondition of solidarization in society (Petersson, 2003: 106).

This reaffirms that security is constructed in terms of constructing insecurity. Such a manipulation between the sides of good and evil contributes to formation of identity ‘against-something-and-someone-insecure’. In other words, creation of ‘we’-identity inevitably provides for rejection of identity of the ‘other’. Bearing in mind that securitization always deals with threats and the struggle against them, I now infer that securitization can become a powerful instrument of constructing identity, which is the identity against-something-and-someone-insecure or, in other words, against-the-alien.

On the other hand, it is clear that securitization requires a threat embodied, for example, in a figure of offender, terrorist, corrupt, pirate, migrant, et cetera. Consequently, it can be supposed the
The securitization and identification practices in the European Union

Precisely the intensive development of the European Union’s security policy might be a striking evidence of how European ‘identity by rejection’ is being constructed. The question is whether it can be possible to speak about European democratic identity with its ‘universal’ equality, freedom and solidarity, while the securitization envisages exclusion of potentially dangerous people. At the same time, the most important issue for the European Union in the context of contemporary security is whether its internal identity is being constructed as identity ‘on the inside’, that is – on belonging to the community and application of the practices of political inclusion – or – as a contradiction to external identities fulfilled by the securitization practices of exclusion.

First of all, I will briefly address myself to the normative identity formation in the European Union. For the first time, the identity issue was raised in the 1970s at a meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs in Copenhagen. Then, European identity was determined as a means of common actions in international relations (Guittet, 2004). The next significant period of actualization of the issue began with signing of the Single European Act in 1986. This document laid a foundation for the further development of the European Community – it was aimed at establishing the Single Market and European Political Cooperation and changing the decision making process toward empowerment of the European Commission and the European Parliament as the supranational institutions. Realization of those provisions took place alongside with adaptation to the new international order after the collapse of the Soviet Union and, accordingly, of the bipolar world system. Although the presence of ‘peaceful war’, which, being founded on the mottos of the struggle for own values still provides this struggle, and thus contains a category of opposition and rejection ‘anti’: anti-something-and-someone, ‘anti’ in relation to some anti-social, anti-moral, anti-democratic conduct.

Identities rejected in the process of securitization are potentially threatening to societal security in itself. Enhancing security is in direct proportion to a rise of violence and insecurity because rejection of the ‘others’, defined and proclaimed as a threat, becomes a precondition for their unifying that might result in both a search for legal ways of recognition and illegal resistance. Bringing an image of the ‘alien’ or a potential ‘alien’ into the security discourse also affirms the presence of ‘peaceful war’ revealing itself, for instance, in the context of ‘war on terror’ or migration control. This dominant discourse of exclusion is the core in the contemporary security sphere; by manipulating with negative stereotypes and prejudices, it eliminates an opportunity for interaction between the included and the excluded – internal and external groups. The context of war against terrorists, migrants, criminals and other similarly insecure groups is implicitly violent as precisely articulation of differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’ shapes the opposition inseparable from violence and coercion. Consequently, only the included group – ‘we-group’ – can identify itself with all privileges provided by belonging to it and levy war on those whom it determines as anti-social, anti-moral, anti-democratic.

As soon as security, moving away the political, puts a stopper on political interaction with recognition and understanding of values of the ‘other’, it initiates construction of the contradictive identities of ‘we’ and ‘they’ that allows the use of emergency measures against the ‘other’. The reference to universality of the European civilizational democratic values and the need for their protection may become the mechanism that legitimizes depoliticization of the security discourse and produces the sole ‘knower’ of the truth about security/insecurity. Hereby the knowledge about security/insecurity that is undeniable and true occurs. Therefore, in the context of securitization one can reaffirm the absence of the political, more so because war against everything presented and accepted as hostile, barbaric, senseless, vague, leaves no opportunity for political inclusion. By such a movement of security beyond the political, depoliticization takes place that does not imply a need for further legitimization of decisions and methods used for their performance. Consequently, intensification of the securitization makes war against terrorism, crime, migration a usual part of everyday life.
appearance of new borders created political uncertainty in the future development, it gave an opportunity for the European Community to play a major role at the international arena. Subsequent treaties – the Maastricht Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty and the Treaty of Nice – were mainly devoted to improvement of the internal institutional structure and preparation for the inclusion of the post-socialist states in the European Union. However, the absence of a common value basis for a collective identity led to a search for alternative factors of identification. Such a project of European identity resembled Habermasian idea of constitutional citizenship. Nevertheless, a potential for common accomplishment of initially different positions by means of political inclusion was not realized in practice – incoordination in positions of the member states preconditioned the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty. When comparing the Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties, it can be noticed that the changes regarding the mechanism of decision making and division of power between institutions have been preserved, while the changes supposed to put the EU into a state shape in the Constitution, such as establishment of the official symbols, have been removed from the new document.

However, Article 1 A of the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community (Official Journal of the European Union, 2007b) (in the sequel – the Treaty of Lisbon) proclaims that the European Union has been founded on the values of freedom, equality, democracy, the rule of law, respect for human dignity and human rights, including minorities’ rights, and underlines these values are common for the EU’s member states coexisting in community of tolerance, justice and solidarity. When looking at the original statement, ‘These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail’ (Official Journal of the European Union, 2007b)¹, it can be inferred that the values are considered common in the indissoluble connection to understanding of European society as living in the community. It becomes even more explicit when referring to the origin of the word ‘society’, which actually means ‘common’ (societas – from lat. ‘union’, ‘community’). Hence, the Treaty of Lisbon, the last treaty adopted by all the EU’s member states, is the document called for constructing European identity, solidarizing the states on a basis of values recognized and accepted by all of them.

Nevertheless, potentially constructed European identity has a rather ambiguous nature. Included in the same document solidarity clause (Article 188 R (1)) and mutual assistance principle (Article 28 A (7)) define solidarity and mutual assistance addressing a figure of the enemy – terrorist and aggressor respectively: ‘The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster’, and, ‘If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power’ (Official Journal of the European Union, 2007b). Thus, the basic principles of constructing European identity are provided here in the context of threats, i.e. security/insecurity. Does it mean that a reason for articulating the external ‘alien’ is an absence of internal solidarity?

Appeals for development of solidarity, spread of liberal and democratic values as universal values, protection of human rights have repeatedly resounded in various documents and speeches of political leaders. But alongside with the mutual assistance principle and the solidarity clause as well as with the emphasis on universality of democracy, freedom and equality, ‘minorization’ of those who do not recognize these values as universal, occurs. Accordingly, those who do not harmonize with the western concept of universality, fall the secondary or the ‘other’ in relation to this concept. This can be revealed, for example, from Tony Blair’s speech to the USA Congress (Blair, 2003)²:

… ours are not Western values. They are the universal values of human spirit … The spread of freedom is the best security for the free. It is our last line of defense and our first line of attack. And just as the

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² ©American Rhetoric.
trend is that the protection of society from threats is accomplished via extensive use of technologies that can be considered surveillance (Buxton, 2010). They include drones and combat robots built by the European defence companies, mainly by PIAP (Industrial Research Institute for Automation and Measurements – a Polish developer of combat robots) and IAI (Israel Aircraft Industries – a developer of space and defence technologies). This is the most obvious proof of Didier Bigo’s statement that war ‘is thus the opposition between “good” and “evil”, where the latter is personified in the figures of the “aliens” – terrorists, crime committers, migrants, et cetera. In the interview “Fundamentalism and Terror” (Borradori 2003: 41) given after 11 September 2001, Jürgen Habermas has accentuated the presence of a phenomenon of “militant democracy”. It means that acting according to the principle “no freedom for the enemies of freedom” and drawing the line of division between different world outlooks democracy denies mutual tolerance by itself. While conducting boundaries in relation to democratic values is regarded as a practice of the enemies of democracy, similar boundaries are created in democracy, where equality of rights and freedoms is supposed to be safeguarded. Therefore, the origin of the European securitization is thus the opposition between “good” and “evil”, where the latter is personified in the figures of the “aliens” – terrorists, crime committers, migrants, et cetera. In the interview “Fundamentalism and Terror” (Borradori 2003: 41) given after 11 September 2001, Jürgen Habermas has accentuated the presence of a phenomenon of “militant democracy”. It means that acting according to the principle “no freedom for the enemies of freedom” and drawing the line of division between different world outlooks democracy denies mutual tolerance by itself. While conducting boundaries in relation to democratic values is regarded as a practice of the enemies of democracy, similar boundaries are created in democracy, where equality of rights and freedoms is supposed to be safeguarded. As has been aforesaid, this is “peaceful war” which being founded on the struggle for the “universal” values however implies this struggle that comes true in putting artificial borders between individuals and groups. The European Union is not an exception to this case as such categorization of population happens via accomplishment of various securitization practices – emergency measures. For instance, after the events of 11 September 2001, the European Union has intensified the development of Schengen Information System (SIS), within which four categories of “alien” behaviour have been marked out: troublemakers, suspected terrorists, people who are not allowed to enter the EU and people who stay in the EU with expired visas and have to be deported (McCahill, 2007: 226).

Then, national identification systems (ID cards) represent an attempt to define and fix internal identity on a basis of rejected external identities. The system of ID cards combines information taken from various databases of the ministries of internal affairs, tax administrations, health institutions, banks, creating a “card cartel” named so by David Lyon (2009), which is designed to protect “we”-identity and so exclude the “others” outside the national borders. By means of ID cards’ application, alongside with identification of “external” groups, the “internal” group of people who belong to the internal political community (citizens) is being defined. At the same time, a simple presence of borders, which function is to put the difference and in such a way to demarcate the political community, does not prove directly the presence of this community, as otherwise an absence of community would mean an absence of borders (see Zapata-Barrero, 2009).

The most sophisticated and simultaneously simple among securitization mechanisms is surveillance. Applied with the purpose of protecting society from threats, technologies of protection such as visual (cameras, satellites, unmanned vehicles), acoustic (audio, infra and ultrasonic), biochemical (biometrics, genetics), electromagnetic (radio, infrared and ultraviolet), computer technologies, et cetera (Petersen, 2001) carry out intensification of surveillance over people; therefore, the dividing line between protection and intrusion is very blurred. Although a possible usefulness of such a phenomenon as surveillance should not be denied, the problem underlined is in the absence of a mechanism of control over the mechanism of control, which, not being restrained, may lead to what is called “militant democracy”. At present, it is to be asserted the imperfection in functioning of surveillance technologies, which, being created for the sake of people and their community, often work against people’s inclusion and recognition.

For instance, more than €50m is allotted in the EU for the installation of military surveillance technologies to control the border (Buxton, 2010). They include drones and combat robots built by the European defence companies, mainly by PIAP (Industrial Research Institute for Automation and Measurements – a Polish developer of combat robots) and IAI (Israel Aircraft Industries – a developer of space and defence technologies). This is the most obvious proof of Didier Bigo’s
banopticon (Bigo, 2006). The unwillingness to recognize other values, which are different from the ‘universal’ or European ones, the insufficiency of interaction and understanding senses of the ‘others’ may result in complete devaluation of the community principles.

In addition, such embodiments of the securitization are meagrely accurate and objective. There is no a case until now when surveillance cameras have prevented a terrorist act, although they are installed with the purpose of the struggle against the threats. Despite the fact that London was the most ‘transparent’ city in the world, video control did not prevent terrorist attacks there in July 2005, but even this fact of the failure did not stop doubling the number of surveillance cameras in London to 4.2 million (McCahill 2007: 218) and application of this technology in other European cities. According to the Financial Times, and specifically to Johnny Barnes, the former Executive Director of the Washington affiliation of the American Civil Liberties Union, surveillance cameras are not effective in preventing crime; and alongside with this they cause irrefutable violation of privacy (Heiser, 2005). When a camera reveals behaviour that might be evaluated as suspicious, this still demands participation of a person able to accomplish the evaluation. But what are the criteria for people who manage these technologies to define which behaviour is suspicious and which is not? Due to the absence of the definite criteria, a priority in suspiciousness may be given to particular racial, religious, ethnic features, namely to those ones which in specific time and specific place differ from an average norm. Meanwhile, as a research shows, 40% of people become targets of surveillance only because of their belonging to a particular group (race, ethnicity, gender, subculture) – not because of aggressive behaviour (Norris and Armstrong, 1997).

Even the most developed technologies do not give a total guarantee of avoiding a threat, being sometimes inclined to misinterpretation and misidentification of data. The relevant risk is that the most commonly used methods of people’s identification – fingerprinting, DNA sampling and facial recognition – are subjected to such inaccuracy. Although fingerprints’ taking is one of the most reliable mechanisms of identification due to their uniqueness and difficulty in changing (the only way to change a fingerprint is to transplant the whole piece of finger skin), there is still a risk of a database failure or a mistake of premeditated or unpremeditated swapping fingerprints in a laboratory (Garfinkel, 2000: 42–43). There are also identification problems in relation to DNA samples. DNA is not always unique: at first, enzygotic twins share an identical genetic system; at second, there is a possibility of a chance occurrence – DNA of different individuals can coincidently match, for example, a standard DNA test can reveal such a random match in 1:100 cases, and even if results of several tests of the same genome are combined, probability of the match will be reduced to 1:1,000,000 cases or more but will not be totally obviated. In addition, DNA identification tests demand a highly-qualified technician which happens not always (Garfinkel, 2000: 48–49).

Facial recognition is the most simple and widely used mechanism of identification. However, it has repeatedly been proved that a facial-recognition system is inclined to detect a number of both ‘erroneously positive’ (erroneously recognized as suspicious) and ‘erroneously negative’ (erroneously not recognized as suspicious) objects. The tests of the US government have showed (International Campaign against Mass Surveillance, 2005) that when identifying a document’s owner, in particular, when matching biometric data with a photo in a document, there are five cases out of 100 when the technology does not identify the individual at all, and there is one case when it identifies him/her wrongly – as someone else. Recurrent tests conducted over three years have demonstrated that the previous degree of inaccuracy has grown up to 15% because of photo’s quality worsening. This means there can be 150,000 misidentified people out of 1,000,000. Thereby, in addition to the fact that detecting ‘hostile’ behaviour is not completely accurate, there is a danger to accuse the crimeless and not to take into account the hostile indeed.

One more thing concerning the securitization-identification practices has to be accentuated. They provide information not so much about an individual as about his/her particular features, thus destroying integral identity of a person, identification of himself/herself with own physical being
Inclusion and recognition of inclusion and recognition of misuse. The most important is that the consequences of such deliberate or unpremeditated errors are not properly dealt with, as suspicious and dangerous easily, in correspondence with the legal document. And again, the discriminative character of categorization according to particular national, religious, anthropological and other features allows some people to label others as suspicious and dangerous easily, in correspondence with the legal document. And again, the principal risk of this consists not so much in quality of information as in its misinterpretation or misuse. The most important is that the consequences of such deliberate or unpremeditated errors reflect themselves on people’s living in the community according to the principles of political inclusion and recognition.

Obvious evidence of narrowing human rights without a proper possibility of their protection, caused by the intensified gathering of personal information, is a well-known case of S. and Marper versus the United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights, 2008). Although S. and Marper, arrested in 2001, were not accused, their DNA samples were saved in the National DNA Database without mentioning a term of their deletion. Only after a lawsuit, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) recognized a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights by the UK government, namely, of the right to respect for private life. Besides, according to the decision of the ECHR, DNA samples of up to 850,000 people, saved among 4.5 million in the DNA database, were decreed to be deleted. However, the general picture has not been changed considerably since then, because the practice of retaining DNA profiles of arrested but not convicted people continues. In particular, samples of arrested people are to be saved for six years (and 12 years for those whose arrest concerns serious violent or sexual offence) (BBC News, 2009). Meanwhile, it has to be marked out that the UK has the largest DNA database in the world – it contains DNA samples of 5.2% of British population – and is to be especially underlined that among this percentage the most ‘sampled’ are black males (40%), whereas a relatively small number of white and Asian males – 9% and 13% respectively – are profiled (Lyon, 2009).

In some official documents, there is even a certain definition of personal data of such individuals, whose ‘racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, and data concerning the health or sex life’ (Official Journal of the European Union, 2007a) are different from ‘normal’. These are so-called ‘sensitive data’ in the Passenger Name Record (PNR) Agreement of 2007, which enables the US authorities to access the EU’s passenger database (34 categories of data on names, addresses, e-mails, dates of birth, credit cards, travel requirements, tickets, et cetera). The purpose proclaimed officially is the fight against terrorism and transnational crime. But the official intention turns into migration control resulting in elimination of the right to respect for private life, the right to freedom from discrimination and the right to data protection (European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, 2010). At first, there are no mechanisms of rights’ protection in the document for people who might be recognized as suspicious as well as there is no information about the ways personal information is collected and used. At second, there is an explicit misuse of personal data by the USA (data are used for immigration policy and border control and supposed to be kept for 15 years at least –seven years in the active use and eight years under the ‘non-operational’ condition). At third, there is no a statement about an accurate deletion of data afterwards (Official Journal of the European Union, 2007a). Next, a disproportion between a necessity to achieve the proclaimed purpose and the methods of its realization takes place. In addition, the discriminative character of categorization according to particular national, religious, anthropological and other features allows some people to label others as suspicious and dangerous easily, in correspondence with the legal document. And again, the principal risk of this consists not so much in quality of information as in its misinterpretation or misuse. The most important is that the consequences of such deliberate or unpremeditated errors reflect themselves on people’s living in the community according to the principles of political inclusion and recognition.
Concluding scenarios

As has been showed above, security is indissolubly connected with construction of insecurity and simultaneously linked with identity making. In relation to construction of identity in the European Union, it becomes obvious that it occurs precisely in the context of the struggle against the threats. Accomplishment of the securitization and identification practices takes place on a basis of ‘othering’ and perception of the ‘other’ as the ‘alien’. Hereof it is evident that the contemporary securitization in the European Union is a strategy of constructing identity ‘by rejection’.

I can now affirm that the antithesis to my hypothesis is not true. Notably, European identity is being contracted by contradiction to external identities, through accomplishing the securitization practices of creation and exclusion of the ‘alien’. When keeping in mind that the ‘other’ influences identity both in contradiction to the ‘alien’ and in connection with the community of belonging, the indisputable prevalence of the former over the latter in the European Union can also be affirmed. Therefore, European identity is not being constructed on a basis of belonging to the community and practicing political inclusion and recognition.

Nowadays, the difference in traditions, values and intentions of the EU’s member states compels to speak about a crisis of solidarity and value basis in the European Union, which results in growth of significance of the ‘other’ as the solidarizing factor. It appears from this that protection of a valued referent object from threats encounters the absence of a common valued component when the referent object is European identity. Thus, the substitution of notions occurs – while the rhetorical subject at issue is pluralism, solidarity, and respect for human rights and minorities’ rights, the matter of fact deals with categorization and exclusion of people in accordance with the specific criteria. That is why the other side of the coin called constructing identity has to be taken into account – formation of European identity by contradiction to external identities, notably by the securitization measures of creation and exclusion of the ‘alien’, without congruous elaboration of identity ‘on the inside’, based on belonging to the community and practicing inclusion and recognition, can be the biggest threat to European society in the meaning of community. As has repeatedly been claimed (but see Neumann, 1998: 37), ‘othering’ may become a too high price to pay for solidarization when development of the practices of exclusion is prioritized even more than exclusion itself. Thereby, the outcomes of the securitization become threatening for the referent object such as internal identity that brings into question feasibility of societal security as a whole.

It follows from this that two different scenarios of the further securitization development in the European Union can be inferred.

1. The EU develops identity on a basis of ‘alien’ identities in the sequel. On the one hand, the function of the securitization as the strategy of identity construction should not be underestimated. It can be supposed that de-globalization, created by means of constructing ‘alien’ identities and setting them against national identities, takes place. European identity, which throughout the history has been founded on the opposition of the European civilization to other – uncivilized and barbarian – values, faces an ultimate threat of loss of its own importance as many other types of identities – ethnic, linguistic, religious, transnational, cosmopolitan – acquire importance instead. Therefore, the current securitization in the EU represents an attempt to maintain national identities in Ernest Gellner’s context from their further erosion. On the other hand, the securitization of ‘rejected identities’ alongside with possible fallibilities in detection of ‘alien’ individuals and groups can enhance insecurity in society. It can also be supposed that the current securitization measures intensify the threat of ‘clash of civilizations’ – globalization with its consequences of blurring boundaries and fragmented identities leads to expansion of the potential ‘clash’ space; therefore, present developments in the security sphere exacerbate confrontations of identities.

2. The EU develops identity constructing a common value fundament. If securitization is continuation of politicization with emergency measures, then it might be theoretically possible to turn securitization back into the field of the political, i.e. direct it toward the practices of political
inclusion and recognition. At the same time, desecuritization as the reversion of the political does not seem exclusively theoretical. The schools of security studies emphasize the negativism of moving beyond the political and suggest a possibility of long-term desecuritization with devaluation of the insecurity discourse (Buzan et al., 1998; C.A.S.E Collective, 2006: 445). At first, one should take into account that a dividing line between identities is very fuzzy – initially, there are no strict good and strict evil or accurately fixed identities ‘we’-‘they’. At second, a dividing line between politics and security is rather fuzzy as well – it is appropriate to talk about both political security and security policy, security is an integral part of the political discourse in terms of foreign policy, conflicts, peace, risks and threats. Thus, such fuzziness gives an opportunity for political discussions. If the political ends when the political discourse ends, desecuritization will take place on condition that security will be brought into the political discourse again, which would suppose not just negotiations on security issues but political inclusion and recognition among various actors, including both ‘included’ and ‘excluded’ identities with their political and philosophical views, religious beliefs, ethnic and race features, that is – beyond the ‘universal’ values. This can be achieved, for example, in a form of Habermasian discourse with political participation of people in life of the community regardless of their ethnic and cultural differences. Possibly, this may lead to a redefinition of the security concept – a transition from ‘negative security’ as security against threats to ‘positive security’ as security for developing a value component in society and a mechanism of civil control over the securitization practices. This would be undoubtedly important for construction of the collective identity in the European Union as would imply identity based not on the external ‘other’ but on the internal common values.

References


