Decelerated Integration

A Qualitative Case Study of the Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration of the March 23 Movement in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Filip Lidegran
Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to study the proposed Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration (DDR) policies of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) and the recommendations of the Rift Valley Institute in the wake of the surrender of the M23 Movement, an armed rebel faction, in December 2013. The study seeks to assess the capability of these policies to address the grievances of the members of the M23 Movement and whether they will bring lasting peace between the rebels and the Government.

To assess these policies, a content analysis of five key documents is conducted. The analysis uses a theoretical framework inspired by the work of John Paul Lederach (1997) on Conflict Transformation and that of Stina Torjesen (2013) on reintegration of former combatants. The framework explores the content of the policies according to four “pillars” of successful DDR – actors, context, timeframe & action.

The study concludes that while efforts for political integration has had some success, the cause for the M23 rebellion was economic grievances which has not yet been addressed. Furthermore, a lack of political will has delayed the implementation of the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, which bears a resemblance to previous attempts at DDR. A new amnesty law that exempts perpetrators of gross human rights violations has had some success in ending impunity for the worst offences. MONUSCO has been criticized for partiality towards the National Government, and its increasingly forceful stance in the conflict has persuaded some groups to submit to DDR while others have intensified their aggressions on UN personnel.

**Keywords:** DDR, M23, MONUSCO, DRC, Conflict Transformation, Force Intervention Brigade
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<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFDL</td>
<td>Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDP</td>
<td>National Congress for the Defense of the People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONADER</td>
<td>National Commission for Demobilization and Reinsertion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization &amp; Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDRRR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration &amp; Resettlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIB</td>
<td>Force Intervention Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICGLR</td>
<td>International Conference on the Great Lakes Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDDRS</td>
<td>Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization &amp; Reintegration Standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M23</td>
<td>March 23 Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDRP</td>
<td>Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNDDR</td>
<td>National Program for Disarmament, Demobilization &amp; Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC Framework</td>
<td>Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCD</td>
<td>Rally for Congolese Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>South African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDDR</td>
<td>Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization &amp; Reintegration</td>
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Introduction

The Democratic Republic of Congo, abbreviated DRC, is renowned for its status as the site of the “First African World War” – a questionable honor that the country has maintained for the past decade and a half (BBC, 2014). Armed groups have proliferated in its eastern provinces. Its clashes with the National Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (abbreviated FARDC from its French name) have entrenched the region in a perpetual state of armed conflict which have brought immensurable suffering to the general population. Despite numerous attempts to disarm the armed groups and integrate combatants into mainstream society, unaddressed grievances between the involved belligerents eventually spark renewed rebellion every time.

The United Nations’ involvement in the DRC has resulted in the largest mission in the organization’s 68 year long history. Founded in 1999, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONUSCO, is involved in several programs to negotiate peace between the warring factions, encourage reconciliation in the affected communities and to motivate rebel fighters to lay down their arms and find sustainable livelihoods outside that of waging warfare. In March 2013, MONUSCO was authorized by the UN Security Council to form a specialized Force Intervention Brigade, FIB, which consisted of 3000 soldiers and tasked to actively hunt rebels to neutralize them with armed force. This was an unparalleled new step in UN policy on dismantling rebel movements.
As a result of this new policy, the M23 Movement – one of the largest and most renowned current armed groups in the eastern DRC – officially surrendered on 12 December 2013. This turning point in history provides policymakers and researchers with a fresh opportunity to evaluate the UN policies that guide its actions in regard to disarming rebel movements in the DRC.

1.1 Purpose of Study

DDR in the Democratic Republic of Congo is not a new activity, but the year 2013 saw a drastic new form of rebel disarmament in the form of the FIB, the first of its kind in United Nations history. In light of this recent development, new policies are created to adapt to the new political terrain. This in turn creates opportunities to place said policies under scrutiny in the hopes of creating a better peace process.

This bachelor thesis seeks to analyze the process of disarming M23 rebels in the Democratic Republic of Congo from their conception to their defeat. The purpose is to describe the current path for DDR as proposed by the United Nations and the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo.
1.2 Research questions

1. How does the national Government of the DRC propose to disarm and integrate members of the M23 Movement?
2. In light of the surrender of the M23 Movement, what course does the United Nations suggest for DDR in the DRC?
3. How have these policies evolved from the conception of the M23 to present day?
4. To what extent have these DDR policies addressed the grievances of the M23 Movement?

Operational questions for the analysis will be presented in Chapter 5. Theory under ‘Analytical Framework’.

1.3 Relation to Peace and Conflict Studies

In order to ensure that post-war societies do not re-elapse into armed conflict, former combatants must learn to refrain themselves from violence and remain within the bounds of lawful and just living. Only then can conditions for Johan Galtung’s famous definition of “positive peace” appear (Galtung, 1967: 17).

The United Nations continuously work towards this goal. Its efforts are guided by policies which at times may be subjected to political discourse or lack all the necessary perspectives. Authors such as Carol Bacchi have suggested that through systematic analysis of the content
and underlying meaning of policy documents, students of peace and conflict can uncover hidden meanings or even find areas where the policy can be improved (Bacchi, 2009: 33). A content analysis can help summarizing and exploring the intent of the UN in the building of sustainable peace among civilians and former combatants in the DRC.
This chapter will provide the reader with the necessary knowledge to understand the practice of disarming rebels in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.

2.1 DDR – an introduction

Societies that have been plagued with violent conflict will inevitably face the problem of what to do with the armed people who fought the war. To that end, the UN has, along with various peace building agencies across the world, spent years developing and refining the practice of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, commonly abbreviated as DDR. It is an essential toolkit of postwar peacebuilding that seeks to help combatants recover from war and reintroduce them to civil society (UN Operational Guide to IDDRS, 2010: 24).

The concept of DDR has emerged from the lesson that a peace accord is no guarantee for long-term stability on the ground. It has always been difficult to link initial peacebuilding efforts to the social and political context (Colletta, Schörlien & Berts, 2008: 11). For that reason, the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, SIDDR, was initiated by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2002 to create a working framework for DDR implementation (ibid, 2008: 15). Realizing that individual combatants often face scarce
livelihood opportunities after war, the SIDDR proposed an approach with a safety net phase to ensure that former combatants do not need to continue their violence, while also linking it to broader social and economic development (ibid, 2008: 15).

In 2006, the Integrated DDR Standards, or IDDRS, was established by the UN with the help of SIDDR as a guidance for technical support, financing and implementation of programmes (ibid, 2008: 15).

The IDDRS employs several guiding principles that are deemed a requirement for successful DDR: a) it must be people centered to ensure non-discriminatory and fair treatment of all participants and beneficiaries, and tailored to the specific needs of different gender, ages and individual physical abilities; b) be flexible to suit the local context, transparent so that information is available and understandable to all involved, and accountable to international donors and national partners; c) nationally owned so that the primary responsibility for DDR programmes rests with national actors but not limited to governmental ownership; d) integrated with the broader peace-building project and have appropriate links with related programmes; e) Well planned in regard to safety and security, coordination, assessment, information and sensitization and a plan for transition and exit strategy (UN Operational Guide to IDDRS, 2010: 30).

Disarmament, sometimes referred to as D1, refers to the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small, light and heavy weapons, ammunitions and explosives from combatants and civilians alike (ibid, 2010: 25).

Demobilization, or D2, is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces and other armed groups. It is often, though not always, carried out by gathering the combatants into specially designed cantonment sites where they are registered, screened and vetted for future employment prospects (ibid, 2010: 25). Preferably, at this stage the ex-combatants should receive a small reinsertion package that will aid their transition to a civilian
lifestyle which may contain benefits such as food, clothing, tools, medical services, short-term education, vocational training, land distribution, subsidies etc. (Kingma, 2001: 410).

Reintegration encompasses many aspects of building peace but can be generally understood as the process in which ex-combatants acquire civilian status, gains a sustainable livelihood and achieves social reconciliation with the communities in which they were previously regarded as hostile warriors (UN Operational Guide to IDDRS, 2010: 25). Thus it becomes an economic and social procedure that may well span years and decades and must encompass psychosocial counselling for both perpetrators and victims, as well as addressing the root causes of the social unrest that sparked the conflict (ibid, 2010: 25).

2.2 History of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

The history of the DRC is one marred with infighting and corruption. As the nation broke free from Belgium in 1960, the country soon fell into a political chaos which only ended after General Mobutu Sese Seko seized power in a military coup in 1965 (BBC, 2014). His reign caused heavy corruption and a rampant abuse of human rights (Raise Hope For Congo, 2014).

Meanwhile in neighboring Rwanda, a leading Hutu regime cracked down the Tutsi minority that had lived a privileged life under its old colonial masters. A growing diaspora of Tutsi in countries bordering Rwanda eventually formed an armed political movement, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which invaded Rwanda in 1990 (BBC, 2014). The resulting civil war culminated with the Rwandan Genocide and the massacre of approximately 800 000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu in 1994. The RPF managed to oust the Hutu government and forced its remnants
to flee into the eastern DRC. These Hutu reformed into armed militias and continued their cleansing of Tutsi with support from the DRC president Mobutu (BBC, 2014).

Angered by the Congolese support for the Hutu guerillas, Rwanda and Uganda began to support an armed movement, Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaïre (AFDL) that was led by Laurent Désiré Kabila to oust Mobutu. What followed was the First Congolese War that raged from 1996-1997 and ended in the victory of the rebels. Laurent Kabila proclaimed himself president of the DRC (Washington Post, 2001).

Fearing to be replaced by a Tutsi marionette leader under Rwandan control, Kabila ordered the expulsion of all Rwandan military forces in the DRC in 1998. Rwanda refused and re-invaded the DRC with a supporting Tutsi guerilla, Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), thus starting the Second Congolese War (Raise Hope For Congo, 2014). This “African World War” raged from 1998-2003 and saw the assassination of Laurent Kabila and the succession of his son Joseph Kabila, the military involvement of nine African states and the loss of over 3 000 000 lives (BBC, 2014).

A temporary armistice called the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed in July 1999 between the DRC and five regional states. As part of the deal, the United Nations Security Council established the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, known as MONUC, to supervise the implementation of the agreement and to monitor the disengagement of forces (MONUSCO, 2014).

The war officially ended in 2003 after a series of peace accords. Rwanda and Uganda promised to leave the DRC and most, though not all, militias were to be integrated into a new national military force, the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC). However, political turmoil had not ended and the Kivu provinces in Eastern DRC would be plagued by countless insurgencies for the coming decade (BBC, 2014).
2.2.1 Rise of the M23 Movement

Following the national elections in 2006, the transitional government lead by Joseph Kabila retained its power. The RCD, now a political party, lost most of its political influence and its soldiers were assigned to integrate into the FARDC (BBC, 2014). MONUC was occupied with local capacity building in the political, judiciary and military sectors and attempted to resolve ongoing conflicts in the provinces (MONUSCO, 2014).

General Laurent Nkunda, a top-ranking officer in the RCD, had refused to integrate into the army – a decision suspected of being influenced by Rwandan interests (Stearns, 2012: 19). Laying low and building his influence among the ex-RCD, Nkunda’s movement gained prominence as the government began a crackdown on rebels in the failing army integration. Escalating tensions between the factions caused Nkunda to publicly announce a new rebellion, leading to the creation of the rebel movement National Congress for the Defense of the People, abbreviated CNDP, in July 2006 (ibid, 2012: 19).

The proclaimed objective of the rebellion was to combat the Hutu guerilla Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and protect the Tutsi community in the Kivu provinces. CNDP made use of ideology and parallel administrations, taxes and law enforcement to maintain control of its population (ibid, 2012: 28).

A failed ceasefire agreement in 2007 attempted to integrate the CNDP into the national army, a project termed “Mixage” (ibid, 2012: 30). However, lack of mutual trust soon turned the factions against each other again. A second agreement, the Amani Process, was initiated in 2008 but failed in its implementation (ibid, 2012: 32).

The CNDP insurgency ended in January 2009 when Kinshasa began backdoor diplomacy with Rwanda, which had backed the CNDP. Rwanda agreed to arrest Nkunda and place a puppet leader, General Bosco Ntaganda, as new leader of the CNDP. On May 23 2009, Ntaganda
agreed to reform CNDP into a political party and integrate its soldiers into the FARDC to aid Kinshasa in the fight against FDLR (ibid, 2012: 34).

In 2010 the UN Security Council renamed MONUC the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONUSCO. In light of the growing insecurity of the ground, this reformed Mission was authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate of protecting civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under threat of physical danger, as well as supporting the government of the DRC in its efforts to stabilize the country (MONUSCO, 2014). MONUSCO became criticized for siding with the policies of the Kinshasa government, particularly in regard to their strategies of military integration, often doing little to discourage the backdoor diplomacy and covert bargaining between the DRC and sub-groups in the rebel movements (Stearns, 2012: 60). MONUSCO would at times find itself cut out of the negotiations completely (ibid, 2012: 60).

Once more, the integration process was met with several difficulties. Elements within the CNDP were discontent with the peace agreement. Among these were Coronel Sultani Makenga, who used his time in the FARDC to covertly strengthen his position. Makenga and 300 loyal men openly defected in May 2012, citing the government’s failure to implement the March 23 accord and oppression of ethnic Tutsis in the Kivus as cause for their rebellion (ibid, 2012: 44). Thus, the M23 Movement was born.

Using the same strategies as their predecessor CNDP, the M23 Movement slowly expanded its territory in the Kivu provinces as government forces were unable to halt their advance. The rebellion culminated on 20 November when M23 besieged and captured Goma, the provincial capital of North Kivu (Global Post, 2013). This victory would allow the M23 to entrench its position in the region.

Following the events of the M23 rebellion, MONUSCO pushed for increased regional cooperation on the issue, which resulted in the signing of the Peace, Security and Cooperation
Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region on 24 February 2013, mostly referred to as the PSC Framework. Eleven countries and four international organizations signed the framework (MONUSCO, 2014). However, the inability of UN peacekeeping forces to protect Goma was a heavy blow for the Mission’s credibility (Stearns, 2012: 60).

Soon after, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2086 on 21 of January 2013, which called for the creation of the specialized Force Intervention Brigade, FIB. It was described as the first-ever “offensive” UN peacekeeping brigade and had the authority to “neutralize” and “disarm” rebel groups in the DRC (Global Post, 2013).

In July 2013, the FIB was deployed with over 3000 soldiers. Together with the FARDC, it managed to successively push back the M23 from their positions (BBC, 2014). Negotiations began in September in Kampala to no avail (Group of Experts 2014: 5).

On 6 November 2013, FIB-assisted government forces dealt a final, decisive blow to the M23 Movement. The following day, Colonel Makenga announced his surrender and the end of the insurgency (BBC, 2014).

On 12 December 2013, negotiations known as the Kampala Dialogue ended with the signing of the Declaration of Commitments by the Movement of March 23 at the Conclusion of the Kampala Dialogue (2013: 1). The agreement called for M23’s preparation for DDR, its renunciation of rebellion and the permanent refrainment from using weapons. The agreement allowed for amnesty for all but perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity, sexual violence and recruitment of child soldiers (ibid, 2013: 4). Additionally, the M23 Movement was granted the right to form a political party and its representatives were to be included in national commissions for reconciliation and restoration of property to legitimate owners (ibid, 2013: 4).

In addition to the United Nations, the government of the DRC and the M23, representatives from three other regional organizations participated in the negotiations. One was the African
Union. The other two were the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), both working for development, peace and security in their respective regions (ICGLR webpage, 2014 & SADC webpage, 2014). As we will see in the upcoming Chapter 6. Analysis, the result of the M23 surrender and its upcoming DDR programme have been mixed.
### MONUSCO Facts and Figures*

**Current authorization until 31 March 2015**  
Security Council resolution 2147 of 28 March 2014

#### Strength

**Initial authorization**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Observers</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Formed units</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
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<tr>
<td>22,016</td>
<td>19,815</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>1,050</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Additional authorization**

On 28 March 2013, the Security Council decided by resolution 2098 that MONUSCO shall, for an initial period of one year and within the authorized troop ceiling of 19,815, include an “Intervention Brigade” consisting inter alia of three infantry battalions, one artillery and one Special force and Reconnaissance company. This force ceiling was further confirmed by resolution 2147 of 28 March 2014.

#### Current strength (31 March 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Observers</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21,189</td>
<td>19,514</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>1,158</td>
<td>517</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*NB: Statistics for international and local civilians are as of 31 January 2014*

#### Country contributors

**Military personnel**

Algeria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Egypt, France, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Serbia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Yemen and Zambia.

**Police personnel**

Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, France, Guinea, India, Jordan, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine and Yemen.

3 Previous Research – Assessments of DDR in Eastern DRC

Since the Second Congolese War ended in 2003 there have been numerous attempts to dismantle armed groups in eastern DRC. There are few accounts that exhaustively explore such DDR programmes. Those that do exist are Master theses seeking to understand why previous programmes have failed. Two distinct targets emerge in this literature – one focusing on reintegration of the ex-combatants to a civilian life and another into the military forces. What they all share in common are that they have been marred by internal problems and in several cases have done nothing to promote sustainable peace in the Eastern DRC.

3.1 Civilian integration

Various UN Offices and national Congolese initiatives have attempted DDR in the DRC (Knight & Ozerdem, 2004: 502). The largest by far was the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, or MDRP (Specht, 2013: 15). Running from April 2002 to June 2009, it was an inter-state project in the Greater Lakes region with the target goal of reintegrating an estimated 350 000 combatants (MDRP Final Report, 2010: 1). The MDRP was funded by
primarily the World Bank, but received donor aid from several entities (MDRP Final Report, 2010, 1).

According to a report from Cordaid, a Netherlands-based organization working for sustainable international development, management of the MDRP in DRC were far from seamless. Observers have doubted the accuracy of the number of fighters, as leaders of armed groups inflated the numbers in order to receive money from the central bank (Douma, van Laar & Klem, 2008: 20). 150 000 of these fighters were to lay down their arms and go back to civil society, the others were to be integrated into the national armed forces (ibid, 2008: 20). However, lack of funding resulted in a prolonged wait between the stages of demobilization and reintegration, causing unrest in the DDR camps (ibid, 2008: 21).

Cordaid notes that the MDRP was throughout its existence dependent on MONUC for providing security, as MDRP was not mandated nor equipped to handle the military aspect of DDR (ibid, 2008: 16). MDRP turned out to have the least success in DRC, its primary target. First, the poor infrastructure became an obstacle for successful implementation on the ground. Second, the World Bank followed the MDRP’s cornerstone policy of promoting national ownership of the DDR process, but this was problematic. The DRC was in a weak position due to its inability to gain a military victory over the rebels, and the political elites themselves had a very low commitment to the DDR process (ibid, 2008: 16-17).

Civil society actors, particularly international NGO’s have been reluctant to participate in DDR, fearing to become associated with military actors and the political risks that entails (ibid, 2008: 57). Moreover, local NGO’s were reported to be marginalized in favor of larger INGO’s who received all the contracts (ibid, 2008: 57).

André Kölln (2011), a researcher at the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research explains that the nationally led DDR programmes for civilian reintegration did not fare much better than the international initiatives. The DRC had little capacity for handling its
own National Program for DDR, dubbed PNDDR in the months following the 2003 peace agreement (ibid, 2011: 12). For this reason it was replaced by the National Commission for DDR, CONADER in 2004. Cooperating with the MDRP, CONADER initially fared better in setting up identification and payment monitoring systems for ex-combatants, but were still hamstrung in their implementation due to heavy delays and poor planning (ibid, 2011: 22). This stance is backed up in a report from Transition International, a Netherlands-based consultancy firm in which author Irma Specht (2013) notes that “reintegration” in the DRC has functioned as a short-term reinsertion benefit that lacks long-term means for sustainable living and reconciliation (Irma Specht, 2013: 8).

Studying the interaction between the two DDR entities, Kölln concludes that the CONADER tended to be uncooperative to the international staff, sidelining them in work and at times pressuring them to leave (Kölln, 2011: 12). Kölln explains that CONADER was internally factionalized, with different political movements that preferred to withhold their military capacity until after the national elections (ibid, 2011:13).

In 2007, CONADER was replaced by the Unit for Project Execution, but this changed little since the Kinshasa government was at this time more concentrated on consolidating its central authority and reforming the security sector by integrating rebel movements into the national armed forces (ibid, 2011: 13).
3.2 Military integration

3.2.1 Brassage

Although civilian integration programmes had been underway for a long time, the transitional government would come to shift its priorities after the end of the Second Congolese War. The Kabila administration’s goal was to forge a new army and bring the disparate armed groups together. Edward Lucas, researcher at the Center of Non-traditional Threats and Corruption, CONTAC, has written extensively on this process and gives a clear analysis of the shortcomings of this ‘Brassage’.

Alongside the establishment of CONADER, the government also formed the Structure Militaire d’Intégration, SMI, working together with the MONUC and MDRP to oversee the creation of this new security apparatus, which would be named the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, FARDC. This process was coined ‘Brassage’, a French word for “mixing” or “melting pot” (Lucas, 2008: 17).

As part of the CONADER project, all combatants were initially required to demobilize and integrate into the civilian society (ibid, 2008: 22). The combatants could then later choose to remain in the military profession in the joint CONADER and SMI-funded orientation centers (ibid, 2008: 23). Those who were approved would undertake 45 days of basic military training and received their arms and uniforms (ibid, 2008: 23). Scholars and monitoring teams acknowledge that 45 days is far from enough to fully train a professional soldier or officer (ibid, 2008: 23). Once finished, these “integrated brigades” were to participate in joint operations with international MONUC soldiers to allow the government to exercise a monopoly on violence throughout the DRC (ibid, 2008: 23). However, military integration was stalled in the
early post-war years that followed the 2003 peace agreement. Lucas attributes this to a) inadequate funding for the projects and poor infrastructure (ibid, 2008: 33), b) problems with intra-agency cooperation and, most importantly, c) a lack of political will from the involved armed factions (ibid, 2008: 20). Although the signatories of the peace agreement were eager to become a part of the FARDC, their political and military elites were positioning themselves in the post-war insecure environment, hoping to gain political and economic power through their soldiers (ibid, 2008: 20). Some groups claimed that their continued presence in certain regions were necessary to protect their own ethnic groups, thus demonstrating a distrust for Kinshasa as well as MONUC to protect all of its citizens (ibid, 2008: 21).

3.2.2 Mixage

In the early years of the CNDP insurgency, the DRC government were still underway with the Brassage. Negotiations with the CNDP commander Laurent Nkunda concluded in an improvised military integration strategy dubbed ‘Mixage’ in which CNDP soldiers were incorporated into the FARDC chain of command without following the common road that other armed groups had previously done (Lucas, 2008: 44). These soldiers never joined an official DDR program nor given any integration assistance. Nkunda remained in command of his brigades (ibid, 2008: 44).

While the Mixage seemed like a necessary compromise at the time, it did little to end the instability and instead only strengthened Nkunda’s hold over the Kivu provinces. By inflating the troop numbers he was provided salaries that far extended his position and he made sure that his units remained intact at battalion level and not redeployed outside the Kivus (Stearns, 2012: 30).
Concluding on the Mixage, Lucas highlights the presence of ethnic loyalties, malfunctioning political arrangements a lack of trust between the belligerents as reason for the failure of the DRC’s DDP programmes to create a national armed force capable of sustaining a monopoly of violence in the hands of the state (Lucas, 2008: 46).
3.2.3 Accelerated Integration

When CNDP surrendered for the final time in 2009, ‘Accelerated Integration’ became the name for a new attempt to integrate the rebel soldiers. Iker Zirion, a professor at the Institute for Studies of Development and International Cooperation, gives an analysis of the process and an insight in recent failures of the DRC’s DDR strategy. Like the Mixage process two years before, integration of CNDP under the command of Ntaganda was undertaken in an immediate form, without any training or sensitization of combatants (Zirion, 2009: 12). This, according to Zirion, has not only entrenched the divisions between the factions within the FARDC but also between the insurgents and the civilian population. One of the most direct impacts of the Accelerated Integration has been the impunity of crimes committed by rebels that now wore a government uniform (ibid, 2009: 11). The FARDC, filled with un-sensitized soldiers that have made their living through extortion, had become one of the main perpetrators against the civilian population (ibid, 2009: 14).

MONUC had been excluded from the planning and implementation of the Accelerated Integration. The Mission had agreed to observe the operation and ensure that the protection of civilians was a priority but its authority extended little beyond that (ibid, 2009: 7).

Looking at the decision-making process of the government’s integration methods, Zirion notes a lack of long-term planning. Importance was placed on integrating armed groups rather than truly restructuring the armed forces (ibid, 2009: 17). Adding soldiers to the FARDC without a coherent purpose for the new personnel seem to only have strengthened the chaos within the national army’s ranks. A lack of vetting have allowed perpetrators of human rights abuses to find protection and means to continue their mistreatment of the civilian population (ibid, 2009: 17).
3.3 Emerging themes

From this extract of scholars who have studied the civilian and military DDR projects – its causes, difficulties and effects – a few general themes emerge which outlines a pattern to the conflict in the DRC:

1. A lack of monopoly on violence on the part of the central government of Kinshasa and the Kabila administration.
2. Lack of trust among the armed belligerents and the need to withhold arms and personnel in case of renewed fighting.
3. Exploitation and abuse of the civilian population.
4. Impunity among perpetrators of human rights abuses within the armed groups and the FARDC.
5. Lack of proper vetting into the FARDC.
6. A failure to reconcile the different ethnic groups that inhabit and wage war in the Eastern DRC.
7. Heavy corruption within the political and military elite that causes distrust from the donor community.
4 Methodology – Qualitative Content Analysis

4.1 Qualitative Research

The qualitative approach to scientific inquiry is defined by John Creswell as “a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible” (Creswell, 2013: 43). Qualitative research often begins with certain theoretical assumptions and uses interpretative or theoretical frameworks which guides the researcher’s actions in the study (ibid, 2013: 44). The research takes place in the natural setting of the intended target for study as opposed to a lab or other controlled settings (Creswell, 2014: 185). The focus on the study is centered on subjective interpretations among the targets for the study (ibid, 2014: 186).

The researcher is a central part of his own work, and must reflect on his or her own role in the study and what their personal background brings into the study (ibid, 2014: 186). Qualitative research is flexible in the sense that it can work both through inductive and deductive processes and can utilize several methods of data collection, ranging from surveys, interviews, document analysis and to organize them in custom-made categories for ease of use (Creswell, 2013: 45).
4.2 Ontological and Epistemological Discussion

I, as the writer of this thesis, recognizes that my own subjective understanding of the topic will shape the form of this study. As a student of Peace and Conflict Studies, I have adopted the opinion that all research should be for the betterment of mankind and that researchers bear the responsibility of pointing out flaws in our institutions that have a detrimental effect on individual people. I believe that good research has a transformative effect on the subject of study.

In autumn 2013 I was an intern at the DDR unit at Folke Bernadotte Academy. I have participated in the administration and courses in DDR and conducted my own research on DDR programmes around the world. I would say that I share the Academy’s views on what constitutes “good” DDR. I do however recognize that alternate views on the matter have validity, hence this study’s attempt to merge the UN’s DDR standards with other authors.

4.3 The Case Study Approach

Given the topic’s interconnectedness with a large entity – the state of DRC and its actors – a case study approach will be the most appropriate way to analyze DDR in the DRC. The intent of the study is to study documents that depict a real-life, contemporary setting which is strictly defined and bound in time and place, much like John Creswell’s definition of a case study (2013: 97). This single case study approach seeks to describe and explore how certain policy
makers assess the future of DDR in the DRC and thus, both the material, timeframe, location and practice becomes clearly defined.

Furthermore, a case study approach allows for a thorough descriptive section, which is needed in order to introduce the topic to the reader. A case study work procedure allows for the investigator to identify certain themes or issues within the research material and allow for further exploration of the subject. In this thesis, the theoretical framework will set the criteria for identifying these themes as described in the following chapter.

As with any method, a single case study faces challenges in the validity and reliability. One such thing is the researcher bias, both when it comes to framing the issue and when selecting research material (Creswell, 2013: 101). I alone have selected the documents based on my own understanding of what is needed for this study. The ‘Material’ section will defend my choices on this matter.

A second challenge is that results from case studies offer little potential for scientific generalization, given that human histories, cultures and practices vary enormously over the world (Yin, 1994: 10). But the intent of this study is to explore an instance of the peace process in one single case and to provide a deeper understanding of this single case rather than generalizing to the broader DDR practice.

A third criticism of the case study approach is that it poses the risk of being time-consuming and require such vast amounts of material that it becomes massive and unreadable (Yin, 1994: 10). However, the intent of this thesis is to analyze what certain policy documents say about the selected case, within a limited and clear timeframe, and not to provide an exhaustive understanding of the Congolese conflict.
4.4 Content analysis

According to Weber (1990), content analysis is a “research method that uses a set of procedures to make valid inferences from a text” (cited in Breuning, 2011: 491) and allows for a systematic investigation of the content of important policy documents. One of the key features of content analysis is the use of categories that are identified either in advance through theory or as they appear in the text (Flick, 2009: 323). Another purpose of content analysis is to reduce the material into smaller pieces of information (ibid, 2009: 323).

Philipp Mayring presents a five-step process for conducting a content analysis (cited in Flick, 2009: 324). The first step is to select and define the material that will answer the study’s research question. The second step is to analyze the origin of this material – its source, its generation and its author. The third step investigates how the material is transcribed and recorded, and what could possibly have affected and edited its production. In the fourth step, the researcher chooses the direction of the analysis as he attempts to answer his research questions, as well as adding his research theory to the process (ibid, 2009: 324). Here, Mayring places particular emphasis on the need to have a clearly defined research question in advance and that it is theoretically linked to earlier research on the issue, as well as it being divided into sub-questions (ibid, 2009: 234). In this study, the sub-questions will be introduced in Chapter 5. Theory under ‘Analytical Framework’.

In the fifth and final step, analytic units are defined. These units define what type of information is selected and processed in the analysis. (ibid, 2009: 325). The analysis material is then summarized, clarifies ambiguous terms and structures the material (ibid, 2009: 327).

An advantage of content analysis is that it is an unobtrusive research method – documents are accessible to anyone, does not require cooperation and will not alter their behavior when under
study (Breuning, 2011: 493). Another benefit of the method is the relative ease in which content analysis can be undertaken. Under the right conditions, a single researcher can process large amounts of information at very little expense (ibid, 2011: 493). Furthermore, due to the fixed nature of documents, recreation of the study becomes easier than other forms of studies, such as surveys (ibid, 2011: 493). It is also appropriate when studying trends over time (ibid, 2011: 493). Content analysis is also flexible in the sense that it can work with a number of research questions and theories (Flick, 2009: 328).

The weakness of qualitative content analysis is its lack of un-biased structures. A quantitative content analysis relies on a detailed research design, whereas a qualitative approach to the method often depends on the expertise of the researcher (Breuning, 2011: 494). Investigator bias is thus an inherent danger at every turn when conducting a qualitative content analysis. Paradoxically, content analysis is often used for the purpose of investigating subjective viewpoints in documents (Flick, 2009: 328). I move ahead with the assumption that my own experience with investigating DDR programmes will allow me to assess my findings in this study.

Content analysis is said to have a directed approach when existing theory is used to create categories before the actual analysis begins (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005: 1281). In this approach, the investigator uses prior research to identify key categories. The advantage of this method is that the analysis can begin immediately upon access of the material (ibid, 2005: 1282). The major disadvantage is an additional stage of researcher bias, as a personally chosen theory with personally chosen categories is applied on personally chosen documents, which increases the likelihood that the findings will confirm existing positions on the topic (ibid, 2005: 1283). However, perceived bias can be an advantage in itself as it avoids the naïve presumption that research is naturalistic and unbiased (ibid, 2005: 1283).
My decision to use a qualitative content analysis is based on the availability of materials – for a bachelor thesis with limited time and funds, a participatory approach is not feasible and I lack reliable contacts to interview. Thus, documents become my primary choice of materials, making content analysis the method of choice.
4.5 Limitations of the study

DDR is a vast concept, as is the conflict in the DRC. I have had to impose numerous limitations on myself as a researcher to be able to cope with the enormous amount of factors that would weigh into the study. These limitations range from thematic to methodological, in order to fit in the scope of a bachelor thesis.

The first limitation is the focus on a sole armed movement – the M23 – in relation to the DRC government and the UN. The reality of the conflict is not as simple – there are scores of armed rebel movements operating in and around the eastern DRC. The narrow scope of this thesis will make it impossible to explain all the interactions, interests and needs of the M23 Movement.

The practice of DDR is equally challenging to specify. DDR encompasses a wide array of peacebuilding initiatives, but this bachelor thesis must – for space issues – limit itself to the most commonly accepted definitions of DDR. Such a narrow understanding will leave out several aspects of the DRC conflict, wherein the mineral trade, government corruption and low state legitimacy all affect the situation.

Concerning methodology, I as a bachelor student am unable to produce first-hand data due to the enormous workload that a field study would entail. I am therefore limited to the secondary data that has been produced by previous research of the conflict. Furthermore I am limited to information that is written in English as I have no proficiency in French. This denies me access to data that quite possibly could impact the final results of the thesis.

The materials chosen for the analysis have been chosen based on their availability. This could pose several issues with the reliability of the study as the selection process could be seen as arbitrary. The importance of each document is described in the ‘Materials’ section.

A final limitation is created in the limited timeframe of the study. The conflict in the DRC spans decades which makes it more difficult to comprehend the causes of the conflict. I must
also point out that the topic of this thesis is a rather modern development in the conflict’s history. Had this study been postponed, more material would be accessible than what is currently available for the public. As of now, this study limits itself to study the outbreak of violence in 2012 to the aftermath of the peace agreement, ending in March 2014.

4.6 Material

The primary material for the thesis has been chosen to provide variation in both authors and publishing dates: one document comes from an independent organization; another from the National Government of the DRC and the M23 Movement; and three documents come from various sources in the UN leadership to provide a relatively coherent description on the UN’s position.

1. *From CNDP to M23 – The Evolution of an Armed Movement in Eastern Congo* (2012) is written by Jason Stearns at the Rift Valley Institute, an independent think-tank in Sudan. The Report was produced before the UN revised their policy towards disarmament in the DRC and created the FIB. The Report contains an analysis of the motives for the M23 Movement and closes with a number of recommendations.

2. *UN Security Council Resolution 2098* came into effect on 28 March 2013 following the establishment of the PSC Framework. The Security Council took note of the UN Secretary-General’s request to establish a specialized ‘Intervention Brigade’ within
MONUSCO (Resolution 2098, 2013: 4) and is thus the starting point for the increased military presence of the UN.

3. *The Conclusion of the Kampala Talks* saw peace brokered between the Government of the DRC and the M23 Movement on 12 December 2013, wherein the conditions for surrender are described.

4. *The Letter dated 22 January 2014 from the Coordinator of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council* was released to the public on 22 January 2014 and is the final result of months of on-site research by a selected team of UN experts. This 51-page document covers a wide range of issues in the DRC ranging from armed groups, illegal mineral trade and game poaching. Some passages in the letter concern the impendent DDR process and the on-the-ground information that the Group of Experts have uncovered. Unlike the other documents in this analysis, the Letter from the Group of Experts is very precise in a few, selected issues rather than focusing on DDR on a general, overarching level.

5. *The Special Report of the Secretary-General in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* was brought before the Security Council on 5 March 2014, in accordance with the Security Council’s request that the Secretary-General reports every three months on the progress of the implementation of the peace accords in the DRC. At the time of writing, this document is the most current report from the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the status of MONUSCO.
5 Theory – An Analytical Framework for Transformative DDR

5.1 Conflict Transformation

The Practice of DDR is based on the assumption that the best way to achieve sustainable peace is through disarming combatants and reconciling them with the civilian population rather than through less peaceful means. Various approaches exist for achieving reconciliation, but this study chooses to use the concept of *Conflict Transformation* as a way to understand “reconciliation” due to its emphasis on social relationships among involved actors.

As framed by Hugh Miall, professor of International Relations at the University of Kent, Conflict Transformation differentiates itself from its cousin traditions in distinct ways (Miall, 2004: 3). While other schools of thought, such as Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution, view conflict as the result of imbalanced power distribution which need to move away from zero-sum games by searching for mutually beneficial settlements to issues, Conflict Transformation upholds that such “quick fixes” are not adequate solutions to the problem (ibid, 2004: 4). Rather, it proposes:

“…a process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses and, if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict.” (Miall, 2004: 4).
Conflict transformation encourages the active participation of all actors in the conflict rather than relying on intervention of outsiders. This develops internal capacity for handling conflict and supports structural change (Miall, 2004: 17). In doing so, all sides of the conflict are taken into account in a comprehensive, wide and long-term process of peacebuilding (ibid, 2004: 4). These ideas seem compatible with the inherent thought behind the “Reintegration” phase in DDR, thus motivating its use in this thesis.

5.2 Lederach – A Framework for Reconciliation

Perhaps one of the most famous contributors to the school of Conflict Transformation is John Paul Lederach (Miall, 2004: 6). In his book, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, the professor of International Peacebuilding at Notre Dame University, Indiana gives an all-encompassing view on his work on Conflict Transformation theory which will serve as a theoretical framework for this thesis.

Central to Lederach’s work is that peace builders must look at both structural and procedural factors to understand conflict (Lederach, 1997: 79). These factors – roles, functions, activities, actors etc. – must be integrated in order to tackle societal problems (ibid, 1997: 79).

For Lederach, actors are the central toolbox for transforming violent conflict. Three levels of actors are identified which encompass the entire society.

At the first level we find the top-level leadership. It consists of the highest representative leaders of the government, opposition movements and the military (ibid, 1997: 38). A common feature for these is the high visibility and the power to frame issues and make decisions that affect the conflict environment as a whole (ibid, 1997: 40).
At the second level, *middle-range* actors represent the scores of highly respected individuals in particular sectors (ibid, 1997: 41). Primary networks of groups and institutions that link certain organizations together as well as representatives of larger social or ethnic groups also fall into this level (ibid, 1997: 41). Their power comes from their direct links with both the top-level national leadership as well as their trust and renown among the grassroots (ibid, 1997: 41).

At the third level we encounter the *grassroots leadership* that represent the people – the very base of society. In this level, life is characterized by a survival mentality where people daily struggle with making a living. The grassroots leadership engage in this life themselves through NGO relief work, hospitals or refugee camps and have good rapport with ordinary people (ibid, 1997: 42).

These three levels of actors engage and interact with each other in several layers. Each group play their specific part in transforming violent conflict to peaceful reconciliation (ibid, 1997: 55). These layers range from the imminent *issue* that sparked the conflict, the perceived *relationship* between the parties that needs to be addressed, *sub-systems* that encompasses limited instances as well as the larger societal *system* (ibid, 1997: 57).

Lederach also introduces the *nested paradigm*, a concept that explains what type of peace building action is used for each actor at a certain time in the progression of the conflict (ibid, 1997: 76). In this, Lederach stresses the need for policy makers to rethink their timeframes. A short-term crisis intervention is obviously needed to end the immediate violence, but actors must apply a longer-term thinking that uses education and a design for societal and social change to create a more attractive future for every actor (ibid, 1997: 77).

Through combining the mapping of actors, system and the process of the conflict, Lederach’s *integrated framework* for sustainable reconciliation takes form.
With the nested paradigm as an anchor for the timeframe, the starting point would be the intervention that seeks to manage the crisis. Here, Lederach points out the need to begin an analysis of the root causes of the conflict in order to explain the broader systematic factors that have given rise to the conflict (ibid, 1997: 79). These dual modes of thinking – that of current issues and broader systemic factors – live on within the subsequent phases where relational concerns are addressed by identifying the factors that preceded the violence as well as the system-wide action of creating desirable social and political relationships between the parties (ibid, 1997: 81).

Transformation occurs in the middle section of the framework where all the communities of thought and action intersect. Lederach thus places high regard on the middle-range actors and the sub-systems, as they have a particular ability to link the entire peace building project together (ibid, 1997: 81).

Conflict transformation can be understood in two fundamental ways – it must be both descriptive, meaning that peace building must assess the empirical impact of the conflict, and prescriptive, meaning that transformation is a deliberate attempt to create social change and envisions a more benign way of life for the affected population (ibid, 1997: 82). These descriptive and prescriptive ways move across all dimensions of society, ranging from personal to societal to the very cultural foundation of the conflict-affected context (ibid, 1997: 83).
5.3 Torjesen – A General Theory on DDR

Lederach deals mostly in the general understanding of conflict transformation, and does not provide a detailed analytical framework for understanding ‘reintegration’ within the context of DDR. To that end, I introduce the work of Stina Torjesen, an associate professor at the University of Agder. In her journal article *Towards a Theory on Ex-Combatant Reintegration* she encourages the development of a theoretical framework on the subject in which the experience of ex-combatants is at the forefront rather than high-level programmatic support (Torjesen, 2013: 1).

Supplementing Lederach, Torjesen recognizes the need to connect the reintegration of ex-combatants with broader conflict transformation process rather than short-term intervention (ibid, 2013: 2). She criticizes the academic and policy-making community for relying solely on international actors as starting point for analysis and requests them to alter their traditional and “one-dimensional” views of combatants as helpless victims or security threats (ibid, 2013: 5). Rather, Torjesen calls for an increased understanding of the fact that combatants are aware of the social relationships that they find themselves involved in with their commanders, comrades and the civilian population (ibid, 2013: 5). Rather than studying the conflict from an international perspective, the local agency among both individual combatants and high power holders must be studied directly on the ground (ibid, 2013: 9).

Torjesen defines “Reintegration” as a two-step process in which the ex-combatants 1) change their identity from combatant to civilian and 2) alter their behavior to end the use of violent means (ibid, 2013: 4). To that end, there are two forms of motivation, *push factors* and *pull factors*, which affect the combatant’s decision to demobilize. Push factors represent the unpleasant living conditions within the combatant’s group or military faction that may motivate an exit, whereas pull factors are factors from the broader societal context that encourages the
combatant to withdraw from their life as a rebel (ibid, 2013: 7). Metaphorically speaking, they serve as a “whip and carrot”.

There are three arenas in which this takes place; the social, political, and economic arena. In the social arena, the military identity of the combatants must be broken down and increase their interaction with civilian society. Torjesen observes that combatants often form part of a fighting group which remains intact even after reintegration has taken place and each combatant has rejoined civil society (ibid, 2013: 7). Peace builders need to be aware of this and study how social relations with family and friends outside military factions affect whether combatants demobilize. Additionally, more knowledge is needed on how said family and friends receive former combatants so that policy makers can employ longer-term reintegration strategies in order to successfully transform violent conflict (ibid, 2013: 9).

In the political arena, reintegration is understood as the process where combatants learn to involve themselves in mainstream politics at the local and national level, either as voters or as political advocates (ibid, 2013:6). An important recognition is that actors at the higher level – commanders and politicians – may use the integration, or lack thereof, of combatants as a bargaining chip in post-war power games which can cause difficulties for political reconciliation (ibid, 2013: 6). Implementers of DDR must assess to what extent the sub-units in the demobilizing factions remain in contact with one another and whether this becomes a leverage in political games (ibid, 2013: 8). The local context is an important variable – if reintegration takes place in a setting of continuing armed violence or in a formal peace it may well affect the impact of DDR and may steer whether combatants become integrated or marginalized in national politics (ibid, 2013: 8).

In the economic arena, reintegration programs must work to end the ex-combatants’ financial dependency on militia networks by giving them material incentives in order to detach themselves from their fighting units. Great care must be taken so that these incentives are not
reserved for the combatants’ superiors (ibid, 2013: 2). Tracing of the ex-combatants’ economic strategies becomes paramount – if they stick to pre-war economic roles such as scavenging, looting and/or providing informal security or if they make use of the new economic opportunities in the post-war society will tell us a great deal of the success of the DDR programme (ibid, 2013: 8).

5.4 The Analytical Framework

The starting point is the broad conflict transformation tradition as provided by Lederach. This knowledge is then funneled down through Torjesen’s ideas on DDR and combined with the founding principles of the UN Integrated DDR Standards. From this, four pillars of transformative DDR emerge that work across the prescriptive and descriptive dimensions of conflict transformation. These pillars will frame the analysis and help us understand DDR in a comprehensive manner.

The first pillar is what all three sources of knowledge propagate – proper peacebuilding and DDR begin their work from an actor-centered perspective. The IDDRS mentions “people centrism” as a prerequisite for DDR, and Lederach and Torjesen unanimously agree that all peacebuilding must be conducted with human beings at the center stage. The first step to this is to make a mapping of the top, middle and grassroots actors to describe and understand their personal, relational, structural and cultural roles in the conflict. Peace builders must demonstrate an awareness of how their actions can affect other people in their DDR programmes.
On the prescriptive level of actor-centered peacebuilding, policy makers should ensure national ownership of the programmes. It must be recognized that local actors, including on-the-ground combatants, are perfectly able to shape DDR and peace building on their own accord. International actors can help in this regard by assisting local actors in keeping their conduct transparent and accountable to all groups.

The second pillar is a contextual understanding of the broader environment. The IDDRS have previously stated that DDR must be integrated with broader peace building efforts, and this holds true in the eyes of both Lederach and Torjesen. Lederach has repeatedly argued for the need to link personal and relational initiatives with broader sub-systematic and systematic projects, and he is backed up by Torjesen and the IDDRS. Peace builders must be aware of how communal and societal factors may impact the combatant’s decision to stay in their military factions or choose to demobilize. This in turn help them develop strategic pull factors to offer a way out of military life.

The third pillar is the timeframe. Programmes must be developed with a clear, long-term scope that not only encompasses the immediate issue but also greater systematic problems that may take generations to resolve. An initial descriptive way of transformation will recognize what has been done in the past. The case of the DRC has been characterized by a complete lack of long-term planning in military integration projects, instead relying on “quick-fix” solutions such as ‘mixage’ or ‘accelerated integration’. The nation’s history has clearly demonstrated that such short-sightedness have only resulted in renewed conflict and has infallibly brought the DDR process to a halt every time.

Lederach’s nested paradigm provides peace builders with a sequenced working plan that includes every stage in a very long process. The ‘reintegration’ stage in particular requires a long-term and all-encompassing thinking as the entire fabric of the society must be motivated to envision a future without the presence of insurgent factions.
The fourth and final pillar is *transformative action*, which is backed up by the first three pillars and thus becomes the end product of conflict transformation and DDR. It involves immediate interventions but must also encompass as long, thought-out processes that require constant monitoring and re-assessment of the situation.

A descriptive approach to Transformative DDR must first make use of existing push- and pull factors that enable combatants to withdraw from rebel groups and rejoin society, as well as to make them stay there. Where none exist, a prescriptive approach will strive to create such push- and pull factors through nation-wide programmes that must be aided by the international community only when needed. It cannot be stressed enough that the root causes of the conflict must be addressed to prevent further outbreaks of violence and provide sustainable livelihoods for both civilians and ex-combatants. In a longer perspective, a conflict transformation approach must work to reconcile the various groups to create a shared future together.

The process starts from the first incentives to leave military ranks, to the surrendering of arms and the reinsertion into society. As for the end goal for the combatant, we recall Torjesen’s definition of ‘reintegration’: 1) change the identity from combatant to civilian and 2) alter behavior to end the use of violent means (Torjesen, 2013: 4). Such measures must be carefully coordinated with appropriate actors that have the power to mediate in society-wide interactions.

The four pillars of Transformative DDR provides me with an operational toolkit to divide my research material into more manageable blocks of information and analyze them separately.
They act as operational questions for my content analysis, where I analyze how the material proposes to deal with DDR in the DRC within each of the four pillars.

5.4.1 Reliability and validity of the Analytical Framework

The Analytical Framework is based on the works of two well-established scholars, but I recognize that the choice of Lederach and Torjesen has been a personal selection on my part and is thus subject to researcher bias. Nevertheless, both authors have well-researched and field-tested views on what constitutes “good” DDR and conflict transformation respectively. I move forward with the trust that the validity of the findings will be acceptable.

The Analytical Framework uses four pillars that are all vital components in any programme, not just in peacebuilding. They are all somewhat broad and will not offer substantial detail within their respective categories, but within the scope of this study they are of appropriate depth.
6 Analysis

In this chapter, the content analysis of the chosen documents will take place. The chapter is structured as follows: the information from each document is categorized according to the four pillars of transformative DDR – Actorship, Context, Timeframe and Action. These serve as operational questions for the study. The documents appear chronologically according to their publication date, so we can follow how the situation has developed over time.

The chapter will start with a list of the analytic units that were targeted by the four pillars upon accessing the documents. For a description of the documents and their origins, refer to ‘Material’ in Chapter 4. Methodology.

6.1 ‘Actorship’ units

Analytic units associated with ‘Actorship’ include words in sentences which implies a direct responsibility for peacebuilding and DDR among the involved parties of the conflict.

The full list of encountered analytic units are:

Parties, government, signatories, M23 Movement, stakeholders, national ownership, agents, groups, leaders, representatives, allies, local level, collaboration, combatants, ICGLR, SADC, AU, International Organizations, stakeholders, signatories, ICRC, local elites, Kinshasa, Kabila.
6.2 ‘Context’ units

Analytic units for the ‘Context’ pillar resemble statements in the documents that refer to broader situational points of concern in the conflict zone.

The full list of encountered analytic units are:

IDPs, refugees, threats, mandate, flows, cross-border, safety of members, political parties, electoral process, assassinations, destroyed property, armed conflict, arms transfers, forced recruitment, employment, HR abuses, rapes, public information, protection, economy, armed groups, FDLR, Tutsi sense of victimhood, credibility, impunity, corruption, stability.

6.3 ‘Timeframe’ units

Words and sentences within the ‘Timeframe’ pillar refer to any awareness of progress over time, past attempts of DDR or to prescriptions for time-management.

The full list of encountered analytic units are:

Take place, slow, progress, delays, accelerate, past failures, swiftly, milestone, process, finalize, partly fulfilled, M23 Agreement 2009, duration, Congolese Transition of 2006.
6.4 ‘Action’ units

Analytic units in the ‘Action’ pillar cover actions, programmes, and other measures that have the intention to create transformative DDR in the area.

The full list of encountered analytic units are:

Amnesty, army reform, DDR/DDRRR, allocation of resources, held to account, threat reduction, measures, neutralization, disarmament, good offices, vetting, training, strengthen presence, protect, security sector reform, prevention, reconciliation, operations, sites, camps, XC relocation, reintegration, address root causes, restoration of state authority, repatriation, sharing of information, prosecution, financing, supervision, facilitate surrenders, implementation, return, participation/representation of women, prevention, deployment, upgrading, hearing, written commitment, security arrangements, cantonment, political party formation, institutional reform.

6.5 From CNDP to M23 – Rift Valley Institute, August 2012

6.5.1 Actorship

In his analysis, Jason Stearns describes the M23 rebellion as led by a largely Tutsi military elite, with decisive backing from Rwanda and some hesitant support from Goma’s upper class (Stearns, 2012: 51). These elites Goma have allegedly been closely linked to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) – a predecessor to the M23 Movement – and has bound their constituencies together in a solid governing system of self-interest, ethnic solidarity and a
resentment towards Kabila’s Government (ibid, 2012: 51). This information suggests that the origin of the M23 Movement stems from a largely middle-level leadership among both military and civilian elements, whose mutual interests are reinforced by a group belonging based on ethnicity. These middle-level actors have a top-level ally in the form of the Rwandan Government. Their mutual relationship of hostility toward another top-level actor, Kabila’s Government, binds them together. However, while Rwanda has at times provided materiel and soldiers for the war effort, its relationship with the Congolese Tutsi elites has at times crumbled when the Rwandan Government struck deals with Kinshasa (ibid, 2012: 54).

Concerning recommendations for handling the M23 Movement, Stearns points out that “hardly any are ever implemented” (ibid, 2012: 60). Stearns emphasizes that a deal will have to be made to end the rebellion and integrate the insurgents, and that the responsibility for this rests primarily in the hands of the DRC Government. President Kabila will have to play a major role in facilitating political dialogue (ibid, 2012: 60). Stearns criticizes the DRC Government for focusing too much on the Rwandan interference and for its refusal to reintegrate M23 officers. In these statements, national ownership of the process comes into the fray, but is mostly interpreted as state-led. Kinshasa’s focus on issues concerning Rwanda’s Government narrows the peace process to exclusively top-level interactions among state leaders and does not leave as much room for inter-level dialogue between top-, middle- and low level representatives as a transformative approach would want.
6.5.2 Context

Stearns highlights three different contextual factors that has played a part in the M23 insurgency.

First, the M23 have found much national support from local Tutsi elites in the Kivu Provinces. These actors allegedly backed the M23 Movement for three fundamental reasons: One was ethnic solidarity based on their common Tutsi heritage. Many other communities are often blind to the Tutsi sense of victimhood that followed from the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 (Stearns, 2012: 57). Local leaders have manipulated these fears to sow discord between Tutsi communities and other groups (ibid, 2012: 57). Another reason was that some local elites supported the M23 and its predecessors for their own personal interests in order to bolster their social, political and/or economic assets. Finally, some were forced to contribute to M23’s cause through extortion (ibid, 2012: 59). It is clear that the M23 movement holds various kinds of sway over its local grassroots population. Thus, societal factors are likely to have an impact on generating pull factors when motivating M23 soldiers to return to civilian life.

A second large contextual factor is Rwanda. Rwanda considers Eastern DRC as a “sphere of influence” where a web of political and economic motives prompt Rwandan intervention to secure the region’s assets from external and internal threats (ibid, 2012: 55). One such threat is the FDLR, who violently opposes the Rwandan Government and the Congolese Tutsi communities (ibid, 2012: 56). Another perceived threat is that of President Kabila’s government, which the leaders in the Rwandan Government disregards as corrupt and unstable (ibid, 2012: 57). On the lower levels of Rwandan actors in the DRC, various Rwandan officers keep businesses and cattle in the eastern provinces and thus has an interest in maintaining Rwandan control over the area (ibid, 2012: 57).
Rwanda also plays a part in the flow of people across the border. There are approximately 55,000 Congolese Tutsi currently living in refugee camps in Rwanda, where the M23 have been reported to recruit soldiers (ibid, 2012: 57). So far, repatriation has been limited to one-sided transfer of demobilized FDLR ex-combatants to Rwanda and the DRC Government have dithered in promoting Congolese Tutsi to return (ibid, 2012: 59).

Third is the regional context: the ICGLR’s involvement focused on the creation of a neutral military force to seek out and disarm the M23 and FDLR rather than work for more peaceful means of peacebuilding. The Committee Chairman, Ugandan President Museveni became widely criticized after allegations of Ugandan government support to the M23 surfaced (ibid, 2012: 52).
6.5.3 Timeframe

Stearns writes sparsely on the timeframe of the peace building process. The report was released in late 2012, before the M23 Movement surrendered to government forces and submitted to DDR, which can be an explanation as to why there is so little on the subject of long-term planning of the programme.

Stearns does mention that President Kabila would have to carefully consider the cost of striking a new deal with the M23 leaders to achieve immediate peace, as this would require strong and sustained pressure on Kigali and a reappraisal of existing and future funding from external donors (Stearns, 2012: 61). Stearns have noticed that this short-term solution has not worked well in the past, neither in terms of years or decades.

6.5.4 Action

As few recommendations are successfully implemented, it is problematic to suggest a course for DDR programmes. Based on the hostility among the key actors in the conflict, and on the lack of a credible political process (Stearns, 2012: 63), Stearns encourages Kabila to initiate political talks that includes not only the middle-range leadership among the Tutsi military and civilian leaders but also the UN, which has been politically marginalized since the end of the Congolese transition in 2006 (ibid, 2012: 63).

Among the recommendations for transformative action, institutional reform appears in a variety of ways, particularly in the security sector and the administration. Stearns points out that there has been little reconciliation or justice for the communities in the Kivus since the outbreak of hostilities in 1993. Only inclusive dialogue and reconciliation among rebel perpetrators and local constituencies can address the root causes of the conflict and encourage
a reduction of violence (ibid, 2012: 62). Here, Stearns also brings up the need to prosecute war criminals but does not elaborate further upon it (ibid, 2012: 63).

6.6 Resolution 2098 – 28 March 2013

6.6.1 Actorship

Four types of actors emerge in the resolution. The primary responsibility for security, reconciliation, peacebuilding and implementation of the PSC Framework rests, according to the Security Council, on The DRC Government (Resolution 2098, 2013: 3). This statement takes a stand for national ownership of the Congolese peace process, but is somewhat vague in specifying who should drive the process. Kabila’s Government is treated as a structure rather than as a collection of high-level actors.

The second actor are the M23 rebels, but their roles are portrayed in sharp contrast to the Government. Whereas the Kabila administration is encouraged to take responsibility for the programmes, the M23 presence in North Kivu are condemned for its attempts to create parallel administrations. The Security Council demands that M23’s members immediately disband and allow for restoration of state authority in North Kivu (ibid, 2013: 5). This differentiation creates an over-emphasis on top-level institutions as the only solution for reintegrating the rebels.

A third set of actors are found in the plea for international actors to fully implement the PSC Framework agreements (ibid, 2013: 5). Outside actors who provide external support to M23 are strongly condemned. Hundreds of M23 combatants have fled to Rwanda, and the Security
Council particularly encourages the Rwandan Government to ensure that these combatants are permanently demobilized (ibid, 2013: 3). Nothing is said on what prompted M23 soldiers to move to Rwanda nor how dialogue with them should be initiated. Instead, the Security Council asks the UN and international organizations to provide assistance in this matter (ibid, 2013: 3).

Lastly, the Security Council elaborates on the role of MONUSCO in the DRC. MONUSCO should mostly be confined to a support role towards Kabila’s Government rather than operating on its own. Support areas include the arrest and prosecution of perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity, to fight impunity for human rights violations by the security forces – particularly its newly integrated units – and to promote transparent political dialogue among all Congolese stakeholders (ibid, 2013: 7). It seems that MONUSCO regards itself as a middle ground between the top-level state actors and the middle-level leaders in the rebel movement. Despite their emphasis on neutrality however, MONUSCO works as a component in Kabila’s Government and should not be considered a middle-range actor.

6.6.2 Context

The Security Council expresses concern over the ramifications of the conflict on the region, particularly the increasing number of internally displaced persons (IDP). These IDP are blamed on the M23 and the Resolution does not mention any other actors who might be responsible for this development. Furthermore, MONUSCO is tasked to observe and report on flows of personnel and armaments across the eastern border (Resolution 2098, 2013: 7), implicitly referring to Rwanda. Neighboring states are encouraged to cooperate among themselves and with UN personnel and to ensure that their safety is guaranteed (ibid, 2013: 11).

Statements where the Resolution calls all parties to “cooperate fully with the operations of MONUSCO and allow unhindered access” (ibid, 2013: 10) suggest that MONUSCO’s
operations are not always met with the cooperation it requires. Furthermore, the Resolution underlines the importance that MONUSCO continues to deter any treats to the implementation of its mandate (ibid, 2013: 4), which suggests that MONUSCO still faces resistance on its operation.

The Resolution makes two statements on the human rights violations committed by troops on the ground on both sides: one is the presence of M23 in the vicinity of Goma where they allegedly abuse the local population (ibid, 2013: 2), the other are members of the FARDC who committed mass rapes in Minova in November 2012 whom have still not been brought to justice (ibid, 2013: 3). This climate of human rights abuses from both sides should force peace builders to carefully consider what potential candidates for DDR programmes are integrating into.

6.6.3 Timeframe

As the Resolution was produced before peace was brokered between the DRC Government and the M23 Movement, there are few references to timely implementation of the actions laid out below. The Security Council requests the UN Secretary-General to report to the council every three months on progress made on design and implementation of DDR and peacebuilding initiatives (Resolution 2098, 2013: 11).

6.6.4 Action

The UN Security Council has pushed Kabila’s Government to begin implementation of security sector reform, as stipulated by the PSC Framework. President Kabila has expressed that reform of the national armed forces will constitute a major priority in 2013, in particular to create a well-trained “Rapid Reaction Force” (Resolution 2098, 2013: 8). MONUSCO is called
to provide good offices and advice to this project and to help create accountable security institutions (ibid, 2013: 8). This effort seeks to create a legitimate national force which the civilian population can trust, as well as generating a pull force on would-be integrated rebels that attracts “the right people” rather than those who see the FARDC as an umbrella for continued extortion. A stronger national army also creates the prospect of better fighting capacity, which can make it less desirable to stay within a movement that opposes the national government.

Meanwhile, the UN also calls on the DRC Government to uphold its commitments in the PSC Framework to dismantle armed groups and create a single, overarching DDR/DDRRR (Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, Repatriation and Reinsertion) plan with a roadmap and allocation of necessary resources (ibid, 2013: 4).

The Security Council has taken note to reject any endorsement for an amnesty for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and gross violations of human rights (ibid, 2013: 5). The Resolution strongly condemns perpetrators within both the M23 and the FARDC, and reiterates that those responsible shall be held accountable and not be eligible for integration into the FARDC (ibid, 2013: 5). The resolution discourages the DRC Government from granting amnesty to combatants suspected of the above but instead to arrest and prosecute them (ibid, 2013: 10). This amnesty could be a double-edged sword – knowing that a perpetrator of lesser crimes can find qualified work will attract rebels to leave their factions. But it will also discourage those who are guilty of the most heinous acts to end their violent means and force them to continue the fighting.

Finally, Resolution 2098 opted for a significant increase in MONUSCO’s military presence. In article 9, the Resolution decides that MONUSCO shall form the “Force Intervention Brigade” with the responsibility of neutralizing armed groups through all necessary measures appropriate to perform its task (ibid, 2013: 6). The purpose of the brigade is to prevent the
expansion of all armed groups, neutralize and disarm them in order to contribute to the overarching objective of reducing the threat against civilians and state authority in eastern DRC (ibid, 2013: 7). More bluntly put, its objective is to make living conditions for any rebel soldiers too hazardous for them to stay in their military factions. Overall, the policies within Resolution 2098 seeks to force rebel soldiers to leave their units through punitive measures. Most of the effort goes into ending the combatants’ use of violent means but not much is specified on how to encourage reintegration into civilian society.

6.7 Conclusion of the Kampala Talks – 12/12 2013

6.7.1 Actors

The peace accord stipulates that responsibility for DDR is shared among Kabila’s Government and the M23 leadership, and aided by MONUSCO where need arises. Numerous passages in the document suggest that the Government is expected to share the larger burden of responsibility than any M23 leader (Kampala Talks Declarations of DRC Government, 2013: 5).

The Government of the DRC pledge themselves responsible for the planning and implementation of the process of disarmament, demobilization and social reintegration of M23 combatants (Annex A, 2013, 2). Logistics and allocation of resources shall be covered by the Government (Kampala Talks Declarations of DRC Government, 2013: 4). The FARDC, with aid from MONUSCO, shall provide maximum security (Annex A, 2013: 2). From this
information, we gather that top-level leaders are in charge of the majority of decision-making as well as of security matters.

M23 leaders, in the name of shared responsibility, are allowed representatives on a National Reconciliation Commission, and are also requested to aid the release of political prisoners on both sides (Kampala Talks Declarations of M23, 2013, 4). M23 representatives shall be included in matters of refugee issues and to be included in a soon-to-come government commission to identify and restore stolen and/or destroyed property (Annex A, 2013: 4). This gives the middle-range actors within the military wing of M23 some degree of influence over national dialogue with the civilian population, but are left to the government’s mercy when it comes to the demobilization of its members.

6.7.2 Context

The agreements within the peace accord are founded on the PSC Framework which requests the DRC Government and the region to end impunity for perpetrators of war crimes, human rights abuses etc. which at the time is still a problem within the security sector (Kampala Talks Declarations of DRC Government, 2013: 5). This is as important as ever to make the army an attractive target for integration of M23.

While Government forces are responsible for security, M23 combatants are responsible for their own discipline and are allowed a limited amount of weapons for protection as to not create a power imbalance during the cantonment phase (Annex A, 2013: 5). The government also pledges to ensure the safety of M23 supporters and sympathizers in areas previously M23-controlled areas (ibid, 2013: 6). This suggests that there are other armed groups waiting to fill the gap that M23 left. The M23 has pledged itself to comply with the Transitional Security Arrangements, but observation teams note that some members of M23 have fled to Uganda
This demonstrates either a division in the ranks of M23 or a lack of trust for the sincerity of the Government and the FARDC to uphold their promises, and will leave a lingering presence of Tutsi military factions in the region.

Lastly, the Government pledges itself to launch a public information campaign about the peace agreement as to inform the civilian population that M23 surrendered (Annex A, 2013: 3). This may suggest that civilian leaders have generally been cut off from the peace process.

### 6.7.3 Timeframe

The outcome of the Kampala Talks has called for a review of the commitments under the 23 March 2009 Agreement, where the CNDP accepted army integration. The Government reaffirms its determination to finalize any implementations of the Agreement which has not been honored or only partially fulfilled (Kampala Talks Declarations of DRC Government, 2013: 6). This awareness of past failures within the DDR process is a new feature in the negotiations with armed groups and can help improve the current peace process.

### 6.7.4 Action

The peace accord from the Kampala talks goes into more detail than any other document on the specifics of DDR for the M23 combatants. The DRC Government programme to implement DDR declares that M23 combatants will begin their processing and disarmament in temporary camps in North Kivu for screening and treatment, and then relocate to cantonment sites in Province Orientale for demobilization and social reintegration (Annex A, 2013: 6). This can pose problems as the social reintegration is expected to take place in a region that is not the
combatant’s home, but it might be the only possible way to uproot them from their own military institutions and change their identity to civilian.

As for reintegration, little is mentioned on what constitutes “social” reintegration, but the Government commits itself to “give favorable consideration to any potential request” should the M23 wish to form a political party in accordance with the constitution and laws of the DRC (ibid, 2013: 4). Nothing is said on the economic dimension of reintegration, though it is possible that it is included in the definition of “social reintegration”. Rebels are offered to either join a reformed national army or to rejoin civil society, both of which conforms to a change in identity on the part of the combatant.

To address the root causes of the conflict, the Government acts on the ICGLR’s request to give the M23 a hearing to evaluate and respond to legitimate grievances, such as failures to implement the 23 March 2009 accord (Kampala Talks, Declarations of DRC Government, 2013: 1). This is an unprecedented step in addressing the root causes of the conflict and to offer alternate means than armed struggle. Through their inclusion in the national reconciliation and refugee commissions, M23 representatives are also given the opportunity to influence the agenda for constructive interaction with the civilian population.

The DRC Government grants amnesty to any and all members of the M23 Movement for acts of war and insurrection, covering the period from 1 April 2012 to the signing of the peace agreement, 12 December 2013 (ibid, 2013: 2). The amnesty does not cover acts of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or gross violations of human rights such as sexual violence or recruitment of child soldiers. Perpetrators of these crimes shall be prosecuted accordingly (Annex B, 2013: 4).

To benefit from this amnesty, each M23 member will be obliged to make a personal commitment in writing to permanently refrain from using weapons or insurgency to invoke any demands. Violations of this commitment will automatically render the amnesty null and void,
and the perpetrator shall be disqualified from any future amnesty (Kampala Talks Declarations of DRC, 2013: 2). This is an example of both short-term and long-term thinking – this amnesty encourages rebels to surrender and submit to DDR, while at the same time discouraging any potential resurgence of rebellion in the unforeseeable future. In one way, it creates a pull-factor for rejoining civil society today, and creating a push-factor against rebellion given the new dangers of that occupation.

6.8 Letter dated 22 January 2014 from the Coordinator of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council

6.8.1 Actorship

The Group of Experts have concluded that the main factors that led to the defeat of the M23 Movement was good collaboration in the military operations between the actors FARDC and the UN FIB, but also the fact that there was a division in M23 ranks (Group of Experts, 2014: 5). In March 2013, the former CNDP Chief of Staff Bosco Ntaganda had deserted from M23 ranks and fled into Rwanda. This reveals that lower actors within M23 have grievances with the higher M23 leadership.

Another factor that caused the defeat of M23 was a decreasing amount of support from Rwanda due to international pressure to end the conflict (ibid, 2014: 5). Despite this
development, the Group of Experts has documented that the M23 have received continued weapons support from Rwanda (ibid, 2014: 10). Sanctioned rebel leaders are still moving freely in both Uganda and in Rwanda, where they and their allies continue to recruit soldiers. Recalling that there are still thousands of Congolese refugees in Rwanda, M23 seem to still have some influence over the grassroots level.

Rwanda has not allowed the Group of Experts access in the country to verify these claims (ibid, 2014: 5). This may indicate that lower-level M23 actors have better relations with the top-tier leadership in Rwanda and feel safer there than they would towards the DRC Government. This also points to the fact that the Rwandan leadership has not taken its commitments toward the PSC Framework seriously, which affects the trust between the two national governments.

6.8.2 Context

Looking at the bigger picture, the Group of Experts say that the military defeat of M23 has “sent a strong message” to other armed groups, but the reaction has been mixed. Some groups have grown more aggressive toward UN personnel, others have entrenched their positions and yet some groups have expressed a willingness to integrate into the FARDC (Group of Experts, 2014: 3). This new climate is the result of the insight that the life of a rebel has become more hazardous. Since it has evidently not prompted the surrender of the entire M23 Movement, given its continued activities in Rwanda, it is unclear whether it will result in more voluntary surrenders among the majority of combatants in the bush.

The Group of Experts has attempted to map the living conditions for soldiers on the ground. Interviewed former M23 soldiers have described that they either joined due to forced recruitment or volunteered on false promises of employment (ibid, 2014: 10). This signifies
that individuals have joined M23 for two fundamental reasons – a lack of security from military threats and out of economic necessity.

Interviews have also revealed that the M23 have primarily financed its rebellion through taxation and looting in areas under its control (ibid, 2014:12). Despite this inflow of money, the former M23 combatants revealed that they were never paid during their service. This strengthens the case that economic factors are a primary concern for many low-level combatants.

Lastly, the Group of Experts have noted that the FARDC has arrested and sentenced several offenders of rape within its ranks, but some of these criminals have escaped from custody (ibid, 2014: 32). This demonstrates that army reform under the new amnesty law is starting to come into effect, but the security and judicial sector still has some way to go.

6.8.3 Timeframe

According to the Group of Experts, the DRC Government has a new DDR programme, called DDR III. The group is concerned about the lack of clarity about the programme and is concerned that without proper review, it might re-live past failures in Congolese integration programmes (Group of Experts, 2014: 14). This understanding of past problems in the integration of armed forces in the DRC is commendable, but the Group of Experts offers no practical timeframe for this new project.

6.8.4 Action

The Group of Experts primarily concerns itself with larger entities in its recommendations.
To the governments of Rwanda and Uganda, the Group of Experts recommends: 1) to create an updated list of M23 members who took refuge within their borders and to share that information with the Group; 2) to extradite Congolese M23 members in accordance with international arrest warrants and; 3) to investigate and prosecute individuals who have provided support to M23 from within their countries (Group of Experts, 2014: 49). These recommendations are aimed at dissuading neighboring countries to provide aid to fleeing M23 officers, which help in a number of ways. Prosecutions within Uganda and Rwanda creates a push factor that makes the option of fleeing the DRC less promising for rebellious soldiers. This decreases the cross-border flow and improves immediate border security concerns. It also prevents said officers from recruiting more combatants to the movement which gives long-term stability and less chance of renewed rebellion.

To international donors, the Group of Experts encourages financing and technical supervision of the DDR/DDRRR planning before and during FIB operations against the FDLR to make this armed group surrender, as well as financing the demobilization centers for armed groups in eastern DRC (ibid, 2014: 51). The Group of Experts finally recommend that the Security Council extends the mandate of the FIB for another year to address the threat posed by FDLR (ibid, 2014: 49). The group recognizes that proper implementation of the DDR/DDRRR is vital to ensure a permanent demobilization of M23 rebels and to alter their identities, and it recognizes that the presence of the FDLR Movement within eastern DRC is one of the root causes that must be addressed before former M23 combatants can feel secure in their civilian communities.

6.9.1 Actorship

The Secretary-General states in his report that MONUSCO supports the DRC government’s efforts to restore state authority in the east through the deployment of “key state actors” to prevent a return to conflict (Special Report of the Secretary General, 2014: 3). The worldview is that state actors bear the primary responsibility for restoring peace to the region.

The Secretary-General’s Special Representative has initiated a functional coordination mechanism at the ambassadorial level which concentrates on local elections, reform of the security sector and on DDR (ibid, 2014: 17). Unlike the other UN documents in this study, the report of the Secretary General have referred to state actors that are lower than the top-level leadership. What these passages suggest is a new focus on the middle-range actors and the build-up of a working relationship with the grassroots level.

The Secretary-General is concerned over the slow implementation of army reform despite the DRC Government’s alleged prioritization, and states that it needs to gain momentum (ibid, 2014: 9). He calls for a timely implementation of the National DDR Plan, known as PNDDRIII, and that the DRC Government offers more engagement and national ownership of the process (ibid, 2014: 9). To supplement national efforts, the UN country team led by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has developed its own reintegration programme. It will not begin its accommodation of vetted ex-combatants until political and technical issues related to
the disarmament and demobilization are clarified and funding is made available (ibid, 2014: 11). It appears as if the state is more concerned with the first two stages of DDR – to dismantle the potential military threat posed by the M23 soldiers – and leaving the reintegration into civilian communities to foreign organizations. This has the potential to delegitimize the national ownership and the role of the government’s relationship to the civilian population.

### 6.9.2 Context

M23 has continued to be an active movement, with a presence of 1325 soldiers in Uganda and 682 in Rwanda (Special Report of the Secretary General, 2014: 8). This has become a complicating factor in the PSC Framework’s stipulation to improve relations among the DRC, Uganda and Rwanda. An Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism team has been requested to investigate allegations of cross-border support to armed groups (ibid, 2014: 9). Regardless, the failure to ascertain the surrender of the entire M23 Movement threatens to delegitimize the accords of the Kampala Talks.

As of 8 January 2014, the Independent national Electoral Commission has adopted a new code of conduct for political parties and candidates. A number of opposition parties did not sign the documents (ibid, 2014: 4). This schism in the political chambers makes successful political reintegration of the M23 Movement less predictable and susceptible for increased distrust toward the political system of the state. Division among the political parties may increase the chance that the M23 Movement will find mutual allies against the state, should relations deteriorate further.

The humanitarian situation on the ground remains troublesome. Over 600 houses in 11 villages have been destroyed since October 2013, and there are more than 2.9 million internally displaced people within the DRC’s borders (ibid, 2014:6). Sexual violence continues to be
rampant, and it is estimated that 90% of these crimes are committed by armed groups and state forces, particularly in the eastern provinces where most of the military factions are located (ibid, 2014: 11). In a context like this, it takes a huge commitment to the peace for M23 combatants to turn in their weapons and demobilize. Undoubtedly it creates a push factor from civilian life to remain in military factions.

The security of state- and UN actors have also deteriorated as a result of the surrender of M23, causing retributions from armed groups on peacekeeping personnel (ibid, 2014: 14). Mamadou Moustapha Ndala, an FARDC colonel who played a key role in operations against FDLR, was assassinated in January 2014 (ibid, 2014: 5). Furthermore, clashes between integrated ex-CNDP soldiers in the FARDC with other armed groups have increased since the peace accord (ibid, 2014: 22). The violent response to the new policy to neutralization of armed groups have caused an increasingly hostile environment for DDR.

There are still 8500 former rebels waiting in nine cantonment sites across the country awaiting reintegration (ibid, 2014: 11). This suggests that there is a gap between demobilization and reintegration. These faulty practices risk dissuading combatants to joining DDR programmes.

6.9.3 Timeframe

A notable feature of the Secretary-General’s report is the criticism of the slow implementation of key reforms, which is blamed on Kabila’s Government. Many commitments from the Kampala Talks have not yet taken place, and the Government has not yet put an updated army reform plan before the Parliament as of March 2014 (Special Report of the Secretary General, 2014: 3). Furthermore, training of FARDC soldiers have been delayed due to impediments in the screening of soldiers (ibid, 2014: 10). The Secretary-General has strongly encouraged Kabila’s Government to accelerate the implementations of these reforms (ibid, 2014: 17). While
these programmes are intended for long-term improvement of the situation, a lack of commitment to the process have had a detrimental impact on both the short-term and long-term situation on the ground.

6.9.4 Action

The defeat of the M23 movement is described by the Secretary-General as “an important milestone in enhancing security and stability in eastern DRC”, and he stresses the need to integrate M23 combatants (Special Report of the Secretary General, 2014:16). Following the defeat of M23, the ICGLR urged MONUSCO to intensify its operations against rebel groups. As a result, MONUSCO has sent warnings to other armed groups to surrender peacefully or face military operations (ibid, 2014: 5). The threat of force is intended to push combatants out of the rebel life and submit to DDR. The Secretary-General admits that an intensification of military operations will have a higher need for screening of units in the armed forces as to avoid combatants with social or political ties with the rebels. Meanwhile, MONUSCO is to continue its sensitization campaign of civilian leaders on the planning of security and military operations in the east (ibid, 2014: 8). This interaction between peacekeeping personnel and local civilian actors will help building trust between civilians and state actors.

The state-led DDR programme, PNDDR III, was adopted on 26 December 2013 but, despite endorsement from the UN, it has been criticized on several points: it has a lack of clarity on the eligibility criteria for participation in the programme; there is an ambiguity over the different categories of ex-combatants, inclusion of dependents and on the combatant-weapon ratio (ibid, 2014:11). There are serious questions remaining over the proposed relocation of combatants outside of the Kivu provinces and over the availability of long-term funding for the PNDDR III
programme (ibid, 2014: 11). If funding for longer DDR projects is lacking, it will have detrimental effects to the long-term social reintegration of ex-combatants in society.

The Secretary-General calls on the DRC Government to “further develop the national DDR plan in close cooperation with the international donor community and in line with the principle of an essentially voluntary process, and ensure its implementation” (ibid, 2014: 16). He further urges the Governments of Rwanda and Uganda to aid the Congolese DDR effort by repatriating former combatants within their borders (ibid, 2014: 17). This is the first mention of “voluntary” DDR in UN documents on the mission in the DRC, and it stands in sharp contrast with MONUSCO’s policy of a military neutralization of armed groups. The statement is likely intended to the low-level fighters and not their commanding officers to create pull factors for demobilizing.

To the matter of attracting voluntary surrender, the Secretary-General welcomes the amnesty law by the DRC Government and urges its hasty implementation (ibid, 2014: 16). As the amnesty only covers acts of war and political offenses, some 15 officers and soldiers of the FARDC have been arrested for sexual violence (ibid, 2014: 12), indicating that the amnesty is slowly starting to have an effect.

Meanwhile, The PSC Framework has not yet adopted its rules of procedure and operates with limited resources (ibid, 2014: 2). In support of the PSC Framework, the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSS) has worked to consolidate peace and restore state authority. The ISSS has received a budget priority from the 730 million USD funded as of 5 February 2014, which covers 81 % of the 893 million USD humanitarian appeal to the DRC (ibid, 2014: 7). The ISSS seeks to address the root causes of the conflict through a focus on democratic dialogue, security provision, restoration of state authority, socioeconomic development, and putting an end to sexual violence in conflict (ibid, 2014:13). MONUSCO remains committed to provide good offices and advice to ensure that the DRC Government
upholds its commitments to the PRC Framework. It has yet to be seen what effects these priorities will have on the demobilization and reintegration of M23 combatants and beyond.
The DDR process in the Democratic Republic of Congo has seen mixed results in the last year. The careful optimism that followed the military defeat of the M23 Movement has faded away as the FIB encounters new difficulties with its presence in the region. To what extent has the DDR process of the M23 movement been successful?

The DRC Government has begun some promising initiatives to foster an inclusive reconciliation process in the higher levels of governance. Participation in truth commissions and the formation of a political party will give the M23 a voice in the peace building process in the years to come. The right to keep arms for personal protection will prevent the sense of power imbalance, and thus address the trust issue between the two sides that has prevailed for two decades.

DDR on the ground has so far failed to gain the momentum that it needs, proving that political will for change has not improved. Efforts have mainly concentrated on the political dimension and has not given full recognition to the economic insecurity among the individual combatants, which was the main reason for many that joined. It has yet to be seen whether President Kabila will take concrete measures to safeguard the Tutsi community in the Kivus from FDLR attacks. The DDR process itself has been criticized for lacking proper vetting of combatants that reintegrate into the FARDC, which sadly rings familiar to previous attempts such as the ‘brassage’ or ‘accelerated integration’. Once again, the national DDR programme has failed to
heed the lessons of past mistakes and moves forward with little regard for the long-term impact of the situation.

MONUSCO remains in close collaboration with Kabila’s administration. Since Resolution 2098 was approved by the Security Council, the Mission has been mainly preoccupied with restoring state authority in the Kivus. The contents of the policy documents do not suggest that civilian elements in the conflict zone have had much say in the decision making, nor has there been any serious attempts from the international community to understand the rebels’ discontent with the government. MONUSCO has been criticized for its partiality to the national government and this analysis has not been able to refute that claim. The voice of grassroots actors have up until very recently gone unheard, but this analysis demonstrates that the UN is slowly beginning to adapt to a more inclusive dialogue. This will have to be closely studied to assess its potential.

The actions of the FIB has demonstrated that MONUSCO’s presence has had very little to do with DDR and rather works with “threat reduction” from paramilitary factions. The newer reports indicate that this has created a more unforgiving peace process in which the choice for insurgents is to surrender or be destroyed. While this strategy has pulled some factions out of the fighting, others have responded with violent retribution that makes UN personnel a target.

The collective UN push for a specialized amnesty law that rejects amnesty for gross human rights violations has seemingly been welcomed by the majority of the actors in the DRC conflict. This is a welcome step towards the impunity that has plagued previous DDR programmes: now, combatants who had nothing to do with the political conflict are given the chance to integrate into the civilian sector, while they are also deterred from taking up arms again. Likewise, prosecutions within the FARDC open up the possibility of creating more attractive target for integration. Hopefully, this will be a stabilizing factor in the long-term objective of reconciling warring factions.
The UN remains committed to disarming the remaining M23 rebels that fled into Rwanda and Uganda. So far, the UN condemnation of the support given to M23 to these countries have been rather powerless, preferring to urge the neighboring state leaders to uphold their commitments in the PSC Framework. On the lower levels, the UN has done little to expedite the return of refugees, where remaining M23 have been able to recruit new soldiers.

The role of MONUSCO in the DRC today seems more like a military deterrent than ever before. The success of the FIB has established a new method for handling insurgency, but one victory on the battlefield does not automatically achieve peace in a nation whose government has warred with armed rebel movements since its conception. While most of the M23 Movement has submitted to DDR, scattered remnants remain and continue to pose a threat to the final dissolution of M23. Other groups, such as the FDLR, remain sound and strong and prepares for a new bout with UN forces.

In closing, this study has offered an analytical framework for assessing transformative DDR in the context of the Democratic Republic of Congo. While rudimentary in its design, it has enabled me to evaluate the documents that have directed DDR in the DRC for the past two years. A continuous monitoring of the development of the conflict is needed before we can assess the long-term achievements of the UN military presence in the Democratic Republic of Congo. An ideal solution for disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating combatants has yet to be found.
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