
Author: Sarosh Anwar
Social Security No: 19820919-9655
Abstract

How has the EEAS affected, if in any way, the coherence of the CFSP on the vertical dimension in security and defence matters? In this thesis I answer this research question in order to draw a conclusion on the affect of the EEAS on the cooperation and coordination of the MS with and within the CFSP in security and defence matters. Coherence within the EU’s foreign policy is an issue that its leaders have emphasized on developing for more than four decades. The introduction of the EEAS through the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 is perceived to enhance the cooperation and coordination of the MS with and within the CFSP, as well as coordinate the actions of the MS outside the boundaries of the EU. By conducting a multiple case study, in this thesis I compare how the most powerful MS: the UK, France, and Germany, interacted with and within the CFSP in the 2003 Iraq War, and the 2011 military intervention in Libya. Relatedly, a qualitative content analysis approach is applied in order to uncover all relevant information from the primary and secondary literature concerning the two cases. In contrast to most of the previous studies conducted on this topic, I combine and apply the theoretical perspectives of liberal institutionalism and social constructivism in order to explain and explore the phenomenon under investigation. Conclusively, this thesis suggests that the coherence of the CFSP on the vertical dimension in security and defence matters has not been affected in any way after the EEAS has been implemented in the CFSP. This is due to the inherent characteristic of the MS of always prioritizing their national interests, determined by their value-based normative ideas gained through social interaction, before a collective, effective, and coherent CFSP in defence and security terms.

Key Words: CFSP, CSDP, coherence, vertical dimension, national interests, normative ideas, 2003 Iraq War, 2011 military intervention in Libya.
# Table of Contents

**ABSTRACT**  

2  

**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**  

4  

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**  

5  

1. **INTRODUCTION**  

6  

1.1 Background and Objective  

6  

1.2 Approach and Structure  

8  

2. **PREVIOUS RESEARCH**  

9  

3. **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**  

14  

3.1 Theories Approaching Cooperation in the CFSP  

14  

3.1.1 Liberal Institutionalism  

15  

3.1.2 Social Constructivism  

16  

4. **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**  

18  

4.1 Ontology  

18  

4.2 Epistemology  

20  

4.3 Deductive Approach  

21  

4.4 Case Selection  

21  

4.5 Method and Sampling  

22  

4.6 Material and Source Criticism  

24  

4.7 Operationalization of Variables and Concepts  

25  

4.8 Limitations  

27  

5. **ANALYSIS**  

27  

5.1 The Failure of the EU as global actor in the 2003 Iraq War  

27  

5.2 Analysis of the Behavior and the interaction of the G3 with and within the CFSP in the 2003 Iraq War  

28  

5.2.1 The Willingness of the G3 to Cooperate and Coordinate with and within the CFSP  

28  

5.2.2 The Willingness of the G3 to Contribute With Their National Resources in CSDP-based Operations.  

33  

5.3 The Failure of the EU as a global actor in the 2011 Military Intervention in Libya  

34  

5.4 Analysis of the Behavior and the interaction of the G3 with and within the CFSP in the 2011 Military Intervention in Libya  

35  

5.4.1 The Willingness of the G3 to Cooperate and Coordinate with and within the CFSP.  

35  

5.4.2 The Willingness of the G3 to Contribute With Their National Resources in CSDP-based Operations.  

37  

6. **COMPARISON AND DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS**  

37  

7. **CONCLUSION**  

40  

8. **REFERENCES**  

43
# List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common Commercial Policy</td>
<td>(CCP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
<td>(CFSP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Security and Defense Policy</td>
<td>(CSDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Council</td>
<td>(Council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
<td>(EEAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
<td>(ESDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>(EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great 3 states of the EU</td>
<td>(G3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
<td>(GDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Representative</td>
<td>(HR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Representative Vice President</td>
<td>(HRVP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Relations</td>
<td>(IR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Institutionalism</td>
<td>(LI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member States</td>
<td>(MS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Fly Zone</td>
<td>(NFZ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
<td>(NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Constructivism</td>
<td>(SC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>(UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
<td>(UNSC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>(US)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acknowledgements

I will use this opportunity to express my gratitude and appreciation to every single individual that has supported me throughout my journey of writing this bachelor thesis.

First of all, I am extremely thankful to my supervisor, Gunnhildur Lily Magnusdottir, for her aspiring guidance, invaluably constructive criticism, and several professional advices she has offered me during my project work.

Secondly, I would like to thank my family, particularly, my wife Saira Khan, my father Syed Khurshid Anwar, and my mother Nasima Khatoon, for the immense support and motivation they have offered me throughout my studies on the bachelor level, and especially during my time writing this bachelor thesis.

Moreover, I would like to offer my gratitude to my fellow students for sharing their truthful and illuminating views on a number of issues related to this project.

Finally, I would like to complement the bachelor thesis seminars I have attended, held by Derek Hutcheson and Gunnhildur Lily Magnusdottir, and the thorough written and oral feedback I have received from the drafts handed in. This truly helped me a lot in improving my thesis.
1. Introduction

1.1. Background and Objective

The problem area of this thesis is the coherence of the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU). This topic is significant and problematic to explore, because coherence within the EU’s external actions is an issue that its leaders and politicians have been emphasizing on developing for more than four decades (Marangoni, 2012:4; Gaspers, N.A.:19; Gebhard, 2011:103). Yet the EU has over the years continuously faced extensive challenges in producing unity among its Member States (MS), and act as a united front in foreign security and defence matters. This has affected the European integration, as well as the image and credibility of the EU as a global actor in international relations (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006:163; Hill and Smith, 2011:476).

The implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 introduced three new institutional innovations in the EU. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) is now delegated a double-hatted position of simultaneously functioning as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security, and Vice President of the European Commission (HRVP). Moreover, a full-time position of the President of the European Council (Council), with duration of two and a half year (renewable once), has also been established. Finally, the most important institutional innovation, the European External Action Service (EEAS), has as well been introduced. The main function and aim of the EEAS is to coordinate the MS and their actions outside the boundaries of the EU, and speak and act on the behalf of the MS and the EU as a whole. The implementation of this body is perceived to offer the institutions of the EU, and its MS a unique and profound opportunity to influence the global political sphere (Takman, 2013:1; Gaspers, N.A.:19).

The overall aim, goal, and expectation of the Lisbon Treaty is to enhance the effectiveness and visibility of the EU’s foreign policy, by improving its policy coherence, integrating its various policy instruments, and making its presence in international politics more uniform (Blockmans, 2011:5; Takman, 2013:1, 11; EUR-LEX, 2010:28-29, Menon, 2011:75).

However, the failure of the EEAS in coordinating the MS actions and speaking and acting on the behalf of the MS and the EU as a whole in the 2011 military
intervention in Libya, and its failure in consolidating all of the EU’s external actions has led to concerns about whether the Lisbon Treaty retains the potential to fulfill its goal and what is expected from it (Menon, 2011:75-76; Takman, 2013:2; Blockmans, 2011:5; Marangoni, 2012; Peterson et al., 2012; Reuter, 2011; Portela and Raube, 2009).

By analyzing and comparing the behavior of the three largest MS of the EU: the United Kingdom (UK), France, and Germany, or also referred to as the great three states of the EU (G3), in terms of how they interacted within and with the CFSP in the 2003 Iraq War and the 2011 military intervention in Libya. I will in this research explain and explore how the EEAS has affected, if in any way, the coherence of the CFSP.

Relatedly, the main claim I am working from in this research is that the coherence of the CFSP has not been affected in any way due to the MS inherent characteristic and nature of always aiming to achieve their national interests as their first priority, which are determined by their value-based normative ideas gained through social interactions. This claim is closely related to the findings I am expecting to derive from the theoretical perspective of liberal institutionalism (LI) and social constructivism (SC), I am applying in this research. These theories will combined be applied as ‘lenses’ that will contribute with explaining and creating an understanding of the phenomenon under investigation.

Coherence in the EU can be defined as a concept in which the absence of contradictions between: policies, instruments, institutions, and level of decision are existent. These factors have further been divided into four principal dimensions, whereas the existence of coherence and consensus between the MS national foreign policies and the EU’s foreign policies is categorized as vertical coherence. The second dimension is categorized as institutional coherence and is perceived as a challenge in two specific scenarios: ‘when a single policy area is served by two sets of actors and their different procedures within the EU, (inter-institutional coherence), and when different actors within the EU have different approaches to a dossier (intra-institutional coherence)’ (Marangoni, 2012:6). The third dimension is categorized as horizontal coherence, in which coherence between different policies of the EU is existent. Finally, the fourth and last dimension is categorized as external or interstate coherence, which refers to how coherently an actor in the EU represents it-self externally, and to what extent its actions are perceived coherent by the outside world.
The main focus and objective of this thesis is to explain and explore how the EEAS has, if in any way, affected the cooperation and coordination of the MS within and with the CFSP on the vertical dimension in security and defence matters. (Regelsberger, 2011:17; Howorth, 2011:200).

This is closely related to the vertical dimension of coherence in the CFSP, and the given intergovernmental nature of the CFSP in which the MS are perceived as the most prominent actors. Hence, the main research question of this thesis is:

*How has the EEAS affected, if in any way, the coherence of the CFSP on the vertical dimension in security and defence matters?*

### 1.2. Approach and Structure

The problem of incoherence in the CFSP on the vertical dimension is suggested to be threefold, which is closely connected to the capability and expectation gaps that exist within the EU in foreign security and defence matters. The three factors related to this are: ‘differences amongst member states’; ‘the unwillingness to use EU institutions’; ‘and the contribution of personnel in achieving coherence’ (Potela and Raube, 2009:20; Hill, 1993:315-321; Smith, 2011:188-189).

By condensing the former two factors into one unit, a conceptual framework containing two factors has been developed. By applying this conceptual framework, the main research question of this thesis has been divided into two different formulations:

- **How has the EEAS affected, if in any way, the willingness of the MS to cooperate and coordinate within and with the CFSP in foreign and security matters?**

- **How has the EEAS affected, if in any way, the willingness of the MS to contribute with their national resources in CSDP-based military operations?**

These formulations will be applied as a comparative framework in the analysis section, which will allow comparing how the G3 interacted within and with the CFSP in the cases selected in a more coherent fashion.

As for the structure of this thesis, in the next section, I will outline the existing literature concerning the topic of this research, which will guide to the research gap I am basing this thesis on. Moreover, in the third section, the theoretical framework
will be presented, while in the fourth section I will outline the methodological considerations applied in this research.

Furthermore, in the fifth section I will then present an analysis of how the G3 interacted within and with the CFSP in the cases selected. In the sixth section I will compare the findings attained from the analysis, empirically explore the main claim of this thesis by relating it to the findings achieved from the analysis, and discuss the replicability and generalizability of the findings. Finally, in the conclusion I will answer to the main research question, and offer a suggestion for future research direction closely related to the topic of this research.

2. Previous Research

The existence of academic literature concerning the coherence of the CFSP of the EU is extensively available. Most of this literature suggests that since the initiation of the European integration project, the EU has faced severe challenges in producing coherence in the CFSP. More specifically, it is suggested that the EU has so far been unable to coordinate its MS and their actions, and act as an effective and unified body in foreign security and defence matters (Smith, 2011:188; Zielonka, 2000). Prime examples in this relation have been Macedonia, Afghanistan, and Iraq in which the absence of consensus between the MS was highly existent. While some MS favored joint action coordinated by the EU, other MS opposed this idea in favor of independent national contributions (Smith, 2011:187).

When looking into the meaning, use, and definition of the term coherence it becomes evident that it has frequently been misconceived and interchanged with the term consistency. This has led scholars to emphasize on drawing a clear conceptual distinction between the two respective terms. Although, consensus among scholars concerning the differences between the two terms is now evident, a general agreement on the definition of the term coherence has still not been successfully reached (Gebhard, 2011:103).

However, according to much of the existing literature the concept of coherence can be defined as a condition in which there is absence of contradictions, and in which the existence of high level of structural harmony based on factors such as ‘comprehensiveness, completeness, continuity, and consistency’ is evident. (Gebhard, 2011:106; Bertea, 2005; Marangoni, 2012:6).
While much of the existing literature have identified progress in the development of the CFSP in terms of enhanced flexibility in the institutional framework, which creates the possibility for the MS to unify and fully exploit the collective power of the EU in international politics (Smith, 2004; Pinelli, 2007; McCormick, 2005; Diedrichs and Jopp, 2003; Marangoni, 2012; Peterson et al., 2012; Reuter, 2011; Barbé, 2004). Several social scientists from most of the theoretical schools, including the fields of International Relations and European Integration, share the common view that the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU is very unlikely to come under the realm of European Integration (Howorth, 2011:199-200).

Relatedly, multiple explanations concerning the incoherence of the CFSP, and why it has been unable to succeed have been offered. These explanations have largely been conducted by applying theoretical perspectives related to state-centric and rationalist ideals, such as liberal intergovernmentalism, and can be categorized into three different dimensions: national, supranational, and international. These explanations are closely connected to the capability and expectation gaps that exist within the EU’s foreign and security policy (Hill, 1993:315; Smith, 2011:188).

According to the literature related to the national explanation, the incoherence in the CFSP in security and defence matters is primarily caused by the lack in consensus between MS. In other terms, the challenge of the MS in finding the political will to coordinate and cooperate with and within the CFSP, due to their divergent national interests that each MS aims to pursue before anything else, makes it next to impossible to achieve coherence in the CFSP (Lamy, 2011; Cini and Bourne, 2006; Hoffmann, 1966; Dunne and Schmidt, 2011; Pinelli, 2007; Menon, 2004; Smith, 2004; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Smith, 2011).

Relatedly, it is suggested that the best way to conceptualize the CFSP is by perceiving it as a ‘problematic social situation’, or a ‘mixed motive game’ (Wagner, 2003:582-583). Although, the MS share the common interest of gaining influence and power in international politics, which is more conveniently gained by acting as a group than individually, cooperation between them is perceived very unlikely due to the ‘compliance and distribution’ factor that may act as a barrier in this relation (Wagner, 2003:582-583; Howorth, 2011:223).

The MS, especially the larger ones, fear that cooperation and coordination may result in that they will have to surrender their national sovereignty to cover and prioritize the interests of the EU, especially in foreign security and defence matters.

Closely related to this, even after the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, which has contributed with creating a more sophisticated infrastructure of developing the CFSP, several MS still resist to pool and delegate their national sovereignty in terms of national foreign policy to the EU (Smith, 2011:172-173; Portela and Raube, 2009; Peterson et al., 2012:289-290).

Moreover, the institutional design of the CFSP is identified as a ‘fast coordination game’, as it is perceived to be dominated by coordination of the MS compared to collaboration, and because foreign ministers of the MS are subjected to immense time pressure when negotiating over common positions (Wagner, 2003:583-585).

Furthermore, it is also suggests that since the MS are not bound by ‘agreed common approaches’ in foreign security and defence matters, they retain the possibility to act freely where there has not been established any agreed policy. Hence, the only way non-compliance with an agreed common position in the CFSP in security and defence matters can affect MS is by hampering their reputation. In other words, the absence of penalties such as political and economic sanctions, when the MS decides not to comply on an agreed common position in the CFSP, leads to that the occurrence of incoherence becomes more likely (Regelsberger, 2011:17; Peterson et al., 2012:295, 300; Wagner, 2003:583-585).

By applying the theoretical perspective of SC, Hadfield (2006) similarly identifies that although shared values and views might contribute with overcoming many vital obstacles to cooperation, the MS own national policies and interests simultaneously act as a threat to the coherence in the CFSP (Hadfield, 2006:694).

According to the literature concerning the supranational explanation, the incoherence of the CFSP in security and defence matters is caused by the weak institutional framework in which the decision-making structure is subjected to the intergovernmental method based on unanimity (Portela and Raube, 2009; Peterson et al., 2012:311; McCormick, 2005:214-216; Diedrichs and Jopp, 2003; Regelsberger 2011:17; Pinelli, 2007:283; Barbé, 2004; Meunier and Nicolaïdis, 2011:276-278; Hadfield, 2006). In other words, with the presence of now (28) MS within the EU, and since the composition and function of the EU’s bodies are located within the intergovernmental cooperation in the CFSP in security and defence matters; the
institutional framework of the EU lacks the capacity to enhance the coherence of the CFSP (Smith, 2004:754; Smith, 2011:179; Portela and Raube, 2009).

This is closely related to the two very diverse perspectives among MS that have circulated within the EU since the CFSP came into being. Smaller MS promote the perspective and idea that the community method of decision-making should be promoted, as they perceive it to be the prerequisite for the EU in achieving the goal of speaking with a common voice and act as a united front in foreign security and defence issues (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006:162-163; McCormick, 2005:209; Peterson et al., 2012:290). The interest of most of the larger MS is to retain their independence in foreign security and defence issues, which is why they strive to ensure that the European Commission and other similar institutions that promote the community method of decision-making are excluded from the CSDP process (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006:174; Peterson et al., 2012:289-290; McCormick, 2005:209).

The tension between these diverse perspectives of the MS, along with the intergovernmental decision-making structure based on unanimity play a vital role in undermining the coherence and effectiveness of the CFSP. Relatedly, it makes the MS become more prone and interested in acting in smaller groups, or even unilaterally when it comes to foreign security and defence matters (Peterson et al., 2012:311; McCormick, 2005:214-216).

Finally, the existing literature related to the international explanation identifies that the EU as a global actor is unable to provide leadership in international politics independently. It is suggested that its behavior and success in foreign security and defence matters is highly dependent, influenced, and supported by its transatlantic ties with the United States of America (US) (Zielonka, 2000).

The dubious and elusive relationship between the EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which has evolved into a more competitive than cooperative relationship over time, plays a vital role in this relation (Fortmann et al., 2010:4; Howorth, 2007:146).

Although, the US has previously been interested in developing the EU’s identity as a security and defence actor in world politics, more recently it has become very concern about the future of NATO in world politics. In other words, the US perceives that a stronger CSDP may ultimately threaten and weaken the existence of NATO in
international politics (Hoffmann 2009:49; Fortmann et al., 2010:4; Howorth, 2007:146).

Moreover, bilateral, multilateral, and transatlantic special relations of the MS are also identified to play a vital role for the incoherence in the CFSP. Such special relations are suggested to develop conflicting perception among the MS concerning what stand the EU as a global actor should take in security and defence matters. This was clearly evident in the 2003 Iraq War, as the special relationship between the UK and the US led to that the EU as a global actor was unable to coordinate its MS and their actions, and act as a unified body (Smith, 2011:177; Menon, 2004).

As earlier stated, most of the previous literature has been conducted by applying state-centric and rationalist theoretical perspectives. Very interestingly, the use and presence of SC in this relation has been less evident. Many scholars have relatedly identified that SC has more recently begun to offer valuable and convincing theoretical insights to the EU’s foreign security and defence policy, by explaining it in terms of identity, ideas, discourse, shared values and views (Cini and Bourne, 2006:123; Howorth, 2011:199, 201, 222; Christiansen et al., 2002, Hadfield, 2006).

In other words, it is suggested that structure and agency play a vital role in influencing MS position in the CFSP, why it is not enough to only focus on their national interests. It is equally important to consider the role of ideas and institutions in this relation (Christiansen et al., 2002:26-27; Howorth, 2011:201).

However, most of the studies on this topic conducted by applying SC have rather focused on how coherence in the CFSP can be enhanced by value-based normative ideas and interaction between MS (Howorth, 2011:201; Cini and Bourne, 2006:123).

By applying the theoretical perspective of LI in combination with SC as ‘lenses’ that will help explain and create an understanding of how the EEAS has affected, if in any way, the coherence of the CFSP on the vertical dimension; and by focusing on how the MS national interests, determined by their value-based normative ideas gained through social interactions, can act as obstacles for achieving a coherent CFSP on the vertical dimension in security and defence matters, this thesis contributes to the existing knowledge concerning the failure of the EU’s foreign security and defence policy.
3. Theoretical Framework

In this section, the core elements of the theoretical perspectives of liberal institutionalism and social constructivism, which are being applied as ‘lenses’ in this research, will be outlined.

3.1. Theories Approaching Cooperation in the CFSP

There exists multiple ways of how a theory can function, and how its role in academic research can be determined. For instance, a theory can be applied as a ‘paradigm’, which underpins a research design of an academic paper; it can be applied as ‘knowledge’ that emerges from a research study; and it can be applied as a ‘lens’ that contributes with creating an understanding of a phenomenon under investigation (Bryman, 2012).

As earlier implied, the role of the theoretical perspectives applied in this research is to explain and create an understanding of how the EEAS has affected, if in any way, the coherence of the CFSP on the vertical dimension in security and defence matters. Hence they will function as ‘lenses’ in this thesis.

Although, the theoretical perspective of realism can be considered as an appropriate alternative to be applied in this thesis, as it may contribute with answering the main research question, the theoretical perspective of liberal institutionalism and social constructivism are the most appropriate and suitable theories for the purpose of this thesis, as they offer a very powerful explanation of under what conditions the CFSP is coherent (Dunne and Schmidt, 2011).

In other words, to the contrary of realism, SC and LI perceive that international institutions promote cooperation and stability between states; assume that the identities of states can change through interaction; and ‘that collective identities (form) around the norm of cooperation itself’ (Sterling-Folker, 2000:97, 110; Woods, 2011:259).

Consequently, by applying these theories combined as ‘lenses’, a coherent explanation and understanding of how the EEAS has affected, if in any way, the coherence of the CFSP on the vertical dimension in security and defence matters will be offered.
3.1.1. Liberal Institutionalism

Similarly to realism, LI is also traditionally perceived as a rationalist and state-centric theory that suggests the international system as anarchic. This system encourages states to act unilaterally and promote self-help behavior, why LI similarly to realism explains the failure of the EU’s external policy by the notion that MS always prioritize their national interests before anything else (Lamy, 2011:123; Cini and Bourne, 2006:122; Hoffmann, 1966:882; Dunne and Schmidt, 2011:86-87).

However, LI contrary to realism emphasizes on that the EU can be perceived as an essential instrument in providing a framework for European integration in terms of cooperation between the MS. It is suggested that it can ‘(…) provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination, and in general, facilitate the operation of reciprocity’ (Baylis, 2011:237). In other words, this theoretical perspective explains the existence of transnationalism, regional integration, as well as the existence of interdependence between MS. (Lamy, 2011:121).

Moreover, LI further reasons the importance of the CFSP by emphasizing on that the MS rather aim for absolute gains compared to relative gains. This potentially leads to the possibility of longer-term cooperation between the MS that can contribute with increasing the stability and credibility of the CFSP (Woods, 2011:258; Cini and Bourne, 2006:122).

Furthermore, it is important to note that this theory similarly suggests that in order to cooperation between the MS can occur and exist, several conditions have to be fulfilled. According to Moravcsik (1998), cooperation between the MS within the CFSP is only possible if it is able to ‘strike substantive bargains’ for the MS (Moravcsik, 1998:21-22). It is relatedly suggested that although MS may accept to delegate or pool their sovereignty under certain conditions in the CFSP, it does not imply neither guarantee that the most powerful MS will always obey the rules (Woods, 2011:257; Moravcsik, 1998:21-22).

In other words, the CFSP is rather perceived as affecting international politics, as it offer the MS new reasons to cooperate; permit them to define their interests in a more cooperative fashion; and increases the possibility of negotiations and compliance among MS, by introducing rules and standards that are mutually agreed upon (Woods, 2011:258).
However, according to Sterling-Folker (2000) LI similarly to SC include the possibility of transforming the MS identities, and forming a collective identity of the MS (Sterling- Folker, 2000:110). In other words, interaction between the MS within the CFSP is suggested to lead to transforming their identities, behavior, and interests. While, formation of a collective identity of the MS is perceived as a reality through cooperation in the CFSP (Sterling- Folker, 2000:110).

Finally, the weaknesses connected to this theoretical perspective are suggested to be that the foundations it rests upon are a ‘relatively simplistic image of human motivation, which may miss many of its important dimensions’ (Bethani, 2011:7). Moreover, the usefulness of this theory is also suggested to be limited, because the interests and goals of the actors it presents ‘exogenously to the analysis, especially in empirical cases’, are usually difficult to specify beforehand (Bethani, 2011:7).

3.1.2. Social Constructivism

The theoretical perspective of SC is often confused with being a substantive theory of international relations, which offers predictions of how states may behave in different situations in the international political arena. However, this theory is rather based on interpretations, and offers explanations of the behavior of states in international politics (Bernett, 2011:154).

Being a non-essential social theory, it is rather concerned with conceptualizing the relationship between agents and structure, and suggests that human consciousness play a vital role in international politics (Barnett, 2011:154-155).

The structure of the international system according to this theory is, similar to LI and realism, perceived to be anarchic. However, the way anarchy constrains states depends on how they perceive anarchy, and their own identities and interests (Wendt, 1992).

Moreover, the operative characteristics of SC are contrasted from rational ideals, as it instead emphasizes on social construction of reality (Barnett, 2011:155, 159). In other terms, this theoretical perspective identifies that value-based normative ideas, knowledge, social interactions, and beliefs play a vital role in forming, changing, defining, and influencing the MS power, identities, and interests within the CFSP, as well as in the international system (Barnett, 2011:150, 154-155; Woods, 2011:259).

Moreover, the normative structure of SC helps identify how identities shape the MS interest, and how ideas act as determinants of their identity and interest and not
something that are derived from them (Bowen, 2012). Relatedly, the ideas, interests, and identities of the MS are perceived to be subject to possible change, and not something that are fixed in the international structure (Barnett, 2011:159; Woods, 2011:259). Hence, when changes or variations occur in MS identities, it affects their national security interests and policies (Jepperson et al., 1996:52).

The core elements of SC, idealism and holism, are closely related to the role of human consciousness in international politics (Barnett, 2011:155). According to idealism the role of ideas in global politics play a vital role, as the world is perceived as being defined by both material and ideational forces (Barnett, 2011:155). The meaning and construction of material reality in idealism is therefore perceived to be dependent on ideas and interpretations. In other words material reality in the CFSP according to SC is not ignored, but rather argued being constructed by the MS (Barnett, 2011:155).

Holism observes the world to be ‘irreducibly social which cannot be decomposed into the properties of already existing actors’ (Barnett, 2011:155). Meaning, MS are perceived as interdependent, and the interaction between them constructs, reproduces, and transforms the structure of CFSP (Barnett, 2011:155).

When looking at how SC interprets and perceives the CFSP, it becomes evident that it rejects ‘the idea that the (MS) interests are objectively definable and fixed’. It rather promotes the idea that the interests of the MS in the CFSP are affected by their identity, and their ‘interests and identity are influenced by a social structure of interaction, normative ideas, and beliefs’ in the CFSP (Woods, 2011:259).

After having outlined the core elements of the theoretical perspectives applied in this thesis, it has become evident that although they suggest that the CFSP promotes cooperation and stability between the MS, their national identities and interests play the most important role in how they behave, interact, and make decisions within and with the CFSP.

Moreover, the value-based normative ideas of the MS gained through social interaction play a vital role in forming, transforming, defining, and influencing the MS power, identities, interests, behavior, expectations, and beliefs within the CFSP, as well as how they interpret and perceives the CFSP (Sterling-Folker, 2000:110; Woods, 2011:259).

On the basis of this information, and the information gained from the previous literature reviewed, a main claim is developed:
Due to the MS inherent characteristic and nature of always aiming to achieve their national interests and preferences as their first priority, which are determined by their value-based normative ideas gained through social interactions, the coherence of the CFSP on the vertical dimension in security and defence matters has not been affected in any way after the implementation of the EEAS.

This claim will be explored by finding evidence for it in an analysis and comparison of how the MS interacted within and with the CFSP in the cases selected. This will ultimately contribute with answering the main research question of this thesis.

In this relation, the national interests of the MS serve as the independent variable, while the coherence of the CFSP on the vertical dimension is the dependent variable of this thesis.

4. Research Methodology

4.1. Ontology

The ontological stance applied in this thesis is constructionism as it can be considered as the most adequate and relevant perspective. As aforementioned, the main objective of this thesis is to explore and explain how the EEAS has affected, if in any way, the cooperation and coordination of the MS within and with the CFSP on the vertical dimension in foreign security and defence matters. Relatedly, according to a qualitative research approach, which is closely aligned with constructionism, the researcher aims to receive information concerning a topic ‘(…) in natural contexts and uncover its meaning by descriptive, exploratory, or explanatory procedures’ (Suter, 2012:344-345).

Moreover, this ontological stance suggests that social entities should be perceived as social constructions that are established, formed, and influenced by social actors (Bryman, 2012:32-33). On the other hand, its counter ontological position, objectivism, suggests that ‘social entities can and should be considered objective entities that have a reality external to social actors’ (Bryman, 2012:32).

When illustrating and exemplifying the differences between these two divers positions, the terms, organization and culture, are very often used in the field of social science (Bryman, 2012:32).

Organization according to constructionism is perceived as a ‘negotiated order’ that is formed and influenced by the interaction between social actors. Hence, the order in
the organization is not pre-determined neither external to social actors, as perceived in objectivism (Bryman, 2012:32-33). Moreover, the social order in terms of rules and regulations within the organization are rather perceived as flexible, and subjected to a constant change, in terms of; ‘established, renewed, reviewed, revoked, revised, (etc.)’, why they can be perceived as less strictly imposed compared to the traditional understanding of the term order (Bryman, 2012:32-33).

However, it is important to note that this does not mean that the existence of rules and regulations in the organization do not play an important role, and can be ignored by social actors. But rather as there exist a margin for social actors to negotiate and influence them, why they can be perceived as ‘general understandings’, rather than ‘commands’ (Bryman, 2012:33-34).

Similarly, culture within constructionism is perceived as ‘(…) an emergent reality in a continuous state of construction and reconstruction’ (Bryman, 2012:34). In other words, social actors continuously create and recreate their culture. Because of this changing and the non-static nature of culture it is rather impossible to create a ‘standardized cultural understanding’, which perfectly provides the solutions to any kind of problems they frequently encounter and have to solve in their everyday life. This is why they need to reconstruct those solutions, and adopt an understanding about the situation at hand by evaluating and determining the difference between the ‘current’ situation compared to the previous one (Bryman, 2012:34).

This is closely connected to how the terms organization and culture in the EU is perceived in this thesis, which has been determined by the findings derived from the theoretical consideration applied as ‘lenses’. Not only does LI and SC share the same ‘functional-institutional logic to explain social change’, as outlined in the theoretical section. But they also share the same ontology, which means that LI can only be perceived as rationalist to a certain degree (Sterling-Folker, 2000:100, 110-111).

Hence, in this thesis the CFSP is perceived to fulfill the aspect of the organization, which functions as a ‘negotiated order’ that is formed and influenced by the interaction between the MS. Moreover, the idea of culture is fulfilled by the behavior of the MS in the CFSP in terms of the willingness to cooperate and coordinate after the EEAS has been implemented through the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. Furthermore, the EEAS is perceived as the ‘social order’ that has been renewed and revised to enhance the cooperation and coordination between MS. Furthermore, the functionality of the
CFSP is perceived as general understandings between the MS, and not as commands that have to be strictly obeyed.

4.2. Epistemology
The epistemological stance applied in this thesis is interpretivism. Within this epistemological perspective the traditions of hermeneutics, phenomenology, and symbolic interactionism are existent (Bryman, 2012: 28-30).

According to interpretivism, people and their institutions are the main subject matter of social science, and in order to study and offer legitimate knowledge concerning the social world it is important to explain and understand human behavior. In this relation the term understanding is ‘concerned with the empathic understanding of human action rather than with the forces that are deemed to act on it’ (Bryman, 2012: 28). On the contrary, positivism, the counter epistemological stance of interpretivism most commonly promotes the idea that the study of society is most appropriately performed by using the principles of the natural science, which includes the concepts of ‘theory-neutral observation and natural law’ (Bryman, 2012: 28).

The theoretical perspective of SC is closely aligned with the interpretivist epistemological stance, as it is based upon interpretations and offers an explanation of the behavior of states in the international political arena (Suter, 2012: 344; Bernett, 2011: 154). However, Interpretivism may still appear as a mismatch to be applied as the epistemological stance in this research, because of the inclusion of LI as the other theoretical perspective. LI is traditionally perceived as being a state-centric and rationalist theoretical perspective, which is closely connected to the epistemological stance of positivism.

However, as aforementioned, the theoretical perspective of LI can only be perceived as rationalist or state-centric to a certain degree, as it shares the same ontology as SC. Relatedly, when comparing the ‘meta-theoretical commitments’ of the two theories, it becomes evident that the epistemological differences between them are non-existent. They can be considered as ‘(…) complementary theories within the larger framework of liberal IR theories’ (Sterling-Folker, 2000: 100, 110-111).

Hence, the most appropriate and relevant epistemological stance to be applied in this thesis can be considered to be interpretivism.
4.3. Deductive Approach

The research approach I am applying in this thesis is deductive, which can be considered to offer ‘the most common view of the nature of the relationship between theory and research’ (Bryman, 2012:24). More specifically, unlike its counter part, inductive research approach, ‘it works from something more general to something more specific’, and is commonly referred to as a ‘top down’ approach (William, 2006). It generally entails that a specific main claim is deduced on the basis of what is already known about a particular subject through ‘theoretical derived considerations’ (Mayring, 2000; Bryman, 2012:24; William, 2006).

Moreover, the main claim then leads to the process of collecting data, and is further used to filter specific aspects from the data collection (Bryman, 2012:24; Mayring, 2000). The findings attained from the data collection are then used to explore, test or verify the main claim.

Finally, the last step within this approach then involves moving the approach from the deductive approach to an inductive approach, ‘as the researcher infers the implications of his or her findings for the theory that prompted the whole thing’ (Bryman, 2012:24).

The theoretical perspectives applied, and the outcomes of the selected cases in this research are pre-known. Hence, generally accepted theories concerning how the world works are applied from which a main claim has been deduced. The main claim will contribute with collecting and filtering relevant data concerning the two cases selected, and the findings attained from them will then verify the main claim (Bryman, 2012:9-8, 24).

4.4. Case Selection

The cases: the 2003 Iraq War, and the 2011 military intervention in Libya have been selected on the basis of representative cases, or as Bryman (2012) call them: exemplifying cases (Bryman, 2012:70). As evident, while the former case took place prior to the EEAS was implemented in the CFSP, and can be perceived as a prime example of incoherency in the CFSP (McCormick, 2005:218). The latter was the first ‘test’ for the CFSP after the EEAS was implemented in which the EU similarly failed to unify its MS, and act as a unified body. This justifies why an inclusion and comparison of, particularly, these cases is important, and how these cases will contribute with answering the main research question of this research.
Moreover, the focus in this relation will solely be on the three largest, and most powerful MS within the EU: the United Kingdom (UK), France, and Germany. As formerly noted, given the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP, the MS are perceived as the major actors (Regelsberger, 2011:17; Howorth, 2011:200).

Hence, the existence of coherence in the CFSP, and how the EU as a global actor responds to foreign security and defence matters is therefore highly dependent on the way MS interact and behave within and with the CFSP (Regelsberger, 2011:17; Menon, 2004:647). Consequently, in order to explore and explain the effect of the EEAS on the coherence of the CFSP on the vertical dimension, this thesis will analyze how the G3 interacted with and within the CFSP in both of the respective cases selected.

The conscious decision of specifically including the G3 is based upon the notion that they are by several scholars considered to retain the power to influence, and shape the development of the EU’s foreign policy. This is mainly because of the relative capabilities they retain as states in terms of: economic strength, military power, and population, which are considered to be much superior compared to any other MS of the EU (Posen, 2006:164; Shuster and Maier 2006:227).

In other words, the coherence of the CFSP on the vertical dimension, and how the EU as global actor responds to foreign security and defence matters is highly dependent upon the way the G3 behave and interact within and with the CFSP (Crowe, 2003:546). Relatedly, the G3 also played a very important role in how the EU as a global actor responded and reacted in the cases selected, why an analysis of their behavior will contribute with answering the main research question and fulfill the main aim of this research.

Moreover, the reason for only analyzing and comparing the response and behavior of these MS is to focus on keeping the process tracing manageable.

4.5. **Method and Sampling**

In order to explore the main claim of this thesis, the method of qualitative content analysis will be applied.

This research method is the most suitable for the purpose of this thesis, as it more frequently emphasizes on interpreting the behavior of social actors in relation to their ‘norms, values, and culture’ compared to its counter part quantitative content analysis (Bryman, 2012:620). Moreover, it often uses an analytic framework in which
concepts and classifications are linked in order to ‘(…) understand an underlying process; that is, a sequence of event or constructs and how they relate’ (Suter, 2012:344).

Furthermore, the goal of this method is to uncover ‘themes, patterns, concepts, insights, and understanding’ (Suter, 2012:344), through the use of ‘qualitative data reduction and sense-making effort that takes a volume of qualitative data and attempts to identify core consistencies and meanings’ (Patton, 2002:453).

This is closely related to the main objective of this thesis, which as evident aims to explain and explore how the EEAS has affected, if in any way, the cooperation and coordination of the MS with and within the CFSP on the vertical dimension in security and defence matters.

In this relation a thick description or rich detail of the content related to the cases applied will be produced, which will help uncover all relevant information from the literature (Suter, 2012:344).

As for conducting sampling in qualitative research, the main discussion is evolved around the aspect of purposive sampling in which the research question plays a vital role in determining the selection of units (Bryman, 2012:416). The units in this relation can be classified by: cases, sovereign states, ‘people, organizations, documents, departments, and so on’ (Bryman, 2012:416).

Moreover, within the aspect of purposive sampling there exist various kinds of sampling approaches that are all related to the main aim of the research. In other words, ‘(the) units of analysis are selected in terms of criteria that (allow) the research question to be answered’ (Bryman, 2012:418-419). Furthermore, sampling in qualitative research based on multiple case study designs, such as this research, contains two different levels: selection of cases, and selection of units within the cases (Bryman, 2012:417).

This refers back to the justification presented earlier concerning the cases selected, and the reason for specifically and only including and analyzing the behavior of the G3 in this thesis. As aforementioned, the cases and the G3 are selected on the basis of exemplifying cases, or typical case sampling, in which cases and units are selected on the basis that they ‘exemplifies a dimension of interest’, and fulfill the criteria of allowing the main research question to be answered (Bryman, 2012:418-419).
4.6. Material and Source Criticism

I am in this research analyzing primary and secondary sources, such as: reports, academic journal articles, academic books, and newspaper articles through the application of qualitative content analysis.

For obvious reasons other qualitative methods, such as: interviews, participant observations, and focus groups cannot be considered as possible and feasible methods to be applied in this research. It is first of all impossible for me to go back in time and perform participant observations of the cases selected. Secondly, due to the scope and timeframe of this thesis it is not feasible to rely on being able to perform interviews with EU officials concerning how the G3 interacted within and with the CFSP in the cases selected. Hence, the most feasible and realistic approach is therefore to analyze social documents related to the topic of this thesis.

This is closely connected to what Blanton (1996) suggest that if it is not possible to encode, observe, and measure an actor’s perception, values, and attitude directly. It is important to use indicators that can be observed, which are usually found through the communication produced by the actor (Blanton, 1996:29-30).

Moreover, the primary sources in terms of academic reports, journal articles, and academic books are primarily applied to analyze and compare how the G3 interacted within and with the CFSP in both of the cases. Relatedly, in order to avoid bias and depict a one-sided image, or in other words, in order to overcome the trustworthiness challenges that are usually aligned with qualitative research. The focus has extensively been laid on triangulation in terms of including a broad variety of different and diversified primary sources (Suter, 2012:363; Patton, 2002:467).

Furthermore, the secondary literature in terms of newspaper articles will solely contribute with obtaining general information, and facts about how the EU as a global actor reacted and responded to both of the cases selected. Hence, they will solely outline the general historical overview of the cases. The choice of including newspaper articles as a means of source in this thesis can be justified with the notion that they contribute with providing valuable information about the cases, and effectively places them within the context of their time (Tosh and Lang, 2006:66-67). In other words, while most of the primary sources concerning the cases selected have been published some time after the cases took place. The newspaper articles were published while the cases were actually taking place. Hence, they ‘provide a day by
day record of events’, why they can be perceived as being very effective in placing events within the context of their time (Tosh and Lang, 2006: 93-98).

Both the primary and the secondary material will be analyzed through the use of qualitative content analysis with thick description or rich detail, which will help uncover all relevant information from them (Suter, 2012:344). Moreover, equal amount of newspaper articles produced by right and left wing perspectives have been selected in order to create more credibility and reliability. Hence, for each case a newspaper article from BBC, and New York Times will be applied. In this relation, BBC can be categorized as right-wing or conservative influenced newspaper (Sommers, 2014; Burrell, 2014). While, New York Times can be categorized as left-wing or liberal influenced newspaper (Stoll, 2014).

The choice of the material selected in this thesis can be justified by the clear authenticity, understanding, credibility, and reliability they represent, why they become appropriate to be applied as historical reconstruction and evidence in this thesis (Tosh and Lang, 2006:93-98).

Furthermore, all the material applied in this thesis is originally written in the English language. Meaning, they have been read and understood in their original language, why the ratio of complexity and misunderstanding is consequently reduced (Tosh and Lang, 2006:93-98).

4.7. Operationalization of the Concepts

In order to produce a more objective understanding of the concepts applied in this thesis, I will in this section operationally define them into more empirically measurable factors.

As formerly outlined, a conceptual framework containing two formulations has been developed in this thesis, on the basis of the threefold challenges of incoherence that exists in the CFSP on the vertical dimension (Potela and Raube, 2009:20).

This conceptual framework will be applied as a comparative framework in order to empirically explore the behavior of the G3 in terms of how they interacted within and with the CFSP in the 2003 Iraq War, and the 2011 military intervention in Libya. This will help explore, explain, and evaluate the main claim, and ultimately contribute with answering the main research question of this thesis.
The two formulations in this relation are: ‘the willingness of the MS to cooperate and coordinate within and with the CFSP’, and ‘the willingness of the MS to contribute with their national resources in CSDP-based military operations’.

Relatedly, the former formulation is operationally defined as: the political unwillingness of the G3 to coordinate and cooperate within and with the CFSP in security and defence matters, because of their divergent national interests determined by their value-based normative ideas that are gained through social interactions.

In this relation the national interests of the G3 refers to their transatlantic relations with the US and NATO; their national interest of gaining, retaining, and maintaining a prominent position and status as an actor in the international political sphere; and their national interest in maintaining or uplifting their national cultural and political identity.

All of these factors play a vital role in affecting the G3’s position and decision in the CFSP in security and defence matters, as well as their willingness to delegate or pool their national sovereignty to the CFSP in security and defence matters. In other words, the MS fear that cooperation and coordination in the CFSP will lead to force them to cover and prioritize the interests of the EU before their own national interests (Smith, 2011:177; Menon, 2004; Howorth, 2011:223; Smith, 2011:172-173).

Moreover, the latter formulation applied in this relation is operationally defined as: the unwillingness of G3 to contribute with their national resources in CSDP-based military operations, similarly, based on their national interests determined by their value-based normative ideas that are gained through social interactions.

When it comes to deploying military and defence operations in the CSDP, the participating MS usually finance almost the entire cost, unless otherwise is unanimously decided by the Council (EUR-LEX, 2010). Moreover, the total costs of military operations under the framework of CSDP are usually divided between the MS according to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Hence, MS with the highest GDP’s usually finances the most of the costs. While MS with the lowest GDP’s finances the least, unless otherwise is decided by the Council based on unanimity voting (EUR-LEX, 2010).
4.8. Limitations

When looking at the limitations and challenges I may encounter when conducting this research, it becomes evident that a qualitative research is subjected to a great challenge in producing trustworthiness, as it is often perceived to be very ‘impressionistic and subjective’ (Bryman, 2012:390-393, 405). It is further suggested that the researcher unsystematically determines what is important and significant; it is difficult to replicate in other cases; it entails problem of generalization, and lack transparency in terms of how and what the researcher exactly did to arrive to the conclusion (Bryman, 2012:405-407, Suter, 2012:363-364).

5. Analysis

In this section, an analysis of how the G3 interacted within and with the CFSP in the 2003 Iraq War, and the 2011 military intervention in Libya will be presented. In this relation, the comparative framework outlined in the operationalization sub-section will be applied.

5.1. The Failure of the EU as a global actor in the 2003 Iraq War

The unilateral decision of the US to lead a military strike in Iraq in 2003, despite the unanimous decision of adopting Resolution 1441 in the United Nation Security Council (UNSC), led to a division between the MS positions in this international security issue (Alasdair, 2004:206).

While MS such as the UK, Denmark, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, signed a declaration that stated the support for the US policy of invading Iraq. Other MS such as Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, and Greece opposed this policy of the US, as they generally did not find the justifications presented by the US valid to intervene (McCormick, 2005:218; Alasdair, 2004:206-207; Tagliabue, 2003; BBC, 2003).

Due to the entrenched positions of the MS, especially the diverse positions of the G3 with the UK on one side and France and Germany on the other in this matter, which were highly influenced by their divergent national interests determined by the value-based normative ideas gained through social interactions, the EU as a global actor was unable to decide and act effectively and collectively.

This ultimately resulted in that the MS acted outside the framework of the CSDP, which significantly impacted the role and credibility of the EU as a security and defence actor in international relations (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006:163; Hill and Smith, 2011:476).
5.2. Analysis of the Behavior and Interaction of the G3 with and within the CFSP in the 2003 Iraq War

5.2.1. The willingness of the MS to cooperate and coordinate with and within the CFSP

The nature of the MS transatlantic relations with the US/NATO is determined by the normative idea and perception they retain about each other, which is gained through historically produced knowledge from social interactions (Castro, 2009:26-37).

When specifically looking at the G3’s transatlantic relations with the US and NATO, which plays a vital role in affecting their position in the CFSP, the most interesting relationship can be considered between the UK and US/NATO. This unique and special relationship has to a very high extent influenced, supported, and strengthened the UK’s foreign policy since the Second World War (Keegan, 2004:165).

The UK is perceived as the most ‘Atlanticist’ MS compared to any other MS, as it has generally always favored the ideas and lead of the US and NATO in international security and defence matters over the CFSP (Howorth, 2007:147). The general perception the UK retains in this relation is that security and defence in Europe has, and can only be insured by the US through the use of NATO. This is closely related to why it has repeatedly been hesitant towards an independent European security and defence entity (Howorth, 2007:147).

Moreover, the UK’s national interest of maintaining its image and identity as a prominent and powerful actor in global politics can as well be determined as a reason why the UK leans more towards the lead of the US and NATO in international security and defence issues, compared to the CFSP. In other terms, another reason why the UK generally supports the US’ and NATO’s lead in international security matters compared to the CSDP, is because of its fear of losing importance and its leading role in the ‘Atlantic security network’ (Howorth, 2007:147). The strategy and self-interest of the UK is to keep functioning as the bridge between the US and Europe, and act as a barrier to any serious attempt of an affective CSDP in order to maintain its relations with the most powerful state in the world as well as its value and position in international politics (Howorth, 2007:147).

As evident, preservation of sovereignty and independence towards the CFSP can be perceived as being inherently integrated in the UK’s national political culture (Wood, 2003:4). This was similarly evident in the 2003 Iraq War in which it favored
the US’ offensive and unilateral decision of performing a military intervention in Iraq, over the more reluctant position of its fellow MS, Germany and France. In other words, its reluctance to delegate its national sovereignty to the CFSP was clearly evident in this security and defence matter (Menon, 2004:647).

Furthermore, the UK’s interest, position, and decision in this war clearly contradicted the identity, values, and norms of the EU in terms of: multilateralism, European cooperation and integration, and the use of normative power in international relations (Meunier and Nicolaïdis, 2011:276).

Although, the UK in the summer of 2002, and then in February 2003 had decided that further resolutions were necessary in order to the coalition could get permission to initiate a military strike on Iraq, it failed to achieve this in the Resolution 1441 that took place in November 2002, as well as in the non-resolution of March 2003 (Ralph, 2005:2).

Hence, it can be suggested that when the UK realized that the US would lead a war in Iraq in any circumstances, despite being aware of that the Iraqi threat was much less alarming in reality than presented by the US. It chose to follow the US’ lead in order to maintain and pursue its national interests, which were determined by its value-based normative ideas gained through social interactions (Ralph, 2005:2-3; Howorth, 2007:147).

As evident, the behavior of the UK in this respective case was closely connected to the core elements of LI and SC, outlined in the theory section, in terms of the MS always aims to achieve their national interests and preferences as their first priority, which are determined by their value-based normative ideas gained through social interactions.

When looking at the transatlantic relations between Germany and the US/NATO, it becomes evident that it can be categorized as a relationship that has transformed immensely over the course of time. Germany’s membership in the NATO after the Second World War did not only offer it a new lifeline in the international political sphere. But it simultaneously provided it a new form of security identity ‘(…) defined as the most appropriate fit between a nation’s collective identity, its security culture, the security environment, and the available security instruments’ (Howorth, 2007:152).

Germany’s role as a security actor in international relations was determined as an essentially defensive and normative power by the US and NATO, and the only way it
could use its armed forces in international conflicts was through multilateral defense missions (Howorth, 2007:152). By the end of the Cold War it managed to assert itself as the most important European actor for the alliance, and a state that promoted multilateralism, human security, ‘territorial centrality’, ‘doctrinal salience’, and the use of military power as the last resort in international politics (Howorth, 2007:152; Forsberg, 2005:215).

However, at the end of the Cold War, the relationship between Germany and the US/NATO drastically changed. The US’ actions of promoting and imposing its interventionist ideas and culture upon its allies through the use of NATO, made Germany distance itself (Berendse, 2003:335). Germany perceived the behavior of the US and NATO as contradictory towards its pacifist political identity, which it had managed to build as a security actor in international relations, why anti-US/NATO sentiments became evident in Germany (Howorth, 2007:152; Forsberg, 2005:216, 220). This led to that Germany began to look for security institutions elsewhere, which ultimately led to the creation of the ESDP/CSDP; a security framework that was very close to its normative identity and values (Howorth, 2007:153).

Relatedly, the opposition of Germany in the US-led intervention of Iraq in 2003 was closely related to its anti-American/NATO sentiments, and its national interest of maintaining its pacifist political identity determined by culturally bound and historically produced knowledge gained from its previous social interactions with the US (Forsberg, 2005:223; Berendse, 2003:345).

Germany perceived that the US was forcing the UN to authorize and legitimize a military strike on Iraq, and follow its policy preferences without questioning them (Bower, 2009:6). In other terms, Germany did not identify the US’ behavior as promoting multilateralism, as it unilaterally decided to lead a military intervention in Iraq despite the lack of proof that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction that constituted a threat to the US and its allies. It rather identified the interventionist ideology of the US as a threat to the development of international cooperation, which it through its pacifist political identity extensively promotes, why it decided not to actively participate in the war (Forsberg, 2005:214-215, 223).

Germany’s quasi-participation in the war, and its claim of unconditional political support to the US was closely related to the commitment it already had made of participating multilaterally against the war on terrorism (Hummel, 2007:18; Wood, 2003:8; Forsberg, 2005:219). Hence, in order to uphold its reputation and identity as a
credible and reliable actor, it chose to quasi-participate in the war (Hummel, 2007:18; Wood, 2003:8; Forsberg, 2005:219).

Moreover, similarly to the UK, it is suggested that Germany also retained self-interest in terms of maintaining its position, image, and identity as a strong political actor in the global political sphere, why it opposed the US’ lead and interest in this particular matter. In other words, Germany’s increasing self-perception of being a great power in world politics, and its resistance against a global unipolar system in which the US is the hegemonic superpower can also be perceived as a factor to why it opposed the war (Forsberg, 2005:224-225).

As evident, the behavior of Germany in this matter was as well closely tied to what the theoretical perspective of LI and SC suggest. In other words, the inherent characteristic and nature of the MS of always prioritizing their national interest and preferences, determined by their value-based normative ideas gained through social interactions, played a vital role in determining how Germany interacted with and within the CFSP in this particular case.

Finally, France is perceived as the US’ oldest and most reluctant ally, especially when it comes to ideas related to security and defence matters. Due to the culturally bound and historically produced knowledge gained from its previous interactions with the US in the two world wars, it has similarly to Germany developed a cultural identity that can be categorized as anti-American. Moreover, the French view on the close involvement of NATO in European security and defence matters has as well been very skeptical over the course of time (Howorth, 2007:154-155).

In 1966, France decided to opt-out from the NATO, because it perceived the alliance within as flawed. In other terms, during the Cold War France was not comfortable with the credibility of the US’ ‘nuclear umbrella’ it had organized against the USSR. It therefore perceived and criticized the US as a weaker ally that were unable to think strategically and unable to ‘(…) contribute to the vitality and dynamism of alliance options’ (Howorth, 2007:155).

In the mid-1990’s France relationship with NATO and the US began to develop, and it promoted the idea of an enhanced cooperative relationship between the US/NATO and the EU in security and defence matters. However, France’s main objective and strategy related to this was to retain NATO from ‘serious operations involving collective defence while building up (a European security and defence
entity) for increasingly autonomous European crisis-management missions’ (Howorth, 2007:156).

The French interest in developing a well-functioning European security and defence entity only increased after the failure in the Kosovo intervention, why it began to emphasize on filling the gaps related to security and defence in the EU through the idea of European cooperation. This was not only related to France’s national interest in spreading its values and views in the global political sphere in order to obtain a more prominent position and status within. But also closely related to its interest of engaging most of the international security and defence issues multilaterally through a EU based framework instead of through NATO, which it perceives does not retain the capacity to assume a global role (Belkin, 2011:1; Howorth, 2007:157, 159).

France’s anti-Americanism in terms of its stark opposition toward the US was similarly evident in the 2003 Iraq War. It actively confronted, opposed, and criticized the US’ ambitions of pursuing its security interest unilaterally, and as well immensely condemned the UK’s active support to the US in this matter (Belkin, 2011:2; Howorth, 2007:158). Relatedly, it actively pressured the US to use a multilateral framework, and tackle this crisis by applying economic sanctions. (Belkin, 2011:2; Howorth, 2007:158). Hence, it can be suggested that France’s opposition to this war was motivated by its national interest of promoting cooperation and multilateralism; its national interest of upholding its powerful position, and being perceived as a great power in international politics; its national interest and identity of upholding and uplifting civilian and international law; and its national interest and goal of establishing a strong Europe that is steered by it, and from which the role of the US and NATO is excluded (Hummel, 2007:17; Stahl, 2005:27-28; Wood, 2003:6).

Similarly to the behavior of the UK and Germany in this respective case, the behavior of France was as well closely related to the core elements of the theoretical perspective of LI and SC outlined earlier.

Moreover, although the position and decision of Germany and France in the 2003 Iraq War was closely aligned with the EU’s values, identity, and norms it aims to image in the international political sphere as a global actor, it can be suggested that their position and decision was rather motivated by their national interests of maintaining their national cultural identity, and their power status in the global political sphere determined by their value-based normative ideas gained through
social interactions, compared to the shared interest and desire for a coherent common foreign policy (Wood, 2003:5). Hence, if the common agreed position in the CFSP had favored this war, they would most likely have abstained from it and pursued their national interests first (Wood, 2003:5).

5.2.2. The willingness of the MS to contribute with their national resources in CSDP-based military operations.

As aforementioned, the UK, France, and Germany are the most powerful MS of the EU in terms of economic and military capabilities, and together amounts for more than half of the combined EU (28) defence spending (Howorth, 2011:209).

Relatedly, they share and account for most of the burden in terms of cost and resources when participating in CSDP-based military missions (Posen, 2006:164; Shuster and Maier 2006:227; EUR-LEX, 2010). Hence, it can be suggested that their national political and economic interests play a vital role in determining their participation and contribution in CSDP-based military missions.

As earlier noted, the UK fully engaged in the 2003 Iraq War due to its national interests, why it extensively contributed with its resources in terms of military personnel that amounted for approximately a third of the entire coalition force used in this war (Keegan, 2004:166-167). Relatedly, the same trend would most likely have been evident if this war was deployed under the framework of the CSDP. This can be reasoned by primarily considering that UK’s national interest of maintaining its transatlantic ties with the US, which is determined by culturally bound and historical produced knowledge through previous interactions, would have acted as its primary priority in this relation.

However, the limited participation of Germany despite its stark opposition against this war, and France’s total opposition and condemnation against this war, due to their national interests determined by their value based normative ideas gained through social interactions, suggests that they would have abstained from contributing with their national resources if this war was deployed under the framework of the CSDP.

5.3. The Failure of the EU as a global actor in the 2011 Military Intervention in Libya.

The 12th of March 2011, the Arab League requested the UNSC to impose a no-fly zone (NFZ) in Libyan airspace, as the revolt in Libya, which emerged in connection to the Arab Spring in 2011, escalated into an armed conflict between the rebels and the Qaddafi-regime. A week later a military campaign was approved by the UNSC
under Resolution 1973, which aimed to protect the civilian population in Libya (Lindström and Zetterlund, 2012:13).

As earlier stated, this military intervention was the first ‘test’ for the CFSP after the EEAS was implemented through the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 in which the EU as a global actor, similarly to the 2003 Iraq War, was unable to decide and act actively, effectively, and collectively in security and defence terms. Germany played a vital role in blocking the possibility for deploying this military intervention as a EU crisis management mission under the CSDP framework (BBC, 2011; Bilefsky and Landler, 2011; IISS, 2011:1).

In other words, while France and the UK proactively intervened militarily within the NATO framework ‘on the Union’s doorstep’, due to their national interests determined by their value-based normative ideas gained through social interactions (Menon, 2011:75). Germany abstained from voting on the UN Resolution 1973, and rejected the participation of offensive action in Libya on similar grounds (BBC, 2011; Bilefsky and Landler, 2011). However, the 1st of April 2011, the EU ineffectively decided and approved a military mission based on humanitarian assistance, which has been highly criticized by scholars and commentators from the field of social political science (Menon, 2011:75-76). This has, similarly to the 2003 Iraq War, contributed immensely with hampering the credibility and image of the EU as a global security and defence actor in international politics.

5.4. Analysis of the Behavior and Interaction of the G3 within and with the CFSP in the 2011 Military Intervention in Libya.

5.4.1. The willingness of the MS to cooperate and coordinate within and with the CFSP

The UK’s motivation for its proactive role in this intervention was highly related to its national interest, determined by its value-based normative ideas gained through social interactions. In other words, the national interest of the UK in this particular case was to maintain its transatlantic ties with the US and NATO, and promoting its image and identity as a ‘major European actor’ in international politics (Lindström and Zetterlund, 2012:36-38).

The US was very clear about its interest of not assuming leadership, and its resistance towards the involvement of NATO in this intervention. It therefore appealed to its allies to take operational lead (IISS, 2011:3; Lindström and Zetterlund,
Relatedly, it has been suggested that the UK stepped forward in order to pursue its interest of maintaining its favorable transatlantic relationship with the US, by proving that it still was a valuable partner (Lindström and Zetterlund, 2012:37).

Moreover, the UK’s past failure of being passive in humanitarian crisis, such as the Rwandan Genocide in 1994, motivated the UK to act in Libya. Its national interest of maintaining its position and image as a ‘major European power’ in international politics required it to act proactively in this intervention (Lindström and Zetterlund, 2012:37).

Furthermore, while France was reluctant to the idea of involving NATO in this matter, and rather eager to deploy the intervention alongside with the UK through a combined operational and political leadership. The UK was reluctant to this idea, and to the contrary favored the involvement and leadership of NATO (IISS, 2011:3). This suggest that the UK valued and prioritized its national interests before the possibility of enhancing its relationship and cooperation with its fellow MS, which can be perceived as a cause for incoherence in the CFSP.

Relatedly, the notion that the UK was only interested in a joint action in Libya with France under the command of NATO, and the notion that the UK never stressed the interest of intervening under the CSDP framework. It can be suggested that it was reluctant to pool or delegate its sovereignty to the CFSP in this matter (IISS, 2011:2-3). As aforementioned, the UK’s motivation in acting proactively in this matter was closely aligned with its national interest of maintaining its transatlantic ties with the US/NATO, and promoting its national identity and image in international politics as a ‘major European power’ (Lindström and Zetterlund, 2012:36-38). Hence, if the intervention were deployed under the framework of CSDP mission, the credit would rather have been given to the EU as a whole, instead of being specifically given to the UK, which would have undermined its sovereignty, main goal, and national interests.

Hence, it can be suggested that the UK’s fear of being forced to prioritize and cover the interest of the EU before its own national interest played a vital role in why it never stressed the interest for the Libyan intervention under the framework of the CSDP-mission.

As evident, the behavior of the UK in this respective case was also closely aligned with the core elements of LI and SC presented earlier. The German motivation of abstaining from voting on the UN Resolution 1973, and rejecting the participation of offensive action in Libya was closely related to its
national interest of upholding its pacifist political identity in international politics (Lindström and Zetterlund, 2012:28).

As mentioned earlier, Germany has since the end of the Cold War managed to assert itself as a security actor that promotes the idea that military action, as a foreign policy instrument, should only be used as the last resort in international politics. This was similarly evident in the 2011 military intervention in Libya, as Germany clearly opposed and abstained from the use of military means in this case (Lindström and Zetterlund, 2012:28).

Hence, it can be suggested that Germany, similarly to the UK, valued and prioritized its national interest, which was determined by its value-based normative ideas gained through social interactions, before the possibility of a collective and affective CFSP in this matter. This can as well be closely related to the core elements of the theories of LI and SC applied as ‘lenses’ in this research.

Finally, France’s proactive role in this intervention was closely related to its national interest of promoting its reputation, image, and identity as a powerful European state in international politics.

France had acted rather slowly in the beginning of the Arab Spring, and perceived a proactive role in the Libyan intervention as a way to reestablish its reputation as a credible and powerful state in international politics (Lindström and Zetterlund, 2012:20). Moreover, on the basis of the notion that France initially emphasized on excluding NATO from the intervention, and emphasized on a bilateral cooperation with the UK in which it wanted a joint operational and political leadership with the UK. It can be suggested that it was interested in showing the world that Europe was capable of handling security and military crisis independent from the US and NATO (IISS, 2011:3).

However, France, very surprisingly, never emphasized on using the framework of CSDP for the intervention, although, it always has favored a strong, collective and effective CFSP in defence and security terms (Menon, 2011:75; IISS, 2011:2; Stahl, 2005:27-28; Wood, 2003:6). Moreover, it ultimately agreed upon that NATO should assume operational command in the intervention, as demanded by the UK (IISS, 2011:3).

As aforementioned, the relationship between France and NATO has over the year been quit turbulent (Howorth, 2007:154-155). The notion that France agreed upon including NATO into the process; it never suggested an intervention under the
framework of CSDP; and rather was interested in acting as a leading actor in this intervention suggests that its national interest, which are determined by its value-based normative ideas gained through social interactions, in terms of enhancing its reputation, image, and identity as a powerful actor in international relations played a vital role in determining its position in this matter, as well suggests that it was reluctant to delegate its sovereignty to the CFSP in this matter. As evident, France’s behavior in this respective case can as well be closely tied to the core elements of LI and SC outlined earlier.

5.4.2. The willingness of the MS to contribute with their national resources in CSDP-based military operations.

As it has become evident, the UK and France proactively engaged in the 2011 military intervention in Libya under the lead and framework of NATO, and never stressed their interest of deploying the intervention under the framework of CSDP (IISS, 2011:2-3). It can be suggested that they would most likely have abstained from contributing with their national resources if the intervention was deployed under the framework of CSDP. In other terms, since a CSDP-led intervention in Libya would have been in contradiction with their national interests, which they as evident prioritized before the possibility of establishing a coherent CFSP in this case, they would most likely have abstained from contributing with their national resources.

Similarly, Germany would most likely also have abstained from participating and contributing with its national resources if the intervention was deployed under the framework of CSDP-based military intervention. As evident, it clearly opposed and abstained from any form of engagement in this case due to its national interest, which is determined by its value-based normative ideas gained through social interactions. Since a CSDP-led intervention would have been in contradiction with its national interest of maintaining its pacifist political identity it would most likely also have abstained from contributing with its national resources in this matter.

6. Comparison and Discussion of the Findings

In this section, the findings derived from the analysis, which has been based on the two formulations applied in the comparative framework, will be compared. This will contribute with evaluating the main claim of this thesis, which has been deduced on the basis of the theoretical perspectives of SC and LI applied as ‘lenses’ and the previous literature presented in this research.
After having analyzed how the G3 interacted within and with the CFSP in both of the cases applied in this research, it has become evident that their national interests played the most important role in determining how they behaved, interacted, and made decisions within and with the CFSP.

The findings from the analysis suggests that the divergent national interests of the G3, which are determined by their value-based normative ideas and historically produced knowledge gained through social interactions, played a vital role in hampering the cooperation and coordination within and with the CFSP in both of the cases.

Moreover, they relatedly suggest that the G3’s divergent national interests would as well have affected their position and decision in the CFSP if it came to the question of contributing with their national resources, if the 2003 Iraq War as well as the 2011 military intervention in Libya were deployed under the framework of CSDP military mission.

While the UK favored the US-led 2003 Iraq War due to its national interest of maintaining its transatlantic relations with the US, and maintaining its position and image as a prominent and powerful actor in global politics (Ralph, 2005:2-3; Howorth, 2007:147). Germany and France opposed the war due their dubious transatlantic relations with the US and NATO; their national interest of maintaining their political identity in international relations; and their national interest of increasing their power status in the international political sphere (Forsberg, 2005:223-225; Berendse, 2003:345; Stahl, 2005:27-28; Wood, 2003:6).

Relatedly, while the UK would most likely have, due to its national interests, contributed with its national resources if the 2003 Iraq War was deployed under the framework of CSDP military mission. Germany and France would on the contrary most likely have abstained, due to their national interests.

A similar trend was evident in the 2011 military intervention in Libya in which the UK and France played a proactive role, primarily due to their national interest of enhancing their power status, influence, and identity in international relations (Lindström and Zetterlund, 2012:20, 36-38). While, Germany decided to oppose the war, because of its national interest of maintaining its pacifist political identity in international politics (Lindström and Zetterlund, 2012:28).

Moreover, if the common position in the CFSP had been in favor of deploying the 2011 military intervention in Libya under the framework of CSDP military mission,
all of the G3 would most likely not have contributed with their national resources due to their national interests. In other terms, since the UK and France never stressed their interest of deploying the intervention under the framework of CSDP military mission, and proactively engaged in the intervention under the operational framework of NATO (IISS, 2011:2-3). It can be assumed that a CSDP involvement would have been in contradiction to their national interests, why they would not have contributed with their national resources. Relatedly, since Germany initially opposed the intervention due to its national interest, its contribution with its national resources would also be unlikely in this relation.

As it has become evident from the results attained from the analysis, there was no difference in how the G3 interacted within and with the CFSP in the 2003 Iraq War and the 2011 military intervention in Libya. In other words, in both of the cases the G3 valued and prioritized their national interest, which are determined by their value-based normative ideas gained through social interactions, before commonly aiming for a coherent and effective CFSP in security and defence matters. Hence, it can be suggested that the results derived from the analysis, and the main claim of this thesis are closely aligned, why it can be considered appropriate to claim that:

**Due to the MS inherent nature and characteristic of always aiming to achieve their national interests and preferences as their first priority, which are determined by their value-based normative ideas gained through social interactions, the coherence of the CFSP on the vertical dimension in security and defence matters has not been affected in any way after the implementation of the EEAS.**

As aforementioned, a qualitative content analysis approach is usually subjected to a great challenge in producing trustworthiness, as it is often perceived to be very unstructured and too subjective (Bryman, 2012:390-393, 405). This is mainly reasoned by the notion that the researcher in such an approach ‘(…) is the main instrument of data collection’ (Bryman, 2012:405). Hence, what is observed, how it is observed, and what has been concentrated upon is closely subjected to the researchers personal preferences (Bryman, 2012:405). This ultimately makes it next to impossible to conduct a true replication of such a research.

However, in order to overcome this challenge the emphasis in this thesis has been placed on triangulation in terms of including a broad variety of different and
diversified primary sources, which have been analyzed through the use of thick description.

Moreover, although it is impossible to produce complete objectivity when analyzing social documents, I have strived to act in good faith and focused on not letting my personal values and theoretical inclinations overtly influence the findings derived from the analysis performed.

Finally, complete and very detailed records of sources that have been used throughout in this thesis have also been provided in the reference list. This makes it easy to evaluate whether the interpretation of the content used for the analysis can be considered acceptable or not (Bryman, 2012:390-393).

All of these factors combined have enhanced the credibility, transferability, dependability, and conformability of the findings from the analysis, why they can be perceived as trustworthy (Bryman, 2012:390-393).

Moreover, the scope of the findings attained from a qualitative content analysis are usually perceived as restricted, why they can not be perceived as generalizable and representative of all cases (Bryman, 2012:405). However, they can be generalized to theory, as ‘it is the quality of the theoretical inferences that are made of qualitative data that is crucial to the assessment of generalization’ (Bryman, 2012:405).

Hence, it can be suggested that the findings from the analysis in this thesis provides sufficient information for a researcher to critically evaluate or replicate this research if used for generalizing the theory (Bryman, 2012:405).

7. Conclusion

Conclusively, the main research question of this thesis: how has the EEAS affected, if in any way, the coherence of the CFSP on the vertical dimension in security and defence matters? Is answered by that the coherence of the CFSP on the vertical dimension in defence and security matters has not been affected in any way after the EEAS has been implemented through the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.

As aforementioned, in both of the respective cases applied, the G3 were reluctant to cooperate and coordinate with and within the CFSP. The main reason for this was that the G3 prioritized their national interests, determined by their value-based normative ideas gained through social interactions, before aiming for a collective, effective and coherent CFSP in security and defence matters.
This finding is closely aligned with what the existing literature suggest on this topic, as outlined in the ‘previous literature’ section.

As earlier stated, the main aim and purpose of the Lisbon Treaty is to make the CFSP more effective and visible, by improving its policy coherence, integrating its different policy instruments, and making its presence in international politics more uniform (Blockmans, 2011:5; Takman, 2013:1, 11; EUR-LEX, 2010:28-29, Menon, 2011:75). Relatedly, the most important ‘tool’ within is suggested to be the EEAS, as it is perceived to enhance the coordination of the MS and their actions outside the boundaries of the EU, and speak and act on the behalf of the MS and the EU as a whole (Takman, 2013:1; Gaspers, N.A.:19).

Although, institutional reforms in the CFSP, such as the EEAS, can be considered as important in order to provide more effective and coherent political directions between the MS, and enhance the cooperation between them, the notion that the MS, particularly the G3, dominate the CFSP in military and security terms, the success and failure within depends vitally on the political will of the MS to ‘turn ambitious rhetoric concerning the EU’s aspirations into reality’ (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006:177; Menon, 2011:76, 81-82).

The Lisbon Treaty, and the EEAS has until now not been capable of influencing the behavior of the MS in the CFSP in terms of shifting their priority from aiming for their national interests, to first and foremost, aim for a collective, effective, and coherent CFSP in defence and security matters (Menon, 2011:81; Howorth, 2007:147).

In other terms, the MS inherent characteristic of first and foremost aiming for their national interests, determined by their value-based normative ideas gained through social interactions, related to their individual transatlantic relation with the US and NATO; their power status in the international political sphere; and upholding their national cultural identity, is exactly the behavior that has and is still causing the most severe problem related to coherence in this policy area.

Finally, an interesting further research direction will be to look into how the experience of successful and stable cooperation and coordination between the MS in other policy areas located within the CFSP may affect the coherence of the CFSP in security and defence matters in the future.
Trade is perceived as the EU’s raison d’être, mainly because of the EU’s success with the CCP, and its foreign trade agreements in the international political sphere (Meunier and Nicolaïdis, 2011:276; Smith, 2011:182; McCormick, 2005:220; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006:62).

The success of the CCP is closely related to the willingness of the MS to cooperate and coordinate with and within this policy area. In other words, the MS are prone to pool and delegate a large amount of their national sovereignty to the CCP, and the decision-making structure is agreed by the MS to be subjected to supranationalism within this policy area (McCormick, 2005:222; Meunier and Nicolaïdis, 2011:276-278; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006:67; Rosamond, 2000:175).

In this relation it will be interesting to look into how the value-based normative ideas of the MS gained through social interactions in the CCP may possibly affect the willingness of the MS to cooperate and coordinate with and within the CSDP in the future.

Relatedly, it will be interesting to explain why the CSDP is not located within a supranational framework, and whether it is likely to develop into a supranational framework in the future because of the success in the CCP.

---

1 The reason for why the EU exists
8. References


Available:
[11 April 2015].


Smith, E. Michael (2011) ‘Implementation: Making the EU’s International Relations


