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International Migration and Ethnic Relations

Managing diversity in post-war Kosovo: multiculturalism in practice

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Abstract
This thesis embarks on efforts to understand how effective is multiculturalism in addressing ethnic cleavages in post-conflict societies. Kosovo, as a post-socialist and post-war country, is the particular case analyzed in order to understand how multiculturalist policies have in the last fifteen years affected interethnic relations in the country. By embarking on a case study approach, I use two main methods, interviewing and document analysis, as a means of triangulation to reinforce the arguments used in the analysis and interpretation of data. Liberal multiculturalism as elaborated by Kymlicka is the theoretical model which is used continuously to give meaning to the empirical data analyzed. The success of multiculturalism is approached in two respects: first, I look at what went wrong during the implementation of such multicultural policies, namely, the approach of international community in addressing interethnic relations through the introduction of group-rights. Secondly, I look specifically at the elements of liberal multiculturalism and how did they affect interethnic relations for the last fifteen years. The thesis shows a shared blame for the persisting fragility of interethnic relations in Kosovo both to the approach of the international community, as well as to the multiculturalist model itself.

Keywords: multiculturalism, multiethnicity, Kosovo, interethnic relations, minority rights, international community
Introduction

Minorities in Kosovo enjoy one of the highest standards of minority rights in the region and wider, at least in paper (Beha 2014). The adoption of an extensive package of group rights from Kosovo institutions within the last fifteen years towards minorities has considerably improved the latter inclusion in the legal and institutional framework of Kosovo. Apart from enjoying autonomous rights in several areas of vital interest to minorities in local level, they have also been entitled to special representation in central state institutions, just as they enjoy veto rights in areas that are vital to minorities in the country. Of particular importance is the progress that has been achieved so far in the integration of Serbian minority living in northern Kosovo in the institutional and legal framework through the EU mediated Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. For the first time since the end of war in Kosovo, the four Serbian dominated municipalities in northern Kosovo have legitimate representatives elected as to the Kosovo legal framework, parallel security structures have been incorporated in Kosovo security system, creating thus conditions for the first time in integrating Serbian minority to the rest of the society and central institutions of Kosovo.

But little has this contributed in the improvement of relations between ethnic communities since the end of the war in Kosovo in June 1999. Findings from various reports indicate that although tensions are in overall decreasing and an increasing number of community members adopt a more open approach to inter-ethnic relations, considerable distrust between communities continues to exist and inter-ethnic relations are fragile and easily influenced by incidents (Kosovo Progress Report 2014; MCI 2013). Ethnic communities, with a special emphasis on Serbians and Albanians, still continue to view the past in conflicting ways and live separate from one another with low levels of inter-ethnic trust (Burema 2012). Despite the launch of a recent dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia under EU mediation aiming to find a solution to the isolated Serbian minority in northern Kosovo, according to an ICG report northern Kosovo Serbs are staunchly opposed to integration, low-level violence is increasing, Kosovo nationalists are tense, and a spark could set off intercommunal fighting (ICG 2013).

The stall in the improvement of interethnic relations has been the topic of many authors. The majority of the literature regarding Kosovo minority issues is concentrated in specific topics or policies such as: decentralization, multi-ethnicity, power-sharing, many times without any clarification or operationalization of concepts used and their distinction/relation to one another. What one can draw from the existing literature is that the goal of improving interethnic relations was largely unsuccessful. The majority of the academic writings—which analyze the ethno-
political situation in Kosovo—conclude in one way or another that the international community’s approach in tackling ethnic tensions in Kosovo has been more connected to short-term security and stability in the country and region rather than any long-term solution of building a multiethnic society (see: Monteux 2006, Gjoni et al. 2010, McKinna 2012).

Undoubtedly, a common term that has characterized IC’s approach to Kosovo has been multiethnicity which basically meant that any form of accommodation of minorities in the society and state institutions has had as its reference ethnicity. Although the concept multiethnicity was never clarified even from those who used it as a justification to vest extensive group rights to minorities, certain elements are identified as defining Kosovo as multi-ethnic. They include, inter alia, the promotion of a civic citizenship, minority languages used as official languages, the preservation of cultural and religious objects of minorities, asymmetric power-sharing and territorial decentralization on ethnic lines and so on.

What one can make from these policies is that the international community’s approach followed with regard to Kosovo were dualist in nature. In one way they tried to create a civic identity which transcended ethnic or national identities around a new Kosovar identity. This was particularly evident in the way the minorities and the majority are referred to in important documents as ‘communities’ or ‘ethnic communities’ which makes more than 90% of the population consisting of ethnic Albanians equal to minorities that may not comprise more than 1-2% of the entire population (KIPRED 2006:4). On the other hand, since the end of the war, in order to ensure the representation of minorities in the institutional framework of Kosovo, extensive group rights were adopted, most of them cementing divisions in the society and institutions based on ethnic identity (see: McKinna 2012).

**Aim and Research Questions**

The purpose of this thesis is thus to understand the logic behind multicultural policies implemented in Kosovo through the international community and the way they have affected inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo’s context. With ‘international community’ I mean the involvement of international organizations (UNMIK, OSCE, UNDP, and others relevant to the case) or actors (EU, US, and other major western countries that have an influence in Kosovo politics) which has led to the adoption, implementation of any policy that has addressed inter-ethnic relations or the accommodation of minorities in the case of Kosovo. The basic idea in the study is to give an answer to the question: *How effective is liberal multiculturalism in*
addressing ethnic cleavages in post-war societies? This question then boils down to a more detailed and specific questions of:

- Why has the multiculturalist agenda of the international community been largely unsuccessful in remedying inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo?

- To what extent can the ability of multiculturalism to address ethnic cleavages in post-conflict societies be questioned regarding the situation of interethnic relations in Kosovo?

While the international community has been heavily criticized for their approach in managing interethnic relations in Kosovo, it is of considerable importance to understand that beyond the IC’s approach, some policies implemented with regard to minorities were itself not feasible in Kosovo’s context and any approach followed to implement these policies would bring to the same current problem Kosovo faces today: the segregation and enclavisation of minorities in certain territories with little incentives and possibilities to interact and build trust with the majority of the population.

**Significance of the study**

The intent of this study is to conceptualize in a broader picture a balanced critique of the current situation of interethnic relations in Kosovo in relation to the multicultural model. For the first time, it seeks to bring together a critique of both the role of the international community in approaching minority rights in Kosovo while at the same time seeking to understand potential flaws to the policies of the multiculturalist model concerning interethnic relations in post-conflict societies. It seeks thus to understand both the problem in the approach followed by the international community, as well as the problem to the multicultural/multiethnic model itself and its ability to address ethnic cleavages in post-conflict societies. It is expected that the thesis will pave the way for more research that has this comprehensive focus regarding ethnic relations in post-conflict societies, as well as contribute to the much needed literature of how interethnic relations are tackled in post-conflict societies, where has gone wrong and what needs to be improved. The study serves to all those interested in the evolution of interethnic relations in Kosovo and how international community has been addressing them. On the other hand, the study also adds to the academic literature by exploring theories and/or models identified in the case of Kosovo and their ability to address the accommodation of minorities/improvement of interethnic relations. One model that of multiculturalism, is particularly analysed and contrasted with empirical findings.
**Conceptual and Operational Definitions**

For the sake of facilitating the reading of the thesis to the reader, I will try to operationalize as much as possible some of the core concepts used.

The first one is that of *international community*. With ‘international community’ I mean the involvement/mediation/intervention of international organizations (EU, OSCE, UNDP, and others relevant to the case) or actors (US and other major western countries that have an influence in Kosovo politics) which has led to the adoption, implementation/application of any policy that has addressed inter-ethnic relations or the accommodation of minorities in the case of Kosovo. The concept does however not mean that all actors or organizations named as *international community* have influenced the same way, nor have they had any uniform agenda throughout the entire period, but it only largely seeks to incorporate the foreign influence with its own diversity of approaches.

*Multiethnicity* and *multiculturalism* are two terms that will be used interchangeably not because they necessarily mean the same thing but because there is no significant theoretical or practical distinction between the two concepts in the case of Kosovo. Multiethnicity includes indicators that are multicultural in nature, while multiculturalism relies on two basic different identities between groups: that of ethnicity and culture (Kymlicka 1995:17-18), which basically makes it worthy of talking in the name of multiethnicity for minorities in Kosovo.

Two other concepts which are important to have in mind are: *the accommodation of minorities* and the *improvement of interethnic relations*. Although the two terms seem to have the same goal, in practice they have proved not to. This means that the accommodation of minorities through their institutional representation, special rights or ‘group-differentiated’ rights in various fields, has not necessarily brought to improvement of interethnic relations. The case of Kosovo, which will be analyzed thoroughly in this thesis, will prove this worthiness of this distinction. Lastly, the term ‘northern Kosovo’ in this thesis will mean areas inhabited of Serbian ethnic community as the majority in these areas. Particularly, ‘northern Kosovo’ includes the municipalities of Northern Mitrovica, Leposaviq/Leposavić, Zubin Potok, and Zveqan/ Zvečan. On the other hand, ‘southern Kosovo’ which includes the rest of Kosovo’s territory includes Serbian and other municipalities that pertain to all ethnic communities other than Albanians (Photo 1).
Thesis overview
As we already gave a general introduction into the thesis, the two follow up sections are dedicated to the literature overview and the theoretical framework. While in the literature overview I scratch on the previous literature to see the perspectives which were employed to research on interethnic relations in Kosovo and the gaps that my study could potentially fill, further in the theoretical framework I put the theoretical grounds my thesis will consider throughout the research process. The follow-up section discusses in details the study design and methodology used to collect, analyze and interpret the data. The last section, which is the longest, is dedicated to the research findings connected to the topic and research questions. This part is divided in four main sections: a historical description of the case in three major periods, the second section discusses the theoretical framework and its connection to the empirical case, the third section discusses some of the major factors that have hindered the improvement of interethnic relations in Kosovo in the period 1999-2015, while the last section discusses the pitfalls in the liberal multiculturalist model itself in addressing minority issues in post-conflict societies.
Literature Overview

Obviously, Kosovo has been the focus of multiple studies regarding the inter-ethnic situation from various fields. Most of them focus on practical assessment of the situation (of minorities) in Kosovo (Beha 2014, Weller 2008, Judah 2011, Monteux 2006, Shultze-Kraft & Morina 2014, Gjoni et al. 2010, Montanari 2009), while only a few consider theoretical perspectives (Schwegler & Smith 2012, Simonsen 2005, Randazzo & Bargués 2012, McKinna 2012). Of those who really consider theoretical aspects, Simonsen (2005) and Randazzo & Bargués (2012) talk about a rigid/traditional/illiberal form of multiculturalism installed in Kosovo by the international community, McKinna (2012) analyses concepts of multi-ethnicity and identity formation, while Schwegler & Smith (2012) focus more on how inter-ethnic relations could improve from a socio-psychological perspective. Most other literature focuses on practical concepts such as: decentralization, consociationalism, power-sharing, without really making any clear distinction or operationalization of concepts used throughout their studies. Some of the studies will be analyzed further in more details to see what they can contribute to this study and where major gaps exist that this study tends to fill.

Weller (2008:14) makes mention of some of the earliest forms of international efforts in solving the Kosovo issue. He cites the plan of the US Ambassador Christofer Hill at the very beginning of the escalation of the conflict in Kosovo 1997-1998 who had suggested that Kosovo be granted autonomy, and in return, Serbs within Kosovo would gain from extensive rights of self-administration and veto powers in key institutions, including the Parliament. McKinna (2012) on the other hand is focused in the failure of the international community to establish a multi-ethnic society in the post-war Kosovo. McKinna argues in a way that multi-ethnicity (or minority rights issue) was not really the goal of the international community. The original plan was that of ‘complying with European standards’ while the means was meeting some minority rights standards seen more as short-term tools of stability and separation rather than tools that aim at building a multi-ethnic society in the long-term future. She argues that policies of education, decentralization and displaced persons followed by the international administration (UNMIK) have entrenched ethnic divisions (McKinna 2012:11).

Other articles (Shultzte-Kraft & Morina 2014; Monteux 2006; Gjoni et al. 2010) embark on a specific tool used by the international community to address minority issues—that of decentralization. Both Shultzte-Kraft & Morina (2014) and Gjoni et al. (2010) criticize decentralization as a tool of ethnic conflict regulation for the fact that it has emerged onto wrong premises of political dialogues. One of the major reasons they argues is to be pointed at as a
contributor in the failure of decentralization is its politicization. Authors’ suggestion for overcoming the pitfalls of decentralization in Kosovo is the establishment of a strong central authority (or what Kymlicka would call a consolidated democratic state as a precondition to liberal multiculturalism) which would in turn manage successfully the decentralization process (Gjoni et al. 2014:310).

On the other hand, Monteux (2006) argues that decentralization has generally been used as a tool to create short-term peace and stability, rather than offer any long-term solution or approach in building a meaningful multi-ethnic society. She states ‘decentralization is nowadays often used by the international community as a magic formula to “freeze” ethnic conflicts, providing a short-term solution that, if not thought through thoroughly, could have inverse implications in the long term’ (Monteux 2006:179). While she argues that decentralization not only is a wrong formula to solving ethnic conflicts, she goes beyond this stating that this form of ethnic conflict regulation will only provide an adequate platform for further conflict in the future (Ibid:179). A similar analysis as that of Monteux (2006) is also given by Montanari (2009) regarding the approach of the international community in solving ethnic tensions in the case of Kosovo. While not only embodying a wrong approach to the ethnic conflict regulation, Montanari argues, ‘international actors’ prioritization of establishing short-term security in Kosovo at the price of long term sustainable peace and economic development’ is the root problem in building a country on basis of multi-ethnicity (2009:5).

Hoxhaj (2005) in his paper on ‘politics of ethnic conflict regulation in Kosovo’ focuses on decentralization and power-sharing, arguing that while the two are effective instruments in easing inter-ethnic tensions, the international administration in Kosovo failed to acknowledge that solving ethnic tensions in Kosovo was not going to be achieved through an ‘apolitical approach’. He argues that much of what is to be achieved regarding interethnic relations depends on the attitude of Serbia towards Kosovo and its Serb minority in Kosovo. He argues that the only way for decentralization and power-sharing to effectively work in Kosovo is to have Serbia abandon its territorial claims in Kosovo and put a stop in pressuring the Serb minority in Kosovo (Hoxhaj 2005:41). While Hoxhaj (2005) acknowledges that Kosovo was being ‘urged’ to implement various minority ‘rights’ policies known otherwise as ‘standards before status’, they were basically being used as the ‘carrot and stick’ approach. If Kosovo wanted to finalize its status negotiations and join the European Union, it needed to comply with minority rights policies the international community was pushing forward.
Two of the most comprehensive articles in their approach to ethnic conflict regulation in post-conflict countries is that of Randazzo & Bargués (2012) and that of Simonsen (2005). Both articles argue that there was a practically narrow understanding of liberal multiculturalism in the Balkans. While Randazzo & Bargués criticize the international community for enforcing decentralization and power-sharing in a way that has ‘frozen’ the ethnic conflict in Kosovo (citing among other Monteux 2006), their suggestions for going beyond this (what they call it) ‘loop of liberal multiculturalism’ is to find a middle approach which both celebrates differences to ethnic communities (as the case of multiculturalism) while at the same time being integrative, avoiding the ethnicization of politics, and promoting a civic identity (Randazzo & Bargués 2012:44). Simonsen (2005) also argues that the international administration in Kosovo did not have any comprehensive strategy to deal with the ethnic cleavages that had arisen due to the conflict. He states that UNMIK’s ambition of rooting multietnicity through the use of quotas (which guaranteed the representation of minorities in institutions) was not going to be enough. In turn, he suggests the use of mixed approaches—conscociationalism, integrative approach and multiculturalism—as a response to the current approach which produces the “reification of ethnic identities as a consequence of institutional design” (Simonsen 2005:304). He embraces Horowitz’s approach of not trying to eradicate or suppress ethnic divisions but rather work to reduce them (Simonsen 2005:305).

From all articles cited, Monteux (2006) and McKinna (2012) are the only ones that partly answer my research question of the logic of the IC towards Kosovo regarding minority policies. However, they don’t elaborate what they mean with multiculturalism/multietnicity and if the ‘proper’ model of multiculturalism would be able to address ethnic cleavages. On the other hand Simonsen (2005), and Randazzo & Bargués (2012) see the IC’s approach as promoting a rigid multiculturalism, but do not make any mention if multiculturalism was really the logic of the international community. While we can certainly endorse most of the conclusions that decentralization and power-sharing have failed, and that there was a wrong approach that international community has followed with Kosovo, the fundamental problem remains whether everything can be blamed upon IC’s approach and if multiculturalism would otherwise manage to heal ethnic cleavages if addressed properly. Thus, the fundamental issue not addressed so far, and that I try to do, is what share of blame can be attributed to multiculturalism.
The selection of a theory for the empirical analysis in my thesis has much to do with the methodological aspects itself. Case studies, as Yin argues (2003:28) are distinguished from ethnography and grounded theory, for the main fact that they develop theory prior to any data collection, regardless if the aim is to test or develop the theory. The central theory to be used in my thesis will be that of liberal multiculturalism. The aim itself of the thesis is to look into the practical situation of inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo and contrast it against the model of liberal multiculturalism. The rationale in here is to see how elements from liberal multiculturalism can be used to address post-conflict minority issues and to what extent does that help in addressing inter-ethnic cleavages.

The last quarter of the twentieth century has seen the emergence of a new paradigm of state-minority relations. Beyond the set of individual human rights, many western states have embraced the so-called ‘group-differentiated rights’ with hopes to bring about ‘ethno-cultural justice’ to groups who were/felt underrepresented in the mainstream society or in relation to the state (see: Petai 2002:259-260). As a result, scholars have come up with various models of such group-differentiated rights known commonly as multiculturalism, identity politics or politics of difference (Song 2010; see also: Young 1989, Taylor 1994, Gutmann 2001) or the ‘new’ pluralism (Eisenberg 2000 in: Bhattarai 2004:298-299). The unique feature of multiculturalism however relies on the aspect that, beyond the recognition of minorities’ disadvantaged position, it advocates the remedying of political and economic disadvantages (see: Modood 2013, Kymlicka 1995, 2007). Multiculturalism is presented from various standpoints from various scholars. Scholars such as Charles Taylor (1994), or Avishai Margalit (1990) are otherwise labelled as communitarians for their strong stance towards group rights and its primacy to most individual rights, while others like Will Kymlicka or Tariq Modood embark on a liberalist tradition, known otherwise as liberal multiculturalism\(^1\). Of course the list of dealing with pluralist societies is not exhaustive.

A significant challenge posed during this period of the emergence of group-differentiated rights was that of finding the proper model or approach in dealing with post-conflict societies. The introduction of models dealing with ethnic cleavages have neither lacked both in theory and practice (see: Coakley 1992, McGarry and O’Leary 1994, Smooha 2002, Simonsen 2005). Coakley simplifies his way of distinguishing between various methods of ethnic management.

through four dimensions: *Physical, territorial, cultural,* and *political*. Based on these four dimensions, he then follows a deductive reasoning to come to the specific strategies. Altogether eight specific strategies are derived from the four dimensions: indigenization, accommodation, assimilation, acculturation, population transfer, boundary alteration, genocide, and ethnic suicide (Coakley 1992:347). Similarly, McGarry & O’Leary provide eight macro-methods that have been so far used for ethnic conflict regulation: genocide, forced mass population transfer, partition and/or secession, integration and/or assimilation, hegemonic control, arbitration (third party intervention), canonization/federalism, and consociationalism (McGarry & O’Leary 1994:94). While *canonization/federalism* involve territorial autonomy (with the major distinction that federalism involves much larger territorial spans than cantons) to ethnically conflicting parties, it is interesting to mention some of the main features which McGarry & O’Leary cite in relation to *consociationalism*. To them, consociationalism (as it relates to Lijphart’s idea of a consociational democracy\(^2\)) has four features: *grand coalition government* representing main segments of the divided society, *community-autonomy* which enables self-government to minorities in fields of vital importance to them, and *minority veto rights* on constitutional changes (McGarry & O’Leary 1994:113). Last but not least, Simonsen (2005) in his article ‘Addressing ethnic divisions in post-conflict institution-building’ examines the way (by looking at the examples of Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq) in which post-war countries could best be dealt with improving inter-ethnic relations in the process of institution-building. He suggests basically three models which to him should be complementary in nature: that of *consociationalism* (as distilled by Lijphart), *centripetalism* concerning the electoral system (associated with Donald Horowitz), and *multiculturalism* (as conceptualized by Kymlicka).

If we employ the minimal definition of multiculturalism as the rejection of the unitary, assimilationist state (Kymlicka 2007:61), all models mentioned above fall roughly within the field of multiculturalism. If we stick to the concept of *multiculturalism*, we can easily stipulate that elements which have been used to address minority rights in post-conflict societies (with a stress to the former Yugoslavian wars) are typical multiculturalist in nature. They include recognition of minority languages as official languages, affirmative actions, representation of minorities in state institutions (parliament, government, judiciary, as well as the local level of governance), territorial autonomy, asymmetrical power-sharing among municipalities that are

dominated by minorities, self-government rights in matters such as education, health, and other important fields, veto powers for vital issues in the parliament, and so on. Because the aim of the thesis is to contrast the reality in practice in the case of Kosovo with the multiculturalist model, it is necessary to clarify what do I mean by multiculturalism and what elements are used as identifying the model as multiculturalist. At the same time, I develop the framework into which I test the multiculturalist model towards the empirical data gathered regarding the case in question.

The simplest understanding of multiculturalism, borrowing from Kymlicka (1995), is to distinguish between those states that maintain a unitary, homogenous model of government where minorities are seen to assimilate, and states which have moved to accommodate differences by recognizing group rights beyond the set of individual rights. The recognition of group-differentiated rights, to Kymlicka, is necessary not as a response to liberalism (as communitarians would frame it), but as a necessity within liberalism under conditions of pluralism (Kymlicka 1996:6). This for the fact that our ability to exercise our individual right of choice depends to a large extent in our relations we have with the societal culture we identify ourselves with (Kymlicka 1995: 126). That is why, to Kymlicka multiculturalism means that the state should go beyond individual rights that protected in all constitutional liberal democracies, and adopt various group-specific rights and policies that help accommodate the distinctive identities and aspirations of ethno-cultural groups (Kymlicka 2007:61).

What makes Kymlicka’s definition of multiculturalism change from many other multiculturalists (such as Charles Taylor or Avishai Margalit 1990) is his way of framing multiculturalism within the framework of liberalism (otherwise known as liberal multiculturalism) based on two fundamental limitations on minority rights: that there should be no internal restrictions (such as the basic civil or political liberties of its own members) and external protections should be justifiable only insofar as they promote equality between groups, by rectifying disadvantages or vulnerabilities suffered by the members of a particular group (Kymlicka 1995:152, 194).

Kymlicka distinguishes between three trends of multiculturalism within western democracies: indigenous people, substate/national minorities, immigrants (2007:66-76). Because our focus is particularly focused on the Serbian national minority in Kosovo, I will try to explain some of his proposition that are given in support of national minorities. Identifying the model which has been at large used in Kosovo in managing inter-ethnic relations, it is important to focus on policies implemented during the period 1999-2015 and then contrast it to the model in question.
My way of connecting the practical situation of interethnic relations in Kosovo with the theoretical model of multiculturalism will be by connecting the major ‘components’ that Kymlicka and Banting (Queens University n.d.a) identify as ‘emblematic’ policies to a multicultural state concerning substate/national groups. They are as follows:

| 1. Federal or quasi-federal territorial autonomy, | Yes | The division of power between the central state and the constituent units (provinces, regions, etc.) is enshrined in the constitution or otherwise guaranteed by the central state, and the territory of the national minority corresponds to one or many constituent unit(s) of the state so as to provide some form of minority autonomy. |
| Partially | The central state is supreme but delegates powers to sub-national units, including legislative and financial powers, through a process of decentralization, and the territory of the national minority corresponds to one or many constituent unit(s) of the state so as to provide some form of minority autonomy. |
| No | The central state is supreme and does not delegate powers to sub-national units, which perform administrative functions at most. |
| 2. Official language status, either in the region or nationally | Yes | The minority language is granted official or national language status in the region or nationally. The minority language has equal footing with the majority language. |
| Partially | Only some level of recognition granted as a protected language in legislative documents or treaties. The minority language does not have equal footing with the majority (official) language. |
| No | The minority language is denied support or recognition by the central and regional governments. |
| 3. Guarantees of representation in the central government or on constitutional courts, | Yes | Institutional representation through reserved seats or electoral rules, i.e., reserved seats for minority population, or electoral districts drawn so that minority population form a majority in a constituency. Seats may be reserved on constitutional courts for members of the national minority. |
| Partially | No formal rules for representation of national minorities in the central government or on constitutional courts, but there are informal practices of including national minorities in those positions. |
| No | Lack of electoral rules or quota mechanisms to ensure minority representation. |
| 4. Public funding of minority language universities/schools/media, | Yes | There is full public funding of minority-language education and media. This funding can be provided either by the central state or the regional government. |
| Partially | There is marginal or limited public funding of minority-language education or media. This funding can be provided either by the central state or the regional government. |
| No | There is no public funding of minority-language education or media. |
| 5. Constitutional or parliamentary affirmation of 'multinationalism' | Yes | The plurinational character of the country (the existence of two or more nations in the state) recognized in the constitution or official documents adopted by the parliament. |
| Partially | Only one nation recognized. Minorities are given special status (e.g., as “communities,” “regions” or “linguistic minorities”) giving them special group rights. |
| No | There is no recognition of the existence of national minorities in the country. |
| 6. According international personality (eg. sitting on international bodies, sign treaties, or have own Olympic team) | Yes | Minority nations are accorded an international personality through either of the following: |
| | - Minorities have legislative competence on the international scene in their areas of internal competences (constitutionally or de facto) |
| | - Minorities have authority to sign bilateral or multilateral treaties |
| | - Be represented on international bodies or have their own delegations abroad |
| | - Have their own team at the Olympics and other international sporting events. |
| Partially | Minorities are consulted by the state when it comes to making policy decisions on the international scene but cannot make unilateral decisions on matters in their areas of internal competence. Minorities can be represented on international bodies or have their own delegations abroad, but under the authority of the central state. Minorities have their own team at regional sporting events. |
| No | The central state has full competence over international affairs, including the signing of bilateral and multilateral treaties, participation in international organizations and representation abroad. Minorities have no separate sports teams at international events. |

(Queen’s University n.d.; Kymlicka 2007:71).

While liberal multiculturalism is celebrated as a victory and continuously in rise (Kymlicka 2015), its real challenge has come to its implementation in post-conflict, post-conflict countries.
Kymlicka himself acknowledges this and tries to address the problems of its implementation in various works. His position on the failure of many multicultural policies in Eastern and Central Europe is related to the sources and preconditions he deems as fundamental to the rise of liberal multiculturalism in a state. The first are more ideological, namely, (a) the rise and spread of a new discourse and consciousness of human and minority rights together with (b) the (incomplete) democratization (a precondition that allows minorities create more space for minorities mobilization), while the last two are more political: one is related to the *geo-political factors* – or the adoption of policies which would help in the state’s struggle with its external enemies (United States approach to racial equality after the Second World War not necessarily because of movements for racial equality rather than as a factor that could have helped face the Communist World). Second factor is the *geo-political security* and securitization of ethnic relations, or in other words, where the state sees that there is no longer threat among minorities that they will collaborate with state’s neighboring enemies. In most western countries ethnic policies have been almost entirely ‘de-securitized’, while there is an opposite situation currently dominating in post-communist countries (Kymlicka 2007:88-121, 133; 2002:21-22).

Kymlicka argues that European organizations have played a significant role in the content of the agreements reached in the former Yugoslavian case (Dayton Agreement in Bosnia, Ohrid Agreement in Macedonia) trespassing way the agreed upon set of international legal standards and norms on minority rights (e.g. Convention Framework for the Protection of National Minorities). The logic behind this kind of IC’s intervention to the author is based on *realpolitik*—which follows the logic of security—rather than that of liberal multiculturalism (Kymlicka 2007:234). This logic has made states in question adopt territorial autonomy only when national minorities have already grabbed the power over that territory establishing *de facto* autonomy. The only way to take it back is through military intervention or through recognizing the *de facto* situation (Kymlicka 2002:17). The case of Kosovo with its Serbian minority in the Northern Kosovo is the best fit in this approach.

Having the empirical part of the study in mind, I will first take into account the eight ‘emblematic’ policies that Kymlicka has cited as the core indicators to tell if a state has or is embracing liberal multiculturalism or not. Second, by analyzing the effects of each of the policies identified and which are implemented in Kosovo, I will then tend to answer the question whether the possible failures come because of the factors Kymlicka cites: human and minority rights consciousness, democratic stability and geo-political factors. In particular, I will be focused on explaining to what extent one can ‘blame’ elements of the multiculturalist model
itself as (in)compatible in managing ethnic cleavages in post-conflict societies, and what part of the blame in this matter can be attributed to the factors that Kymlicka identifies, namely: (a) that there is scepticism about the likelihood that substate autonomies will be liberal-democratic, (b) that there is a wrong belief that ethnic mobilization will disappear over time with modernization and economic development, and (c) that the fear that minorities will collaborate with the enemies of the state, adding the most important aspect of my thesis (d) the mistaken short-term security approach/logic followed by the international community in dealing with ethnic relations. Based on the results, I will then see if there is any argument that goes beyond the wrong approach and sees the model of multiculturalism as wrong in some of its elements implemented.

**Research Design and Methodology**

The methodological approach to be employed in this study is that of qualitative case study approach. The choice of this approach has much to do with the specificity of the case in itself compared to other similar cases in the region or elsewhere (see section: relevance of the study) as well as the approach that is needed for the information/data to be collected. One of the important ways to distinguish the best strategy is to go to the very basis of the thesis: that of the research question (Yin 2003:5-9; Swanborn 2010:41). To Yin research questions that usually begin with ‘why’ or ‘how’ are more prone to be explanatory in nature and case study approach is one of the most preferred ones. What makes case studies differ from similar research approaches is that, besides dealing with ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions, we are simultaneously dealing with contemporary events or phenomena in which the researcher has little or no control over it, and, at the same time, the researcher uses two considerably unique sources of evidence: direct observations and interviews (Yin 2003:6-8). Furthermore, the use of the case study approach has several advantages compared to other research approaches: it is less tightly structured which implies that changes are more easily accommodated in the research frame, the researcher gets deeply familiarized with the case in question, it involves multiple sources of evidence (e.g. from observations, interviews, audiovisual materials, documents and reports) (Creswell 2007:73), the researcher comes with new insights that suggest new theoretical leads (Perrin 6 & Bellamy 2012:104). Just as Ragin (1994, 2004 in Perry 6 & Bellamy 2012:104) argued ‘cased-based research (or case study research) has a distinctive capacity to encourage iterative dialogue between the theory and empirical evidence’.
Among several philosophical traditions, two are most popular in qualitative case study research: that of post-positivism and social constructivism (Hyett 2014:1). This thesis is based on a social constructivist paradigm for the fact that as a researcher I acknowledge to be the main research instrument in this study and understand that I my own subjective interpretations of data and potential biases are unavoidable. The constructivist paradigm assumes a relativist ontology (there are multiple realities), a subjectivist epistemology (knower and respondent co-create understandings), and a naturalistic set of methodological procedures (Denzen & Lincoln 2013:27). This paradigm (often combined with interpretivism) recognizes the importance of the subjective human creation of meaning (Creswell 2007:20; see also Hyett et al. 2014:1). Researchers rely on subjective meanings which are negotiated socially (through interactions with others) and historically (through historical and cultural norms that operate in individuals’ lives) (Creswell 2007:21; Simons 2009:35). Further, the advantage of this paradigm is that, rather than following with a theory (theory-driven research), researchers try to generate or inductively develop a theory or pattern of meaning (Creswell 2007:21).

Another important aspect to consider is my position in the study. In qualitative research, in contrast to quantitative research, the researcher is the primary instrument of data analysis and interpretation. This is why the researcher’s positionality (commonly known as reflexivity) is of paramount importance to understand before any collection or play with the data begins. Reflexivity is commonly viewed as the process of a continual internal dialogue and critical self-evaluation of researcher’s positionality, actively acknowledging that this position may affect the research process and outcome (Bradbury-Jones, 2007; Guillemin and Gillam, 2004; Pillow, 2003; Stronach et al., 2007 in Berger 2013:2). So as to avoid any unethical or unintentional influences in my study, I will give a brief personal background related to the study. The first necessary information to disclose is that I am an ethnic Albanian from Kosovo who has lived and (mostly indirectly) experienced the evolution of inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo. I have a bachelor’s in political science, have worked in Kosovo state institutions and civil society (including minorities) continuously, got to know many people who specialize in the political situation in the country. All this gives me the commodity to embark on this project, while at the same time may influence how findings are framed.

This thesis intends to explore major cross-cutting patterns that best explain the ability of multiculturalist policies in addressing ethnic divisions in post-conflict societies, trying to see potential flaws both in the multiculturalist model as well as in the practical approach the
multiculturalist policies were implemented. That implies that, following a constructivist paradigm, the study follows an iterative approach, which means that there is an interplay of the empirical data and theoretical propositions in this study. Case study approach (known differently also as case-based research) is often stormed with criticism: either for the lack of rigor (failure in following systematic procedures), its problem of generalizability (Perry 6 & Bellamy 2012:105), as well as the problem of the large volume of data that are difficult to decipher (Yin 2014:19-22). One of the major and most cited problems of generalizability addressed to case studies, Yin argues, is misunderstood. Case studies ‘are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universe’. In this sense, conducting a case study does not mean following a ‘sample’, rather the goal is to expand and generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization) (Yin 2003:10).

**Limitations and Delimitations**

Two major limitations that one should consider in this thesis are: (a) the time span for data collection and analysis, and (b) restrictions in methods employed to collect the data. First, because of the time limit, there may be problems on choosing the ‘most’ appropriate participants for the interviewing (which may cause that the phenomena in question be not properly researched will its varieties) as well as only certain vital documents that deal with minorities will be considered for main analysis (raising fears that any important document is left aside). Secondly, because of the strictly limited time, only two methods, that of interviewing and document analysis, will be used to collect data for the main analysis, excluding thus other possible methods that case studies typically involve: (participant) observations, audiovisual materials and so on. On the other hand, the thesis considers also important delimitations due to the huge time span the thesis considers for analysis. Having in mind that we are dealing with a historical events that involve one and a half decades and they still continue, the thesis will only consider specific time contexts involving: the 2000-2007 intensive period of administration of the UN Mission of Kosovo, Vienna negotiations for the settlement of the status of Kosovo (2005-2007) regarding Kosovo’s final status, as well as the current ongoing dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia that started in 2012. I would argue that any effort to go in more in-depth on the chronology of events would be much more suitable for ethnographers and would require much longer time.
Relevance of the Study
There are many reasons which make Kosovo the most suitable, unique case study to meet the needs of my thesis. I use some of the points provided by Yin (2003:39-42) to argue for the choice of Kosovo as a relevant case to be studied. The first reason is related to Kosovo as representing the (a) critical case in testing a well-formulated theory. If multiculturalism was to be tested in any of the countries that have emerged from the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo would be the critical case because of the intensity of the international involvement in the country compared to other countries in the region. Kosovo has been under direct international administration for almost a decade, and it is still subject to strong scrutiny from the international community concerning its treatment of minorities. Secondly, the reason why I choose Kosovo as the only case to measure the compatibility of multiculturalist theories is for the fact that Kosovo is a unique case in the region for the depth and persistence of the international involvement on introducing group rights to minorities. Beyond that, I believe that, after all, as a method of inquiry, case study’s primary aim is to ‘explore the particularity, uniqueness, of the single case’ (Simons 2009:3; Harder 2010:371) which I would not be able to if I incorporated more countries to the thesis. The last one relates to the unique feature of a single-case study of being (c) longitudinal or studying of the case at two or more different points in time, which is precisely what the thesis aims to. The case of Kosovo will be approached from three major points in time in order to make sense of the evolution of multicultural policies implemented in Kosovo.

Data Collection Methods
‘The concept of methods refers in general to the appropriate use of techniques in collecting and analyzing data’ (Prasad 2005:8). Qualitative research is inherently multimethod in focus, drawing together ‘naturalistic, holistic, ethnographic, phenomenological, and biographic research methods’ in a bricoleur design, or in Stake’s words, “a palette of methods” (Stake 1995: xi-xii in Hyett 2014; Denzin & Lincoln 2013:9). In our case, specific methods such as: interviewing and document analysis are primarily used.

Interviewing
Because of the nature of my research which requires specialized knowledge on the case, I use open-ended interviews with a certain number of people who have a professional or academic background in the field. There are multiple advantages pronounced from various scholars for
using interviewing as a method in case study research. Among others, interviewing helps finding others’ perspectives which we cannot observe ourselves, it helps collecting data which one might have not thought of before, and more importantly it engages the interviewee and the interviewer in a dialogue that might easily generate important insights into the topic (Simons 2009:43).

Four interviews were in total conducted with two people working as university senior lecturers and who have a considerably specialized knowledge and interest in the ethnic situation in Kosovo. Secondly, two officials from Kosovo institutions were also interviewed: a deputy representing Egyptian minority at the Parliament of Kosovo, as well as the Deputy Chairperson for Communities at the Municipality of Northern Mitrovica (more on interviewees see: Annex 1). Interviewees were chosen by using, as Creswell (2007:125) suggests, a *purposive sampling* strategy, based on their ability to inform an understanding of the research problem. Although in-depth interviews usually require a certain degree of professionalism to handle because of the sensitivity and complexity, dealing with public figures who all agreed to have their personal identifying information revealed, helped me minimize any ethical issues related to the interviewees. Interviews were all recorded, transcribed in word documents and then translated from Albanian to English. Being a native speaker of Albanian made it easy for me to manage easily the translation without losing the meaning to what interviewees said. Their inputs is inserted in the analysis as raw text so as to avoid any misinterpretation.

**Document Analysis**

Document analysis method on the other hand will be used to understand the rationale or meaning that is delivered through the selected sources regarding the case. Document analysis involves an iterative process that combines elements of *content analysis* and *thematic analysis* through skimming (superficial examination), reading (thorough examination), and interpretation (Bowen 2009:32). However, I will concentrate only in the thematic analysis (considering that both overlap in many aspects with each other and no big risk is involved leaving one of them aside) as a form of pattern recognition within the data, with emerging themes becoming the categories for analysis (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane 2006 in Bowen 2009:32; Braun and Clarke 2006). By using thematic analysis, I take a close look at the selected data and perform coding and category construction, which in turn helps to uncover themes pertinent to the case. A detailed explanation of how document (thematic analysis) of selected data is carried out is given in the data analysis and interpretation section below. Bowen points out several advantages of using document analysis: apart from providing useful data, it also
provides the context in which such data emerged, information generated through documents help other methods such as interviewing for more insightful questions—having methods complement each other during the research process. Furthermore, document analysis help provide significant supplementary data to the research and be used to track changes over time by comparing documents at different points in time (2009:29-30).

Data Sources
Yin (2003:83) cites six major data collection sources that are important while conducting a case study research: documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant-observation and physical artefacts (Yin 2003:83) corresponding largely with the four major sources that Croswell cites, namely: observations, interviews, documents, and audio-visual materials (2007:129). In this thesis, I use three main sources of document: primary documents (laws, agreements, reports, conference minutes/transcripts, speeches), interviews (extracted through transcripts in word documents), and secondary literature with relevance to the case in question so as to help the main analysis and avoid ignoring any important factor that might affect my findings.

Data Analysis and Interpretation
In qualitative research data collection and data analysis cannot be seen as distinctive processes, rather they are usually interrelated and often go simultaneously in a research project, just as data analysis and data interpretation are (Creswell 2007:150, Simons 2009:118). Data analysis consists of preparing and organizing data for analysis, then reducing the data into themes through a process of coding and condensing the codes, and finally representing the data into figures, tables, or a discussion (Creswell 2007:148). There is a variety of suggestions on analyzing and interpreting data from different authors and the elements they identify are subject to the choice of individual researchers based on one’s research approach used. In my case, I will be considering a mixed approach which involves steps that are used in thematic analysis (as suggested by Braun & Clarke 2006), Creswell’s (2007:156-164) and Yin’s (2003) main steps that are seen as important in analyzing and interpreting data in a case study research. They are given as following:

a) Organizing and managing data. The first step involves categorizing data into files and folders (interviews, reports, laws) so as to facilitate the process of analyzing and interpreting
data. This also involves data transcription of interviews in word docs (see Creswell 2007; Braun & Clarke 2006:16)

b) **Familiarizing with data.** The second important step is a general reading through text gathered or the so-called ‘getting to know’ your data. This helps then making sense of the data gathered, initial ideas are construed, which in turn means that initial codes are generated (see: Creswell 2007; Braun & Clarke 2006:16). Such codes are used for further reading of the text, while allowing for other codes to emerge at later stages.

c) **Describing.** For a case study it is important to make a detailed description of the case and its setting. By describing the different points in time included in the case study in my thesis, it will then be easier to fit the data into this chronology of events described and understand what has happened at which point in time and how they can be related to one another.

d) **Classifying.** In this process Creswell suggests using categorical aggregation in order to establish themes of patterns that one wishes to identify. This is seen as code making process, where sentences/text is extracted from data and then categorized so that it makes meanings (the process of meaning making). These categories are then named based on the actual language coming from interviews, previous research, theoretical propositions and other descriptive material. Yin too suggests using the logic of “pattern matching” whereby pieces of information from the same case are related to theoretical proposition (2003:116).

e) **Interpreting.** In the interpreting stage, I look at the main cross-cutting themes or patterns by looking for correspondence between main categories identified. This means that in this phase multiple categories identified are narrowed down to a few categories which in turn would help generate overarching themes. The process of themes emerging is where the interpretative phase of the research roughly starts (Boyatzis 1998 in Braun & Clarke 2006:18). Evidence and counterevidence within the data is contrasted with the final identified themes which in turn then are discussed in the final findings of the research process.

f) **Representing, visualizing.** The final phase is attributed to the presentation of an in-depth picture of the case. From multiple ways suggested for the representation of the data (see: Creswell 2007; Yin 2003), because of the iterative nature of my study, I present my findings in a narrative form.

**Validity and Reliability**

Yin’s approaches to validity and reliability of the research are central to my thesis. Yin (2003:33-34) cites four common tests that have been commonly used to establish the quality of
an empirical social research and which are also relevant to case studies. They are: construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability. But, before everything, it important to mention his three common principles that are to be taken into account (and which cut across these four tests). The first one is the use of multiple sources of evidence (triangulation) which can take the form of data triangulation (multiple data sources), investigator triangulation (among different evaluators), theory triangulation (of perspectives of the same data), and methodological triangulation (of methods). The second principles has to do with creating a case study database which means using basically two separate collections: the data for evidentiary base, and the report of the investigator. The third and last principles is maintaining a chain of evidence which serves to allow an external observer to follow the derivation of any evidence, ranging from initial research questions to ultimate case study conclusions. This in turn not only increases the reliability of the data but also of the methodological problem of determining construct validity (Yin 2003:97-106).

Getting back to the four tests cited by Yin (2003:33-38), I give some of the measures undertaken to ensure that overall validity and reliability of the thesis. First, construct validity, which simply means establishing correct operational measures for the concepts being studied, will be maintained by using multiple sources of evidence, establishing chains of evidence, and engaging key informants to review drafts. Secondly, I consider internal validity which stands for establishing a causal relationship between (in this thesis) theoretical propositions and empirical evidence. To ensure internal validity I will be using tactics such as: pattern matching (an empirically based pattern is measured against a predictive one), explanation building and addressing rival explanations. Thirdly, external validity is used to establish the domain to which the thesis’s findings can be generalized. I have mentioned above Yin’s explanation on the problem of generalization, especially when dealing with single case studies (N=1), and I will argue the same in here that the intention of this study is analytical generalization (the attempt to generalize a particular set of results to a broader theory) and not to populations (other empirical cases) or universe (Yin 2003:10). The fourth important test is reliability or what is broadly understood as the operation of a study—such as the data collection procedures—can be repeated, with same results. To ensure reliability, I will be documenting all steps undertaken in the research process which would in turn make easier for other investigators to follow the same procedure as mine and measure this way the level of reliability of the thesis.
Ethical Considerations

With regard to the ethical consideration, I follow some of the basic principles identified by Lichtman (2013) as significant considering during my research process. They are given as follows: (a) **Do no harm**. This principle is generally related to my participants in the thesis. I ensured every interviewee that in any case they feel that any harm might come from the release of their opinions or the like, the interview will be immediately interrupted and nothing from the interview be used in the research. (b) **Privacy and Anonymity**. All interviewees were ensured that their identifying information will be concealed unless they themselves agree to disclose their identifying information through a written consent form after they were explained all the details of the research. All interviewees however agreed to reveal their identifying information included in the thesis making it easier for me as a researcher to avoid any problems with privacy and anonymity. (c) **Confidentiality**. Participants’ information given out are treated in a confidential manner and no one has access to that information except for me as the researcher. (d) **Informed Consent**. This implies that participants were given out a written informed consent which provided information about the nature of the study, and all above mentioned points concerning ethical considerations, enabling them to give a written documented way regarding the use (or not) of their information in the research report. (e) **Rapport**. As a researcher, I tried to build a professional rapport with my interviewees in a level in which they build trust on me to speak openly about their opinions in question without feeling jeopardized that their information may be in any way misused. I usually met them in prior to book the time for interviewing and shared much of my information as a student from Kosovo studying abroad, which information helped me build trust with them and make them feel happy to have the chance to help me in my studies and be a representative of successful Kosovo students abroad. (f) **Data interpretation**. The last point which I use from Lichtman (2013) is that of data interpretation. Data interpretation implies that I as a research will do my best to present their opinions in a way which avoids misinterpretation, misstatements or fraudulent analysis. For this sake, I insert whole sentences from the interviewees so as to avoid misinterpreting their analysis of the case.
Research Findings

The purpose of this study was to explain the ability of multiculturalism in addressing interethnic cleavages in post-war Kosovo. I address the topic in two major perspectives: the first perspective has to do with the major factors that have hindered the improvement of interethnic relations in the last fifteen years in Kosovo, by specifically analyzing the logic of the international community in addressing minority rights in Kosovo. Secondly, I look at main elements of the multiculturalist model, contrast it with group rights granted to minorities and see which policies/elements have proved to be counterproductive to the improvement of relations between the ethnic communities and why.

There is a number of primary documents which are used to identify how liberal multiculturalism fits into the reality of minorities and group rights entitled to them in the case of Kosovo. These documents reflect both policies which connect multiculturalism as a theoretical model and multicultural policies applied in Kosovo, just as they make a considerable contribution in understanding the logic of multiculturalist policies implemented in Kosovo. The following particular documents were used for analysis:

- UNMIK Regulation on self-government of municipalities in Kosovo (2000)
- Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo (2001)
- Law on ratification of the first international agreement of principles governing the normalization of relations between the Rep. of Kosovo and the Rep. of Serbia (2013)

Documents reflect some of the milestones concerning rights and privileges that were given to minorities in the period 1999-2015. In addition, thematic analysis is also used to extract some of the main themes further in additional documents such as: speeches, press releases, communications, and reports that specifically deal with the topic. Academic literature is also taken into consideration. As a matter of data triangulation, I also use in-depth interviews to support the major arguments represented. In overall, four interviews were conducted, two of them being with two academics who have written extensively on the political situation in Kosovo and the multietnicity in particular. The two other interviewees are officials in the central and local institutions of Kosovo with a particular focus on the topic (see: Annex I).

Data analysis and interpretation below are divided as follows: first, I provide a thick description of interethnic relations in post-war Kosovo divided in three historical periods: 1999 – 2005
period corresponding mostly to UNMIK administration, 2005 – 2007 period of negotiations over the settlement of Kosovo’s status, and 2010 – 2015 period concerning Brussel mediated Kosovo – Serbia dialogue for the normalization of relations between the two countries.

Secondly, by identifying main elements that have characterized group-differentiated rights under the principle of ‘multiethnicity’, I try to find the connection with main elements that characterize the theory of liberal multiculturalism as explained by Kymlicka and Banting (Queen’s University n.d.b). Thirdly, I address the first research questions by having a retrospective look at the international community’s role in improving inter-ethnic relations since 1999 until 2015 by linking it to Kymlicka’s major points of why liberal multiculturalism would under certain circumstances not thrive in post-communist countries. In the last part of the thesis, I try to answer why some elements within the model of liberal multiculturalism should be carefully reconsidered because of their mixed effects regarding the improvement of inter-ethnic relations in post-conflict societies.

**Historical background**

*1999 – 2005 period: Kosovo under the UN administration*

The end of the war in Kosovo, after an international military campaign led by NATO, marked the end of the Serbian rule over Kosovo and placed the latter into an international administration for almost a decade. The adoption of the resolution 1244 by the Security Council in 1999 paved the way for the establishment of an international civilian presence in Kosovo, named otherwise as UNMIK (United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo) together with a NATO led international military presence known as KFOR (Kosovo Force). UNMIK, representing an unprecedented UN mission ever in complexity and scope, immediately established a presence on the ground. The Security Council vested UNMIK, through its Special Representative of Secretary General (SRS), with all legislative, executive and judiciary power over the territory and people of Kosovo (UNMIK n.d.; UNMIK 1999). KFOR’s mandate, on the other hand, as to the resolution 1244, consisted primarily in: (a) establishing a secure environment for the return of refugees and displaced persons, and (b) ensuring public safety until the international civil presence takes over (see: Security Council Resolution 1244).

At the very first moments when UNMIK took the power to administrate Kosovo, minorities were given a special attention. Several bodies were established to deal with advancing minority rights. The first among them was the *Ad Hoc Task Force on Minorities* which operated jointly by primarily UNHCR and OSCE between 1999 and 2001 producing several reports that
assessed the situation of minorities in Kosovo (MRG 2006:13). In September 1999 UNMIK established **Civil Affairs Minority Officers**, renamed as **Local Community Officers** in 2000. At the end of 2001 UNMIK officially established the **Office of Returns and Communities**, which took over from the UNHCR the coordination of policy on returns and general issues affecting minorities. In December 2001, UNMIK set up an **Advisory Board on Communities** to provide policy advice on minority issues (Ibid.).

Some of documents adopted by UNMIK concerning minorities are presented below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulations</th>
<th>Relation to minorities</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regulation 2000/4 on the prohibition against inciting to national, racial, religious, or ethnic hatred, discord or intolerance (1 Feb. 2000)</td>
<td>- Incitement of hatred in public based on national, racial, ethnic, or religious grounds is punished by law (5 to 8 years) or fine, or both.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- The official languages used became Albanian and Serbian. Every document was to be translated into these two languages. Translation was to be used when needed in other languages.  
- It established a Communities Committee and Mediation Committee dealing with minority rights |
| Regulation 2001/9 on a Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government of Kosovo (15 May 2001) | **Specific rights to the ‘Communities’ (minorities):**  
- Receive education in their own language;  
- Establish associations to promote the interests of their community;  
- Provide information in the language and alphabet of their community, including by establishing and maintaining their own media;  
- Provide and support (financially) education in their own language, alphabet, community culture and history.  
- Preserve sites of religious, historical, or cultural importance to the Community, in cooperation with relevant public authorities;  
- Be guaranteed access to, and representation in, public broadcast media, as well as programming in relevant languages;  
- Reserved seats in the Parliament, Presidency, Government, with a particular stress to Serbian community (entitled to 10 out of 20 reserved seats for minorities in the Parliament)  
- SRSG had the authority to block any law or decision that was deemed to go against ‘Communities’ (minorities) |
| The Seven-Point Plan ‘A Choice for Mitrovica’ by SRSG Michael Steiner (1 Oct. 2002) | - Created sub-municipal units with the power to decide on issues such as: schools, health centres, culture, sports, etc.;  
- UNMIK police and KFOR to guarantee any possible ‘incursion’ from the South by safeguarding the bridge between South and North Mitrovica; |
| Standards for Kosovo a document issued by UNMIK in 2003 as a condition for Kosovo to be able to open its status negotiations | The document contained 8 standards, among others: functioning democratic institutions, rule of law (equal access to justice), freedom of movement, sustainable returns and the Rights of Communities and their members (among others fully complying and implementing Framework Convention for National Minorities), Economy, Property Rights, Dialogue (between Kosovo and Serbia), Kosovo Protection Corps,  
- All eight points give a particular stress to ‘Communities’ |
| Law No. 2004/3 on Anti-discrimination | - Protection of all ‘Communities’ to enjoy rights and privileges entitled to by laws applicable in Kosovo regardless of national, religious, ethnic, racial (and others) affiliation; It further envisaged measures against perpetrates accordingly. |
| Framework Document for the Reform of Local Self-Government in Kosovo (UNMIK&PISG) a Jul. 2004 | - Further transferred competencies from UNMIK and PISG to municipalities  
- Proposed establishing 5 ‘pilot municipal units’ (2 K-Serbian majority, Graçanica and Partesh). Serbian minority rejected the decentralization plan” |

\[a\] Gjoni et al. (2010)
While the first two years UNMIK dealt with minorities in the general framework of human rights, the promulgation of the *Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo* (hereinafter as the Constitutional Framework) through its 2001/9 regulation paved the way, for the first time, to promote ‘group-differentiated rights’. The Constitutional Framework outlined a comprehensive catalogue of human and minority rights and prohibited discrimination, whereas the 2004 Anti-Discrimination Law (UNMIK 2004), further specified the prohibition of discrimination, made available remedies and provided for sanctions for violators. The Constitutional Framework uses the term “people” as it tried to avoid association of the people with a ‘non-existent’ state (KIPRED 2006:4). Similarly, the Constitutional Framework avoid the use of the term ‘minorities’, as the commonly accepted terminology in international documents and uses instead the term “community” as reference to members of the same ethnic, religious or linguistic group (KIPRED 2006:4). Borrowing from the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM), the Constitutional Framework affirmed the prohibition of any disadvantage incurred from an individual’s choice “to declare or not to declare” himself or herself a member of a community (UNMIK 2001).

More importantly, the Constitutional Framework gave significant institutional representation to minorities, with a particular stress to Serbian minorities. From the 120 seats that political entities of each community win in the proportional system, minorities were entitled to 20 reserved seats in the Kosovo Assembly, 10 of which were reserved for Serbian minority (UNMIK 2001). Minority communities were also entitled to a guaranteed representation in the Presidency of the Assembly. One member of the Presidency must be from parties representing the Serb community and one from parties representing non-Serb (and non-Albanian) communities (UNMIK 2001). As the main decision-making institutions, the Presidency of the Assembly and the Government in principle make decisions by consensus, which in the case of the former is seen as “limited degree of veto power” (Bieber 2004: 124 in KIPRED 2006: 8).

Minorities were also guaranteed representation in Government with at least one minister from the Serb community and one representing other communities. “In case there were more than 12 ministers, a third minister from non-majority communities had to be appointed (UNMIK 2001). At the municipal level minority communities also enjoyed a number of mechanisms to protect their interests. “In order to protect community interests, each municipality with a ‘sizable minority population’ is to establish a Communities Committee, a Mediation Committee and one or more Communities Offices” (Gjurgjeala and Malazogu 2004: 12-13). Communities
Committee’s role was to fairly represent the number of communities in the municipality and its role was, among others, to ensure that “all persons enjoy, on an equal basis, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, and fair and equal employment opportunities in municipality service at all levels” (UNMIK 2000/45). Minorities’ representation did not lack in the judiciary level either, as well as the security bodies such as the Kosovo Police Service (KPS-SHPK) and the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC-TMK).

2005 – 2007 period: Kosovo status negotiations

The 1999 Rambouillet Agreement between Kosovo and Serbia (which was in fact rejected by Serbia or that time Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) had foreseen an international administration of Kosovo until 2002, a date deemed appropriate for opening negotiations over the future of Kosovo (Weller 2008:18). However, plans for opening Kosovo status negotiations were pushed forward only by 2003 when UNMIK drafted a document (endorsed by the UN Security Council) known as the ‘Standards for Kosovo’ (or commonly known as standards before status) which comprised of eight fundamental areas in which Kosovo had to progress if it wanted to open its status negotiations. It did not take long before frustration over the opening of status negotiations in early 2004 produced the ‘March 2004 unrests’ known as the worst ethnic clashes between Albanians and Serb ethnics since the end of the war in Kosovo. One thing was made clear: despite the international administration’s disappointment over the failure of its ‘multi-cultural’ project (MRG 2006), the status negotiations had to be opened as soon as possible. In October 2005, a comprehensive report on evaluating the situation in Kosovo drafted by Kai Eide (known as Eide Report) was submitted to the Security Council proposing that the status talks for the future of Kosovo open. The report paved the way for the appointment in 2005 of a special envoy, Marti Ahtisaari (former President of Finland), to lead Kosovo status negotiations in Vienna. An important document which the special envoy had to consider while drafting his final proposal for the future of Kosovo, is the so-called ‘Ten Guiding Principles’ drafted by the Contact Group\(^3\) in 2005 which document, among others, contained the following points:

- The settlement should ensure Kosovo as a multiethnic society both in policy and practice;
- Draft mechanisms that ensure minorities’ participation in local and central institutions. Decentralization is to be prioritized.

\(^3\) The Contact Group for Kosovo consisted of a group of influential countries like: the United States, Russia, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy
- Specific safeguards for the protection of religious and cultural heritage (specifying the Serbian Orthodox Church’s institutions and sites and other patrimony in Kosovo).

- The settlement is to contribute in strengthening regional security and stability.

Although in the beginning the content of negotiations was pretty much technical focusing more on minority rights, political negotiations over the Kosovo’s status were by and large a failure. The product of such negotiations in early 2007 was the so called ‘The Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement’ (or shortly the ‘Ahtisaari Plan’) proposing a monitored independence for Kosovo (which Serbia rejected). As hopes for another solution faded gradually to meet the expectations of both Kosovar and Serbian representatives, Kosovo Assembly proclaimed independence unilaterally in February 2008 based on the Ahtisaari Plan. The Ahtisaari Plan for the most part concerned the rights and interests of minorities in Kosovo. Its implementation has so far largely been implemented in the constitutional and legal framework of Kosovo. Main points which deserve to be mentioned in this regard are:

- Kosovo is defined as a ‘multi-ethnic’ society
- Two official languages are equally recognized: Albanian and Serbian
- Additional municipalities for Serbian community (Northern Mitrovica among the ones)
- ‘Double voting’ for minorities in vital matters (language, education, municipal borders).
- Serbian municipalities have the possibility to establish inter-municipal cooperation and receive funding from Belgrade
- 20 reserved seats for minorities in the Kosovo Assembly for two electoral mandates (10 for Serbian minority) as well as a permanent Committee of Communities and Returns
- Quota representation in Government and Presidency (similar to the 2001 Constitutional Framework)
- Ensured preservation of the culture, language, opening of primary and secondary schools funded by central government for minorities
- The right for double citizenship
- The right to have their symbols and media outlets
- Serbian municipalities have the right to appoint the commander of their Police Station
- North of Mitrovica to have its own university education and hospital
- Each municipality has its one branch of courts which reflects the ethnic composition

After the proclamation of the independence, Kosovo was placed under the monitoring of an International Civilian Representative (ICR) through an International Civilian Office (ICO) set

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4 ‘Double voting’ in this context (according to the Constitution) means that for a law/constitutional amendment of a particular importance to minorities, the move in questions need to receive the majority votes of all Members of the Assembly as well as the majority votes of Assembly Members holding reserved seats (minorities)
up shortly after, led by the International Steering Group for Kosovo (a group of states that had recognized Kosovo). The ICO functioned also as the EU Special Representative. In addition, the EU set up one of its largest missions ever—EULEX—to help Kosovo in the field of the rule of law. KFOR military presence remained, although not to the same extent as before, just as a symbolic presence of UNMIK remained too, mostly due to the 1244 UNSC resolution which is still in force today (see: ICO 2012). The ICO was disbanded in 2012 after the monitoring of the independence officially ended, leaving however behind EULEX which still operates nowadays. The proclamation of the independence from Kosovo closed many contested issues since war, but opened many others. Although it rapidly got recognized from many countries, among which the most powerful powers such as the US, UK, France, Germany, the inability to push the independence through the UN Security Council left Kosovo in a vulnerable position concerning its international subjectivity. Above all, its ability to exercise the sovereignty over the entire territory was put in serious question when faced with Serbian majority-inhabited areas. It was clear that Serbia was not to let go, thus withholding its authority over northern Kosovo where Serbs were a majority in the four municipalities. As for the newly Kosovo state institutions, two solutions were at stake: a coercive one (by the use of force) or a diplomatic one (the latter necessarily included Serbia). For many reasons Kosovo’s best solution was that of diplomacy.

2008 – 2015 period: Post-status negotiations
Having not given up in Kosovo, Serbia shortly after the independence, called on the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to rule over Kosovo’s proclamation of independence. After two years of hearings, the ICJ comes with the final verdict that Kosovo’s proclamation of independence was not a violation of the international law (see: ICJ 2010). Contrary to what was expected that the ICJ’s opinion would contribute in strengthening the international subjectivity of Kosovo, the EU decided to take into account another proposal from Serbia sent to the General Assembly in 2010, in a modified version, which called on Kosovo and Serbia to launch a new series of negotiations with the mediation of the European Union (see: Development Group 2012). The General Assembly Resolution (A/64/L.65/Rev.1) of September 2010 called on launching the dialogue ‘as a factor of peace, security and stability in the region… (as well as)...to promote cooperation, achieve progress on the path to the European Union and improve the lives of the people’. Since the start of the dialogue until now Kosovo and Serbia have reached several agreements, many of which have stalled in the practical implementation. Some of the agreement with the relevance to our topic include: establishment of four municipalities (as set out in Ahtisaari Plan), establishment of an Association/Community of
Serb municipalities, police and security, and judiciary (Kosovo Assembly 2013). While the agreement on the establishment of four municipalities was already envisaged in Ahtisaari Plan and is part of the legal framework of Kosovo, three other agreements are a novelty in this series of dialogue: the judiciary, police, and the Association of Serb Municipalities. As for the first, beyond the legal framework applicable in Kosovo, a permanent panel of the Appellate Court is to be established and operate in Northern Mitrovica, consisting of a majority of K-Serb judges (see also: Bassuener & Weber 2013:2). Further, appropriate judges are to sit depending on the situation in question. Secondly, four municipalities in northern Kosovo (Northern Mitrovica, Leposavić/Leposavić, Zubin Potok, and Zveçan/Zvečan) are entitled to select their Regional Police Commander by proposing their candidates to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Lastly, the agreement foresees the establishment of an Association/Community of Serb Municipalities envisaged to have full ‘overview’ of the areas of economic development, education, health, urban and rural planning, as well as other competencies delegated by the central authority (Kosovo Assembly 2013).

Applying liberal multiculturalism in Kosovo’s context

In order to consider measuring the (in)compatibility of liberal multiculturalism in Kosovo’s context, I first identify in a tabular view how multicultural Kosovo really is based on the Multicultural Policy Index (hereinafter referred to as MPI) developed by Kymlicka & Banting (Queen’s University, n.d.a). By exploring the evolution of Multicultural Policies in Kosovo over the period 1999-2015, it is then possible to explain concretely what has gone wrong while this model was being established, and what parts of the model have proved questionable in relation to the improvement of interethnic relations.

A table containing all multiculturalist elements implemented in Kosovo are integrated in the six ‘emblematic’ policies of the multiculturalist model developed by Kymlicka and BAnting. The table is used to identify each MPI policy and to what extent is this applicable to Kosovo. Answers are given as: yes, partially, and no, followed by an explanation for the answer. Based on the scoring from 0-1 (0=No, 0.5=Partially, 1=Yes) that is used by the authors, Kosovo

7 A more detailed description of why is one policy given a ‘yes’, ‘partially’ or ‘no’ is provided in the ‘theoretical framework’ section where the six emblematic policies are given the detailed explanation by Kymlicka and Banting and when their implementation is considered a ‘yes’, a ‘partially’, or a ‘no’.
reaches a 5.5 score out of 6. If this MPI for Kosovo is true, then it puts the country before several other countries that are currently part of the monitoring like Switzerland or United States, while making it equal with countries like Belgium (Queen’s University n.d.b). Despite the country’s successful elevation of the status of minorities in policy and (to a considerable extent) in practice, Kosovo still suffers with regard to the improvement of interethnic relations. The concentration of minorities (Serbian minority in particular) is described in various reports and academic articles as typical homogeneous ethnic enclaves with no or little incentives for cooperation with the mainstream society (or vice-versa), a considerable low interethnic trust and persisting secessionist ideas. The following sections will be addressing why this issue is persisting by answering the two research questions central to this thesis. As cited before, concepts of *multiethnicity* and *multiculturalism* will be used interchangeably to refer to the set of group rights granted to minorities throughout the period 1999-2015 in the case of Kosovo.
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<td><strong>1. Federal or quasi-federal territorial autonomy,</strong></td>
<td>Yes. - Territorial decentralization on ethnic lines; - The city of Mitrovica separated in two sub-municipal units based on ethnic lines</td>
<td>Yes. - 5 new municipalities are established for minorities by redrawing of territories - The city of Mitrovica is officially divided in two municipalities based on ethnic lines - Serbian municipalities are granted extended competencies (i.e. higher education, levying taxes, health, and so on.)</td>
<td>Yes. - Association/Community of Serbian Municipalities is established forming a union of all Serbian dominated municipalities in Kosovo</td>
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<td><strong>2. Official language status, either in the region or nationally,</strong></td>
<td>Yes. - Serbian and Albanian recognized as official languages in the central and local level - All promulgated laws to be published in the Albanian, Bosniak, English, Serbian and Turkish languages - Translation to languages for other minorities to be provided if needed</td>
<td>Yes. - Serbian and Albanian recognized as official languages in the central and local level - Turkish, Bosnian and Roma languages have the status of official languages at the municipal level or will be in official use at all levels as provided by law.</td>
<td>Yes. - Serbian and Albanian recognized as official languages in the central and local level - Turkish, Bosnian and Roma languages have the status of official languages at the municipal level or will be in official use at all levels as provided by law.</td>
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<td><strong>3. Guarantees of representation in the central government or on constitutional courts,</strong></td>
<td>Yes. - 20 (out of 120) reserved seats in the National Assembly, out of which 10 reserved for the Serbian national minority - 2 out of 12 ministries are reserved to minorities. If there are more than 12 ministries, an additional ministry is given to minorities - Guaranteed representation in the Presidency</td>
<td>- 2 out of 9 seats in the Constitutional Court consist of minorities</td>
<td>- Financial support from the central government for cultural activities, historical and religious heritage, pre-school, primary and secondary education, university education - Special representation in national media and the right to create and use their own media</td>
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<td><strong>4. Public funding of minority language universities/schools/media,</strong></td>
<td>Yes. - Financial support for education and educational institutions of minorities - Funding for the preservation of minorities’ cultural, historic and religious heritage</td>
<td>- Financial support for education and educational institutions of minorities - Funding for the preservation of minorities’ cultural, historic and religious heritage</td>
<td>- Financial support from the central government for cultural activities, historical and religious heritage, pre-school, primary and secondary education, university education - Special representation in national media and the right to create and use their own media</td>
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<td><strong>5. Constitutional or parliamentary affirmation of ‘multinationalism’,</strong></td>
<td>Partially. - The term ‘communities’ is used to refer to minorities - Minorities are given special group rights</td>
<td>Yes. - Kosovo is defined as ‘a multi-ethnic society consisting of Albanian and other Communities, - Minorities are given extensive group-rights in terms of the territorial autonomy and delegation of power</td>
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<td><strong>6. According international personality (e.g., allowing the substate region to sit on intern. bodies, sign treaties, or have their own Olympic team</strong></td>
<td>Partially. - Minorities are entitled the right to participate in regional and international non-governmental organizations</td>
<td>Partially. - Municipalities have the right to inter-municipal and cross-border cooperation in the areas of their own and extended competencies. - Serbian municipalities are given the right to receive funding from Serbia upon the condition that funding is transparent as provided with Kosovo legal framework.</td>
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\(^a\) Please see: ‘Theoretical Framework’ section for a detailed overview of Multicultural Policy Index elements as framed by Kymlicka and Banting
A Sober Second Look

This section addresses the first research question: *why was the multiculturalist project promoted by the international community largely unsuccessful in improving inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo?* But first is important to understand that multiculturalist policies as such were not altogether unsuccessful. Indeed, as it will be discussed below, they have contributed in minorities’ representation in state institutions as well as achieving some of the main goals proclaimed in the resolution 1244, the ‘Ten Guiding Principles’ or the EU Council conclusions in bringing about peace and security to the region and bringing both countries closer to the European Union. However, our focus is specifically interethnic relations and how they were affected by policies that were implemented in post-war Kosovo.

*What’s multi-ethnicity like in Kosovo?*

The most common term used to refer to the improvement of minorities’ position in Kosovo either through the general doctrine of human rights or through specific group rights is ‘multi-ethnicity’. Yet, to date, there is no clear definition of what ‘multiethnicity’ means or what elements constitute a ‘multiethnic society’ in Kosovo’s context. The approach towards protecting and promoting minority rights from the international community in Kosovo throughout 1999-2015 is diverse and carries no coherent pattern overtime which could be named as ‘multiethnic’. Aidan Hehir, a scholar who has written extensively in the case of Kosovo and the international intervention, also agrees that there is no definition of ‘multi-ethnicity’ in the official documents which employ them (Hehir 2010:29). One of its first practical use of the term ‘multi-ethnic’ was in assessment reports produced by an UNHCR-OSCE Ad Hoc Task Force on Minorities between 1999 and 2001. Its assessment report in 2001 asserts the need for a broader inclusion of minorities in areas such as education, employment and other spheres of life, as the only means to reflect the ‘multi-ethnic character’ of Kosovo. The 2001 Constitutional Framework provides a broad range of group-differentiated rights to minorities but does not make mention of the concept ‘multi-ethnicity’. The definition of ‘multiethnicity’ that could be understood within the framework of group-differentiated rights appears only in the ‘Ten Guiding Principles’ drafted by the Contact Group for Kosovo in 2005. Point three particularly states that: “The settlement [of Kosovo’s status] should ensure multi-ethnicity that is sustainable in Kosovo. It should provide effective constitutional guarantees and appropriate mechanisms to ensure the implementation of human rights for all citizens in Kosovo and of the rights of members of all Kosovo communities…” Subsequently, all principles

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8 Author’s input
part of this document were incorporated in the 2007 Ahtisaari Plan and the latter merged in the Constitution adopted after Kosovo proclaimed its independence in 2008. In the first article in the Ahtisaari Plan Kosovo is defined as follows:

“Kosovo shall be a multi-ethnic society, which shall govern itself democratically, and with full respect for the rule of law, through its legislative, executive, and judicial institutions”

Article 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo makes a similar definition, defining Kosovo as “multiethnic society consisting of Albanians and other Communities”

Multi-ethnicity in practice: what went wrong?
Kymlicka (2007) gives four major reasons why liberal multiculturalism has not been a successful story in the post-communist countries. The first two are more ideological in nature, namely, (a) the rise and spread of a new discourse and consciousness of human and minority rights which helps to delegitimize traditional ethnic and racial hierarchies, together with (b) the (incomplete) democratization (a precondition that allows minorities create more space for minorities mobilization). The last two are more political: one is related to the geo-political factors – or the adoption of policies which would help in the state’s struggle with its external enemies (United States approach to racial equality after the Second World War not necessarily because of movements for racial equality rather than as a factor that could have helped face the Communist World). Second factor is the geo-political security and securitization of ethnic relations, or in other words, where the state sees that there is no longer threat among minorities that they will collaborate with state’s neighbouring enemies (Kymlicka 2007:88-121, 133; 2002:21-22). An additional factor that Kymlicka cites in this respect is related to the wrong approach of the IC concerning state-minority relations. The logic behind the IC’s intervention, Kymlicka argues, is based on realpolitik—which follows the logic of security—rather than that of liberal multiculturalism (Kymlicka 2007:234). Embarking on these four premises, I extract some of the major themes from the primary documents analysed, as well as the secondary literature, so as to see the connection between the theoretical propositions and the situation in the ground. First, the empirical findings will be provided below following by a discussion related to Kymlicka’s four main reasons on the problem of implementing multiculturalism in post-communist countries.
After looking into the collected data, the following factors are most often cited in relation to the failure of multi-ethnic/multicultural policies in contributing to any substantial improvement of interethic relations in Kosovo:

- **Segregationist policies – the ‘key’ to every problem**
  
  One of the most cited problems that define international civilian and military administration of Kosovo in the first years is their policy of avoiding ethnic clashes through segregationist policies. Segregation is seen in two respects: first, territorial segregation of Serbian ethnic community, particularly those in northern part of Kosovo. The international civilian and military presence insisted that the only way to properly maintain interethnic security was separating ethnic communities territorially through checkpoints, following their inability to exercise the authority granted by the Resolution 1244 over the entire territory of Kosovo. K-Serbs in country’s north established their parallel structures run and funded by Serbia, leaving UNMIK and KFOR with only nominal presence (Devic 2006:264). Secondly, it is argued that the international administration overlooked security issues by persistently separating public services (education, health and other public services) and minimizing contacts between ethnic communities (mostly Albanian and Serbian) (MRG 2006; McKinna 2010; Bloom et al. 2006).

  In an interview, Emir Azemi, an official from the Municipal Assembly of Northern Mitrovica municipality⁹, sees territorial segregation as one of the major pitfalls that has characterized the international administration in Kosovo. Among others, he states:

  “The biggest mistake of the international administration has been the separation of northern Mitrovica by stationing in the Ibër bridge and hindering interethnic contacts. Such a territorial separation between the communities has only nourished hatred, deepening the gap for a possible reconciliation, maintaining a fragile situation which was continuously characterized by protests, clashes between communities, and so forth.”

  The separation of public services is also characterized as a major pitfall or a missing chance from the international administration to improve interethic relations in Kosovo. In his report on minority rights in Kosovo, Baldwin (MRG 2006), states:

  “From 1999, UNMIK and KFOR have allowed all aspects of Kosovo to become divided. In July 1999, the majority of Serb and other minority staff in Prishtine/Pristina hospital walked out, following numerous cases of intimidation and harassment. In Mitrovice/Mitrovica hospital...,"

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  ⁹ Emir Azemi holds the position of the Deputy Chairperson for Communities in the Municipal Assembly in the municipality of Northern Mitrovica.
Albanian staff and Albanian patients were harassed, and a Serb leader said publicly that there should be no Albanians in the hospital. KFOR proved unable to do anything about this and all Albanians left the hospital in September 1999."

In its report ‘Grass-root approaches to interethnic reconciliation in the northern part of Kosovo’, KIPRED (2012) lists the range of systematic policies that were used for effective segregation of minorities. Not only public services such as health and education were provided separately for respective ethnic communities, but segregation was also reflective in minor issues. According to the KIPRED report “most of the roads, bus transport, bridges, that were built after the war were established with exactly that aim: to avoid inter-ethnic contact and thus reduce further conflict potential and increase the (feeling of) security for the respective communities."

- **Negotiations for the status of Kosovo**

The success of ‘multi-ethnicity’ project of the IC was seriously put into question in March 2004 following one of most violent ethnic clashes since the end of the war. The violence began following the reported deaths of three Albanian children and one Serb teenager and resulted in numerous casualties and property damage. Following the riots, the special envoy, Kai Eide, in his 2005 assessment report warned against any further postponing of status negotiations by stressing out the immediate need for considering of opening the status negotiations for Kosovo (Security Council 2005). Afrim Hoti\(^{10}\), professor at the University of Prishtina, states that international community’s aim of building a multiethnic society, and contributing therefore to the improvement of interethnic relations in Kosovo was in contradiction with their decision of prolonging the settlement of the status of Kosovo. Hoti (2015) cites:

“The prolongation of Kosovo status settlement in one side nourished hopes of one ethnic group that Kosovo was to be independent, and the other ethnic group, on the other side, hoping that Kosovo would be reintegrated in Serbia. This kept particularly Serbian ethnic community unwilling to integrate in the newly emerged institutions of Kosovo.”

Same opinion shares also the political scientist Nexhmedin Spahić,\(^{11}\) stating that

“The international administration should have at first hand focused on solving Kosovo status and then give extensive rights to minorities’. Sharing too much power to minorities at a time

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\(^{10}\) Head of the Department of Political Science at the University of Prishtina, Kosovo.

\(^{11}\) Professor of Political Science at AAB University, Kosovo.
when Kosovo’s status was not yet settled, has only contributed in hindering minority integration efforts in the mainstream society”

Of a similar line of opinion is also Aidan Hehir (2010) but who focuses more on Albanians and their unwillingness to contribute on the multi-ethnic project and the shortsightedness of the international administration to see this problem. He explicitly states that ‘the idea that Kosovo Albanians would focus on forging a multi-ethnic Kosovo before achieving independence was [therefore] naïve’. Lastly, Baldwin (MRG 2007) lists five elements he argues are essential for a long-term solution in Kosovo, with the fifth being that ‘there must be a final settlement for Kosovo’. Baldwin (MRG 2007:5) concretely states that the “fear of being ruled by ‘alien’ Albanians or Serbs in the future is inciting violence between the two majority groups as they seek to create ethnically pure areas, with crimes going unaddressed by the authorities.”

- Minority rights at the hands of political compromises

The third common perception concerning the situation of minority rights in Kosovo is related to the emergence of these group-rights as ad hoc compromises coming from the dialogue between Prishtina and Belgrade over the status of Kosovo (see also: Beha 2014). The group rights which minorities today are entitled have come largely in two periods. The first period relates to the package of group rights incorporated in the Ahtisaari Plan (most of which were a copy paste from the 2001 Constitutional Framework) which in return gave Kosovo the green light for declaring its independence (Weller 2008; DG for External Policies of the Union 2010). The second period relates to the fierce diplomatic battles of Serbia to counter Kosovo’s declaration of independence which produced another more extended package of group rights during the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia under EU mediation. Both periods of time have however been detrimental to minorities’ integration. Complying with Serbia’s demands, as Baldwin (MRG 2006:27) argues, meant ‘addressing the demand of Serb leaders for effective segregation while other minority groups have been effectively treated as second class’ (MRG 2006: 27). As Hoti (2015) argues, Serbia was never really interested in defending Serbian minority rights in Kosovo but called on their name to serve other purposes in relation to Kosovo (see also: Weller 2008:26). The international community on the other hand, Hoti (2015) states, was too generous in complying with Serbia’s demands which as a result made minorities ‘not follow the trend of integration but the opposite, that of ghettoization, isolation, or enclavisation,
the one that prevails today’. Talking about the most recent group rights given to minorities through Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, Spahiu (2015) states:

“With recent agreements reached between Kosovo and Serbia, Kosovo has reached to only formally integrate K-Serbs in its institutions, while Serbia still keeps its de facto administration. Formally, the police in northern Kosovo wears the uniforms of Kosovo Police but takes orders from Serbia. This is a situation that Brussel brought about as a compromise between the two parties.”

The role of the international community is neither appreciated as constructive in the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. While explaining EU’s mediation role, a Kosovo Government Official states12: “You wouldn’t believe what kind of materially unsubstantiated proposals we received from the EEAS13 throughout the dialogue.” The implications of agreement between Kosovo and Serbia under EU mediation are also seen in the latest agreement about the judiciary. Non-Serb minorities in Kosovo have heavily criticized the last agreement reached for panel of the Appellate Court to be sitting in northern Kosovo and to be comprised of ‘Albanians and Serbs’ only without mentioning any other minority present in that part of the territory, which goes against the laws and constitutional guarantees on minority rights (ECMI 2015). During an interview, Veton Berisha, a deputy representing the Egyptian minority, has also criticized the agreement seeing it as “a breach of the constitutional and legal system of Kosovo and discrimination towards other non-Serbian minorities in Kosovo.”

- Security before everything else

It is argued that security was, at least in the first years, one of the most important factors that shaped how interethnic relations would be dealt with. In an interview, Emir Azemi argues that the territorial separation that the international community imposed to ethnic communities “was justified by the international administration in the name of security, but which problem later turned into a political problem, something that Kosovo still faces today.” That security would be turned into a political problem is also evident nowadays when Serbian minority in northern part of Kosovo is still perceived as threat to the sovereignty of Kosovo state. According to Beha (2014:103) inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo ‘continue to be seen through a security lens and

12 In an interview conducted by Bassuener & Weber (2013). Not yet a Done Deal: Kosovo and Prishtina-Belgrade Agreement, a DPC Policy Paper.
13 European External Action Service
Kosovo Serbs, especially those in the north, are still perceived as a threat to the security of the new state’.

The international administration on the other hand had a contradictory approach in maintaining security in Kosovo. They would excessively use segregation to provide for security of minority groups but did not go beyond that. As Clive Baldwin (MRG 2006) explains the March 2004 riots “report after report, set out in most detail by Human Rights Watch, shows minorities saying that when they called for assistance, UNMIK and KFOR security forces did not come, or if they did, they came late and said they could only evacuate the minorities, not protect them.” That security was used as a justification to systematically separate ethnic communities is also evident with the issue of return of displaced people and refugees, Baldwin (MRG 2006) states:

“The basic principle of every Kosovan having the right to return to their home was set out in Resolution 1244 and therefore UNMIK and KFOR were required to prioritize this. Yet the approach of many units of KFOR was to try to control this return and, in particular, to say it could not take place until KFOR had created a ‘safe and secure environment’.”

- Addressing historic injustices

The last factor to be dealt with as an important factor that has hindered the improvement of interethnic relations in Kosovo is the way how historic injustices (Kosovo war and its aftermath) have been dealt with so far. To Kymicka, in order for a state to claim to be multicultural, a sufficient number of its citizens must endorse the three general principles of a multicultural state: (a) that the state is not in a possession of a national group, but is equal to all citizens, (b) that assimilationist and exclusionist policies should be replaced with politics of recognitions and accommodation, and (c) that historic injustice should be acknowledged (2003:153). The problem of addressing historic injustices has haunted Kosovo society for the last fifteen years without any comprehensive strategy in dealing with the past. Dealing with the past to many lies at the heart of reconciliation of conflicting parties (Commissioner for Human Rights 2012; Bar-Tal 2008; Bloomfield 2003:12 in Burema 2012:14). Some of the main issues that lie at the heart of improving interethnic relations in Kosovo have not yet been resolved. First, the issue of more than a thousand persons from Kosovo still missing after having abducted at war time is still keeping families locked in their past and unable to contribute in a meaningful reconciliation (Peci 2014, Burema 2014). Secondly, there is still negligence in dealing with war crimes committed by both sides in the conflict. The importance of dealing with post-war crimes is
acknowledged in the report of the Commissioner for Human Rights (2012) of the Council of Europe as follows:

“Genuine inter-ethnic reconciliation and durable peace in the region of the former Yugoslavia cannot be achieved without justice. Post-war justice is not only judicial and retributive (...) it is above all restorative and preventive, aiming (...) to ensure that all people in the region come to terms with the past, and live in peace and security in cohesive, pluralist democratic societies.”

To date, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has sentenced only 11 people in relation to Kosovo (ICTY 2015), a similar number convicted in the Special War Crimes Chamber at Belgrade District Court, while Kosovo has mostly remained dependent in international courts (Burema 2012:14) until recently when Kosovo is to also establish, after international pressure, a Special Court for serious abuses during and after the 1998-1999 Kosovo war (HRW 2014; Hajdari 2015). To Burema (2012:15) judicial failings in the case of Kosovo “have left both communities with a sense that many of the atrocities committed during the conflict have gone unpunished and resulted in a feeling on both sides that, in the prosecution of war crimes, the “other side” was accorded preferential treatment”

In another case, Burema (2012:21) explains how the return process has been affected by the level of atrocities committed in various regions. Areas that have had more intensive fighting and count more atrocities have a significantly lower return rates, while other areas with less fighting and atrocities are characterized with higher return rates.

Discussion
The five points that are introduced above as major factors that have hindered the improvement of interethnic relations in Kosovo, do not follow the four points of Kymlicka, but come across most of them. While we try to connect Kymlicka’s four arguments that he argues can account for a potential failure of minority rights in post-conflict countries, it is important to note that while Kymlicka focuses on the success of the accommodation of minorities mostly with regard to state-minority relations, our focus is more horizontal, looking specifically at the improvement of interethnic relations between the majority and minority ethnic communities. Two prevailing arguments that can be linked to Kymlicka’s four arguments is the securitization of ethnic relations from the international community, and minorities seen as a potential threat to the state because of their potential collaboration with the enemy. Building from these arguments, there is no doubt that the international community overlooked the issue of security concerning interethnic relations. Simonsen (2005) rightly argued that “important opportunities for
peacebuilding may be lost if intervening actors [IC in this case] fail to acknowledge the dynamic nature of ethnicity and opt for policies that institutionalize ethnic differences.” Secondly, the problem of minorities being seen as a threat to Kosovo’s security or even its existence is of special importance. The major problem Kosovo faces is the opposite. As argued above, it is in fact its neighbor Serbia that not only collaborates, but still controls the Serbian minority in Kosovo, and this way shapes how the security situation is like in Kosovo. While Kymlicka argues that post-communist countries are reluctant in giving rights to minorities because of the fear of their collaboration with the neighboring enemy, Kosovo’s case is special for the fact that most group rights to minorities in Kosovo have come out of efforts to solve the contentious issues between Kosovo and its neighboring Serbia. This implies that Kosovo will only have the possibility to stop seeing its Serbian minority through security lens when it stops seeing Serbia as a threat to its security or sovereignty.

Two last arguments that Kymlicka cites regarding the rise of a human rights consciousness and the democratization process, although not directly discussed above, are also to an extent part of the factors that have hindered the improvement of interethnic relations. Reports assessing human and minority rights in Kosovo agree that there is a considerable improvement of human and minority rights in Kosovo, although interethnic incidents and the low trust between Serbs and Albanians still persist, particularly in Northern Mitrovica (see: Kosovo Progress Report 2014; EMCI 2013). Drawing from this, the last two points of Kymlicka on human rights consciousness and democratization may certainly be counted as problematic in practically implementing a multiculturalist model of minority rights in post-war Kosovo, but they do not constitute some of the major factors that have particularly hindered the improvement of interethnic relations.

**Did multiethnicity really fail to improve interethnic relations?**

“If a minority seizes power, the OSCE pressures the state to accept an ‘exceptional’ form of autonomy; if the majority refuses any autonomy proposal, the OSCE rewards it by putting pressure on minorities to be more ‘pragmatic’. This is perverse from the point of view of justice, but it seems to be the inevitable logic of the security-based approach. Insofar as this is the logic of the security approach, it has the paradoxical effect of undermining security”

(Kymlicka 2007:237)

After giving some of the major factors that are seen to have hindered the improvement of interethnic relations in Kosovo, the second issue now is to understand why interethnic relations are this fragile despite the fact that Kosovo to date has implemented one of its most advanced
levels of group-rights to minorities in the region and wider. Disappointment over the results of the multiethnic project has been persistent since 1999. After the March 2004 ethnic violence, the then Special Representative of the Secretary General stated:

“The concept of a multiethnic Kosovo that the international community has been persistently attempting to implement in recent years is no longer tenable.” One year after, Kai Eide, a special envoy of the UN Secretary General, who was in charge of assessing the situation in Kosovo before the start of status negotiations, among others, in its 2005 report, states:

“With regard to the foundation for a multi-ethnic society, the situation is grim. Kosovo leaders and the international community should take urgent steps in order to correct this picture. The overall security situation is stable, but fragile.”

Further, while explaining the problems of the return of displaced people and refugees, Eide further states that “the overall return process has virtually come to a halt. The general atmosphere in many places is not conducive to return. Multi-ethnicity is often not seen as a goal” (emphasis added). Anita McKinna (2010) argues that the international administration has pursued multi-ethnicity in Kosovo as a panacea. “Far from creating the conditions conducive to greater inter-ethnic integration, the policies enacted supposedly in the name of multi-ethnicity have resulted in the further entrenchment of ethnic division” (McKinna 2010:10).

While it is argued that multiethnicity largely failed to improve interethnic relations in Kosovo, the problem is to understand if the multi-ethnic project completely failed its objectives. Kymlicka argues that the implementation of multiculturalism in post-communist countries has not failed because it was not the goal itself. Multiculturalist/multiethnic policies were used as means to achieve the goal which to Kymlicka is security but were not itself the goal. International interventions he argues, ‘were based on realpolitik rather than any principled conception of state-minority relations’ (Kymlicka 2007:234). But to what extent is this true in the case of Kosovo? Based on the documents analysed, the international community in Kosovo has prioritized (a) building of a multi-ethnic Kosovo, (b) ensuring peace, security and stability in Kosovo and region, and (c) Kosovo’s fulfilment of EU standards. In the ‘Ten Guiding Principles’ of the Contact Group for Kosovo, two of them explicitly call for the settlement of the status of Kosovo to ‘strengthen regional security and stability’ and ‘ensure Kosovo’s security’. Further, the third point calls for building of a multi-ethnic Kosovo through ‘constitutional rights and appropriate mechanisms’ elevating the status of minorities.

Two arguments go against multiethnicity as a project that aims to build state-minority relations: firstly, for the fact that most group-rights came as a political compromise during the Kosovo
status negotiations so that Serbia would agree with the final settlement (Weller 2008). Secondly, as argued above, because Serbia itself was not primarily interested in defending the Serbian minority rights and thus any group-rights pushed by Serbia for its Serbian minority in Kosovo had the opposite effect to their integration in Kosovan’s society. The second package of group rights which Serbian minority benefited from after Kosovo’s declaration of independence also came from political negotiation with Serbia. In the 2010 General Assembly resolution (A64 L.65 Rev1) which marks the beginning of Kosovo Serbia dialogue, states that:

“The process of dialogue in itself would be a factor for peace, security and stability in the region, and that dialogue would be to promote cooperation, achieve progress on the path to the European Union and improve the lives of the people.”

The group-rights for the Serbian minority that has followed the dialogue was therefore seen mainly through security and stability lens as well as achieving the aim of accession to the EU for both countries involved in the dialogue. In this regard, without doubt, the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia under EU’s mediation gave its own results. While Serbia was first given the candidate status from EU in 2012, and further reached to officially open accession negotiations with the European Union by the end of 2013 (Euronews 2012; Mitrovic 2015), Kosovo awaits by June 2015 to sign the Stabilization and Association Agreement with EU (Tota 2015; European Commission 2013). Serbian minority, which was the only ethnic community in Kosovo benefiting from the latest group-rights has formally started to integrate in Kosovo’s institutions but practically arrangements achieved throughout the dialogue fear a further isolation of Serbian ethnic community towards the mainstream population. According to Bassuener & Weber (DPC 2013) the process of Kosovo Serbia dialogue “is presently at a point at which it could go seriously awry, threatening the hard-won functionality of the state of Kosovo, the continued integration of the majority of Kosovo’s Serbs, and the indefinite perpetuation of the status dispute with Serbia.”

Drawing from this, Kymlicka’s security argument is certainly true in the case of Kosovo, with the EU integration factor being the additional and very important objective of the international community to be achieved. While some of the latest group rights are rightly considered as part of the ‘multiethnic’ project in Kosovo, it can be argued that so far they have certainly hindered rather than accelerated the improvement of interethnic relations in Kosovo.
**The model or the approach: which to blame?**

Beyond the wrong approach used to implement multicultural policies, the aim of this thesis is to see if the multicultural/multiethnic policies *per se* were feasible for the improvement of interethnic relations in Kosovo’s context. Therefore, this part is dedicated to answering the second, and the most important, research question: *To what extent can the ability of multiculturalism to address ethnic cleavages in post-conflict societies be questioned regarding the situation of interethnic relations in Kosovo?*

The fundamental problem identified regarding the feasibility of multiculturalism in post-communist countries is the logic to which multicultural policies are pursued. While the logic behind the multicultural policies implemented in Kosovo is widely criticized, so are the policies itself. When dealing with the problem of minorities’ integration in the society and improvement of interethnic relations, the multiculturalist model says little about it. Hence, the fundamental problem of the liberal multiculturalist model can also be seen through its logic it approaches state-minority relations. Now the question would be: what's the logic behind multiculturalism and how compatible is it with the objective of improvement of interethnic relations?

Bar-Tal (2008) argues that two of the most important challenges to the international community in conflicts is, firstly, findings ways how to end the conflict (through mediation, arbitration or negotiations), and the second level involves reconciliation. To Bar-Tal reconciliation in post-conflict societies is of great importance because it both lays the foundations for successful conflict resolution and prepares members of the society to live in ‘lasting peace’. The first condition for reconciliation to the author is to delegitimiz and humanize the ‘rival’ which means that people of different communities are seen as legitimate partners in peace and deserving of humane treatment (2008:366). The connection of reconciliation as a fundamental problem facing post-conflict societies with most of the policies that are cherished by (liberal) multiculturalism is largely antagonistic.

As we have discussed above, multiculturalism associates with ‘politics of difference’ or simply advocates to change ‘dominant patterns of representation and communication that marginalize certain groups’ (Young 1990, Taylor 1992, Gutmann 2003 in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2010). But, multiculturalism goes beyond that and ‘demands remedies to economic and political disadvantages that people suffer as a result of their minority status’ (Ibid.). Multiculturalism’s aim to bring justice to ethno-cultural groups can thus be neither seen as compatible with the main problem that post-conflict or post-communist societies have faced: that of integrating minorities in the society and improving relations between ethnic communities. While multiculturalism through its policies improves minorities’ positions...
towards the state, it does not necessarily do that horizontally with the majority population. Some pragmatic examples to this characterizing the multicultural model are given below.

The first fundamental contradiction in applying a multiculturalist perspective of minority rights in Kosovo is the preservation of distinctive identities of communities based on ethnicity, culture and/or religion vis-à-vis the promotion of a cross-cutting or common identity to all ethnic groups. Kymlicka himself acknowledges the importance of some sort of shared identity in order to gain the necessary social unity, particularly when dealing with competing identities in wartorn societies, but falls short of offering any substantial suggestion to address it. Callings of doing justice to ethnocultural groups that are in a disadvantaged position in relation to the state do not properly address callings of post-conflict societies for comprehensive mechanisms or policies to tackle reconciliation and improvement of interethnic relations. Song Loong argues that ‘even though Kymlicka tries not to be too demanding regarding his expectations of citizens, he doesn’t know what policy could stimulate the modest demands he has to make (2012:14). Particularly when talking about self-government rights and the case of Kosovo, Song Loong states:

“Self-government does not encourage the participation of minorities in the political community, and thus does not create any awareness of a common future with the rest of the political community. On the long term groups become estranged from each other, which makes social cohesion even less probable.”

In his paper ‘Multicultural States and Intercultural Citizens’ Kymlicka (2003) admits himself that a multicultural state has strained inter-ethnic relations having minorities restrain themselves more to their own group. He then introduces, although with several reserves, the idea of an ‘intercultural citizen’ which implies the necessity that individuals exhibit a more positive personal attitudes towards diversity. No person is ‘self-sufficient’, and no group is truly ‘institutionally’ complete without interacting with others outside their own group (Kymlicka 2003:157).

Secondly, the issue of territorial arrangements for minorities based on ethno-cultural identities are also part of the problem of the multiculturalist model in addressing interethnic cleavages in post-conflict societies. The process of decentralization and extensive power-sharing in Kosovo which established municipalities based on ethnic lines has managed to freeze or even exacerbate resentment between ethnic communities. Group-rights which are granted today to minorities in Kosovo, specifically the Serbian minority in northern Kosovo, have contributed in successfully achieving the goal which multiculturalism indeed advocates for: that of power-sharing in most
areas vital to the national minority within a territory they solely administer, together with a special representation in central institutions (DG EPU 2010; Beha 2011). This has been particularly evident in the recent agreements between Kosovo and Serbia under EU mediation. Both Emir Azemi, as the deputy chairperson for Communities in Northern Mitrovica municipality, as well as Veton Berisha, as the deputy in the Parliament of Kosovo representing Egyptian minority, agree that recent agreements have been indispensable for the integration of Serbian minority in Kosovo institutions and Kosovo-Serbia dialogue is indeed providing results. While such arrangements have given vertical results in including Serbian minority, at least formally, in the institutional and legal framework of Kosovo, it shows even a stronger determination and hopes from the Serbian minority to oppose any form of meaningful integration in the society as they turn their face to Serbia (ICG 2013).

It is of particular importance to mention the behavior of newly Serbian minority elected leaders who emerged within the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia under EU mediation. Benefiting from extensive group rights, they not only renew older attitudes denying Kosovo state existence, but in some respects worsen the progress of integration of Serbian minority particularly in southern part of Kosovo. The barricade erected by Serbs in the Ibër bridge connecting northern and southern Mitrovica which served to divide any transport from southern Kosovo through northern Mitrovica is one of the examples. The arrival of the newly elected Mayor of Northern Mitrovica Municipality transferred the barricade into a ‘peace square’ diminishing further hopes that in a near future northern and southern Mitrovica would begin interacting and cooperating (Mustafa 2014).

Beyond ordinary people, newly elected Serbian officials running institutions in majority inhabited areas in Kosovo reject by and large Kosovo statehood by avoiding the use of Kosovo symbols and issuing statements that pledge allegiance to Serbia state as their only ‘legitimate’ authority (Woehrel 2013; see also: Burema 2012). While there is a considerable improvement of interethnic relations between Serbs and Albanians in southern Kosovo, the periodical escalation of ethnic violence in northern Kosovo serves as a spillover for the rest of the country (Burema 2012:20). After the agreement between Serbia and Kosovo that elections in Serbian inhabited territories be held as to the laws of Kosovo, Serbia introduces through its Serb minority the political party firstly known as ‘Srpska’ (largely connected to the idea of Republika Srpska in Bosnia & Herzegovina) but later changed to ‘Serb Civic Initiative’. The new Serbian Party easily managed to overrun other Serbian older parties and won the power in most
municipalities dominated by Serbs. While talking about the consequences of such an arrangement, in a DPC report, the situation is explained as follows:

“Serbian officials are telling them that by voting for the joint list [Serb Civic Initiative], “Belgrade returns.” One observer noted: “People are confused. They have re-oriented towards life in Kosovo, but they believe Belgrade, which is telling them ‘Serbia is back’.” Another Serb interviewee said: “Ninety percent of Serbs will always listen to Belgrade – they’ve accepted living in an independent Kosovo, but they look to Belgrade... This April agreement is returning us to a stage that we already had passed.”

Having said this, while these kind of arrangements involving territorial autonomy and extensive power-sharing for the Serbian minority are by most seen as a necessity for Serbian minority integration in Kosovo institutional and legal framework, too much independence from the rest of the society and central institutions, without any cross-ethnic incentive for cooperation, is risking to permanently establish arrangements that segregate this minority to the rest of the society, with very little possibilities and incentives for interaction, diminishing thus hopes for reconciliation or improvement of interethnic relations.

The other problem concerning liberal multiculturalism in Kosovo’s context is that of the language and power-sharing on vital areas of concern to minorities. To Kymlicka one of the basic principles of a multicultural state is that of the state accepting ‘an obligation to accord the history, language and culture of non-dominant groups the same recognition and accommodation that is accorded to the dominant group’ (2003:150). Questions are however then raised to what history is the Serbian minority to learn or according to which curricula? Group-rights accorded to minorities regarding this issue envisage that Serbian minority use school curricula as provided by Serbia. After all, Serbian school curricula is their only option to learn a Serbian version of history and culture, despite it being overwhelmed with nationalist elements, unless a new school curricula is presented. Nexhmedin Spahiu raises this issues in Kosovo’s context by arguing that the international community should have intervened to produce a unified curriculum for all communities, one that is stripped off the nationalist and communist ideas from both sides. He states that while ‘Adem Jashari\textsuperscript{14} in the school curricula learned by Albanian children is hailed as a hero, the same person is seen as a criminal in the school

\textsuperscript{14} Adem Jashari was one of the founders of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and is since seen as symbol of Kosovo’s independence. In an armed confrontation with Serbian army in 1997, he was killed together with 58 members of Jashari family. This marked one of the turning points to Kosovo escalating conflict in 1997.
curricula that Serbian children are taught with, and the same applies to Karadžić\textsuperscript{15}. Not only they do not teach the Albanian language, which is the language of the majority of the population, but they learn a totally different history and perception towards its Albanian neighbors as portrayed by Serbian educational system. This to Burema (2012) not only means ‘that children of the two communities never come into contact with each other, but they are also taught fundamentally different and in many ways irreconcilable views of history’ (Gashi, 2012 in Burema 2012:17).

Although the focus in here is the problem of multiculturalism towards post-conflict societies, multiculturalism has been the target of criticism in a wider spectrum. Recently, there is a wide range of discussion over tendencies for a paradigm shift from multiculturalism to ‘interculturalism’ which is deemed by many as a more pragmatic and effective way of dealing with ethno-cultural groups and avoiding segregation problems that is allegedly characterizing multiculturalism. In its document ‘White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue’ launched by the Council of Europe Ministers of Foreign Affairs, they come to reject both assimilation and multiculturalism for their opposite ‘extremes’ in diminishing ethno-cultural communities (assimilation), respectively segregating them from the mainstream society (multiculturalism) (Council of Europe 2008). The ‘White Paper’ specifically states that there is “revealed a belief that what had until recently been a preferred policy approach, conveyed in shorthand as “multiculturalism”, had been found inadequate. On the other hand, there did not seem to be a desire to return to an older emphasis on assimilation.” Instead, it argues that a novel approach, that of ‘intercultural dialogue’ should be embraced in order ‘to avoid the pitfalls of identity policies and to remain open to the challenges of modern societies’.

Multiculturalist theorists (Kymlicka 2015; Meer & Modood 2011; Barret 2013) counter the arguments of this paper as mere rhetoric, ambiguous, representing no specific arguments against multiculturalism. Both papers of Barret (20113) and Meer & Modood (2011), which were in fact published by the Council of Europe itself\textsuperscript{16}, argue that while interculturalism as a political discourse is “able to offer a distinct perspective, one that can speak to a variety of concerns emanating from complex identities and matters of equality and diversity in a more persuasive manner than at present, interculturalism cannot, intellectually at least, eclipse

\footnote{Radovan Karadžić is a former Bosnian Serb politician who was declared guilty for war crimes from the International Criminal Court for Former Yugoslavia for crimes committed in Bosnia during the Siege of Sarajevo as well as ordering of the Srebrenica genocide.}

\footnote{For this publication see: Barret, M., ed. (2013), Interculturalism and Multiculturalism: similarities and differences, Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg.}
multiculturalism, and so should be considered as complementary to multiculturalism” (2011:1).

While multiculturalism theorists understand that there is a growing support for a new political discourse known as ‘interculturalism’, they simply don’t deny its importance it plays in intercultural relations, but see it only as complementary to multiculturalism as the larger paradigm of state-minority relations. According to Devic, even if we accept the package of ‘ethnocultural justice’ as an impetus for advancing minority rights, we need to understand ‘that in these areas where individual rights and economic existence are precarious, insistence on collective rights tied to ascribed ethnic markers of citizenship may act as further hindrance of political participation’ (Devic 2006:270). This brings us to the point where we can argue that while multiculturalism is still a dominating model on properly addressing minority issues in recent decades, it certainly needs a considerable ‘dose’ of interculturalist elements that would enable it thrive in post-conflict societies with deep identity cleavages.

Contrary to what Kymlicka argues that multicultural policies are ineffective in properly accommodating minorities in post-communist, post-conflict societies, the extensive group rights granted to minorities in Kosovo have proved very successful pertinent to the goal of multiculturalism: that of doing justice to ethno-cultural groups through arrangements that improve their disadvantaged economic and political situation in the society. But what they have not proved successful, and what Kymlicka and his liberal multiculturalist model have not been able to properly addressed, is the effect multiculturalist policies have in interethnic relations when they achieve the primary goal of accommodating minorities vis-à-vis the state. Multiculturalist theorists as Kymlicka do identity problems of multiculturalism vis-à-vis the promotion of intercultural/interethnic dialogue, but do not truly address any approach which could be combined so as to enable multiculturalism thrive in this respect in post-conflict societies. This brings us to infer that multiculturalism alone in post-conflict societies is counterproductive when dealt with healing identity cleavages (based on ethnicity or culture) and at least for a certain period of time needs to be complemented by policies or approaches that are interculturalist in nature: policies which go beyond separate accommodation of minorities and involve arrangements which bring people of different communities to interact in public spaces and share common needs and interests.
Final Conclusions

The thesis argues that the problem of interethnic relations relies both to the approach that the international community has been promoting in Kosovo, just as to the multicultural policies itself with their inability to promote cross-ethnic reconciliation. In the first case, I identify five main factors that have hindered the improvement of interethnic relation in Kosovo, namely: segregationist policies, prolongation of Kosovo status settlement, the emergence of most group rights from a top-down approach through political compromises, the over-securitization of ethnic relations, and the lack of a proper addressing of historical injustices. In addition, I also explain that the problem of multiethnicity not properly thriving in Kosovo is also because of the logic that was followed through the multiethnic policies beyond the improvement of minorities’ position in the society and in relation to the state, namely, that of security and stability in Kosovo and region, and measures to bring Kosovo closer to the European Union.

Secondly, it is argued that some of the elements characteristic to liberal multiculturalism have produced mixed effects regarding the integration of minorities in the institutional life and the society at large. Some of the policies like: territorial arrangements to minorities, extensive power-sharing (e.g. language, education), and the promotion of ethnic identities without any cross-cultural or cross-ethnic elements have hindered the possibility of ethnic communities to interact with each other, reducing thus the speed of reconciliation between the ethnic communities. Counter to what Kymlicka argues that multiculturalism has failed to do ‘ethno-cultural justice’ to minorities in post-communist, post-conflict societies because of the lack of certain preconditions, the case of Kosovo has demonstrated that the adoption of multiculturalist policies have in fact largely brought the ‘ethno-cultural’ justice that Kymlicka identifies in his MPI. However, what has instead happen in the case of Kosovo is that parallel to the success of group rights in the inclusion of minorities in the institutional life, they have on the other hand seriously hindered the improvement of relations between ethnic communities. This has in turn caused the issue of interethnic relations, particularly between Albanians and Serbian ethnics, to remain largely fragile, characterized with ethnically motivated attacks and considerable mistrust.

Having said this, I end this thesis by attributing a shared responsibility for both the approach of mainly international actors and the way they have approached ethnic problems in Kosovo, as well as multiculturalist policies per se and their incompatibility to deal with post-conflict societies.
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Newspaper articles


# Annex I: Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Background of the interviewee</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afrim Hoti</td>
<td>2015/04/17</td>
<td>Afrim Hoti currently holds the position of the Head of the Department of Political Sciences at the University of Prishtina. He is a professor of subjects like ‘international law’, ‘international organizations’, ‘human rights and protection of minorities’, and ‘gender and politics’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nexhmedin Spahiu</td>
<td>2015/04/29</td>
<td>Nexhmedin Spahiu is general director of the Radiotelevision of Mitrovica and professor of “Policies of Balkan countries” at the University of Pristina. He is known to be a prominent political analyst concerning minority issues and reconciliation in Kosovo. He is also engaged in other universities in the region and wider.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emir Azemi</td>
<td>2015/05/01</td>
<td>Emir Azemi holds the position of the Deputy Chairperson for Communities in the Municipal Assembly in the Municipality of Northern Mitrovica. In his position he officially represents the interests of Albanian ethnic community who are a minority towards Serbian ethnic community in that municipality. He has formerly worked as the Political Advisor for the Mayor of Southern Mitrovica Municipality. He is now also engaged as the Political Advisor of the President of the Parliament of the Rep. Kosovo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veton Berisha</td>
<td>2015/05/17</td>
<td>Veton Berisha is a deputy at the Parliament of Kosovo representing the Egyptian minority in Kosovo. He is also the leader of the Egyptian Liberal Party (Albanian: Partia Liberale Egjiptiane).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH

‘Managing diversity in post-war Kosovo: multiculturalism in practice’

My name is Arton Krasniqi. I am a graduate student at the University of Malmö, Sweden, at the Department of Global Political Studies, in the field of International Migration and Ethnic Relations. I would like to invite you to take part in my thesis study, which concerns the international community’s role and approach in improving inter-ethnic relations in post-war Kosovo in the light of multiculturalism.

Upon your agreement to participate in my research, I will conduct an interview with you at a time and location of your choice. The interview will involve questions about the multi-ethnic model introduced and implemented in Kosovo since the end of the war, as well as the role of the international community’s role in improving ethnic relation in the post-war Kosovo, factors which have influenced their approach, how successful they have been, identified pitfalls in their approach. The interview should last about 30-45 minutes. With your permission, I will audiotape and take notes during the interview. The recording is to accurately record the information you provide, and will be used for transcription purposes only. If you choose not to be audiotaped, I will take notes instead. If you agree to being audiotaped but feel uncomfortable at any time during the interview, I can turn off the recorder at your request. Or if you don't wish to continue, you can stop the interview at any time.

There is no direct benefit to you from taking part in this study, however, it is hoped that this study will contribute to the previous academic literature concerning the management of ethnic and cultural diversity in Kosovo.

Confidentiality
Your study data will be handled as confidentially as possible. If results of this study are published or presented, individual names and other personally identifiable information will not be used unless you give explicit permission for this below. To minimize the risks to confidentiality, I will make sure that no data is accessible to anyone else except me as a research and (if necessary) thesis evaluating panel at Malmö University. When the research is completed, I will retain these records for up to 2 (two) years after the study is over. The same measures described above will be taken to protect confidentiality of this study data.
Rights

*Participation in research is completely voluntary.* You are free to decline to take part in the project. You can decline to answer any questions and are free to stop taking part in the project at any time. Whether or not you choose to participate in the research and whether or not you choose to answer a question or continue participating in the project, there will be no penalty to you or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.

Questions

If you have any questions about this research, please feel free to contact me. I can be reached at tel: +46704340958 or e-mail: artonkrasniqi@msn.com

If you have any questions about your rights or treatment as a research participant in this study, please contact the University of Malmö at +46 40 665 70 00 or e-mail info@mah.se.

**********************************************************

CONSENT

If you wish to participate in this study, please sign and date below.
You will be given a copy of this consent form to keep for your own records.

_____________________________
Participant's Name *(please print)*

_____________________________  _______________
Participant's Signature        Date

If you agree to allow your name or other identifying information to be included in all final reports, publications, and/or presentations resulting from this research, please sign and date below.

_____________________________  _______________
Participant's Signature        Date