The EU as a Security Actor
A Comparative Study of the EU & NATO between 2006 and 2014

Alexander Marshall
Abstract

NATO has provided security for the Western Hemisphere for more than half a century now and there is little doubt that it is one of the most successful security alliances the world has ever known. However, after the end of the Cold War, its future become increasingly uncertain, thus leaving space for other security actor: the EU. During the last two decades, the EU became more active in security matters and even launched its own, first ever anti-piracy and peacekeeping operations, despite a strong NATO presence in the same areas, at the same time.

We will take a step back from these specific cases and approach the question of: To what extent, if any, has the EU developed into a security actor which is similar NATO? This question has been approached by constructing a deductive mixed methods study of a longitudinal design, in which we have compared the security regimes of the EU and NATO, and the military expenditures of the two organisations. The results of this study were that: the EU has, in fact, developed into a security actor, but it aligns more closely with the neoliberal institutionalist notion of a security institution.

Keywords: EU; EDA; NATO; Military Expenditure; International Security; Neoliberal Institutionalism; Discourse Analysis
Acknowledgements

Even though this is optional, I would like to seize this opportunity in order to express gratitude and appreciation towards my supervisor, Peter Hallberg, for the constructive criticism and insightful comments I have received throughout the months leading up to the submission of this thesis.
# Table of Contents

1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1
   1.1. Disposition ............................................................................................................ 2

2. Literature Review ......................................................................................................... 3
   2.1. Neoliberal institutionalism, NATO and discourse analysis .................................... 3
   2.2. EU-NATO Relationship and Cooperation .......................................................... 5
   2.3. The development of the EU as a security actor .................................................... 7

3. Theoretical Framework ................................................................................................. 9
   3.1. Neoliberal institutionalism .................................................................................. 9
   3.2. Concepts of International Security ..................................................................... 11

4. Research Design ........................................................................................................... 13
   4.1. Statistical Analysis ............................................................................................ 14
   4.2. Speeches and Critical Discourse Analysis ......................................................... 16
   4.3. Operationalization ............................................................................................. 18

5. Analysis ...................................................................................................................... 19
   5.1. Statistical Analysis of Military Expenditure ....................................................... 19
   5.2. Discourse Analysis of NATO Speeches ............................................................ 21
   5.3. Discourse Analysis of EU Speeches .................................................................. 26

6. Results and Findings .................................................................................................. 32

7. Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 37

8. Works Cited ................................................................................................................. 39

9. Appendix ..................................................................................................................... 42
List of Abbreviations

Common Foreign and Security Policy: (CSFP)
Common Security and Defence Policy: (CSDP)
Critical Discourse Analysis: (CDA)
European Defence Agency: (EDA)
European External Action Service (EEAS)
European Union: (EU)
Gross Domestic Product: (GDP)
International Relations (IR)
Ministry of Defence (MoD)
North Atlantic Treaty Organization: (NATO)
1. Introduction

There is little doubt that NATO is one of the most successful military alliances in history, as no other alliance integrates forces the way NATO does. However, after 1989, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the downfall of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of the Cold War, many scholars believed that NATO would disappear because, simply put: without a clearly defined threat, there was no longer a need to sustain the alliance. Yet, this has not been the case. NATO has since not only endured but has gone on to expanded in terms of mandate and members (Williams M. J., 2013, pp. 360, 380; Ruane, 2000, pp. 1-4).

Even though NATO has expanded, in some instances even the most pro-NATO members have opted to prioritise the ever more popular EU conflict management missions. The best example of this is the launch of Operation Atalanta by EU NAVFOR Somalia in November 2008 (Gebhard & Smith, 2015, p. 108). NATO had already deployed an anti-piracy force to secure the shipping lanes but the EU insistently launched its own autonomous anti-piracy operation. Even the United Kingdom, which has long preferred NATO as Europe’s main security provider, opted to prioritise the EU mission above the already ongoing NATO-led operation (Riddervold, 2014, p. 547). The specific reasons for the launch of the EU-led anti-piracy operation are less interesting at this particular point, but what the case, in combination with EU missions in Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, and the Central African Republic, does hint at is that the EU is a developing security actor (Peen Rodt, 2011, p. 41; Riddervold, 2014). However, often when the EU as a security actor is studied, it is done by conducting very specific case studies. In this thesis, we shall take a step back from the above-mentioned trend and approach the question of:

To what extent, if any, has the EU developed into a security actor that closely resembles NATO?

The above-mentioned question will be approached by conducting a longitudinal deductive mixed methods study of a comparative design, in which we shall examine the average military expenditures of the EU/EDA and NATO, and how their security regimes, may or may not have converged over time.

In the following sub-section, Disposition, the way in which this thesis is structured will be elaborated upon. The importance and relevance of the individual sections will also be explained.
1.1. Disposition

The purpose of this sub-section is to give an overview of the structure of this thesis and to highlight the significance of the individual sections.

The purpose of the next section, Literature Review, is to give an extensive overview of the pre-existing scholarly literature and to situate this particular thesis in the larger research area. The literature review is divided up into three sub-sections, each of which has a specific purpose. We shall first examine how the international relations (IR) theory of neoliberal institutionalism can, to a certain extent, be applied to security organisations, and how certain parts of the theory are compatible with discourse analysis. Secondly, we shall examine literature regarding EU and NATO cooperation, and how the two organisations have been studied. The purpose of which is to give some background information about the two organisations in order to contextualise the analysis later. Third, since this thesis is primarily focused upon the EU as a security actor, it is appropriate to examine literature relating to how the EU as a security actor has been studied previously.

After the literature review has been concluded, the theory and methodology of this thesis will be discussed and evaluated. In this thesis, we shall work with a neoliberal institutionalist- and a traditional- conceptualization of an international security alliance/institution, and international security. These two conceptualizations will frame and guide the analysis. In other words, these two conceptualizations will be used to highlight what is important in the discourse and to frame the developments of the EU. This will be explained in the third section, which is called: Theoretical Framework.

The purpose of the fourth section called: Research Design, is to structure the analysis. There we shall discuss what a statistical- and critical discourse analysis (CDA) entails, what materials these methods will be applied to, how these materials were selected, and what knowledge we can gain from conducting the research in this specific way.

Finally, the analysis will also be divided up into three sub-sections. We will first examine the military expenditures of the EU/EDA and NATO. After which, we shall move on and conduct a longitudinal discourse analysis of both organisations as well. The findings will later be combined into a bigger picture. After the analysis will be conducted, the results will be presented and discussed in accordance with the deductive methodology.
2. Literature Review

An extensive amount of pre-existing literature relating to NATO, as well as EU military developments, is available. As above-mentioned, this literature review will be organised thematically and divided up into three sub-sections. First, we will examine how certain aspects of neoliberal institutionalism has been used in relation to the field of international security and the method of discourse analysis. In the second sub-section, we shall look at literature regarding EU and NATO anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia, and the problematic EU-NATO relationship, for the purpose of contextualising the analysis later. In the third sub-section, we will approach literature regarding the EU as a developing security actor. The two last sub-sections in combination will help place this thesis in a proper scholarly context.

2.1. Neoliberal institutionalism, NATO and Discourse Analysis

Theories found within both the liberal and realist spectrums are commonly used when studying international security, and international security organisations. After the end of the Cold War, many realists predicted that NATO would cease to exist due to the lack of a common threat. As Wallander put it: “When threats disappear, allies lose their reason for cooperating, and the coalition will break apart” (2000, p. 705).

However, NATO did not disband after the Cold War. Instead, the alliance became even more active and no longer solely concerned with providing security for Northern America and Western Europe (Williams M. J., 2013, pp. 360-361). NATO started carrying out interventions outside of Northern America and Europe on the basis of protecting non-combatants as illustrated in the cases of Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya (McCoubrey, 1999; Kay, 2000; Kuperman, 2013; Carati, 2015). Thus, some realists started arguing that: if NATO would continue to exist, it would no longer be a relevant and effective military alliance as it would clearly serve US interests (Hellman & Wolf, 1993, p. 17; Lepgold, 1998; Ratti, 2006, p. 88).

From a liberal point of view, the debates about NATO’s prevalence was seen as the final nail in the ‘realist coffin’ (McCalla, 1996; Wallander, 2000). Neoliberal institutionalism is often considered to be the most convincing and comprehensive response to the realist logic. The roots of neoliberal institutionalism can be traced back to the 1940’s and 50’s, and regional integration studies. The studies suggested that the path towards peace and prosperity is to have independent states pool together resources and in some instances, even give up on a certain degree of sovereignty in order to create integrated communities and to promote economic growth and
international peace and security (Smith, Baylis, & Owens, 2014, p. 132; Lee, 2005, p. 109). Neoliberals have since become increasingly concerned with international security, and one of the major difference between the realist and neoliberal perspectives is how international institutions are approached. Neoliberals emphasise their role in the international arena, whereas realists dismiss them as being tools of the powerful member states (Ratti, 2006, p. 86).

Since we will examine the way in which the EU develops over time by using discourse analysis, we will have to select a theory which both emphasises the role of international institutions and embodies a discursive element. Neorealism is lacking in both aspects.

The discursive element with neoliberal institutionalism is the notion of regimes and how they influence international politics and policies. This is, however, something that will be expanded upon later in section, 3, Theoretical Framework. But for now, it is appropriate to state that the neoliberal notion of international security is, in part, characterised by democratisation, conflict resolution and the rule of law (Williams P., 2013, p. 46). The above-mentioned items are discursive in nature. These norms are meaningless on their own, but not when conveyed via the use of language, and it is thus important to study communications and the uses of languages. As such, neoliberal institutionalism will not be applied to its fullest extent, as we will focus on how the EU-security regime is talked about and develops over time.

However, given that neoliberal institutionalism is more in line with positivism, and that critical discourse analysis is a constructivist tool, it is important to address this seemingly incompatible combination. Carta Caterina (2014) addressed these issues by referring to the fact that several recent studies of EU policies have been carried out by utilising discourse analysis (pp. 138-140). Despite the difference in the underlying research philosophies, qualitative methods and IR theories were combined by conceptualising the discourse as constitutive of social reality, where there is no separation of the discursive and the non-discursive realms (Carta & Morin, 2014, p. 134). Relatedly, according to Philips and Hardy, “[…] reality is produced and made real through discourses, and social interactions cannot be fully understood without reference to the discourses that give them meaning” (2002, p. 3).

We too shall adopt this research philosophy in this thesis, and as such, discourse analysis can be combined with certain aspects of neoliberal institutionalism, in this instance will be useful in observing how the EU security regime develops and, to what extent it matches NATO’s security regime.
2.2. EU-NATO Relationship and Cooperation

Aforementioned, in this second sub-section, we shall examine articles which concretely touch upon the topic of EU and NATO anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia. After which we shall briefly turn to the politics of NATO and the EU.

Marianne Riddervold (2014) approached the question of: ‘why the EU, and not NATO, has taken a lead in the international political and diplomatic efforts to solve conflicts both on land and at sea’. Riddervold approached this question by conducting a study of why the EU insistently launched an autonomous EU-led anti-piracy operation, named Operation Atalanta, off the coast of Somalia despite the fact that there were ongoing NATO, US-coalition, Russian and Chinese operations at the same time (Riddervold, 2014, p. 547; Gebhard & Smith, 2015, p. 108).

At first glance, Riddervold’s case study may not seem particularly relevant in relation to the primary research question of this thesis. On the contrary, the two topics are highly related in so far that Riddervold’s research is a practical and singular case study of the greater trend which will be researched in this paper. There are two key points which Riddervold made that can be related to this research paper: First, in relation to the launch of Operation Atalanta, the EU member states wanted a law-enforcement operation which took human rights standards into account. NATO is a purely militarily-oriented organization, whereas “[…] the EU is a political organization and could therefore take a more comprehensive approach, coordinate policies across different policy areas and draw upon tools outside of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) framework to establish agreements with third countries in the region” (Riddervold, 2014, p. 559). Secondly, ‘another important empirical implication is that the analysis shows that NATO is not necessarily the preferred European security actor even among the more transatlantic oriented EU countries. Clearly, the preference for the EU should not be exaggerated, as many countries, including the UK, […] also have contributed with forces to the NATO and/or US-led forces. However, the consequence of launching Atalanta was that NATO came as an add-on to the EU and not the other way around. The EU was the prioritised choice’ (Riddervold, 2014, p. 560).

In other words, the EU in this instance took a more comprehensive approach to the problem at hand, and Operation Atalanta was more than simply providing a military presence to deter piracy. The two above-mentioned points are the main reasons as to why the EU-led operation was prioritised by even the most Euro-sceptic member states. As such, this EU-NATO anti-
piracy case illustrates an instance in which the EU shined as a security actor. As Gebhard & Smith put it: “[…] counter-piracy off the Somali coast holds a lot of potential to serve as an exemplar for analysing the politics underlying the institutional, inter-organizational and political relationship between the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and NATO” (2015, p. 109). As such, it is from Riddervold’s study, and others like it, that we shall take a step back away from in this thesis.

Moreover, in order to gain a greater understanding of the EU-NATO relationship, we can turn to Græger’s article (2016), in which the EU-NATO relationship has been studied. The relationship between the two organisations has been problematic at times even though EU-NATO cooperation was initiated and defined by a joint EU-NATO Declaration of Common Defence and Security Policy in 2002. The declaration sets out conditions under which the EU may draw upon NATO planning capabilities and assets in exchange for classified information (Græger, 2016, p. 482).

To exemplify, after Cyprus joined the EU in 2005, Cyprus’s political conflict with Turkey (a NATO member since 1952) had escalated into a political conflict between NATO and the EU. Turkey had demanded greater influence within the framework of CSDP, and European Defence Agency (EDA) especially so in the decision-making. “An administrative arrangement with the EDA requires a security agreement on classified information between the EU and Turkey, which has been blocked by Cyprus. In turn, Turkey has vetoed any sharing of classified information with or access of Cyprus to EU–NATO meetings on the grounds that it is a member of neither NATO nor Partnership for Peace, to which Cyprus responded by denying any EU involvement with NATO beyond “Berlin Plus”” (Græger, 2016, p. 482; Smith S. , 2011, p. 258). For extensive information on the CSDP and the Berlin Plus agreement, please see the European External Action Service Website (Shaping of a Common Security and Defence Policy. n.d.).

In sum, above we have seen examples of how the two organisations both cooperate extensively with one another, and how problematic the relationship has been at times. We have also seen that researchers often conduct specific case studies of the two organisations. In this thesis, we shall, however, take a slightly different approach and examine how the two organisations approach and provide security in more general, rather than specific terms.
2.3. The development of the EU as a security actor

One of the multiple ways the EU military has been studied is by conducting a longitudinal comparative study, as exemplified by Annemarie Peen Rodt (2011). In her article, Peen Rodt examined five cases in which the EU had conducted military operations to manage conflicts. She approached the cases of Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad and Central African Republic (Peen Rodt, 2011, p. 41).

Annemarie Peen Rodt studied EU conflict management, and how the EU utilises both civilian and military means. In the case of Macedonia, the EU relied on NATO assets from within the Berlin Plus agreement and civilian elements. Thus, the EU was able to take a more comprehensive approach to the conflict at hand (Peen Rodt, 2011, p. 43).

The unit of measurement that Annemarie Peen Rodt used was a problematic one: success. In essence, she developed four criteria which were used to measure to what degree the operations were successful. What the criteria actually entails is less interesting in relation to this research but what is important with regards to her study is that: First, she conducted case studies with longitudinal elements. Secondly, her study was comparative in nature. We can draw upon these two elements and implement them into this research. Third, as concluded in her case study: the EU has a good track record despite the fact that the EU only started undertaking missions after 2003. The EU has developed greatly and employs both civilian and military elements. These two elements in combination have contributed to its success (Peen Rodt, 2011).

Finally, we can briefly examine what has been researched with regards to the military expenditure of the EU. First, we can look to an article by Kaija Schilde (2017), in which it is illustrated that the Russia-Ukraine crisis represents a shift away from the overall trend in which EU member states have tended to spend less and less on the military. The study is important as it tells us something about how, and what knowledge we can extract from data on the military expenditures of states. Schilde described data on military expenditures as reflecting political decisions in relation the allocation of resources, and threat assessments (2017, p. 37). This knowledge is crucial in relation to the analysis further on.

Moreover, the military expenditure has also been approached by conducting regression analyses. Nikolaidou conducted a focused study of 15 EU member states, in which she explored the linkage between a number of variables and military expenditure (Nikolaidou, 2008). It is an interesting study, as it explores the military expenditure of the EU through an intergovernmental perspective, and how a multitude of factors affect the military expenditures of states (2008).
However, none of the variables that she examined are important in relation to this study. Instead, what we wish to draw upon in her study, is that she worked with and examined statistical data of the military expenditure of states. We will draw upon that in this thesis as well. Whereas Nikoladuou had retrieved statistics from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) database, we will instead retrieve statistics from the NATO database and the European Defence Agency (EDA). More about that later in section 4, Research Design.

In sum, in the three different sub-sections above we have seen how certain aspects of neoliberal institutionalism can be combined with discourse analysis. We have also deepened our understanding of the EU-NATO relationship, which at times have been both deeply problematic and very beneficial for both parties - the two organisations cooperate extensively with matters of security within the CSDP and Berlin Plus frameworks, but this has not always been easy due to disputes between the member states. Lastly, we will draw out aspects from several of the above-mentioned studies and combine them here in this thesis. These previous studies will in a sense shape this thesis. This will, however, become clearer throughout the two following sections of this thesis.
3. Theoretical Framework

Per considerations regarding the literature review and the main research focus of this thesis, certain aspects of neoliberal institutionalism and a traditional conceptualization of international security will be used to frame and guide the analysis in this thesis. Neoliberal institutionalism is a good choice because it embodies a discursive element and because it emphasises the role of international institutions. However, as aforementioned, neoliberal institutionalism will not be applied to its fullest extent because it would not be useful when considering the primary aim as set out within the thesis. Thus, we are led to the questions of what neoliberal institutionalism entails, which parts of the theory are useful in relation to this thesis, and how do we conceptualise an international security actor and international security?

3.1. Neoliberal institutionalism

Let us begin with addressing what neoliberal institutionalism entails. Neoliberal institutionalism shares many of its same fundamental assumptions with neorealism: states are the main actors in the competitive anarchic international system and states are rational actors which seek to maximise their interests in all issue areas (Lee, 2005, p. 109). This is often referred to as gains. A realist, Joseph Grieco (1988) coined the two concepts of absolute and relative gains. According to Grieco, states are mainly interested in increasing their power, influence, and capabilities within the international system. This is called: absolute gains. However, states also concern themselves with how much power other states might achieve by cooperating and banding together. This is called relative gains (Smith, Baylis, & Owens, 2014, p. 130; Grieco, 1988, p. 487; Williams P., 2013, p. 44; Nuruzzaman, 2008, pp. 197-8). Within this liberal framework, it is thought that the rationality of states leads them to seek cooperation because they can often gain more by cooperating. A fundamental assumption of neoliberal institutionalism and the wider liberal perspective is that states which share similar norms and values are more likely to cooperate in order to ensure individual and mutual survival (Williams P., 2013, p. 44).

The focus of neoliberal institutionalism advocates often stretches beyond issues of trade and development. As the Cold War ended, states were forced to address new and emerging security issues, such as ‘terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and an increasing number of international conflicts that threatened regional and global security’ (Smith, Baylis, & Owens, 2014, pp. 132-3).
This led advocates of neoliberal institutionalism to argue that successful cooperation between states had to involve the creation of discursive regional- and global- regimes that promote and facilitate cooperation amongst states, and coordinate policy responses to these new threats (Smith, Baylis, & Owens, 2014, p. 133). A regime can be defined as a set of implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules, and procedures around which actors and expectations converge in a particular issue-area. These are transmitted via the use of communications and interactions (Ratti, 2006, p. 86; Williams P., 2013, p. 45).

Regimes are capable of developing ‘a life of their own’, in which the regimes gains independence from the actor which created it in the first place. Fundamentally, the idea here is that regimes can create internal incentives for norm compliance and thus, the norms within a regime can influence: officials, domestic actors, and the public itself. As a result of this, within the neoliberal institutionalist perspective, international institutions are perceived as more than simply the tools of states. International institutions are believed to have an independent impact on the preferences of states, officials, and the public (Ratti, 2006, pp. 86-7; Williams P., 2013, p. 45). In other words, whereas advocates of neoliberal institutionalism do acknowledge that states are the main actors in the international system, they also often make some strong assertions regarding the ability of international institutions to influence their preferences and policies. In the neoliberal institutionalist perspective, international institutions pressure groups and non-governmental organisations to shape intergovernmental policies (Ratti, 2006, p. 86).

The notion of regimes will be used to frame and guide the analysis to a very large extent.

Neoliberal institutionalism is often considered more useful when examining issue-areas where states have mutual interests. ‘For instance, most world leaders believe that we shall all benefit from an open trade system, and many support trade rules that protect the environment. Subsequently, institutions that govern both areas are created’ (Smith, Baylis, & Owens, 2014, p. 133). However, neoliberal institutionalism is not particularly useful when examining areas in which states have no mutual interests. A good example is individual state security. However, in this thesis, we are not examining individual state security, we are examining collective security provided by international organisations, and how this the discursive security regimes develop (Nuruzzaman, 2008, pp. 197-8). As such, only certain parts of the theory are useful in relation to this thesis, whereas other parts are not.
Moreover, no theory is ever limitation-free. Neoliberal institutionalism is no exception. We can take NATO as an example in this instance to illustrate that in some cases, even the neoliberal institutionalist arguments fall short. The extent to which NATO’s security regime has been able to influence and affect the preference and policies of the member states has been questioned, as exemplified by the political conflict leading up the invasion of Iraq. Many European NATO member states opposed the invasion even though Article 5 was invoked for the first time ever by the USA. French and German reluctance to part-take in the invasion of Iraq directly undermined the NATO regime, and subsequently the neoliberal institutionalist theory (Ratti, 2006, p. 89). Neoliberal’s advocates claim that states which have the broadest possible range of common political, military and economic interests are more likely to cooperate (Grieco, 1988, p. 504). However, as we have seen above, this was not the case, even though Article 5 was invoked.

3.2. Concepts of International Security

From the neoliberal institutionalist literature, a differentiation between the traditional and neoliberal perspectives of a security actor have emerged. A security alliance is for dealing with common threats, while a security institution deals with risk and a broader spectrum of issues. These two conceptualizations will be used to guide and frame the analysis. Here, it is also important to say something with regards to the how we conceptualise international security.

A security alliance traditionally operates according to a traditional notion of international security. This notion mainly refers to measures taken by States and international organisations in order to secure their own survival. Military and political means are the primary tools which states and international organisations rely upon in order to establish security (Taylor, 2004, p. 16). Within the school of security studies, this is often referred to as traditional international security, as the concept of international security has come to encompass much more. As such, if a state or an international organisation primarily utilises military and/or political means to achieve international security, we can consider the entity to be an international security actor which operates according to the conceptualization outlined above (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998).

On the other hand, the neoliberal institutionalist notion of security can be summed up as: a state-centric view of security, which emphasises the role of international organisations that provide integration, democratisation, conflict resolution and the rule of law as forms of security (Williams P., 2013, p. 46). Many more issues have now been included in their area of operation.
We can see that this notion of security encompasses norms, norm compliance, military and non-military means to achieve security. The two above-mentioned conceptualizations will be used to guide, frame and highlight what is important throughout the analysis.

So, now that we have outlined neoliberal- and the traditional conceptualization of security actors, and security, we are led to the question of: how are these theoretical concepts are useful in relation to this research? The main research question which we are examining in this thesis is: to what extent, if any, the EU has become a security actor that is similar to NATO. We will first examine if the traditional and neoliberal notions of security are reflected in ‘hard data’ – statistics regarding the military expenditure of the two organisations. However, the data is limited in what it can tell us, and as such, we must also examine the discourses.

Traditional international security can be difficult to identify through the use of discourse analysis, whereas the liberal notion is more discursive. However, if approaches to security are described as being political and/or militaristic in the discourse analysis, we can take that as an indicator of the utilisation of traditional international security. However, if the above-mentioned liberal norms are expressed in relation to the issue area of security, throughout speeches, we can view the speakers as relying on the neoliberal notion of security.

We can begin by analysing the way in which NATO representatives speak about issues of security. This will most likely align closely with the traditional notion of international security. We can also examine how the NATO representatives speak about the EU as providing international security. Here, the two notions will be clearly distinguished from one another.

Per considerations regarding the main research question, we must then also examine the way in which the EU representatives speak about international security and compare to which notion it most closely aligns with. Thus, we will be working with the two concepts. They will be used as lenses, through which we will view the speeches, and speech extracts. These concepts will thus: help frame the discourse analysis, and highlight what is important, and what is not, in relation to the main research question, and the operationalized sub-questions.

This philosophical clash of the selected theory and method was addressed in the literature review (see page 4). Previous studies of EU policies have recently been conducted via the use of discourse analysis (Carta & Morin, 2014, pp. 138-140). Discourses are seen as an inescapable medium through which we make sense of the world and reproduce reality. Here too, it is important to examine the world through discourses (Carta, Italian Political Science, 2014).
4. Research Design

As previously discussed in the literature review, NATO and the development of an EU military has been approached from multiple different angles. As we have seen, longitudinal- and specific-case studies are common (Lepgold, 1998; Williams M. J., 2013; Riddervold, 2014; Gebhard & Smith, 2015). Having that said, the main purpose of this section is to describe: the way in which the research in this paper will be conducted; what kind of material will be analysed; and what type of data or knowledge that can be produced from the selected material.

We can start with the question of: in what way will this research be conducted? Simply put, this paper is a deductive mixed methods study of a comparative design, with longitudinal elements (Bryman, 2012, pp. 71-4, 632). As such, this research design embodies three distinct qualities: mixed methods, comparative, and longitudinal. Each of which embodies different strengths and weaknesses.

The mixed methods approach will be cultivated because we will analyse different materials in this research paper: speeches and statistical data. Consequently, we have to approach the data in different ways. Moreover, often when conducting political science, the researcher often tests relationships, correlations and other linkages between things. As such, we shall also utilise a comparative element in this research design and compare discourses respectively to each other, and with statistical data. Relatedly, this study also embodies a longitudinal element. This longitudinal element will be intimately combined with the comparative element, as we will compare discourses and statistical data over a pre-determined period of time. By adding together the three above-mentioned elements, we can start to construct a study, in which we will explore: to what extent the EU’s approach to international security has become similar to the way in which NATO approaches it.
4.1. Statistical Analysis

Aforementioned, the analysis will be divided into three parts. In the first part of the analysis, we will conduct an analysis of statistical data on the military expenditures of NATO and the EU/European Defence Agency (EDA). The EDA is a relatively new branch of the EU, and it only came into existence in 2004, as part of the CFSP. An analysis of military expenditures will be conducted to complement and provide a more comprehensive picture of the observed phenomenon.

What we will specifically examine is the military expenditures as a percentage of GDP. This data is a rough indicator of the proportion of the national resources used for military activities, and it is more useful to look at this type of data, instead of looking at ‘total military expenditure’ as millions of, for instance, Euros or USD as it makes a clearer linkage to the national and combined economies (The World Bank, 2016). We can view this data as reflecting political decisions in relation the allocation of resources, and threat assessments (Schilde, 2017, p. 37).

The statistical data has been retrieved from two separate NATO fiscal reports, one published in (2011), and one published in (2016), and the European Defence Agency Portal (2016). These trends will then be related to the discourse analysis for a more concrete and comprehensive view of the EU developments. The data was sampled 5 times, at two-year intervals. In other words, the averages military expenditures as % of GDP was sampled five times, at two-year intervals, at 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014.

The EDA keeps up-to-date records of the military expenditure of its MS. However, the EDA only started keeping records in 2006 (2005 in some cases) (EDA, 2016). The data available on the EDA database determined the examination period of this research paper, and it is crucial to note that at the time in which this thesis is being constructed, the EDA has not yet released its 2015 report; only an estimate. For a comprehensive list of all the states which are both NATO and EU/EDA member states, please see the Appendix, item 1.

Detailed NATO statistics are widely available as “NATO publishes an annual compendium of financial, personnel and economic data for all member countries” (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2016). The first of these reports date back to 1963. In other words, NATO has a long history of record-keeping. As such, EU/EDA and NATO statistics are easily compared.

Furthermore, statistical data is often of a very high quality as well. It is commonplace that both the EU and NATO work with the material, and since this material is utilised by such big
organisations, the material is very credible, relevant, and valid according to the Bryman’s standards (2012, pp. 168-9, 312-3).

Lastly, it is not useful to compare the budgets of the EDA- and NATO member states, as per the Berlin Plus agreement, and the CSDP, the EU can draw upon some of NATO’s assets in its own conflict management and peacekeeping missions (European Union External Action, n.d.). The EDA and NATO databases both consist of very similar numbers. In some instances the numbers are identical. However, an e-mail correspondence with the EDA provided a probable explanation:

[...] please be aware that EDA and NATO perform different processes regarding defence data gathering and analysis, completely independent from each other, as these exercises are designed to meet different purposes of different organisations/agencies. [...] Without speaking on behalf of NATO, same amounts in lists generally indicate same definitions. So, as long as a member state sends the same amount of military personnel to both NATO and EDA, it is indicative that both EDA and NATO include to military personnel the same things. Another factor that generally affects the results of data compiling is also the source selection. To further explain this comment, please not forget that defence data could be compiled either from MoDs (ministry of defence) directly, or from the Internet, from media etc., according to the procedure selected by each institution, organisation or agency. As a result, the more consistent to each other two different databases are, the more possible it is that they used the same type of source.

(The EDA Email Correspondence transcript is available on request).
4.2. Speeches and Critical Discourse Analysis

In the second part of the analysis, we shall longitudinally analyse five speeches performed by NATO representatives. This will be done for two reasons. First, we want to see the way in which the NATO discourse on the EU as a security actor has developed over time. Secondly, if we treat NATO as an already well-established security actor that operates according to the traditional conceptualization of international security, we can more clearly see what the discourse looks like in order to create a baseline against which we can compare the EU discourse developments.

In the third and final part of the analysis, we will examine five speeches performed by EU representatives. We shall longitudinally examine the EU discourse about itself as a security actor according to both liberal and traditional conceptualizations of a security actor. We can then discuss to what extent, if any, the EU discourse has developed over time, and to what extent it matches the NATO discourse.

For Hodges et al. discourse analysis is about studying and analysing the uses of languages and communications. A critical discourse analysis (CDA) is the most suitable choice in relation to this research. CDA is sometimes referred to as Foucauldian analysis because it lines up very closely to the fundamental ideas of Michel Foucault (1926-1984). “[…] Michel Foucault, for whom discourse was a term that denoted the way in which a particular set of linguistic categories relating to an object and the way of depicting it frame the way we comprehend that object. The discourse forms a version of it. Moreover, the version of an object comes to constitute it” (Bryman, 2012, p. 528).

‘When conducting a CDA, you examine samples of written texts or oral communications; and data on the “uses” of the text in social settings; and data on the institutions or individuals who produce and are produced by the communications’ (Hodges, Kuper, & Reeves, 2008, p. 571; Bryman, 2012, pp. 536-7). As such, we can examine the roles of the people performing the speeches and what they say in the speeches. However, in this critical discourse analysis, we shall refrain from examining the audience who consumes the discourse because it is not relevant to the main question at hand.

Nor shall we closely examine the roles of the actors who promotes and constructs the discourses, as their roles are already evident. We can already say something about the individuals who performed the speech acts. The selected speeches were all performed by elites who work for the two organisations respectively. Therefore they are privy to the internal
workings and perspectives of the organisations, and they are thus able to provide us, the audience, with information and the inside perspective of the organisation.

Moreover, it is appropriate to say something with regards to the selection of speeches. In relation to the NATO speeches, one speech was selected for every second year across the pre-determined examination period (2006-2014). The NATO speeches were selected on the criteria of touching upon the themes of international security and the European Union and had to contain the key words of: “European Union” and “security” in order to be considered for selection. The speeches were retrieved from the NATO Online Library.

With regards to the EU speeches, the speeches were retrieved from the European Commission Press Release Database. Similarly, one speech was also selected for every second year across the pre-determined period of examination as above-mentioned. The EU speech-selection was slight more problematic and involved qualitative judgments. These speeches have been collected by inserting a set of two keywords into the database. The keywords were: “speech” and “security”. This was done five times, and each time a time-frame was set between the 1st of January and the 31st of December of each interval year. Approximately 7-10 results appeared each time the keywords were processed. Upon combing through numerous speeches, and the final selection criteria involved a qualitative judgment call about which speech could tell us the most in relation to the main question of this thesis.

Finally, after the speeches had been selected, the speeches were combed through and the most relevant parts were extracted from the speeches for analysis and a discussion. Analysing 10 speeches in full is far too extensive for this thesis, and certain parts are not relevant to the main research question of this paper.

The speeches were examined and analysed in accordance with the concepts as outlined on page 12. Once again, this means that the speeches were analysed according to how NATO and the EU respectively approach the issue area of international security. Both in traditional and neoliberal terms.
4.3. Operationalization

As aforementioned, the main research question of this paper is: **to what extent, if any, has the EU developed into a security actor that closely resembles NATO?** This question is quite difficult to approach. In the analysis, we shall first examine statistical data on the military expenditures of both the EU/EDA and NATO. However, this data is limited in relation to what it can actually tell us. Thus, we will later move on to conduct a critical discourse analysis of a total of ten pre-selected speeches. By comparing the discourses, and the security regimes within them, we can determine the way in which the two organisations have developed over time.

In order to better structure the analysis, we can pose operationalized sub-questions. In breaking down the main research question, the research becomes easier to conduct and digest. Thus, to operationalize:

- **Question 1.** To what extent, if any, does the military expenditure of the EU/EDA and NATO reflect how they provide international security?

- **Question 2.** To what extent does the NATO security regime align with the traditional conceptualization of international security?

- **Question 3.** In what way does the NATO portrayal of the EU as a security actor change over time and throughout the five selected speeches?

- **Question 4.** To what extent, if any, has the EU discourse regarding itself as a security actor, undergone change throughout the five selected speeches?
5. Analysis

In the first part of the analysis, we will examine trends in the military expenditure of the EU/EDA and NATO. This data is limited in relation to what it can tell us and as such, we shall later move on to conduct a longitudinal discourse analysis of NATO and EU speeches, in which we will examine the security regimes.

5.1. Statistical Analysis of Military Expenditure

Figure 1 below shows us the average EU/EDA, NATO and NATO-Europe military expenditure as a percentage of the GDP.

We can observe a number of interesting things in the graph above.

First, the EDA and NATO-Europe figures align closely. There are two possible explanations for this. As was previously discussed on page 15, these similarities are very likely the result of similarities in the EDA and NATO data collection methodologies, and that the two organizations chose to extend cooperative ties within the CSDP and Berlin Plus frameworks instead of doubling up on their pre-existing militaries (European Union External Action, n.d.). As such, we can deduce that the member states report the same assets, according to different methodologies to the two organisations.
Secondly, we can clearly see that the trend of decreasing the military expenditures has continued. The continuing decline in traditional military expenditure can possibly also be viewed as indicating a decreased concern with traditional international security. I.e. primarily military means to achieve security. This observation is consistent with what we observed in the literature review, where the military expenditures were often described as decreasing in the years following the end of the Cold War (Nikolaidou, 2008; Williams M. J., 2013; Schilde, 2017). There were numerous reasons for this, but such considerations lay outside the scope of this paper.

Third, even though the member states in question have decreased their military expenditures, we can clearly deduce that non-European NATO member states spend significantly more than the EU/EDA. This could suggest a European overreliance on the US (and others) to provide traditional security. This could also suggest that the European states which have dual EU-NATO membership are relying on both organisations to provide security in various forms.

It is also important to note that the military expenditure alone does not necessarily accurately reflect the capabilities of the states or organisations. It can, however, represent capability shifts and a decreased threat assessment. As Schilde put it: “These material investments are not direct indicators of power; instead, they reflect political decisions over relative defence resource allocations – in the form of discretionary spending and procurement, as well as indications of threat assessments” (2017, p. 37). As such, the decrease in the military expenditure that we observed above may reflect a reassessment of the international security environment and/or a reallocation of resources.

Both NATO and the EU/EDA perhaps have capabilities which lay outside the data collection, which was used to compile the graph above. This thought is reinforced when considering the fact that NATO has undertaken new tasks in recent years, and the EU developed the EEAS. As such, on its own, this graph may not accurately represent how these two organisations provide international security.

Since the military expenditure is intimately connected with political decisions, we must move on to the discourse analysis and examine how representatives of the organisations discuss and approach international security. This will undoubtedly provide a better understanding of the case at hand. Thus, we move on to the next section with some new knowledge.
5.2. Discourse Analysis of NATO Speeches

In analysing NATO speeches we hope to gain knowledge about two things.

First, we can treat the speech extracts as samples of how NATO representatives, as part of an already well-developed and well-established international security organisation, construct and maintain a security discourse and regime, which in turn reflect the empirical reality. These speeches and the discourse constructed within them will form a baseline against which we can later compare the EU discourse. In other words, we must sample the EU and NATO security regimes in order to compare them.

Secondly, we hope to gain knowledge about how the EU as a security actor has developed from a NATO point of view. I.e. how do the NATO representatives talk about the EU developing as a security actor, in terms of ‘traditional’ security? We can gain this knowledge in analysing the way NATO representatives speak about the EU in relation to matters of security, and the way this develops over time of particular interest. However, the way in which the EU is described as a security actor varies from speech to speech, and as such, this question will be approached at irregular intervals, unlike the above-mentioned questions.

Let us begin with a speech performed by NATO Deputy Secretary-General Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo at an US-EU Conference at the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels. The speech was performed on the 21st of March 2006, and the main theme of the speech was: EU and US perspectives on security.

In the very beginning of the speech, Rizzo (2006) stated:

As a security actor, the European Union needs to be seen for what it is worth. Clearly, for the time being, the EU is not yet the strong and coherent actor that it aspires to be, particularly when it comes to security and defence. But there is no doubt in my mind that foreign and defence policies will be coordinated much more closely in the future. The European Security Strategy is a major step forward.

This first extract is very explicit in what it can tell us. Rizzo, and thus NATO did clearly not consider the EU to be much of an international security actor at the time. At least in a ‘traditional’ sense. The above-mentioned statement sums up the NATO view on the EU, as similar expressions can be found throughout several speeches. We can thus take this as a starting point from which we can proceed.
Furthermore, Rizzo (2006) had gone on to state that ‘the EU often is rightly credited with taking more comprehensive approaches to international security, and that the EU is unique in relation to how it operates’. This statement corresponds with well what we observed in the literature review, and thus we led to further consider other capabilities that lay outside the EDA, and the traditional approach to security.

Relatedly, in the speech, it was implied that the EU, at least to a certain extent, has worked with issues of security in a traditional sense. Once again, cross-referencing these hints with the literature review, we can see that this is, in fact, the case. Prior to 2006, the EU had only launched a couple of peace-keeping operations. Most noteworthy of which were in Macedonia. Thus, we are led to think of the EU in 2006 as a relatively new and possibly quite weak security actor, which often prefers to combine civilian and military means to achieve and end.

In any event, towards the end of the speech, Rizzo extended a cooperative hand to the EU. Rizzo stated that ‘NATO needs to accommodate the growing EU security dimension because international security is too broad for NATO to manage alone’. Rizzo also explicitly stated that the EU embodies a growing security dimension. The wording would in this instance imply that the EU security dimension was under development at the time.

Moreover, taking a step back and looking at the speech as a whole, even though Secretary-General Rizzo mostly spoke about the EU, and the EU-NATO relationship, he approached the EU as a security actor from a very militaristic point of view. Rizzo portrayed NATO as being very two-dimensional: political and militaristic. This view aligns very closely with the traditional conceptualization of international security as previously discussed. This is something we will observe throughout the other NATO speeches as well.

As for the second speech, we shall examine extracts from a speech performed on the 23rd of October in 2008, by NATO Deputy Secretary-General Claudio Bisogniero at the Forum of Euro-Atlantic Security. The overarching themes of this second speech are: addressing public concerns about NATO being a “global police force”, and the way in which NATO approaches issues of security.

This speech is of particular interest because a traditional perspective on security is clearly expressed. For instance, Bisogniero (2008) stated that: ‘well over 60,000 NATO soldiers – including sizeable contributions by Poland - are engaged in operations on three different continents’. If we look closely at the wording, Bisogniero described the NATO military personnel as soldiers, and not e.g. peacekeepers or anything suchlike. Statements similar to, and
including the above-mentioned, illustrate the overt militarism of NATO. This is important and interesting to note, as this will be contrasted later on with the EU speeches.

Furthermore, towards the middle of the speech, Bisogniero (2008) stated the EU had ‘grown to realise that it must, and will become a stronger security actor’, and that ‘this could only be achieved via deepened cooperation with NATO and the USA’. This statement is very interesting as it does tell us something about the then current state of the EU as a security actor. From a NATO point of view, the EU was still seen as relatively weak, but still developing.

Thus, we can see that the EU was viewed as a weak security actor in both 2006 and 2008. However, since NATO, and subsequently the above-mentioned NATO representatives work according to traditional conceptualizations of international security, it is also reasonable to think that they viewed the EU as a weak security actor, in a traditional sense. This is an important limitation to note, as these NATO speeches only account for a certain type of security; the traditional militaristic view on international security.

The third speech which we will examine was performed by Admiral Di Paola, the chairman of the military committee at the Centre for European Security in Moscow, on the 23rd of June, 2010. The main theme of the speech was the security challenges of the 21st century and the roles of Russia, the European Union and NATO in the international arena.

Towards the middle of the speech, di Paola (2010) stated that there are a number of challenges that NATO needs to deal with. For instance, the political developments that stem from Kosovo declaring independence and instability in the Caucasus, amongst other things. Many of which were described as being fundamentally political in nature. Even so, the reasoning is still heavily militaristic. This is evident as the Admiral explicitly also often spoke about threats to be met head on using military force.

To exemplify, piracy and borderless threats such as terrorism were explicitly mentioned and described as threats to be met head on. di Paola had also stated that since these threats ignore borders, the NATO modus operandi had to adapt. This is a regime change, as it widens the scope of the NATO operations. This slight regime change is also consistent with what we observed in the literature review, and it is a noteworthy development. As such, we can also see that NATO embodies political and military elements that closely align with the theoretical conceptualization of traditional international security.
Next, we shall look extracts from a speech which NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmusen performed on the 23rd of April, 2012. The main purpose of the speech was to call for closer EU-NATO coordination in the issue area of security and to urge the EU to adopt new capabilities. This speech is particularly useful for two reasons:

First, this speech does tell us something about the way the EU has developed up until 2012. It is easier to gain this knowledge by comparing this speech to the previous speeches, rather than examining this speech on its own. Thus, contrasting this speech with the previous ones. Previously, we saw that the EU was described as an incoherent and weak actor security actor and that Rasmusen now told the European states to not shy away from seizing a more robust role in the international arena (2012). This does tell us that the EU has developed quite a lot over the last years. If the EU was encouraged to ‘take up a greater role’, the ability to do so must be there. Thus, we can deduce that there has been some level of development there.

Secondly, we can also find samples of the NATO security regime in this speech, as Rasmusen attempted to transmit the NATO regime to the EU through the speech at the European Parliament. Rasmusen ‘urged the European states not to turn inwards and cut back the military expenditure further even though they were amid an economic crisis’. He explicitly urged the European leaders to increase, and further develop their military capabilities, so that they would be able to achieve international peace and security.

To illustrate, Rasmusen does for instance state that “[…] the European nations must continue to invest in critical military capabilities – smartly and sufficiently. And they must continue to show a willingness to use them when needed” (2012).

This particular statement and the norms and values expressed in and throughout the speech as a whole, appear to be very similar to what one can observe in the previous speeches. The NATO representatives continue to rely upon the traditional heavily militaristic conceptualization of international security, just like we observed previously.
The fifth and final NATO speech we shall examine was also performed by Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg. From this speech was also examine the NATO security regime and the way in which the Secretary-General spoke about the EU in relation to matters of security. The three main themes in his speech were: strengthening NATO, stability in the immediate European neighbourhood, and EU-NATO cooperation. Three most suitable topics in relation to the main, and operationalized questions of this thesis.

First, this particular speech contains a number of prime example of how closely the NATO security regime aligns with the two-dimensional traditional conceptualization of international security, as Stoltenberg often describes NATO as being very two-dimensional; political and military organisation. He also describes the NATO modus operandi as encompassing these two elements (2014).

This was especially evident when Stoltenberg spoke about Russia and Ukraine. He stated that ‘NATO needs to be ready to use force to defend its member states and that he condemned Russia’s actions by referring to international law (2014). These observations align both with what we observed in the previous speeches and with the traditional perspective on international security. To further illustrate the point above; after the speech had been conducted, the audience was allowed to pose questions to Stoltenberg. Stoltenberg was amongst other things asked post-intervention reconstructive measures taken by NATO in Libya, to which Stoltenberg answered that ‘it was their responsibility to conduct the military operations, and that it was not entirely clear who should conduct the reconstruction’ (2014).

Yet another interesting piece of knowledge which we can extract from this speech, stems from the way in which Stoltenberg described the European Union or rather the lack of it. In previous speeches, we observed that the European Union as a security actor was described as being weak and incoherent. However, in this speech, Stoltenberg says little in the way of description, but a fair amount in terms of cooperation. For instance, once after the speech had been concluded, Stoltenberg was asked about EU-NATO cooperation, specifically in the issue area of returning foreign fighters. Stoltenberg responded by elaborating on how the two organisations work together. He stated that: intelligence is shared between the two organisations, and that the European police forced had to handle the issue on the ground. This is a very interesting observation because it represents a change in the NATO security regime and the way that Europe and NATO cooperate to achieve security. The sharing of intelligence so that the national police forces can deal with the issue on the ground is an extension of the fundamental NATO mandate.
5.3. Discourse Analysis of EU Speeches

We can treat the NATO discourse about itself as a security actor, as a baseline against which we can compare the EU discourse, in order to deduce to what extent the EU has developed in a similar direction. In the previous sub-section of the analysis, we saw that it would appear that NATO primarily works according to a traditional conceptualization of security. Here, we shall examine the speeches according to both theoretical perspectives again.

This part of the analysis will also be organised chronologically and we shall begin with extracts from a speech conducted in 2006, by Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy. The Commissioner performed a speech which touched upon many different items, ranging from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the EU enlargement of 2007. Ferrero-Waldner (2006) spoke about the EU as a global player. Ferrero-Waldner stressed economic and political aspects, before moving on to address the numerous issues of maintaining such a complex union.

On the issue area of security, Ferrero-Waldner stated that: ‘We know we have to improve security against threats that know no borders, like international terrorism and global pandemics’, and that ‘the EU has responded by building up the foreign, security and defence policy’ (2006). The above-mentioned example perfectly illustrates the way in which deepened integration has been occurring in the issue-area of security. According to the neoliberal notion of international security, international organisations and states band together and deepen integrative ties with one another, to increase collective security. This is precisely what we have observed here.

However, when viewing this speech from a traditional perspective on security, a crucial difference arises. Ferrero-Waldner was not nearly as explicit about the militaristic aspect of the security developments. For instance, recalling that various NATO representatives referred to their personnel as soldiers, Ferrero-Waldner referred to the European personnel as peacekeepers. These expressions give insight into how security issues are both viewed and approached from a practical point of view.

Moreover, we can combine the observations we made in this speech, with the observations which we made in the first NATO speech. We can recall that the EU was described as being a weak security actor throughout the first NATO speech. Here, however, the EU security and defence policy are being described as being under development. By overlapping the two speeches, we can also see that nowhere was the EU described as being particularly strong or
well-developed at the time. Thus, we can deduce that, around 2006, the EU was not viewed as a particular well-developed security actor. Especially so in terms of international security, according to which NATO primarily operates.

The second speech which we will analyse was performed by Olli Rehn, the now former EU Commissioner for Enlargement, in Helsinki, August 27, 2008. The main topic of this speech is EU CFSP. In the speech Rehn (2008), amongst other things, stated that:

Many people have wondered, [...], whether the EU can become a significant security policy player, at least if viewed in terms of the traditional concept of security applied in power politics. It is true that the EU, [...], started life as an explicitly civilian power. And the EU continues to draw most of its influence in world politics from the core social and economic areas of Community competence, such as trade policy, the internal market and environmental and consumer legislation. [...] However, the Union has learned the hard way that it also needs to develop common foreign and security policy tools. At the start of the 90’s when war broke out in Bosnia, the EU had neither the power nor the unity to prevent the ethnic cleansing or exert diplomatic clout.

The mere fact that Rehn had to address these concerns says a lot about the state of the Union, as a security actor in 2008. Rehn very strongly implied that the EU was relatively underdeveloped as a security actor in 2008 as well. Rehn even exemplified this by referring to the fact that the EU was unable to prevent the atrocities in Bosnia during the 1990’s. He stated that “[…] the EU had neither the power nor the unity to prevent the ethnic cleansing or exert diplomatic clout” (2008). What this tells us, is that the EU lacked both political and military power, the two key elements that make up a security actor. As such, we are led to think of the EU as still very weak and underdeveloped, especially in ‘traditional’ security terms.

Moreover, combining observations made in and throughout the two first EU speeches, we are led to think that there were some internal and also most likely, external doubts about the extent to which the EU could develop as a security actor. Both Rehn and Ferrero-Waldner brought up doubts regarding the developments.

Relatedly, by comparing the two first NATO speeches to the two first EU speeches, we can make some interesting observations. First of which is that the NATO regime of collective defence remained consistent throughout the two first speeches. The representatives spoke in a relatively similar and militaristic way about threats to be met head on.
The EU speeches were consistent, in so far that both Ferrero-Waldner and Rehn expressed doubts with regards to the extent to which the EU could develop as a security actor. Threats were consistently mentioned, but they were not approached in a manner that is consistent with the traditional conceptualization of security. Instead, the EU representatives both spoke about the EU as a security actor as being under development.

Since the EU was described as being militarily and politically weak throughout the two first EU, and the two first NATO speeches, we can assume that this was, in fact, the case and that the EU as a security actor was still under development at the time.

Moving forward; on the 7th of July, 2010, Catherine Ashton, the High Representative / Vice President held a speech in Strasbourg. The main topic of the creation of the EEAS. The EEAS is the EU’s diplomatic service and carries out the Union’s CFSP. As such, it a good speech, in which we can sample the security regime.

In the speech, Ashton (2010) spoke about her vision for the EEAS. She explained that she wished for a strong and united Europe that is able to provide security and face problems such as “fragile states, pandemics, energy security, climate change and illegal migration” (2010). Ashton went on to state that in order for Europe to be an effective player on the world stage, it needs to utilise all the means at its disposal. Some of which include: “diplomacy, political engagement, and development assistance, civil and military crisis management tools in support of conflict prevention, peacebuilding, security, and stability (2010).

Thus, we find that many parts of this particular speech overlap closely with both the liberal and traditional concepts of an international security actor and that the EU has developed significantly. For instance, above Ashton portrayed the EU’s way to becoming a security actor, as being very two-dimensional. This way of speaking closely resembled the way in which the NATO representatives spoke about themselves as providing security. Many of the practical means to achieving international security were described as being political in nature. To exemplify a few: “diplomacy, political engagement, and development assistance, civil and military crisis management tools in support of conflict prevention, peacbuilding, security and stability” (2010).
Moreover, Ashton made some interesting statements that closely align with the neoliberal notion of a security institution, to exemplify:

Now our common foreign and security policy is in another league. In recent years the EU has acted as a mediator in conflicts not just in the Balkans, but also in the Middle East, in policy towards Iran and, most recently, in Georgia.

This overlaps closely with the liberal definition, according to which international organisations that provide integration, democratisation, conflict resolution and the rule of law as forms of security. Assuming that what she says is true, and accurate, her speech closely overlaps with the liberal notion of an international security actor. At least in so far that the EU provides conflict resolution, and aims to uphold the rule of law.

Moreover, Ashton’s speech also represents a significant step forward when compared to the two previous EU speeches. Here, Ashton is much more assertive, and less doubtful regarding the EU on the world stage. This is a very interesting and noteworthy development. It may just be that Ashton simply is a strong speaker, but if we overlook that possibility, we can see a shift in the fundament of the discourse regarding the EU as a security provider. Not only in the traditional sense, but also in a liberal sense.

It is also important to note that even though the EEAS is described as being a very important tool of the EU, and it certainly is, it still lays outside of the EDA framework. It is also unclear whether or not the military materials and resources described in the graph, in the first part of the analysis, are related to, or utilised by the EEAS. Thus, the linkage to the EEAS and the EDA remains uncertain.

Next, we can turn to yet another speech by Ashton. In 2012, the High Representative gave a speech in the European Parliament, in Strasbourg. The main theme of the speech was the EU’s approach to Afghanistan. Even though this speech is about a very specific topic, it is nevertheless interesting to examine it.

In the speech, Ashton (2012) announced that the EU would be increasing its funding to the civilian police force in Afghanistan. Ashton explicitly emphasised the civilian nature of the projected, stating that: “I emphasised the critical role that a uniformed police – distinct from the military – needs to play in any democratic society so that people can have confidence in the fair administration of justice, in rule of law.”
We can see that this also overlaps closely with the more liberal notion of what an international security actor is like. Non-military means are emphasised along with the rule of law and democratic values. This is a very interesting development. It is also quite different from the way in which that Stoltenberg spoke about NATO personnel in Afghanistan – recalling that Stoltenberg said: “NATO has built up a capable Afghan force of 350,000 soldiers and police (2014). The differences are clear.

Moreover, the way in which that Ashton approached issues of international security is different here, as there was a much greater emphasis on civilian means that are distinct from the military, to achieve peace. As we observed in the previous Ashton-speech, she did not primarily emphasise military means to achieve international peace and security. But rather a mixed approach which encompasses civilian, political, aid, crisis management, and military means to uphold peace. This is a consistent development of the EU security regime we see here. This speech is also very different from the way in which the NATO representatives approached issues of security. The NATO representatives often spoke of threats to be met head on by utilising military means. Here instead, Ashton brought up and emphasised other means to achieve security. To exemplify; on the topic of Afghanistan, Ashton (2012) had said:

Many challenges lie ahead. Afghanistan needs above all better governance. Without functioning politics and institutions that are seen as legitimate and effective, the transition cannot succeed, but also better action against drugs; better management of public finances; better rule of law; better human rights protection.

Above, we can once more see that civilian and a multipronged approach to the challenges are ahead are favoured by the EU representatives. This does more closely align with the liberal notion of an international security actor. The way she spoke about these issues is less two-dimensional than what we observed in the NATO speeches.

Finally, we shall turn to a speech performed by José Manuel Durão Barroso, the President of the European Commission, on the 4th of March, 2014. The main topic of the selected speech was fitting: European security. This speech is most suitable to analyse as Barroso was at the time, President of the European Commission; i.e. the EU body which represents the heads of states. As such, we can treat this speech as a representative sample of the security discourse within the Commission. From the speech, we could extract a number of interesting statements.

In the beginning of the speech, Barroso spoke about the EU and its role on the world stage. He explicitly stated that he believed the European defence and security sector to be of vital
'A comparative study of the EU and NATO' - Alexander Marshall – 937030 - 31

importance to the future of European stability and prosperity (2014). In di-chronically comparing this statement, to the doubts expressed in and throughout the first two EU speeches, we can, in fact, deduce that the EU has developed significantly as a security actor. The two first EU speeches started off in drastically different ways, in comparison to this speech. No doubts are expressed here.

Moreover, we can also compare this speech to the NATO speeches. The discourse Barroso constructs here sounds rather similar to the way in which the NATO representatives spoke about the fundamental purpose of NATO. Whereas the NATO representatives spoke about collective defence in exclusively military and political terms as the fundamental purpose of the organisation, Barroso took a broader approach to the issues at hand. For instance, further on, Barroso (2014) stated:

It is a key element of our capacity to ensure that every European has access to security, economic prosperity, political freedom and social well-being. It is therefore at the core of Europe's "raison d'etre".

As seen above, Barroso spoke about political, social and economic security as well. He described these dimensions as being important to protect. This approach to security is more consistent with the liberal notion of an international security actor. As such, the security discourse portrayed in the speech overlaps less with the traditional conceptualization of security, and more with the broader liberal notion.

Moreover, certain things Barroso said in relation to the EU as a security actor were more in line with the traditional conceptualization, according to which NATO primarily works. To exemplify, Barroso stated that:

The strategic and geopolitical environment is constantly evolving and we are witnessing a wide range of new and complex security challenges of trans-national nature. To name a few, international terrorism, organised crime, cyber threats, piracy, human rights violations, all these challenges can only be tackled in a comprehensive approach combining different policies and instruments, underpinned by a large range of civil and military capabilities.

The statement above is also very explicit in what it tells us. Barroso named a number of threats and even said that they needed to be approached via the utilisation of military and civilian means. This is very much in line, and closely resembles the way in which the NATO representatives spoke about threats.
6. Results and Findings

In the analysis, we have first examined data on the military expenditures of both the EU and NATO. This data was limited in what it could tell us, and as such, we moved on to conduct a longitudinal discourse analysis. In the discourse analysis, we examined a total of ten speeches; five speeches performed by EU representatives, and five speeches performed by NATO representatives. Throughout the first five NATO speeches, we aimed at creating a baseline, against which we could then compare the EU speeches, both in theoretical and practical terms.

In the NATO speeches, NATO was described as providing international security according to a very traditional conceptualization of international security. This approach primarily consisted of military and political means to achieve international security, peace, and stability. The liberal notion of an international security actor did not overlap well with the way in which the NATO representatives described the NATO modus operandi.

In the analysis, we have also seen samples of NATO during a state of peace and during a time of armed conflict in the immediate European neighbourhood. Despite the difference in the circumstances, we see little to no change in the way in which the NATO representatives approach these issues of security, obviously aside from the change in tone with regards to Russia’s actions against/in Ukraine. Threats were often described as requiring to be met head on via the utilisation of military means. Once again, approach overlaps with the traditional conceptualization of a security alliance to a large extent.

NATO’s collective defence regime remained consistent and heavily militarised throughout the analysed speeches. Recalling NATO’s fundament - it is a primarily military organisation, and therefore this was expected. The discourse and the regime are most likely products of the core- and the founding idea behind the alliance. This is also consistent with what we observed in the literature review.

Throughout the discourse analysis, we saw how the two organisations approached security. One good example of this was the way in which that the representatives referred to the, for lack of a better word, ‘security personnel’. The NATO representatives insistently spoke about soldiers. To exemplify, Stoltenberg (2014) said: “NATO has built up a capable Afghan force of 350.000 soldiers and police. This in itself does imply a traditional way of approaching security – the utilisation of military means to achieve an end. On the other hand, the EU High Representative Catharine Ashton often stressed that the EU used ‘peacekeepers’, and she also emphasised the civilian elements of the police force that the EU had funded in Afghanistan.
The differences here are all too clear, as the NATO approach to security was permeated by an emphasis on military and political means to achieve an end. The EU representatives, on the other hand, often described a much more comprehensive approach to international security. This approach fundamentally emphasised some of the liberal notions that more closely align with what you would expect from an international security actor that operates according to a liberal conceptualization. To exemplify, Ashton listed a number of means that the EU/EEAS uses to achieve peace: “diplomacy, political engagement, and development assistance, civil and military crisis management tools in support of conflict prevention, peacebuilding, security, and stability (2010). As seen above, military means are not primarily emphasised.

The differences in the way in which the two organisations operate are also to a certain degree reflected in the military expenditures of the two organisations. We have observed that the military expenditures generally have decreased: both amongst the NATO, NATO-Europe, and the EU/EDA. However, NATO-Europe has spent a significantly less than they should have, according to the NATO guidelines at least in which it is stated that the member states are supposed to spend a minimum of 2% of their GDP on military defence. Even though very few of the European NATO members actually meet, or come close to meeting this requirement, the NATO average military expenditure remains high. This is something that one could have expected of the organisation as a whole.

These statistics may reflect a political re-evaluation of the international security environment and the reallocation of resources. This thought corresponds well with the discourses at the later stages, as both the EU and NATO describe and emphasise how they work with issues of borderless threats. This is what we see develop over time. To exemplify, Barroso (2014) stated that:

The strategic and geopolitical environment is constantly evolving and we are witnessing a wide range of new and complex security challenges of trans-national nature. To name a few, international terrorism, organised crime, cyber threats, piracy, human rights violations, all these challenges can only be tackled in a comprehensive approach combining different policies and instruments, underpinned by a large range of civil and military capabilities.
On the other hand, when asked about how NATO deals with returning foreign fighters, Secretary-General Stoltenberg said: “To fight terrorism and to deal with the threats posed by returning foreign fighters is partly an issue we address within NATO. And we are increasing the exchange of information, which is crucial for being able to deal with the threat” (2014).

The above-mentioned, and similar statements located throughout the speeches would suggest a re-evaluation of the international security environment and that the two organisations are adapting. The approached to these issues are also described in the EU speeches to be more comprehensive, and they do not primarily emphasise military means. This approach to security issues does, as such, align more closely with liberal notion of how an international security actor operates.

In any event, we did not only analyse the NATO speeches to determine the way in which the NATO representatives spoke about NATO, but we also examined how they described the EU as an international security actor, and how this develops over time. Throughout the longitudinal discourse analysis, we can clearly how the NATO discourse on the EU as a security actor develops. In 2006, NATO Deputy Secretary-General Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo described the EU ‘as not yet being a strong or coherent actor, with one that embodies a lot of potential’. This did, however, change a lot over time. For instance, in 2012, NATO Secretary-General Anders Rasmusen described the EU and NATO as playing complementary roles in the issue-area of international security. In its original context, Rasmusen could have been implying that he thought more highly of the EU as a security actor. This aspect was more difficult to measure as the EU as a security actor was not described regularly throughout the NATO material.

These observations and developments do to a large extent match the EU discourse about itself. In and throughout the two fist EU-speeches, a lot of doubt regarding its future and potential developments was expressed. The two first speeches in combination give the impression that, as NATO Deputy Secretary-General Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo had stated in 2006, that “[…] for the time being, the EU is not yet the strong, coherent actor that it aspires to be […]” (2006).

This does, however, change in the three latter speeches. There are big differences between the two first speeches and the speech in which Ashton spoke about the EEAS. However, it is unclear whether or not this difference is due to the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon or not. In any case, Ashton spoke about the development of the EEAS as a tool which enabled the EU to take more concrete measures to provide security. To once again name a few measures:

‘diplomacy, political engagement, development assistance, civil and military crisis management tools in support of conflict prevention, peacebuilding’ (Ashton, 2010).

Throughout the three latter speeches, we also saw that the EU security regime developed along a line that more closely aligns with the broader liberal notion of a security actor, instead of the two-dimensional traditional notion which NATO primarily relies upon. These observations also correspond well with the literature review, where we also saw that the EU often takes a more comprehensive approach to its security operations, than NATO.

Moreover, the perhaps most interesting observations we can make stem from a comparison of the two first EU speeches, and the fifth and final EU speech, performed by Barroso. As aforementioned, in the two first speeches, a lot of doubt with regards to any potential developments was explicitly expressed. In contrast, in the final speech, Barroso specifically talks about concrete threats to the EU, and that they must be met head on with the utilisation of “civil and military capabilities” (Barroso, 2014).

Assuming these statements accurately reflect the empirical reality, it is reasonable to think that the EU has fundamentally developed in and throughout the time-frame specified in this study. However, the EU discourse on security issues has not become militarised or similar to the NATO discourse. Even so, security issues have become a more prominent topic in and throughout the speeches. They are also addressed in a stronger manner.

Per the main research question, we then also have to think about to what extent, and in what way, that the EU has developed as a security actor. Upon reading the EU speeches, there is little doubt that the EU discourse has developed a lot during the last decade. There is a distinct development which we can observe within the EU speeches - recalling that the two first EU speeches were permeated with doubts regarding whether or not the EU could actually develop and become a strong international player and security actor. However, in the final EU speech which was analysed, Barroso continuously spoke about and emphasised how much the EU had achieved, how far the organisation had come, and its ability to provide various types of security; both for its immediate international neighbourhood and its citizens.

Even so, comparing the EU speeches, and the EU discourse to the NATO discourse on security, one thing becomes evident: the EU is not a military organisation. The discourse does not reflect the overt militarism which the NATO discourse does. The way in which that the representatives describe the respective approaches to security also differ. The EU approach to
security aligns more closely with the neoliberal notion of a security actor, whereas we see an over ‘traditional’ approach to security in the NATO speeches.

In sum, assuming that the ten selected speeches sufficiently reflect the empirical reality, it is reasonable to say that the EU has, in fact, developed as a security actor; from both an internal and external NATO point of view. However, the EU representatives, and thus the EU discourse lack the overt militarism, a key characteristic of a ‘traditional security actor’. The EU security discourse and the security regime located within the discourse aligns more closely with the neoliberal institutionalist perspective.

In the two first EU, and two first NATO speeches, the EU was described as a security actor in its infancy – young and incoherent. Many doubts were expressed in relation to its potential developments. This changed significantly later as the EU was described as having achieved a lot in a short amount of time, and many of its concrete and practical capabilities were open described.

As for how the NATO representatives described the EU in and throughout the last speeches, we can see that it is a clear-cut case of ‘less being more’. Fewer doubts were expressed, and the EU was no longer being described as being underdeveloped and incapable. Throughout the discourse analysis, NATO also remained a rather two-dimensional security alliance that mainly relies on military and political means to achieve security. This aligns very closely with the traditional conceptualization of an international security actor. This observation corresponds well considerations regarding the fundamental purpose of NATO, and with what we observed in the literature review.

Finally, the decreases in military expenditure, in combination with what we observed in the discourses could suggest that the European states are no longer particularly concerned with traditional security, i.e. threats of invasions or inter-state conflicts, and that they have instead become heavily concerned with issues such as international terrorism, organized crime, cyber threats, piracy, and human rights violations – to name a few.

In putting all these pieces together, we are presented with a picture, in which the EU has developed a lot as a security actor in the last decade. However, the way in which that the EU develops aligns more closely with a neoliberal notion of a security actor, rather than according to the traditional perspective.
7. Conclusion

In this deductive thesis, we have examined the extent to which the EU as a security actor has developed, and how its modus operandi matches that of NATO in relation to matters of international security. This has been done by first examining trends in the military expenditure of the two organisations, before moving on to conduct a longitudinal discourse analysis, in which we examined speeches performed by NATO and EU representatives.

The data on the military expenditure was very limited in what it could tell us. It did, however, give possible insight into the minds of the policy makers. The data can be seen as reflecting a willingness to invest in defence, and/or how they assess threats. Decreases in the conventional military expenditure could reflect an increased concern with borderless threats and a reallocation of resources. However, this study was less exploratory in nature, and as such, we could have gone deeper into other departments of the EU; such as the EEAS and how they also work with matters of security. In any event, since the data was limited, we moved on to the discourse analysis.

In the critical discourse analysis, we first established a baseline so that we could compare it to the EU discourse. This was done by examining the NATO speeches according to a traditional two-dimensional conceptualization of a security alliance. After which, we moved on to examine the EU speeches, through the utilisation of neoliberal and traditional conceptualizations of a security institution/alliance.

As discussed in the chapter above, Results and Findings, we have seen that the EU has, in fact, developed significantly as a security actor. The EU discourse about itself as a security actor more closely aligned with the neoliberal conceptualization of a security institution. The EU is described as utilising a more comprehensive approach towards issues of security, both in the EU and NATO discourses, whereas NATO representatives emphasised more traditional military means to achieve international peace and security.

We saw a clear development of the EU, both from an internal EU perspective, and external NATO perspective. In the beginning of the longitudinal analysis, the EU was described as being a very incoherent, uncoordinated and weak security actor. This changed a lot throughout the three last EU speeches, in which the EU was applauded for its achievements. The NATO representatives also began criticising the EU less over time.
Differences between the EU and NATO are, to a certain degree, also reflected in the military expenditures of the two organisations. The average military expenditure of NATO as a whole is significantly higher than that of NATO-Europe and EU/EDA, even though it has been declining. What this tells us is that NATO is still primarily concerned with international security, in a traditional and military sense; threats from other states. This can be attributed to the NATO ‘raison d’être’.

Judging primarily from the discourse analysis, the EU *modus operandi* is distinctly different from the way in which NATO operates and provides security. Even though we can see that the discourse develops a lot over time, it is unclear as to what extent the EU’s capabilities to deal with security threats lay inside the EDA framework. Thus, the statistical data may not reflect the EU’s capabilities to deal with these issues. To properly examine this, we would have to examine different types of materials. This has been a clear limitation in this study.

Even so, we can deduce that even though the EU has most certainly developed as a security actor, the way in which it operates more closely aligns with the neoliberal institutionalist notion of a security institution. The EU has, judging by the developments observed in the discourse, developed significantly over the last decade. The EU most certainly has become a capable actor, but it does not operate according to a traditional notion of a security alliance, and as such, it is not very similar to NATO.

Moreover, some of these findings can be corroborated with numerous other studies which we examined in and throughout the literature review, recalling Marianne Riddervold’s, and Gebhard & Smith’s studies, in which they found that the EU wanted to take a more comprehensive approach to the security issue at hand. This is also what we observed in the longitudinal discourse analysis. There we saw that the EU representatives explicitly expressed a will utilise both civil and military means against security issues. The mere fact that the findings of this thesis can be corroborated with the findings of other studies, gives the findings here validity.

As for further research, it could be very interesting to conduct a diachronic discourse analysis and examine to what extent the Lisbon treaty affected the European security regime. In other words, one could sample the European security regime prior to, and after the Treaty had entered into force in 2009 for the purpose of examining the impact that the treaty has had.
8. Works Cited


## 9. Appendix

### Item 1. – List of European EU/EDA and NATO members.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item No.</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>EU Member</th>
<th>EDA Member</th>
<th>NATO Member</th>
<th>Selected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Yes (1995)</td>
<td>Yes (2005)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Yes (1958)</td>
<td>Yes (2005)</td>
<td>Yes (1949)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Yes (1973)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Yes (1958)</td>
<td>Yes (2005)</td>
<td>Yes (1949)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Yes (1973)</td>
<td>Yes (2005)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Yes (1958)</td>
<td>Yes (2005)</td>
<td>Yes (1949)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Luxemburg</td>
<td>Yes (1958)</td>
<td>Yes (2005)</td>
<td>Yes (1949)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Yes (1958)</td>
<td>Yes (2005)</td>
<td>Yes (1949)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes (2005)</td>
<td>Yes (1949)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Yes (1986)</td>
<td>Yes (2005)</td>
<td>Yes (1949)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes (2005)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Yes (1973)</td>
<td>Yes (2005)</td>
<td>Yes (1949)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>