China’s Nuclear Perception:
How does the English School explain the case of China’s shift from nuclear proliferation to nonproliferation?

By Jonathan Sahlin
Abstract

This explanatory single-case study explains why China shifted its policy from proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology, to nonproliferation. In doing so, English School (ES) theory is used in order to explain this shift – stressing the importance of both the international system as well as the international society. To streamline the methodological inconsistencies of the ES tradition, a constructivist methodology is applied. The study concludes that China’s perception of the international system and society is the most important feature when formulating foreign policy and complying with the nonproliferation regime. From applying a streamlined constructivist view of ES theory the result is the discovery of China’s national rationale, which serves as a benchmark for its foreign policy. China is primarily driven by national interest and while adhering to international norms, rules, and structures – it will still see domestic stability and defending its sovereignty as its main priorities.

Keywords: China – Nonproliferation – English School Theory – International Society – Policy Shift

Length: 14449 words
Observe carefully, secure our position, handle the rest of the world calmly, bide our time, perfect our capabilities, and desist from claiming leadership.

Deng Xiaoping 1980

---

Contents

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................................. III

1 INTRODUCTION AND STUDY OVERVIEW ............................................................................. 1
   1.1 PURPOSE AND CONTRIBUTION ....................................................................................... 1
   1.2 OUTLINE .......................................................................................................................... 3

2 METHOD AND CONCEPTS ........................................................................................................ 4
   2.1 MAKING SENSE OF THE ENGLISH SCHOOL ................................................................. 4
   2.2 THE CASE OF CHINA’S NONPROLIFERATION POLICY ............................................... 6
   2.3 NONPROLIFERATION: NORMS, REGIMES, AND ES THEORY ....................................... 8
   2.4 THE NONPROLIFERATION NORM AND DELIMITATIONS .......................................... 10
   2.5 MATERIAL AND SOURCES ............................................................................................. 12

3 THE ENGLISH SCHOOL ......................................................................................................... 13
   3.1 THE ESSENTIALS OF THE ENGLISH SCHOOL THEORY .............................................. 13
   3.2 THE ANARCHICAL INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM ............................................................... 14
   3.3 THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY .................................................................................... 16
   3.4 UNDERSTANDING AND MEASURING CHINA’S COMPLIANCE .................................... 18

4 CHINESE PERCEPTIONS AND NONPROLIFERATION ...................................................... 21
   4.1 CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM ................................................................... 21
       4.1.1 Summary ................................................................................................................ 24
   4.2 CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY ................................................................ 24
       4.2.1 Summary ................................................................................................................ 28
   4.3 FROM PROLIFERATION TO NONPROLIFERATION .................................................... 28
       4.3.1 Summary ................................................................................................................ 31

5 ANALYZING CHINESE NONPROLIFERATION ................................................................. 32
   5.1 ANALYZING CHINESE PERCEPTIONS AND NONPROLIFERATION ............................ 32
       5.1.1 The International System ....................................................................................... 32
       5.1.2 The International Society ...................................................................................... 34
       5.1.3 From Proliferation to Nonproliferation ................................................................ 35
   5.2 ANALYZING ES THEORY AND CHINESE PROLIFERATION ...................................... 35
       5.2.1 How ES Theory Explains China’s Policy Shift ...................................................... 36
       5.2.2 Why Have China Complied with the Nonproliferation Regime? ........................... 37
   5.3 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................ 38
   5.4 THE RESEARCH DESIGN ............................................................................................... 39
       5.4.1 The Explanatory Power of the English School ...................................................... 39
       5.4.2 The Case Study Method ....................................................................................... 40
   5.5 FINAL REMARKS ............................................................................................................ 42

LITERATURE ............................................................................................................................ 44

TREATIES ....................................................................................................................................... 47

APPENDIX 1 .................................................................................................................................. 48
Table of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>China’s Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>Conference on Disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>English School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>Kuomintang (or the Nationalist Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSG</td>
<td>Nuclear Suppliers Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROC</td>
<td>Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWI</td>
<td>First World War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWII</td>
<td>Second World War</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1 Introduction and Study Overview

There is little doubt that the People’s Republic of China (PRC)\(^2\) is today a very important actor in international politics. While observers voice concerns over China’s poor human rights record, China’s elite seems to be preoccupied with other issues than to please international opinion or world leaders. There are however instances where China has actually complied with international norms and laws – thus indeed being affected by exogenous pressure. This essay will do an explanatory single-case study on China’s shift from proliferation of nuclear weapons, material, and technology, to becoming a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and a member of the nonproliferation regime. Using English School (ES) theory the study will seek to answer the following:

Research questions

- *Why have China complied with the nonproliferation regime?*
- *How can English School theory explain China’s compliance with the nonproliferation regime?*

The first question is open-ended and will be dependent on what method and theory the researcher chooses. The second question delimits the first one by defining both theory and method (see Chapter 2 and 3). The ‘how’ element will consist of an analysis of the explanatory power of ES theory, while the ‘why’ element implies that the essay will search for causality – these issues will be further elaborated in the forthcoming chapter.

1.1 Purpose and Contribution

The aspiration of this study is to gain understanding on *why* China has complied

\(^2\) Hereinafter referred to as China, except when its relationship with Taiwan (i.e., the Republic of China, ROC) is being addressed.
with the nonproliferation regime, and how ES theory can explain this shift. Thus, the essay has two purposes: a) to gain understanding on why a state is being affected by international rules, norms, and institutions, and b) how a particular non-mainstream theory of International Relations (IR) is able to explain this occurrence. One could then argue that the essay has an implicit purpose that is more general in character, namely to gain knowledge about contemporary China. While the explicit purposes relate to the research design with the aim to be generalized and analyzed, the implicit purpose is particular and relates to China’s increased influence in world politics and international relations.

Broadly speaking the literature on China’s foreign policy can be divided into two genres: China’s international impact and China’s regional impact. Within the genre of international impact, there is an inflation of titles consisting of “rising” or “rise” (e.g., Deng and Wang 2005; Gill 2007; Goldstein 2005). These books often explain how the world will, or ought to, react to the possibility of China as a superpower – some with an American viewpoint, while others explain it from the Chinese perspective. The genre of regional impact treats China’s relation with its closest neighbors, such as Japan, North and South Korea, India, and Taiwan – or addresses the region as a whole. The exception is scholars such as Ann Kent (2007) and Alastair Johnston (2008) who explain how China is indeed being socialized into the international system or society – with the purpose of showing how China is affected by the behavior and actions of other actors in the international system.

Much of the literature on China’s international position is descriptive in character and does not give much room for theoretical analysis. Although, as in the case of Kent and Johnston, which use theoretical frameworks are founded in psychology and sociology and gives a well informed description of China’s socialization with the international system and society – few tries to bridge the gap between China’s foreign policy and IR theory. Liberal and realist scholars have failed to explain China’s behavior and Barry Buzan has branded this shortcoming as the ‘liberal-realist dilemma’ (2004: 194). This essay will not close the gap between China’s actual behavior and IR theory; however, the study will

---

3 Socialization being defined as “the process that is directed toward a state’s internalization of the constitutive beliefs and practices institutionalized in its international environment” (Frank Schimmelfenning cited in Kent 2002: 344).
be able to highlight the usefulness of a non-mainstream IR theory for understanding the actions and behavior of China.

1.2 Outline

Five main parts form the outline of this essay. The introductory part, which this section is a part of, presents the studied topic, the research questions, and the purpose of the essay. Chapter 2 will discuss the method employed by this study and present definitions of the central concepts used for studying China’s compliance with the nonproliferation regime possible. The ES theory’s methodological issues will be clarified since scholars have expressed concern over its inconsistent usage. Without this part, the essay would lack the scientific standard required for social science. Chapter 3 will elaborate further on the scientific foundation of ES theory and begin with a brief overview over the theory’s main features. This will be followed by a more in-depth discussion that relates to the study at hand. The chapter will conclude with explaining how the study will measure ES theory’s explanatory power and China’s compliance. Chapter 4 will disclose the empirical findings in relation to the theoretical framework. Each section will end with a summary in order to highlight the more important findings. The final chapter, Chapter 5, will present the essay’s analysis. The research questions will be addressed and extensively discussed, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the method chosen for the study. The essay will conclude with some personal final remarks about the studied topic and ES theory.
2 Method and Concepts

The English School theory is not a theory in the conventional IR sense, but a ‘tradition of thought’ amongst a group of scholars, meaning that it is comprised by several different components that are found within IR. This has led to a number of methodological dichotomies, which will be clarified in this chapter. While the case-study method is well known to most social scientists, its usage is sometimes contested and how the method is applied to the case of China’s policy shift will be explained here. In addition, the definition of nonproliferation – the essay’s central theme – as well as norms and regimes needs to be discussed. This chapter will present the method and concepts applied in this essay, making it possible to study China’s compliance with the nonproliferation regime.

2.1 Making Sense of the English School

The English School can be said to rest on three assumptions (or philosophical traditions): International politics is dominated by states in an anarchic international system (Hobbesian); the behavior of states is regulated by international rules and norms (Grotian); and many of the international norms originates from the normative strive of a world society (Kantian) (Finnemore 2001: 512). Two of the founders of the school, Hedley Bull and Martin Wight, build much of their theorization on empirical observations supplemented by normative elements. Martha Finnemore highlights how this unusual combination is not a “methodological virtue” as argued by Buzan, but makes it hard to make sense the methodological foundation of the ES theory, which creates inconsistencies and therefore a dilemma to scholars (Ibid: 509). Hence, while the novel combination of philosophical traditions might enable better understanding of international relations than mainstream IR, the methodological foundation of ES theory needs to be clarified. As Chapter 3 will show, this study will focus on the former two elements of the ES theory, namely the anarchic international system and the
international society; the concept of world society is not thought less of, it merely does not correspond to the case of nuclear nonproliferation.

The idea of an anarchic international system is derived from realism and Hobbes. Realism argues that states operate in a self-help system with no supreme authority, which means that the quest for and distribution of power is central to the realist scholarship (Donnelly 2005: 41). The realist way of thinking is often positivist and claims that there is a Real World that can be studied separately from ourselves, meaning that it presents an ‘objective’ truth (as explained by Moses and Knutsen 2007: 9). Important to note about realism is that state behavior is shaped by the anarchic system, meaning that it is the systemic setting, or distribution of power, that decides how state behaves in the international system (Waltz 1979: 72, 80).

ES scholars acknowledge that the international system has no supreme authority – making the system anarchic – however, states are guided, influenced, and regulated by international laws and norms. This idea originates from the thinking of Hugo Grotius and together with empirical observations about the formation of societies they constitute the basis for Bull’s theorizing in *The Anarchic Society* from 1977 (Bull 1995: 4, 25). However, in recent interpretations (e.g., Buzan 2004: 23) the international society is not derived from positivistic observations about the Real World, but an interpretation of the social construction of norms and rules amongst states, meaning a hermeneutic methodology.

While it is compelling to accept the ES scholars’ reasoning, since they have a habit to tell things as they see it, the complex mixture of two competing methodologies (positivism and hermeneutics) does not meet scientific standards – it is simply not possible to mix contrasting views of what knowledge is and how we acquire that knowledge. Alexander Wendt (1992) has argued that while international anarchy is a social construction, it is the *perceived reality* of states. Wendt’s reasoning suggests that although the international system is a social construction, states might find it appropriate to balance its power against others in order to gain influence and security. The essay will apply a relaxed version of the realist definition of international anarchy and ‘realpolitik’ (i.e., power politics) in accordance with constructivist theorizing – meaning that both the international system and society are seen as social constructions. This enables the essay to streamline the methodological aspects of English School theory, and therefore
meet the standards called for by Finnemore (2001). The study will describe, or interpret, how China has perceived the international system and its actors. This will be followed by a description of how China’s rationale, or international identity, is formulated. Thus, China’s compliance with the nonproliferation norm, rules, and institutions will be analyzed in the context of China’s perception of power, the international system, and other actors, as well as its socialization with the international society.

2.2 The Case of China’s Nonproliferation Policy

The reason for choosing the case study method resonates with Robert K. Yin’s (1994) thinking, where especially two arguments has been helpful when choosing the research design: First, it enables the researcher to limit the independent variables, or as Yin notes: “[t]he case study is preferred in examining contemporary event, but when the relevant behaviors cannot be manipulated.” (Ibid: 8). This is important since it is not possible to study international politics in a laboratory setting with experimental testing. Second, the essay will try to develop (at the most) or explain (at the least) English School theory – being what Yin refers to as explanatory (Ibid: 5). While the study would have benefited from comparison with other cases (i.e., a multiple-case study), there is simply not enough time or space to elaborate on a comparable case or actor. However, the research design is intended to have enough lucidity to make it repeatable and to increase its reliability. The possibility to generalize the results from this study lies in its ability of comparison; that is, can China be compared with other great powers or rising superpowers; or can the nonproliferation regime be compared with the human rights regime? These two questions will be left unanswered for now and instead addressed lastly in the analysis.

One essential task when doing case studies is to identify what the case is (Ibid). China’s policy change from proliferation of nuclear weapons and material to nonproliferation is not a linear development, but a lengthy process that takes set when the international system is experiencing great changes. During this period, China experienced both endogenous and exogenous changes and pressures. As a
result, the question arises in relation to what is actually studied here. Should the essay study the behavior of political elite’s decision processes, international bargaining, domestic developments, or systemic changes? The spread of nuclear weapons greatly altered the international system and its impact has been theorized by scholars such as Robert Jervis (1989) with his theory of the “Nuclear Revolution”. How then should a state’s change perception of the spread of nuclear weapons and technology be treated? This study is a case of a state’s socialization with the international society and adaptation to a changing international system. It is important to remember that while structures are often seen as static, both the international system and society has greatly developed during the past century. China’s shift of policy most likely depended on a combination of multiple variables – variables that are suitable for ES theory analysis. The dependent variable in this case is China’s shift of policy regarding nuclear weapons and technology. China’s perceived position and survival in the international system is central when analyzing the policy shift on proliferation – or what Stanley Hoffman would define as “high politics” (cited in George and Bache 2001: 119). The forthcoming chapter will elaborate on ES theory and disclose the multiple variables that explains China’s shift of foreign policy.

One of the study’s purposes is to analyze how English School theory can explain China’s conformation to nonproliferation. Does nonproliferation fit the description of a theory fitting or mis-fitting case study? Moses and Knutsen explain their differences: “Whereas ‘fitting’ case studies seek to demonstrate how a case fits a general proposition, the ‘mis-fitting’ case study seeks to show how a case does not easily fit a general or a universal claim.” (2007: 134). The former tries to build support for a theory, while the latter tries to develop theory. The English School argues that states will be socialized when engaging in international relations, eventually becoming a part of the international society. International norms, rules, and laws are all parts of the international society and its members will follow these to various degrees. Consequently, one needs to ask if nonproliferation is a theory fitting case where China is socialized according to English School theory, or if not.

---

4 See section 3.4 for the discussion on establishing causality.
5 The English School theory will be fully elaborated in Chapter 3.
The essay’s case does not correspond with either of the two methods described by Moses and Knutsen. While it is true that China has complied with the norm of nonproliferation, it is somewhat exceptional that China fully complies with norms of the international society. According to ES theory a state will be a member of the international society to various degrees, but not as selective as China has been. Even so, the case is not fitting since it is an exception and it is neither mis-fitting, since China has actually complied with the norm. China’s nonproliferation is an exception among Chinese compliance with international norms. Rather than being theory fitting or mis-fitting, nonproliferation is a theory fitting exception. Yet, this particularity makes the study interesting since it could be compared with a similar study on, for example, human rights, in order to analyze the different variables in play.

2.3 Nonproliferation: Norms, Regimes, and ES Theory

The term nonproliferation refers to the idea that nuclear weapons are such a dangerous tool in international relations that its spread and possible usage should be strictly limited (Rumblee 2009: 34-6). In the aftermath of the Second World War (WWII), it was initially only the United States of America (US), the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom (UK) that had the technical knowledge to develop nuclear weapons. However, China and France soon learned how to develop them, but also other states such as Egypt, Sweden, and Brazil had advanced nuclear programs without finalizing their strive to become nuclear weapon states (Rumblee 2009). The permanent members to the United Nations (UN) Security Council are the same as the five legitimate nuclear states—representing the earlier great powers. The importance of nuclear weapons in the post-WWII order had much to do with the zeitgeist of realpolitik and military security of the mid 20th century (True 2005: 226).

---

6 Such as democracy, liberal capitalism, human rights, or rule of law.
7 The United States, Russia (former Soviet Union), and the United Kingdom became members to the NPT in 1970 while France and China became signatories in 1992 – together they constitute the five legitimate nuclear weapon states.
According to Maria Rumblee (2009), the nonproliferation norm itself originates from the international outcry after the American nuclear bombings of Japan, when religious and political leaders as well as the American population condemned the use of nuclear weapons (Ibid: 35-6). While the nonproliferation norm has a grassroots origin, the nonproliferation treaties have been drafted by the UN and are heavily influenced by the Cold War powers, which at the time were represented as the permanent members of the UN Security Council.

To be able to define nonproliferation we need to include international norms, rules, and laws. Rules and laws being the treaty-based framework where states oblige to whatever limits in proliferation are being stipulated in the document. The most important treaty is the Nonproliferation Treaty (INFCIRC/140), which entered into effect in 1970.\(^8\) A very useful summary of these two parts of nonproliferation is given by Weixing Hu: “The nonproliferation regime is a set of international norms, principles, rules, and legal obligations enshrined in the NPT and facilitated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)” (1999: 120). In its simplest form, nonproliferation can be said to be a gathering of norms and rules, which are meant to regulate the spread of nuclear weapons, material, and technology. The concept has been formalized in international treaties such as the NPT; it has prevailed as an international norm given that there are only about five percent of the world’s states that have acquired nuclear weapons.\(^9\) In addition, there are certain rules that its members need to commit to, such as the ones put forth by the IAEA. The above-mentioned components are often referred to as the nonproliferation regime.

Liberalism has been keen on theorizing on international regimes since they show how actors in an anarchic environment will find ways to cooperate, even though they are not always interdependent. Stephen D. Krasner has been one prominent scholar who has theorized on regimes and he states, “International regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area.” (1982: 185). Besides Krasner there are many liberal scholars who have theorized and written

\(^8\) See Appendix 1 for full version of the “Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”.

\(^9\) In addition to the five ‘legal’ nuclear states Pakistan, India, Israel, and North Korea are all believed to have acquired nuclear weapons.
about regimes (e.g., Keohane 1982), which have generated better understanding on how international actors interact in the international system.

While this essay acknowledges that regime theory can be useful for studying regimes, the actual bargaining process within the nonproliferation regime will not be studied. While recognizing the liberalist scholarship, this essay defines nonproliferation as the sum of the treaties, rules, norms, and the institution itself. The combination of these elements will be branded the *nonproliferation regime*. While one could call this gathering something else, such as an international ‘standard’, it will be easier to remain consequent and use the widely recognized term, the nonproliferation regime. The term ‘regime’ will be used hereinafter when nonproliferation is addressed as the gathering of the above presented elements. If one or several of these elements are addressed independently, their respective names will be used accordingly.

Given the much writings on norms and state acceptance of norms, it might seem odd why this study does not embrace a complete constructivist framework. As explained here and in Chapter 3, much of the theorizing of the ES can be and has been interpreted by constructivism, as noted by Reus-Smit (2005: 211-2). ES theory is a holistic theory for understanding and analyzing international relations. The English School will constitute the theoretical framework while having a methodological foundation of constructivism – enabling a hermeneutic approach to China’s perception of the international system and shift to nonproliferation.

### 2.4 The Nonproliferation Norm and Delimitations

As scholars strive to explain the complexities of international relations, concepts such as balance of power and interdependence is simply not enough on their own to explain the behavior of international actors. Social constructivism has focused much scholarship to explain how actors are affected by norms, where Martha Finnemore (1996) has successfully showed that actors are indeed affected by norms set by non-state actors.

One important issue that needs to be discussed is the uniqueness of nonproliferation as a *norm*. While for example human rights and democracy are
important values to some groups globally, they relate to a certain set of values that are often referred to as ‘Western’. China, for example, has stated that these values derive from Western philosophy and practices, and are perceived as a mean to influence the domestic affairs of less powerful states (Deng 2008: 87-8). Nonproliferation on the other hand is an idea that was created by the superpowers and great powers of the Cold War. It does not relate to the domestic affairs per se of the state, but rather the distribution of power in the international system. Would the nonproliferation norm be comparable with the human rights norm? As argued by many scholars (see Chapter 4), China perceives any attempts to influence its domestic or foreign affairs as a breach of sovereignty. Nuclear weapons was an attempt to cement the balance of power in the Cold War, while the democracy norm is an attempt to affect domestic affairs – they both target China and its ability to maintain control of raison d’état (Goldstein 2006: 7, 27). The Chinese leadership sees its past as “a history of a military and economic weak China trying to fend off rapacious exploitation by larger powers operating in international anarchy” (Johnston 1997: 285). While this argument is not fully explored and there are more dimensions to it than mentioned here, it makes one important point: for a long period, China’s main priority has been state survival. In the international realm, this means that China will do what ever it believes is necessary to maintain and strengthen its position. Domestically it will mean that social stability and economical development, as defined by China’s Communist Party (CCP), will be prioritized (Deng 2008: 87). Thus, international norms that affect these objectives will be seen as threats to China’s national security; making the essay’s research question even more relevant.

Given the above discussion, the essay’s design has two major inherent delimitations in order to control the independent variables in line with the space and time given. If the sole purpose of this essay had been to analyze the variables that made China conform to the nonproliferation regime, the essay would have benefited from making a comparison between China and at least one other actor (who also changed its policy); alternatively, making a comparison between two different international norms. The former would have focused on China as an international actor, while the latter would have focused on nonproliferation as a norm. Since the essay’s purpose is to analyze the particular variables that were in
place for China’s change of policy, the study will focus solely on China and the nonproliferation regime.

2.5 Material and Sources

There are of course many ways to learn about how China’s behavior toward the nonproliferation regime has changed throughout the years. As described above, ES theory will be used to analyze China’s compliance with the nonproliferation regime. ES theory will be used to select the empirics and as Popper has argued the empirics will be *theory dependent* (Moses and Knutsen 2007: 44). What Popper means is that theory will guide the selection of what will be studied, making the empirics biased. Popper is correct in his statement, and this is why clarity in scientific method is such an important aspect of the social sciences. Constructivism would in relation to Popper say that everything is biased since there is no such thing as objective, unfiltered social science – the human brain will interpret what we experience making all experiences subjective (Ibid: 11). The material that is presented in this study is chosen in relation to the English School and will be used to *understand* why China has complied with nonproliferation. The material is not thought of as objective empirics, but it will describe China’s rationale and perception of the international system.

To make the most out of the given timeframe, secondary sources will be used as the principal material for this study. While the task of conducting interviews would had been an interesting experience, there are already many articles and books written by scholars who greatly supersedes this researchers proficiency in Chinese and access to primary sources in China. International scholars’ views will be supplemented by Chinese academia who nowadays experience relative freedom from government control.
3 The English School

To understand the formulation of foreign policy one needs to analyze both the domestic and the international environment. However, China’s compliance with the nonproliferation regime is not merely a foreign policy. Nonproliferation is a denominator for China’s self-perception in the international system; nonproliferation gives an indication how China relates to other international powers as it becomes socialized. As many Western states have experienced a rather stable political climate the past century, China’s past ranges from imperial interference, violent revolutions, ethnic clashes, to its rise as a great power. Compared with other theories, the ES takes into account both the domestic context, such as history and the construction of international identity – as well as how China perceives the international system and its actors. These features combined will give us China’s rationale, making it possible to analyze why China has complied with the nonproliferation norm. Barry Buzan argues that realism and liberalism cannot explain China’s development on their own (2004: 194). The essay will test the applicability of ES theory in the case of China’s compliance with the nonproliferation norm, given the shortfall of liberalism and realism. This chapter will present the central theoretical concepts used in this essay, namely the international system and the international society. The English School will be operationalized in order to sharpen the theoretical tools that the essay will need to measure China’s shift of policy.

3.1 The Essentials of the English School Theory

The English School theory is not a single coherent theory in its own, but a tradition of thought that originates from several different scholars, by whom many are not British. Martin Wight and Hedley Bull are two prominent figures from the early days of the school, while Tim Dunne, Nicholas Wheeler, and Andrew Linklater have produced several recent articles and books. The school has three
main components: the international system, the international society, and the world society (Buzan 2004) – these three components interplay as state behavior and interest is formulated. To make these three concepts more lucid one could say that the international system is the anarchic structure that states experience. To not be solely dependent on wars to settle international disputes, states have developed or accepted more peaceful ways of interacting and restricting behavior in the international system, thus creating an international society where rules and norms are defining state behavior. In addition, there are actors – states and non-state actors – that are formulating the normative ideals of what the world ought to be, creating a multilayered world society.

These basic assumptions relate to the empirical observations by Wight (1977) and Bull (1995), and while the two scholars used a deductive method to create positivistic laws about their observed ‘reality’, they hold up to constructivist reasoning. All three components can be read as social constructions of human activities and resonate well with Buzan’s (2004) revision of the ES theory. As mentioned in the earlier chapter, this essay will use a constructivist method in order to create a uniform framework for analysis – although earlier ES scholars have been keen to stress the naturalist depiction of the international system.

3.2 The Anarchical International System

In his classic work The Anarchic Society from 1977, Hedley Bull (1995) develops the idea of how and why the international society has developed. At the basis of his reasoning lies the recognition of the anarchic international system. Bull defines anarchy as the “the absence of government or rule” (Ibid: 46). The anarchic system automatically makes one think about a Hobbesian world order, where states are in a constant struggle for survival. Yet, Bull bases his statement on empirical observations about the historical construction of the international system, which has its origins from the European nation-state system. Moreover, Bull is not as deterministic as most realist and not as idealistic as most liberalists. Dunne explains this middle ground as:
It [ES theory] rejects the realist representation of international anarchy in which relations among ‘units’ are anomie. It rejects the idealist representation of a world order in which authority and legitimacy rest with a world government or in the collective hearts and minds of the great society of humankind.

Dunne 2005: 162

Buzan (1993) tries to develop Bull’s earlier arguments, to move beyond empirical observations of history, and instead incorporate the reasoning of structural realist such as Waltz (1979) (Buzan 1993: 327). Buzan’s idea is well meant, but it creates the exact methodological inconsistencies mentioned earlier by Finnemore (2001). The marriage between ES theory and structural realism has not been as successful as Buzan would have hoped. Constructivism provides a better ground for ES reasoning. The perceived reality of anarchy corresponds to Wendt’s analysis of how states acquire identities, which are often anchored in a reality of power politics and related to the formulation of interest (Wendt 1992: 398). Based on a states particular context and background, it will shape its interest in relation to its domestic and international setting. To understand this realist anomaly the next section will explain the international society.

Hence, the international system is not a ‘natural’ feature of our world, as for instance the Law of Gravity. Anarchy is a social construction, which is a product of how humans have chosen to organize themselves, although anarchy remains as the perceived reality that most states experience. This means that the contemporary international system is the structure where independent units, such as states, interact both peacefully and violently. While states have found ways to cooperate in the international system, states do at times resort to violence to handle their differences. This means that states strive for power, since it increases their ability to pursue their national interest. National interest is not formulated in a vacuum, and is not solely dependent on state survival (Buzan 1993: 341). Furthermore, power involves more than merely military power. Given that ES theory regards norms and rules of the international society as restraining state behavior, the international system is more complex than most realists would describe it. Avery Goldstein makes a helpful argument when discussing China’s strive for power. Great powers rarely strives to become hegemons (with the
exception of Hitler’s Germany, Napoleon’s France, and Hirohito’s Japan); and he further notes that “[...] leading states have usually sought to shape, and not just survive in their international environment, typically in ways that will further enhance their wealth, power, and status” (Goldstein 2005: 17n).

3.3 The International Society

The international society connotes with the observation that whereas states find themselves in an anarchic system, it is not as violent as realism claims, and there is a high level of cooperation and mutual recognition between states. The high level of cooperation between states, while at times strenuous, cannot solely be explained by interdependency (Dunne 2003: 305). This means that other forces need to be in place to maintain the relative stability of the international system – consequently providing the starting ground for the English School reasoning. While contemporary states are affected by, and being members of, the international system, the international society relates to agreed values and norms among certain actors in the international system. As Bull states:

A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.

Hedley Bull 1995: 13

Buzan (1993) has advanced Bull’s earlier arguments about the international system and the development of an international and world society. Buzan illustrates his arguments by describing the hypothetical birth of the international system (Ibid: 340-1). Even at the most primitive level societies will eventually develop activities sophisticated enough to enable them to travel and explore their

---

10 China’s strive for international status is further explored by Deng (2008).
11 The word “institutions” is commonly used by sociologist to describe behavioral rules – and according to Finnemore and Sikkink, institutions are used to explain how “behavioral rules are structured together and interrelate” (1998: 891).
surroundings. When this occurs, the society will probably encounter neighboring societies. At a peaceful level, the interactions between the societies will lead to trade, marriage, and individual visits; but the interactions might lead to conflict over land, resources, and status. Even at a primitive level, actors will construct ways to interact – although not saying that they will construct a global international society. Today’s nation states have reached such an advanced level that they are all a part of the same global international system, without necessarily being members of the international society. Furthermore, the level of socialization with the international society will vary amongst its members. To become a member the state needs to adapt the common values and rules defined by the international society.

As ruling elites recognize the permanence and importance of the economic and strategic interdependence among their states, they will begin to work out rules for avoiding unwanted conflicts and for facilitating desired exchanges. Failure to do so would mean enormous inconvenience and, more seriously, potential loss of competitive advantage for those who failed to take this step when others had done so.

Barry Buzan 1993: 334

Buzan (1993) notes that Bull (1995) fails to elaborate on how and when an international society becomes into being; or what the exact differences are between the international system and society, as well as explaining the correlation between international society and world society. Buzan concludes that today’s international society need to be explained as a hybrid of a functional system or ‘gesellschaft’, as well as an historical construction or ‘gemeinschaft’, using the language of sociology to explain their respective features (1993: 348-9). Today’s treaty-based system originates from the European society of states. The European system is based on gemeinschaft, meaning that it has been developed through the close and historical interactions among the European states (Ibid: 329). Given the hegemonic nature of European imperialism, these norms were spread to the rest of the world and made its entrance into Asia in the 19th century (Ibid: 343). In contrast to gemeinschaft, Asia’s abrupt socialization to the European society of states is a process best understood as gesellschaft – meaning that states were forced or necessitated to interact through the norms and institutions set by the
European powers. Thus, the emergence of an international society is not linear and many states outside of Europe have been forced to comply with the norms of the international society. Yet, while this would imply that the European states used violence to coerce non-European states, it need to be stressed that states have also been compelled by other aspect such as economic incentives, norm transcendence, political influence, and so forth. Whilst states will act in accordance to the norms and rules of the society, they are likely to disobey them when if there is sufficient motive.

Since the society of states does not exist in the formal sense (i.e., contract or treaty), the international society is an abstraction of the social contract between states trying to overcome the ordeals of the anarchic international system. The very foundation of the social contract between states is to preserve sovereignty and minimize the use of violence (Dunne 2003: 307). Dunne continues his argument by stating that the international society reflects the balance of power in the international system. This is exemplified through the structure of the League of Nations and the UN or the great powers as the signatories to every major peace treaty since the Peace of Westphalia. Dunne concludes that the international society is maintained by the great powers to bring order and distribute power (2003: 315). Dunne notes that the US chose to ignore the international society as it started to act in a hegemonic fashion in the beginning of the 21st century. This means that it is possible for a great power (in this case a superpower) to disregard from the rules and norms of the international society, when that state believes it to be in its national (security) interest.

3.4 Understanding and Measuring China’s Compliance

This essay has set out to understand why China has complied with the nonproliferation regime. In doing so, ES theory will be used to explain China’s actions and behavior. The case study method indicates that the study will search for the independent variables that produce the dependent variable – or in other words, the search for causality. Yet, as Moses and Knutsen notes, establishing causality in social science is a complicated task (2007: 168-9). Moreover, the
existence of correlating factors does not establish a causal relationship. While the issue of causality persists, the constructivist methodology sets out to “identify the (socially constructed) patterns and regularities of the world” (Ibid: 192). When applying the constructivist methodology on the case-study method it becomes clear that rather than searching for absolute variables, patterns will be central for answering the causes of China’s policy change. To simplify the language of the essay, patterns will be seen as independent variables in order to make the structure of the case study coherent. Yet, the reader should bear in mind that this essay does not regard it to be possible to find the material factors that produce causality – but will interpret China’s perception of events in order to identify patterns that will explain its behavior.

Ann Kent explains that “[f]ormal or ‘rule’ compliance may be defined as a state’s implementation and enforcement of the specific norms, principles, and rules required by the international treaty […]” (2007: 17). China’s compliance with the nonproliferation regime will be regarded as the dependent variable, where the NPT constitutes the most important treaty. The nonproliferation regime is by all standards a product of the international society, which is a product of the anarchic international system. These two theses result in the following questions in relation to ES theory:

- How does a state to become a member of the international society?
- Why do states conform to norms and rules in the anarchic international system?

First, both the international system and the international society are products of the European system of states. The international system is comprised by sovereign nation states that operate in international anarchy. The anarchic feature of the system has led to the creation of a society of states, trying to regulate the interactions between states, and with the normative aspiration to reduce violence. States have become members to the international society by either historical development, or as a functionalistic logic of a further globalized international system. Thus, all non-European states have been, by their own will or force, socialized into the society of states. Second, while states affect each other and engage in power balancing, states are influenced by norms and rules. These norms
and rules guide state behavior, but will at times be broken if national interest is believed to supersede that of following a norm or rule (i.e., a cost-benefit assessment). Norms and rules are seen as common values by the members of the international society. States can be motivated to comply with a norm due to its normative value, economic incentives, or through force.

The essay will describe China’s interactions with the international system and society as a historical process – and will look at the formulation of history in the case of China and identify historical events that have shaped the Chinese perceptions. Following the argument by Buzan that the international society is a product of the international system, the balance of power between the great powers and China must be explained in order to understand China’s relationship with the international society. China’s compliance with the nonproliferation norm is not a linear process, but is defined by setbacks, national interest, economic incentives, as well as progresses. The analysis will be multilayered looking at the different competing, but possibly interacting, variables described above.
To understand China’s policy change on proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology this essay has argued that ES theory provides an appropriate framework for analysis. This means that the international system and society lies at the basis of the analysis. While the system is neither as Hobbesian as claimed by realists – nor as static as Waltz (1979) proclaims – China’s understanding, or perception, of the international system and its actors is of great importance since it provides the rationale for China’s behavior. The international system and the distribution of power provide a contextual setting, while the international society regulates the behavior of China and other states. To understand the development of the nonproliferation regime and China’s compliance, this essay will look for different variables present in the two structures.

The chapter will begin with describing how China has perceived the international system and how China has been socialized into the society of states – both sections are meant as an overview rather than an in-depth analysis of Chinese political history. China’s formulation of history and its construction of an international identity are closely linked with its perception of the international system and its actors. After providing the international and domestic context of China, its shift from proliferation to nonproliferation will be disclosed. The material presented in this chapter will then be analyzed in Chapter 5.

4.1 China and the International System

The English School argues that the international system is anarchic in character and that anarchy influences the behavior of states. States will balance their power against each other and while power is usually measured in military capabilities by realists, power is now being reconceptualized and is complemented by terms such as civilian power (e.g., Smith 2005), normative power (e.g., Manners 2002), and
soft power (e.g., Nye 2004). Given the constructivist leaning in this essay, power is not something that can be measured in strict material terms. In addition, perceptions are equally important as power and perceptions are acknowledged as a motivating force by both realists and constructivists (Kang 2007: 19). David Kang argues that national identity is one of the central causalities that shapes how states determine and respond to threats in international relations (Ibid: 18). It therefore becomes vital to understand how China has perceived threats throughout history in order to understand why its policy of nonproliferation has shifted. This section will describe how China’s perception of the balance of power has shifted during the past century in order to provide the systemic setting for further analysis in the forthcoming chapter.

In the beginning of the 20th century, China had just fought and lost two wars, the first with Britain and France, and the latter with Japan. The battering by foreign powers and internal demands for change put an end to the 268-year rule of the Qing Dynasty in 1912 (Encyclopædia Britannica 2008: 33). The outcome was the creation of The Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT), and the attempt to form a Chinese republic (Ibid: 36-7). However, China struggled with Japan’s imperialistic aspirations and had to accept Japan’s occupation of Manchuria due to Japan’s strength and wide support in the League of Nations after the First World War (WWI) (Gill 2007: 22). KMT’s republican aspirations were finally halted as Mao Zedong facilitated a broad coalition against the Japanese occupation, a fight that was further augmented by the Allied victory in WWII (Goldstein 2005: 20).

With the outbreak of the Cold War, China found itself trying to recover from years of war and foreign interference. The period shows how China went from having an ideological-based foreign policy when Mao first came to power, to a pragmatic view of how to secure China’s interests in international relations (Goldstein 2005: 21; Kent 2007: 37, 46). Mao’s revolutionary ideas that first inspired the Chinese foreign policy aimed to challenge the two superpowers’ hegemonic structures of the international system and society (Zhang 1998: 4). While China had signed a Treaty of Mutual Friendship with the Soviet Union in

---

12 This essay will define power from the Chinese experience, meaning that power is the ability to influence other actors in the system in order to make the outcomes more favorable (e.g., protecting Chinese sovereignty in border disputes; securing economic interests; or, lessening the influence of other great powers.)
1950, the Russians never came to China’s aid during the Korean War and the Sino-Soviet cooperation was finally halted as China aligned with the US to resist the Soviet Union’s growing power. Nikita Khrushchev cancellation of 600 inter-governmental contracts and the withdrawal of all Soviet advisors from China in 1960 further impeded this development (Zhang 1998: 26). In the 1970s, the Chinese leadership left their Marxist revolutionary ambitions and adopted a strict realpolitik view of international relations (Goldstein 2005: 134).

The shifting alliances exemplify how China’s was socialized into the international anarchic environment where ideology had little to do with the balance of power. During the 1980s, the Sino-American relationship was in a decline due to the détente between the superpower in the 1970s and the diminishing Soviet threat (Ibid: 22). The end of the Cold War meant that China lost the basis for continuing its cooperation with the US. Instead, China became worried about an American-dominated world order where China had no allies to turn to (Ibid). As this new reality unfolded, Beijing perceived a multipolar world order as the most viable option and made this a part of its foreign policy strategy (Ibid: 24; Tsang 2008: 58).

Mao’s realpolitik view of politics has influenced Chinese foreign policy since 1935, where Mao’s focus has always been aimed at the most principal enemy (Goldstein 2005: 20). The realpolitik view of the world was a product of extensive foreign interference in Chinese politics and the period is known as the “century of national humiliation” (Gill 2007: 140). China has learned from experience that nations that are more powerful will interfere in domestic politics. Further, international treaties has limited China’s influence over territory and material structures such as harbors and railways; military operations have countered China’s interest and decreased its territory; and finally, capitalist institutions have countered China’s influence in Asian politics. Thus, China’s perception of the international system is characterized by its experiences from what impact actors that are more powerful have on domestic politics. Mao realized that China’s limited resources only made it possible to concentrate at one enemy at a time, the principal.

In the post-Cold War period, China has realized the size of American power and the effect of American hegemony. Gill exemplifies this by showing how the UN-sanctioned invasion of Iraq in 1991 made China aware of the American
ability to mobilize powerful allies and achieving its security goals (Ibid: 3). Goldstein identifies three policy challenges that faced the Chinese leadership after the Cold War: a) reducing neighbors’ fears about a stronger China; b) ensure continued growth of its economy and maintain domestic stability; and c) deal with the American military supremacy and unilateralism (2005: 26). The end of the Cold War meant that China started to fully engage in the international society, accepting constraints on its sovereignty, conforming with international norms, and accepting both the cost and benefits from complying with international treaties (Kent 2007: 77). As the 21st century saw the dawn, the hegemonic behavior of the US was made visible. While, many observers have criticized the US for unilateral behavior, the US has proven a very important point: It is impossible to rely on military power alone.

4.1.1 Summary
As material structures have provided the foundation for the distribution of power in the international system, the possibility to obtain ones policy objectives does not solely rest on military capabilities. For instance, China’s increased power is highly dependent on a continued economic growth and ability to appear as a legitimate actor in international relations. China’s rationale rests on its experience from foreign hegemonic behavior and violation of sovereignty. The Chinese leadership regards domestic stability as its top priority and consequently seeks security. Meanwhile, perception remains important since it decides how a state relates to other actors in the international system. Shifting perception of the international system and its actors has meant more to China’s foreign policy than the distribution of power has. This insight is important to bear in mind for the forthcoming analysis.

4.2 China and the International Society
Three-thousand years ago, the Chinese regarded themselves as belonging to the Middle Kingdom of the world (Linklater 2005: 99). In the early 20th century, this was far from a reality. The European powers had a well-developed system to
conduct foreign affairs within Europe, called the treaty system. China, conversely, had its own system called the tribute system, which had been developed over two millennia by the Chinese empire (Zhang 1998: 8). As Buzan explained earlier, all societies will engage in relations with neighboring societies at some point – and the Sino-European affair was no exemption. The initial communication was peaceful and mostly related to trade between the two civilizations until the 19th century. The Chinese tribute system became contested as the British launched a naval attack in 1842 in order to force China to open up its economy (Ibid: 9). Eventually, foreign powers such as Russia, Britain, and France made sure that the Chinese tribute system was replaced by the European treaty system through force (Ibid: 9-10). While the European treaty system had been developed throughout centuries of interactions, China had to learn it as a necessity, or what Buzan calls gesellschaft. European public international law served as a justification for the European power to intervene in China (Kent 2007: 34); and while the European expansion was violent, it laid the foundation and unified the world in what we nowadays call the international society (Zhang 1998: 12). The ‘century of national humiliation’ resulted in China’s skepticism toward international organizations and treaties. China felt exploited by imperial powers, which had the implications that the revolutionary Chinese leadership rejected any attempt by foreign powers to influence domestic politics (Deng 2008: 4).

China acquired its official statehood with the end of WWI, as it became a formal member to the international society with its acceptance into the League of Nations in 1920 (Ibid: 13). However, China’s membership status did not mean that it would fully experience the Westphalian privilege of sovereignty. Neither being respected as a full member, nor having the possibility to claim its legal rights, China’s sovereignty continued to be violated – first by Japan in the 1930s and later by the US in the 1950s. China also tried to increase its international legitimacy through joining international institutions and organizations, but this had little effect on facilitating international respect (Kent 2007: 35). It was not until 1944 as China became recognized, symbolically, as a great power by the US, the Soviet Union, and the UK (Zhang 1998: 15). Still, as Zhang argues, the international society that emerged after WWII was quite different from before

---

13 Such as the International Labour Organization and the Universal Postal Union.
Zhang’s point is important, since the international society – before WWII – was constructed by the European powers alone and used as a tool to increase its international dominance – or in other words, a tool for hegemony. The international society, post-WWII, could not solely depend on the European historical construction of a treaty based system. Both the US and the Soviet Union made sure that their interests were being protected. And while the WWII powers cemented their positions with the creation of the UN’s Security Council, weak states and the third world gained substantial influence as they became recognized states and members of the UN’s General Assembly (as discussed below). Consequently, as Buzan argues, the international society is a hybrid of gesellschaft and gemeinschaft and was in parts restructured by the victors of WWII.

With the end of WWII, the imperial ambitions of Japan was put to an end and posed a lesser threat against China. Mao cemented his and the CCP’s power over China, but the communist rule in China was contested by the Western powers that supported the ROC (former KMT). The US branded China as an aggressor in the Korean War, which helped the US in its attempts to isolate China, excluding it from the UN and trying to deprive China of its legitimacy (Zhang 1998: 22). The result was a two-decade long isolation of CCP experienced, due to its non-legal status by UN. Meanwhile, the ROC resided to Taiwan and held China’s chair in the UN (Kent 2007: 33-4). This means that Taiwan is a sensitive issue for China and represent how the CCP views conflicting ideologies and foreign involvement in the region. As China emphasizes domestic stability, internal or external actors who threaten the superiority of the CCP are viewed as threats to the national security. The importance of Taiwan was demonstrated when China cast its first veto in twenty-five years in the UN’s Security Council, blocking a peacekeeping mission to Guatemala, due to Guatemala’s support to Taiwan (Wang 1999: 81).14

When China finally was permitted to its seat in the UN in 1971, it held a skeptical view of the international society. China’s experience from being ‘socialized’ to the European public international law meant that China perceived these institutions as means for dominance (Ibid: 34). A few years later, China

---

14 While the UN is an important facilitator for international cooperation and treaties, it is merely an intergovernmental organization (with a certain degree of actor capabilities) and is separated from the international society.
tried to organize what they called “The Third World”, to rise against the oppressing international powers (Ibid: 40). UN’s founding principles were used to serve China’s national interest, or specifically decreasing American and Soviet influence over Chinese politics, given that the two superpowers were trying to weaken China’s sovereignty (Ibid: 43). As Kent points out, China had adapted well to the international institutions founded by the great powers – and through its support from weaker states (by many African), it reclaimed its seat in the UN (Kent 2007: 48). While maintaining a skeptical view of the international society, China learned the rules of the game, and was quick to adjust to this new reality. The same institutions that had decreased China’s power, now served as an instrument to gain international legitimacy.

Kent has identified China’s three stages of socialization with international organizations as presented in the table below (2007: 51):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Type of Organization</th>
<th>Key Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Stage</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Organizations</td>
<td>Chinese skepticism toward international cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966–1977</td>
<td>1 ► 21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Stage</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organizations</td>
<td>Increased participation in international relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977–1983</td>
<td>71 ► 201</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Stage</td>
<td>The World Bank, IMF, and the WTO</td>
<td>Acceptance to key instrumental organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980, 2001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

China’s participation in international organizations is an important benchmark for its socialization with the international society. While it is not possible to define the exact level of any state’s membership to the international society, it is possible to argue that China is indeed a member of the international society, given its extensive participation and membership status to international non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations. It would be impossible for China to conduct foreign policy without being a member to these institutions. China became utterly aware of the importance of international legitimacy after the bloody crackdown on the Tiananmen Square Protests.

In June 1989, student demonstrators clashed with the police and the military at the Tiananmen Square after months of protests in Beijing and elsewhere. While the real number of injured and killed protestors are still unknown they are
estimated to several hundreds deaths and thousands imprisoned (Deng 2008: 75). The protests were held as many communist states around the world collapsed, but the Chinese government was not dissuaded by the protests. Whilst the CCP remained in power, the event sparked an international outcry for China’s treatment of the dissidents (Deng 2008: 69). For China, the event marked a decade long isolation, where it became aware of the importance of legitimacy and status in international relations (Deng 2008: 12). The impact of the international pressure led to a policy of “reform and opening up” by the Chinese leadership (Gill 2007: 4).

4.2.1 Summary
China’s role in the international system and international society has changed greatly during the past 200 years, but so has the system and society as well. The international system is nowadays global in character, and as states have increased their interactions, the international society has developed and become more complex. China’s first introduction to the European powers meant a brute awakening and lost of territory and sovereignty. As Mao and the Chinese leadership secured the CCP’s position through its authoritarian rule, it soon learned the rules of the post-WWII international society. China regained some of its lost legitimacy in 1971 and took a more proactive role in international relations. Ideology did no longer supersede power politics, and international organizations and institutions were used, although reluctantly, as instrumental tools to obtain foreign policy outcomes. China’s strive for a multipolar world order might never be realized, but achieving this means to balance the US while supporting upcoming powers.

4.3 From Proliferation to Nonproliferation

In 1964, China detonated its first nuclear bomb. At this point, China had still not been permitted to the UN and its relationship with the Soviet Union was deteriorating. The Chinese leadership was becoming aware of the power politics in the international system and society, and regarded nuclear weapons as a way to
defend its sovereignty (Gill 2007: 74). China regarded the nonproliferation norm, as most international organizations and treaties, as a way of the current great powers to maintain its dominance in the international system. China perceived the spread of nuclear weapons and technology as something positive, decreasing the superpower hegemony (Ibid: 75). This section will describe China’s perception on nuclear proliferation and its shift to a policy of nonproliferation.

China’s policy of proliferation of conventional weapons as well as nuclear weapons and technologies has led to a very negative image of China – depicting it as an immoral actor in international relations. China’s more controversial weapons export has been to Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran. China’s support to North Korea began in the 1950s with the Korean War. In the 1950s and 1960s, North Korea received support from China in terms of conventional weapon systems and logistics. North Korea is also believed to have had support when developing its nuclear program from the 1960s to the late 1970s (Gill 2007: 23). Pakistan’s nuclear program is also believed to have enjoyed the support of China and dates back to the 1960s – with the initial motive to counter India’s influence in the Asian sub-continent (Ibid: 80). China’s nuclear support to Pakistan has been well documented as several schematics of nuclear facilities and technologies have been intercepted by Western intelligence agencies (Ibid: 81). China’s support to Iran is not as old as its support to Pakistan and North Korea. The Sino-Iranian cooperation started on a larger scale in the 1980s – with the chief motive of strategic, political and economic aims (Gill 2007: 79). While the exact level of assistance remains unclear, it has been confirmed that China has sold advanced systems for uranium mining, enrichment, and processing, as well as conventional weapon systems to Iran (Ibid). The Sino-Iranian exchange has been troublesome for the US who does not want to see a nuclear-armed Iran. In total, the US has imposed 20 sanctions relating to China’s proliferation of nuclear technology to Iran (Gill 2007: 208-15). However, it should be stressed that none of these sanctions have violated the IAEA export rules (Kent 2007: 96). Nevertheless, as Kent also notes, the benchmarks for compliance with the IAEA rules are at times ambiguous.

China’s proliferation of conventional weapons and nuclear weapons and technologies is extensive and well documented. The initial rationale for proliferation was China’s perception of the distribution of power in the
international system. In the 1980s, however, China started to shift its official position, as it became the signatory to several nonproliferation treaties. The first step toward compliance with the international norms of nonproliferation was taken in February 1980 as China participated in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) – an entry that was characterized by its general doubt toward international regimes and institutions (Kent 2007: 69). Yet, in the years to come, China quickly learned that cooperation also had its benefits, and in 1984, China joined the IAEA. To have a nuclear program, without benefiting from the civilian aspects of nuclear energy is costly and China became compelled by the possibility of technology transfer from the West, which was facilitated by the IAEA membership (Hu 1999: 124-5). Hence, the IAEA membership process was largely driven by economic incentives since it enabled China to benefit from Western technology and knowledge, as well as legally export nuclear technology.

China’s shift was in the early stages motivated by the benefits from cooperation. This was however complemented by changing perceptions about the international system and balance of power with the easing tensions between the superpowers (Kent 2007: 75). The second stage of accepting international norms was enhanced by the end of the Cold War and the Tiananmen Square Protests. The international outcry after the bloody crackdown resulted in isolation from the international society. China, together with France, had been the last two states not signing the Non-proliferation Treaty. Hu claims that France could not see itself being associated with China after the Tiananmen Square Protests and because of this announced that it would sign the NPT (1999: 122). China, feeling the international pressure, followed France’s lead and decided to become a signatory to the NPT, which came into effect in 1992 (Zhang 1998: 163).

Kent argues that while having set out to use the CD for its own purposes, China ended up with complying and accepting its basic norms and principles (2007: 101). Further, China has made a substantial impact on the CD, both positive and negative. Kent concludes that while China has been complying with the nonproliferation regime, it has not so often been cooperating. It has repeatedly protected its national security concerns and China continues to have doubt about the institution. Yet, its compliance is a sign of socialization with the international society and while not trying to measure its membership China is indeed involved in some of the positive developments of the CD (2007: 102). Zhang draws a
different conclusion than Kent and is not as convinced that China was driven by international norms as one is inclined to believe. China, Zhang argues, still holds a realpolitik view of international relations and that the development of China’s recent nuclear strategy is indicating that China believes its nuclear weapons to be a legitimate capability in order to defend its national interest (while stressing the non-first use policy) (1998: 176-7). Yet, in 1981 China was the participant to only one out of eight major multilateral arms control treaties, compared with the end of 1992 when China was the signatory to six of those treaties, as well as the NPT (Ibid: 152).

4.3.1 Summary
The nonproliferation norm has, as discussed earlier, a grassroots origin. The idea of killing thousands of humans in one single blow was perceived as something horrible, and the emotions were increased as images of Japanese civilians with radioactive burns were spread around the globe. As the norm was politicized, it followed a great power logic meaning that it was the most powerful states that would possess the most powerful weapon. In that sense, the norm has been successful, given that ninety-five percent of the world’s states adhere to the norm. China, however, perceived it imperative for its national security to remain independent from the great powers and superpowers, and thus acquired nuclear-weapons capabilities in the 1960s. This section has not discussed every single international agreement on weapons nonproliferation that China has signed.15 Instead, China’s gradual shift toward nonproliferation has been discussed, in relation to its changing relations with the superpowers and the international system. This will provide the rationale for the forthcoming analysis on China’s policy shift in Chapter 5.

15 For an overview, see Gill (2007: 85).
5 Analyzing Chinese Nonproliferation

The purpose of this essay is to gain understanding of why a state is being affected by international norms, rules, and laws; and how the English School can explain this occurrence. As the previous chapter has shown, China’s compliance with the nonproliferation regime is not exemplified by the ratification of a particular treaty, nor is there a single causal event that can explain the shift. What has been made evident is that there has been a historical process of socialization with an international regime, and that this process has been dependent on China’s perception of itself and its relation with other great powers. The subsequent analysis will be done in the reversed order of the essay’s chapters, starting with summarizing the empirical findings, analyzing the explanatory power of ES, and lastly a discussion about the research design.

5.1 Analyzing Chinese Perceptions and Nonproliferation

The intention of the nonproliferation norm was to restrict the spread of nuclear weapons and technology. The effect of its usage and a possible Third World War with nuclear weapons was thought of as something so horrible that the fewer states that acquired nuclear weapons, the lesser the chance would be of a nuclear war. Yet, as we now know, China perceived the benefits from having nuclear weapons to exceed the risk of a possible nuclear war. This section will follow the same structure as Chapter 4 – starting with analyzing China’s perception of the international system, its socialization with the international society, and finally China’s shift from proliferation to nonproliferation.

5.1.1 The International System

Regardless of how anarchic the international system really is – China’s perception of it is characterized by realpolitik and great powers that intervene in the domestic affairs of weaker states. China’s experiences from the European, Japanese, and
superpower hegemony lies at the heart of this perception, and while other states who have shared this experience have developed differently – the Chinese leadership has been very influence by this description of history. Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping are no longer present physically, but their spirits live on in Chinese politics. While Mao was very concerned of maintaining domestic stability, Deng imagined China’s return as a great power.

China was not as important as the US and the Soviet Union to Cold War politics, but learned the importance of bandwagoning and balancing power. The Sino-Soviet cooperation should have been more influenced by ideological similarities than it was; and China’s collaboration with the US shows how Mao’s realpolitik view of international politics influenced China’s foreign policy. The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union meant that the US became the world’s sole superpower. China had long held the view that the international system would benefit from a multipolar world order, but has in accordance with Deng Xiaoping’s reasoning not claimed any international leadership. Although several scholars stress China’s socialization with international institutions, Zhang argues that China is still perusing its national interest rather than following the normative values of the international society.

Hence, the conclusion of China’s perception of the international system is twofold: First, China has constructed its history based on the ‘century of humiliation’. Foreign powers interfered in Chinese politics and tampered with its sovereignty – and deprived China of its dominating position in Asia. Power, in various forms, is central to China’s raison d’état since it defines China’s sovereignty. While sovereignty is a European construction – it has been a part of the Chinese perception of international relations since the 1950s. For that reason, China craves power given that it will ensure its independence and domestic stability. Second, during the Cold War, China was able to rebuild and restructure its economy and obtained access to international institutions. China regained its legitimacy that was lost when branded as the aggressor in the Korean War by the US. With the end of the Cold War, China soon realized the dimension of US power with the first invasion of Iraq, and understood that the American unilateral behavior needed to be restricted. While not attempting to challenge the US globally, China seeks to secure its position as a regional power in Asia. In addition, China has learned that military power needs to be supplemented by
international legitimacy as it has become socialized with the international society, which brings us to the next section on China’s socialization.

### 5.1.2 The International Society

China’s encounter with the international society was equally abrupt as with the anarchic international system – since they were, at the time, both products of the European powers. China learned that the European public international law was used to interfere with China’s domestic affairs. In the years to come, China saw how the rules of the international society were used to decrease its independence and sovereignty. It was not until the end of WWII that China was accepted as a full member to the society of states and was recognized by the other powers in the system. Yet, the experience with the European treaty system made China reluctant toward international cooperation and it constitutes the basis for Chinese skepticism toward international norms, rules, and law.

As Figure 1 showed, China might hold a skeptical view toward international cooperation, but it does engage in intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations. International norms, rules, and laws could restrict China’s behavior, but they also restrict other actors’ behavior. The UN system that once deprived the PRC of its legitimacy has served China’s national interest several times, as China has blocked UN resolutions. The Tiananmen Square confrontation made China realize the meaning of international legitimacy, but maybe more important: the international society is comprised by others actors than great powers. It was foremost the argument of sovereignty, rather than the violent reactions against the demonstrators, that appealed African states’ support to China as it experienced diplomatic isolation. As China has learned how the international society can reduce ones legitimacy, the same structure can be used to rally support and regain legitimacy.

China is today a member of the international society. Whilst it will not follow all norms and rules, China’s participation in the international society is an upward-sloping curve. Kent points out that China has been driven by national and economic interest, but its behavior has also been influenced by the norms and rules of international institutions. However, more important to stress is that China has also affected these international institutions. As noted earlier, the international system and society are not static and they will continue to develop, reflecting
contemporary norms and the balance of power. There is no way to predict the future, but China’s influence will probably increase in the forthcoming century as its economic power progresses. It therefore becomes highly relevant to study China’s impact on the international society’s norms and institutions. As Bull also have pointed out, the existence of one international society, does not rule out the existence of another – creating two competing societies of states. However, it is rather implausible at this point to argue that China would try to develop a parallel system on its own. Yet, several of the sources cited in this essay stresses that China has had, and still has, a foreign policy led by national interest, rather than by international norms.

5.1.3 From Proliferation to Nonproliferation
The Chinese ratification of the NPT was not a linear process and China’s skepticism toward the nonproliferation regime was augmented by its historic experience of the international society. China’s membership to the IAEA was clearly motivated by economic incentives as it would enable China to export its nuclear energy technology, and the transfer of Western technology to enhance its effectiveness further enhanced the benefits. Still, the very cause for China’s shift depends on the multiple variables (or patterns) that this essay has set out to study. The analysis of the actual shift from nuclear proliferation to nonproliferation will be carried out in the next section where the English School’s explanatory power in the case of China’s policy shift will be discussed.

5.2 Analyzing ES Theory and Chinese Proliferation

State actions cannot be reduced to merely responding to an anarchic system, or that states will always cooperate peacefully. Still, while realism and liberalism has flaws, ES theory is not an *absolute* theory of IR. This section will analyze why China has complied with the nonproliferation regime and how ES theory can explain this – thus addressing the two research questions.

ES theory implies that the dependent variable, nonproliferation, is caused by China’s socialization to the society of states, and/or being the result of changed
perception of international system. Yet, a third model has been identified due to the constructivist framework: namely China’s national rationale (domestic and international stability and freedom from foreign interference).

5.2.1 How ES Theory Explains China’s Policy Shift

China’s perception of the international system and the society of states resonate well with how the English School analyses international relations. The anarchic system, although a social construction, constitutes a structure where independent units seek to shape their environment according to those units’ preferences. Given the lack of authority, states rely solely on their own capabilities in order to influence other actors. Yet, while it is true that the international system is anarchic, the system does have rules and limitations. The international society gives meaning to the international system and creates a framework for the spread of norms and the implementation of rules and international law – and China is no exception to this reality. This study has shown that China is indeed a member of the international society and is able to be affected, as well as affecting, the institutions responsible for the norms and rules.

The ES framework has enabled this essay to search for a wide variety of variables in order to explain China’s policy shift. The constructivist interpretation of the English School and the case-study method has streamlined the theory’s methodological inconsistencies and revealed a third independent variable, China’s national rationale. It is of course not that surprising that a state strives for domestic stability. The very principle for forming nation-states is to organize societies into stable units that can defend themselves against foreign power. What is exceptional in the case of China is how important this issue has been when constructing its foreign policy. However, one should bear in mind that China is comprised by many different ethnicities, which have at times resulted in local conflicts. It has had outstanding border disputes with Russia and China still claims ownership over Taiwan. It is consequently not that surprising that China perceives the international system as threatening to its national interests.

The international society has greatly shaped China’s experience of international relations and has indeed influenced its behavior. It would not be possible to explain China’s position in the international system without mentioning its relationship with the international society. The international society
provides a conceptual framework for explaining how states behave in the international system – the system might be anarchic, but actors do try to find ways to cooperate while still stressing national interests.

5.2.2 Why Have China Complied with the Nonproliferation Regime?
The very reason for China to have a policy of proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology resonates with its perception of the international system. The US and the Soviet Union was both considered as possible threats against China. If more states had acquired nuclear weapons, following China’s rationale, power would have been better dispersed in the international system. This would help to decrease the superpower hegemony and make China more independent. Still, the perception of the international system is a product of the reasoning and experiences by the Chinese leadership. As international identity has been formulated by the Chinese leadership, two patterns materialize: maintaining domestic stability and regaining the once lost grandeur – the former being a pragmatic way to restructure the war-torn country and the latter a way to create national unity or national identity (both relating to what has been identified as China’s national rationale).

While the impact of the nationalist idea has to be analyzed separately, the pragmatic policy of domestic stability has material consequences. Creating a sound base for a progressive economy has been the Chinese goal for decades, although observers blinded by the communist cloak might have thought otherwise. Protecting China’s sovereignty meant that the country needed to have the ability to defend itself, stressing military capabilities. Acquiring nuclear weapons became central to China’s military strategy. The spread of nuclear weapons served China’s national interests, which is based on its perception of the international system. China’s perception of the system relates to its history of foreign interference and imperial and superpower hegemony. However, in the 1980s, its attitude shifted and China took part in the Conference on Disarmament. When reading the historical events they indicate that the collapse of the Soviet Union worked as a catalyst for China’s compliance with the nonproliferation regime. However, the collapse worked as a catalyst for many things. For instance, the UN took on a more proactive role in the mid-1990s and without the
superpower stalemate international organizations and institutions thrived. The East-West dichotomy ended, but how important is this catalyst?

To answer this, the Tiananmen Square confrontation provides a useful example – China’s dependence on international legitimacy. To appear as a more responsible stakeholder in the international society, China signed the NPT. Since the balance of power had shifted in the international system, the US appeared even more powerful. The only actual change, from a realpolitik perspective, was that the Soviet Union had disintegrated into several smaller states, with Russia still holding nuclear weapons capabilities. Conversely, this essay has argued that China’s international commitment (see Table 1) provides a benchmark for its socialization with the international society. The international society rests on a sense of shared believes, something that is not easy to maintain. The initial spread of nuclear weapons and technology was caused by China’s perception of the balance of power in the international system. Pakistan balanced India, North Korea balanced Japan, and Iran served both economic incentives as well as a balance to the American-dominated Middle East. Thus, the shift to nonproliferation should also have its basis in China’s perception. While China’s economy might be global, its reach was not – especially when compared with the US. As the Soviet Union was no longer a threat, the chances of China to position itself as the Middle Kingdom, or at least a regional power (or hegemon), increased immensely. To have a nuclear armed Iran, with the possibility of an American offensive is not good for China’s strive for domestic, and now also regional, stability.

5.3 Conclusions

China’s perception of its position in the international system, and its position in Asia, serves as the denominator for China’s foreign policy. China has repeatedly used international institutions for its national interests. In the case of the nonproliferation regime, China’s national interest has coincided with the international regime. This arguing suggests that China adapts to the norms and rules that corresponds with its national interest. While this study has not compared
its results with other cases, it could explain China’s position during climate change negotiations or its views on exporting nuclear technology to Iran. Hence, national interest is not formulated in a vacuum, but is highly dependent on perception. It is therefore possible to argue that while China has complied with the nonproliferation norm, it is unlikely that it will comply with other international norms (such as climate change and proliferation to Iran) as long as it does not correlates with domestic objectives and its perception of the international system.

The international society, in the case of China, is merely one more structure that have conformed China’s behavior and perceptions. The term society demarks a difference from system; processes are more complex and driven by values and beliefs. China has indeed been socialized with the international society, adhering to the norms and rules, but it does so following a realpolitik thinking, securing its national interest and power. This conclusion deviates from the mainstream ES reasoning, which often have a more normative view of the international society. In the case of China, this essay regards the international society to be yet another structure that states (or more particularly, China) is regulated by in an anarchic world order. The international society brings complexity to IR and its importance is not to be neglected. However, given current events, without becoming too speculative, it is possible to argue that China would cease with its proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology as China reclaims its position as the Middle Kingdom.

5.4 The Research Design

The explanatory power of the ES theory and the case study method are the two essential parts of this essay’s research design – this section will discuss their respective usage and issues.

5.4.1 The Explanatory Power of the English School

The explanatory power of ES theory in this essay has much depended on the formulation of the theoretical framework. The three elements of ES theory are the anarchic international system, the international society, and the world society. The
essay highlighted the methodological inconsistencies put forth by scholars, and addressed this issue as it was stated that the study would have a constructivist leaning. By constructivist leaning, the essay regarded the international system and society as social constructions and stressed the importance of how states’ perceptions shape state interest. If the essay had not made this distinction, the result would likely have differed. China’s perception of the international system, as well as construction of history provides the very rationale for China’s behavior. To base the analysis of China’s perception of the international system in accordance with, for instance Waltz, reasoning would have lead to a different conclusion. The very spread nuclear weapons to Asian states would lessen China’s power in the region and would not correspond to structural realist reasoning of a rational actor trying to increase its security. Thus, perception and constructivist interpretation of China have been essential for the above reasoning.

It now becomes apparent that Popper’s argument of theory dependence is an important one. Yet, this essay regards IR to be too complex to be reduced to merely power politics or interdependence. While national interest highly influences Chinese politics, it is not because of a Real World structure, but the Chinese construction of history. The English School has provided a sound framework for analysis, incorporating multiple variables in order to explain China’s shift from proliferation to nonproliferation.

5.4.2 The Case Study Method
The accuracy of the case study method relies on two foundations: reliability and validity. Reliability refers to how precise the researcher has gathered the empirics – meaning that if, for example, ten different researchers measure the same phenomena they would all end up with the same result. This study has chosen the material based on a constructivist approach, meaning that scholars have interpreted China. It has been based on historical accounts and physical actions (such as ratification of treaties). The various sources used, are meant as a way to increase the study’s reliability. Another factor that enhances the reliability is the extended period that the study covers. China’s formulation of national interest is the result of actual historical events that have been reframed by the Chinese leadership for the past 60 years. China’s outspoken strive for domestic stability and sovereignty has been continuous during the studied period. Given that the
reliability will be based on a constructivist method, it is possible to argue that the study has a reasonable reliability. Validity can be divided into an internal and external subgroup. Internal validity relates to the ability to defend the causal connections and not that there are merely correlation. This issue is of course much harder to evaluate since causality is very difficult to establish in social science.

In this essay, ES theory builds its reasoning on two very different assumptions. To say that China has been directly affected by the international system rather than the international society is possible. However, to say that the Soviet Union’s collapse resulted in China’s shift to nonproliferation, or that the international isolation after the Tiananmen Square protests are the causal explanation for China’s shift to nonproliferation is an exaggeration of the findings. It therefore becomes very hard to judge the internal validity. More important is the possibility to generalize the, or external validity. The essay’s case has been defined as a “case of a state’s socialization with the international system and adaptation to a changing international system”. This definition is somewhat narrow and does not increase the study’s generalizability. More interesting is then the issue of the fitting or mis-fitting case.

ES theory claims that as states interacts with the international system, it will become more socialized with the international society, but this process will be voluntary and in the end it will be the state that decides whether it will adhere to the norms and rules of the society of states. Since it has been argued that the case is a theory fitting exception, it would be interesting to involve other international norms in order to identify differences and similarities between several cases. So far, the study has claimed that China is primarily driven by national interest and it does not comply with the democracy norm since it would decrease the CCP’s control over the Chinese population. If an additional study would be carried out to compare the two different norms, it would be able to make a more reliable conclusion in relation to the causal factors behind China’s behavior. It is sound to say that the explanatory single-case study’s most apparent weakness is the lack of comparison, making it possible to analyze the findings even further. The findings now stand alone and are contextual to the single case of Chinese nonproliferation – without saying that they would not be valid if compared with a second case or multiple cases.
5.5 Final Remarks

So far, this chapter has discussed the specific conclusions of the study of China’s compliance with the nonproliferation regime and the explanatory power of ES theory. The explicit purposes have been discussed and the study has generally succeeded what it set out to do – answering the two research questions. However, the implicit purpose has not been dealt with. To understand China’s rationale is an important aspect if one wishes to understand contemporary events of international relations. China’s influence and relevance will probably increase in the coming century and to understand the behavior of this major player is a worthwhile task.

While China has been socialized with the norms and rules of the international society, it is still very hesitant to comply if these do not correspond with China’s long-term strategy. Meanwhile, the Chinese leadership is aware of foreign perception of China – exemplified by the China Threat Theory. As its influence increases and economy becomes interdependent; China needs to appear as a benign power and not as a threat against other actors in the international system. The relationship with foreign powers will also become more complex, making it harder to produce coherent foreign policies. As I researched this study, it appears that rather than having global aspirations, China’s focus will be to establish regional dominance – and not necessarily oppose US power. As explained before, China does not strive to become the second pole in our contemporary system. Instead, China bides its time and waits for a multipolar world order to form, once again making the initial citation of Deng Xiaoping relevant.

In my personal view, this essay’s most important conclusion is the importance of perception when China formulates its foreign policy. Rather than being a product of a systemic setting or driven by normative values – the Chinese leadership’s construction of history and national rationale has proven instrumental for formulating its foreign policy. Reaching this conclusion would not have been possible using a positivistic view of science, leaving out the ability of constructivist interpretation. The essay’s motive to develop (at the most) ES theory is of course overambitious and not very realistic. Yet, this essay has shown the applicability of ES reasoning in the case of China. Given the complexity of
our contemporary world, there is a need for holistic theories that search for explanations beyond the mainstream conceptions of the Real World.


44


Treaties

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Notification of the entry into force

1. By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depositary Governments in Article IX, 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970.

2. The text of the Treaty, taken from a certified true copy provided by one of the Depositary Governments, is reproduced below for the convenience of all Members.

TREATY

ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the “Parties to the Treaty”;

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

ARTICLE III

1. Each Non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.
INFCIRC/140

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

ARTICLE IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

ARTICLE V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclearweapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.
ARTICLE VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

ARTICLE VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

ARTICLE VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January, 1967.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

ARTICLE XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorised, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.