Marketisation of Security


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Abstract

Entangled in a context of increased use of private military and security companies globally, this study sets out to investigate the motivation for Denmark to use private military and security companies (PMSCs) for maritime security in parilious international waters. This study examines the decision making process taking place in the Danish Parliament in 2012 prior to the passing of Law 116 *The amendment of the Firearms Act and the Act on Warfare, etc.* that mandated the shipping industry to hire PMSCs for armed protection of their vessels. A critical discourse analysis has been applied in order to understand the discursive mechanisms present in the political debate prior to the adoption of the law. The analysis shows that a neoliberal market discourse of necessity, efficiency and competition informs the parliamentary debate on international maritime security and pirate threats. That is, the protecting of the Danish industry and trade are found to be a first priority whereas personal security of the employees, the pirates, and control over weapons are only secondary. The findings indicate that in the political discourse, security has become subjected to a market logic. Thus, security is referred to as security for *the market* more than for the population. The thesis argues that this change in thinking about security needs a critical public debate in order to make sure that issues of security stay within the political sphere.

*Key words:* Critical discourse analysis, Denmark, maritime security, neoliberalism, private military and security companies, security.

Words: 13.923
List of abbreviations

CDA = Critical discourse analysis
DF = Dansk Folkeparti
EL = Enhedslisten
KF = Det Konservative Folkeparti
LA = Liberal Alliance
MR = Member Resources
PACS = Peace and Conflict Studies
PMSCs = Private Security and Military Companies
PSS = Private Security Studies
R = Radikale Venstre
S = Socialdemokratiet
SF = Socialistisk Folkeparti
V = Venstre
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1 Introduction

The past thirty years have seen a rapid growth in the field of private military and security companies (PMSCs). The traditional Weberian notion that the state has the monopoly of legitimate use of force seems to be “out of sync with reality” (Abrahamsen & Leander 2017: 1) as states are no longer the sole providers of legitimate force.

In present time, PMSCs are becoming more and more important in the provision of services related to security (Joachim 2018: 1). Services that span from security guards, military personnel, maritime security, logistics, cyber security, and in house alarm systems - services constantly expanding. Similarly, the forms of contracts are multiple and PMSCs are hired both by states, NGOs, individuals, and by other private companies. Many of the PMSCs are multinational companies operating across borders. The world's biggest security company G4S operates in 120 countries with more than 618.000 people employed and Securitas, another large security company, is employing around 300.000 people in 52 different countries (Berndtsson & Stern 2016: 51). Consequently, security can no longer be understood solely within the borders of the nation-state; instead, security has been globalised and commodified. This development poses a huge challenge for regulation and control (Holmqvist 2005; Nevers 2009; Cameron 2006) as PMSCs operate within different legal frameworks with overlapping jurisdictions and often far from the eyes of impartial observers (Liss 2017: 66).

Despite the significant growth in the industry, there has been very little public debate on this development in an European context, and scholars argue that there is discrepancy between how the use of PMSCs are perceived and how such companies are used in reality (Leander 2013; Berndtsson & Østensen 2015). In fact, European countries “tend to deemphasize and hesitate to document the private aspect of their contracting practices” (Leander; 2013: 202). This predicament calls for studying European contracting practices as these are not always in tune with the public assumptions.

Moreover, most existing academic research on private contractors focus on conflict situations and on a very limited number of states – often US, UK, South Africa, and Sierra
Leone (Meegdenburg 2015). Hence, it is necessary to deploy a more nuanced understanding of the growing use of PMSCs in order to understand the complexity of the phenomenon and, importantly, to be able to develop a regulative framework to assure accountability.

This dissertation intents to expand the scope of what is considered important in the debate on privatising security by exploring how Denmark, a country that is seldom mentioned in relations to PMSCs, is actually actively relying on PMSCs in response to international challenges. By studying the discourses connected to change in procedure related to PMSCs in Denmark, this thesis seeks to advance our understanding of the change in the security structure that we are currently witnessing (from public to private). Such knowledge is pivotal in order to more acutely understand the political motivation for the change in the security structure that we are witnessing these years.

1.1 Purpose statement and research question

The aim of this thesis is to explore why Denmark increasingly rely on PMSCs for security tasks. As the scope of the thesis does not allow for an all-encompassing investigation of this topic, the thesis will focus specifically on an addition to the Danish weapon law (Law 116 The amendment of the Firearms Act and the Act on Warfare, etc.) that has made possible outsourcing the use of arms onboard Danish flagged vessels (will be further explained later). With this study, I set out to investigate the discourses related to the decision making process prior to the adoption of Law 116 in order to better understand the political motivation for the change in procedure that the adoption of the law has brought about. Hence, the research question: Which discourses have been present in the decision making process in the Danish Parliament prior to the adoption of Law 116 in Denmark in 2012?

In order to address this research question, I will conduct a critical discourse analysis (CDA) on the decision making process in the Danish Parliament, as CDA serves to be useful to the study of change. The analysis will be inspired by Fairclough's three dimensional model for CDA and, consequently, my operational questions will be arranged around the three dimensions in his model. The first two questions will be investigated with inspiration from
Fairclough’s analytical tools. Whereas the third question will be answered and discussed with the use of a theoretical lense of neoliberalism. This choice of theoretical conceptualisation has been made due to the present political regime in Denmark characterised by outsourcing still more core welfare tasks.

In order to answer my research question, I will make use of the following operational questions:

Q1. How do the speakers in question make use of interdiscursivity and ‘common sense’ assumptions?
   - Hereby, I aim to explore the underlying discourses which have served as legitimation for the decision to adopt Law 116. To answer this question, I will make use of discourse theory connected to the second dimension in Fairclough's model: Discursive practice.

Q2. To what extent does the speakers in question take on responsibility for their attitudes?
   - To answer this question, I will look at the grammar in the document and explore the level of agency and affiliation. This will be done with the use of the analytical tools to analyse the textual level as provided by Fairclough.

Q3. In which way does neoliberal thinking inform the parliamentary debate on Law 116?
   - Answering this question will contextualise the political climate in which the parliamentary discussion took place as well as place the findings related to Q1 and Q2 in a larger context.

Answering these three questions, I aim to provide a comprehensive understanding of the specific discourses at play in the Danish Parliament prior to the changing of Law 116 as well as the broader contexts informing these discourse, with the overall aim at understanding the view on PMSCs in the Danish Parliament at this point in time.
1.2 Relevance to Peace and Conflict Studies

The character of war and conflict has changed radically since the total wars of the beginning of the last century (Kaldor 2013). Where old wars are characterised as wars fought through battle by regular armed forces of states often for geopolitical interests and/or ideology and financed by the state, new wars, cast in an era of globalisation, are characterised by various actors, interests, and financiers. In new wars, PMSCs are playing a central role in both war and security provision and are both involved in direct violence with use of arms in conflict zones (see. e.g.: Abrahamsen & Williams 2010; Hough 2007; Singer 2005) but also involved in violence in everyday situations as, e.g., private armed guards are becoming increasingly common (Berndtsson & Stern 2016). The study of PMSCs and the way such companies are employed is thus of central importance to the field of Peace and Conflicts Studies as the main objective of Peace and Conflict Studies is to diminish violence - both cultural, structural and direct (Galtung 1969). As PMSCs are increasingly becoming actors involved in direct violence, understanding the structures allowing for this to take place is essential in order to make this transformation as democratic and transparent as possible, secure accountability of these companies, secure their adherence to human rights, and avoid potential misuse of arms.

Finally, as PMSCs are a fast growing actor in the global security structure, it is paramount to understand the political decision making processes that are assisting this change in procedure to take place. This is urgent both in order to assign responsibility for military operations and in order to facilitate critical reflection of and question the underlying rationale for such change.

1.3 Limitations and delimitations

The research design employed in this study does not permit a high level of generalisability. That said, by leaning on previous studies, this study can serve as a piece in a larger puzzle and hereby contribute to a more general understanding of the motivation for states to use PMSCs. However, generalisability is not a goal in itself for this study. Rather, the aim is to shed light on a specific decision making process and in line this CDA is conducted on the
rather limited amount of available material connected to the adoption of Law 116. Such a reality narrows what can actually be studied, and consequently also narrows the scope of what can be concluded based on this thesis. Hence, the conclusions of this study is delimited to a specific time and place.

Similarly, strict validity and objectivity is hard to obtain as the underlying assumption in CDA is that several truths claims exist simultaneously. Moreover, this analysis is also a result of my own biases as a researcher, which is why I find it important to outline the personal perspectives that I bring to the analysis. This will be done in section 5.1.1.

Finally, CDA is a comprehensive approach that offers a lot of analytical tools but due to the limited scope of this thesis, I have had to choose to focus on only the most prominent aspects. Among others, it is relevant to mention that I could beneficially have had a more comprehensive outlining of the discursive field; as there are more relevant findings that what I have had the space to include.

1.4 Thesis outline

The thesis consists of seven chapters. After now having read the introduction, chapter 2 will provide background knowledge on Law 116 and the context in which it has been adopted. Chapter 3 examines previous research on PMSCs arguing that there is a need for studies with a more inclusive, nuanced and empirical focus. Chapter 4 outlines the theoretical framework of the thesis, mainly, critical discourse analysis (CDA) and neoliberal theory. In chapter 5 the methodological underpinnings of the study is outlined aiming to make my procedure as transparent as possible. The analysis in chapter 6 consists of three parts following Fairclough's three dimensional model, followed by an analytical discussion of the findings. The final chapter concludes on my findings and argues for the need of additional research on the area.
2 Background

This chapter provides some basic information on the Danish state, it’s PMSCs contracting practises, and the content of the specific law under investigation in this study. This knowledge is important in order to understand the context in which Law 116 has been adapted and, especially, why this Law marks an important change in procedure in a Danish context.

The nation-state of Denmark can be characterized as a strong and universalistic welfare state. Denmark has a large and developed public sector financed by a high level of taxation providing a broad range of services to all citizens; services such as health care, education and security in general (Esping-Andersen 1990: 27-28). However, in the last decades, triggered by economic crises in the 1970’s, The Government focus has increasingly shifted from developing the welfare state towards making it more efficient. For instance, New Public Management techniques has been implemented alongside marketisation and outsourcing of multiple welfare services (Sørensen & Torfing 2012: 3; Pestoff 2012: 13-15). That said, Denmark is still characterised as a universalistic welfare state with one of the highest tax burdens in the world (Dupont & Sunesen 2017).

In line, Danish Governments have been reluctant to make use of PMSCs for lethal tasks in national contexts and when involved in international operations PMSCs have almost exclusively been employed to take care of logistical tasks (Mandrup 2013: 45). Nevertheless, the use of private contractors for such tasks has increased significantly with a total expenditure of 12.26 million euros in 2003 to 25.14 million euro in 2007 (ibid.). This doubling in expenditures in only 4 years shows a clear tendency towards increased reliance on private contractors. The policy of primarily using PMSCs for logistic tasks is closely connected to the fact that Denmark has a very strict law on firearm possession; for instance, in order to carry a gun, one needs a permission from the Ministry of Justice or the Police (Retsinformation 2012).
However, from June 30, 2012 a rather exceptional addition to the Danish law on firearm possession was added (see: Retsinformation 2012a). This addition regards shipping companies’ ability to hire PMSCs. Up to this date, every contract for engaging armed protection on vessels had to be approved by the Ministry of Justice judging whether or not such action was necessary, as the Ministry also had to approve the individual contractor or person. But from this date Danish flagged vessels can apply the Ministry for one-year permissions to independently hiring PMSCs for protection. Such a reality means that the owners of the shipping companies are now in charge of hiring armed PMSCs and are the ones to evaluate whether or not the personnel under consideration are sufficiently educated, have adhered to existing laws and regulations, have a suiting and professional approach, and, finally, judge which situations calls for a need of armed protection. Consequently, the Danish Government has, by this law, outsourced the decision on who can carry arms to private enterprises (the shipping companies).

In short, the change in the law on firearm possession in Denmark in 2012 is both quite exceptional in a Danish legal context regarding outsourcing of armed security, and at the same time in line with the general tendency of privatisation seen in the Danish welfare policy (as outlined above).
3 Previous research

This chapter reviews previous research in the field of PMSCs outlining the main trends in the literature and arguing that there is a need for a more inclusive focus due to the complex, expanding, and transnational character of the private military and security industry.

3.1 The main themes in the literature on PMSCs

In the mid-1990s publications began to appear on private security then followed by a huge increase in publications in the beginning of the 2000s, and we still see a growing amount of research on the topic (Abrahamsen & Leander 2017: 4).

As already touched upon, the studies on private security companies have had a tendency towards a certain focus. Meegdenburg (2015), who conducted a study based on a content analysis on 111 published studies of private security companies, found that 55% of these studies are concerned with either US or UK as the contractors and only 7% included other countries than US, UK, Germany, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Angola, and Former Yugoslavia (Meegdenburg 2015: 333). The author explains this finding partly as a consequence of more information being available on these countries in mention. Similarly, Berndtsson and Stern (2017: 52) argue that studies of private security have a tendency to focus on the “more spectacular use of armed security contractors in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq”. Such a focus is of course both necessary and important, but as Meegdenburg also points out it is also necessary to study other aspects of private security in order to get a more complete picture and a fuller understanding of the growing complex industry of security. In addition to the relatively narrow focus in the literature on only certain states, there is also a quite delimited focus when it comes to the content of the literature. A range of authors emphasise issues such as power, accountability, regulation, and control (see e.g.: Avant 2005, Kaldor 2012; Leander 2013; Petersohn 2015). Issues that are important to discuss, but often
these approaches are of a theoretical kind with only limited empirical backing (Abrahamsen & Williams 2011: 5).

In the following sections I will briefly sketch out the main arguments in the existing literature keeping the above mentioned concerns in mind.

3.1.1 The public-private relationship

With Weber’s essay Politics as a Vocation (1919) the idea that the monopoly of physical violence was at the core of the nation state was born. This argument has been widely acknowledged and plays a central part in the critique of the increased reliance on PMSCs as many scholars argue that PMSCs distort this monopoly and, ultimately, challenge state authority and power over security provision and decisions (Leander 2005; Gaston 2008).

As an example, in her article The Power to Construct International Security, Anna Leander argues that the emergence of PSMCs has shifted the location of power from the “public/the state to the private/market” (2005: 803) and she finds that this poses great challenges to the possibilities of both regulation and accountability. In line with this, it is a concern that if states are undercut by private security providers it challenges the “traditional cores of security governance” (Holmquist 2005: 8) and, consequently, also risk destabilising the international system as we know it today (ibid.). To continue, it is not only the mere physical power that are debated in the literature, but also the structural power that the industry holds in relation to being security experts, and, consequently, partaking in framing what is to be considered as security issues (Leander 2005). Such insight is important, as the discussion about PMSCs is then not just about the power related to physical force, but also about the discursive power related to framing something as a matter of security in the first place.

Whatsoever, the clearecut state-versus-private division that has been characteristic for many publications on PMSCs, has also been challenged. In their book: Security Beyond the State, Private Security in International Politics, Abrahamsen and Williams introduce a new way of understanding privatisation of security in relation to power structures and legitimacy. They argue that PMSCs do not necessarily threaten the power and authority of the state, rather, the proliferation of PMSCs shall be understood due to “changes inside the state”
(2011: 3), and, consequently, “state power is certainly reconfigured, but not necessarily weakened” (ibid.). Understanding this new context for security provision is important, as it is no longer possible to understand the nature of the global security structure solely within the boundaries of the nation state. Abrahamsen and Williams coins this transformation: *global security assemblages* and argues that security practices are now “simultaneously public and private, and global and local” (ibid.).

In short, the main critique of the increased reliance on PMSCs for security tasks is that this will transfer power from the state to the private sphere. Either as an unintended development or as a result of deliberate decisions made within the state. The concerns scholars raise regarding such transformation of power over security decisions closely relates to issues of regulation, accountability and control. Issues that I will turn to now.

### 3.1.2 Regulation, accountability and control

In the academic discussion on PMSCs the potential power of state control and accountability of the private companies are often discussed, and often this discussion relates to conflict and military activities where the consequences are clear and visible (see e.g.: Cameron 2006; Fayemi & Musah 1999; Holmquist 2005; Leander 2013). Especially, a specific focus on the early military companies such as Blackwater, Sandline International, and Executive Outcomes (see e.g.: Seahill 2008; Dinnen 2017; Montague 2002), the use of PMSCs in the Iraq war (see e.g.: Avant 2004; Singer 2008; and Schreier & Caparini 2005) and also the use of private policing in South Africa (see e.g.: Baker 2002; Minnaar 2005) are often referred to in the academic literature.

The main criticism in these studies is that privatisation of security diffuses states’ control of violence and diffuses the question of accountability (Avant 2005: 157; Singer 2008). This is so, as PMSCs are private enterprises structured around a market logic of seeking profit and, consequently, aim for cost effectiveness. It is argued, that this may lead to human right abuses as there is only little control of employees in the PMSCs and, moreover, only little “incentive for firms to report” possible incidents (Singer 2008: 215). Moreover, scholars argue that there are not sufficient regulation regarding PMSCs activities (see e.g.:}
Schreier 2005: 71; Cameron 2006; Gaston 2008) and, consequently, it is difficult to secure accountability in relation to PMSCs activities as they operate within different legal frameworks and often far away from impartial observers (Liss 2017: 66).

In short, the three issues of accountability, control and regulation are closely connected in the literature. The argument is that states are no longer able to fully secure accountability when increasingly relying on PMSCs as there are currently no sufficient regulation possibilities.

The concerns outlined above can lead to a general understanding that the issue of accountability and importance of regulation is most relevant in spectacular situations where the direct short term effects of a lack of accountability and regulation are most visible and serious. Such a narrow focus on the ‘visible’ and the ‘serious’ consequences tends to de-emphasise the importance of other aspects of security privatisation taking place in less spectacular environments. However, it is arguable that the same problematic issues are at play in many other aspects of security privatisation and that these go unnoticed as the focus tends to be on the spectacular. Paradoxically enough, as many PMSCs do operate both in conflict zones and in everyday non-conflict contexts (e.g.: G4S in a Danish context (Mandrup 2013: 45)). In such non-conflict contexts the same mechanism of decreased state control over security provision is a reality but goes slightly unnoticed in the public and political debate (Abrahamsen & Williams 2011; Leander 2013: 205).

3.2 Summarising the literature and identifying a gap

To sum up, academic debates on PMSCs have to a high extent focused on only certain states and on certain issues (regulation, control, and accountability). Due to lack of data available there has been an overweight of theoretically informed studies critically discussing how PMSCs pose challenges to regulation, control, and accountability. And these studies have for the most part investigated the same contexts of a few countries and episodes. As a result, there is a gap in the literature concerning the use of PMSCs. Especially, there is a lack of studies focussing on (among others) European states and studies with a thorough empirical foundation.
Consequently, there is a need for empirical investigations of more concrete and everyday aspects of the private military and security industry in order to reach a more nuanced understanding of the scope of the phenomena. Especially, I would argue that there is a gap in the literature dealing with motivations and explanations for this change in procedure towards relying more and more on PMSCs. Such knowledge is necessary in order to understand not only the consequences of such change, but also the motivation for such change in order to better be able to discuss the underlying assumptions that accompanies this change in action. The study at hand aims to contribute to filling this knowledge gap by shedding light on the present discourses in the Danish Parliament prior to the adoption of Law 116.
In this chapter I introduce the discursive theoretical framework that the analysis in chapter 6 will be based upon. Discourse analysis is not only a tool for analysis but has to be seen more as a ‘package deal’ sharing both ontological and epistemological perceptions of reality (however, these vary slightly within the field of discourse analysis), theoretical models, and methodological guidelines. Consequently, for this study, the critical discourse analysis employed will entail both theoretical and methodological consideration as these are intertwined and, in fact, this premise has to be acknowledged in order to use the approach (Jørgensen & Phillips 2013: 12). However, I will seek to make a distinction, developing the concrete consideration on method in chapter 5.

This chapter will be divided into two parts where the first outlines the discourse analytical framework that this study is leaning on and the second part discusses neoliberal theory in order to create a conceptual framework for the coming analysis.

4.1 Discourse analytical framework

This section will outline Fairclough’s version of critical discourse analysis (CDA), which will be the dominant framework for my analysis. CDA has been developed with the purpose of investigating the relationship between discursive practices and social and cultural changes in a given setting (Jørgensen & Phillips 2013: 72). The underlying premises of CDA is that reality is constructed and consequently change is possible. Within CDA, language is seen as social practice and, consequently, the context of language use is crucial for analysis (Wodak 2008: 5). CDA, therefore, is not interested in solely investigating linguistics per se but in studying social phenomenons (ibid.: 2). CDA is a problem oriented approach seeking to discover and also de-mystify ideologies and power relations. Hence, CDA is not considered a
political neutral analytical tool as the purpose of CDA is to generate social change (Jørgensen & Phillips 2013: 76).

To Fairclough, discourses do not simply “shape and re-shape social structures and processes” (Jørgensen & Phillips 2013: 74) but do also serve as reflections of social practises. Consequently, discourses are not only creating the social world but can be affected by practices and events that do not have a discursive character. Therefore, Fairclough argues that it is necessary to involve both a textual and social analysis. In order to include these elements, he has developed a three dimensional model to guide the analysis (see Figure 1). He argues that all three dimensions of the model have to be studied in order to make a comprehensive CDA (Fairclough 1992: 73).

Figure 1, Fairclough’s three-dimensional model for CDA (Fairclough 1992: 73).

To Fairclough (1989), discourses are to be seen as the entire process of social interaction involving all three aspects of the three dimensional model. Texts are seen as a part of the overall discourse, but as “a product rather than a process” (Fairclough 1989: 24). The first dimension of CDA is concerned with the concrete text under investigation. This can be a speech, newspaper, interview or any other written text or use of language and the concrete tools for examining the text are to look at e.g vocabulary, grammar and textual structures (Fairclough 1989: 111). The second dimension focus on The discursive practises and are concerned with intertextualities and interpretation of the material; regarding both the production of the material and the interpretation of it. In the third dimension, Social Practice,
social theories and social contexts are employed in order to contextualise and understand the discourse in a wider societal context (Jørgensen & Phillips 2013: 81).

When interpreting and analysing data, Fairclough argues that the researcher has to draw upon her own background knowledge and experiences (as this is the only possible way of doing it anyway). He argues that it is only “the self-consciousness that distinguishes the analysis from the participants she is analysing” (Fairclough 1989: 167), and, furthermore, that the analyst is “consented to explicate what she is doing” (ibid.). What the researcher brings into the analysis Fairclough describes as member resources (MR), and the MR I bring into the analysis will be explained in section 5.1.1.

In short, according to CDA discourses are at one and the same time constituted in practice and constitutive for practice. This is why I in my following analysis will look at both the discursive mechanisms and the wider societal context that the adoption of the law can be seen as a product of.

4.2 Conceptual framework

Following the assumptions that CDA has to involve the social context in which discourses play out, I will in this section outline the contours of what I consider to be the most important ideological and political social context of the discourses I am to analyse. More specifically, the following section will focus on neoliberalism and the competition state as the passing of Law 116 is to be understood in the light of an eпоche where the belief in the market forces has gained prominence and where the traditional welfare state has changed more and more into a competition state.

4.2.1 Neoliberalism and the marketisation of discourse

Neoliberalism, in this paper, is referred to as a set of ideas springing from traditional laissez-faire economic liberalism (Haymes & Miller 2015). Its main objective is to create better conditions for free markets to act and consequently to limit the use of government interventions. According to neoliberal thinking this aim is to be achieved by a high level of
privatisation and deregulation inside the nation states, and internationally by promoting free trade via international institutions - not states - and by enhancing the role of multinational corporations (see e.g.: The Chicago School). This political vision is rooted in neoclassical economic theory which suggests that markets can allocate resources more efficiently than governments. In neoclassical economics (and neoliberalism) ‘efficient’ refers to the maximisation of profits and not (re)distribution of wealth.

Neoliberalism gained political significance in the 1970’s and 1980’s, at least in the western political hemisphere, with Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan as prominent promoters of these ideas, and neoliberalism has in different ways continued to influence economic policy in many states (Harvey 2005: 21, Watson 2017: 13). In Denmark, the former prime minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen was a promoter of a neoliberal shift in politics as, for instance, envisioned in his book *The minimal state*. Prior to the neoliberalist era, in the early postwar period, the accepted political wisdom followed by most western governments was that certain aspects of social life should be kept apart from the influence of the market (Watson 2017: 12). But when conventional political thinking was more and more informed by neoliberalism, an increased range of areas were believed to be more efficiently governed by market forces and not state intervention. In other words, the marketisation of former publics sectors has increasingly been envisaged to deliver better outcomes both for the economy and society at large (Watson 2017: 13).

This belief in the advantage of markets has been criticised, the argument is that such process is leading to more *inequality* and *depoliticised* conditions in democracies. As regards inequality, Giroux and Giroux argues that the end result of neoliberalist policies is that “private interests trumps social needs, and economic growth becomes more important than social justice” (Giroux & Giroux 2004: 250). A common critique is also that by leaving still more areas to the market, political control and participatory democracy is endangered (McChesney 1999: 11, MacEwan 1999: 5), an argument resembling the notion of depoliticisation. A notion that can be described as a process where policy is no longer the result of a complex democratic political debate, but more a kind of ‘governance autopilot’ producing seemingly effective solutions not reflecting the give-and-take politics of democracy (Watson 2017: 14). When leaving policy and, especially, economic policy, to the market forces, politicians increasingly speak about policy as a matter of necessity as the logic
of the market forces tends to single out only one solution as the most efficient one (ibid.). Furthermore, when policy outcomes are considered unfavorable (at least for certain parts of the population), leaving the responsibility to the ‘necessity’ of market forces can function as a kind of excuse for politicians; it is not their decisions but the logic of the market forces. Such change in political thinking has also influenced public discourse as market discourses have increasingly colonised the discursive practices of many public institutions (Jørgensen & Phillips 2013: 84). As an example, Fairclough argues that where the welfare discourse has previously been dominating, it is now fighting with other discourses such as a neoliberal consumer discourse (a discourse that has previously been solely concerned with the market discourse) (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999: 84).

In short, neoliberal ideas combined with its inherent potential to depoliticise has led to a privatisation of different spheres of the welfare society, and different policies to been seen as ‘necessary’. This development has been criticised for trumping social needs as economic growth has become more important than social equality.

4.2.2 The Competition State

Globalisation and the influence of neoliberal ideas has opened up for new levels of international competitiveness. Whereas competition previously took place at a firm to firm level, competition is now taking place at the level of the national economy and thus play a significant role in policy-making discourses (Watson 2005: 200). It is no longer only firms that have to be competitive, but the environment in which firms operate, as firms can easily change environments. Hereby, competition has, together with globalisation, to a larger extent become a concern at state level. Instead of de-commodifying welfare activities, such as guaranteeing public health insurances in contrast to health insurances being a product, as the welfare state’s intention has traditionally been, the marketisation of states has led to “make economic activities located within the national territory….more competitive in international and transnational terms” (Gerny 1997: 259). Consequently, “the transformation of the nation-state into a competition state lies at the heart of political globalisation” (Gerny 1997: 251) as the state has to a larger extent become a competing actor itself.
In short, the competition state is not only shaped by domestic democratic needs, but increasingly by the demands of international corporations leaving now both states and corporations as competing actors in the international system.
5 Methodology

This chapter provides an overview of the research design and the method used for this study in order to give the reader an understanding of the methodological assumptions underlying the study. In section 5.1 Research design, I will start by explaining the design chosen for this study and then continue explaining the member resources that I as a researcher has brought into the analysis. Section 5.2 Method will include the methodological considerations related to conducting this study and the concrete tools used to operationalise the analysis. Finally, the last two sections will 1) explain the material and 2) critically evaluate the source.

5.1 Research design

The research design chosen for this study is organised around a case examining data related to one specific decision making process with the intent of understanding how the Danish Government argue in favour of using PMSCs as a response to piracy threats. The strengths of such design is that it allows for a thorough and in depth analysis of the exact situation under investigation. Furthermore, given the limited scope of this thesis, focusing on only one document has made it possible to make a comprehensive analysis of this decision making process. As I am studying change, a comparison to earlier debates on the same topic could have served useful and added valuable insight. However, that would only have allowed room for two shorter analyses. Therefore, I have prefered to make one comprehensive analysis as I believe this gives more insight into the specific case under investigation. As a consequence of focusing on one specific case, the conclusions and insight that I draw based on this research is also limited to this specific case as well. However, as previously argued, there is a lack of case specific studies on the use of PMSCs and especially studies on political decisions regarding the topic. Consequently, I find it arguable that even though this study will only contribute very narrowly to the overall field of study, the design I have chosen, through
giving in depth insight into only one specific situation, can potentially contribute to the larger field of studies related to PMSC.

The research design of this study is constructivist in nature as the presumption of discourse analysis is that reality is constructed through (or partly through) language (Laclau & Mouffe 1985, Jørgensen & Phillips 2013) and, thus, that several realities exist and how these are understood depends on the eyes of the beholder. As a result, the next section discusses my personal biases that shape my worldview.

5.1.1 Research bias

As for the scope of this study, there are no direct involvement with any participants. There have been conducted no interviews, experiments or in other way been an interaction with other human beings and there are no obvious ethical issues connected with the research. Consequently, the most important thing to accentuate is the possible pitfalls regarding the personal standpoints that I have as a researcher (my MR) and these will be sought described in the following paragraphs.

First, as I hope is already clear, my motivation for undertaking this study, is to make a critical investigation of the recent and rapid increase in the use of PMSCs in a range of areas. When I as a researcher already have a critical or even antagonistic attitude towards the topic under investigation there are some possible pitfalls. Especially, there is a risk that my own worldview and opinions will influence how I understand the data and, thus, the conclusions I will make. However, leaning on Fairclough’s assumption that by acknowledging and clearly describing such critical point of departure this kind of research still differentiates itself from general interpretations (1989: 141). Resultly, I find it arguable that the study can still give valuable insight into this specific case, as the reader can herself determine whether or not to accept the underlying premises for the analysis.

Secondly, it is important to mention my Danish cultural background. I have grown up in a society with a well-functioning welfare state that has offered me, among other things, free education, free health insurance, freedom of speech and a general feeling of security. Based on such experiences, I might have a more positive view on the state than what would be found elsewhere and, consequently, I might perceive the privatisation of core services,
such as security, as more problematic than would people with a different socio-cultural background. In other words, another researcher with dissimilar cultural background might have interpreted the data under investigation differently due to different experiences with the state.

Thirdly, I am analysing a Danish political decision making process and as I am both a Dane and politically interested I already have both sympathies for some of the political parties (those on the political left) and disregards for others - I vote for one of them and certainly disagree with others. This bias will most probably influence my interpretation of the individual political parties’ statements. My political positioning will probably also influence the way I analyse and interpret neoliberalism and privatisation in the present study, as I have a somewhat critical view on those developments.

Together, these member resources render me overall critical to the change that I am analysing which can of course be argued to be problematic as I might dismiss important aspects in the analysis or unnecessarily highlight others. However, by leaning on the CDA method’s assumption that by making these personal biases explicit, CDA differs from everyday interpretation, and by making my own procedure clear in the following two sections, I believe that my analysis does offer valuable insight of scientific character.

5.2 Method of analysis

For the purpose of this study, I rely on Fairclough's three dimensional model for critical discourse analysis and I use the analytical tools as described in Language and Power (Fairclough 1989). In addition, I have drawn upon Jørgensen and Phillips’ conceptualisation of Fairclough’s CDA (Jørgensen and Phillip 2013: 79-104) as inspiration. Inspired by these two authors, I will use discourse as an analytical concept for my analysis. I have preferred CDA over other types of discourse analysis as CDA has its roots in critical theory which implies that social theory “should be oriented towards critiquing and changing society as a whole” (Wodak 2008: 6). I see this approach as fruitful to my study, as I believe that the political motivation for the increased reliance on PMSCs needs thorough critical
investigation. Such an investigation could have been more difficult to carry out using another and less critical approach.

For the more concrete performance of the analysis, David Ayers’ (2005) work on neoliberal ideology in community college mission statements has served as inspiration. Similarly, I have sought inspiration in Fairclough’s own CDA on health and educational systems in which he argues that a neoliberal consumer discourse has taken over the previously dominating welfare discourse (Fairclough 1993, 1998). Moreover, in these studies, he shows how market discourses have been incorporated into public institutions’ discursive practices in late modernity. Relying on this previous work places my study in a broader trend of identifying how market-discourses infiltrate and effect upon public discourses, and for the case of my study demonstrate this in relation to security provision in a Danish context. In the following section I will present the more concrete methodological tools that I have made use of in my analysis.

5.2.1 How to go about it

My analysis falls in three parts - one part reflecting each step in the model (figure 1). However, I have (with inspiration from Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 93-100) switched around step one and two, as I believe the textual dimension (step one) serves its purpose better in the light of the interpretations from part two on discursive practice.

In the first section, discursive practice, I examine the interdiscursivity and the underlying common-sense assumptions in the arguments in the document. I have identified the common sense assumptions by interpreting the underlying rationality or logic of the arguments in the data. In the second section, text, I concentrate on the two aspects of the analysis that I find most fruitful for this study. I have used the grammatical tools of modalities and transitivity in order to examine how agency is expressed in the document, by looking at how the speakers make use of truth claims and to what extent they are affiliated with their speech-act. This choice is based on the idea that the level of affiliation and whether or not the politicians take on active agency reveal important insight into the degree to which the politicians take on responsibility for their decisions. In the third stage of the analysis I use
the conceptual framework outlined in chapter 4.2 in order to contextualise the findings of the two previous sections into the larger social context of neoliberalism and the competition state.

I have conducted my work exploratively and have thus adjusted my conceptual framework along the way in order to contextualise my findings the best way possible. Consequently, the social context of neoliberalism and the competition state is chosen partly based on the findings revealed by the interpretive part of the analysis, partly by inspiration from Ayers (2005) and Fairclough’s (1993) work on marketisation of public discourses (as mentioned above), and finally due to the current trend in Danish politics of privatising core welfare tasks as explained in the background chapter.

5.2.1.1 Operationalisation of discourses

In order to make the discourses explored in the analysis in chapter 6 as clear as possible, the following section briefly outlines the core words and concepts used to identify the discourses.

I identify two main discourses: a market discourse and a security discourse. To identify a market discourse, I have identified concrete words and concepts that refer to the market. These are, for example: market, trade, world trade, free trade, free market, protection of the market, efficiency, necessity, and competition. I have especially emphasised concepts such as: efficiency, necessity, and competition, as these concepts are often referred to as ‘the main arguments’ within a neoliberal market logic (see e.g. my conceptual framework in chapter 4.2 and Springer 2012).

To identify a security discourse, I have similarly identified both concrete words and concepts that traditionally relates to security. These are words or sentences describing how something or someone are endangered. These are, for example: that something poses a threat, that something is endangered, to secure something, protect, and enemy.

5.3 Material

Within CDA there are multiple ways of gathering data. However, most often already existing data are used for analysis (Wodak 2008). This is so, as the goal of CDA is to see how
discourses are articulated in a certain already existing constellation, and consequently secondary data is often best suited. In line with this, the material used for this analysis is secondary data as the aim is to explore the prominent discourses in the debates antecedent the adoption of law 116.

The following CDA is based on an oral parliamentary debate taking place on the 10th of April, 2012. The debate is transcribed verbatim and can be found at Folketingets web-page (Folketinget 2018a). My following analysis is based on this debate and consequently all citations used in the analysis are from the same document (Folketinget 2018a). As this is the case, I will, in the analysis, only quote the political parties and page (e.g. (V: 8)) and not the source (Folketinget 2018a).

The choice of this material is based on the assumption that I hereby will be able to explore which discourses have been dominant in the process before the adoption of the law, and, consequently, legitimised the outsourcing of control of force from the Danish state. This strategy of inquiry has been straightforward as all political debates in Denmark are made accessible to the public. As a result, I have been able to get hands on the data through the Danish Parliament's webpage (Folketinget.dk).

5.3.1 The context and content of the data

This section will provide background information relevant for understanding my data. This will be done in order to keep the analysis analytical and avoid having to many descriptive elements along the way.

First, it is important to notice that what is analysed is part of a political debate with different politicians and political parties having their different standpoints. In the analysis, I refer to the following political parties: Enhedslisten (EL), Socialistisk Folkeparti (SF), Socialdemokratiet (S), Dansk Folkeparti (DF), Radikale Venstre (R), Venstre (V), Det Konservative Folkeparti (KF), and Liberal Alliance (LA). The debate in the Parliament has taken place with contributions from all the above mentioned parties. The president of the Parliament, chairs the negotiation and calls upon the representants of the different parties to speak in turns and they are free to speak without being interrupted. Hereafter, other members of the Parliament are given the opportunity to ask questions, and occasionally they do so. The
statements analysed in this thesis are thus the politicians’ (each representing their parties) attitudes towards the adoption of Law 116 including that shipping companies are granted a one year permit to be in charge of the hiring of armed protection. In short, in the debate analysed the politicians are offering their attitudes to weather or not to give increased power to shipping companies so that they can themself easier and faster decide who to hire for armed protection. The problem the passing of the law should help solving is the increased amount of piracy attacks in the Gulf of Aden and outside the coast of West Africa. The different politicians have a range of different arguments on the issue. However, all political parties (V, S, R, LA, KF, SF, DF) except EL voted for the proposal (Retsinformation 2012b) and, as it follows, only few arguments against the law have been offered in the debate; implying that a rather uniform attitude exists among the rest of the parties.

5.4 Source criticism

Due to the character of my sources and their close proximity in time and place, my sources can definitely be argued to fulfill the criterion of proximity (Dulic 2011: 37) and thus also to be authentic. Moreover, the context wherein the material is produced is very clear (it is also recorded and accessible on video) and there is no confusion as to what the material is referring to. As a result, the quality of the material can be argued to be very good and reliable. However, the transferability of the analysis based on only one source is low as the source only says something about a rather specific time and space.

Moreover, as the data only represent one context (the parliamentary debate) it could be questioned if there is enough data to actually answer my research aim. To continue, I have limited insight into whether there might be some material or discussions that has not been recorded and transcribed, which leaves an uncertainty in relation to whether the findings include all relevant aspects of the discussion before the adoption of the law. Despite this, the aim of this research is only to say something about the discourses within this specific decision making process, and, consequently, I would argue that by limiting my conclusion to say something about this specific debate, it does not matter if additional material actually exist. Finally, the material that I have used is written in Danish. I am myself a fluent native
Danish speaker so that is not a problem in itself. However, I am not a native English speaker and I have conducted the translations myself. Consequently, there is a chance that some meaning might not get transferred correctly to the reader.
6 Analysis

The following analysis will be divided into three parts structured around my three operational questions with each part having a brief conclusion. At the end of the analysis, I will critically discuss the findings and compare them to previous research on PMSCs. The first part of my analysis will show how the politicians in the Danish parliamentary discussion make use of two main discourses; a market discourse, and a security discourse. The market discourse are characterised by phrasings and understandings related to a vocabulary of ‘efficiency’, ‘necessity’, and ‘competition’. The security discourse mostly refers to a market logic of ‘security for the market’ and ‘secure trade’. Based on these findings, I argue that the security discourse is, with its high level of interdiscursivity, informed and even subjected to the market discourse. In the second part I identify how the politicians in the debate only take on limited agency in regards to their statements as the argue to act out of necessity more than out of own opinions. Finally, in the third part I argue that neoliberalism can be used to contextualise 1) my discursive findings and, 2) the social context that Law 116 has been adopted within.

6.1 Discursive practices

This section will focus mainly on text MR interpretation in which “interpretations are generated through a combination of what is in the text and what is ‘in’ the interpreter” (Fairclough 1989: 141). I will be making use of the analytical tools of interdiscursivity and common sense assumptions in order to explore which discourses the speakers are relying on and speaking into.
6.1.1 Interdiscursivity

In this section I identify how the speakers draw on already existing discourses and on how they make use of interdiscursivity\(^1\). Doing so will allow me to analyse in what way discourses are combined and drawn upon and thus see whether it is done in a creative or conventional way (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: 73), and hereby I will be able to analyse whether or not there are a room for change.

Within the document, the speakers extensively draw on a market discourse\(^2\) in several ways. First, the speakers make use of a business-inspired vocabulary as, for instance: “more flexible weapon permits” (LA: 15), “efficiency” (V: 2). Words such as ‘flexible’ and ‘efficiency’ clearly associate with a market logic and the idea of competition that this logic is build upon. Moreover, administration is referred to several times: “administrative trouble” (S: 3), “administrative relief” (SF: 6). Administration is not necessarily a word connected to ideas about the market as also in the state a lot of administrative work take place. However, it is interesting how the word in these contexts are associated with the idea that there should be as little administration as possible. Moreover, in the document, ‘administration’ is linked to other words such as ‘trouble’ and in this way associate to ideas of efficiency, which is related to a business-inspired vocabulary. So, not only do the speakers use words from a market inspired discourse, they also attach seemingly neutral words (or, one could argue, a word from another discourse), to the market discourse by linking them together with other words that adds such meaning to them.

Within the market discourse there is an articulated use of arguments referring to state competition; for instance, “With this proposal, we kind of secure Danish ships to stay under Danish flag” (LA: 15), “A proposal that will be good for the industry, and thus good for Denmark” (LA: 15), and “We support this proposal because it facilitates case processing” (SF: 8). All these statements are based on the idea that what is good for the private sector is also good for Denmark, which is a classic assumption within the market logic and by drawing

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\(^1\) Understood as: “The use of elements in one discourse and social practice which carry institutional and social meanings from other discourses and social practices” (Candlin and Maley 1997: 212).

\(^2\) The Market discourse is to be understood as utterances that connects to words such as e.g. ‘efficiency’, ‘necessity’, and ‘competition’ as outlined in chapter 5.2.1.1 and explained in Ayers work (2005).
on a market discourse such arguments reinforce the importance of the idea that competition creates better societies.

To continue, the issue of piracy in itself is also referred to by the use of a market discourse, as for instance seen in these two utterances: “as piracy has expanded and has become a great business, especially around the horn of Africa” (S: 3), and “piracy is a profitable business” (SF: 6). The problem that the law seeks to address - the threat of piracy - is thus not referred to as a result of a structural problem within a globalised economy treating many African states unfairly, but instead as regular business. Such an understanding of the problem limits the types of measures that could be applied in order to ‘solve the problem’ as both the problem and the solution are referred to within the same market logic.

Another dominant discourse that the speakers rely upon is a security discourse3. That could be said to be obvious as the law is a reaction to a security issue. However, the use of interdiscursivity within the security discourse is quite interesting. The word security is used in several ways, and referring to the security of different aspects. But what becomes obvious is that it is not so much the personal security of the employees onboard the vessels or the idea that these people have to be safe that the use of security is connected to. Instead, the security discourse in the data is heavily inspired by the market discourse described in the previous two paragraphs; security is actually informed by a market discourse. To exemplify: “We have to do what we can to secure a good protection of the shipping companies’ values and their investments, and of course also of the employees working onboard the vessels” (Minister of Justice: 16). Such a statement creates a clear hierarchy of what it is that has to be secure: first and foremost the investments of the shipping companies. To continue, the statement: “to strengthen the security on Danish vessels - make it more flexible” (Minister of Justice: 17) similarly exemplifies how security is referred to with the use of a market logic. This is so, as ‘strengthened security’ is understood as ‘flexible security’ where ‘flexible’ refers to being agile on a market.

The interdiscursive use of a market discourse within the security discourse also becomes ‘obvious’ in the way that the speakers connect the issue under debate (threat of

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3 When identifying a security discourse I refer to statements and words that are closely connected to the concept security. That have among others been ‘safety’, ‘protection’, and the words that are used in connection with the word ‘security’ itself, as outlined in chapter 5.2.1.1
pirates) to a threat to the market. As an example: “Piracy has become a threat to the world trade” (KF: 16), and “this (the law) is good in a globalised era where we have to be able to trade across countries” (LA: 15). Such argumentation again show how the concept of security is used to refer to secure trade and not the employees.

However, this is not to say that personal security is not mentioned at all in the document, e.g., we see: “where seamen risk their lives everyday, by just being onboard Danish ships” (SF: 8); however, the market inspired security rationality are predominant.

6.1.2 Common-sense assumptions

According to Fairclough, one should concentrate on and discover ‘common-sense’ assumptions defined as “the conventions according to which people interact, and of which people are generally not consciously aware” (Fairclough 1989: 2). In this section I will identify the taken for granted assumptions of reality that are underlying the arguments in the discussion and by so doing I aim to better understand the predominant ideologies and power structures that the politicians are weaved in to and relying on.

“I attach particular importance to the fact that the shipping companies and seafarers' organisations support this proposal as these must be the most important parties to listen to in this context” (V: 2)

The above quote demonstrates clearly the general common-sense logic visible throughout the Parliament discussion. Namely, that the shipping companies are number one priority as is clear in the statement: “these must be the most important parties to listen to in this context” (V: 2). This logic is found throughout the document. The speaker from LA for instance states “Everyone is happy. The shipping companies are happy. The Union is happy” (LA: 15). Here it becomes clear that “everyone” is referring to the shipping companies (and in this case, to a certain extent also the Union). In general, the overall concern is that the business life is ‘happy’ and not, for instance, that the state maintains control over arms or a feeling of safety for the employees. Another aspect that supports this assumption is the idea that the industry is an important part in constituting the country as such; for instance: “So on
all points, it is a great proposal, that will be beneficial to the industry and thus also to Denmark” (LA: 15).

The second common-sense assumption that I will highlight in this analysis relates to Efficiency. Throughout the text efficiency is talked about in a way that makes it a taken for granted goal in itself. As an example, it is used as an argument to change the law that “the current agreement entails a lot of administrative trouble” (V: 2). Such a statement exemplifies how administrative trouble is bad and should be solved even if it requires handling over state control of force. Similarly, another politician argued in the debate that adopting the law “will better facilitate case processing” (SF: 8) an argument that creates a hierarchy of importance prioritising efficiency (and thereby competition) over control over arms.

“I cannot exclude that we will experience future situations where some guards accidentally violates the rules that apply and that this may be unfortunate.....That is of course unfortunate, but the alternative is that we should have a situation in which you will have approve such a guard by several authorities, and that it is also unfortunate ......So, with the modification that it is of course unfortunate, I would like to say that the balance of interests here speaks for the proposition” (V: 2).

The above quote are in line with the previous examples and clearly articulates that business and efficiency are the most important. However, it reveals another aspect of this, as ‘the consequences’ of this law is clearly articulated being that rules might be violated (for instance, armed guards shooting at pirates). The consequences of a potential violation of rules, which can potentially be lethal, are referred to as “unfortunate” but at the same time weighed up against too much administrative work as is how the situation is perceived to be before the new law. Moreover, it is perceived as more important to avoid administrative work than to ensure strict adherence to rule of law. Such statement clearly displays the view that efficiency of the shipping industry is paramount.

The common-sense logic just outlined goes almost unchallenged. However, one political party, Enhedslisten, does challenge it. They do this by arguing that it is possible to meet the challenges with piracy by thorough planning, e.g., having ships sailing in convoys and building higher railings (EL: 10) in opposition to outsourcing the use of arms. However, the premessis of Efficiency is still penetrating the proposal of Enhedslisten, as they are
arguing that such measures have been proven to be just as “efficient as arms” (EL: 10). So, even though they challenge the overall way to go by suggesting another solution, they still buy in on a part of the common sense logic of efficiency as being the most important aspect of this security issue and consequently, they do not really challenge the overall assumption of efficiency.

6.1.3 Partial conclusion

To sum up, I have analysed the discursive practices and found two main discourses that the speakers rely upon: a market discourse and a security discourse. Moreover, I have found that the security discourse is connected to and embedded in the market discourse. This implies, that security in this context is primarily understood within a market discourse.

Secondly, I have analysed the common-sense assumptions that underlie the debate and found that these centers on the following: 1) business/trade is of first priority, and 2) that increased efficiency is a goal in itself.

6.2 The textual dimension

Following Fairclough’s three dimensional model, this section will include a textual analysis of the material in order to examine the level of agency and how the speakers relate to their own statements. I will make use of the analytical tools of modality and transitivity.

6.2.1 Affiliation and agency

I will start by identifying the modalities and how transitivity are used in the discussion. Modalities is the “the speaker’s degree of affinity with or affiliation to her or his statement” (Jørgensen & Phillips 2013: 95) and thus show to what extent the speaker is connected to his or her statement. Transitivity refers to how processes are connected (or not connected) to subjects and objects (ibid.) and looking at this can tell about the agency within the text; whether it is passive or active.
There are two clear modalities in the document and these are *claims of truth* and *claims of necessity* and the two of them are closely linked together in the sense that necessity is used to support the *truth* of the argument. The statement “The proposal is unfortunately a necessity” (KF: 16) serves as an example of such, where the truth claim in the arguments is that the proposal “is”, rather than “I believe that the proposal is” necessary. Necessity in this sense supports the truth of the argument by indirectly saying that there are no other choices. Another quote: “It is unfortunately a necessity” (S: 3) serves as an example of the same mechanism. However, in this statement it becomes clear that by using the word *unfortunately* in combination with *necessity* the speaker does rely so much on a truth claim that his personal opinion - that this is unfortunate - becomes irrelevant to include in the discussion, as there is an almost natural truth that demands a certain action.

Another kind of truth claims in the document are those where, for instance, *necessity* is not backing up the argument, but where objective modalities (Jørgensen & Phillips 2013: 96) are used on their own. Objective modalities are found when the speakers are using terms such as “so, in every way it is a good proposal” (LA: 15), “so, it is very important to ensure that they have the right weapons” (DF: 7), “It [piracy] has to stop” (RV: 5), and “Consequently, it is of course necessary” (DF: 4). All these examples show how the speakers talk in objective terms, leaving out that they are actually presenting their own personal opinion and not some higher truth. Relying on objective modalities assuming that one (rather than multiple) truth(s) exists are leaving very little room for other truths and inevitably limits the actions that are possible to take in response to the problem. As a consequence the speakers appear authoritative and also have a high affiliation with their claims as there are no uncertainty related to the arguments.

These findings are also relevant when it comes to the establishment of agency in the text. This is so, as agency becomes blurred with arguments of what *is* (objective modality); the speakers’ arguments refer to a *logical reasoning* that actually include the underlying logic of exactly truth and necessity. By using wording such as e.g. “unfortunately a necessity” (KL), “it has to stop” (RV: 6), and that it is “common sense” (LA: 15) when arguing for adopting the law, it seems like there are no other choice of action possible. This discursive move, using logical reasoning as an argument, removes the responsibility from the speakers.
By using logical arguments such as necessity leaves the politicians with only little responsibility (agency) as they are simply doing what seems to make most sense and what they ‘have to do’.

6.2.2 Partial conclusion

I have found that the politicians in the debate rely on truth claims backed up by arguments of necessity, which create a feeling of authority and the believe that there is no other solution possible (than adopting the law). Moreover, I have argued that the speakers do not take on direct agency in relation to the this decision. Comparing the speakers’ degree of affiliation with their arguments with how they take on agency reveals contradictions. This is so, as there is a high degree of assumed necessity within the arguments themselves, but at the same time, this way of arguing deprive the speakers of direct agency and, thus, they can avoid taking on the responsibility of the decision.

Such findings indicate that the politicians (overall) do not see adopting the law as a matter of choice, but as something they have to do regardless of their personal attitude towards the use of PMSCs.

6.3 Social practices

It is in the relationship between discursive practices and wider social practices that CDA researchers can draw their final conclusions (Jørgensen & Philips 1999: 98). Hence, this final section of the analysis focus on contextualising the findings from the previous sections with the use of the conceptual framework of neoliberalism and the competition state outlined in section 4.2. The aim is to understand the discursive practices in a wider societal setting. This section is divided in two parts. The first maps out the non-discursive social context that sets the stage for the analysed material. This is what Fairclough refers to as the social matrice (1992: 237). Here I will make use of my conceptual framework of neoliberalism and the competition state. The second part examines the order of discourse, which is “the limited range of discourses which struggle in the same terrain” (Jøgensen and Phillips 2013: 27).
6.3.1 Neoliberalism and the competition state

As explained in section 4.2, a neoliberal economic rationality has increasingly gained influence in western politics, including Denmark. Within such a context, the discourses investigated in this paper may not appear surprising as they can be seen as following an overall trend in Danish politics in which a neoliberal market logic informs more and more aspects of the political decision making process.

The discursive findings of section 6.2 suggests that when it comes to allowing Danish vessels to hire PMSCs Danish politicians perceive such deregulation as the only possible political choice regardless of personal attitudes towards armed private security companies onboard Danish vessels. This perception fits well with the general neoliberal development in politics. As the politicians are afraid that the market forces will make shipping companies leave Denmark if they do not make a change in legislation, this change is perceived as ‘necessary’. Furthermore, politicians tend to hide or mask their decision behind arguments related to market mechanisms, as if their initial attitude towards the use of PMSCs have in some way been overruled. As such, this process of change in legislation acts as a prime example of how neoliberalism creates depoliticised conditions in an otherwise deeply politicized area. The political landscape in Denmark, characterised by increased influence of neoliberal thinking, can thus be used to understand why the politicians make use of the language and the discourses they do when they argue in favor of adopting the law, as they are to a large extent a product of the environment that surrounds them.

Another important insight can be found by looking at my interpretations through the lense of the competition state as conceptualised in section 4.2. This is so, as what is articulated in the parliamentary discussion can be interpreted as a reaction to and an example of an already existing competition culture in the international system; a culture that is reflected in the politicians’ speech-acts. As an example, shipping companies are allowed to decide which flag they want to carry (Mansell 2009). Flag is in this context referring to the country in which the company is registered and regulated from. As a result, Panama did in 2010 host 22.26 % of the world's registered tonnage (UNCTAD 2010), a number which does not reflect actual shipping industry in Panama. Rather, it reflects the country's loose regulation and attractive (for the companies) tax benefits (ibid.). Consequently, there is a high
level of international competition when it comes to regulating maritime activity, as shipping companies can ‘flag out’ if they find the rules of their hosting country to be unfavorable. In light of this and in order to understand the adoption of Law 116 in Denmark it is worth mentioning that several other countries did already allow PMSCs onboard vessels in certain international waters. Consequently, it is arguable that the international competition in the area influenced the discourses in the Danish Parliament and the decision making process that I analysed so far. Especially, the discourses that focus on the needs and wishes of the industry. Seeing the passing of the law in question partly as a result of the global competition in which states engage, is an example that not only serves to give an understanding of the effects that globalisation can have on national legal frameworks, but can also explain why the logic of ‘necessity’ is used so massively and unquestioned in the parliamentary discourse.

Moreover, in this context it is relevant to mention that the world's largest container shipping company Mærsk is registered in Denmark (Rasmussen 2017). Consequently, it is arguable that the Danish Parliament is especially willing to be accommodating when it comes to maritime security, as keeping Mærsk registered in Denmark is crucial for the Danish economy.

6.3.2 The order of discourse

Analysing the texts and the discursive practices revealed how the speakers drew heavily upon both a business vocabulary and a wider neoliberal market discourse of competition, efficiency and necessity. This is so, even though the topic under discussion in the political debate is a response to a security issue. Comparing these findings reveals how there is actually a blurring of the categories of security and market in the parliamentary discussion. In this way, the border between the two discourses is almost removed and the discourses melt together. That is, the market-discourse gives meaning to the security discourse. Such a finding fits well into what I previously referred to as the ‘marketisation of discourse’, and in this specific case we see how a dominant market discourse (successfully) struggles to give meaning to the term security; a domain that has previously, in a Danish context, been seen as a part of a welfare discourse.
As such, it becomes clear that the reigning discourse, relying on the logic of the market, in the Danish parliamentary debate, is reinforcing already existing patterns of domination and power within a capitalist system, as questions of security becomes subordinate to the market discourse. Moreover, as the neoliberal project does not in the same way as the welfare state project have a focus on protecting citizens (see e.g. the critique of neoliberalism as presented in section 4.2.1 in which I argued that the neoliberal idea is more connected to competition, efficiency, and flexibility) the monopolisation of the security discourse by the neoliberal market discourse can be seen as contradictory. That is, when security is being intertwined with the neoliberal project, security becomes a commodity and, thus, potentially something that not everyone can obtain. Therefore, having these two concepts security and neoliberalism in the same order of discourse potentially affects who can get security in real life.

6.3.3 Partial conclusion

In this section I have contextualised my findings by the use of neoliberal theory of marketisation of public domains and the competition state. I have argued that the predominant market discourse and the overall argumentation found in the data fits well into a general neoliberal tendency of privatisation of public domains that are going on in Denmark. Moreover, I have used theories of the competition state in order to understand where the logic of necessity might spring from and argued that the competitive global environment that Denmark is entangled in have an effect on the feeling of necessity among the politicians in regard to adopting the law.

To continue, I have argued that in the document under investigation, a blurring of the lines between the concepts of security and the market is going on, as it is a market logic that in this debate gives meaning to the term security. Consequently, security in this case becomes commodified - something that can be governed through the market - and becomes entangled and understood within a neoliberal market discourse.

In short, the neoliberal framework seems to be present at a textual level but also present as a wider societal explanation for this discourse in the document. As a result, I find it arguable that the decision of adopting the law and the motivation behind it, may reinforce an
already strong discourse of privatisation, and it seems that there is very little room for counter-discourses that do not speak into a neoliberal reality.

6.4 Analytical discussion

This last section of the analysis sets out to make 1) a critical analytical discussion of the findings in relation to my theoretical framework, and 2) critically examine the findings in relations to previous research in the field of PMSCs.

The findings from the analysis reveals how the decision of transferring responsibility over arms control and security decisions to PMSCs and the shipping industry, in this specific context, has to a high extend been based on a market centered ideology of competition and efficiency showing that, in this specific case, the rationale for relying on PMSCs is primarily a question of protecting the industry. As such, I would like to stress that my findings support both Ayers (2005) and Faircloughs (1983) work on how market discourses are penetrating welfare discourses. In light of this, and on a general level, my findings indicates that the neoliberal regime are gaining still more terrain and penetrating even more areas of Danish politics.

Previously (in chapter 4.2), I provided critique of the neoliberal regime for serving as the ideological background for a policy where private interests trump social needs and thus challenge equality as “economic growth becomes more important than social justice” (Giroux and Giroux 2004). Moreover, I raised the argument that neoliberalism endangers participatory democracy and creates a depoliticisation of important political topics (McChesney 1999: 11). In light of this critique, what I have just showed in a Danish context can be argued to be problematic. This is so, as the implications of security being penetrated or even overruled by a market discourse (marketisation of security) can be seen as a step towards dismantling the welfare state (and its monopoly on legitimate violence) and a step towards a more unequal society where security decisions become depoliticised and somewhat distorted in the public debate. Based on this critique, and on previous research (see chapter 3) which suggests that privatisation of security challenge states’ control of violence and also
questions accountability (Avant 2005: 157; Singer 2008), I find it important to argue that security and safety issues maintain to be a public issue and a public good in order to ensure accountable use of arms.

6.4.1 Discussion on previous research

When connecting the findings above to previous research in the field of PMSCs it becomes clear that my findings do not fully support previous research. Issues of control, accountability, regulation and the public-private divide (see my outline in Chapter 3.1) are only slightly touched upon in the material analysed in this study. This is interesting, as much academic literature in the field of PMSCs can be characterised as theoretical discussions of the consequences of the use of PMSCs. However, my study reveals that in the actual decision making process (in this case at least) such issues are not considered important, actually they are not even a part of the discursive field. Consequently, my study serves as an example of how there seems to be a gap between an academic focus (especially the highly theoretical inspired analysis) and the political motivation for using PMSCs. This is so, as the academic sphere has a focus on the problematic consequences of using PMSCs, whereas the political sphere (in this case) has a focus on economic benefits and does merely not address the possible downsides or the power balance that outsourcing of core security tasks is challenging. This lack of perspective in the political debate can be argued to be problematic, as the use of PMSCs are chosen due to short term economic problem solving arguments with no considerations of the long term implications that reliance on such companies has on the power of the state, the power to make security decisions, control over use of arms, and, finally, what overall ideological trends such a decision is a part of.

However, one thing from the previous research on PMSCs that my study does support is the theory of global security assemblages (Abrahamsen & Williams 2011). As this study demonstrates, the increased use of PMSCs can be analysed as a restructuring within the state system and not merely that the industry is ‘gaining power’. The political decision of outsourcing security decisions is, to a large extent, a result of a general political change
within the Danish state system characterised by the privatisation of still more core welfare tasks. Hence, it seems that there is very little room for alternative opinions within the political discourse of privatisation - also in regards to the area of security.
7 Conclusion

In this final part of my thesis, I conclude on my research question: *Which discourses have been present in the decision making process in the Danish Parliament prior to the adoption of Law 116 in Denmark in 2012?* Subsequent, I make suggestions for further research on this area.

7.1 Answering the research question

In relation to Q1: *How do the speakers in question make use of interdiscursivity and ‘common sense’ assumptions?* I identified two main discourses that the speakers rely upon; a *market discourse* and a *security discourse*. The security discourse, I argued, is heavily embedded in the market discourse. This finding is backed by the common sense assumptions underlying the arguments of the politicians that I identified in the material. These are: 1) the shipping industry and international trade are of first priority, and 2) increased efficiency is a goal in itself.

In regards to Q2: *To what extent does the speakers in question take on responsibility for their attitudes*, I found that the speakers make heavily use of objective modalities as their arguments are to a high extent backed by truth claims and claims about necessity. This finding, I argued, indirectly removes responsibility from the debating politicians and leaves the impression that no alternative solutions to the problem in question exist. These rhetorical moves leaves only a limited amount of responsibility and agency to the politicians; they are simply doing what they ‘need’ to.

Finally, Q3 sets out to investigate: *In which way does neoliberal thinking inform the parliamentary debate on Law 116?* I found that the broader political landscape in Denmark reflects my findings. Especially, the competition state and the unidirectional effects of globalisation can be seen as motivating the speakers standpoints, as also the parliamentary
discourse and the adoption of the law reinforces these broader ideas and developments. Consequently, I argued that security in the case I have examined, as a consequence of the predominant neoliberal political regime, has become a depoliticised topic subjected to a market logic of necessity, and, consequently, only leaves few alternatives to privatisation.

In sum, I conclude that a neoliberal market discourse has been at play both in the parliamentary debate analysed and in the political reality that this debate (and the following law) is a product of. Hence, the decision of increased reliance on PMSCs in this specific case is informed by a neoliberal ideology welcoming privatisation of public services. Such findings imply that the security privatisation in question is taking place within a dominant and almost hegemonic market discourse of necessity. In consequence, a political discussion of what security is and how it should be provided based on more profound philosophical values is lacking. These findings, I have argued, support both Ayers (2005) and Fairclough's (1983) work on marketisation of public discourse and can beneficially be understood within this broader trend. Surprisingly, however, I have found that my study does not fully support previous research in the field of PMSCs. This is so, as the topics present in the political debate only deals little with issues such as accountability, regulation, power, and control; issues found central in the academic literature on the field of PMSCs.

Having reached these conclusions, the main purpose of my CDA analysis - which is to demystify ideologies and power relations in order to seek change (Jørgensen & Phillips 2013: 76) - has been fulfilled. By showing that there is a very narrow and uncontested order of discourse and, consequently, a limited room for change, as there are few competing discourses within the material, we have come one step closer to demystifying the ideological power relations underpinning the discussion on PMSCs for maritime security. The future challenge thus becomes to use this knowledge in order to question the underlying assumption of necessity regarding the market and hereby question the narrow basis for decisions regarding future outsourcing of welfare services to PMSCs. Ultimately, this knowledge should be used to ensure that the topic of security is continuously discussed in both the public and the political sphere. This is so, as only by understanding why we see the change in security provision that we do in these years, it becomes possible to challenge this logic of necessity that (in this case) underpins it, and only in this way can we have a more ideological
long term discussion on the implications of PMSCs on society; how security is understood and who is to benefit.

7.2 Suggestions for further research

After having answered my research question new questions have appeared. First, as argued in the introduction and in the previous research chapters, I believe that there is an urgent need for studies on European contracting practices when it comes to PMSCs. Especially, the argumentation related to such shift in practices needs to be clearer and overt in order to secure a democratic process related to the increased use of PMSCs for security tasks. The study at hand serves as a small contribution to this goal, though, further research on the same topic regarding other cases and other countries are still very much needed.

Finally, this study has been concerned with the motivation behind adopting Law 116 by studying the discursive mechanisms at play. It would be interesting to examine the effects this law have in practice, examining, e.g, how the shipping companies make use of the new authority they are given. Also, it would be relevant to investigate whether any accidents has occurred - and if so, due to what reasons? Answering such questions would help understand the real life effects of security being increasingly embedded within a neoliberal market discourse.
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Appendix

This appendix consists of the transcribed parliamentary debate used as data for my analysis. The debate took place in the Danish Parliament on the 10th of April, 2012. The debate is transcribed verbatim and can be found at Folketingets web-page (Folketinget 2018a).
Det næste punkt på dagsordenen er:

15) 1. behandling af lovforslag nr. L 116:
Forslag til lov om ændring af våbenloven og lov om krigsmateriel m.v. (Civile bevæbnede vagter på danske lastskibe m.v.).
Af justitsministeren (Morten Bødskov).
(Fremsættelse 28.03.2012).
Forhandlingen er åbnet, og jeg starter med at give ordet til Venstres ordfører, hr. Preben Bang Henriksen.

Tak. Forslaget vedrører civile bevæbnede vagter på danske lastskibe. Det er et vigtigt emne, vigtigt for rederierne og vigtigt for de søfarende.


Vi må lægge til grund, at rederiforeningerne og også de søfarendes organisationer finder, at der er tale om en særdeles effektiv beskyttelse i form af vagter, og det gør selvfølgelig, at Folketinget skal være positivt indstillet over for ethvert forslag til udvidelse på forsvarlig vis af denne ordning.

Den aktuelle situation er den, at 24 danske skibe dagligt er i piratfarvande, at der i 2011 har været 225 angreb på skibe, at der har været tale om 25 kapringer, og – hvad vi ikke skal glemme – at der i dag sidder to danske søfolk kapret et eller andet sted. Jeg går ud fra, at justitsministeren gør, hvad han kan, for at forhandle disse fri så hurtigt som overhovedet muligt.

Imidlertid er det sådan, at den aktuelle ordning medfører en hel del administrativt bøvl, om man så må sige. Heri involveres Forsvarsrommandoen, Søfartsstyrelsen, Justitsministeriet, Rigspolitiet og eventuelt også ambassader, i det omfang det er udenlandske sikkerhedsfolk, der skal rekrutteres. Det gør, at effektiviteten i sagsbehandlingen måske ikke er af en sådan art, at man får den hurtige sagsbehandling, som man skal have. Der kan gå flere uger, inden rederierne får den pågældende tilladelse, og det er uheldigt i en situation, hvor skibene måske omdirigere fra dag til dag.

Derfor hilser vi fra Venstres side forslaget velkommen. Forslaget indebærer, at rederierne får en generel tilladelse af sandsynligvis 1 års varighed, således at man ikke længere på forhånd skal forudskikke, hvad det er for en sejlads, hvilken vagt osv., og hvilke våben der er tale om. Jeg lægger i den her forbindelse særdeles meget vægt på, at rederierne og de søfarendes organisationer støtter forslaget. Det er da de allervigtigste parter at høre i den her sammenhæng.

15:05
Første næstformand
Bertel Haarder (V)

Forhandlingen er åbnet, og jeg starter med at give ordet til Venstres ordfører, hr. Preben Bang Henriksen.

15:05
Ordfører
Preben Bang Henriksen (V)

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Jeg skal ikke negligere, at der foreligger høringssvar fra nogle, som er betænkelige på enkelte områder. Jeg tænker selvfølgelig her på FTF’s svar, politiets svar og svaret fra Retspolitisk Forening. Det, man anfører her, er det lidt besynderlige i, at en vagtvirksomhed i Danmark og en dørmand på et diskotek skal være godkendt, hvorimod der ikke fordres nogen godkendelse, når man udstyrer folk med våben på et skib. Jeg må medgive, at det kan være paradoksalt, og at man godt kunne gøre anskrag over for den del. Forholdet er imidlertid, at det er noget, der reguleres gennem en bekendtgørelse, som justitsministeren administrativt udsteder efterfølgende, og det er allerede skitseret, hvilke vilkår der fremgår af den her bekendtgørelse. Jeg vil ikke udelukke, at vi kan opleve situationer i fremtiden, hvor en eller anden vagt uheldigvis kommer til at overtræde de regler, der gælder, og at det kan være betænkeligt. Det kan vise sig, at vagten ikke har opfyldt de krav, som man har forudsat i bekendtgørelsen, og at der på den baggrund kan rettes kritik mod det rederi eller den vagtvirksomhed, som har sagt god for vagten. Det er selvfølgelig uheldigt, men alternativet er altså, at vi skal have en situation, hvor man via flere ugers myndighedsbehandling skal godkende en sådan vagt, og det er også uhel dig; det kan man jo bare spørge rederierne om i dag.

Så med den modifikation, at det selvfølgelig er uheldigt, vil jeg sige, at en afvejning af hensynene her taler for, at justitsministerens forslag på området er ganske fint, og Venstre kan derfor støtte forslaget.


Tak til Venstres ordfører. Så går vi til Socialdemokraternes ordfører, hr. Ole Hækkerup.

Tak, formand. Dette lovforslag giver mulighed for, at danske rederier lettere kan have bevæbnede vagter om bord for bedre at kunne imødegå pirateri. Det er jo desværre nødvendigt, fordi pirateri har grebet om sig og er blevet en stor forretnings særlig ved Afrikas Horn.

Konkret går vi med det her lovforslag fra, at et rederi i dag skal have en konkret tilladelse til at benytte navngivne vagter på en bestemt sejlads, der må bære våben, til, at et rederi kan få en generel tilladelse til at have våben om bord på skibene, og at våbnene kan bruges i områder, hvor der er risiko for pirateri. Betyder det så samlet set, at vi er kommet pirateriet til livs med det her lovforslag? Nej, langtfra. Men det her lovforslag sikrer i hvert fald en bedre beskyttelse af besætningen og af skibene hos danske rederier. Samtidig synes jeg, at det, når vi behandler det i dag, er vigtigt at understrege, at man stadig skal søge tilladelse hos Justitsministeriet, at det her selvsagt ikke kan komme til at omfatte...
fiskerbåde eller passagerskibe, at dansk våbenlov jo uforandret gælder i danske farvande, og at hele udmøntningen af lovgevningen i øvrigt kommer til at ligge i en bekendtgørelse fra Justitsministeriet.

Det vil sige, at det bliver en mere fleksibel ordning, som bedre sikrer besætninger og skibe hos danske rederier, og det kan Socialdemokraterne støtte.

Tak til den socialdemokratiske ordfører. Så er det hr. Peter Skaarup som ordfører for Dansk Folkeparti.

I Dansk Folkeparti er vi selvfølgelig, havde jeg nær sagt, positivt positivt stemt over for det forslag, som vi har til behandling her i dag, vedrørende mulighederne for, at danske skibe i Adenbugten og det område kan forsøre sig mod pirater og undgå, at de bliver angrebet af pirater i de forskellige sammenhænge, som vi har set det ske i igennem de seneste år. Her i 2012 synes man vel egentlig, at det er helt utroligt, at der findes moderne pirater nogen steder i verden, og at det kan lade sig gøre for nogen pirater nogen steder i verden at drive gæk med et søfartsland som Danmark, men også mange andre lande, og de skibe, som virker med afsæt i Danmark. Derfor er det selvfølgelig nødvendigt, at vi giver de rederier, som tjener mange penge ind til Danmark, og som holder fanen højt for den store søfartsnation, som Danmark altid har været, de redskaber, der er nødvendige.

Hvis Dansk Folkeparti skulle have bestemt, hvordan det her forslag skulle have set ud, så kunne vi godt have tænkt os, at man havde indrettet det på en sådan måde, at det, i og med at det netop er af vital dansk interesse, at vi beskytter vores skibe mod angreb og piratvirksomhed, var danske soldater, der varetog den sikkerhed om bord, som de skibe har brug for. Nu er forslaget indrettet sådan, at man i stedet for giver mulighed for, at skibene kan have våben om bord, der så kan benyttes af forskellige sikkerhedsfirmaer, der på vegne af rederiet kan sikre mod angreb, hvilket er det, man har tænkt sig ifølge forslaget.

Det er ikke sådan, at vi vil stemme imod forslaget, men som sagt synes vi, at det havde været det rigtige, at man havde tilladt, at det var danske soldater, der varetog sikkerheden på de danske skibe, ligesom vi jo egentlig betragter det som en selvfølge, at det er danske soldater og dansk politi, der varetager sikkerheden, når danskere på forskellig vis er i en udsat position et sted i verden. Men sådan er det ikke indrettet, og vi forstår, at man har stillet sig tilfreds med den udformning, det har fået, i branchen og blandt de vitale danske interesser, som piraterne angriber, og derfor må vi også sige, at det så er den næstbedste løsning, vi har fået her. Men det er ikke desto mindre en løsning, vi kan støtte.

Når vi så kigger i selve forslaget og udkastet til bekendtgørelse, kan vi se, at der er noget,
der tyder på, at man måske ikke har fremtidssikret det her forslag godt nok. Derfor vil vi stille spørgsmål under udvalgsbehandlingen, og vi vil også gerne høre justitsministerens svar allerede i dag, hvis justitsministeren vil svere på dem, men under alle omstændigheder vil vi under udvalgsbehandlingen spørge regeringen, hvordan man sikrer, at de pågældende vagter og sikkerhedsfirmaer har de rigtige våben. For når man opruster på den måde, som man jo gør, ved ikke bare at beskytte skibene med forskellige anordninger ved rælingen, men ved også at have vagter om bord, så er det meget vigtigt, at man er sikker på, at man har tilstrækkelige våben til at imødegå de trusler, der måtte komme.

Det er klart, at når piraterne opdager, at der er bevæbnede vagter om bord på rigtig mange skibe – danske skibe og andre landes skibe – så vil de muligvis tage kraftigere våben i anvendelse, end de har i dag, og der kunne det være formålstjenligt, at det her forslag også gav mulighed for, at man f.eks. kunne bruge større håndskydevåben, der kunne udgøre nogle mere afskrækkende instrumenter for vagtfirmaerne og rederierne. Derfor må vi have regeringen på banen og have den til at fortælle, hvorfor man har udelukket den mulighed i det materiale, der ligger til Folketinget i dag.

Derudover er jeg enig i det, som også andre ordførere har sagt allerede nu under debatten, nemlig at der skal mere til for at sikre os imod pirater. Først og fremmest skal vi jo ikke under nogen omstændigheder fremover løslade anholdte pirater i området. Der kan jeg simpelt hen ikke deleg den glæde, som udenrigsministeren har givet udtryk for nogle gange, over at man nu har fået fængslet nogle enkelte pirater af dem, man har tilfangetaget, hvorimod man har løsladt hovedparten. Der er ikke holdbart i længden, for på den måde siger vi jo egentlig bare til piraterne: O.k., værsgo, kom i land med proviant osv., og så kan l i øvrigt fortsætte jeres forehavende nogle dage efter. Det har vi jo også set eksempler på. Det duer simpelt hen ikke med den slaphed, og jeg håber meget, at regeringen kommer på banen her under debatten i dag og svarer på, hvad man rent faktisk vil gøre for at strafforfølge pirater, der overtræder enhver lov og ret i internationalt farvand.

15:17

Første næstformand
Bertel Haarder (V)

Tak til Dansk Folkepartis ordførere. Så giver jeg ordet til Det Radikale Venstres ordfører, hr. Rasmus Helveg Petersen.

15:18

Ordfører
Rasmus Helveg Petersen (RV)

Det Radikale Venstre bakker op om forslaget. De kapringer, der er sket af danske skibe i særlig somaliske farvande, må standses. Vi har lagt os hårdt i selen med en militær indsats, men fra De Radikales side mener vi også, at sikringen af den civile skibstrafik kan yde et stort bidrag til løsningen af pirateriproblematikken. Det er klart, at det dels forhåbentlig vil afskrække pirater fra deres forehavende, dels vil beskytte de konkrete
danske skibe.

En facet af denne indsats er dette lovforslag. Det gør det muligt for rederierne at have våben om bord på skibene med henblik på at medføre bevæbnede vagter ved passage af piratfyldte farvande. Alle parter er hørt i sagen, og både rederne og sømændene bakker op om forslaget.

Det er klart, at vi fortsat stiller betydelige krav til rederierne i de tilfælde, hvor de nu får øgede beføjelser. Vi stiller krav til våben- og ammunitionstyper, vi stiller krav til opbevaring af våbnene, vi kræver, at der færes våbenbog, vi stiller krav til vagternes egnethed, vi stiller rapporteringskrav, når våbnene har været i brug, hvad enten de er blevet afyret eller ej.

Under disse forudsætninger er vi fra radikal side meget tilfredse med de nye muligheder, der ligger i lovforslaget, for at medføre bevæbnede vagter og giver det vores fulde opbakning.

Tak til den radikale ordfører. Så er det SF's ordfører, fru Ida Damborg.

Tak for ordet. At bruge våben til at forsvare skibe, der passerer uroligt farvand er ikke en langsigtet løsning. Derom må der ikke herske tvivl. Men i en situation, hvor pirateriet er tiltagende, hvor piraterne bliver rekrutteret længere og længere inde i landet og dermed har meget lidt kendskab til søfart og navigation, bliver piraterne mere desperate og livet dermed farligere for rederiernes sejlads i farefyldt farvand.

I en sådan situation er vi nødt til at give rederierne de redskaber, som de har brug for til at forsvare deres skibe og mandskab. Som loven er i dag, tilgodeser den ikke rederiernes behov for at få våbentilladelse til vagter på rederiernes skibe, ikkemindst fordi tilladelsen er meget specifik til kun at gælde en bestemt rejse og en bestemt person. SF støtter derfor dette forslag, fordi vi mener, at det letter sagsbehandlingen. Vi bakker op om forslaget, som vil gøre våbentilladelserne gældende i en længere periode, når skibene passerer farefyldt farvand. Vi forventer dog en præcisering i bekendtgørelsen, sådan at der bliver nærmere betingelser for våbentilladelser; at rederierne inden for kort tid efter piratangreb skal redegøre for, hvordan våbenmagt er blevet anvendt; at der skal føres nøje kontrol med våbnenes opbevaring under sejlads; at der også stilles krav til vagternes egnethed. Alt dette forventer vi bliver en del af bekendtgørelsen.

Situationen i farvandet ud for bl.a. Afrikas Horn skærpes. Pirateri er en indbringende forretning i et land, hvor der ikke er mange muligheder for unge mennesker til at skabe sig en fremtid. Jeg var selv med dette Tings Integrationsudvalg i Kenya i marts, hvor vi bl.a. blev grundigt briefet om arbejdet med at tilbageholde og retsforfølge pirater. Kenya tager
en stor del af sit ansvar, og det selv om landet også huser et sted mellem 600.000 og 700.000 flygtninge fra regionen. Derfor er jeg glad for den indsats, som Danmark yder i form af praktisk og administrativ hjælp til den kenyanske regering i denne sag.

Dette lovforslag er som sagt i starten ikke en løsning på en meget kompleks problemstilling, men et redskab i en situation, hvor sømænd hver dag risikerer livet ved blot at være til stede på danske skibe i et farefyldt farvand. Jeg skal derfor meddele, at SF støtter lovforslaget.

Tak til Socialistisk Folkepartis ordfører. Der var en kort bemærkning fra hr. Peter Skaarup. Værsogo.

Jeg kunne godt tænke mig at spørge ind til to forhold vedrørende de ting, som SF's ordfører sagde. Det ene er, om SF er med på at tillade, at danske skibe på sigt, hvis det bliver nødvendigt, får mulighed for at få kraftigere våben, der f.eks. kan give en bedre synlighed over for piraterne, men SF vil tilsyneladende udelukke brug af visse våben, hvor man kunne forestille sig, at de faktisk ville have en god effekt for at afskrække pirater fra at foretage de her tilfangetagelser af danske skibe. Det er det ene spørgsmål.

Det andet spørgsmål er: Mener SF virkelig, at det er tilfredsstillende, at man gang på gang har måttet løslade pirater og bare sætte dem i land uden at retsforfølge de pågældende, med det resultat at de begår nye overgreb på skibene?

Ordføreren.

Jeg mener, at vi skal tænke os rigtig godt om, med hensyn til hvad det er, vi ønsker at udstyre vores danske skibe med. En optrapning af en krig synes jeg at vi så i 1980'erne i
Europa. Hvad er det næste? Skal vi have kanoner, skal vi have jagerfly? Vi kan blive ved med at køre sådan en krig op.

Jeg synes, det er vigtigt, at man har våben til at kunne forsøre sig med. Det er det vigtigste formål for SF. Det ville hr. Peter Skaarup også vide, hvis han kendte til SF’s historie. Med en lang fortid som pacifistisk parti er vores ønske, at skibene her får mulighed for at forsøre sig.

Med hensyn til den anden ting, som jeg kort nævnte i min ordførertale, om retsforfølgelse af pirater, synes jeg, at hr. Peter Skaarup og det parti, han repræsenterer, skulle være med til at lave nogle langsigtede løsninger, med hensyn til hvordan vi kan retsforfølge pirater. Der er et land, et meget fattigt land, med 40 millioner indbyggere, der i den grad tager et meget, meget stort slæb med hensyn til det her ansvar. Det anerkender jeg at de gør. Jeg synes måske ikke, at det land skal have ansvaret for hele verden. Jeg synes, at hr. Peter Skaarup skulle være en af dem, der kom med bud på, hvordan vi kunne løse det, så vi også kunne tage vores del af ansvaret.

Peter Skaarup.

Jeg er såmænd udmærket klar over, at SF er et pacifistisk parti – eller i hvert fald var. Når jeg siger »var«, er det jo, fordi man faktisk her går ind for et forslag, der betyder, at danske skibe har et våbenskab ombord, som forskellige sikkerhedsfirmaer så ... [Lydudfald] ... at undgå piratangreb. Det er det, man gør her, så jeg ved ikke, hvor meget pacifisme der er over det her forslag. Men det er som måske ligesom med andre ting, som SF har stået for, sådan, at man smider det i skraldespanden. Det er i hvert fald det signal, man kommer med her.

Man skal jo ikke være naiv: Lige præcis de her pirater har jo våben med. Der findes et dansk krigsskib, der har de tunge våben med, og det, som man kunne forestille sig kunne være vigtigt, var netop, at man havde nogle våben for at afskrække pirater. Spørgsmålet er så, om man har de rigtige våben

Jeg synes, jeg sagde det meget tydeligt, men jeg vil gerne gøre det igen, til hr. Peter Skaarup: Vi ønsker, at skibene skal kunne forsvare sig. Det synes jeg vi med tydelighed siger: Vi ønsker, at skibene skal kunne forsvare sig mod angreb, og det er det, vi ønsker at give en lidt lettere mulighed for til de danske skibe. Det er det, vi ønsker. Vi ønsker ikke at optrappe et våbenkapløb ombord på skibene, heller ikke ud for Afrikas Horn, men vi ønsker, at danske skibe skal kunne forsvare sig.

I forhold til retsforfølgelse må jeg igen til hr. Peter Skaarup og Dansk Folkeparti sige: Kom med nogle bud på det. Man snakker om, at vi kan have skibe liggende, men hvad skal de så? Skal de så sejle rundt i 6 år, hvis de idømmes 6 års straf, eller hvor er det, de skal afsone henne? Jeg kunne næppe forestille mig, at hr. Peter Skaarup ville synes, det var en vanvittig god idé, at de kom til Danmark alle sammen og afsonede, men det kan vi jo diskutere. Jeg synes, det er lidt nemt blot at sige, at de skal være på nogle skibe, for jeg synes, at det, som er meget vigtigt i den her sag, er, at der her er et land, Kenya, som vi meget gerne vil have nogle gode aftaler med, men vi har også et land, der har kæmpestore problemer og tager sin del af slæbet.

Tak til SF's ordfører. Så giver jeg ordet til Enhedslistens ordfører, fru Pernille Skipper.

Værsgo.

Tak for det. Jeg vil starte med at indrømme, at det var intentionen, at vores udenrigsordfører skulle have stået her i dag, men han er desværre rejst til Palæstina. Det er vel ikke desværre, men det er altså derfor, at jeg er til stede i dag, og jeg vil så håbe, at jeg kan svare så godt som muligt på de spørgsmål, der måtte komme.

I Enhedslisten kan vi sagtens forstå, at man hos rederierne, ikke mindst hos dem, som er ansat hos rederierne og sejler i farefulde vande, har et ønske om at øge sikkerheden. Det kan vi godt forstå, for det er nogle uhyggelige historier, vi hører. Det er dog sådan, at man allerede i dag har lov til at have et også bevæbnet vagtærn ombord på et skib, men det er
sådan, at det er enkeltpersonerne, altså de enkelte vagter, der skal have tilladelse til at bære våben. Problemet med det her lovforslag er, at man nu ikke blot vil give enkeltpersoner tilladelse til at have et våben, men give en gruppe tilladelse, altså en privat gruppe. Det er også en af de betænkeligheder, som Advokatrådet og Politiforbundet bemærker i høringssvarene. Her er altså tale om ikke blot enkelte mennesker, men private grupper, som får tilladelse til at administrere våben.

Det kan give en risiko for en meget stor spredning i de våben, som florerer, og som hører under dansk ret. Det danske samfund er sådan set kendetegnet ved, at vi har en meget restriktiv lovgivning, når det kommer til skydevåben, og det er med vilje, for det er for at sørge for, at vi præcis ved, hvor mange våben der er i omløb, så vidt muligt i hvert fald, og så vi ved, hvem der har lige præcis hvilke våben. På den måde kan vi forhåbentlig sørge for, at uheldet ikke skulle være ude. Jo flere våben, der florerer, jo mindre vi har styr på, hvem der har de enkelte våben, jo større bliver risikoen også for, at noget går galt.

Med det her lovforslag bliver det ikke kun op til de private vagtværn at administrere, hvem der skal have hvilke våben, det bliver også op til dem at afgøre, om en plet på straffeattesten er alvorlig nok til at sørge for, at den her enkeltperson, vagten, ikke bør bære et våben. Dybest set får vi altså et problem med, at vi ikke rigtig med det her lovforslag ved, hvem der render rundt med hvilke våben. Det er også muligt for rederierne i dag som sagt at have bevæbnede vagter med ombord på skibene. Hvis man gerne vil sørge for det, kan man planlægge i ordentlig tid, altså hvordan det skal foregå, så man er sikker på, at det er de rigtige mennesker, der er med ombord. På rederier og på skibe er man jo vant til at planlægge meget nøjagtigt, hvornår en enten container skal læses, inden for hvilken præcis time et helt andet sted i verden, og så er det nok også muligt at lave en vagtplan over, hvem der skal med på det skib i god tid.

På den anden side er det også klart, at pirateri skal bekæmpes, det er der ikke nogen tvivl om at vi i Enhedslisten er enige i. Der er både et langt perspektiv, som handler om muligheder, som handler om udviklingspolitik, udviklings bistand, bl.a. i Somalia, og der er et kort sigt, og her er det at være bevæbnet en meget, meget lille del. Bl.a. ved vi, at de skibe, som sejler meget hurtigt, næsten aldrig bliver udsat for piratangreb, der sejler i konvoj, næsten aldrig bliver udsat for piratangreb, og at de skibe, som har meget høje rælinger, næsten heller aldrig bliver udsat for angreb. Det er sådan nogle ting, som er forholdssvis nemme, ting, som faktisk kan have en effekt, og som ikke samtidig letter vores lovgivning på våbenområdet, så vi får flere våben i omløb, som der er mindre kontrol omkring.

Det positive ved det her lovforslag skulle jo være en administrativ lettelse hos rederierne, men det synes vi sådan set er en for lille effekt i forhold til at have mindre styr på våbnene, og derfor kan Enhedslisten ikke støtte forslaget.

Første næstformand
Bertel Haarder (V)

Der er en kort bemærkning fra hr. Peter Skaarup.

15:31
Peter Skaarup (DF)

Jeg kan forstå på Enhedslistens ordfører, at Enhedslisten ikke mener, at det her forslag er godt. Enhedslisten vil nærmest stemme imod forslaget, sådan som jeg hører det. I Dansk Folkparti synes vi ikke, at det er den bedste løsning, men vi synes faktisk, at det er den næstbedste løsning, og vi kan trods alt godt støtte det. Grunden til, at vi mener, at forslaget ikke er helt optimalt, er, at vi faktisk mener, at det bør være danske soldater, der forsvarer vores danske handelsskibe i området, og ikke vagter fra private firmer.


Første næstformand
Bertel Haarder (V)

Ordføreren.


Når det kommer til det første spørgsmål, må jeg desværre blive ordføreren svar skyldig. Som sagt var det meningen, at vores udenrigspolitiske ordfører skulle stå her i dag. Så her må jeg desværre beklage.

Første næstformand
Bertel Haarder (V)

Peter Skaarup.
Peter Skaarup (DF)

Med hensyn til det sidste er det fair nok. Med hensyn til det første er det da fint nok med konvojsejlads; det er også fint nok med høje rælinger; det er også fint, hvis skibene kan sejle lidt hurtigere, men alt det er jo noget, de forsøger at gøre i dag. Rederierne har gjort, hvad de kunne for at sige til deres medlemmer, hvad de skal gøre for at undgå piratoverfald. Rederierne har jo hele vejen igennem ikke ønsket våben om bord på skibene, for så vidt heller ikke danske soldater, hvis det var det, man nåede frem til, men de har ændret opfattelse, fordi pirateriet har vist sig at være et så omsigtrigende fænomen i området, som vi rent faktisk har set.

Det er derfor, jeg synes, at det virker lidt tyndt, at Enhedslisten peger på de ting, som man allerede gør i dag, plus at man gør en hel del mere end det, Enhedslisten siger. Så prøv lige at gå i tænkeboks og find på noget mere, for det her er simpelt hen ikke et godt nok svar. Man er nødt til at finde på noget, der hjælper. Og jeg synes, at vi fra Dansk Folkeparti供给侧 har givet nogle gode forslag i dag, men vi vil meget gerne være behjælpelige over for regeringens støtteparti, som åbenbart vil stemme imod.

Omdøberen.

15:34
Første næstformand
Bertel Haarder (V)

15:34
Pernille Skipper (EL)

Det er jeg sikker på at Dansk Folkeparti er. Som sagt er jeg sikker på, at Dansk Folkeparti også allerede har foreslået vores udenrigspolitiske ordfører de gode forslag, som Dansk Folkeparti nu engang måtte have.


Det får mig lige til at bede Enhedslistens ordfører om at konkretisere: Er Enhedslisten imod muligheden for private bevæbnede vagter på de danske skibe?

Jeg har prøvet at sige, men jeg vil gerne sige det igen: Nej, Enhedslisten synes, at lovgivningen, som den er i dag, altså hvor det allerede i dag er muligt at have bevæbnede vagter på skibene, er fin.

Det har jeg problemer med, at man frem for at give enkeltpersoner våbentilladelser giver private vagtvejer muligheden for efter deres forældrelige at uddele våben. Det betyder, at den danske stat har mindre styr på dem, og det synes vi er en dårlig idé.
Preben Bang Henriksen.

Jeg skal bare høre: Har Enhedslisten ikke respekt for, at de søfarendes organisationer og rederierne i dag beretter om problemer, fordi det tager så lang tid at få disse tilladelser i hus efter den gældende ordning? Jeg bemærkede godt nok, at ordføreren sagde, at det kunne man jo planlægge sig ud af, men i nutidens skibstrafik er det jo altså fra dag til dag, at skibe bliver omdirigeret.

Mener Enhedslisten, at den gældende ordning er o.k., og er Enhedslisten dermed uenig med stort set alle de søfærendes organisationer og rederierne?

Ordføreren.

15:36
Preben Bang Henriksen (V)

Jeg skal bare høre: Har Enhedslisten ikke respekt for, at de søfarendes organisationer og rederierne i dag beretter om problemer, fordi det tager så lang tid at få disse tilladelser i hus efter den gældende ordning? Jeg bemærkede godt nok, at ordføreren sagde, at det kunne man jo planlægge sig ud af, men i nutidens skibstrafik er det jo altså fra dag til dag, at skibe bliver omdirigeret.

Mener Enhedslisten, at den gældende ordning er o.k., og er Enhedslisten dermed uenig med stort set alle de søfarendes organisationer og rederierne?

Første næstformand
Bertel Haarder (V)

Ordføreren.

15:36
Pernille Skipper (EL)

Vi mener i Enhedslisten, at det kan man planlægge sig ud af. Man kan planlægge sig til rigtig, rigtig mange ting. Og når man kan planlægge sig til, hvor en enkelt container skal ende i den anden ende af verden stort set på minutbasis, kan man også godt ægge vagtplaner.
Tak til Enhedslistens ordfører. Så giver jeg ordet til Liberal Alliances ordfører, hr. Simon Emil Ammitzbøll.

Danmark har en stolt tradition som handels- og søfartsnation, og dette lovforslag ligger jo fint i tråd med den tradition. Det er sådan set rart at se, fordi vi jo alle sammen har været vidne til de problemer, der er omkring pirateriet i Det Indiske Ocean og navnlig i Adenbugten ud for Somalia.


Jeg synes også, det er værd at have med, netop når vi taler om en globaliseret verden, at hvis ikke vi fra dansk side sørger for, at man på betryggende vis kan sikre skibene, der er udsat for piratangreb, er der mulighed for, at man kan flage ud. Det ønsker ikke nogen af os. Med det her forslag sikrer vi ligesom også danske skibe under dansk flag.

Endelig, måske som et kuriosum, vil jeg nævne, at det egentlig er lidt interessant, at der i dette forslag står, at der ikke er nogen udgifter for erhvervet, og det er der faktisk heller ikke, selv om der umiddelbart indgår en ny afgift. For hvis man ved lidt om skibstrafik og om, hvor mange sejladser der er, så kan man faktisk se, at vi efter et halvt år med byger af afgifter vel faktisk er vidne til en mindre afgiftsnedsættelse, i hvert fald hvis vi ser på, hvad der vil være det forventede provn fra det her forslag. Det vil Liberal Alliance selvfølgelig gerne i særlig grad kvittere justitsministern for. Der bliver sat et lille kryds, om ikke i den sorte, så i hvert fald i den mørkeblå bog hos Liberal Alliance, for, at man har medvirket til det. Så på alle punkter er det et godt forslag, som vil være til gavn for erhvervslivet og dermed til gavn for Danmark.
Tak til Liberal Alliances ordfører, men man må ikke tegne skibe på flaget.

Så er det den konservative ordfører, hr. Tom Behnke.

Også fra Konservatives side kan vi støtte lovforslaget her, et lovforslag, som jo dybest set bare gør det, som vi allerede gør i dag, men gør det på en mere smidig og hensigtsmæssig måde. Man går bort fra det, at skibene i dag må søge individuel tilladelse for hver gang, så de fremover kan få en generel tilladelse, og det gør det altså langt mere smidigt og hensigtsmæssigt, og derfor kan vi selvfølgelig støtte lovforslaget.

Lofforslaget er desværre en nødvendighed; det er desværre nødvendigt for danske skibe at kunne forsvare sig selv, fordi pirateri er blevet en trussel imod verdenshandelen. Det var det også for mange, mange år siden, og der har så været nogle hundrede år, hvor der har været ro på det felt, men nu er det kommet igen. Pirateri er et alvorligt problem og en alvorlig trussel mod verdenshandelen, og derfor skal man selvfølgelig have mulighed for at kunne forsvare sig selv, for uanset om vi så sendte hele det danske søværn ned i Det Indiske Ocean, ville det ikke være muligt at beskytte alle.

Så staten har altså simpelt hen ikke, ligesom den har det i Danmark, kapaciteten til at kunne beskytte bорgerne, virksomhederne, derude på de store verdenshave, og derfor må det være rimeligt, at de, der sejler derude, og som er udsat for truslen, har mulighed for at forsvare sig selv, og derfor er vi tilhængere af lovforslaget her.

Tak til alle ordførerne. Så giver jeg ordet til justitsministeren.


Der har været et par kommentarer, som jeg gerne vil adressere herfra. Inden jeg gør det, synes jeg, at det er vigtigt at understrege, at det fra at være en individuel tilladelsesordning
til nu en generel tilladelsesordning selvfølgelig rejser en hel række spørgsmål, og det har været vigtigt, at både rederierne og også de søfarendes egne organisationer har været tæt inde i arbejdet, og her fra Folketingets talerstol vil jeg gerne rose rederiforeningen, også de søfarendes egne organisationer, for at have gået så seriøst til værks, som man er gået med det her. Det synes jeg er virkelig flot, og man har jo, som man kan se af høringssvarene, afgivet et fælles høringssvar, som er meget positivt, om at man også i den videre dialog om udmøntningen af det her har et tæt samarbejde med hinanden. Så det synes jeg er rigtig godt, og det synes jeg også at Folketinget skal have med i den videre behandling af lovforslaget.

Så har der været et par spørgsmål, kaliberstørrelsen, altså hvor store må de våben så at sige være, man må tage med. Ja, det er vores vurdering, at det er det, der er behov for, og jeg synes jo også, at den opbakning, der har været i høringssvarene til det, peger i den retning. Det er klart, at det jo er en bekendtgørelse, det er en løbende vurdering, og er der behov, så er der mulighed for at se på det igen, men som sagt er det vores vurdering, at den kaliberstørrelse, der er angivet her, er den rigtige.

Danske soldater om bord på skibe er jo en diskussion, vi har haft mange gange. Det mener vi ikke er den rigtige vej at gå, og der ligger jeg helt i forlængelse af det, som hr. Tom Behnke også sagde, nemlig at det jo kan være uden ende. Vi kan jo se på de trusselsvurderinger, der kommer, at det jo ikke bare er Adenbugten, der er et problem lige nu. Det kan også være kysten ud for visse dele af Vestafrika, hvor der kan være et problem. Der er der altså her på baggrund af den individuelle godkendelses- og tilladelsesordning, som vi har haft tidligere, en proces med rederierne og nu også i tæt dialog med de søfarendes organisationer, hvor man kan finde en ny model til at få styrket det, og det sker med afsæt i, at det er private vagtværn, som får muligheder for det på baggrund af en generel tilladelse. Så det mener vi er vejen at gå.

Så er det klart, at Danmarks øvrige engagement på min kollegas, forsvarsministerens, område jo bl.a. har fokus på, hvordan det danske militær kan bidrage til, at vi forhåbentlig kan få bedre ro og orden i de områder, hvor piraterne desværre hærger alt for meget. Men samlet set handler det her lovforslag altså om, at danske skibe skal have bedre og nemmere muligheder for at få vagter om bord. Så tak for opbakningen til lovforslaget.

Første næstformand
Bertel Haarder (V)

Der er en kort bemærkning fra hr. Peter Skaarup.

Peter Skaarup (DF)

Det er lige en kommentar til spørgsmålet om de våben, der kan anvendes. Jeg synes, det er positivt, at ministeren åbner for, at der kan, hvis der viser sig at være et behov, være mulighed for, at man så kan justere den bekendtgørelse, der ligger til grund for det, for det er jo vigtigt, at man kan afskrække pirater, der er i færd med at ville angribe et skib, allerede inden de kommer helt op til skibet. På den måde kan man undgå blodsudgydelse,
og der kunne det godt være relevant, at man fik de her 12,7 mm i kaliber i forbindelse med brug af håndskydevåben. Det, der er fordelen ved det, er jo, at det giver et meget synligt opsprøjt, som det hedder – det giver en ret klar lyd – og det kunne måske i sig selv på fredelig vis afskrække nogle fra at gå i gang med deres forehavende.


15:47
Første næstformand
Bertel Haarder (V)
Ministeren

15:47
Justitsministeren
Morten Bødskov

Uden at fornærme nogen tror jeg, at jeg vil henholde mig til, at jeg med det her lovforslag har fremsat en ny model for at styrke sikkerheden på danske skibe, gøre den mere smidig. Og hvad Dansk Folkeparti så måtte have af spørgsmål, der vedrører den øvrige del af dansk udenrigspolitik – eksempelvis det, der her spørges til – synes jeg man skal rette dem de steder hen, hvor de hører hjemme. De hører ikke hjemme i en diskussion om at sikre danske rederier mere smidige vilkår til at få en bedre beskyttelse, når de sejler i piratfyldte farvande.

15:47
Første næstformand
Bertel Haarder (V)
Hr. Peter Skaarup.

15:47
Peter Skaarup (DF)

Det ved jeg nu ikke. Altså, jeg går da ud fra, at ministrene taler sammen, og at regeringen taler sammen om de initiativer, den iværksætter. Her har vi altså et initiativ, som vel skal kombineres med andre ting, for som også andre ordførere har været inde på, handler det her jo ikke kun om, at man fra rederiernes side kan få de rigtige muligheder; det handler
vel samlet set om en indsats fra dansk side, der gør, at vi undgår, at piraterne overhovedet kommer tæt på skibene. Og med til det hører, og det må regeringen vel være enig i, at vi skal undgå, at pirater, der tilfangetages af danske krigsskibe, bare sættes i land, hvorefter de begår nye piratangreb. Det må vel være en fælles holdning hos regeringen, uanset om det hører under udenrigsministeren eller forsvarsministeren eller justitsministeren; for man taler vel så meget sammen, at man kan have en holdning til, at det ikke er holdbart, og at man bør anvende forskellige metoder i farvandet til at sikre, at det ikke gentager sig.

Justitsministeren.

Altså, igen: Jeg er som sagt glad for Dansk Folkepartis opbakning til lovforslaget, det vil jeg henholde mig til. Hvad Dansk Folke parti måtte have af spørgsmål til den samlede danske strategi for deltagelse i bekæmpelsen af pirateri synes jeg man skal tage de steder, hvor det nu en gang hører hjemme. Jeg synes, det er glædeligt, at man her i Folketinget har en så bred opbakning til et så vigtigt lovforslag, som vi har her. Danmark er en stor søfartsnation; vi har mange skibe, som krydser problemfyldte farvande, også piratfarvande, og vi skal gøre, hvad vi kan, for at sikre, at der er en god beskyttelse af både rederiernes værdier og investeringer i deres skibe og selvfølgelig også af medarbejderne, de søfarende om bord på skibene. Og det er det, det her handler om, og derfor er jeg som sagt meget tilfreds med den brede opbakning, der har været til forslaget i Folketinget i dag.

Tak til ministeren.
Da der ikke er flere, der har bedt om ordet, er forhandlingen slut.

Jeg foreslår, at lovforslaget henvises til Retsudvalget. Hvis ingen gør indsigelse, betragter jeg det som vedtaget.
Det er vedtaget.