PESCO: A New Era in EU’s Security Rhetoric?

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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to uncover what has changed in the EU security field that caused the EU to decide that their new military treaty, PESCO, should be the first treaty that excludes NATO from its constitution. The purpose for this aim is to understand if a paradigm shift has occurred in EU’s security rhetoric in order to understand the general picture of the EU security research field on the day PESCO was officially welcomed. The European Council will be the main actor and subject of the thesis, where the press statements of select EU members along with the Council President will be analysed as data. The context behind their statements will be brought forth based on the content that they deliver in the statements, which will by default deepen the comprehension of the EU security situation on the day that those statements were made.

Keywords: Permanent Structured Cooperation, EU, European Council, EU Security, Paradigm, Rhetoric, PESCO, EU-US security relationship, NATO
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In this part of the paper, the issue of this paper will be presented as what puzzle this paper aims to solve. It will also be stated what the purpose of this puzzle is and why it ought to be solved along with research question and operational questions which will explain how the aim will be reached. In addition, a background will be given on the most immediate events in regards to the issue of the paper, and will end with an overall structure overview of the paper.

1.1: The Puzzle
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), represents a new era in European Union’s (EU)’s military treaty making since it is the first EU military treaty that does not include the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in its constitution. This is novel since NATO has played a major role in EU’s security building and has always been featured in legislations related to military cooperation. By using Securitisation Theory as a point of perspective, this paper aims to find out why PESCO is different from its predecessors and this will be the main puzzle of this paper (see ch 3). The way this thesis will solve this puzzle is by analysing securitising content given by EU member states surrounding the initiation of PESCO. Therefore, to specify, the aim of this study is to revive a general understanding why PESCO’s legislation does not follow the same pattern as the rest of EU military cooperation regulations. This aim will be achieved by looking on the European Council meeting that was held on the day PESCO was welcomed. The reason why this meeting was chosen is because they are meant for EU leaders to discuss the most important or most pressing issues, hence, one can see what the EU members securitised that day. This aim in turn leads to the research question: To what extent is PESCO a representation of a paradigm shift within EU’s security rhetoric?

However, despite narrowing down the scope of research to one day, the research question is still too broad, hence three operational questions will be utilised to specify what components the overall research questions will attempt to answer in this paper. The three operational questions are: What was securitised during the Council summit? What is the underlying context for this securitisation? How does this context explain that PESCO excluded NATO in its legislation? (see ch 3)

Where the purpose for answering these questions is to widen the understanding of the research area concerning European Security and gain a general idea of how the research field looked like on the day of PESCO’s inception. This is due to the fact that PESCO does break the existing pattern of how EU military treaties were usually structured, hence it is important to study this new
phenomenon. Therefore, the questions that this paper aims to answer will determine if PESCO is a mere exclusion of the rule or is a start of a new trend in EU’s security that will develop over time and will result in EU being self-reliant in regards to the defence of its own continent. Regardless what conclusions will be reached, it will still give an even deeper insight into EU’s security formation, which is the true purpose of this paper.

1.2: Background
The European Council is the main institution within the EU that defines the general political direction and sets the priorities for the entire EU and has mandate over security questions, which is why it will be the focus of this thesis. Its Council meetings are a forum where EU members gather to discuss issues that need to be dealt with as a Union and decide on future action plans on how the Members together can handle the issue in question. The way the Council handles these problems is usually by discussing potential creation of/ or creating institutions or legislations etc., where the discussion is done by to EU member state politicians behind closed doors. Therefore, one can see all the Council decisions as extra-legislative acts (see ch 3), hence, one can see the European Council as the main security actor within the EU structure and all that it discusses is already by default securitised.

PESCO was officially welcomed by the European Council on the meeting held 14th of December 2017, though the discussion of this cooperation was initiated the 22nd of June 2017 by the European Council and was adopted by the Council 11th of December 2017. PESCO is positioned as EU members coming together to protect its citizens and to face-off global threats in a “troubled world” (European Council, 13/11/2017). However, it was expressed by the European Council already in mid-December 2016, that there is a “need to strengthen Europe’s security and defence” (European Council, 2018).

The PESCO initiative is seen as the furthering of the EU integration that occurs “in light of a changing security environment” (EEAS, 2017). PESCO essentially represents a deepening of the already existing security relationship between the Member States by furthering the military capabilities and conducting operations together. PESCO involves an enhancement of “coordination, increased investment in defence and cooperation in developing defence capabilities” (EEAS, 2017). The PESCO initiative does not only focus on deepening the relationships between the Member States in terms of the military cooperation but also encourages a deepening in the economic relations between the Member States as well. This is clearly reflected in the binding nature of PESCO’s treaty-based framework which involves “jointly develop[ing] defence capabilities and make them available for EU military operations”, which maximises the effectiveness of the members defence spending (see more at EEAS, 2017). Thence making PESCO a deepening of the
political-economic relationship between the states both internally as well as externally, since the European states are notoriously unwilling to increase their military expenses which has put them at odds with the United States of America (US) within the NATO structure (Gordon, 1998).

The PESCO structures’ legal framework which consists of Treaty of the EU, Articles 42 (6) and 46, as well as Protocol 10, where the United Nations Chapters VI and VII of the United Nations Charter are also recognised, as per usual in a European military legislation. What makes PESCO so nominal however, is not the fact that it is deepening the relations between the EU members in three vital areas of statehood (political, economic and military), but the fact that the EU is now willing to develop its own military capabilities independently from the US. The fact that only sub paragraph six in article forty-two was included, thus excluding subparagraph two that mentioned NATO, is nominal. Because this means that the Member States are now willing to form their independent military identity from the US and are now focusing on their own region and members and therefore are fortifying their European identity. Yet, it is important to note that the 5th of December, 2017, a EU-NATO cooperation meeting was held, six days before the Council establishes PESCO with 25 member states participating (European Council, 19/12/2017). Furthermore, in a notification in regard to PESCO it was stated that the Member States are “[d]etermined to reach a new level in the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy as called for in Article 42 (2)” (Notification). This indicates that NATO still remains as an important component for Europe’s security, yet the EU still is looking towards a future of EU’s security that holds less involvement from the US government and is more self-sustained. Hence the importance of a puzzle that will answer why the EU suddenly decided to start building a military without the US when the NATO is important to the region; because the solution will show why this new future of EU security was selected.

1.3: Structure of the Thesis
Following this introduction, which gave a quick overview of the immediate events and background information necessary to understand the issue, is the literature review. This second chapter of this paper is an overview of European Security research field that will be given along with the methods and theories used by the scholars mentioned in the literature review. This is done in order to show how other scholars handled data within the same research field. The thesis itself builds on the topics from the literature review that handle issues that give deeper understanding of the context in which PESCO was formed; this is done in order fulfil the aim and purpose of this thesis. The Theory and Method part of the essay will explain the chosen theory and method, while also explaining what data will be used and, how it will be used for each part of the analysis. The analysis itself will be
divided into three parts based on the operational questions and will itself be followed by a conclusive chapter where an evaluation of the thesis will be given and will end with the final answer to the overall research question.

Chapter 2: Literature Review
The literature review will be divided into four subtopics, where each part will consist of academic articles discussing a similar issue. The first part will show the inception of EU security as an understanding and to use academic articles to show from an academic perspective what was the situation when the first brick of EU security policy formation was laid. In addition, this topic will discuss the question of what the predecessors of PESCO were and why were they constituted as they were. The second will explore the more political side of EU security policy inception, rather than a historical as the previous part was, in order to show how the formation of EU’s security interest has led to the creation of PESCO. The third topic of the literature review will show how academics analysed the difference between what EU members were saying and doing when it came to security which will be an issue that will also be dealt with in this paper. The fourth topic will be about “UK’s Importance for EU’s Security”, which is important since UK’s Brexit is changing the European security field hence it needs to be answered how important is the UK to EU’s security. The articles will be presented by what they researched in each respective topic and what methods they used in order to deepen the understanding of EU’s security structure and how the field of European security was previously researched. The appraisal of the findings made in this literature review will be done in the fifth and last part of the literature review. There, all the findings that are relevant for this paper’s aim will be summarised, and will be later used in the third chapter and the last part of the analysis.

2.1: How EU’s Security Institutions and Foreign Policy Came to Be
When discussing the creation of EU’s security institutions, it is inevitable to not discuss the difficult relationship the EU has had with NATO in the past. From this relationship sprung EU’s security policy that became institutionalised. This development affected the European society as a whole, and specifically the regions security. Cornish and Edwards (2001) used descriptive content analysis and the constructivist theory perspective when analysing this issue, where this combination was utilised in order to give an extensive overview of the different European opinions and actions towards NATO through-out time. Cornish and Edwards showed how these actions and thoughts developed into the new European security institutions, which showed that constructivism as a perspective gives a very well-rounded perspective of the context in which EU’s security institutions were created. The end conclusion was that EU will develop an independent security “style” but
despite tensions will continue its relationship with NATO. The only criticism that can be given is regards to this article is that there was little analysis on what each decision meant for EU’s physical security or reflection of the exact factors behind the EU-NATO tensions, which would be needed for a deeper analysis.

Another aspect about the institutions who constantly are renewed or founded is that there is tension between them due to the lack of direction concerning mandate, like issues of who has access to security policy information. A consensus between all the old and new institutions would result in a deeper European integration and increase in EU’s security foreign policy formation, which is what Rosén (2015) discussed. Just as Cornish and Edwards (2001) article, Rosén gives a good overview of the situation that showed how the new security institutions were formed, as well as some of the opinions from different EU institutions and Members. When making the analysis from a constructivist perspective, Rosén, includes normative theory that widens the area of discussion even more and makes the overview more extensive. Although, just as the methodological tools are, to some extent, the same, so are the weaknesses of the two articles, at least from this papers’ perspectives. This weakness, however, only emerges since these two articles do not aim to find the core of the tension within the EU for one or another issue. The way it would have been rectified is by focusing on a small niche of a theory in order to gain a focused discussion that Rosén (2015) lacked. One needs to clarify, however, that these articles fulfil their purpose impeccably of informing the overall situation but is still very shallow and too expository for a paper that wants to go deeper into the issue, which is the aim of this thesis.

An additional factor that one looks at when discussing institute-creation, is the formation of decision-making structures within the institutions and on what values and/or interests they were based on. Naert’s (2005) article that discussed this matter focused on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and its decision-making mechanisms as well how this institution came to be. Naert gives an extensive appraisal of the CSDP and its objectives, scope and mission as an institution while analysing the norms on which the CSDP was built upon (Naert, 2005). Furthermore, he puts the CSDP’s missions and objectives in relations to EU’s policies and objectives and evaluates how well the CSDP is fulfilling the EU’s general objectives (Naert, 2005). While doing this, Naert also brings forth the internal conflicts between the Member States concerning neutrality, which deepens the context of the CSDP was formed to cater to all Member States desires and how it affected the norms which it follows (Naert, 2005). This article does not only show the complexity of the CSDPs norm formation but also highlights the complexity behind security policy formulation within the EU that spawns from this (Naert, 2005). Even here NATO is brought forth as a factor for EU security policy formulation since many of the EU members are a
part of the organisation (Naert, 2005). This had a great effect on how the CSDP’s regulations were formulated, thus again showing the importance of the US to EU’s security (Naert, 2005). This article uses normative theory and constructivism which scatters the focus but regains it slightly due to the precise and narrow scope, which makes this article’s conclusions more focused than they would have been. The qualitative content analysis method helps give a very lively and interesting discussion, but it becomes too ambiguous with the scattered focus of theory.

Yet another theme that is important to the institute-creation topic is the question if the institutional structures fulfil the European Security Strategy and what is the overall European strategic/security culture in relation to UN and NATO. When Chapell and Petrov’s (2012) article discussed this topic and as an example analysed the work of the European Defence Agency (EDA) as well as its Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence (PSCD). More specifically Chapell and Petrov analysed the structure of the PSCD and the EDA as well as highlighting what are the current problems and what can be done to improve both structures, which gives the article a more concrete set of tone. Chapell and Petrov emphasise, just as many other articles, that the US plays a major role in EU’s security policy formulation and how EU members are torn between catering to the US and their own continents interests (Chapell and Petrov, 2012). This, according to Chapell and Petrov, is the reason why EU’s security cannot move forward, and will only do so when the Member States decide if they want to focus on the global approach to their security (NATO) or create their own regional defence since “[t]his article has highlighted the missing defence component – or the ‘D’ – in PSCD” (Chapell and Petrov, 2012:61). This article used normative theory and securitisation theory as well as the content analysis method, which gave way to a very interesting discussion, though the discussion would need to be more focused in order to reach a deeper level of analysis, which could be done by narrowing down the theoretical perspective.

2.2: How EU’s Interests are Shaped
This topic is also about the development of EU but more focus on EU as a significant global actor as well as EU’s political authority within the security aspect of the European region. Kaldor’s (2012) article, just like Rosén, used normative theory and constructivism however with a much emphasis on norm meaning in addition to the constructivist theory (Kaldor, 2012). Kaldor uses these two theories in order to explain various examples and gives an extensive account on the perspectives on Europe’s interests and how they are shaped (Kaldor, 2012). The theoretical focus in Kaldor’s paper fell mostly on the realistic perspective and liberalism where Kaldor discusses the norms behind the decisions and the context (Kaldor, 2012). While doing this Kaldor also discussed EU’s internal political authority and how its internal norm structure collided with NATO, or more
precisely, the U.S government, when making security decisions for the region. Kaldor concludes the article with policy suggestions on how the EU could improve its chain of command as well as discussing how this will affect EU’s security institutions and policy making and how in the end, this could enhance EU’s position as a global actor (Kaldor, 2012). From this essay's perspective, Kaldor's article is much more centred since it narrowed down its perspective solely to security which is why Kaldor’s results were more specific, though does not state that securitisation is used. Yet, due to focusing on many theoretical perspectives and having normative theory as the main theory of the article made the discussion interesting yet scattered. Kaldor’s article would have been more in depth if it had a more narrow and precise focus in the security theory perspective.

An additional aspect of shaping interests in the EU is how EU and NATO were fashioning their identities during the Cold War that in turn formed their world view, as well as how they forged their interests. Fierke and Wiener (1999), when discussing this issue, focused on norms and speech acts, and institutional interests (Fierke and Wiener, 1999:723). Fierke and Wiener define their framework as rationalist and constructivist, however, one could argue that there are heavy undertones of normative school of thought. This framework is used in the article to analyse speech acts and actions that shape the interests of institutions by explaining the context in which the speech acts and/or actions were made as well as their significance to the overall context (Fierke and Wiener, 1999). Furthermore, this article also analyses the similarities and differences between how EU and NATO handled and perceived different content of contexts such as the fall of the Soviet Union. Unlike, Kaldor’s article, Fierke and Wiener also choose a wide range of examples, but they defined the nature of what type of examples they will make which narrowed the discussion scope and made their discussion much more focused and in-depth. The choice of speech acts, from this paper’s perspective added a much deeper layer to the security perspective of Fierke’s and Wiener’s article, which the other articles lacked despite their choice of focusing on security. Though one could still argue that one could go even deeper into the security theory perspective. It is also noteworthy that, just as Kaldor’s article, Fierke’s and Wiener’s article also used content analysis which gave a good depth to their context discussion.

2.3: EU Identity and Its Security
When discussing EU’s identity, one usually stumbles over the interesting fact of how EU’s portrayal and actual interests contradicted each other. Where the force for good that the EU is trying to portray itself as, is just a facade, where in fact the EU only focuses on its own region and its relations to the US. Bailes (2008) discussed this using the example of Kosovo that showed how UK and France were the driving force behind wanting to create a common European security treaty. Bailes uses the
example to portray what that context did to the EU member states and also highlighted that the
countries that were sceptical to a military cooperation were the ones that were not, and are not, NATO
members (Bailes, 2008). This was used to explain the structure of the first cooperation formulation,
but the main focus of Bailes was on the discrepancy between how the cooperation was publicly
motivated and what the discussion actually contained (Bailes, 2008). One could argue that Bailes uses
realism as a theoretical undertone to her argumentation and a content analysis as a method which
results in a complete uncovering of EU’s external identity that exposed EU’s true identity underneath,
or possibly, what Bailes portrays as its identity. This article’s overall analysis could be described as
one-sided but precise and well-developed arguments.

Another fact that one just as often comes across is the internal dissonance between the Member
States and how that plays-out negatively for the Unions integration, where Risses’s article (2012)
made suggestion of how this gap can me mended. Risses’s article makes this suggestion by
discussing EU’s identity through its foreign policy formation and how it is portrayed in the US
(Risse, 2012). Risse highlights the fact that there is a clear discrepancy between the identity the EU
portrays to the public and what its identity actually is, just like Bailes. Risse, just like Bailes, means
that the EU’s policies are focused inward and on what is good for the EU rather than what is good
for the entire global society (Risse, 2012). The theory that one can presume that Risse uses is social
constructivist due to his focus on identity and its portrayal, while the method is content analysis
since he digs very intently for the underlying context throughout his paper. This all renders to be
well rounded discussion, although Risse has a slightly wider scope than Bailes. Risse’s and Bailes’s
arguments are of similar nature, they are just as one-sided since he views it form a US perspective
only, but the arguments made are very well developed.

2.4: UK’s Importance for EU’s Security
When discussing the UK and Brexit, one needs to look at what significance Brexit will have for
EU’s security policy formations through various angles, since the UK will still remain and will have
an interest in the regions security. Biscop’s (2016) article discusses all the possible outcomes Brexit
could have for the EU and the different possibilities the UK has regarding its security cooperation
with the EU. Biscop, however, does not only focus on EU as the main actor but also underlines that
the US, who is shifting its focus from Europe to China and the Pacific region will not be able to
handle all of Europe’s security problems anymore (Biscop 2016). This article outlines the short- and
long-term capabilities while using realism as its underlying theory while also utilising content
analysis that consist of present-day’s security climate (Biscop 2016). The article fully fulfils its aim
to act as a policy suggestion and grounds its arguments, which leads to precise results. Yet, the
article has two main actors and it leaves the argumentation and the analysis shallow since it prevents Biscop to go deeper into the possibilities for one actor. This, however, also has a positive side since it gives a better overlook of the benefits and drawbacks for each party as well as gives a brief insight how the current security climate affects the EU and UK separately.

Though when discussing Brexit, one needs also to understand UK’s significance as an actor in relation to the EU and the overall security context in the region. Whitman’s (2016) article evaluates, just as Biscop, the possibilities for UK to be a part of the region’s security, but also the possibilities of influencing the regions security through institutions such as the UN and NATO. Whitman also argues that EU’s formulation regarding the decisions made about security policy, that they are intergovernmental rather than community decisions, makes it easier for the UK to continue be a part of the European security policy making (Whitman, 2016). Whitman means that even the EU does not see their institutions as integrated and that every decision is still intergovernmental, and therefore it does not matter if the UK is a part of the EU or not (Whitman, 2016). This means that the UK can utilise this weakness in the EU’s decision-making and reap benefits from it and not have to deal with the difficulties of membership. Whitman insists that for the sake of all, the UK and EU must foremost focus on creating a roadmap for their future security relations during the Brexit negotiations in order to provide security for the region (Whitman, 2016). What concerns the method and theory of the article, it is the same as Biscops’, since it also analyses the context through content analysis, but only UK’s interests, which makes this article more in-depth and precise in its conclusions.

2.5: Summary of Findings in the Literature Review
What has been made clear in this literature review is that NATO is an integral part of EU’s security past and present, which makes the decision of excluding NATO from PESCO even more confounding, which makes it even more crucial to fulfil the aim of this paper. Another factor that has been made very clear by almost-all articles is that there is no unity within the EU, be it between Member States or institutions. Therefore, this paper will focus on individual member states in order to see their opinions on the issue as many articles have done above, but still view the European Council as the main actor since its decisions is a unanimous decision between all members.

Although it has been proven by the articles above that it is better to focus on more than one actor to avoid a one-sided arguments, which is not what this paper aims for, hence several members will be used as data. Paradoxically, the literature review also showed that it is better to focus on one actor to uncover that actors’ mechanisms better. Though, one could argue that the Member States are a part of the Council, which makes the Council one actor. Hence, when looking at the Member
States, one is simply deepening the insight into one actor, which is the European Council, thus solving the issue.

What concerns the theory and methods, it has been made clear that constructivism is a solid choice for EU security analysis. Yet, as stated above the deepening into speech acts and a larger focus on security specifically helped the articles above to gain precision in their arguments. Hence it could be derived that the securitisation theory with its narrow scope is a solid choice for a theoretical perspective.

The content analysis brings forth not only the context of what something was said but also the historical and cultural reasons for why it was said. All the articles above when discussing the content of the event they were focusing on used context in order to deepen their arguments, which shows that the same should be done in this thesis. The findings made in this literature review prove that this method would fare well even with the topics of the articles in the literature review, which will be a part of this paper’s analysis. Though the specifics on how the theory and the method will be used will be given in this forthcoming chapter.

Chapter 3: Theory and Method
In this chapter the chosen theory and method will be introduced along with how the data will be treated in order to reach the aim of this thesis.

3.1: Securitisation Theory
The theory was chosen for understanding the topic of EU security the Copenhagen Schools Securitisation Theory where “the secritisation model /.../ could be seen as a synthesis of realism and constructivism” (Emmers, 2016:172). This duality allows to explore the security issues in the EU security field deeper; because of the constructivist origin, the securitisation theory does not attempt to determine if an issue is truly a security threat or not as it would have done if it were only of realist origin. Instead, it focuses on analysing how the content of the discourses/ contexts surrounding the issue makes the issue into a threat (Elbe, 2010). Wæver defined securitisation as a discursive process where an actor declares an issue as an imminent threat (Wæver, 1995). Since the Copenhagen School holds that security must be articulated as an existential threat (Buzan et al, 1998). The way security threats are viewed within the Securitisation theory is that there are securitising actors are defined as actors who securitise issues by declaring them as existential threats, while the referent object is the issue which is securitised. The actors must be in a position of legitimate authority to be able to securitise an issue, a position like: a political leader, or in a bureaucracy, government, etc. and even a non-state actor (Buzan et al, 1998). The threats can be of any nature, hence the Copenhagen School claims that any issue/referent object can be either non-
politically, politicised, or securitised. PESCO is already highly politicised since it was created at the highest governmental body of the EU by the leaders of the individual member states, hence a discussion on PESCO’s politicisation will not be conducted. The requirement for politicisation is an establishment of a threat that is conceptual and that has salience enough to produce a substantial political effect, PESCO is proof that that has already taken place (Buzan et al, 1998). “[A] securitising actor [has already used securitizing] language to articulate a problem in security terms and to persuade a relevant audience of its immediate danger” (Emmers, 2016:171). Furthermore, a discussion will not be conducted whether or not PESCO has been securitised is extra-legislative due to the fact that it adds new nuances to the existing treaty as discussed in CH 1. “[A] successful act of securitisation provides securitising actor with the special right to use exceptional means”, which has already occurred since PESCO is a treaty that grants and expands the military possibilities of EU’s member states (Emmers, 2016:172). Therefore, it can be clearly stated PESCO is the effect of a successful securitisation.

PESCO fits well within the narrow scope of the Securitisation theory as it fulfils all its requirements of a successful securitisation process. Though this theory has also been critiqued, where one principal critique was that the securitisation theory is state-centric (McDonald, 2008). This argument can be countered with Wæver’s reasoning about the theory, where he holds that securitisation can go beyond the normative way of thinking, which ties all security to the state (Wæver: 1995: 47). Another critique towards the Securitisation Theory is that it is dependent on an “environment” where democratic processes take place, such as legitimising actions with the public. This is not an issue since EU is a highly democratised governmental organisations hence this critique does not apply to PESCO, despite its legitimacy that has been admitted by the Copenhagen School as well (Buzan et. al, 1998). Henceforth, it is safe to use the securitisation toolbox without issue, which consists of several questions that need to be answered that are:

1. Who/What is the securitising Actor? 2. Who/What is the referent object? 3. What “power” does the securitising actor have and who is the audience? 4. How was the issue (referent object(s)) securitised and is there a speech act? 5. If any, what extraordinary measures are suggested? (Simin, 2017:24)

For this thesis, not all questions must be answered since some of the answers are already known, such as the securitising actor is the European Council that made the decision of establishing PESCO. It is also known what legislative power the European Council has and that the audience is EU’s citizens when they make their press statements. The extraordinary measure taken in response to the referent object is that NATO cooperation is not included in the PESCO legislation as it has
been done before, in addition the treaty is aimed at expanding existent military cooperation amongst the member states in ways discussed in CH 1. This leaves two out of the five questions unanswered, what is the referent object and how was it securitised. These two questions will be the focus of this thesis analysis where they will be answered separately with the help of content and discourse analysis. To find answers to these questions is the aim of this study where the purpose for this aim is to understand if a paradigm shift has occurred in EU’s security rhetoric.

However, as mentioned before in chapter 2.5, member states will also be analysed, more specifically their speech acts, in the discourse part of the analysis, though the facts on what has been stated will be analysed in the content part of the analysis, and all discourses will be summarised in the last part of the analysis.

As it has been portrayed in the previous research in the EU security field, France has been one of the main driving forces for EU security along with the UK, who is now exiting the Union. Due to knowledge in French president Macron’s statements on PESCO will be analysed as the actor that is driving force for a common EU security. Due to knowledge in Swedish, the Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven’s statements on the issue as the actor of a nation that is not a part of NATO and, as it was shown in the literature review, a country that shies-away from military cooperations. Both France and Sweden have ratified the PESCO treaty and this is the reason why UK’s Prime Minister Theresa May’s statements, who has not ratified and is exiting the Union, will be analysed as well.

3.2: Method
The method that will be used for analysing data is Content Analysis which focuses on the underlying context of what is stated. This method was chosen for its capability to show how people “use and manipulate symbols and invest communication with meaning” (Moyser and Wagstaffe 1987:20).

What is ‘said’ in a text is always said against the background of what is ‘unsaid’ – what is made explicit is always grounded in what is left implicit. In a sense, making assumptions is one way of being intertextual – linking this text to an ill-defined penumbra of other texts, what has been said or written or at least thought elsewhere” (Faireclough, 2003:17).

The content analysis is also convenient due to its methodological toolbox consists of questions that need to be answered before one begins researching. These questions were displayed by Hermann as below and where the answers can be seen as epistemological justifications for this thesis; other than the aim and purpose of the thesis which have already been stated.

(1) Does your research question involve extracting meaning from communications? (2) What kinds of materials are available and how accessible are they? (3) Does what you are interested in studying
The answers to these are as follows: 1. As stated above and as it will be further explained in the next part of the chapter is that extracting the meaning behind communication/speech is the main goal of the research. 2. All the materials are from one site which can be accessed by anybody therefore excluding researcher privilege as an ethical concern. 3. The research will be qualitative due to the nature of the speeches and the format of this paper. 4. The material will be mostly considered representational due to the fact that the researcher cannot bring forth all the meaning behind the communication either due to researcher bias or due to specific cultural knowledge/political insider knowledge that the researcher does not have. 5. The unit of analysis is general themes and the way they are being coded is that the issues that the chosen representatives bring-up will be summarised into words (see Table 1). The analysis will decodify this coding by first stating how the representatives communicated the theme that was summarised into a word and then decodify what was the meaning behind those statements (see ch 3.3 for more information). 6. In this instance only the most relevant history and culture related factors will be included as context, unfortunately, research-bias is unavoidable at this stage just as it is in other similar types of research. 7. If one knows all three languages (Swedish, French and English) then the research can be replicated without problem. 8. The way this analysis captures the area of interest and aim of this study is by focusing on speeches surrounding the Council meetings which are done behind closed doors. Hence, to find out why that specific content was securitised is by analysing the speeches surrounding the meeting when PESCO was initiated. How this will be done will be further discussed in the next part of the chapter.

3.3: Data procedures
The first part of the analysis corresponds with the Securitisation question that was left unanswered: what is the referent object(s), or rather what was securitised and will be responsible for setting up the content for the next part of the analysis. The first analysis part will be responsible for answering the operational question What was securitised during the Council summit? The material that will be used for the analysis will be qualitative, and in the form of press statements from December 14th when all members (including the UK) had a meeting and “welcomed” the initiation of PESCO. This includes statements from the Council President Donald Tusk, who will be viewed in this paper as a part of the European Council. These statements are done on video that can be found on European Councils official page. Each participant’s statements are shown in separate videos, but these videos do not have transcripts hence general topics from the speech acts will be extracted from each video.
The topics which came from Löfven, Macron, May, or Tusk will be listed next to their name where a main topic will be indicated (see Table 1). The way the main topic will be derived is by looking on which topic the representative in question spent most time talking about. Journalist questions will not be included as a factor for shaping the discussion of the representative due to the fact that all chosen representatives either disregarded or gave short answers on questions they did not want to answer and talked about what they thought was important. Hence this paper considers that the topics which each representative brings up in the video is what that representative securitises. The official conclusions from the meeting of December 14th will not be used since it does not indicate which member discussed what and etc. and therefore serves no purpose for this paper. The method that will be used for this part is content analysis since it will be most useful for extracting information from the videos and analysing it.

The second part of the analysis will correspond to the question how was it securitised, thus giving context to the topics which will be brought forth in the first part of the analysis. The second part of the analysis will be responsible for answering the operational question What is the underlying context for this securitisation? Hence, for the content part of the analysis, statements by the chosen representatives in press releases or news articles will be used as data as well as historical- and present-day events. This data will be chosen based on if it was stated before the meeting held 14th of December 2017 and its relevance to the topic. The data will be used to give further context regarding EU security with a focus on what topics were brought forth to the discussion, in order to analyse the root and/or cause for the representative to securitise the topic. All this different types of data will be utilised in order to see what the member states perceived as a threat to the Union to such extent that they felt the need to find a common solution to the problem. Furthermore, to see what the Council President has to say about PESCO and therefore gain further understanding for what discourses lead to the exclusion of NATO from the PESCO legislative framework. This data will be analysed with the help of content analysis and will be presented in flowing text, where the material used to support the arguments made, will not contain information concerning events that took place after 14th of December 2017 in order to fully understand the state of affairs and thoughts of the chosen representatives on the day of the Council meeting.

The last part of the analysis will only answer the operational question How do these contexts explain that PESCO excluded NATO in its legislation? Where content analysis will be used to discuss all the information that was uncovered in the literature review and the previous parts of the analysis.
Chapter 4: Analysis
This paper’s analysis will be separated into three parts. The first part will be using content analysis to uncover what topics were brought forth during the day PESCO was officially initiated, where the second part will be using content analysis to analyse the underlying discourse/context of that which was found in the first part of the analysis. Where the third part of the analysis will further discuss the findings made in the two previous parts along with the information given in the introduction and literature review in order to finally understand why NATO was excluded from PESCO’s legislation.

4.1: What was securitised during the Council summit?
In this part of the analysis, the content of statements made by the representatives of France (Emanuel Macron), UK (Theresa May), Sweden (Stefan Löfven) and The European Council (Donald Tusk) will be analysed (see ch 3). The statements used were uttered on 14th of December 2017 on a European Council summit, which was the day they welcomed the start of PESCO (see ch 1). Since these summits are made for EU member states to discuss issues of utmost importance makes all the topics politicised (see ch 3). The topics are also considered securitised due to the fact that the members feel that they need legislative measures outside the current ones to deal with the issue (see ch 3). In this part of the analysis, all the topics that were brought forth in statements that were either done before or after the meeting were mentioned by the representatives and this will be clearly depicted in a table below. All topics will be listed and next to them it will be depicted which representative brought it up (see Table 1). Furthermore, it will be stated if a topic was the main focus of the representative which was determined by how long the representative spoke about the topic (see ch 3.3 for more detail). After the table, a discussion will be conducted where the content will be analysed by comparing the different topics and which representatives highlighted what. The topics will not be compared to the official topic overview provided by the Council since the topics that were not mentioned were not as important to the representatives which void the use of such comparison. All the topics with their respective contents will be discussed separately from each other to maintain the distinction of the otherwise highly related content. The first part of the analysis will then end with a summary where all the findings made will be stated and will then be elaborated upon in the second part of the analysis.

Table 1
In this table below, it is depicted which topics were mentioned during the interviews on December 14th, 2017, during a European Council meeting. The topics presented are what representatives mentioned when asked what were and are the topics discussed during that meeting. Hence showing which topics were the most important for each representative and where the most important topic
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was determined by how much time each candidate spent talking about it (see chapter 4). One of the representatives is Stefan Löfven who is the representative of Sweden and is depicted as Swe in the table. Emanuel Macron represents France and is depicted as Fra in the table, while Theresa May that represents the United Kingdom and is depicted as UK in the table. The last representative’s statements that are shown in the table are by European Council President Donald Tusk and is depicted in the table as EUC. All the material came from one source (European Council, 14/12-2017).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topics</th>
<th>Countries that mentioned this topic</th>
<th>For who was the topic the main focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>Swe, Fra,</td>
<td>Swe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Threat</td>
<td>Swe, UK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donald Trump</td>
<td>Swe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Unity</td>
<td>Swe, EUC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brexit</td>
<td>Swe, UK, EUC</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daesh</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PESCO (security/defence)</td>
<td>Fra, EUC, UK</td>
<td>Fra, UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working with African countries, and Turkey</td>
<td>Fra, Swe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forming Unity</td>
<td>Fra, EUC</td>
<td>EUC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Discussion
In this discussion, each topic brought up in the table above will be discussed separately where it will be specified how each representative discussed the topic and what comments did they leave to the press concerning the topic they brought-up. All the comments and statements are taken from one source where all the statements can be found; the source used is “European Council, 14/12-2017”.

Migration: As seen in the table above the migration topic was brought up by two out of four representatives and was also the main topic of the Swedish representative which makes this topic very important within this selected group. Yet the two country representatives discussed migration in very different ways. The representative from France discussed migration from the perspective that is within the framework of the Council. Stating that it is planned to form a collective plan and solve the issue together and internally. Though it must be noted that the French representative did not spend much time on this topic and discussed it in relation to how PESCO will lead to security
and further integration. The representative from Sweden, however, was not as positive as the French representative and had a very firm and aggressive view on the migration topic. Though this representative too, expressed that this issue can only be solved collectively yet made it very clear that Sweden does not believe that the burden of accepting migrants (or refugees) are distributed equally between the Members. Furthermore, the Swedish representative stated clearly that if no common solution is reached on this issue that satisfies Sweden then Sweden will have no other choice but to leave the Schengen Agreement. Though this agreement does not include all the EU member states it does contain most West European countries and it is an agreement which allows people to move freely between countries and get jobs etc. This withdrawal would risk completely stopping the progress of integrating the entire EU if one of the countries that have already come so far in the integration would close its borders. Especially, due to Brexit that is currently stirring EU politics in the South of Europe, where the countries are also inclined to leave the Union just as the UK. Therefore the statements made by the Swedish representative at the summit could cause a lot of damage in combination with Brexit and could stop the EU from reaching its goal of an integrated European society. Hence, with this topic one can see that there is a clear discrepancy between the views on migration politics within the EU, and as seen by the harsh, and potentially dangerous, comments made by the Swedish representative, it is a topic that is very much securitised by Sweden.

**The Russian Threat:** Though this topic also was brought up by two representatives out of four, it was not a main issue and both representatives from UK and Sweden discussed it as a part of the overall security issue which PESCO aspires to solve. Both representatives mentioned the Russian threat in relation to the annexation of Crimea and the ongoing war in Ukraine, where both expressed a concern for further Russian expansion.

**Donald Trump:** This topic was only brought up by the Swedish representative and it was brought up in relation to Trump’s decision to move the American embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. What was interesting with this statement made by the Swedish representative was that this decision was not referred to as a country’s decision but was expressed as a decision made specifically by the President of that country.

**Lack of Unity:** This topic was not the main topic for any representatives but in Sweden’s case, this topic very much related to its main concern which was migration and lack of unity within the EU was brought-up in relation to the migration issue. The Swedish representative expressed it as a fact and explained it as a result from not all EU member state interests are considered equal, yet, it was
also mentioned that the council president was regretful over the lack of unity during the meeting. The president of the European Council himself also stated lack of unity within the Union as a fact to the press, though, clearly stated that there is a clear division between North and South on the issue of migration and there is a clear division between East and West concerning issues of economic nature.

**Brexit:** This topic can be considered as one of the main topics that were discussed at the Council summit held 14th of December 2017. The reason for this is because three out of the four selected representatives discussed this topic with the press and it was a main issue for one representative. The representative from the UK, for whom Brexit was a main issue, expressed the topic by first talking about how the UK needs to work with the rest of the EU to make their exit smooth. In addition to that a promise was made by the representative concerning the UK remaining just as actively involved in the security of region as before. But, what was interesting was that the representative spent the other half of the time talking about how they are working on making the British Parliament conform and accept Brexit. Though this could be due to the fact that the reporter asked about the British parliament vote, but still the representative did spend a lot of time talking about it, thus showing that Brexit is not only securitised as a topic for the European Union but also within the UK itself. The representative from the European Council expressed scornful concern over Brexit but was mostly brought up in relation to the lack of unity topic. The Swedish representative only mentioned Brexit briefly when asked by a reporter what important issues will be discussed at the summit, but no comments were made on the topic itself.

**Daesh:** This topic was only mentioned by the British representative and it was brought-up when discussing the Russian threat topic, while discussing what PESCO will be used for. No comments on the topic of Daesh was made other that it is a major issue for European security.

**PESCO (Security and Defence):** As expected of a summit that was held on the day PESCO was welcomed, it was the other main theme of this council summit and the main topic of two representatives out of four. For the representative from the UK, for whom PESCO was a main topic, PESCO was expressed as important due to the threats that are posed directly by Russia and Daesh. The French representative, that also had PESCO as a main topic, expressed the necessity for PESCO as means to build a European culture and community and further the European integration. While the representative from the Council that did not have PESCO as a main topic discussed PESCO as a means of further integration but also for defence against threats, however, this representative did not specify which threats unlike the representative from the UK.
**Working with African Countries and Turkey:** Though the French and Swedish representatives both brought-up the topic of working with countries outside the EU but the French representative talked only about how EU should work with African countries concerning trade, while Sweden expressed a strong need to work with Turkey on the migration issue.

**Forming Unity:** This was for obvious reasons the main topic for the representative of the European Council who did not specify how this is to be achieved but highlighted that it needs to be improved and that it takes a lot of courage and realism to be able to create unity. While the French representative, on the other hand, who did not have unity as a main topic, specified that the EU needs to create its own culture and focus on issues that are internal as well as the start of PESCO will help create unity within the EU.

**Summary of the Findings Made in the Content Analysis**
What can be clearly seen in this part of the analysis is that there is a clear lack of unity within the EU which creates conflict between the members as seen with the migration topic. Another issue that has been made apparent in this part of the analysis is that all these selected member states in one or another way have perceived as well as expressed that the EU is threatened. Yet, there is still discrepancies of what the actual threat really is, since it is made clear by the representatives from Sweden and the UK, that they identify a physical enemy in the form of Russia or Daesh while the representatives from the European Council and France expressed the lack of unity in itself as a threat. Although it was the French representative that stated that the EU needs to shift its focus inward, he then contradicts himself by saying that the EU needs to cooperate with African countries and the Swedish representatives also confirms that the EU needs to cooperate more with countries outside of EU in order to achieve solutions on issues inside the EU. Though it is also made clear that outside forces such as the decision of a President to move an embassy can also cause issues for the EU as well as international terrorism in the form of Daesh. All these “threats” and issues are already highly securitised issues within the EU, which proves that the issues that are securitised in the EU does not only exist within the limits of the region.

**4.2: What is the underlying context for this securitisation?**
In this part of the analysis, the underlying discussion beneath what was stated by each representative will be unearthed. Thus, in this part of the analysis, the aim is to show what contexts from the representatives’ home countries sprung the content in Table 1 and explain why the main topics were important for the respective representatives. The topics and their respective contents
will be discussed separately in order to show distinction from the otherwise tightly linked issues, which will be followed by a summary of findings made in this part of the analysis.

*Migration:* As seen in analysis part one, the Swedish representative was very determined when it came to this topic and the reason why migrant distribution was brought-up by Stefan Löfven is because Sweden was one of the European countries that took on most of the Syrian refugees. Where the cause of the representative’s irritation is that Sweden’s economy cannot handle the pressure since the Swedish government is still forced to rent expensive housing due to lack of current housing along with many more administrative issues related to migrants. Another possible reason for such harsh spoken words in regards to the Schengen Agreement is due to the context of an impending Swedish election that is held in September 2018 and migration is one of the most discussed topics where the Swedish people have expressed great concern over the issue. Parties who have a firmer and more migrant hostile stance are winning voters and therefore the statement made by the Swedish Prime Minister could be seen as a ploy to win the votes of the Swedish people in order to stay in the government for another term. Hence through this context one could see that the statement made by the representative in regards to the Schengen Agreement is more about winning voters in Sweden than actually expressing a firm policy that will lead Sweden to exit the Schengen Agreement and stop EU’s integration process for Sweden. But what is made clear from the Swedish Prime Ministers’ statements is that he is much more focused on Sweden as an individual country and putting its interests before all, which is a direct opposite of the statements made by the French representative in regards to this same topic. The French President made statements about how this issue should be solved by the Union where a plan should be formed by the Member states as a collective. Such statements made by the French representatives is cohesive with Emanuel Macrons’ policy on furthering EU integration and having France shoulder the leading role of the EU to integration, a role Germany is currently holding. Though Macron’s migrant policy does not depend on the common decision of the EU in regards to French migration policy but makes very many executive decisions without consulting the Union, which is somewhat contradicting to his statements made on the 14th of December. What can be stated about Macron’s overall policy for France is that it reflects the French craving for returning to big politics where France has the leading role (Tiersky, 2016). This is reflected clearly in Macron’s policy in regards of spreading the French language. In a speech made in Burkina Faso, December 2017 the President stated: “French will be the number one language in Africa and maybe even the world if we play our cards right in the coming decades” (Skapniker, 2017). This statement clearly proves that Macron mainly focuses on enlarging the importance of France within the EU and the world. Thus, this context renders
Macrons’ statements about integration as a way of showing that France is taking over the leading role in the EU, and not about EU integration itself.

*The Russian Threat:* What concerns the fact that the Swedish representative naming Russia as a threat is not a surprise due to the context of Sweden has already been preparing for war with Russia since December 2016 out of fear of a Russian invasion (Orange, 2016). The academic hospital in Uppsala is currently gearing-up its basement so it could work under the conditions of war, based on the overall policy of the Defence ministry (SVT, 2017). However, the Swedish fear of a Russian invasion is nothing new and has existed ever since they lost the war in Poltava (in 1709) and with it some of the Swedish Empire, which is now Finland and most parts of the current Estonia and Latvia. During the Second World War and during the Cold War a group within the Swedish Security Service (Säpo) created an organisation outside the government’s control in order to spy on the Soviet Union since they believed the government did not have harsh enough attitude to the big threat from the East. Though what has altered and heightened the already existing context of fear towards Russians within Sweden was the annexation of Crimea which made Swedes remember their own past thus explaining the Swedish representatives’ statement. What concerns the equally stern statements about Russia made by the UK is not as expected, however, the UK too has had turmoilis with Russia in the past. Though they were sometimes allies and enemies throughout history but only in the 19th century did the British Russophobia start to get a hold when Russia and Britain were clashing over Central-Asia and Britain fearing that Russia was coming too close to its colonies and its ally the Ottoman Empire (Siegel, 2002). This is when British media started to depict Russia and Russians as barbaric and backward in comparison to the civilised British. Yet, the angst cooled down during the Great War where the two countries were yet again allies and was reheated again when the Bolsheviks took over the control of the country. Afterwards, the British continued their trend of depicting Russians as barbaric and backwards despite being allies in the Second World War, due to strong fear of communism (Defty, 2003). Hence when Russia annexed Crimea, it only confirmed the already deep-rooted belief/context within the British society that all Russians are barbarians and that they are unreasonable and there is nothing stopping them from continuing committing barbaric acts. This context is what lead the British people to fear Russian expansion, which was seen in opinion polls (see Thomson, 2018), and made the British Prime Minister to openly state that Russia is a threat to the EU.

*Donald Trump:* As it was noted in the first part of the analysis, Stefan Löfven expressed that the movement of the US embassy to Jerusalem was a negative decision. When expressing the Swedish perspective on the matter, Löfven stated that it was a decision made by Donald Trump rather than
stating that it was a decision made by the US president Trump. This statement, though brief, shows that there is a resentment towards President Trump and may have a lot to do with the fact that Sweden’s government openly stated that they supported Hilary Clinton and were disappointed that she lost the election. The explanation Stefan Löfven gave in 2016 when Trump won the election was that it would be a lot easier to find a common ground with Clinton than with Trump (Svensson, 2016). Thus, showing that the Swedish Prime Minister already in 2016 openly expressed a distrust towards the US President and this only grew since due to clashes on environmental politics and economic interests. Furthermore, the Swedish government expressed great displeasure when US President Trump criticised Sweden for having a too “open” migration policy which lead to the rise in crime, gang violence and riots in Sweden (according to Trump). Hence, Löfvens’ noting on the fact that Trump, not the US made a bad political decision of moving its Embassy in Jerusalem knowing full-well that Palestine would not be happy and would even fuel the Israel-Palestine conflict, is nothing more than a reflection of the context that exists between Löfven and Trump. While the reason why Jerusalem was an important enough topic for the representative from Sweden to mention is because Sweden is one of the countries that have recognised Palestine as a state completely, with all rights and obligations of a state, which the UK and France do not. Yet, it is necessary to mention that the Swedish Prime Minister is not the only European leader which has openly expressed distrust towards Trump and his policies, and one can say that there is an unspoken consensus amongst the European leaders concerning Donald Trump. President Trump in that consensus is perceived as someone that cannot be trusted since he changes his views often and does only prioritise uncompromisingly American interest before all, which does not sit well with Trump’s European counterparts.

Lack of Unity: This topic as discussed above was more discussed as a side topic to the other topics since Löfven only expressed this topic in relation to the migration topic and the context that is attached to it. This statement was more made for the Swedish people that are now pressing the Swedish government to focus on the country self-interests rather than on the common interest of the Union before the Swedish election. Where the statement made by Council President Donald Tusk, and which was remarked by Löfven simply shows that the rift in the EU is deep and is based on countries geopolitical location in regards to different issues. The statement by Tusk was that countries in the Northern European countries are more pro open-door policies than the Southern since they are further away from where the refugees enter Europe. Where the division in regards to economic issues is East and West, which can be clearly seen with the Nord Stream 2 project where the Eastern countries express deep fear of falling under the Russian sphere of influence while the Western countries are the ones who would gain the most out of the deal (European Council, 14/12-
Therefore, the statement made by President Tusk is just a reflection of the true condition and context under which the Union is working in and what is truly behind the slow progress of European integration, which is geopolitics. Ergo, Tusk with his statement clearly shows that geopolitics is a very important component in EU decision-making processes.

**Brexit:** Here too one can view Donald Tusk’s statements that were expressed in relation to lack of unity but in correlation to Brexit. That Brexit is an issue that came from geopolitical location, since the UK is an island group that is detached from mainland Europe, hence, following Tusks logic, it is natural that the UK does not feel as a part of Europe nor does it want to integrate completely. Donald Tusk is the European Council President and therefore his statements in regards to Brexit show a desire to enhance European integration which is why he expressed concern for Brexit. Since Brexit is causing other countries to consider leaving the EU even more, which is the opposite of Tusks position on EU integration. For the UK that also has Brexit as the main topic for the reason that it is UK that is making the exit, though as seen in the first analysis part, this process is not going very smoothly for the UK. The discourses behind this has a lot to do with the fact that many believe that people only voted for Brexit because they did not believe it would happen or that the people who voted for Brexit are uneducated or simply did not know what the EU really does and therefore perceived it as something bad (Macann, 2018). The contexts concerning EU as a threat towards British independence mostly rose during the campaign before the vote, where EU was depicted as a tyrant that was taking UK’s money, which is the cause for the bad healthcare in the country. Additionally, this was preventing the UK from making profitable economic deal and is the reason for the bad economy. This last context was fed into the context of Britain returning to its glory days as a self-determined empire along with all the rest of these contexts that are about those who want to leave the UK. Those who do not, however, which is a bit less than half of the population that voted in the referendum and consists of most of Scotland who threatened London that they will call for another independence vote if Brexit happens. In addition to this, most of the British “elite” who have a lot of stock in the European single market policy wanted to stay and tried to explain that the EU is a very valuable partner in many spheres during the anti-Brexit campaign before the voting (Macann, 2018). The context that existed amongst those who want(ed) to stay in the EU stated that leaving the EU could lead to isolation and crash of the British economy. These now polar discourses that are happening with the background of rising nationalism and international threats such as the ISIL (Daesh) that are promoting countries to integrate for their own security, which was the opinion of those who wanted to stay. Where those who wanted to leave stated that EU’s open-door policy is the real cause for UK being under attack by the international terrorist group. These contradicting contexts are the reason why the UK securitised Brexit, while the reason
Sweden mentioned Brexit, though without comment, is due to the fact that Britain has been an important trading partner for Sweden throughout history, hence Brexit has a direct influence on the Swedish economy.

**Daesh:** Though it was only the representative from the UK that mentioned Daesh as a threat, this terrorist group has performed many successful terrorist attacks with a high body count throughout the world and mostly in European cities. The reason why the British Prime Minister Theresa May is the only one bringing this topic up relates back to the context that this international threat is promoting countries to work closer together in order to provide security for its citizens and stop this enemy. This context is and was well supported in all different class categories when asked if they viewed the Islamic States as a great security threat for Britain in the post-Brexit opinion polls (Thomson, 2018). If to follow the logic of this context, the UK that is on its way of leaving the Union feels more exposed than the other Member States hence they are the ones that are securitising Daesh on this particular summit, but mainly does so to soothe the population part that wanted to stay in the Union.

**PESCO (Security and Defence):** Following the logic of that same context as in the topic above, the UK poses PESCO as the main concern due to the fact that they are more exposed since they are leaving the Union to stand alone. Hence, Theresa May’s promise of still being involved with the region’s security has not so much to do with keeping the region safe for the EU (though the UK has one the most well-equipped army in the EU). The statement made by May is actually about seeking security in numbers from the threats that the UK will be even greatly exposed to if it stands alone without the support of its closest neighbours and to seek influence within the new treaty. While Macron’s statements related a lot more to the context of making France the centre and leader for the European integration process hence his emphasis on PESCO leading to an even more integrated society rather than focusing on the defensive advantages the PESCO project has, like the representative from the UK did. The statements made by Donald Tusk could be regarded as a common ground between the two types of contexts that exists within the Union, since the UK is not the only country in the EU who has before expressed a concern for EU’s security. Tusk as a representative of the EU makes statements that clearly portray the general opinions of the EU concerning the concern of the regions security. Though does not name enemies since the EU is not a state and cannot name something an enemy without reaching a consensus on the issue with all member states. Yet, in his speech made the same day as the summit was held, Tusk did state that PESCO is "very bad news for EU’s enemies"(European Council, 14/12-2017), thus recognising officially that the EU does have enemies that it needs to protect itself from. Ergo, yet again
confirming that PESCO is an extraordinary measure for an existential security threat towards the EU which explains why it is different from its predecessors. In the same speech Tusk mentioned that the idea of PESCO was invented a half a century ago and that it was revisited many times throughout the years, where the strongest argument against it was that it would make NATO weaker while stating that it is the opposite and a stronger EU makes a stronger NATO (European Council, 14/12-2017). Yet, Tusk did not explain why he believes it is so and what exactly made the context turn 180 degrees in the last couple of years if PESCO has been around as an idea for so long.

**Working with African countries and Turkey:** Returning back to the quotation mentioned in the migration part of this analysis, it is noteworthy that Macron expressed his desire for the French language in an African country where he wants his language to spread. Thus relating back to the context that Macron is aiming to make France return to its glory days to when it had a lot of influencing power. Where it is clear that Africa is important to France when it comes to fulfilling Macron’s dream since it was where most of its colonies were and it is from Africa where most migrate to France. What is interesting with this context is that it is the same context that exists in the UK and which lead to Brexit because the UK wants to be a superpower again as it was when it was an empire. This is the same desire that Macron is expressing, but, what makes this context interesting is that the French President is harnessing the nationalistic spirits that are rising allover Europe and the rest of the world. Macron is actually doing the opposite of what the UK did and is harmonising French nationalism with the community spirit of the EU, or as he himself puts it, it makes a” radical centrism” policy (Tiersky, 2018). If to put it in other words, this radical centrism in actuality is Macrons’ French self-determination policy within the European community. The way Macron makes these opposing discourses harmonise is by justifying further EU integration as a means for France to get a greater role within the EU thus making the EU integration context a part of the French nationalist context. All which centres around his persona since ”Macron has a sense of personal destiny similar to de Gaulle’s” and wants to develop a political heroism where he is the hero that saves the day (Tiersky, 2018:88). What concerns Sweden bringing up Turkey relates back to the context that Sweden wants to be firmer on migration policies and Turkey is important since it is the country that acts as a gateway to Europe. Hence Sweden’s mentioning of cooperation with other countries is simply directly linked to their stance on migration.

**Forming Unity:** As stated many times over, for France Unity is a means to become a greater political power and is only related to those contexts mentioned above. What concerns the statements made by Donald Tusk is that it is derived from the position he holds as European Council President, where he simply stated that unity within the EU needs to be improved upon, which is
understandable considering the context Tusk brought up in regards to lack of unity within the EU. The statements on the lack of unity topic that revealed how the discussion in the Council that is conducted behind closed doors showed that each Member State is looking out for their own interests, which is exactly as Macron’s policy on EU works. Tusk’s other comments on the Council discussion disclosed that representatives act emotional and defensive when discussing the issues with each other, which again shows that the rift within the EU is even greater than politicians show when they give statements to the press (European Council, 14/12-2017).

Summary of Findings in Made in the Context Analysis
What has been confirmed in this second part of the analysis is that the true motivator behind all EU decisions are state interests based mostly on geopolitics, just as Tusk, Bailes (2008) and Biscop (2016) and other scholars from the literature review have stated and/or indicated (see ch 2). It is, however, still unclear if PESCO is a result of an enemy that required extraordinary measures. Nor is it clear if the US President, due to the fact that he is not highly regarded in the EU, was considered as important/main factor that contributed to the creation of PESCO. What is ultimately unclear in the results from this analysis is if PESCO is a result of a specific issue/threat/referent object that forces states that contain highly nationalistic discourses within them (which is most of the EU member states) to unite in order to ensure their own security. The statement by Donald Tusk, mentioned in the first part of the analysis, where he stated that it required a lot of courage and realism when discussing these topics in the council suggests that PESCO is a treaty based on EU’s common interest to survive. Thus, showing a possibility that the turn in paradigm in the discourse about NATO being able to protect the European region occurred when the US President changed, international terrorism, and officially framing Russia as a threat on an EU level occurred. Therefore, on this level of analysis one could presume that all of these events mentioned above have led to the unique constitution of PESCO that differs it from its predecessors.

4.3: How do these contexts explain that PESCO excluded NATO in its legislation?
It has been shown in the analysis above that EU is focusing on self-determination when it comes to security presumably because the EU views the US as untrustworthy, and therefore cannot rely on US with the region’s security. This differs from the reality painted in the statements made in both articles by Cornish and Edwards (2001) and Rosén (2015), where the EU has always seen NATO as its main security structure where the US played the role of the guarantor of the European Regions security. Even when EU’s own security institutes were formed, NATO and the US were heavily included into those structures despite the fact that the structures were meant as a unification mechanism for the EU member states only (Bailes, 2008: Naert, 2005). The previous attempt to be
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slightly more independent from the US with the Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence (PSCD), PESCO’s predecessor, still significantly lacked the independence from US that PESCO has (Chapell and Petrov, 2012). The promises made in relation to the PSCD were not mentioned any further and the structure eventually lapsed quietly since the members simply just used NATO as a security forum instead of PSCD. PESCO, however, completely excluded NATO from its constitution and is only relying on the EU to support it; possibly to avoid the same mistake made with PSCD, but that does not feature in the discussion in the two previous parts of the analysis.

What does feature, however, is that in the latest years after the formation of PSCD, an enemy has been named as a threat to the Union and the region in the form of Russia and Daesh. As discussed in the previous analysis parts, Russia officially was recognised as a threat when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, kindling a fear that Russia will continue to expand its borders. Though it was proven in the second part of the analysis that fear of Russia has existed for very long time in the countries that securitised Russia. Yet, as it was clearly seen in Sweden, this fear has clearly escalated in the past couple of years since the Swedish Prime Minister openly stated that they should prepare for war against Russia and hospitals are made to gear up in order to work under war conditions, thus one could consider PESCO as an answer to the perceived Russian threat from the EU.

Another existential threat that was named besides Russia was Daesh, which is the representation of the new generation of terrorism that needs a novel approach of tackling that PESCO could provide. Daesh is an existential threat that was closely paired with the Brexit topic in the analysis which was also securitised by the UK. The reason why Brexit is closely related to the topic of Daesh is not only because the later was only securitised by the UK, but because just like Daesh, Brexit is also changing the security field of the region since it has one of the most well-equipped armies amongst the EU members (Biscop 2016). But the possible reason why the UK is the one that is securitising the Daesh topic, other than those that have already been mentioned in the previous part, is that the UK needs an opening into the security structures of the EU. This is confirmed by May’s statement that the UK will be still remain as part of the region’s security, and it has not only to do with keeping the UK safe with the help of its neighbours, but to still be able to carry weight in the Unions decision making process without having the obligations of membership (Whitman, 2016). Thus, proving that Daesh is not as big of a problem security wise for the entire Union but is more of a security and political issue for the UK and therefore has little to do with PESCO unlike the Russia topic. Brexit, however, is a possible reason for why the PESCO formation was triggered since the main land Europe also felt that they needed another structure on a security basis that could help unify the Union which clearly is breaking apart in order to prevent future exits.
It has been clearly shown by Fierke and Wiener (1999) that external and internal factors still have a huge impact on the EU’s interest formations. For one, the migration crisis hit hard against the Union and its individual members and PESCO could act as support for current border security structures. In spite of that fact, the election of the US president played an even bigger role even though only Sweden securitised Trump. Kaldor’s (2012) article clearly displayed how much the US shapes EU’s security interests, which was possible when the EU trusted the US administration, but it in the analysis it was indicated that the EU, for the most part, does not trust Trumps judgement as seen above. Therefore, one could see PESCO as a reaction towards Trumps’ election since the discussions of PESCO started in the end of 2016 after Trump was elected and initiated a year after Trumps election. Thus, this might make PESCO an official milestone for when the Union stopped trusting the US government with the region’s security, because the election of Trump exposed the problem of being dependent on a government whose interests concern its own continent that is far from Europe.

Another feature that might have contributed to the formation of PESCO is the discrepancy between the identity the EU portrays to the public and what its identity actually is (Risse, 2012). It is clearly seen in the fact that the topics of unity formation and lack of unity was securitised. The Council President clearly stated that individual state interest clearly is more important to EU interest formations, where the strongest and most influential states get to decide what the EU’s interests are and the weaker states have to follow suit as seen in the article written by Bailes (2008). As the example with France that wants to lead the integration process of EU and wants to work with African countries due to France’s interest and Sweden simply concurs by mentioning it, but it is Macron that fully develops this idea. This does not only point to that cooperation with countries outside of Europe more are important to France, but it also shows that France that has the strongest army in the EU also has the most driving power in this question. Though it must also be pointed out that on the example of Macron’s statements one can find the same issue that Risse describes, hence the issue of not portraying the true identity of the interest is much deeper seeded than just being a problem of the EU’s structure. This is probably why there is no official clear-cut explanation for why PESCO is formed now or why NATO is not included in its legislation thus one needs to look all these above-mentioned factors underneath, just like all the scholars did in the literature review.

However, what is arguably one of the most important factors that were securitised/ discussed in two different perspectives is the question of European unity, where it was formulated as a statement that there is a lack of unity and it was formulated as a need to form unity. The Brexit referendum
vote that took place in the summer of 2016 also played a major role for why the discussions of PESCO started, since it showed that the Union is crumbling. It has been clearly shown in this paper that the Union hopes that PESCO will act as a unifying catalyst for all the members that will partake in the treaty. Thus, one could assume that the biggest existential threat that the PESCO treaty is supposed to answer is the lack of unity within the Union. Though it must be mentioned that Brexit would possibly not have been as big of a deal if not all the other factors were present. It could be argued that it is because of all the securitised factors that the Union realised that it is dangerous for the Union to be scattered and that they need to come together in order to survive. This is mainly due to the fact that most of the issues securitised already existed for a while or are a part of a historic interest, lack of unity has always been a problem since the inception of the EU. But all these factors in combination with US no longer being seen as a guarantor from the physical threat that Russia poses most likely made PESCO a reality. Additionally, Britain, who was a driving force behind EU’s security formation together with France, suddenly leaving the EU made the EU feel exposed. Exposed enough to view the combination off all the factors discussed but most importantly the EU’s lack of unity as a great enough existential threat to change its normal structure of military treaties in order to meet the existential threats completely and at the same time building unity within the Union on the basis of survival.

Summary of Findings in Made in Part 4.3 of the Analysis

The securitising contexts along with the previous research done within the EU security field shows that all securitised factors played a role in why PESCO is formulated differently than its predecessors. In addition to this one could suggest that the most important existential threat was the lack of unity within the union itself. This was, however, only framed as a threat when all security factors came together and exposed the fact that the EU needs to be able to protect itself if it wants the Union to survive. This indication is confirmed by the topics that were mentioned by most states and what topics that were denoted as main topics (see table 1). Where the Brexit topic represents the fear of the collapse of the EU, while the PESCO topic is shown as a symbol of hope for trying to amend that fear by promoting integration instead. Though Daesh and Russia are perceived existential threats, it was shown above that both are threats of political nature, since Daesh was only mentioned by the UK for reasons described above. While Sweden’s then looming election is the reason why it is reacting to an event that took place in early 2014 by late 2016; this shows that this too is a securitisation of a political nature. Hence these threats are not direct causes for the formation of PESCO, but due to their existence together with other securitised factors that are seen in Table 1, they simply created an existential threat together which created PESCO. Therefore, it cannot be stated that one of the topics were more important than the other, since lack of unity has
been an issue for a very long time as seen in the literature review. Ergo, when all these factors were coming together with the addition of US being perceived as no longer being a reliable partner, the EU members realised that they will have to now become self-reliant and manage their own security problems which resulted in PESCO’s constitution as it is now.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

In this last chapter the topic and what has been discussed around it will be summarised along with an evaluation of the thesis achievements and what can be improved for the future will be conducted, followed by the answer to the research question.

5.1: Thesis Topic
The research question which this paper aimed to solve was: To what extent is PESCO a representation of a paradigm shift within EU’s security rhetoric? Where the main actor that was chosen was the European Council, since it is the institution that works as EU’s securitising actor and all that is discussed there is already by default securitised. The way this actor was analysed was by focusing on specific Member States and the EU Council President to find out what was securitised in their press statements on the day PESCO was officially welcomed by the Council on the 14th of December. The members were chosen on the basis of authors language skills and that they all represented a different category of Membership within the EU. Where France was a part of EU and NATO, Sweden was just a part of the EU, and UK was a part of NATO and is in the process of leaving the EU. This selection of representatives gave a broad overview of different positions concerning PESCO and when it came to securitisation of threats. The reason why this was of big interest was due to the fact that NATO was not included in the treaties’ constitution despite the fact that NATO has previously always played the main role in EU security formation and maintenance. Thence answer to the posed research question will enlighten the field of EU security as well as other scholars on what has changed in the EU security paradigm, and show why it changed. By using Securitisation Theory and Content Analysis this paper looked into the different securitised topics in order to determine which securitising factor lead the EU members to decide to exclude NATO from the PESCO constitution.

5.2: Thesis Achievements
The aim was reached with the help of the operational questions that were: What was securitised during the Council summit? What is the underlying context for this securitisation? How do these contexts explain that PESCO excluded NATO in its legislation? Where the aim was to understand the general picture of what caused the paradigm shift in EU’s security rhetoric. This aim was set for
the purpose of understanding the content of context from which PESCO arose from in order to have a general understanding of how the research field of EU security looks like. This purpose was also fulfilled since it was determined that the securitised topics: Migration, Russian threat, Donald Trump, Lack of Unity, Daesh, Brexit, PESCO, Working with African countries etc., and Forming unity, all were equally important to form PESCO. This thesis determined that none of these factors could have been securitised if the others were not securitised as well, hence showing the general picture of how the research field looked like on PESCO’s inception.

5.3: Future Improvements
In order to achieve a complete understanding of how the research field looked like on PESCO’s inception one needs the statements of all the Member State representatives along with an individual context background to the content that they deliver in their statements. In addition to this, one would also need to expand the scope of research in regards to dates as well as expand the literature review in a way that encompasses all topics that arise from the statements and their respective contexts in order to achieve that complete picture of past and present. Unfortunately, these suggestions could not be taken to heart in this thesis due to its limiting framework. Because of this, there is still a possibility that there is another factor that had contributed to this obvious paradigm shift; but the reason it was not found was because the chosen representatives in this thesis did not bring it up in their statements.

However, the factors found still give a general but comprehensive idea of the workings behind PESCO, which was the aim of this thesis.

5.4: Answer to the Research Question
Hence to answer the question: *To what extent is PESCO a representation of a paradigm shift within EU’s security rhetoric?*, is that PESCO’s existence itself proves that a paradigm shift has occurred however more data is needed and more time is needed to pass in order determine the true and correct answer to this questions. From this research it has been determined that these topics and the select securitising actors all gave a very good overview over the hidden contexts that take place behind the closed doors of the Council summits. It shows that all these factors that have been securitised before and those who are securitised now, only together can form the existential threat that made the EU realise that it needs to become more closely integrated and self-reliant. This explains why only now, when all these factors in Table 1 have come together, did PESCO, which has been in the workings for so many decades, has finally been realised. However, for now, PESCO itself is the only proof of a paradigm shift since all these events but what can be stated that there are
several components that triggered a paradigm shift but if this new paradigm will last, only time can tell.

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