United Nations use of private military companies for peacekeeping operations

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Abstract
UN is sending peacekeeping operations all over the world. The paper will highlight that UN is not going only with their peacekeeping operation personnel, UN is also bringing private military companies into their ranks. This paper will focus on UN peacekeeping operations in Africa with the focus of non-interstate operations. Traditionally would not the Just war theory be the theory to apply to peacekeeping operations but by UN orthodox behavior of bringing private military contractors into peacekeeping operations, just war theory becomes appropriate. The purpose of this paper is to bring light on UN use of PMC and if PMC has increased UN security during peacekeeping operations. To be able to shed this light, a more extensive empirical study will be made to see UN practice with PMC by descriptive statistics. The paper finds that PMC has been an active force within peacekeeping operations and that PMC is performing several military tasks for UN. It further sees that UN fatalities are increasing in the cases when PMC has been present. Further insight into peacekeeping operation is that higher taxpaying nations are sending fewer troops and commanders compared to less taxpaying nations.

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1. Introduction

If a stroll were made down in Malmö centrum, looking to left and right, private schools, private pharmacies and security guards in every corner. All areas in which the state used to be the only provider. Today are these areas shared by the private and public sector. The private sector of security guards has taken some areas which earlier were provided by the police. However, there are some lines in which the private area of security has not gone, crime-fighting. Since the cold war has the private security sector also entered the public sector of the military and had a rapid increase (Pattison 2010, 425). This paper will investigate the private sector of military security when it comes to UN peacekeeping operations. The insight into private military companies (PMC) is little, and the insight into UN use of PMC is even less. The rapid increase of PMC has resulted in controversies where US hired PMC; Blackwater conducted the Nisour Square massacre killing 17 and wounding more (Singer 2007, 1). The private military industry has portrayed itself as a success story, which promotes security and peace. Where ineffective state military has been unable to finish what was needed, the private has been able. According to Akcinaroglu & Radziszweski (2013, 815) research, PMC is a handy tool to decrease violence and stabilize a conflict quickly who agrees with the industry. Singer (2007, 10) has described PMC to be a slippery slope down toward state reliance on PMC to conduct violence.

It is not controversial or peculiar to see the company Securitas standing outside the Swedish parliament or a nightclub. It is standard that these jobs belong to the private and not to the state. Outsourcing for military abroad operations is not either eerie but not either normalized the same way as Securitas. During the Iraq invasion did USA hire 180 000 PMC and send 160 000 militaries themselves (Singer 2007, 11). Within international law does PMC neither belong to mercenary nor follow military law. PMC is something weird in-between, a professional company hired for security and possible killing if necessary. For international relations academic, it is not a consensus of what PMC is. The range within IR academic is that one side (Krahmann 2012, 355) argue that they are mercenaries, the opposite side with Leander (2010, 476) that PMC is a state function. The generalized picture is that PMC is civilians within a company, bought by money to protect others from violence in dangerous areas. While Krahmann argues that its mercenaries who conduct this in a company, Leander says this is a state hiring a private company who joins the monopoly of violence.
The first issue of viewing UN’s use of PMC is that they are not displaying their use of PMC themselves. By this, there is a need to use other sources to find UN use of PMC. By lacking in transparency, the assumption is that it is something to find where something is hidden.

The purpose of this paper is to provide objective evidence on UN use of PMC and secondly to evaluate if UN is moving in the right direction by using PMC. UN peacekeeping operation represents a virtue of what good can come from international collaboration. It is an act of helping a nation in need. The first question will be to address to what magnitude has UN hired PMC for peacekeeping operations. The second will be to assess if PMC is increasing security for peacekeeping operations?

1.1 Puzzle
With the end of the cold war, the world community moved toward pacifism and wanting government to cut military spending (Leander 2005, 616). The world entered a unipolar system, and the likelihood of inter-state violence decreased. During this time, the actor PMC arrived and filled a void which was created by a decreasing military budget (Pattison 2010, 425). By a decreasing budget and less likelihood inter-state war, nations adopted small standing professional armies which had the focus on smaller abroad missions (Berndtsson 2013, 48).

It is within this contemporary environment that PMC take place. By engaging within IR literature, it became clear that IR authors either argued that PMC are either boosting or decreasing security by their presence. There is not a consensus within IR for what effect PMC has on states behavior and for war. There is not a clear winner between the sides of IR scholars who could prove either side wrong. With the dominant number of authors focusing on a theoretical approach or case studies on PMC, an empirical overview of PMC use is lacking. The primary interest of this paper became to address the question if PMC was enhancing security or not since the literature were divisive. It’s also in the interest of the taxpayers to receive as much as possible for their money. But it also a moral concern for the population, do people want their taxpaying money to go to companies and individuals who’s motive for killing is money.

To describe PMC would be to call them greedy and selfish. From a realism perspective, this is also how states would be described. The interest became to investigate the opposite actor to hire PMC since arguable an opposite would be the less likely contractor of PMC. The interest did, therefore, become to investigate UN use of PMC since UN peacekeeping operation is the
act of a virtue of selfishness to help others. With this combination of UN using PMC, an opposite of core values became the interest. Would the act of virtue from peacekeeping operation engage themselves with contractors who aim is to make money on violence? Which UN objective is to prevent. With a moral consideration, UN became the less likely hirer of PMC. One hundred ninety-three sovereign nations contribute to UN budget, all nations have some responsibility to assert to what their money is used for. Traditionally would not the theory JWT be applied upon peacekeeping operations. However, since PMC is a tool for war, peacekeeping operations will fall under its lenses. The JWT is a doctrine to evaluate if a war is morally correct. With the intention of UN to promote peace and increasing security by their presence, JWT will be the theoretical tool to analyze the empirical data which will be the basis for evaluation.

2. Literature review
PMC has been a controversial subject within IR, where there is no dominant scholar of literature which can claim they dominated the discourse of the fundamental ontological question, what is a PMC? Krahmann (2012, 355) is claiming they are individual mercenaries gathering in a group, and its only discourse in international law which differentiates them from mercenaries. Leander (2010, 476) goes in the opposite direction of Krahmann and claims they are a weapon system for the state, a state function. Singer (2007, 4) proclaim, private military industry is an enabler for war, both for state and private groups. Pattison (2010, 446) argues PMC are an industry which lack regulations and have immoral motives for their actions. Orend connect mercenaries and PMC to the same category, based upon that they are soldiers without political objective, offering their services to the highest bidder. Private mercenaries band together to form PMC (Orend 2013, 74).

With the Geneva convention, PMC has not considered mercenaries with international law and are legal to use by states, companies, and UN. However, with a troubling moral concern, and an evident lack of transparency, people and IR are unaware of PMC involvement with UN. The JWT have a long tradition and have been updated in relation to world views and the contemporary view on war. Therefor will prominent authors of JWT such as Augustine, Aquinas, Francisco de Vitoria and Grotius not be in focus. Instead will Orend’s view on JWT be dominant since he includes all of them into one piece.

2.1 Just war theory
JWT is a doctrine but also referred to a military tradition of how to morally justify and engage in war. The concept is divided into three criteria’s, start, middle, and end. The right to go to
war “Jus ad Bellum” and right conduct in war “Jus in Bello” and the post-war “jus post Bellum.” The three categories are interconnected, and the Jus ad Bellum sets the tone for the other categories. The just post bellum will not be included in this paper, since the paper will not evaluate the aftermath of a peacekeeping operation.

2.1.1 Jus Ad Bellum
The JWT was introduced in the 4th century by Augustine and was concerned with Jus ad Bellum. The war needed justifications morally. The justifications came from, a just cause and rightful intentions. The goal of war is peace or punishing wrongdoers. The natural path of men is peace and the strive for peace. All men seek peace by war and not war by peace (St. Augustine 2007, 63). The king has the authority to discern God from the devil and therefore, between good and bad, order, and chaos (St. Augustine 2007, 65). Its therefor only the king who has the authority and legitimacy to gather soldiers for war. The difference between cities is the barrier of language, the higher the barrier, the greater danger. Augustine argues that a wise man does never need to justify war because his enemy justifies it for him. The just cause arrives from self-defense.

Even if St Augustine is primarily making references to God and kings, it is still relevant in the 21st century. There are two rules for a just cause unless an exception from the UNSC. Its self-defense from aggression or defend other nations from aggression, which is a move from the international world to make the risk for war less likely (Orend 2013, 34). Its dictated into international law (Article 51 UN charter) that state has the inherent right of self-defense.
The right cause is written into international law, but the right intention is not. The right intention is aiming toward morality, which is harder to write into law than the just cause. The intention is vaguer to define in relation to the just cause, which can explain that intention is not written into law (Orend 2013, 48). To give an example, the first (1991) and second Iraq war (2003), has been argued that the intention of the invasion was imperialistic and searching for oil. While the USA claim that its intention was self-protection (just cause and just intention) from Iraq’s development of WMD. This argues that there can be several intentions for the state. This is also the cause of the intention not being into law. It is too hard to judge intention since there can be several. By looking at a murder trial, the intention of the killer matters, if he or she are going to be charged with first- or second-degree murder. The intention of states matters, but it is hard without well-developed investigations to see the real intention of the state to start a morally correct war. What does JWT argues when there are several intentions? What if one intention is legitimate and two are illegitimate? Orend argues that the valid intention is the one the state provides because it is hard to provide evidence of other intentions. The intention the state provide according to JWT excludes the inclusion of the illegitimate once since it is too hard to prove intent which is not provided (Orend 2013, 48-50).

The public declaration of war is written into international law with the Hague convention III. The point of this is to give the enemy the last resort of not starting a war since war arrives from self-defense. Human rights are upheld by informing both their own and enemy civilians that war is about to start and give the population a possibility to build a shelter. For Jus ad Bellum, the proportionality is a macro-level decision over the war. The evil which will be dealt with in the war needs to be in proportion to the amount of good which will come from the war. This is one of the most non-selfish criteria because here the nation shall evaluate the cost of war, for both themselves, the enemy and internationally, which effect the conflict can result in (Orend 2013, 62).

In accordance with the right intention, the probability of success criterion is not written into international law, since the question is too complex to address by law. This criterion heavily favors powerful nations, which probably is the reason it has not been written into international law. Since it is unrealistic to meet this criterion (Orend 2013, 61). The last criteria of last
resort are to exhaust other options before the use of force. Diplomatic talks or sanctions are steps which should be taken before the option of force.

2.1.2 Jus in Bello
The jus in Bello, or justice in war, is the right conduct in the middle of the war. The legitimate target is divided into a combatant and non-combatant category. Since the soldier has accepted the terms of war, the soldier has forfeited the human rights of security and is within the risk zone of being killed. Since the civilian has not accepted this term, the civilian is not a legitimate target. An objection from civilian immunity of war comes from Usama Bin Laden argument of people are paying taxes. The population is responsible for their soldiers’ action and pay the soldiers to perform violence in the nations name. Therefore, argues Bin laden that civilians become a legitimate target, which is not recognized in JWT (Orend 2013, 116).

Let us bring Usama bin Laden’s argument to the DDE category since it is connected to the first. A weapon factory is a legitimate target, and the same is the workers, even if they are civilians. The JWT concern that people who directly contribute to the war are legitimate targets, but those who contribute to the living hood are not. The DDE concern that the violence which is conducted should intend for more good than unfortunate, and civilian casualties are collateral damage, which relates to the proportionality (Orend 2013, 121). Bombing a church is not within the proportionality of war, but a church full of soldiers may achieve the proportionality, even the collateral of civilians.

This is also why is Jus in Bello is more of moral evaluation and puts higher effort on well-educated soldiers (Orend 2013, 114). The soldier is the ones evaluating, to bomb or not to bomb the church in battle, not the politician ordering the war. A further rule of Jus in Bello is that specific methods of war are illegal, according to JWT and international law. This includes methods of evil, such as rape, poison gas, mines, or genocide. The ban on mines declare that mines do not know the difference between a civilian or a soldier, and mines has been shown killing civilians during and after the war. The JWT deems mines illegal, and international law banned mines in 1997 with the Ottawa treaty but significant nations such as Russia, USA and China have signed but not ratified the treaty.
The first landmine was created in 1277 in China and Europe 1573 but it was in 1997 it was banned by most nations. This move us toward the next section, EMTS. Which is rule for the rich. Which argues that it’s only the rich nations which will have the most developed weapons and advantage in war. The international law will play a catch game to the new weapons. With the example of land mines, sometimes it takes some time. The new technologies of soldier enhancements and drones does not have any international law restrictions at the moment (Orend 2013, 134). The superiority in weaponry has made the poorer societies forced to choose between fighting dirty or clean while the rich will always fight clean to win. The EMTS makes it more likely for a weaker organisation to fight dirty since they can’t afford to fight clean. Which has been the development of guerrilla warfare, to minimize the advantage of being superior on the battlefield.

2.2 Just war Theory – Private military Companies
Pattison argues that the implication of using PMC has been undeveloped and undertheorized in the literature. His article aims to fill this gap by applying JWT on PMC. The JWT is heavily state-centric, and in the current form of JWT, PMC becomes an illegitimate actor (Pattison 2008, 143). Pattison indulges himself into a particular section of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, which he argues concern PMC the most. The right intention and legitimate authority as the most prominent.

Pattison argues that the Jus ad Bellum and the right intention in the JWT is outdated. The Jus ad Bellum is within the start of the war, and the theory assumes that the soldier’s intentions are in line with the state intention. With the hiring of PMC, this assumption of PMC and states having the same intention is not adequate. Pattison argues that the intention of making money by the PMC is not immoral. Since bankers, lawyers, or stockbrokers makes an absurd amount of money (Pattison 2008,145). The immoral part is combining money with afflicting direct harm upon others. According to the JWT theory, the right intention for the solider is national pride, which is unobtainable for the PMC. Which makes PMC intention invalid. Pattison’s ask the ontological question, what is the right intention? Pattison brings forward that national pride has brought forward genocide and argues that the intention of making money is not per automatic bad in relation to national pride (Pattison 2008, 146).

Pattison’s conclusion of the right intention is to divide the right intention into two sections, intention and motive. The intention of PMC is always to give the best possible services; the motive for giving the best services is to win another contract. The intention of a soldier and PMC is the same, but the motive is different. Pattison’s argues to update the JWT to include
the intention of those undertaking the use of force during the war, not just the decision-makers. The right intention shall; therefore, both include those who are authorizing the violence and those using it, since the current analyse in JWT is not complicated enough (Pattison 2008, 149). Kaldor would further nuance the military soldier’s perspective on the conflict and include the battle of hearts and minds. This struggle is between the counterinsurgency and the insurgent group where the two actors fight over the local populations support. By gaining the local support you gain intel and their support for your action. While western counterinsurgency is striving to act good toward the local population, they have drawbacks by accidental killings of civilian and being on the side of invasion. The insurgent group play on fear, that the hostile counterinsurgency has come to concur and that they may harm the local population if they do not support them (Kaldor 1999, 10). Pattisons argument of national pride would link soldiers to follow orders, and the orders is always to treat the local population with dignity which promotes their likelihood of supporting their struggle of hearts and minds. While PMC has other orders with are more directly linked to security and not hearts and minds.

The legitimate actors to conduct war is written into the UN charter and the Geneva convention, which assert that only legitimate institutions can wage war (Pattison 2008, 150). The international law and the JWT category are focusing on limiting war. The hiring of PMC is only increasing the possibility of war and therefore goes against JWT and international law. It furthers also decrease the democratic control over when the state can wage war, since the hiring increase the possibilities for war. The core argument to why it is dangerous to hire PMC is a connection with public opinion for war. With PMC not effecting the official death tolls in war, the more PMC and fewer state soldiers who dies during a conflict, more legitimacy are given to the state actions (Pattison 2008, 153).

Wettan (2012, 275) has the aim of his paper to show that there are no theoretical or moral objections to use PMC. The argumentation is based upon objectivism and use Rand literature to critique Pattisons conclusion of money. Secondly to argue about privatisation of military. The first critique is Pattison argument of intention and motive, where the motive is to make money by the PMC. The objectivism answer to this is that money is not a root to evil. It’s a voluntary trade between two parties. Where one person buys the other persons time. Money is a tool of survival since it buys time. Money does therefor become the tool of survival, since the normal job does not focus on survival but to make money for survival. For the Just ad bellum and right intention, Wettan argue that the PMC are still fighting for human rights on
behalf of the state and the motive of financial gain is not immoral. By the length of Rand and objectivism, making money combined with violence would not break the just ad bellum of right intention from their perspective (Wetten 2012, 273).

For privatisation within PMC, Wetten does not believe in competition between PMC to be an issue. Since the competition will only decrease the value and not affect the state negatively. Which can be connected to an empirical study to Akcinaroglu & Radziszewski, which will be discussed later in the paper. Wetten takes a theoretical approach in discussing the effects of privatisation will have on the state. The conclusion is simply, competition between PMC is good, competition between states to use PMC is bad. The state will always seek control over the military, without the state controlling the military it’s not a functional state. It only becomes a problem when the state over hire PMC to the degree when the PMC becomes more powerful than the own military. Which we can see was the case of the Iraq invasion, where US used more PMC than state soldiers (Singer 2007, 1). Wetten counter this argument, by saying that generals have through the centuries overthrown the government, as late as Egypt and Mubarak. A coupe from the military has been a normal feature. While adding, its not in the interest of PMC to govern, only to extract wealth (Wetten 2012, 274).

2.3 Increasing or decreasing security?

Buying mercenary services is an illegal activity within international law. Buying PMC services is not. Mercenaries are viewed as immoral, cruel, and motivated by financial gain. PMC is connected to the same motivation of performing violence, financial gain. They are in the same line of business. They are selling force for violence. The difference between the two is connected to incorporated into a business where PMC can claim accountability and a chain of command (Krahmann 2012, 358). It has been seen that mercenaries are decreasing security since they have been hired by both states and rebels (Krahmann 2012, 349). Since PMC is not an illegal activity, should this mean that PMC is enhancing security? In the following part, there will both literature arguing that PMC is enhancing security and other neglecting it.

Leander looks on weak African states to evaluate if PMC is decreasing or increasing security for the state. The framework Leander works from is the dynamics of the market, with demand and supply. Leander (2005, 618) argue that PMC is a weapon system at the disposal of the policymakers. However, within the context of weak African states, it arises question of monopoly on violence and who is a legitimate buyer of PMC services. Since within the weaker African states, there can be actors who claim they have legitimate claims for the state but are not democratically recognized. The nations also lack strong traditional institutions and
the collection of taxes. The weaker African states have been seen hiring PMC, and it has been seen enhancing the security immediately. It is by the dynamics of the market the state has quickly been able to hire the necessary security which the state cannot provide themselves.

Leanders perspective on the PMC market is that European nations choose to hire PMC to evade possible public scrutiny (Leander 2005, 615). With a pacifist public force of which want a slimmer military budget in Europe, it becomes tempting for states to hire firms over homegrown professional armies. (Leander, 2005, 616). With the market, a more significant number of clients, which did not have the possibility of conflict does now possess this possibility. The issue with PMC is that they are not a solution for solving the conflict, and the money spends on immediate security, is money which is needed for increasing the long-term peace. African soldiers are poorly paid, with PMC been hired within the country, military personnel of the country have taken double shift. Working for the state and then working for a PMC. Which is the latter they earn much more and been blurring the line between private and public in weak African states. The market has been an enabler for short time resolution but clearly has long term consequences for the African state (Leander 2005, 619). Since money which were needed for long term military of their own, need to be spend on short term PMC.

Akcinaroglu & Radziszewski is also using the market but chooses to include opportunity structure theory to understand if PMC is prolonging conflicts or not. The authors are using extensive empirical data set on Africa and argue that PMC behavior is based on the environment of the market. When the supply is high from the market, and the state can hire several PMC for the same mission, it has been seen that PMC is not prolonging the conflict. When several companies have been hired by the state the competition from the market, force PMC to perform or are otherwise they are exchanged for other companies. The conclusion the authors arrives to is that state reliance on PMC is a good thing for terminating civil wars (Akcinaroglu & Radziszewski 2013, 815). Some smaller finding, but of high significance is connected to when PMC performs the best and when they are hired. PMC perform the best when the payment relates to natural resources. Because then the state and PMC interest become stability, which is long term peace. PMC is more likely to be hired when people are already dead, which suggest that the state are unable to perform security. This suggests that PMC is hired in the middle of the conflict (Akcinaroglu & Radziszewski 2013, 812).

A case study of PMC in Iraq argues that the USA has become dependent on PMC for abroad missions. The debate declares that the US cannot fulfil the Abrams doctrine, which suggests that a nation cannot go to war unless the population supports the war. By hiring PMC, the
policymakers go around the political cost of war and the public interest. Since it does not need to bolster public support and if the war fails, American death tolls are low, because PMC is not included (Singer 2007, 4). Singer (2007, 2) makes a case study by looking at the Internal department of defense and finding that US has hired 180 000 PMC while only providing 160 000 American soldiers themselves for the counterinsurgency. PMC is neither civilians nor military, but they are perceived as military personnel as they belong to the counterinsurgency. Singer argues that lousy behavior from PMC affect the overall counterinsurgency negatively and therefore should not a market be the solution to find appropriate PMC (Singer 2007, 11). By hiring PMC, Singer argues that states are starting to rely on PMC and the market to perform violence. Since states are losing their ability to bolster public support for violence abroad. The solution has been unflagged PMC (Singer, 2007, 16).

Akcinaroglu & Radziszweski and Leander draw to the conclusion that PMC were directly enhancing the security. But neither of those authors argued for the long-term problems which civil wars cause. Wulf argues from the perspective of which long term issues external states causes when they arrive to a conflict zone. To visualize the issues, five dilemmas are portrayed, footprint, duration, participation, dependency and coherence. The five dilemmas can all be connected back to the footprint dilemma, which focus on the big presence external security has. The dependency dilemma connects back to the market, where Wulf argues that, the local nation become dependent on the external forces. But if the external forces do not achieve the duration dilemma, the local state are forced to hire PMC to fill the gap which the external state leave behind (Wulf 2011, 141). Similar to Singer, Wulf argues from a case study, and this time Afghanistan. Pentagon has hired 242 647 PMC personnel in 2009 and 41, 850 where in Afghanistan. One year later it was 70 000 PMC in Afghanistan (Wulf 2011, 144). Wulf aggress with Leander when it comes to describe PMC “Companies act as a state within the state” (Wulf 2011, 144). The issue Wulf draws forward is the monopoly of violence, where there are no different between a PMC and a state soldier. The PMC are destroying the monopoly of violence which used to belong to the state. Wulf argues for regulations of the monopoly of violence where international collaboration to collectedly take back the monopoly of violence to the state. With PMC, all nations increase their potential for violence and increase their temporarily violence. With the 5 dilemmas listed, when the external state leaves, PMC becomes the only solution for the local state to fill the void (Wulf 2011, 146). Which turn back to both Singer and Leander’s argument of the danger of
becoming dependent on the market to supply PMC. While the local state should be investing in their own security, the money they have for security needs to be invested into PMC.

3. Method

3.1 Choice of method
To analyse the use of PMC by UN, will the independent variable of UN peacekeeping operation and the dependent variable of PMC be used. The research question demands a broader set of data to give a fair picture. Therefore, will a descriptive statistics analysis be used to easier get an overview of the hiring degree of PMC by the UN. The work of Singer is a case study, and Krahmann’s work is a discourse analysis which is a small N-study and highly subjective analysis which would not be suitable here. To conclude UN use of PMC, there is a need to look toward the bigger picture. To conduct a descriptive statistics analysis, it will follow the blueprint of Akcinaroglu & Radziszweski. To portray and enable their analysis, they show the result with statistics by using the British foreign and commonwealth office report to find intel on PMC and correlates of war (COW) for civil war activity. Data on armed conflict and security (DACS) which would be like their British foreign and commonwealth office report will be present in this paper. Represented as their COW, the primary data of UN peacekeeping operations will be used.

To analyse the two variables together in one dataset has allowed the analysis to show how it came to be (Ethridge, 2004:24). The explanatory research shows the data, but the data itself does not produce and explanation to the world. Which mean that data should serve as an objective truth while the analysis arriving from the data is subjective, which mean that other authors could arrive at other conclusions from the same data. The method is about stating what is objectively in front of us as an infinite truth. How to interpret the data is subjective and arrive to a conclusion should not arrive from the data but from the interpreter.

3.2 Data collection
In this paper has both primary and secondary data been used. The primary data consist of the UN peacekeeping operation, and the secondary data is of PMC activity by DACS. All data found on peacekeeping operations, can be found on UN peacekeeping website, under “past peace operations”. The DACS data can be found on their website under PSD- data download. To answer the research question, the paper will limit itself only to Africa and between the years 1990-2007. The reason to choose Africa over any other regions was the amount of UN
peacekeeping operations exceeded any other regions by far. The choice of the years 1990-2007 is limited to the PMC research by DACS. There is no other data collected on PMC to this magnitude and therefore does also the collection on UN peacekeeping operation be limited to the years of 1990-2007.

The primary data is a collection of UN peacekeeping operations in domestic conflicts between the years 1990-2007. I have decided to allow UN peacekeeping operation that start previously than 1990 to enter the data collection but cut it off so it starts in 1990 and the same logic of 2007, even if the operation will surplus the time limit of 2007, I will not analyze the full extension because I do not have the data of PMC activity of that time because of the limitation in DACS. Between the years 1990-2007 UN peacekeeping was in 12 countries in Africa and those countries will be the basis for the analysis. The following UN peacekeeping operation times have been excluded because of limitations in secondary data, Angola 1988-1989, Ivory Coast 2008-2017, DRC 2008-2010 Liberia, 2008-2018 and Sudan 2008-2011. The data collected is only in countries which had an UN peacekeeping operation. It was further decided to include fatalities and commanders from each peacekeeping operation to get a greater overview of UN peacekeeping operations.

3.3 Data
Within DACS, its viewable to see when PMC has been hired, in which country, by whom and what tasks the PMC has performed. However, the data does not provide evidence for how many contractors were hired. In the chart can we see brackets of numbers which represent the tasks and has the number between 1-12 (Appendix A). To not analyse the UN hiring degree in a vacuum, it will also include PMC activity by other actors in the same country between the same period. By combing data from both secondary research (DACS) and data from UN, the tables which follows were created.

Table 1. Overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>UN presence</th>
<th>PMC presence</th>
<th>UN hired</th>
<th>Externally hired</th>
<th>Locally state hired</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>2004-2006</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>South Africa: 2006 (4)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>1998-2000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>2003 – 2007</td>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>2003-2004 (4)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the first table, there is not very specific but country-based view, to get decrease the spectrum, table 1.1 will watch on each operation. In table 1.1 we see each operation and looking closer for which operation PMC was used. It also includes a list of UN fatalities for each operation that can be found on UN website.

### Table 1.1 With and without PMC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>UN Fatalities</th>
<th>PMC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(ANG) UNAVEM I</td>
<td>1990–1991</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ANG) UNAVEM II</td>
<td>1991–1995</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ANG) UNAVEM III</td>
<td>1995–1997</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ANG) MONUA</td>
<td>1997–1999</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(BDI) ONUB</td>
<td>2004–2006</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CAR) MINURCA</td>
<td>1998–2000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(IVO) MINUCI</td>
<td>2003–2004</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2003–2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(IVO) UNOCI</td>
<td>2004 - present</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LIB) UNOMIL</td>
<td>1993–1997</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LIB) UNMIL</td>
<td>2003 - present</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(M0ZM) ONUMOZ</td>
<td>1992–1994</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(RWA) UNAMIR</td>
<td>1993–1996</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SIE) UNOMSIL</td>
<td>1998–1999</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SIE) UNAMSIL</td>
<td>1999–2005</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SOM) UNSOM I</td>
<td>1992–1993</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Result
UN has hired PMC to perform different tasks, operational support, logistics support, security/protection, demining and facility & infrastructural build-up. When they have been hired by local and external nations, PMC has done the same tasks but more tasks. Combat and military operations and military assistance as well.

The second table is using a larger lens to go deeper into PMC and UN peacekeeping operation. The interest here is to see how well UN missions and PMC are overlapping. This to easier assert the hiring degree. From table 1.1, the decision was made to divide the table into 1.2 and 1.3. This to easier portray the hiring degree variables when PMC were used and when it was not used. Table 1.2 and 1.3 with commanders were added along the way, when the JWT proper authority were added, the commander section became of interest. In table 1.2, the commander is only those active during the PMC period. While in table 1.3, commander is those present during the full extension of the peacekeeping operations.

There are further two significant finding from these tables. If we compare the fatalities. We can clearly see spikes in fatalities when PMC has been hired, compared without PMC hired. The second finding is that five out of the seven times PMC is hired after UN has arrived.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>UN Mission period</th>
<th>PMC period</th>
<th>UN Fatalities</th>
<th>PMC task</th>
<th>Commander</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(IVO) MINUCI</td>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SIE) UNOMSIL</td>
<td>1998–1999</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SIE) UNAMSIL</td>
<td>1999-2005</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SOM) UNOSOM I</td>
<td>1992-1993</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SOM) UNOSOM II</td>
<td>1993-1995</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Malaysia Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SUD) UNMIS</td>
<td>2005-2007</td>
<td>2006-2007</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4, 9, 12</td>
<td>Ethiopia Pakistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.2 - UN mission with hired PMC.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>UN Fatalities</th>
<th>Commander</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(ANG) UNAVEM I</td>
<td>1990–1991</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ANG) UNAVEM II</td>
<td>1991–1995</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>UK, Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ANG) UNAVEM III</td>
<td>1995–1997</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Zimbabwe, Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ANG) MONUA</td>
<td>1997–1999</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Zimbabwe, Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(BDI) ONUB</td>
<td>2004–2006</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CAR) MINURCA</td>
<td>1998–2000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LIB) UNOMIL</td>
<td>1993–1997</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Kenya, Egypt, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MZM) ONUMOZ</td>
<td>1992–1994</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Brazil, Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(RWA) UNAMIR</td>
<td>1993–1996</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Canada, India</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.3 – UN missions without hired PMC.

5. Analysis

The analysis will primarily use the JWT and the sections are divided into Just ad Bellum and Jus in Bello and the sections belonging into those. The strength the JWT will provide is the moral evaluation. The use of the nuclear fat man over Nagasaki, may have been the most effective weapon, but morally correct to use a weapon which cannot differentiate civilian from enemy with that area damage? Even if the empirical data shine a certain light toward PMC security on the fatalities, the JWT the aim is to go into deeper morally and physical consequences of the use of PMC by UN.

5.1 Jus Ad Bellum

The just Ad Bellum is prior to the peacekeeping operation. The decisions are made in a comfortable chair at UN headquarters. The conflict within the nation is ongoing, but the peacekeeping operation has not yet been sent. It in this category, UN has the possibility to calibrate their future action to achieve the best possible peacekeeping operation with their resources at disposable. Most of the Jus ad Bellum categories will be included, but not all of them, the reason for this is that all categories are not of value to mention for this paper.

5.1.1 Just Intention

Already in the 4th century with the scholar St Augustine (2007, 65), only the right authority had the right to assemble soldiers for war. Since the king was assigned by God to derive good from evil, the king had the right judgment. The goal of the war was peace, which made
conflict the way to peace. In its original form, JWT is troubled with the state’s intention of going to war, with the military. With traditional JWT, the assumption is that the intention of the UN and UN-personnel is the same. As the intention of the state and the military. There is a clear line of intention between the ones ordering the violence and the one conducting the violence. Pattison (2008, 145) agrees with this assumption but disagrees that the assumption is applicable when PMC is used. Pattison’s would argue that the intention of PMC and UN personnel would be to give the best possible service, but the motive to perform the best is different. Where UN-personnel is driven by wanting to help, PMC is motivated by financial gain and winning the next contract. Both actors intention is in line. However, what motivates the behavior is different by having a different motivation to perform. PMC is arguably less likely to perform as good as UN personnel. It is highly unlikely that a person motivated by money would go to the same extension of security than a person motivated by helping. While both actors arguably have the same intention, the PMC intention is weaker than UN personnel. By watching table 1.1 we can see that there are more deaths in operations which includes PMC. The issue is that there are no guidelines and no death toll on PMC. The death amount from PMC would be a WAG (wild ass guess). A fair assumption to make is that PMC is also dying in peacekeeping operations. Some of the deaths from a PMC would most likely been the death of a UN personnel unless PMC were hired to fill the boots. This follows both Leander (2005, 615) and Singer’s (2007, 4) argument that by hiding PMC death toll, UN are saving public scrutiny and the lives of their own soldiers.

With Orend discussing traditional JWT, the intention of the state is the ones who matter. Orend does not include the intention of the ones conducting the violence. The JWT assert that it is the intention of the states which matters, which is the opposite view of Pattison (2008,145). It follows that the UN could have several intentions of peacekeeping operations, and it is only the one presented by the UN, which matters (Orend 2013, 48-50). Pattison argues that the motive of the once performing the violence also matters. By hiring PMC, the motive of those fighting for the UN are changing, which need to be included to understand the performance better.

Looking at table 1. we see that PMC has been a lot in the same countries as UN, which mean that they probably already have a reputation of themselves. Not necessary this specific company, but that there are people without a flag or a blue helmet in the area which is heavily armed and protecting certain areas. By looking at the three different sections, locally, external
and UN hired. We can see that PMC generally has a substantial presence in the countries, and this does not include PMC as being hired by private companies for protection. By UN using PMC and having them protect their facilities, the UN does not separate themselves from the other in the same way. The blue helmet represents the motivation of helping. PMC protecting is a sign of greed, and people ready to use violence for money. Which is why Pattison’s argument of JWT becomes more relevant than Orend perspective; it should be a separation between those ordering the violence and those conducting violence. It becomes even more apparent when those conducting the violence is separated into UN personnel and PMC. The UN flag is only on the uniforms of UN personnel, the blue helmet is only on the UN personnel. PMC is a company moving from actor to actor in the same cloths motivated by money. By UN hiring PMC they decrease their representation of being the negotiators and peacemakers by having not only virtues people in their ranks.

For the UN to intervene with a peacekeeping operation, they are guided by three basic principles.

· Consent of the parties
· Impartiality
· Non use of force, except in self-defense and defense of the mandate

A question of impartiality from PMC is concerned with a larger picture. Since a larger PMC can undertake several missions at the same time. For example, the UN was using Delta protection for a peacekeeping operation in DRC. At the same time in DRC, was Delta protection hired by a mining company, Tenke Fungurume Mining (Pingeot 2014,8). This makes Delta protection invested in the country and not impartial. Since it is a significant risk that the mine favor one of the sides in the conflict. Civil wars have the attribute of dividing the country into groups. Its highly likely the mining is supporting one group which are working their mines. By UN hiring Delta protection for a peacekeeping operation, it fails to fulfill their guidelines of impartiality. The issue is that PMC is hired by several actors, which imply that different guidelines for the PMC depend on the contractor. The guidelines a mining company or UN peacekeeping operations are giving to a PMC is probably a bit different. A PMC arguably behave differently depending on who is hiring them.

5.1.2 Proportionality
The proportionality guideline in JWT is written into international law with the Hague convention article 22-23. The violence performed should not outweigh the benefits of the
conflict. The proportionality has three different levels of analysis which the UN need to take in consideration for sending UN peacekeeping operation. What good does it do for themselves, for the country which they will help and what good does it do for the world?

In this section will it be concerned with the two last ones, what good does it do for the host nation of the peacekeeping operation and for the world. For UN, they are supposed to arrive during a ceasefire in a conflict and help the two or several parties to arrive at a diplomatic end to the conflict. Alternatively, they are making sure that the parties follow what was agreed. When the UN send their forces, they need to assert what is needed to achieve peace for the host nation and security for themselves and civilians seeking protection. Sending UN forces is a calculation in math asserting several variables. With UN supposedly assert only to send troops during ceasefire, a high death count shows to which degree it is a ceasefire or an ongoing civil war. Singer argues that PMC is an enabler for war and makes it easier for the policymaker to go around public support. Looking at the death in table 1.1, there is arguable not a ceasefire since UN personnel is dying. With PMC only arriving two out of the seven times with UN, Singer’s argument that PMC is an enabler, seems lacking. By looking at when PMC arrives to a peacekeeping operation in table 1.1, we see that five out of seven times, PMC arrive during the conflict. The enabling factor is doubtful, but looking at Akcinaroglu & Radziszewski (2013, 812) conclusion that PMC arrive when people are dying, sounds more likely. According to table 1.1 are PMC arriving during the peacekeeping operation, which neglect Singer view that PMC is a enabling factor, at least to the degree which Singer argue for (Singer 2007, 4).

UN need to calculate if it is beneficial to help for what it might cost and assert if they may cause more harm than good by helping and if the cost of helping is within the proportionality. By looking at the UN death in table 1.1, it’s not a significant number, but it is a big number arguing that UN would arrive during peacetime to prevent conflicts from breaking out or preserve the peace. By looking at table 1.2, we see that out of the seven-time UN has used PMC, five times PMC arrived after the UN peacekeeping operation and two times with the peacekeeping operation. When PMC arrives after the UN, they generally arrive one year after and either do the task of logistics or security, which suggest that PMC has either been actively helping in the security or freed up logistics spot for UN. The data suggest that PMC is always within the consideration when the UN is asserting what proportion of UN personnel, they need to send. Because two of the times they are joining with the UN and the other times, they
are quickly deployed after the first UN personnel, which suggest that UN is highly aware of the option of using PMC for a peacekeeping operation and have PMC as an early option.

Singer (2007, 18) had two primary arguments for why the US used PMC for the Iraq invasion. The first was the Abrams doctrine. Which argue that if a nation cannot garner enough support to mobilize the nation for war, it should not happen. Where Singer argues that PMC was able to fill US void. Not because the US lacked enough soldiers but could not garner enough support from its population to support the war effort with the right number of soldiers necessary. The second was that PMC causalities are not within official death tolls as American soldiers are (Singer 2007, 4). PMC is positive for the war effort since neither the politician are hold accountable for PMC death and does not negatively affect the war effort from the population. One of the concerns for the UN is support for peacekeeping operations. Looking at peacekeeping operations and which nationalities population are dying; we can clearly see that the UN personnel is primarily non-European. Without knowing the death tolls of PMC, we can most likely say that the UN death toll would be much higher without PMC. Since PMC present and deaths is a shadow number, UN is assuring lower death tolls. The proportionality doctrine would assert that PMC is a factor that increase the legitimacy of the peacekeeping operation. By taking spots which otherwise would been filled by UN personnel, PMC is taking causalities which otherwise would been reserved for UN personnel. If PMC is hidden, they are not affecting nations moral of contributing to peacekeeping operation. Negative media attention is also decreasing by hiding PMC inclusion. With JWT, the proportionality doctrine, the UN is making peacekeeping operations more justifiable for the taxpayers. Fewer deaths and according to PMC themselves, they are a cheaper option.

5.1.3 Public declaration of war by a proper Authority
The proper authority is written into international law with Hague Convention III, which declare that a state needs to have a declaration of war. This step was made to prevent future blitzkrieg and to inform both sides of the future conflict of what is about to happen (Orend 2013, 52). It also about informing the public to initiate Abrams doctrine to gain support. UN does also declare their operations to the world with resolutions. The peacekeeping declaration does also need to be legitimated by the proper authorities. It also seeks justification from the
parties in the conflict to gain support for the mission and assure the safety of the peacekeeping operation.

The public declaration is made by the UN, and the legitimacy arrives from independent nations which collaborate for the peacekeeping operations. The vote is made by permanent members with veto rights and several other nations. Peacekeeping is not the typical declaration because the declaration is not between two or more nations but for a nation typically in a civil war. This means that the cause of the peacekeeping operation is not within self-defense or self-defense of other UN nations, which are the just causes. This means that the UN needs to have the support of the local to intervene not to break international law (Orend 2013, 57). The proper authority does, therefore, primarily become UN and local government for the peacekeeping operation. However, both actors need to legitimate UN presence because the UN will not go without consent from the nation which needs a peacekeeping operation.

When UN hire PMC, the PMC is hired by UN but are controlled by the commander. By looking at the table 1.2 & 1.3 of when UN use PMC and not, there is no consistency in which kind of commander has chosen to use PMC or not. However, it is a rather big consistency from where the commander comes from. Moreover, it is the smaller taxpaying nations. Which mean that the ones paying for UN peacekeeping operations and PMC are not the once’s directly in charge.

By UN formula, US is supposed to pay 28% for peacekeeping operations in 2018. At the same time, India pays 0.8%. By looking at the table 1.2 & 1.3, the bigger economic contributor is not included in the commanders. Arguably, the biggest taxpayers for UN are paying weaker nations, such as Senegal, Nigeria, Malaysia, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and Ghana, for leading UN peacekeeping operations. The ones paying the most for PMC is not the ones in charge of PMC. Since there are no guidelines for how to use PMC, it is the commander which dispose of the use of PMC.

PMC does not have their own authority to cause violence. Their legitimacy arrives from the states/UN hiring them. UN personnel loyalty lies with UN, the PMC loyalty lies with themselves and their shareholders. Which mean that PMC temporarily joins the legitimate violence but not loyalty. By combining that western nations primarily paying for
peacekeeping operations and that African states are providing commanding to PMC. The way western nation pays for African nation soldier looks similar to western nation paying for PMC and being used by African commanders. Which in the end mean that the proper authority is paying others to perform peace and violence.

5.2 Jus in Bello
The just in Bello is the morally correct way to guide the soldiers behaviour during a conflict. This section assert that there are a different moral between PMC and UN personnel. The JWT argue for well-educated soldiers to be the best option for conducting a morally correct war.

5.2.1 Legitimate Target
This requirement is the core of Jus in Bello. The soldier needs to discern from a legitimate to an illegitimate target. The legitimate target is soldiers, their equipment, supply routes, and some of the civilian suppliers and military factory workers (Orend 2013, 112). Civilians not directly engaged in the conflict is not a legitimate target. With Usama bin Laden’s argumentation, everything contributing to a nations war effort is a legitimate target. Since by paying taxes, they are directly supporting the war effort in his views (Orend 2013, 119).

According to JWT, all soldiers are a legitimate target since they gave up their human rights of security by being in the military. Secondly, they are individuals who are trained in the political killing. The standard of soldiers killing soldiers. This is not the case of UN peacekeeping operations, its UN soldiers, being attacked by civilians/Taliban’s picking up a weapon to fight injustice from their perspective. By picking up the weapon, the individuals left the security of civilian immunity. The issue is that the enemy is not wearing a uniform and will directly after the battle melt into the civilian population. The Just in Bello call for highly educated soldier to be able to act properly in conflicts (Orend 2013, 114). By fighting against civilians which are picking up arms, the call for professional personnel is ever increasing. Which were a previous argument, by looking at the commanders and PMC, UN are not sending their best educated soldiers to perform peacekeeping operations. Which in the end, will most likely end with more deaths.

“Evolving mandates have changed the security posture of the UN, leading to growing securitization and “bunkerization” of UN missions. Member states have played a key role in promoting this shift. “(Pigeot 2014,13)
The move toward bunkerization and adding PMC into the algorithm is a rather interesting combination. Let us talk about two different principles. PMC is a profit-driven organization, and the people hired within is not motivated by a cause of helping but money. Which means contractors are less likely to follow an order which will be good for the group but has a high individual cost. Since both UN personnel and the contractor has the intention of security but the motivation to fulfill the duty cause the PMC to be less likely to risk their own life. UN would logically want to put PMC at the frontline because the life of a PMC is less worth than a UN soldier when it comes to publicity and death tolls. However, the magnitude of how far PMC is ready to go for risking their life is shorter than UN soldier. By UN hiring PMC, UN has decreased the number of people prepared to die for the cause of helping each other. By combining PMC and UN personnel, according to table 1.1 we see that the death of UN personnel has increased or spiking by including PMC.

By being in areas where the legitimate targets is combined with civilians, the assumption that the local person moving towards the wall is likely friendly. However, since there are non-discern a rebel from the local population unless fired upon, the walls become a necessity. To create a distance between UN and the enemy. By doing this, UN are creating a distance between those they are supposed to help. With further hiring of PMC, the distance is even further.

5.2.2 Doctrine of Double Effect
Singer (2007, 5) argues that PMC was one of the most visible and hated aspects of American counterinsurgency in Iraq. Telling from the perspective of the local population, the PMC was riding the cars in the wrong lanes, firing in the air. With other factors included, the locals saw the PMC as impolite and disturbing the civilian’s everyday life. The PMC which Singer focuses on is Blackwater and the Nissour square massacre, which also reflect the interviews from the local population.

“The four-vehicle Blackwater convoy, which had stopped at Nisoor Square on Sept. 16 to seal off traffic for another convoy carrying State Department officials, “wasn’t even hit by a stone,” much less hostile gunfire when Blackwater guards began shooting at unarmed civilians, government spokesman, Ali al-Dabbagh, said.” (Pauk von Zielbauer 2007, Iraqi Inquiry says the shooting was unprovoked, New York times.)
While the local describe the American soldier, who kept them safe were drinking tea and playing cards with them. Singer explains PMC behavior by arguing that their mission is to get a client from point A to B and to do this in the safest way they decline the hearts and minds principle which the state soldiers follow (Kaldor 1999, 10. Since the PMC client evaluate if they could keep the object safe from point A to B, the PMC will proceed with the safest action, which may damage the overall mission (Singer 2007, 5-7).

The DDE assert that actor A will perform action X and will predict that the action will cause both G (good) and B (bad) effect. With this doctrine, it is about how much good comes from the bad (Orend 2013, 121). The doctrine wants to respond to if its correct to take this action or not. By following the DDE doctrine and try to cause minimum evil and maximum good, the bombing would only be on military targets but increase the risk of their soldiers.

Let us apply UN personnel and PMC with the same situation with the DDE doctrine. To look on the doctrine, an escort of convoys serve as an example like Singer.

\[ X = G + B \] (Actor (A) will apply (a) action (X), which will result in Good (G) + bad (B).

PMC à Protect a high-ranking individual from point A to B in an escort convoy. = The PMC will successfully transport the high ranking official from point A to B (g). The PMC did not follow driving laws and were firing in the air to make sure no object from the local population was in their way (b).

UN Personnel à Protect a high-ranking individual from point A to B in an escort convoy. = UN personnel will successfully transport the high ranking official from point A to B (g). UN personnel will follow the driving law and respect the local population, which will increase the risk of getting stuck in a cue. Which could be a vulnerable position (b).

For the short-term solution, the DDE would suggest the PMC approach since it promotes the protection of both the high ranking and the security personnel. However, since civil wars have been proven to be a long-term conflict, UN presence is not short. With the data, it is not possible to directly draw the connection to support either of the two approaches. If the threat is not immediate or UN has not had a history of violence in the current mission, the DDE example of UN personnel is favorable. One incident of killing a civilian by driving reckless would harm the UN effort and risk the hearts of minds of the civilians to favor the rebels. The point to make with DDE and hearts and minds is to view that PMC behavior affects the local population view on PMC. Without knowing the right reason for why the killings spiked with PMC, it needs to be in consideration that PMC behavior affects the local population view of UN presence in the country.
Singer (2007, 2) argues that PMC is only making the war effort worse. The hearts of minds which Kaldor (1999, 41) is discussing promotes good behavior towards the local population. Because without the support from the local population, it’s harder for the counterinsurgency to fight the Taliban’s and will only gain more enemies by misbehaving toward the local population. Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski (2013, 815) oppose Singer with their research, arguing that PMC is a good option for terminating civil wars. What Kaldor and Singer push for are the hearts and minds and that the conflicts are low-intense, which mean that peace is not achieved just because the killing stopped. PMC may be the solution for directly stopping the violence but unable to get to the roots of the conflict.

5.2.3 EMTS & Prohibited weapons
Leander (2010, 476) argues that PMC is inherently a state function. She takes it as far as to call them a weapon system for the states to use (Leander 2010, 482). The argument for this case is that PMC is not challenging the monopoly of violence, but they join the state monopoly of violence when hired. Therefore do they inherently become a state function and a weapon system for the state to use. The opposite view of the specter arrives from Krahmann. By viewing them for their attributes, she argues that PMC should be included within the Geneva convention ban on mercenaries since PMC is only a group of individuals and are more like mercenaries than a company (Krahmann 2012, 362).

By looking at table 1, we can see that PMC has been used by external government, local government, and the UN. The PMC has been used in a wide range, in all locations except for one, Central African Republic and been doing almost all different kind of tasks. To discuss EMTS and prohibited weapon, the market will be included for both sections.

The market is the area in which supply and demands meet and set the price of PMC. By watching table 1, in which magnitude PMC has been used, it looks like the supply will always be big enough to fill the demand. Including that the US was able to deploy 180 000 PMC, there is a large amount of PMC ready to be bought (Singer 2007, 2). Which arrives at this section core argument. Should nations/UN have unlimited access to soldiers if they have an unlimited amount of money? By training your own soldiers, there is a limitation in the amount of violence a nation can cause, by unlimited amount of personnel, the market has enabled nations to increase their possibility for violence. The same assumption can be made with UN. The number of peacekeeping operations UN can do will only be limited by money and not by personnel. Since nations contribute with their soldiers for UN peacekeeping operations, PMC
removes that barrier and enables UN to achieve more peacekeeping operations. Wulf argues that one of the core issues with today’s conflict is the amount of time external actors need to have their presence to restore security (Wulf 2011, 141). Wulf provides this by showing several dilemmas that appear by external security. Looking at table 1.2 with PMC presence with UN, PMC is generally hired for a short duration. This is good. PMC is not a tool for peace, it’s a tool for war and should be there to restore peace not to achieve peace. UN is there to prevent war from breaking out or making sure that peace is upheld. Not to actively fight either of the actors. PMC is a EMTS, its something that has recently emerged and international law are not keeping up with the technology. By looking at the tables 1.3, UN has been doing good without PMC, the use of PMC should not bee looked upon easy. It’s actor away from peacebuilding and a move toward militarization of peacekeeping operations. Wulf argues that operations in civil wars are long-term, the investment of UN should arguable also be long-term and not short-term solutions by bringing actors of war into peacekeeping operations (Wulf 2011, 146).

Leander (2010, 476) argues that PMC is inherently a state function since they are included within the monopoly of violence when hired. Which also includes that they are killing in the name of the state, which is where the traditional legitimate violence arrives from. The market has enabled states to temporarily and quickly enhance the capabilities of the state. With the hiring degree being high, the market has changed the landscape of the possibilities of violence. Which goes against international law from the UN charter of limiting violence as much as possible. To agree with Leander that PMC is a weapon system, we indulge ourselves to a new aspect of weaponry, feelings, and motivation. A gun does not have motives, it is the user of the gun which have motives and are conducting the violence, the gun is simply the tool.
5.3 Money
The enabling and creation of PMC itself, rest in money. Without the high wages which PMC contractors receive, PMC would not exist. The low wages of state soldiers are probably one of the triggering factors to PMC creation as well. By watching table 1. local, external, and UN hired PMC, it is a heavy presence of PMC in Africa. The presence of PMC within UN is the lowest compared to the other categories. The research does not include nation which UN has not been in and private companies use of PMC, which argument mean that PMC present in Africa is high. The enabling factor of PMC is money. Wetten argued from the objectivism perspective that money is not evil. However, arguably, money is the creation of PMC. On the other hand, the user of PMC is UN, is UN, therefore evil? Pattison argues that money is an immoral motive, but again, the UN’s motive to use PMC is also money. PMC motive to work for UN is money. Since no guidelines or document are claiming which motive UN has for using PMC, I cannot claim I know UN motives for using PMC. However, since PMC themselves declare they are cheap and effective. The rational motive UN has for using PMC would be money. By viewing the commander category, I want to bring in Leander and Singer argument. Both this author argues that states are afraid of negative scrutiny at home, which will affect the effort negatively. Viewing the taxpaying nations table to the right. There is almost a similar perspective from UN using PMC as wealthier nations paying weaker nations to perform peacekeeping operations. Which arrives in another perspective. Does it matter who dies? The tables above only display UN fatalities, but not includes the nationality of the fatalities. By looking into UN own report on fatalities overall from “(2) Fatalities by Nationality and Mission up to 6/30/2019 11:59:59 pm”. I decided to look at nationality fatalities. The picture to the right depicts the top ten nation with the most fatalities working for UN. The top ten paying and the top ten fatalities do not look the same. Singer argues that there are two dominant reasons to use PMC, money, and that US was not able to fill the Abrams doctrine. Watching the two pictures, the dominant reason to use PMC is most likely about money. The economic nations want as much as possible for their money, without risking their own soldier’s life by sending them with UN. From a market perspective, www.peacekeeping.un.org - How we are funded

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>28.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>10.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>9.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>6.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>6.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>5.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>3.99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2.44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the PMC is the supply and UN and the nation behind stands for the demand. PMC existence is not immoral since the use of them are legitimacies by the users. Without the demand from UN and states, there would not be a supply.

6. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper where to find UN hiring degree of PMC and secondly to evaluate how PMC security service is contributing to peacekeeping. With the descriptive method, an overview of UN hiring degree of PMC became quickly visible. Out of the 16 peacekeeping operations in table 1.1, we see that PMC were active with UN at seven times. We can further see that PMC did generally not arrive at the starting point of the peacekeeping operation but one year after. The tasks PMC performed for UN were mostly logistics support (4) and security/protection (7). Another finding was that the fatalities of UN personnel were increasing when PMC was hired. The commander of PMC was generally non-western, and most fatalities by UN personnel was non-western. By this line of thinking, the wealthiest nations are paying non-western nations for a peacekeeping operation, for them to supply the workforce. In similar thinking, the wealthier nations are also paying to use PMC, so western nations primary contribute with money. This line of thinking agrees with Singer (2007, 4) and Leander (2005, 615), western nations are afraid of scrutiny for failing peacekeeping operations. The scrutiny is linked to fatalities. By using other actors, western nations are avoiding negative attention to peacekeeping operations from their nations. Poorer nations and PMC become a solution for wealthier nations to decrease their contribution of soldiers. While still performing peace operations around the world. Simply by paying for it.

The second research question was to asses if PMC is increasing the security for peacekeeping operations. The fatalities of UN personnel is not a definite answer to this question, but it gives some insight. Security is a term to measure a conception of reality, the feeling of safety. Objectively, four guards are more than two guards. With the JWT, jus ad Bellum and jus in Bello were applied on PMC activity in peacekeeping operations. The hope with JWT was to engage in a theoretical level to see if four PMC may be a worse option than two UN personnel for security. With Pattison (2008,145) argument from intention and motive, it is most likely that PMC will perform less satisfactorily than UN personnel based upon that PMC is motivated by money. Arguing from the feeling of security, UN personnel would most likely feel safer by being guarded by their own personnel than PMC. International law and JWT are all focusing on decreasing the chance of war. The use of PMC would the JWT deem going
against JWT and international law since PMC is not decreasing the chance of conflict rather increasing it. By giving more actors the possibility to perform violence. But an increase of peacekeeping operation, would that not be good? I would argue from both Pattisons and Singer perspective. PMC is an immoral actor who are motivated by money which makes their action less controllable. By UN hiring PMC, they are hiring personnel which they cannot control to the same extent as their own personnel. This creates a dangerous security environment. The steps toward hiring PMC 7/16 peacekeeping operations do, therefore, threaten the perception of security and future peacekeeping operations. UN personnel would feel that their security is not prioritized, and the range of security is motivated by money. Four guards are more than two, but two loyal UN security personnel is more than four PMC that are less likely to protect UN personnel with the risk to their lives.

Akcinaroglu & Radziszewski (2013, 812) argued that PMC primarily arrives when the conflict is ongoing, even further says, when people are dying. This could we see in table 1.1 to support their finding that PMC arrive during the conflict. With the data collected and provided, there is not any support for that PMC would increase the security for UN peacekeeping operations. Rather the opposite since more killings appear when PMC has been present. UN is motivated to hire PMC because they are supposedly cheaper, and western nations can send less from their population to fill the ranks with PMC. The use of PMC is not motivated by increasing security, but by money. At the beginning of the text, there was a claim that the act of virtue motives UN peacekeeping operations, and PMC motive was the opposite. With the view of money, the western nation is also motivated by money, the claim of peacekeeping operation intentions should be made with ease.

For further research on UN use of PMC, there should be a more extensive set of data, over a more prolonged period. There should also be an evaluation of the aftermath of the peacekeeping operation. The descriptive method serves the purpose to see the data, on black and white easily. The method meets the demand to get a greater overview. A case study or similar methods does not serve the purpose of this kind of research. Secondly, being forced to use secondary data of UN use of PMC, because of the lack of transparency is troubling. UN has the data on their use of PMC and fatalities of PMC but decides to hide this from the population. Peacekeeping operation gets its money from UN taxpaying nations and should have higher transparency, and PMC use should be public knowledge. The use of PMC should be a political question where individuals should be informed to be able to take a stand to PMC in general. Paying individuals, not military to perform violence in the name of peacekeeping
operations is not a move in the right direction. It’s a move further away from UN values and
distance themselves from those they are supposedly them to help. With the combination that
IR authors such as Orend (2013, 74) and Krahmann (2012, 355) think PMC is mercenaries,
people need to have the possibility to make their opinion on PMC.

PMC came with the end of the cold war and should be considered to be something new.
Further data is therefore needed on PMC. Fundamental questions need to be addressed, when
should PMC be hired, for which tasks, how to use PMC, and why use PMC over military
soldiers? The paper provides some evidence to these questions, but because of the lack of
data, its unable to give suggestions for how PMC should be used in the future. The paper
provides some insight into when UN has hired PMC, for what tasks and to which degree. By
finding this data, PMC is in need of further research and this research should be in interest of
states.

UN wealthiest nations are paying weaker nations and PMC to conduct the security in
peacekeeping operation. Without sending much soldiers themselves. PMC has questionable
moral. By this paper, I will argue that UN has questionable moral as well. PMC has further
enabled the wealthiest nations to send other than their own countrymen to die for UN
peacekeeping operations.
7. Bibliography


### Appendix A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Combat and military operations</th>
<th>Armed private actors are directly involved in military operations and fighting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Military assistance</td>
<td>Private actors provide military training and consulting (e.g. tactics) to parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Operational support</td>
<td>Private actors operate and/or maintain combat-related goods (e.g. weaponry, satellites) and/or fulfil certain functions in the command and control chain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Logistics support</td>
<td>Transportation of soldiers and/or combat-related goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>Private actors provide risk assessments, reconnaissance or translation services and/or are part of interrogations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Quasi-police tasks (prevention) and border patrol</td>
<td>Private actors provide services that would usually be ascribed to the police, including the safety of public places and/or protection of state and local borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Security/protection (individuals and facilities)</td>
<td>Private actors provide (mobile) security for individuals and/or facilities; this task refers to protective services details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Police advice and training</td>
<td>Similar to military assistance, private actors providing training and/or consulting to police forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Demining</td>
<td>Military and humanitarian demining for the destruction and removal of land and/or naval mines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Humanitarian aid</td>
<td>Private actors provide armed material or logistical services for humanitarian purposes such as transportation of food in crisis zones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Weapons disposal/destruction</td>
<td>Deinstallation, destruction and disposal of warfare-related goods and facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Facility and infrastructural build-up</td>
<td>Private actors construct and build military infrastructure such as military bases</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From DACS user manual and coding scheme