NORMS, SOCIAL FITNESS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY

A Study of the Norm Entrepreneurship of the World Bank and the Diffusion of the Norm of Good Governance

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Abstract

This study deals with the process of norm diffusion in international politics. It primarily analyses and explains the diffusion of the norm of ‘good governance’ initiated by the World Bank in 1989. In so doing the study delivers an analysis of the norm entrepreneurship of the World Bank in this specific case of norm diffusion. Moreover, the analysis reflects on the capacity of the World Bank as a norm entrepreneur from a more general point of view. An analytical framework that mainly draws on social constructivist literature on norm evolution is developed and applied to the empirical case at hand. The analysis is divided into two parts. The first section focuses on normative structures and the second section concentrates on the norm entrepreneur. The last concluding part wraps up the analysis of the empirical case by explaining how the first and the second part of the inquiry relate. The present study suggests that social fitness is the key analytical concept to understand the process of norm diffusion in the case at hand. The analysis shows how the social fitness of the norm of ‘good governance’ and the social fitness of the World Bank as an international organisation are fundamental to understand the diffusion of the norm of ‘good governance’. The theoretical conception of norm diffusion delivered in the present study suggests that international organisations can be influential and powerful norm entrepreneurs. Furthermore, the study incorporates a theoretical conception of power into the analysis of norm diffusion and shows how power in different forms is a fundamental element to understand and analyse the social construction of intersubjectivity.

Keywords: Norm Diffusion, Social Fitness, Norm Entrepreneur, Normative Structure, Good Governance, the World Bank

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1 Introduction

1.1 Background

The World Bank is a key institution in international aid and development and has been so since the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions in 1944. Officially the institution(s) derives its legitimacy by employing an apolitical approach to development and by basing its lending programmes on technical expertise. During the 1960s the Bank made clear that its decisions could not be influenced by the political situation in countries like South Africa or Portugal (von Benda-Beckmann 1994). Even if it is possible to question whether the approach to development employed by the Bank ever has been completely apolitical, the introduction of the ‘governance agenda’ in the late 1980s marked a more distinct step into a political policy area. In 1989 the study ‘Sub-Saharan Africa – From Crisis to Sustainable Growth’ was published by the Bank and it highlighted the instrumental merit of ‘good governance’ in order to achieve economic development. In the World Development Report of year 1991 the Bank delivered a formal statement on its new governance agenda. This policy transformation occurred in an international context where the Cold War was coming to an end and at a time when the failure of the structural adjustment programmes (SAP) was becoming strikingly evident in particularly the African continent (Lancaster 1993: 9). By year 1992 international organisations (IOs) like the Organization of African Unity, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the European Council had all expressed their support to the ‘good governance’ concept of development (IDS Bulletin 1993: 7). Furthermore, state representatives like Margaret Thatcher and François Mitterrand had also explicitly welcomed the governance agenda (ibid). Today the concept has become a commonplace in international aid and development and it has been institutionalised in different aid and research programmes by various organisations like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the United Nations Development Programme and the Commonwealth Secretariat.

* The World Bank Group consists of five international organizations: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Finance Corporation (IFC), International Development Association (IDA), Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Henceforth the World Bank or The Bank will refer to IBRD.
The emergence of the governance agenda within the World Bank is an interesting case in several ways. It emerged at time when world politics was in a process of transition. Moreover the political dimension of the concept makes it a controversial idea per se on the development agenda. However, this study will not primarily focus on these particular aspects. The present study recognizes the emergence of the governance agenda and its diffusion within the international community as a case of norm diffusion and furthermore a case which revolves around how ideas become norms. By defining this case as a case of norm diffusion I do not claim that there exist or has ever existed such a thing as a coherent norm of ‘good governance’. This concept has actually been criticized for being to fluffy, diffuse and open-ended (Doornbos 2001: 94). Like other buzzwords it has become widely supported but there is no total agreement to its core meaning. Despite the fact that different actors apply slightly dissimilar meaning to ‘good governance’ I still believe that this is an interesting case that can reveal general insights about norm diffusion; about why some ideas gain acceptance and about how consent to ideas is produced. Moreover I believe this case can tell something about the capacity of the World Bank to promote ideas and influence the development agenda, which is of interest in the light of the historic record of the Bank to shape the development agenda (see Finnemore 1996). On a higher level of abstraction this case can reveal something about how international organisations promote ideas and what role international organisations can play in a process of norm construction. This study is of interest from an empirical perspective since it can tell us something about the World Bank’s influence on the development agenda and its authority in the international community. Furthermore, the present study is also relevant since it addresses an interesting theoretical question of norm diffusion on an international level.

1.2 Aims and Research Questions

The principal aim of this study is to analyse the process of norm diffusion initiated by the World Bank through the introduction and promotion of the governance agenda. Furthermore, the study will analyse the norm entrepreneurship of the World Bank in this specific case of norm diffusion. Moreover, the inquiry will deliver a general depiction of the capacity of the World Bank as an international norm entrepreneur. In addition, this case study aims to generate theoretical insight on norm diffusion by exploring this process in the case at hand. In sum the study will address the following questions:
- How can the diffusion of the norm of ‘good governance’ by the World Bank be conceived and explained using a social constructivist account?

- How can the norm entrepreneurship of the World Bank in the present case and in international politics in general be conceptualized?

- How may the present inquiry contribute to the study of norm diffusion within International Relations?

The research questions will be theoretically developed and further clarified as the study progresses.

Whether a single case study of this kind constitutes a justifiable source of generalisation is a question of controversy (Björkdahl 2002: 32). I claim that it is possible from the present study to make limited generalizations. This study is based on the assumption that the emergence of the ‘good governance’ agenda to some extent can tell something about the World Bank as a norm entrepreneur from a general point of view. Furthermore, a case study is of merit since it will allow a detailed and in-depth study of a complex process. By delivering a theoretically informed description of reality it will be possible to arrive at a better understanding of the empirical case at hand and the theoretical elements utilized in the study (Ericson 2000: 24).

To avoid misunderstandings I would like to clarify the limitations in scope of this study. This inquiry analyses the initial phase in a process of norm evolution. Consequently this study does not aim to give an all-embracing account of how the norm of ‘good governance’ has evolved. The study will only analyse the process of norm diffusion initiated by the World Bank in the case at hand and it will thereby focus on the theoretical and empirical elements necessary to analyse this particular phase of norm evolution. Furthermore, this study does not primarily aim to investigate how the idea of ‘good governance’ actually influences or has influenced the behaviour of actors within the international system. By devoting this research paper on the topic of ideas and norms I implicitly assume that ideational phenomena are of interest and importance when studying International Relations (IR). However, this study is not foremost an inquiry on the causal effect of ideas, even though this will be discussed and elaborated on. Moreover this study does not asses the utility or desirability of the norm of ‘good governance’ or tries to make any normative claims about development and governance in general.
1.3 Method

Within the field of International Relations the importance of norms and ideas is not widely recognized by all scholars. Realists and neorealists argue that norms and ideas do not have an influence on politics and consequently cannot explain political change. Norms are believed to only reflect the distribution of material power (see Mearsheimer 1994). Moreover realists see international politics as amoral and claim that social learning and hence the evolution and diffusion of norms at an international level is not possible, since anarchical self-help and the security dilemma prevail and at all times determine the national interest of states. Liberal scholars give more weight to norms. For example, literature on democratic peace and security communities give ontological status to norms and see them as important when explaining international politics. This study will mainly make use of IR literature taking a social constructivist point of departure that widely recognizes ideas and norms as essential to understanding social reality.

In the most recent grand debate in International Relations between rationalist and reflectivist, and structuralist and individualist approaches to IR, social constructivism has been described as a middle course (see Adler 1997). Social constructivism operates with a mix of material and social or cognitive factors, since it recognizes that ‘the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world’ (Adler 1997: 322). Hence, there is a real world out there, but it is not entirely determined by material forces and conditions, since ideas of intersubjective meaning define this world. Consequently the world is not completely independent from our understanding of it. Recognizing the importance of *intersubjectivity* means that one can understand the world a result of both objectivism and subjectivism (Björkdahl 2002: 26). Constructivism recognizes the human capacity of learning, which is seen as fundamental to understand how individuals and social actors attach meaning to the material world and cognitively frame this world (Adler 1997: 322). Through processes of social learning and social communication an intersubjective reality is produced. This intersubjective reality of shared ideas is seen as a driving force of social action. It defines what is possible to think and do and consequently, intersubjectivity is fundamental to understand or explain social practices and ideas. Thus, material forces are recognized, but the causal effect of material factors are mediated by intersubjective meaning. This kind of shared meaning has a structural quality and can be conceptualised as a cognitive structure. Agents are
continuously interacting with material and cognitive structures and these are recognized as mutually constitutive, since agency affects structure and vice versa (Björkdahl 2000: 28, Adler 1997: 325). It therefore follows that the properties of both agent and structure are of interest when conducting a social constructivist analysis of social reality. In the present case this implies that the normative context in which ideas exist and arise is as relevant as the norm entrepreneur *per se*. Actors and structures are ontologically dependent upon each other, but are given equal ontological status, since they are equally important to explain the reality.

Neo-liberals argue that ideas matter by affecting the choices states make. However, according to their methodological individualism, ideas reside at the individual and interests are exogenous to interaction (Adler 1997: 330). Consequently an individualist methodology of this kind cannot account of the constitution of actors’ interests and identities by intersubjectively held ideas and knowledge. According to social constructivism, a neo-liberal approach cannot observe the intersubjective structures that motivate state action and that is at the core of understanding social reality. Ideas do not merely order the world or constrain behaviour; they help to constitute social reality (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 12). The more constitutive ontology and structuralist methodology employed within postmodernist research also give ontological status to ideational elements by seeing social reality as a constitutive effect of discourses (Adler 1997: 332). This constructivist approach makes use of some of the constitutive thinking by recognizing that social reality is partly constituted by discourses and systems of knowledge that can be studied through human language. However, social reality cannot be explained only by interpreting discourses; social reality is about how the material world and the ‘ideational world’ interact and produce outcomes. By using intersubjectivity as an object of analysis a social constructivist approach can account of how material and ideational structures relate and still thoroughly study the construction of intersubjective meaning and the underlying ideas and knowledge underpinning a specific constellation of intersubjective meaning. In sum, a social constructivist account ‘sees more’ of social reality than both a neo-liberal and constitutive approach.

Furthermore, social constructivism recognizes power as an important factor in the construction of reality. Power has many guises but could be the ability to impose one’s view on others by defining the qualitative content of the shared meaning given to a phenomenon. To be able to define what is appropriate behaviour and moreover what constitutes knowledge is a very subtle and probably effective form of power (Adler 1997: 336). A social
constructivist account gives ontological status to intersubjectivity and makes it possible to investigate the social construction of meaning and how power relates to this process. Consequently an ontological and epistemological stance of this kind facilitates an inquiry of conditions that make one particular intersubjective conception of reality prevail over others (Adler 1997: 337). A middle ground social constructivist approach makes it possible to make an in-depth study of the processes of norm diffusion which makes it attractive for a single-case study of this kind.

**1.3.1 Analytical Framework and Outline of the Study**

In order to operationalize this approach an analytical framework that will mainly draw on constructivist literature on norm evolution will be developed and applied to the empirical case. This framework will firstly focus on the role of normative contexts and existing norm complexes when norms are introduced and diffused. Hence, this part of the analysis will primarily deal with the cognitive intersubjective structure. Empirically, this section will try to trace norms that existed when the governance agenda was introduced and moreover shed some light on how these pre-existing ideas related to this new policy idea. The second part of the framework will concentrate on the norm entrepreneur. This part will look into how norm entrepreneurs operate and how they strategically can promote new ideas. Power will consequently be an issue of concern in this section and the power of international organisations will be discussed. Empirically, this section will concentrate on the capacity of the World Bank as a norm entrepreneur in general and in the case at hand. This part will look into how the norm entrepreneur interacts with the normative structure in the present case. In the last concluding part of the study the results of the analysis will be discussed. This part will conclude how the first and the second part of the study relate and try to wrap up the analysis of the empirical case. By applying this analytical framework the principal aim of this study will be met. The framework will inform the structure of the study and furthermore identify the empirical material relevant to this inquiry.

**1.4 Material**

The analytical framework on norm diffusion in this study is predominately based on existing constructivist literature on norm evolution. The first part of the analytical framework draws on the work by Steven Bernstein (2000). Bernstein advances a socio-evolutionary approach to
explain why some ideas get selected over others. His analytical model focuses on the social fitness with existing norms when analysing a process of norm evolution. This study makes use of much of his structural approach to normative structures and social fitness to analyse the role of prevailing ideational structures in a process of norm diffusion.

The second part of the analytical framework focusing on the norm entrepreneur is partly based on the analytical model on norm evolution presented by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). Their model concentrates on the interaction between the norm entrepreneur and the presumptive norm followers. Compared to Bernstein, Finnemore and Sikkink’s focus is foremost on the agent and their approach does not in a comprehensive way consider the role of structure when explaining norm evolution. They contribute to this study primarily by conceptualising the process of norm framing as a strategic activity undertaken by the norm entrepreneur. Their approach invites to a discussion about the logic of action at work in order to understand the promotion of norms by a norm entrepreneur. Both the first and the second part of the analytical framework draw on the work of Annika Björkdahl (2002). She presents an analytical model on norm evolution that gives equal weight to structure and agency. It thereby fits somewhere in between, on the one hand Steven Bernstein’s structural approach, and on the other Finnemore and Sikkink’s focus on agency. In this respect the analytical approach of the present study resembles the most with Björkdahl’s approach.

The material used to analyse the empirical case are mainly secondary sources on the World Bank and ‘good governance’. I have used an anthology by Gilbert and Vines (eds. 2000) as my main source to get an overview of the World Bank and to look into specific issues such as the autonomy of the Bank and its different fields of activities. To explore the governance agenda of the Bank I have mainly made use of the writing of Michelle Miller-Adams (1999). Various articles have also been used in order to further explore the empirical case. In order to delve deeper into the development agenda and how it has evolved since the 1980s I have used literature from the discipline of Development Studies. The access to relevant material has been satisfactory, but the use of secondary sources has its downsides worth considering. It would have been more interesting to have had access to first hand accounts such as internal briefs and interviews. This kind of material would have given the study further depth and credibility.
2 Norms and Normative Structures

2.1 Norms

In constructivist literature norms are given different connotations and functions. Firstly, norms define appropriate behaviour and thereby create shared expectations of behaviour (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). Consequently norms have both a regulatory and prescriptive function, and since they assign rights and responsibilities they have a deontological dimension. Fundamentally a norm is a shared intersubjective understanding of standards of behaviour that can only arise in a social community (Björkdahl 2002: 40). Moreover, norms consist of intersubjective meaning and thereby have a constitutive quality, since intersubjective meaning defines the world and motivates behaviour (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). Norms become internalized in the interaction between structure and agency and thereby become a part of the identity and interest of an actor. Settled norms are intersubjective meaning that fits into systems of knowledge. Structures of intersubjective meaning are what give value to social reality and thereby define what is regarded as legitimate, morally good and bad, etcetera.

Friedrich V. Kratochwil (1989) has constructed a typology of norms based on the degree of commitment they entail and the way they are expressed. From these indicators he draws a fourfold table that distinguishes between unspoken rules (tacit expression and tacit commitment), unilateral declaration (explicit expression, tacit commitment), customs (tacit expressions, explicit commitment) and treaties (explicit expression, explicit commitment) (Kratochwil 1989: 55). Kratochwil’s typology shows that norms can not only be derived from binding treaties and explicit rules. Consequently, speech and practice are equally good sources when tracing a norm. The range of statements that invoke a norm can constitute an indicator of the frequency or density of the norm at an intersubjective level (Bernstein 2000: 468). Furthermore, the extent to which actions violating a norm require justification can also be a way to identify the existence of a norm (Frost 1996: 106). Thus, a norm does not have to be internalized by all actors to exist. Moreover, norms do not need to thoroughly prescribe what is appropriate behaviour and can thereby simply convey notions of what ought to be.

Since this study does not foremost deal with the actual behavioural influence of norms, it will concentrate on norms as a constitutive element of intersubjective meaning. Norms will be
used to analyse the intersubjective understanding of reality that is constituted by existing and emerging norms. Hence, to trace and analyse norms can be seen as a way to operationalize a study of intersubjective meaning. In the following section the relationship between collectives of norms and individual emerging norms will be discussed.

2.2 Normative Structure

Norms emerge in a pre-existing normative structure of intersubjective understanding. This structure is hierarchically ordered since there are norms that are more dominant than others in a specific context (Björkdahl 2002: 51). The norm of state sovereignty is for example more fundamental in international politics than the norm of abolishing personal landmines. Furthermore, norms are interdependent (Väyrynen 1999: 31). When studying a single norm, the norms that relate to this specific norm are also of interest. A new norm arises in an exiting framework of appropriateness and it is shaped by interacting with exiting norms, and is thereby influenced by the prevailing normative structure (Björkdahl 2002: 52). Settled norms and hierarchically more fundamental norms condition the emergence of new norms. The key to the selection process of norms is the social fitness with already settled norms that constitute the normative structure (Bernstein 2000: 483). Norms that fit with existing norms are more easily accepted. Consequently norms that are compatible with the existing normative structure or have a mutually reinforcing relationship to the prevailing normative structure are more easily acknowledged and adopted. Within the normative structure there are norm complexes that govern practices in a particular issue area (Bernstein 2000: 468). A norm complex defines a collective purpose and does not need to be stated explicitly. By analysing a single norm one can infer the norm complex it belongs to by revealing the underlying pattern of values and goals the norm expresses (ibid). For example, the norm of ‘most favoured nation’ within the WTO belongs to the norm complex that regulates international trade. It is based on the norms of non-discrimination and reciprocity and moreover liberal patterns of value and the fundamental norm of state sovereignty within the international system.

Whether a norm is seen as compatible with the existing normative structure is not a unilateral process. The social fitness of norms that gain acceptance is created in the interaction between the new norm and the prevailing normative structure (Björkdahl 2002: 52). The fitness does not just occur, it can be strategically constructed or framed by the norm entrepreneur and consequently the norm entrepreneur per se is of interest when new norms arise. A more
elaborate discussion on how norm entrepreneurs frame norms will be provided in the second part on norm entrepreneurs. The pedigree of an emerging norm can influence the social fitness of a norm (Väyrynen 1999: 31). If the content of the emerging norm can be linked to existing settled norms or, if the norm has been articulated earlier or over an extended period of time the likelihood of it gaining acceptance may increase. When analysing a specific emerging norm the normative fit with the potential norm followers and the normative fit with key actors within the international system are also parameters that need to be taken into consideration (Björkdahl 2002: 52, Bernstein 2000: 482). In the following sections the study will look into the norm of ‘good governance’ and the normative structures of relevance to the diffusion of this norm.

2.3 The Norm of ‘Good Governance’

The governance concept introduced by the World Bank in 1989 referred to ‘the exercise of power to manage a nation’s affairs’ (Lancaster 1993: 9). This definition was later refined and in an official statement of the Bank in 1992 governance was defined as ‘the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development’ (ibid). The concept revolves around public sector management and authority structures within a state. Governance connects the sphere of politics and the sphere of administration. Moreover, it does not prejudge the locus for decision making and power, since governance can not only be exercised by a government, but also by NGOs within civil society or by an international organisation (Hydén 1992: 6). The Bank has declared that their usage of the concept excludes normative judgments and does not specify the type of regime, the substance of rule or the design of institutions of the state (Miller-Adams 1999: 102-103). Nevertheless, by calling for better governance in Africa as a means to development the Bank declared what the opposite of ‘good governance’ was. Extensive personalization of power, corruption and unaccountable governments were referred to as examples of ‘poor governance’ (Hydén 1992: 5). Even if the Bank in official statements maintained its apolitical approach to governance, it is hard not to see the political implications of the policy. To implicitly urge for accountability, transparency, rule of law, political participation and legitimate rule, implies that ‘good governance’ calls for democracy and civil rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of the press, free elections, and etcetera. It is hard to imagine that the Bank did not recognize these kinds of civil rights and state obligations as conditional upon achieving ‘good governance’. Speeches by Bank representatives give a hint of their implicit political position.
Barber Cohen, the former president of the World Bank, emphasised his non-political stance on governance during a meeting with African Governors in 1990. In the same speech he advocated increased transparency, accountability, respect for human rights and adherence to the rule of law, since he saw them as instrumental in the development process (Lancaster 1993: 10).

The political nature of the norm of ‘good governance’ becomes more explicit when considering how the governance agenda was received and interpreted by other actors in international politics. In 1992 the British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd defined ‘good governance’ as pluralism, respect for the rule of law, human rights, and the ‘market principles’ (Williams and Young 1994: 85). In the same year François Mitterrand of France stated that he conceived the core of the concept as liberty and democracy (ibid). The German Minister of Economic Cooperation in the same way considered popular participation in the political process, responsible governments and respect for human rights as the essence of ‘good governance’. Regardless of the World Bank’s attempt to promote the idea of ‘good governance’ as a technical parameter in the economic and social development of a country, major actors in the donor community that embraced this concept conceived it as more normatively loaded. With the benefit of hindsight it is possible to conclude that the more explicitly political conception of ‘good governance’ has prevailed, since even the World Bank has included such elements as ‘voice and accountability’ in their governance research programme (The World Bank 2006a). Following the theoretical stance of this study, the normative structure in which the concept of ‘good governance’ emerged can provide one explanation of the ‘normative design’ of ‘good governance’ as a norm and moreover clarify how prevailing normative structures facilitated or hampered the recognition and diffusion of this norm. Before delving into the normative structure and the norm complexes at work in this case, the study will look into the normative characteristics of ‘good governance’ as an international norm.

2.3.1 A Market Oriented Liberal Norm

Since this study deals with the emergence of the norm of ‘good governance’, the characteristics of the norm during its initial formative and diffusive period is of greatest concern for the analysis. Scholars have argued that ‘good governance’ implicitly called for liberalization and democratisation based on a liberal set of values (Lancaster 1993, Hydén
Hence, it is not too controversial to categorize the norm of ‘good governance’ as market oriented and liberal. By scrutinizing the principles of public sector management and authority that the norm contains it is possible to infer the liberal values underpinning the norm of ‘good governance’.

The ‘good governance’ norm prescribes transparency, participation, accountability and efficient public spending in the administrative and political functioning of the state. In sum the form of public sector management and authority structures advanced by the norm resemble the legal system and bureaucracy of the modern state of the industrialized world (William and Young 1994: 87). The political, economic and societal conditions attributed to ‘good governance’ create a more predictable economic environment which encourages investment and entrepreneurship leading to economic development. The individual and the civil society constitute means to this development. By empowering civil society through improved human rights, individuals and NGOs will be given voice which will increase the pressure on the government to pursue further ‘good governance’ reforms. The process is circular in a way; political participation brings about better civil rights which encourages more participation and greater public demand for ‘good governance’ which strengthens both the political environment of the individual and the economic environment of business entrepreneurs. The reasoning is grounded on a rational conception of the individual from the neoclassical economic theory. The individual acts rationally and the rationality of the individual becomes institutionalised in political institutions like the state and its legal framework (Smith 1992: 201). The rational institutions of the market economy such as property rights and contractual rights will guide the rational individual, who thereby will not be influenced by kinship or give in to nepotism (William and Young 1994: 97). Applying ‘good governance’ as conditional upon international aid can from this point of view be seen as an attempt to set free the hampered rationality in developing countries. ‘Good governance’ as a norm prescribes policy intervention in states where poor governance prevails. It moreover conveys an ideologically informed normative view on the organisation of the state. The norm is market oriented since private sector growth is at the heart of the concept, and it is also compatible with liberal values of the freedom of the individual. The study will now explore the normative structures and norm complexes that relate to the norm of ‘good governance’.
2.4 Normative Structures and Norm Complexes

The ‘good governance’ norm relates to various norms and norm complexes in international politics. Norms like economic sovereignty, democracy and modernization together with norm complexes regulating international aid and trade are just a few that touch upon the norm of ‘good governance’. The liberal values of ‘good governance’ make it part of larger liberal norm complexes of international trade and the liberal economic order set up after World War II. To more thoroughly assess the social fitness of ‘good governance’ the study will in more detail analyse the aid and development regime and its normative content and try to see how it relates to ‘good governance’. An analysis of this norm complex is attractive primarily since the norm of ‘good governance’ arose within the donor community and therefore the intersubjective meaning ‘existing within’ the aid and development regime constitute relevant ideational structures to analyse in order to assess the social fitness of the norm of ‘good governance’. By analysing this norm complex before and during the emergence of ‘good governance’ it will be possible to illustrate the broader normative trends affecting the formation and diffusion of the norm. Consequently, special attention will be given to how norms within the aid and development regime relate to the norm of ‘good governance; whether a norm has a conflicting, compatible or reinforcing relationship to the norm of ‘good governance’ (Björkdahl 2002: 56). Before delving into the aid and development regime, a brief discussion on the ‘deep’ norms within the international system will be provided in order to able to situate the norm of ‘good governance’ in relation to the fundamental norms in the international system.

2.4.1 Fundamental Norms of the International System

To give a straight forward answer to the question of which norms that constitute the normative foundation of the international system is problematic. Scholars have provided different answers to this empirical question. Hedley Bull’s elaborative work on different notions of order touches upon this question. He claims that the preservation of the international system, the maintenance of the external sovereignty of individual states and the maintenance of peace among member states constitute foundational principles of the international order (Frost 1996: 115). Consequently, less fundamental norms such as the norm of state monopoly of violence are derived from these deep normative values. Christian Reus-Smit delivers a slightly different view. He claims that three constitutional normative structures underpin the international system: (1) a moral belief in the state, (2) sovereignty as the
organizing principle within the system, (3) a normative belief in procedural justice (Reus-Smit 1997: 567). According to Reus-Smit the current international system rests on the foundational institutions of multilateralism and contractual international law (Reus-Smit 1997: 558). These institutions are derived from the constitutional normative structures and define how cooperation should be organized. All norms within the international system are to some extent compatible with the constitutional normative structures and the foundational institutions. Consequently, a social fitness between these normative values is a precondition for a norm to become settled. Steven Bernstein also regards the norm of who counts as a constitutive unit within the international system as the most fundamental norm (Bernstein 2000: 483). From sovereignty as the organizing principle of the international system, Bernstein derives less fundamental norms such as sovereign equality, property rights of states, rules of non-intervention and non-aggression (ibid). The present study deals with the period of the fall of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War communist states wanted to abolish the system of sovereign states as it was seen as an instrument of oppression of the capitalist class (Frost 1996: 104). Even though this can be seen as merely ideologically informed rhetoric, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent scramble for statehood by former Soviet republics created a broader consensus on the fundamental norms identified above.

2.4.2 The Aid and Development Regime

In 1949 President Truman coined the notion of an undeveloped world and furthermore considered greater production through application of modern scientific and technical knowledge as means to development (Potter et al. 2004: 6). Since the days of Truman the aid and development regime has revolved around the tension between on the one hand economic growth and modernisation and on the other hand equitable distribution of resources and development. There is an inherent tension within liberalism and the present liberal international economic system. Liberal economies do not necessarily produce equal distribution of wealth, which potentially can undermine equality and liberal values of human rights (Barnett and Finnemore 2005: 168). Ideologically informed development strategies have offered different solutions to reconcile economic growth and equality, and international aid has by some been seen as a means to compensate for the negative effects of a competitive economic system. Within the multilateral liberal economic system set up after the Second World War reciprocity is a fundamental principle which implies that the interest of each state to some extent shall be met and consequently, all participants shall ‘get a piece of the pie’.
Multilateralism as an organizing principle of cooperation can be seen as based on a kind of diffuse reciprocity, where the benefits of cooperating are expected to be distributed roughly equivalent over time (Ruggie 1998: 110). This reciprocity can be seen as an element of fairness that to some extent tries to reconcile economic growth and distributive justice within the present international economic system (Kapstein 2005: 97). Liberal development theorists see reciprocity as a source of legitimacy to the present system while more leftist theories advocate more economic intervention to achieve distributive justice. How to define and achieve a balance between economic growth and distributive justice can be seen as the most controversial component of development.

2.4.2.1 The Aid and Development Regime 1980-90

In the early 1980s an overall decline in international aid flows occurred. Aid from government to government decreased and the only type of aid that increased was aid to the private sector and NGOs (Gibbon 1993: 37). The World Bank’s role as a lender increased and so called non-project aid was introduced. This was the first form of conditionality lending employed by the Bank and it was used to promote economic policy changes in the recipient country. Conditionality was officially motivated by a need of macro economic reform. However this kind of policy was an integral part of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which according to its constitution should employ conditionality to influence exchange rates and trade barriers in the recipient countries (Gibbon 1993: 38). The lender conditionality of the IMF was adopted by the World Bank and the two institutions commenced to coordinate their lending conditions. This meant that recipients of loans could only gain access to significant level of assistance if they could show that they had implemented the policy changes recommended by the Bank and the IMF. Aid coordination and cross-conditionality between the IMF and the Bank resulted in the incorporation of the stabilisation programmes of the IMF into the lending policies of the Bank. This change in donor-recipient relations marked a general shift within the donor community and set the standard for how international aid was to be carried out for a decade. The change occurred gradually in the period of 1980-85. Aid coordination and cross-conditionality was adopted by donor governments that started to coordinate their aid with the policies of the Bank. Conditionality was institutionalized into the aid bureaucracy and states like France, Germany and the UK started to review the policy progress of the recipient countries. The governments that chose to implement conditionality had no independent source of information to assess the policy progress and the economic performance of the recipient
countries. Therefore the World Banks’ country reports and their policy recommendations had a great influence on the donors’ policies. According to Peter Gibbon the aid regime that emerged from this development was by the mid 80s a regime that subordinated the bilaterals and consequently increased the influence of the IMF and the World Bank (1993: 39). Conditionality as a means to intervene in the economic autonomy of the recipient country became widely regarded as a legitimate within the donor community and can thereby be seen as a norm that prescribed how aid should be structured and carried out.

In 1985 the IMF and the World Bank introduced a more sectoral policy reform program based on conditionality, which was formulated by James Baker, US Secretary of the Treasury in the Reagan administration. A sectoral approach was more precise than the former macroeconomic approach and this form of conditionality became known as structural adjustment programmes (SAP). The willingness of the donor community to make funds available to the Bank increased and private creditors were brought into the cross-conditionality lending programmes (Gibbon 1993: 40). The SAP thereby strengthened the World Bank’s position as a lead institution within international aid. Structural adjustment was intended to create more suitable exchange and trade rates policies, efficiency in the use of public sector resources and better agricultural prices. The overall objective was to create an enabling environment for private sector led growth (Gibbon 1993: 40). It implied that the state was urged to provide infrastructure, a legal framework and basic social services to create a supportive context for private led economic development. This new orthodoxy within development and international aid of the 80s was later named ‘The Washington Consensus’ and rested on two major principles of neo-liberal economics: macro economic stability and structural reforms in the name of increased economic efficiency (De Vylder 2002: 35). Neo-liberalism was gaining credibility from the successful export oriented development strategies in East Asia, which at the time were interpreted as a ‘roll back of the state’ in favour of a neo-liberal development strategy (Kukreja 2005: 340). At the same time the import substitution strategy (ISI) based on the leftist dependency school was starting to render unsuccessful in Latin America. The empirical evidence of the fallacy of dirigisme gave legitimacy to increased neo-liberal intervention in the recipient country’s economic and political structures. The supposed neo-liberal consensus was frequently challenged. New social movements like the green movement and new aid movements like Live Aid challenged the neo-liberal orthodoxy and called attention to third world poverty and advocated less economics and more social welfare on the
development agenda (Gibbon 1993: 44). These grass root movements of NGOs gained influence and came to call for the abolishing of the SAPs in the late 80s.

International aid and development during the 80s was overshadowed in many respects by the security concerns of the Cold War. By the US and the Soviet Union aid or other kinds of economic or military assistance were used as instruments of changing or maintaining political alignment of recipient states in the Third World. Dictatorial states were regarded as easier to conclude alliances and aid relations with, and authoritarianism and the internal economic or political situation in the country was generally not a big concern (Doornbos 2001: 97). The demise of the Soviet Union put an end to this kind of aid based on security concerns. To support regimes with dubious records of governance was no longer a priority of the only super power left. The end of the Cold War also led to an increased belief in the neo-liberal ideology that became strikingly evident in Francis Fukuyama’s essay ‘The End of History?’ from 1989. China had started to slowly liberalize its economy in the late 70s and the newly independent states in Eastern Europe became emerging liberal markets. However, in the late 80s the SAPs started to be rendered inefficient even by the World Bank and the critique of the programmes from NGOs intensified.

2.5 The Social Fitness of ‘Good Governance’

‘Good governance’ implicitly advocated democratic institutions within the state and human rights. Democracy and human rights were not widely recognized within the donor community at the time of the introduction of ‘good governance’. However, in parallel to the introduction of the governance agenda by the Bank, humanitarian concerns were given more importance and were incorporated into the conditionality approach to aid by actors such as USAID and the EC Council of Ministers (Kukreja 2005: 347). The new conditionality that included human rights concerns was widely embraced in the 1990s. The European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was founded in 1990 with the authorization to only grant loans to democracies. Moreover, key donor countries such as Britain, France and Germany quickly embraced the new conditionality (Miller-Adams 1999: 101). The ‘good governance’ norm can be seen as a part of a larger normative trend where liberal values of human rights and democracy were becoming more widely incorporated into aid policies of various states and organisation. The demise of the Cold War led to a search for a new rational on which to base international aid. Furthermore, following the argument of Raimo Väyrynen
(1999) and Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998), the end of the Cold War was a
world historic event that invoked a need to question prevailing norms and to search for new
ones (Väyrynen 1999: 35, Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 901). Since ideas associated with the
losing side of a war often are discredited, liberal ideas gained credibility

The social fitness of ‘good governance’ with the fundamental norms of the international
system can be regarded as comprehensive. ‘Good governance’ was to some extent constructed
from the constitutional structures presented by Reus-Smit (1997). The norm of ‘good
governance’ was based on an ambition to increase state capacity in order to create an enabling
environment for development. The norm thereby reflected a moral belief in the state as the
organisational unit within the international system. According to some NGOs conditionality
threatened the sovereignty of national economies since the economic policies were being
dictated by an outside organization (De Vylder 2002: 38). Conditionality was seen as
conflicting with norms of sovereign equality and rules of non-intervention. However, ‘good
governance’ and the conditionality it included did not conflict with the norm of sovereignty as
the organizing principle within the system. The conditionality of ‘good governance’ only
created constrains to the economic autonomy of the recipient state. Furthermore,
conditionality was not a direct form of intervention since it to some extent was based on
consent expressed by the recipient country. In sum ‘good governance’ reflected a status quo
by being compatible with fundamental norms in the international system. This compatibility
increased the social fitness of ‘good governance’.

The normative content of the aid and development regime that encountered the idea of ‘good
governance’ was a strong belief in conditionality as a means to influence the economic and
political structures of the recipient country; an advocacy for modernization and a strong belief
in the liberal economy and private sector growth. ‘Good governance’ had a pedigree in many
of the prevailing norms existing prior to its introduction. Conditionality was an
institutionalized aid practice applied both in bilateral and multilateral aid. However,
conditionality was widely criticized by transnational activist groups within civil society since
the conditionality of the SAP was seen as a great failure that had caused more harm than
good. The macroeconomic results of the SAPs were adverse including decreased exports,
increased unemployment and high inflation. The SAPs also led to general cuts in education,
public health, and social safety nets. Even if conditionality was widely employed within the
donor community when the governance agenda was introduced, the practice was controversial
and its legitimacy was being questioned. To some extent, ‘good governance’ was a result of the critique of the SAPs. It was not only about macroeconomic stability and deregulation; ‘good governance’ brought back the state into the aid policies and focused less on the market and private sector growth. In a way ‘good governance’ became a means to regain the legitimacy of conditionality by showing political will to address the failure of the SAP (see Lancaster 1993). Even if ‘good governance’ was a step away from the neo-liberal orthodoxy of the SAP, it reflected and was compatible with the liberal economic order and liberal values in general. The liberal characteristics of the norm did not occur out of whim; the deeper norm complexes of international trade and the international liberal economic system conditioned the normative content of ‘good governance’. At the same time the end of the Cold War created a normative transformation further in favour of liberal values associated with the winning side of the war, which influenced the content of the norm.

Furthermore, the liberal values of the governance agenda made it compatible with key actors within the donor community. The neo-liberal politics of Thatcher and Reagan are probably most significant in this context. Additionally, market oriented and liberal governments within the donor community created a general normative fit between the idea of ‘good governance’ and the potential norm followers. Many developing countries also started to move away from the goals of the NIEO (New International Economic Order) which was launched during the 1970s to replace the Bretton Woods system and to revise the international economic system in favour of the developing world (Bernstein 2000: 497). All in all, a social fitness with key actors and potential norm followers within the donor community facilitated the diffusion of ‘good governance’. Of importance to the social fitness of ‘good governance’ is also what it did not include or issues it avoided to take a stance on. ‘Good governance’ did not explicitly consider the tension between economic growth and equality. By apolitical framing and silence on issues concerning equitable distribution of resources, the ‘good governance’ norm craftily avoided the traditionally controversial ground on how fairness and equality relate to development and how it shall be achieved. By avoiding the tension between economic growth and equality the ‘good governance’ norm could be more easily accepted by both leftist NGOs and right wing politicians within the donor community. The social fitness with the existing normative structure can be regarded as a facilitator to the diffusion of the ‘good governance’ norm. However, social fitness alone cannot explain a process of norm diffusion. This process requires an analysis of both structure and agency and how they interact. The analysis will now focus on the World Bank as a norm entrepreneur in the process of norm diffusion.
3 Norm Entrepreneurship

3.1 The Norm Entrepreneur

The first stage of norm diffusion is the construction of a norm candidate by a norm entrepreneur. Following the constructivist approach to norm evolution, the norm entrepreneur launches an idea that it believes reflects desirable behaviour and appropriateness within its community (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 896). Social fitness between the new norm and the normative structure is believed to be the key to norm diffusion. Consequently, the norm entrepreneur has to convince the potential norm followers that the norm candidate it is advancing to some extent is compatible with existing normative structures. On a higher level of abstraction norm construction should be understood as a contestation of what constitutes standard of appropriateness; a contestation of what constitutes intersubjective understanding of the reality (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 989).

Persuasion is understood to be the mechanism at work when a norm entrepreneur is trying to convince a critical mass of potential norm followers to adopt the norm it is promoting (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 895). It is achieved by a process of framing, where the norm entrepreneur is calling attention to an issue by interpreting it, defines appropriate action in order to address the issue and assigns responsibility for carrying out actions to address the problem (Björkdahl 2002: 86). Framing is consequently about attributing meaning to social reality and thereby placing a norm candidate in a context that will favour specific interpretations and hence, promote certain ideas. For example, framing could be to link a norm candidate to an issue of great concern on the international agenda. In general, framing is about making use of commonly held values or familiar ideas in order to favour and draw attention to the norm candidate (Björkdahl 2002: 61). Framing capabilities can thereby be seen as based on soft power resources which are relatively autonomous to material power resources. The organisational platform of the norm entrepreneur can be seen as a soft power resource. For example, expertise, access to information and important audiences such as the media and decision makers are vital power resources, since norm diffusion occurs in a communicative environment (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 900). In sum following the conventional social constructivist analytical model of norm diffusion, persuasive communication is the key to the initial phase of norm diffusion. In the following sections I
will try to develop and expand the social constructivist understanding of the mechanisms that are at work in a process of norm diffusion.

### 3.2 Logic of Action

The theoretical discussion on social fitness and persuasiveness as key mechanisms in norm conformity has implicitly been based on a *logic of appropriateness*, where actors conform to norms because they reflect intersubjective notions of appropriateness in accordance to their identity and interests (see March and Olsen 1998). According to this logic the pursuit of purpose is associated more with identity than interests (March and Olsen 1998: 951). Hence, appropriateness is associated with a particular conception of self and the situation you are in. Applying a logic of appropriateness in a deterministic manner will probably not do the empirical analysis of norm diffusion justice. Moreover, a social constructivist account does not only recognize a logic of appropriateness. A logic of expected consequences (rational self-interest) does not require a materialist ontology and is therefore also relevant in a study where ideational structures are seen as central in explaining social reality.

There are many different reasons for states to conform to a norm, and persuasiveness is only one reason in this context. Moreover, state practice alone is a fallible way of assessing the persuasiveness of a norm, since it is problematic to empirically validate that persuasiveness was the mechanism at work that made a state adopt the norm (Payne 2001: 41). Insight from neo-realism highlights this problem. How do we know that norms reflecting the interest of the most powerful states are not followed merely because they reflect the interest of the powerful? Seeing persuasiveness as the only mechanism at work when norms are adopted seems to be a monocular explanation that does not make use of the full potential of a social constructivist approach. More fine tuned theoretical tools are necessary to explain the process of norm diffusion in a more comprehensive way. Following this argument, the present study recognizes that norms are conformed to not only because they are regarded as *legitimate and appropriate*, but also because they *serve the self-interests of actors* or that adherence to one norm is *instrumental* to achieving other goals of the actor. The main point is that the logic of action is applied to a social constructed context of intersubjective meaning (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 912). Actors may conform to a norm because it makes them get what they want, no matter if it is materials gains or prestige, but what they want is still defined by intersubjective meaning. Decisions are always informed by perception and in order to
understand what we perceive we need to apply meaning to it by applying intersubjectively held ideas. The basic logic of action will always be informed by the socially constructed intersubjective meaning. Hence, both rationality and appropriateness can be seen as socially constructed since both logics get their meaning from intersubjectively held ideas. All actions are carried out in a context where intersubjective meaning define what is appropriate and rational.

Following this reasoning, a logic of consequences can also be applied to explain the actions by the norm entrepreneur when framing a norm candidate. Framing is a strategic activity that requires means-ends calculations in order to maximise the utility of the framing (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 910). Moreover, since norm construction is about the contestation of what constitutes intersubjective meaning, framing can be a way to strategically construct intersubjective meaning based on self-interested motives. In order to more elaborately account of how norm entrepreneurs diffuse an emerging norm it is necessary to look into the power resources relevant to the construction of intersubjective meaning. Power is the dimension that will make it possible to, in a more nuanced way, account for the mechanisms at work when norms are diffused and conformed to.

### 3.3 A Taxonomy of Power

In International Relations the conventional conception of power used within realism is to see power as the ability of one state to use its material resources in order to get another state to do what it otherwise would not have done. A more comprehensive conception of power is delivered by Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall. According to them power is ‘the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their own circumstances and fate’ (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 3). What they are saying is that social relations have an authoritative dimension and that power can be mediated through social relations. Consequently, power can either be an attribute of a particular actor that is exercised through social relations, or it can exist in a social process like social relations. Put simply, power can be overt coercion based on military superiority possessed by an actor. This kind of power is an attribute of an actor that works through social relations. Furthermore, power can also be socialized coercion based on intersubjectively held ideas that prescribe that some actors are better and more privileged than others. This kind of power is not exercised by a particular actor. Instead it is based on intersubjective meaning that
constitutes actors identities in interaction. Consequently, intersubjective meaning should not be conceived as value-neutral; it may reflect a certain normative order and thereof has an authoritative dimension. The first type of power is conceptualized as power that works through interactions and the latter type is conceptualized as power that works through social constitution (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 9). Both types of power interrelate and coexist. Power through interaction can impose and shape an actors subjectivities and self-understanding and conversely, power through constitution can shape the power resources an actors possesses.

These two types of power can be direct or diffuse (ibid). Consequently, it does not have to be an observable connection between the actor exercising power and the outcome of that action. Power can by socially, spatially and temporally diffuse. By using these four categories (power through interaction, power through constitution, direct power and diffuse power) Barnett and Duvall present a fourfold taxonomy of power (see Table 1). Compulsory power conceptualizes power through interaction that in a direct way makes actor A control actor B or influence the circumstances of actor B (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 13). Institutional power is indirect power through interaction. This could be agenda setting power possessed by state A which constrains state B in an indirect or diffuse way. Structural power is power through constitution that works in a direct traceable way. The capitalism system generates structural power by constituting, in a direct way, the interest of states to achieve economic progress and growth. Productive power is indirect or diffuse power through constitution that emanates form intersubjective systems of knowledge that set the boundaries for the thinkable and doable which thereby define social reality (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 21).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1 - Types of power</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Relational specificity</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Power works through</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Interactions of specific actors</td>
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<td>Social relations of constitution</td>
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(Barnett and Duvall 2005: 12)
3.3.1 Power and Norm Diffusion

Since this study recognizes action as motivated by both appropriateness and rationality that is defined by intersubjective meaning, intersubjectively held ideas are the basic motivational force of action. To be able to on an intersubjective level define what is appropriate or rational can be seen as the most fundamental source of power to influence state behaviour. Following the taxonomy presented above productive power is at the core of the production of intersubjective meaning. This form of power makes an actor able to influence notions of appropriateness and rationality, which consequently will increase the actor’s capacity of framing a norm candidate as compatible with existing normative structures. It is important to emphasise that productive power is not exercised by an actor, since it exists within social relations (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 13). Hence, the productive power at work when a norm candidate diffuses and becomes settled does not have to emanate from the norm entrepreneur. However, this case study will first and foremost look into the power exercised by the World Bank as a norm entrepreneur. To be able to influence the constitution of a problem that needs to be addressed is a form of productive power central to norm construction. Problems do not just exist as objective facts, they revolve around a normative discrepancy between what is and what ought to be. To socially construct this discrepancy and moreover to craft a solution to the discrepancy is a form of productive power central in a process of norm construction.

Institutional power is also relevant in a process of norm diffusion. Framing can be facilitated by an actor that can influence what shall be discussed and what shall not be discussed. Agenda setting power makes it possible to direct the attention towards an issue and towards a specific problem and at the same time direct the attention away from other issues. Classificatory practices that organize and classify information and moreover define the options to resolve a problem is a form of institutional power that can be at work in a process of norm diffusion (Barnett and Finnemore 2005: 178). Structural power also needs to be considered when norms are diffused. For example, the structural power of the capitalist system constitutes state interest in a certain way that will need to be taken into consideration when new norms are promoted. This structural power may limit the likelihood of the diffusion of norms that are not compatible with the capitalist system. Compulsory power can also be at work when norms are conformed to. Norm entrepreneurs sometimes possess material resources such as trade sanctions or military means that can be used together with other forms of power. An actor can impose sanctions on a country and define it as a malfunctioning state.
This practice makes use of compulsory power and links it to productive power by attempting to influence the intersubjective notion of this particular state. The different forms of power thereof relate and intertwine.

The taxonomy above makes it possible to in a more explicit way bring power into the process of norm diffusion. Persuasiveness is a term which in a misleading way gives the impression that norm diffusion only revolves around so called soft power and the ability to persuasively communicate messages. Björkdahl describes two different kinds of persuasion: non-coercive persuasion and normatively coercive forms of persuasion like shaming tactics (2002: 101). Her typology touches upon elements of power within a process of persuasion, but does not in an explicit way recognize that power intimately relates to norm diffusion. The diffusion of norms can be achieved by framing and persuasiveness. Consequently soft power resources constitute assets when promoting a norm. Furthermore socialization through persuasiveness can be the mechanism at work when norms are adopted by norm followers. However, this study also recognizes that socialized coercion can be the mechanism behind norm conformity (see Hurrell 2005: 40). A process of socialization may involve coercive elements. The different forms of power discussed above can be at work in a process of socialization when norms are diffused. For example, productive power is coercive but not in a direct way; it often operates over a period of time which makes it difficult to question and not to follow the systems of knowledge and notions of appropriateness it produces. Sovereign states are today seen as natural and it is difficult to challenge the system of knowledge underpinning this notion. Over a period of time we have been coercively socialized or indoctrinated to take the present international system for granted. Productive power and coercive socialization operate in a way that make them hard to discern, since they set the boundaries for what is thinkable and doable. Socialized coercion is to some extent at work in all processes of norm diffusion, since social reality is defined by systems of knowledge that are not value-neutral.

I define the mechanism as coercive since it does not rest on directly expressed consent and as a process of socialization since it constructs the identities and interests of actors. Actors learn the rules, expectations, and knowledge existing in a community through a process of socialization. The rules, expectations and knowledge they internalize in this process are constructed in the interaction between structure and agency. An actor can thereby influence the process of socialization and the shared norms that are internalized. Consequently, socialization is not an involuntarily act; it is a result of the fact that actors socially belong to a
community. However, the social construction of intersubjective meaning involves power. Some actors are more successful in defining the qualitative content of the shared meaning given to a phenomenon. Put simply, the intersubjective rules, expectations, and knowledge existing in a community are not unilaterally defined by the actor who internalises them. There are intersubjective norms like state sovereignty mentioned above that are in a non-consentient way imposed upon some actors that want to belong to a certain community. The coercive elements in socialized coercion are subtle, exercised via systems of intersubjective meaning that may advantage some actors and disadvantage others.

All in all, using the taxonomy presented above makes it possible to arrive at a better understanding of which types of power that are at work in a process of norm diffusion. Since this study deals with an international organisation acting as a norm entrepreneur, the study will now look into the characteristics of this particular kind of norm entrepreneur and the power resources it possesses.

3.3.2 The Power of International Organisations

The power of international organisations in international politics is a topic of heated debate within International Relations (see e.g. Keohane and Martin 1995, Mearsheimer 1994). The rationalist perspectives within IR have treated IOs in a functionalistic and instrumental way that has not recognized the power they exercise (Barnett and Finnemore 2005: 162). In order to understand the power and influence IOs can have in international politics in general and within processes of norm diffusion, the authority that IOs possesses has to be taken into consideration. Authority is socially constructed. An actor can only have authority if other actors recognise her as such and it thereby requires consent (Barnett and Finnemore 2005: 169). Furthermore, granting authority to an actor is to grant the actor the right to speak and to confer the statements of the actor credibility. The opinions expressed by an actor with authority are consequently influential within a community. Actors are likely to alter their behaviour in ways that are consistent with the authority (Barnett and Finnemore 2005: 170). Authority is more than getting an actor to do something they otherwise would not do. Authority comes in earlier in the process; it is about telling an actor what the right thing to do is. Following the taxonomy of power presented earlier, authority contains elements of productive power that can be used to exercise other forms of power as compulsory or institutional power.
It is because actors believe in the legitimacy of an authority that they follow the authority and simultaneously confer it authority. Hence, there is an intimate link between authority and legitimacy. To say that an IO has authority is to say that it enjoys legitimacy. So, in what way are IOs legitimate? In general, legitimacy is a socially constructed notion that reflects intersubjectively held ideas and systems of knowledge in a particular community and at a specific time. According to Barnett and Finnemore (2005) IOs are legitimate because they reflect values that are widely held and regarded as legitimate in international politics. What they are saying is that IOs are legitimate because of the social fitness between the values IOs embody and the normative structures of intersubjective meaning that define our conception of legitimacy and the appropriate. According to Barnett and Finnemore liberal values and rational-legal principles are the most important intersubjectively shared values that are the basis of the legitimacy of IOs. International organisations embody liberal values like modernity and development and rational-legal principles like impersonal authority based on legal rules and procedures (Barnett and Finnemore 2005: 170). IOs have expertise which together with their bureaucratic structure make them appear apolitical and able to represent the interest of the community in an impartial way. This makes states willing to delegate authority to IOs (Barnett and Finnemore 2005: 173). In sum, the liberal goals of IOs and their bureaucratic structure make IOs legitimate, which give them authority. Their authority gives them considerable capacity to define the interest of states and moreover to construct issues that need to be addressed, by modifying the system of knowledge underpinning our understanding of social reality. Accordingly, IOs seem to have great potential to act as norm entrepreneurs within their field of expertise.

3.4 Socialization and Norm Diffusion

This study focuses on norm diffusion by a norm entrepreneur that actively propagates a norm candidate. This process is closely related to socialization, where norm followers accept and internalise the norm candidate and a norm community arises (Björkdahl 2002: 62, 100). Hence, if norm diffusion has occurred, a norm community of norm followers has emerged through a process of socialization or coercive socialization as described in the previous section. Norm evolution progresses from a process of diffusion to a process of socialization when a critical mass of states has adopted a new norm and become norm leaders. In this process some states are more critical than others by having more normative weight to a
specific norm (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 901). Critical states are those that need to adopt
the norm in order to make it prescriptive in practice. For example, states possessing nuclear
weapons are critical to a norm that bans this particular kind of weapons. When a critical mass
has been established the propagation of the norm continues through a process of socialization
lead by the critical mass. This study will not go into details about this phase of norm evolution
and the process of socialization it involves, since its focus is on the initial phase of norm
evolution.

3.5 The World Bank

The World Bank is a multilateral organisation consisting of 184 member states. The purpose
of the Bank is to technically and financially assist member states in their development process
(Article I, IBRD Articles of Agreement, 1989). To carry out this task the Bank has a quite
wide scope of activities. Firstly it is a bank that grants loans and economic assistance to
members. Since the Bank can borrow international capital to the finest terms, it can grant
loans to less creditworthy states on advantageous terms they otherwise could not lend to
(Hopkins et al. 2000: 283). Moreover, the World Bank is a development agency by
monitoring governments in order to promote good development practice. To fulfil this
function the Bank gathers information about the overall economic and political climate in
each recipient country. The Bank is also a development research institution that is
continuously doing research in more than 150 countries to underpin policy recommendations
(Woods 2000: 139). All these three functions of the Bank intertwine and are coordinated;
loans and policy recommendations are based on research etcetera.

The World Bank is a multilateral organisation that shall represent and implement the will of
its member states. The Bank portrays itself as a cooperative where each state is a shareholder
and accordingly, the voting power of each state is determined by its ‘share sub-unit’ (The
World Bank 2006b). The capital subscription of each state is set in proportion to the GNP of
the country and it determines the countries voting strength (George and Sabelli 1994: 14).
Consequently, rich countries like the US, Japan, Germany, France and the UK are the most
influential when it comes to voting power. The US has the greatest influence of all states by
having veto power over all major decisions like constitutional changes requiring more than 85
percent of the votes. However, the US does not have a veto over all decisions, since the
approval of loans and policy implementations only require a majority vote or 70 percent of the

votes. The influence of the US and the richest countries has given rise to criticism that the Bank does not reflect the interest of all members. This criticism relates to norms such as multilateralism and reciprocity in international politics discussed above. The true multilateralism of the institution has been questioned due to the influence of the US and the richest states. Despite criticism the Bank enjoys support from its members. In practice most decisions are taken by consensus, albeit underpinned by an awareness of the relative voting strength among the member states (Woods 2000: 134). Proposals that are not supported by the US are mostly not presented and voted on at all. The historic record of politically influenced lending was a serious challenge to the Bank at the beginning of the 1990s. During the Cold War the Bank supported various US-friendly regimes like the regimes in Nicaragua and Indonesia. The need to establish autonomy over lending decisions and moreover portray itself as a rule based meritocratic organisation emerged with the end of the Cold War. Ngaire Woods (2000) argues that the Bank was and has developed into a relatively autonomous institution compared to other international organisations. The Bank’s financial basis is not completely dependent on capital subscriptions from member states. The institution primarily borrows from capital markets which makes it relatively financially independent (Woods 2000: 137). Moreover, the Bank is the world’s largest research institution in development economics with specialists producing some of the most recognized research in the field. According to Woods the economic experts within the Bank enjoy relative freedom. Bank officers prepare policies for approval by the political representatives and in so doing they preserve their independence from the members (Woods 2000: 140). Their proposals are technical and detailed which makes it hard for a single member state to in a credible way put forward alternative proposals. Therefore, direct political influence over specific policy prescriptions of the Bank is not widespread.

3.5.1 The Authority of the World Bank

The World Bank enjoys great authority in international politics and especially in the field of international aid and development. Following the discussion on the power of international organizations presented earlier, the Bank is fundamentally based on widely recognized liberal values. The development the Bank is advocating and was advocating during the period of the introduction of the governance agenda was liberal and market oriented and not conflicting with the prevailing liberal economic order. The Bank was even set up at the Bretton Woods Conference as a lead institution within the liberal Post-World War II economic order. The
autonomy the Bank enjoys according to Woods (2000) is relevant to the perception of the Bank as an institution based on rational-legal principles. By having access to politically independent revenues and by producing politically independent research (i.e. research not directly influenced by the member states) the Bank strengthens the perception of it as an apolitical and meritocratic institution that represents the interest of the community in an impartial way.

Member states socially construct the authority of the Bank by believing in the legitimacy of the institution. Furthermore, states delegate authority to the Bank to do research and give policy advice within its field of expertise. The social fitness between on the one hand the liberal goals and the bureaucratic structure of the Bank and on the other the prevailing normative structures produces the authority of the Bank. The Bank and the values it embodies correlate to the notions of legitimacy and appropriateness existing on an intersubjective level. The authority of the Bank existing in its social relations to other actors makes its opinions influential and makes it able to influence state behaviour. Since the Bank enjoys legitimacy its statements and policy advice, to some extent, also enjoy legitimacy. By being a constitutive part of the intersubjective understanding of legitimacy, the actions and statements of the Bank are influential on an intersubjective level. Consequently, the Bank is not only capable of telling a state what it ought to do; it is to some extent capable of defining what constitutes the right thing to do. In the case at hand the Bank did not only tell the donor community and developing states what they were supposed to do; they defined what the right thing to do was, namely ‘good governance’. The Bank thereby constructed an issue that needed to be addressed and redefined state interest on an intersubjective level.

3.5.2 The Productive Power of the World Bank

The Bank is through its research a producer of knowledge and the authority it enjoys makes the knowledge it produces influential. In the case at hand the production of knowledge exercised by the Bank is very obvious. Through the introduction of the governance agenda the Bank created a new connotation to governance. Before 1989 this word referred to some kind of management or administration exercised by governors (Doornbos 2001: 93). ‘Good governance’ was about administrating and politically managing the state and civil society in a development context. Furthermore, ‘good governance’ was a construction of a normative misfit between what is and what ought to be. The Bank constructed a problem that needed to
be addressed and that had not existed semantically before. Moreover, the World Bank socially constructed this discrepancy and crafted a solution to the discrepancy. The emergence and diffusion of ‘good governance’ resulted in a modification of the system of knowledge underpinning our understanding of social reality. Using the taxonomy of power, the diffusion of ‘good governance’ involved elements of productive power. The diffusion was to some extent achieved by a modification of intersubjective notions of appropriateness, rationality and moreover legitimate knowledge in general. The diffusion of ‘good governance’ by the World Bank shows how the institution in a successful way turned its subjective ideas into intersubjectively held knowledge.

The productive power of the Bank was not exercised in a direct and intentional way; it existed in the Bank’s social relations to states and other actors and is grounded on its authority. The authority is constituted through social relations and rests on the legitimacy of the Bank which makes its actions and statements influential on an intersubjective level. Since intersubjective meaning constitutes the interest and identities of actors, the productive power of the Bank makes it able to influence the constitution of actors’ interests and identities and consequently, on an intersubjective level, influence other actors to adopt new norms. The authority of the Bank is not only influential on a subtle intersubjective level. Its authority also contributes to the Banks ability to intentionally exercise institutional and compulsory power.

3.5.3 The Institutional Power of the World Bank

The Bank is the leading international development agency and research institution in the world. Moreover the Bank is a forum for state actors to coordinate and cooperate in the field of aid and development. This together with its authority gives the Bank extensive institutional power. The Bank produces country reports where it defines the issues of concern in a country. Moreover, the yearly world development report summarizes the economic, social and environmental state of the world according to the Bank. The institution also invents and constructs action plans and policy guidelines to address different issues. Through its production of research and its authority the Bank enjoys extensive agenda setting power. Its reports have a great influence on what is discussed and what is not discussed within the field of development by highlighting some issues and overlooking other. It can direct the attention to new issues like ‘poor governance’ and simultaneously direct the attention away from other issues like the debt-crisis and the criticism of conditionality in aid that arose after the SAPs. In
an intentional way the Bank can define the options to a problem and create constrains on what is being discussed and the measures that can be undertaken. The authority and productive power of the Bank make its institutional power more influential. Intentionally exercised institutional power is underpinned by productive power which reinforces the impact of the knowledge, policy guidelines and reports the Bank produces. The productive power of the Bank sets the boundaries to the thinkable and doable on a cognitive intersubjective level and the institutional power of the Bank further constrains what actions that are undertaken in practice.

3.5.4 The Compulsory Power of the World Bank

The Bank also possesses and exercises compulsory power. The economic resources of the Bank are the basis of its compulsory power. The loans and the economic assistance the Bank offers are attractive to developing states since the terms are advantageous. By granting loans based on conditionality the Bank is intentionally trying to make the recipient state to undertake reforms it otherwise would not have undertaken. Furthermore, a country who does not comply with the conditions of the Bank can be denied future access to loans. The Bank does not just lend money and produce ideas; it packages ideas and money together (Gilbert et al. 2000: 51). By bundling together lending, development research, and development assistance the Bank reinforces its compulsory and productive power. The diffusion of and acceptance to new policies are facilitated by economic incentives. The ideas of the Bank are not only attractive because the Bank is an authority and lead research institution within development. The economic incentives and economic sanctions of the Bank make the ideas further attractive. By issuing ‘good governance’ policy recommendations to a country and simultaneously offering economic incentives to undertake these policy recommendations the Bank does not only get the recipient state to do want it wants it to do; it gets the recipient country to adopt the subjective views of the Bank. This means that the Bank shapes the recipient country’s subjectivities and self-understanding. Conditionality becomes a means to intentionally make the subjective ideas of the Bank intersubjective. Accordingly, by using its compulsory power the World Bank reinforces its productive power.
3.5.5 Framing

The types of power exercised by the World Bank and existing in its social relations to other actors give it an extensive capacity to frame norm candidates. Following the conventional social constructivist model on norm diffusion where persuasive communication is essential to successful norm entrepreneurship, the World Bank has considerable potential to successfully promote new norms. The Bank’s production of research, expertise and ability to reach out with its views to important audiences give it a significant organisational platform in order to promote norms. However, the Bank’s framing capacity rests fundamentally on power and authority, and the organizational structure is only a means to further strengthen the influence of the Bank. It is the productive, institutional and compulsory power of the Bank that determine its ability to call attention to an issue, interpret the issue, define appropriate action in order to address the issue and furthermore to assign responsibility for carrying out actions to address the issue.

The framing exercised by the Bank can be regarded as a strategic activity. The institutional and compulsory power of the Bank are consciously and intentionally exercised and can be used to constrain the interpretations of an issue and to make the ideas of the Bank more attractive through economic incentives. In the case at hand the Bank called attention to ‘good governance’ and directed the attention away from the criticism of conditionality in aid that arose after the SAPs. ‘Good governance’ can be seen as a strategic way to please both the critics of the neo-liberal orthodoxy who advocated more dirigisme and redistribution politics, and right wing governments who believed in deregulations and the market forces. The introduction of ‘good governance’ brought back the state into the development strategy and was a step away from the SAPs. But it was not a big step. ‘Good governance’ was market oriented and propagated private sector growth similar to the SAPs (Miller-Adams 1999: 103). The introduction of ‘good governance’ by the World Bank can be seen as a strategic attempt to regain the legitimacy of conditionality and moreover the Bank’s legitimacy as an international organisation. From a social constructivist point of view, the critics of the SAPs threatened the social fitness of the World Bank by trying to construct an intersubjective understanding of the development the Bank promoted as flawed and illegitimate. Consequently the framing of ‘good governance’ by the Bank was strategic since it served the institution’s self-interest of maintaining its legitimacy and social fitness by responding to the criticism against it.
3.5.6 The World Bank as a Norm Entrepreneur

The norm entrepreneurship of the World Bank differs from other actors. The policies and ideas the Bank advance have to some extent been approved by the members. When the Bank launches a norm candidate like ‘good governance’, it already enjoys support from many of the member states of the Bank. The most influential states, the US, Japan, Germany, France and the UK, are all rich donor countries which can be regarded as critical states when a new aid policy is to be implemented. Subsequently, when the Bank promotes a norm candidate, a mass of norm followers will most likely arise simultaneously. A process of norm diffusion where the World Bank constitutes the norm entrepreneur is to some extent carried out internally within the institution. It is of merit to bear in mind that internal negotiations between member states and the dominance of the richest countries influence a process of norm diffusion initiated by the Bank and can facilitate the formation of a critical mass of norm followers. However, the internal work and the distribution of voting power among member states within the institution cannot give a comprehensive explanation to norm diffusion lead by the Bank. Factors like ‘social fitness’ and the power of the Bank as an international organisation contribute to a deeper understanding of this process.

In sum the World Bank is a competent norm entrepreneur since its entrepreneurship works on different levels. The Bank is capable of influencing our intersubjective understanding of development and aid, since productive power exists in its relations to other actors. Furthermore, the World Bank has comprehensive agenda setting power and can thereby constrain or guide our interpretations of existing intersubjective meaning. Finally the Bank offers incentives to states that do as the Bank recommends and can thereby in a direct way influence state behaviour. All forms of power are to some extent based on the authority of the Bank. Without authority the Bank’s compulsory power would be compromised, since the policy guidance of the Bank would be less credible and attractive. In a similar way the agenda setting power of the Bank would be reduced with less authority. The knowledge and policies the Bank produces would be less influential if the Bank did not have authority. The productive power of the Bank is intimately related to the authority of the institution. If the Bank was not regarded as a legitimate institution, the productive power of the Bank would be extensively diminished. All in all the Bank as a norm entrepreneur can influence the social construction of reality (productive power), the interpretation of that reality (institutional power) and in a direct way the behaviour of actors within that reality (compulsive power).
4 Conclusion

Rationalists would suggest that the diffusion and adoption of the norm of ‘good governance’ occurred since the norm addressed urgent problems like corruption and lack of accountability that in a pragmatic way needed to be addressed. The present study has showed that this kind of inference is too hasty and overlooks the causal relation in the case at hand. Rationalists cannot elaborate on why ‘good governance’ was conceived as appropriate and urgent. Instead they would reify notions of appropriateness and rationality, and treat them as parameters with a fixed content to explain social reality. The reason why ‘good governance’ was regarded as a pragmatic and appropriate policy has to be understood by considering changeable intersubjective structures and their role in the constitution of social reality and the production of outcomes. Structures of intersubjective meaning construct our understanding of social reality and thereby give meaning to contextually dependant notions such as appropriateness, rationality, legitimacy and fairness. The present study suggests that social fitness is the key element in order to understand the process of norm diffusion in the case at hand. Both the social fitness of the norm of ‘good governance’ and the social fitness of the World Bank as an international organisation are relevant to understand this case of successful norm diffusion. The Bank and the values it embodies as a liberal international organisation were compatible with prevailing notions of legitimacy and appropriateness. This normative match constituted the basis of its authority, which furthermore explains why the Bank was a capable and powerful norm entrepreneur in the present case. Additionally, the normative fit between the norm of ‘good governance’ and the normative structures existing at the time of its introduction created a social fitness that facilitated the diffusion of the norm. The social fitness of ‘good governance’ as a norm per se was profound, but social fitness alone does not cause norm diffusion. The World Bank was the purposeful norm entrepreneur which initiated the diffusion of the norm, to some extent by constructing it in a way compatible with prevailing normative structures.

The norm diffusion carried out by the Bank was achieved through a mechanism of socialization involving some coercive elements. Norm diffusion in general is to some extent not a completely consensual process, since some actors are more influential than others in the construction of intersubjectivity. In a process of norm diffusion some actors are critical by having more normative weight. Hence, their behaviour is more influential on an intersubjective level and they are therefore more influential over the social construction of
intersubjective meaning involved in a process of norm diffusion. This does not mean that
might is right; it rather suggests that ‘might’ in the form of normative weight matters, but
what gives an actor normative weight differs from case to case. In the present case the World
Bank as an international organisation possessed extensive normative weight per se. Firstly
and most obviously, it had normative weight since it is one of the world’s largest development
agencies and thereby constitute a central actor when new aid policies are implemented.
Secondly, the authority of the Bank gave it normative weight and thirdly, the Bank had
normative weight since it to some extent represents the interest of its members.

The extensive influence and normative weight of the Bank make it hard to imagine how LDCs
(less developed countries) or other actors with less normative weight could have resisted or
opposed the diffusion of ‘good governance’. In the case at hand the critical states with the
most normative weight were states within the donor community that needed to implement the
new aid policy of ‘good governance’ in order to make the norm prescriptive in practice.
Consequently, the diffusion of the norm relied heavily on the normative weight of the Bank
and richer donor countries. These actors formed a critical mass of norm leaders which further
diffused the norm. Their extensive influence over the construction of intersubjectivity
propelled the norm diffusion and made resistance to the norm difficult. The conditionality of
the ‘good governance’ norm made the coercive elements in the diffusion process more
evident. By issuing ‘good governance’ policy recommendations to a country and
simultaneously offering economic incentives to undertake these policy recommendations the
Bank succeeded in diffusing its subjective ideas to recipient countries that otherwise could
have resisted the norm in a more decisive manner. Conditionality is a mechanism that resides
somewhere in between economic coercion and freely-entered contractual arrangements. The
extensive normative influence of the Bank and donor countries together with conditionality
resulted in a process of socialization involving non-consensual mechanisms. The diffusion
was therefore not a completely consensual process; it involved power and coercion to some
extent. However, the diffusion of good ‘governance’ was not conceived as involving coercion.
The social fitness of ‘good governance’ made it legitimate and appropriate and the diffusion
and adoption of it were conceived as something good and progressive. By belonging to a
community, actors internalize certain intersubjective notions such as rationality and
legitimacy and they help to define their interest and behaviour. Intersubjective ideas and the
systems of knowledge they belong to are not value-neutral; they reflect a certain contextual
notion of appropriateness, legitimacy, and etcetera, which may advantage some actors and
privilege certain ideas. Consequently, the influence of the World Bank and the donor countries and the use of conditionality were not regarded as a coercive or problematic since they corresponded to prevailing normative structures of legitimacy and appropriateness that to some extent privileged these actors or the ideas they advanced.

This study has showed that the World Bank is an influential actor that has power to influence other actors’ interest and identities. According to the present account the power of the Bank is embedded in the existing normative order. The Bank has authority because actors perceive it as a legitimate institution and thereby believe in its authority. Consequently in order to maintain its influence, the values the Bank embodies have to correspond to the prevailing normative structures constituting the intersubjective understanding of world politics. The future challenge of the Bank revolves around the central question of maintaining its own social fitness. The present study on norm diffusion has showed that the Bank is a competent norm entrepreneur that can influence normative structures. To some extent the Bank is able to maintain its own social fitness by having extensive influence over the construction of intersubjective meaning within its field of expertise. However, there are actors and changes in the normative structure that the Bank cannot control or hinder. In recent years the lack of democracy, transparency and accountability of international organisations has been brought up on the agenda by transnational activist groups and networks. Movements like Attac and protesters in Seattle and Porto Alegre have expressed their criticism towards the present economic system. In particular the IMF and the World Bank have been the objects of harsh criticism from this kind of movements. The Bank is not based on the principle of ‘one state, one vote’ and instead reflects the distribution of economic strength within the international state system. The democratic structure of the Bank has thereof been regarded as insufficient and dubious. Non-state actors like NGOs and transnational activist groups can have an influence on an intersubjective level (see Keck and Sikkink 1998). By bringing up new issues on the agenda and creating an awareness of situations perceived to be unjust or illegitimate these kind of groups can influence prevailing normative structures and thereby threaten the notions of legitimacy underpinning the authority of the World Bank. If the Bank becomes widely recognized as undemocratic, its social fitness is in danger. The World Bank cannot control these kinds of threats towards its power and authority, but needs to respond to them in order to defend its legitimacy. The ability of the Bank to respond to criticism in order to preserve its social fitness can be seen as the greatest future challenge of the Bank.
The present study of norm diffusion has not only analysed and explained an empirical case. It has furthermore delivered a theoretical conception of a process of norm diffusion in international politics. I would shortly like to comment the value added by this study to research on norm diffusion within the field of International Relations. Social fitness is at the core of the analysis. It explains why international organisations that embody values that are compatible with prevailing normative structures are competent norm entrepreneurs and influential on an intersubjective level. The present case study suggests that an international organisation like the World Bank could be a better suited norm entrepreneur than state actors. States can also have authority and normative weight like international organisations, but they do not produce research to the same extent. Moreover, the expertise of international organisations makes them able to appear apolitical and impartial. To some extent, IOs are more competent norm entrepreneurs than states since they do not in a direct way represent the interest of specific state actors and can therefore be conceived as more credible in their norm entrepreneurship. IOs are however limited by their field of expertise. Their authority and expertise is limited to specific issues and they can therefore foremost act as norm entrepreneurs within their field of expertise. States are in this respect less bounded and can thereof be more diverse in their norm entrepreneurship.

Furthermore, this study has in an explicit way incorporated a theoretical conception of power into the process of norm diffusion. It has showed that different types of power are relevant to consider when analysing a process of norm diffusion. This process does not only involve persuasive communication or shaming tactics. Power and coercion are two elements that can be at work in a process of norm diffusion. The main point is that the adoption of norms is not necessarily a completely consensual process. Different forms of power may persuade, coerce, or something in between, actors to adopt a norm. Power does relate to the construction of social reality and it has therefore a central role in a social constructivist account. This study has in a more nuanced way conceptualized the mechanisms at work in a process of norm diffusion by showing that power in different forms are fundamental elements in this process. To further understand a process of norm diffusion it would be of merit to conduct a case study of failed or unsuccessful norm diffusion. There are several ideas that do not become norms, even if they are purposefully propagated by norm entrepreneurs. To find out why some of these subjective ideas fail in becoming intersubjective would be an interesting topic for future research.
Bibliography


