WikiLeaks CableGate and the Multi-Stakeholder Model of Internet Governance

Project work by
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ABSTRACT

Internet is recognised as an alternative media tool that has the potential to stimulate civic cultures, mobilize and sustain civil society networks. It is also perceived as an important tool for social change that offers a powerful communication platform for different social groups to advance their views and ideology online in a significantly less controlled way than it is done through traditional media.

In the end of 2010, the release of U.S. secret diplomatic on the Internet by the non-profit organisation WikiLeaks got an instant global outreach through the Internet and primarily, through the Wikileaks website – www.wikileaks.org. The immediate reaction to this resulted in governmental pressure on global providers of Internet services to stop servicing the website, thus preventing the global public from accessing the materials.

The project studies the discussion that has arisen in the context of these actions and examines the communication tactics used by civil society and governmental actors in this discussion in order to advance an ideology of the right to communicate, and civil society participation in forming and safeguarding Internet principles. The project looks deeper at ideological, participatory, and developmental issues brought up in the discussion around the restriction of access to the main Wikileaks website, and how do they relate to eventual processes of social change.

The study is based on Fairclough's framework on critical discourse analysis, and is grounded in the theoretical framework of participation, discourse and ideology.

The main conclusion of the study is that the discussion around the Wikileaks CableGate case has clearly articulated the necessity of common Internet principles and democratic framework built in an inclusive and participatory manner through the active involvement of civil society actors in order to preserve the core values and enabling potential of Internet as media, and that an effective model for this is the multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance.
## ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>Association for Progressive Communications</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFR</td>
<td>Council on Foreign Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENISA</td>
<td>European Network and Information Security Agency</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>GIPI</td>
<td>Global Internet Policy Initiative</td>
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<td>GNI</td>
<td>Global Network Initiative</td>
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<td>IACHR</td>
<td>Inter-American Commission on Human Rights</td>
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<td>ICANN</td>
<td>Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Addresses</td>
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<td>IG</td>
<td>Internet governance</td>
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<td>IGC</td>
<td>Internet Governance Caucus</td>
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<td>IGF</td>
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<td>ISOC</td>
<td>Internet Society</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non governmental organisation</td>
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<td>NWICO</td>
<td>UN New World Information and Communication Order</td>
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<td>RSF</td>
<td>Reporters Without Borders</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>WGIG</td>
<td>Working Group on Internet Governance</td>
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<td>WSIS</td>
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXTUALISATION

The Internet architecture has been built to reflect the “values of interactivity, openness, egalitarianism, anonymity, cosmopolitanism” (Malcolm, 2008, 16) which have been established in the course of evolution of the Internet. These values have developed without significant governmental regulation, and in a legal vacuum with little supervision from regulatory agencies (Castells, 2009, 103). The incorporation of these values in its core has enabled the Internet to become a powerful communication platform for different social groups to advance their views and ideology online in a significantly less controlled way than it is done through traditional media. Internet is also recognised as an alternative media tool that has the potential to stimulate civic cultures, mobilize and sustain civil society networks (Bailey et al, 2008, 105) thus becoming an important tool for social change. As Hafez postulates, the Internet is “beyond the reach of authority and has enormous potential to link societies, as opposed to merely politics” eliminating the separation between sender and recipient of communication and acting across borders (Hafez, 2005, 101).

On 28 November 2010, the non-profit organisation Wikileaks announced the release of more than 250 000 leaked US embassy cables on the Internet, which became known as CableGate (Wikileaks, 2010). The information published was claimed to reveal confidential communications between 274 U.S. embassies around the world and activities of the U.S. such as “spying on its allies and the UN“, “turning blind eye to corruption”, “backroom deals with supposedly neutral countries;” (Wikileaks, 2010), attributing to CableGate characteristics typical for media politics – to be “spectacular, provide good footage, so that the whole world can see it: like a Hollywood movie ” (Castells, 2009, 139). The dominance of this type of media politics, and politics of scandal connects exposure of corruption to the decline of political trust (Castells, 2009, 289), which in turn opens the path for civil society resistance, and exploration of new models for participation. Whether the Wikileaks claims have any grounds or not, as well as the content of the published materials are not of interest to this study. What is interesting is to look closer at the immediate reaction to the exposures, resulting in the eventual attempts of certain social groups (governments and private businesses) to try to
restrict the access to the Wikileaks website www.wikileaks.org in an effort to limit the outreach of the materials. Despite the existing controversy about who has been pushing for these restrictive measures, they created a dialectic between international organisations, civil society organisations and groups, and governments in regard to freedom of expression online, and the basic principles of how Internet is governed and by whom. This has positioned the discussion around the restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org in a broader context, in which the event is used as an argument for different social groups to advance a particular ideology – the one of freedom to communicate –, and to legitimise their participation in global decision-making on communication through a multi-stakeholder model. “Multi-stakeholder governance” is understood as a concept that legitimises the participation of non-governmental actors in international institutions (Mueller et.al., 2007, 268), and the discussion around the restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org offered a context, in which global social groups could try to re-affirm or challenge the existing power balances between governments and civil society groups in the discussion about freedom to communicate and Internet governance. Popular fears that have been articulated by civil society organisations in the media are that the restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org could impact the way in which Internet space is regulated, lead to legislations which would legitimise governmental censorship practices, and therefore will limit the right of the global civil society¹ to freely communicate (see analysis section). However, in the context mentioned above, these fears could also be understood as a framing tactic used by civil society groups to advance their ideology and interests in relation to the role they play in the field of online communication, participation in policy-making and regulation of the Internet.

In this context, I will look closer at the communication techniques used by civil society actors and governments in this discussion and explore how does communication work in order to create more participation opportunities for civil society in the question about Internet principles and governance. This will allow for mapping the social practices and processes articulated in the discussion, and understand their meaning from the

¹ When speaking about civil society groups and international NGO's, I will use Keck & Sikkik's understanding about a “global civil society” which includes non-state actors developing and advocating some conception of the public interest across national borders. (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, 14)
perspective of communication and social change.

Thus, the research question of my project is **how the debate around Wikileaks CableGate relates to the multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance from a theoretical framework of ideology and participation?**

To approach the research question, I will try to answer the following set of sub-questions:

- What are the main discourses and ideology articulated by civil society organisations and governments in the debate about the restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org?
- How do these discourses and ideology influence the possibilities for civil society participation in decision-making through and on Internet-related issues?
- Are there concrete developmental issues that have arisen from the discussion around Wikileaks CableGate, that a multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance can address?

From a communication for development perspective, looking at the question of civil society participation in the global discussion about Internet governance is important, because the Internet as a channel for alternative thought has “unleashed a wide-ranging and globally significant shift in communications... that has led to the empowerment of individuals and nonstate actors on an unprecedented scale” (Deibert et. al., 2010, 3). This empowerment has both enhanced civil society participation in all areas of social life, but also led to attempts of governments to impose regulations on the Internet space in an attempt to control the flows of information. Thus the Internet impacts the relations between civil society with governments through its growth in political and social significance, which leads to social change - “through technology, regulation, norms, and political calculus – (the Internet) has emerged to shape a new geopolitical information landscape.” (Deibert et. al., 2010, 3). Such a shift in communications suggests a process of renegotiation of power balances around the question of who controls online communication and the global online information flows. While, traditionally the control of information has been the foundation of state power (Castells, 2009, 320), the
question of control of Internet globally has only recently emerged. With a stronger participation of civil society actors in this process, a way for social change is opened, allowing for actors who have previously not been able to express their voice to take part in global discussions the international effect of which could shape the local empowerment possibilities of Internet in a glocalised way. The combined result of cultural change in communication and governance processes, along with political change might open the path to social change (Castells, 2009, 300). Therefore, the study of the question from the theoretical framework participation and ideology is appropriate for putting the discussion in a communication for development perspective, and will allow for relating it to Wikileaks CableGate in the context of the issues that it has raised in relation to Internet governance.

My work draws on the border between participatory democracy and communication, converging in the Internet’s enabling potential seen through the case of Wikileaks CableGate. I am aware that the study might have at times too strong focus on governance, but it is anchored in the participatory model and enabling communication potential of Internet, therefore I believe it is relevant for exploring the potential for social change through the debate about Internet governance.

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2 Glocalization is understood here as in Kraidy’s terms as “a blending of global forces with local elements, adequately accounts for the complexity of global relations in the Information Age” (Kraidy, 2001, 39).

3 Further in my work I prefer to use the term “social change” instead of “development”, as it allows to avoid widely established notions associated with the latter term, such as neo-liberalism or its particular relation to “developing” countries.
CHAPTER II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

I have limited the theoretical framework in my project to three main areas: the concept of alternative media; the concept of participation through multi-stakeholder cooperation; and discourse, power and ideology with a focus on the ideology of the “right to communicate”.

RELEVANT RESEARCH

Alternative media
In order to connect the concepts of participation and ideology from a communication for development perspective to the case of Wikileaks CableGate, and in particular to the restrictive measures taken to limit the global access to www.wikileaks.org, it is necessary to introduce the concept of alternative media. In the current project I look at the Wikileaks website\textsuperscript{4} as an example of media used to express alternative discourses and require higher accountability by governments through a community way of work. Bailey (2008) suggests four approaches in understanding alternative media. Of relevance to this study is a mixture of all four, since each of them provides points of entrance to understand the debate around Wikileaks CableGate, and allows for building up the analysis further. The first approach treats alternative media as a medium oriented towards community\textsuperscript{5} and participation\textsuperscript{6}. Participation is in turn understood as a process in which at least two parties influence each other in making decisions, but the final power to decide rests with one party only (Pateman, 1970, 70). I will elaborate more on this concept in the next section. Bailey develops further the notion that alternative media facilitates and allows the participation of the community in the produced content and in the content-producing organisation (Bailey et. al., 2008, 14). In this approach, the “ordinary people” are given the possibility to have their voices heard and is thus becomes a tool for community empowerment. (Bailey et. al., 2008, 14).

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\textsuperscript{4} www.wikileaks.org, which by the time of writing is still resolvable only through its IP address, but not through a domain name. The existing mirrors of the website are not of relevance to the project.

\textsuperscript{5} Community is understood as a unit, “actively constructed by its members and those members derive an identity from this construction” (Bailey et. al., 2008, 10)

\textsuperscript{6} Participation is understood taking the UNESCO definition as “a higher level of public involvement...in the production process and also in the management and planning of communication systems” (Servaes, 1999, 85)
approach to alternative media is as an alternative to the traditional media which despite offering a counter-hegemonic discourse, is rather unrepresentative, and is articulated as “unprofessional, inefficient, limited... and as marginal as some of the societal groups to whom they try to give a voice” (Bailey et. al., 2008, 20). The third approach sees alternative media as part of the civil society, contributing and playing a vital role for democracy. In this sense, Bailey claims that alternative media plays the same role as a civil society organisation. (Bailey et. al., 2008, 24). The fourth approach establishes the connection between community, participation, democracy and media by looking at alternative media in three aspects: “its role at the crossroads of civil society, their elusiveness, and their interconnections and linkages with market and state” (Bailey et. al., 2008, 27). This approach is claimed to allow for mapping the threats to the existence of this type of media, such as for example losing financial or other independence (Bailey et. al., 2008, 30).

The attempts to restrict [www.wikileaks.org](http://www.wikileaks.org) after the publication of the alleged diplomatic cables by Wikileaks, as well as the governmental attempts to exercise power in order to block the financial and operational assets of Wikileaks can be seen as an example of these threats, provoking a discussion between civil society organisations and governments about the freedom of expression online. They form also a case of alternative media use, in which Castells quoting Downing (2009, 57) suggests that “social actors and individual citizens around the world are using the new capacity of communication networking to advance their projects, to defend their interests, and to assert their values” in an attempt to challenge the existing power balances. Communicative action is central for the creation of meaning, so when the civil society can provide the content of state action freely through the public media, democracy is ensured (Castells, 2009, 12). Bryan further develops the topic claiming that computer-mediated-communication is claimed to hold “the key to the enhancement of the democratic aspects of the political process and to the creation of new opportunities for citizen participation in the local and national public spheres” (Bryan,1998, 2). The decentralized and relatively unregulated Internet space allows thus to explore the possibilities for civil society's empowerment through online media, and go a step further – to try to influence in the regulation of the online space giving the question a global
This highlights another quality of alternative media – to allow for “self-management” giving civil society actors “the power of decision making within communication enterprises” and to be “fully involved in the formation of communication policies and plans” (Servaes, 1999, 85). In this sense, alternative media and participation can provide a channel for resisting mainstream discourses at communicative, organisational and political level (Bailey et. al., 2008, 33). In the same time, “fighting a war of position on numerous fronts has left the alternative media movement in a rather problematic, vulnerable and isolated position”(Bailey et. al., 2008, 33) – a problem which Wikileaks also partly shares.

**Participation, and the multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance**

*Participatory democracy*

Castells states that democracy is about a set of processes and procedures, and not about policy (Castells, 2009, 12), and democratic governance is the one that serves the people as opposed to only ruling them (Pateman, 1970). Elaborating on Mill, Klang (2006, 12) suggests that “for an efficient democracy it is not enough government to be structured democratically but even large parts of the social system must be similarly organized” - which is a precondition for achievement of a self-managing society. Already in 1977, UNESCO drafted a normative theory of alternative communication developing the concepts of access, participation and self-management (Vatikiotis, 2005, 7), which has set the grounds for a participatory communication model (Servaes, 1999, 88), stressing the importance on “ the cultural identity of local communities and of democratisation and participation at all levels – international, national, local, and individual.” Klang continues that until now the processes of democracy have been a compromise between theory and technological limitations. (Klang, 2006, 12). With the development of new communication technologies though, and in particular the Internet, more possibilities are created for the civil society to exercise direct participation. As Enzensberger (1974, 97) suggests: “For the first time in history, the media are making possible mass participation in a social and socialized productive process, the practical means of which
are in the hands of the masses themselves”.

This concept of participatory communication is in the core of the discussion about a multi-stakeholder model of governance, which is necessary to present in more detail in order to be able to understand it in the context of Internet governance and to help in the analysis the discussion of governments and civil society actors around the restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org.

**Multi-stakeholder governance**

The idea about a multi-stakeholder model of governance builds upon the earlier idea of the UN New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) which in the 70s-80s of the 20th century focused on multiplicity through participatory communication for social change, to which a normative approach had been suggested. (Carlsson, 2005, 212). At that time though, the way to ensure the multiplicity was through creating preconditions for new communicative situations, often on a “grass roots” level. (Carlsson, 2005, 212). A definition suggested by Banks (2005, 85) presents the multi-stakeholder process as: “the coming together of different interest groups on an equal footing, to identify problems, define solutions and agree on roles and responsibilities for policy development, implementation, monitoring and evaluation”. The concept of “stakeholders” and “stakes” which has roots in the UN terminology (Mueller et. al., 2007, 268) creates clear relations to neo-liberalism, and as suggested by Charkiewicz (2005, 80), this way of organisation of social actors positions them inside the corporate orbit. Charkiewicz argues further that NGOs that rely on a normative understanding of power are not well equipped to make sense of how power works through discourse, an effect of which is that the neo-liberal governmentality has shifted civil society and the UN together with market and the State (Charkiewicz, 2005, 80). The work of power through discourse is of particular relevance to the project and will be examined in detail further on.

**Internet governance and the multi-stakeholder approach**

The question about Internet governance has been identified as a priority area during the UN World Summit on Information Society (WSIS) forums in 2003 and 2005, and as a
result, an international forum was established under the name Internet Governance Forum (IGF). It's task is to “support the United Nations Secretary-General in carrying out the mandate...with regard to convening a new forum for multi-stakeholder policy dialogue”. (IGF, 2010). In this summit it was expressed for the first time the requirement that Internet governance is conducted on a multi-stakeholder basis, setting a new norm of customary international law (Malcolm, 2008, 322). This is reflected in the following working definition: “Internet governance is the development and application by Governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet” (WGIG, 2005, 11). However, the role granted to the civil society in this decision remains unclear. The Tunis agenda suggests that civil society should continue playing important role at community level (Tunis agenda, 2005), but does not delegate neither rights nor decision-making power to it. On the contrary, governments' role is presented as rights and responsibilities on international Internet-related public policy issues seen as a sovereign right of the States (Tunis agenda, 2005). The struggle of the civil society actors for defending their right to participate in the process is colourfully described by Mueller: “the status of civil society and private sector participants was a point of tension and instability, and renegotiated at every turn” to the extent that there was a lack of agreement of whether these participants should be allowed to speak (Mueller et.al., 2007, 282). The ambiguity in roles and power delegation, as well as lack of clarity in a process, which otherwise asserts the need of civil society actors in the frame of a multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance creates the preconditions for them to try to draw the borders themselves by using various communication tactics and approaches. A problem of the multi-stakeholer model in the context of Internet governance is that from a development perspective, it has unclear mechanism for stimulating the participation of actors from areas not having access to the Internet. Sylla (2007, 40) develops on that suggesting that if participation in Internet governance is based only on the knowledge of a country about Internet issues, then “the voices of more than 80 percent of the African population will always be translated by representatives who may not be aware of their real problems nor understand the languages spoken by them”. Another problem is that despite the identification of a multi-stakeholder approach as “the only legitimate way to develop
the Internet regulatory environment” (Alvand, 2007, 9), the civil society and
government interests “stand in conflict, and there is little consensus as to how these
global stakeholder coalitions should be built.”(Alvand, 2007, 9). Aspects of this conflict
penetrate the discussion around the Wikileaks CableGate case, and are included in the
analysis section of the study, and presented in the context of the above framework.

**Discourse, power and ideology**

At the bottom of the advancement of certain views and ideology lies a process of
creation of meaning and representation practices. Therefore, looking at research theory
about how meaning is constructed is relevant for understanding the ways different social
groups create and advance their positions in the debate about the restriction of
www.wikileaks.org and the multi-stakeholder approach, as well as their relation to
broader social practices and process of social change.

Stuart Hall speaks about the importance of a common access to language in order to
share meaning and sees language as central to culture and meaning playing, and as a
repository of cultural values. (Hall, 1997, 1). This is of particular relevance for
communication that takes place in the media, as it reflects cultural and social processes
articulated through specific discourses. Discourse is thus seen as “a system of
representation” (Hall, 1997, 44) that is a result of the combination of language and
practice. Discourse allows to establish a connection between the use of language in
social life and social structure (Deacon et al, 2007, 151), suggesting the idea that social
and cultural reproduction, and change take place in the discursive practice (Jørgensen,
2000, 67). There are four main characteristics that map the discursive field: a critical
attitude to an obvious knowledge; historical and cultural specifics; relation between
knowledge and social processes; and relation between knowledge and social actions
(Jørgensen quoting Burr, 2000, 11). In this sense, discourse is important for analysing
both social change and social practices.

According to Foucault quoted by Hall, “nothing has any meaning outside of discourse”
(Hall, 1997, 45). In Faucauldian terms, discourse is defined as “speech or writing seen
from the point of view of the beliefs, values and categories which it embodies” which constitute a way of looking at the world, and a representation of experience (Deacon et. al., 2007, 152). Foucault has further elaborated this concept establishing a connection between knowledge, power and discourse claiming that “knowledge linked to power not only assumes the authority of the truth, but has the power to make itself true” (Hall, 1997, 49). Therefore, establishing regimes of truth in discourse can be used as a tool to advance particular ideology of a social group, making it relevant for studying the discussion around the restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org. With relevance to communication processes, Castells defines power as exercised by the construction of meaning in the human mind through processes of communication enacted in global/social multimedia networks of mass communication, and mass self-communication (Castells, 2009, 416). In this sense, when speaking about positions or views of certain social groups, the production, dissemination and consumption of these positions can be understood as attempts to influence this process of circulation of power and become an “oppressor” instead of “oppressed”. Further, Foucault has argued that knowledge is not only form of power, but power is implicated in the application of knowledge in different circumstances, thus having the quality to make itself true (Hall, 1997, 48-49). Therefore, according to Foucault, the use of power to present certain knowledge establishes a regime of truth, which exists only in a discursive formation and does not have an absolute character. (Hall, 1997, 49).

While Foucault is concerned primarily of the relations of power and knowledge, rather than on the meaning production, (Deacon et. al., 2007, 152), Fairclough understands discourse as “an attempt to show systematic links between texts, discourse practices, and sociocultural practices” (1995b, 16-17). This understanding has shown an attempt to develop a social analysis of media language and discourse (Deacon et. al., 2007, 156). In the context of my research question, the approach suggested by Fairclough helps to make relations of broader character, and see how the text practice constructs ideology and discourses that ultimately reflect a broader social practice and may indicate change. In terms of the latter, Fairclough works a lot with the concept of interdiscursivity. The definition he suggests is that interdiscursivity “highlights the normal heterogeneity of texts in being constituted by combinations of diverse genres
and discourses” (Fairclough, 1995a, 95), where genres or orders of discourse are understood as a system, in which “communication events not only reproduce orders of discourse, but also can change them through creative use of language” (Jørgensen, 2000, 76). Therefore, interdiscursivity plays an important role in the analysis of media events, since the discourses produced in them can influence and change dominant opinions or policies, thus creating conditions for shift of powers and social change. This claim is supported by Jørgensen analysing Fairclough's theory who postulates that “high interdiscursivity goes together with change, while lower interdiscursivity tends to reproduce the existing.” (Jørgensen, 2000, 87) and is relevant for the discussion about a multi-stakeholder governance in the context of the event of the publication of US diplomatic cables by Wikileaks. What is more, through high interdiscursivity it is created meaning, which can in turn be mobilized to shift relations of power between different groups in the society. (Jørgensen, 2000, 79). The concept of interdiscursivity is important for building and expressing ideological concerns, since it also represents a concerted effort to probe and pinpoint the ideological dimensions of communication mainly in its intersubjective contexts, and is thus concerned with a dynamic of contingent discourses and contexts. (Orr, 2003, 43).

The right to communicate

Thus, from the perspective of ideology and discourse it is of relevance for the project to briefly present the concept of the right to communicate which would help later in the analysis to discuss the relations of power enforced between civil society actors and governments in the debate around Wikileaks CableGate.

The “right of men to communicate” (D'Arcy, 1969, 14) has formed the foundations of a social movement in the past 35 years, based on ideas about participatory democracy asserting that all citizens should have a communication right in any and every governance process that affects them (Mueller et. al., 2007, 274). The concept reflects the thought that new technology makes it possible for people to participate interactively in all social processes that affect them (Mueller et. al., 2007, 270). This idea has been an important milestone in the work of the UN MacBride Commission in the 70s and 80s towards NWICO, in which the right to communicate was seen as a solution for
empowerment of “third world countries”, through which they would develop and strengthen their independence and self-determination (Carlsson, 2005, 199) and overcome the gap between North and South. Later on it has been developed in WSIS which had the ambition: “to create a more inclusive Information Society and to bridge the digital divide in a North-South perspective”. (Carlsson, 2005, 213). In these contexts, the right to communicate is seen as a “new human right” that expands and supersedes the individual rights of freedom of speech, the press, and assembly associated with classical liberalism” (Mueller et. al., 2007, 274). In this way, it becomes an important ideology with relevance to social change creating opportunities for civil society groups and advocacy networks to demand higher participation in decision- and policy making on communication issues. It has also the feature to serve as a “broad normative banner and the language of “rights” ...(is used) more as a framing tactic than as something to be taken literally and applied legalistically”, which helps a broad range of movements involved in communication-information policy (Mueller et. al., 2007, 277). This is called by Mueller as a “normative-tactical” view on communication rights used to facilitate “the ongoing development of consensual knowledge among non-state actors about communication policy issues.” due to its own incompleteness it (Mueller et. al., 2007, 277). Such a framework can act as a convergence tool for creating a common voice for civil society actors in legitimizing their role in Internet governance and policy issues, and demand higher participation in policy issues grounding the demands on the ideology of the right to communicate.

In the analysis section of the study I will look in more detail on whether the “normative-tactical” approach was used by the non-governmental actors and governments, and in what way in the discussion around the Wikileaks CableGate case.
CHAPTER III. METHODOLOGY

The case which forms the core of my analysis is Wikileaks CableGate, and in particular - the attempts of governments and companies to restrict the global access to www.wikileaks.org after the publication of the US diplomatic cables. The communication event in focus is the discussion between government and non-governmental actors that have emerged around the legitimacy of these attempts in the context of participation, Internet principles, and the multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance.

Case and method

Having defined the Wikileaks CableGate as a starting communication event which contextualizes my study, I will do a critical discourse analysis on a sample of statements produced by civil society groups, key non-governmental actors and governments in the course of the discussion of the restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org. In terms of the civil society actors' statements, it was necessary to divide the civil society sector into groups due to the fact that they represent different communities (technical, advocacy, etc.). In the overall selection of statements I have aimed at gathering material which represents the points of view of mainly different groups comprising the civil society sector and governments with an active position on Internet principles, empowerment through participation and the freedom to communicate. The positions of companies or the academic community are not subject of this study.

I have identified as relevant to the research question the positions of civil society actors from the following three major groups: international NGOs and groups active in advocacy on Internet governance issues (Internet Governance Caucus, Association for Progressive Communications, Global Network Initiative, Internet Society), international NGOs active in advocating the concept about the freedom of communication, that see the communication on the Internet as an aspect of it (PEN International, Article XIX, Reporters Without Borders, Council on Foreign Relations) as well as the hackers community (Anonymous, 2600 Magazine) as representatives of the technical
community that works with educational and social aspects of the Internet. The hacktivist community has a different goal and position on the issues of governance of Internet than the NGOs and advocacy groups, but since hacktivism aims at influencing decisions, opinion, as well as disrupt and undermine political opponents (Dahlgren, 2009, 197), looking at the hacktivist community position on wikileaks.org is important for discussing the relation of the case to the Internet governance process. This selection would allow for a better understanding of the motives and ideological framework driving the civil society actors in taking certain positions on the restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org and in analysing its relation to the dialogue about a multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance from a communication for social change perspective.

In analysing the governmental positions there is less variety in the documents because most of the governments have focused on commenting the contents of the released materials, while very few produced a statement on the restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org. Nevertheless, three major governmental actors produced a statement of relevance to the present study, namely – the US government (analysed here through three statements: one of the White House, and two by the US State Secretary Hilary Clinton), the EU in the face of the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), and the UN in the face of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, issued jointly with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression on Human Rights (further abbreviated as UN/IACHR). I look at the latter as a governmental position, because the UN is an intergovernmental international body, and the Inter-American commission represents the voices of governments of all countries in South and North America. In this way, these three clusters of statements would represent the majority of voices of the European, South and North American Areas. The African and Asian opinions remain unclear, as there were almost no statements publicly available in English, but one was still found and belongs to the prime minister of the Republic of Kenya, Mr. Odinga, which I also consider in my analysis, being aware that it does not represent the opinion of any major

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7 A brief description of each organisation is placed in the analysis of the relevant statement. This gives an additional context to the particular statement in focus.
African union, but still enriches the empirical data.

**Qualitative interviews**

The difficulty in finding statements from the Asian and African regions suggests a problem of representation of the global South in the discussion, which I have tried to approach through complementing the empirical material through several qualitative interviews taken with representatives of other regions.

The goal with the interviews was to get a personal and eventually, regional perspective from non-governmental actors that take part in both the discussion about Internet governance, as well as have an opinion on Wikileaks CableGate and relate the discourses mapped in the interviews to the jointly advanced discourse through statements. The interview material would also allow for grasping attitudes and beliefs that contribute to building an idea of the common ideology shaping of the discourses advanced in the discussion about multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance. This will enrich the empirical material and will contribute to the understanding of how the regional discourses relate to official statements on the CableGate case and Internet governance.

The choice of interviewees was based on their involvement in non-governmental or civil society driven projects or initiatives related to Internet policy and governance formation, at local or international level with focus on non-Western countries. The inclusion of interviewees from Russia, Kyrgyzstan and the Democratic Republic of Congo is an attempt to partly compensate for the lack of public statements on the case in point from these areas and get an additional perspective on it. The rest of the interviewees participate directly in some of the organisations, whose statements I am analysing, as well as in the debate about multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance, at international or local level. One interviewee is an exception, M. Mueller, whose position was interesting to see from the point of view of a representative of the IGC, which is a civil society group comprised of participants from all around the world. Therefore it was interesting to explore how does the public statement relate to a personal position of a participant.
Interviews were made with the following interviewees: Veni Markovski (Internet Society Bulgaria chapter); Milton Mueller (Internet Governance Caucus); Alexey Bebinov (Global Internet Policy Initiative, Kyrgyzstan); Alexey Sidorenko, (Global Voices, RuEcho, Russian Federation); Badouin Schombe, (TIC@FRICA and ICANN At Large member, Democratic Republic of Congo). Interviewees from Brazil and India have also agreed to an interview, but their answers did not come by the time of writing, and therefore are not included.

The interviews were email based. I am aware that this leads to a loss of information, such as voice tone, pauses, emotions and flexibility, which could be of importance for the analysis, but on the other hand this approach is seen as “convenient and cost-effective means for questioning large and/or geographically dispersed populations” (Deacon et. al., 2007, 68). I am not working with large populations, but I am interested in getting replies from geographically dispersed respondents which makes the method a relevant choice. Moreover, non-face-to-face asynchronous online interviews allow the interviewee to have more time for response and eventually provide more thought-out answers.

While I have tried to pick statements and do interviews which would present the visions of a broad variety of civil society actors and governments in relation to the research question, this study does not use quantitative methods, therefore I am aware that it might not be entirely representative. However, since the choice of qualitative methods tend to look at far fewer texts, but more in depth (Davis, 2008, 57), I have put weight on the selection of texts to analyse so that they can help answering the research question, rather than representativeness in terms of quantity of opinions analysed.

**Why critical discourse analysis? Argumentation of the method**

The research question aims at addressing the debate around the restriction of access to the website [www.wikileaks.org](http://www.wikileaks.org) that have emerged directly after the CableGate publications, and how did the communication work in relation to the participatory
possibilities of civil society in Internet governance. The existence of a discussion suggests the operation of rhetoric between different social groups. Rhetoric is defined as persuasion by any available means (Fairclough, 1995a, 502), and Fairclough suggests that its structure constitutes a frame within which diverse discourses are articulated together in a particular way, within which relations are established (Fairclough, 1995a, 512).

My choice of critical discourse analysis as a particular method to do the discourse analysis is based on the function of this method to work as a “systematic transdisciplinary analysis of relations between discourse and other elements of the social process” (Fairclough, 1995a, 10) which addresses social wrongs and possible ways of mitigating them (Fairclough, 1995a, 11). What is more, the critical discourse analysis presumes that the operation discourses and their ordering is determined by the unequal power relations of social institutions and society (Deacon et. al., 2007, 157), and analyses them with the goal to look at processes of ongoing “social change in direction towards more even power relations in the communication processes and in the society as a whole. “(Jørgensen, 2000, 69). Thus it is a convenient method to look at the ideology and power relations established between civil society organisations and governments in the debate about www.wikileaks.org and analyse them in the broader context of civil society participation in a multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance. The question about ideology is important in Fairclough's critical discourse analysis, as it is seen as a result of the discourse practices, and leads to the creation and reproduction of asymmetrical power relations between social groups which are seen as ideological effects (Jørgensen, 2000, 69), and discourse analysis is considered “at its best when it turns these ideological strategies inside out” (Deacon et. al. 2007, 158).

Ideology is in the basis of the articulation of certain views and discourses, and in the debate around www.wikileaks.org it is important because the struggles to naturalise dominant opposing discourses tend to make the latter appear as common sense rather than ideology (Deacon et. al., 2007, 158). Therefore, the ideology and combination of orders of discourse allow to map “potential cultural hegemony, with dominant groups struggling to assert an maintain particular structuring within and between them”
(Fairclough, 1995b, 56). The ultimate benefit from using this method is that it provides a critical approach that is politically engaged in social change. As Jørgensen postulates, the results of this “should be able to be used in the struggle for social change” (Jørgensen, 2000, 70), which is of importance from a communication for development perspective. Therefore, it will be possible to look at the current power balances between non-governmental actors and states, and how these balances are impacted in the context of the CableGate discussion and its relation to the multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance.

When working with texts as empirical material, the linguistic approach might be useful for performing a critical discourse analysis. The latter works with the “linguistic-discursive dimension in social and cultural phenomena and processes of change in the late modernity” (Jørgensen, 2000, 67), in which language becomes both ” a site of and a stake in class struggle” (Deacon et. al. quoting Fairclough, 2007, 157). What is more, texts can communicate about events and processes, and establish and reproduce social relations or construct links with the situations in which they are used (Deacon et. al., 2007, 154). Therefore, the methodological framework suggested by the critical discourse analysis will ultimately allow to map processes of social change that eventually take place in the context of participatory communication in the light of the Wikileaks CableGate case.

The framework of my analysis will follow Fairclough's three-dimensional model of working with critical discourse analysis: text; discursive practice; and social practice, as it is suitable for empirical research about communication and society (Jørgensen, 2000, 74). I will examine how does the discursive practice relate to the discussion about a multi-stakeholder Internet governance and how they are constructed by the different actors in the discussion.

I approach the case with restriction of the access to www.wikileaks.org as a place of conflict of cultural and political power between the governmental and non-governmental actors. Since the institutional framework of Internet governance is still not entirely set, and the scope of influence of each actor in the multi-stakeholder model
is still to be precisely defined, it is a matter of advancement of particular discourses and ideologies of different social groups in order to attain legitimacy and try to draw the borders in advance setting the stage. Given this setting, the critical discourse analysis will also help to better understand the specifics of the ideology which frames the discourses of the non-governmental and governmental actors in my case of point. It will allow for capturing changing media practices and therefore reflect social and cultural changes, as well as shifting chain or choice relations. (Fairclough, 1995b, 66).

**Limitations of the method**

Despite the strength of critical discourse analysis to study change, ideology and relations between social groups through discourses, the method has some disadvantages that should be taken into account. At first place, it assumes that aside from the existence of discourses, there are social practices or events of non-discursive character that also influences the studied social practice and change. However, it is very difficult to draw the line between discursive and non-discursive and to say where is the edge between the two to determine the dialectics (Jørgensen, 2000, 93). This is of particular difficulty in my current study since the discussion that I analyse is of high-degree of complexity, which makes it difficult to clearly say which practices are not discursive. Another weakness of the method is that while putting a strong value on the discourse practices, it underestimates the possibilities of people to control the use of their language (Jørgensen, 2000, 94). It is also important to be aware of the differences in interpreting power relations, which according to Fairclough are productive leading to change, while for, for example van Dijk they are abuse. (Jørgensen, 2000, 95). Another critique is that Fairclough’s approach builds upon a combination of discourse theories, based on Foucault, Gramsci, Althusser, Habermas, and Giddens which poses the question if any discourse theory is valid and applicable to the critical discourse analysis (Jørgensen, 2000, 93).

From a broader perspective, there are general limitations of discourse analysis. One should be aware it “does not explain the world, it helps us to understand parts of it” (Barker, 2008, 163). Therefore, assuming the trustworthiness of the results produced through discourse analysis is subject of dispute, since they might also simply reflect the
researcher's own discourse. To partly solve this problem, Barker (2008, 163) suggests the importance of the reliability of the studied sample, using it more as a “corpus” rather than a sample. Another problem is the difficulty for analysis to check this method (Barker, 2008, 165), which given the large volume of analysed material limits the possibility to present the variety of contexts of use of the discourses due to for example, time and volume limitations. Thirdly, text and discourse analyses lead to making claims about things beyond themselves (Barker, 2008, 166). This is a problem especially in critical discourse analysis where texts and discourses are seen as a broader social practice, the choice of which is though left on the researcher, and the characteristics that are attributed to the studied empirical material. Therefore, there is a risk of implying qualities that might not belong to them. The only suggestion that Barker (2008, 167) presents for tackling these problems is to keep awareness and be honest about the boundaries and limitations, to which I try to adhere.

Here is the place to admit, that since the publication of cables through Wikileaks website is a rather recent event, the study made here has taken into account only publicly available statements, most of them published between December 2010 and March 2011. Therefore, the study does not have the ambition to reflect long-term effects or complete representativeness of the results, but rather aims at giving a picture of some immediate issues brought up in the context of participatory communication in creating rules and principles of Internet governance.

**My position in the research**

As an answer to some of the problems by using this method, it is important to clarify my own discourse when approaching the research question. I have been working for more than 7 years as part of the Bulgarian chapter of Internet Society, the latter being one of the major global NGOs “dedicated to ensuring the open development, evolution and use of the Internet for the benefit of people throughout the world.” (ISOC, 2010) and being present through a statement in my analysis. Moreover, in January-February 2011 I took part in an online group on Internet Governance 4 Development suggesting questions to be brought up in the upcoming global meeting of the Internet Governance Forum in Nairobi in September 2011. These affiliations put the challenge to not take a
side in the analysis of the civil society organisations' discourses by taking certain positions for granted, which as Jørgensen suggests (Jørgensen, 2000, 28) makes certain discourses hard to be seen as such. As a solution to that, Jørgensen advises to get a distant position in the analysis and constantly evaluate how does the researcher relate to the discourses that are being analysed (Jørgensen, 2000, 29). I have tried to keep to this principle in the course of my analysis, as well as in the choice of methodology for approaching the question.
CHAPTER IV. ANALYSIS

In the course of analysis I have identified four main themes that penetrate my empirical material, and establish links between the case with restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org and the concept of a multi-stakeholder Internet governance from the perspective of participatory communication and social change. These themes are: (1) Hegemonic relations and representation; (2) Neo-liberalism vs net neutrality; (3) Disruptive practices vs cyber-security; (4) Development issues and the democratic dimension of the multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance.

The presentation of each of the themes below follows Fairclough's three-dimensional model to do critical discourse analysis of looking at discourse practice, text/linguistic practice, and social practices. Since some of the texts are distinguished by high interdiscursivity and intertextuality, they touch upon more than one of the themes. Therefore, in each section I have used only the relevant for the topic texts.

THEME 1. Hegemonic relations and representation

In this section I look at the texts subject to my analysis from the perspective of ideologies and power relations established in the context of the discussion about the restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org. In this theme I argue that while advancing their agendas and ideology, the civil society actors use the discussion in order to challenge the hegemony of power established by governments by contrasting the discourse of human rights and full freedom of communication online to the governmental discourse of security to ensure their right to participatory communication.

Discursive practice

The statement of the Internet Governance Caucus (IGC) is an example of a transparent and collective production of a public position, which has been developed using a publicly available online collaborative tool. It has been done in a manner in which

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8 A track of the comments and the person suggesting them is still kept and publicly available at: http://www.igcaucus.org/digress.it/archives/10
every participant in the IGC could contribute to the discussion seeking consensus in the published statement. From the track of changes available online it can be seen how the statement has gradually changed focus from a rather emotional to a moderate and politically oriented message published as a reaction to the restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org. The IGC position advocates for a discourse that builds upon the need of a common dialogue related to Internet principles and governance – a discourse which dominates most of the analysed statements, and supports Drake's appeal (2004, 38) for securing Internet's future as an open and vibrant global medium through engagement, exertion of soft power, and building a lasting and widely supported consensus through collective problem solving. IGC's statement is distinguished by high grade of interdiscursivity featuring a broad range of discourses – political, globalization, and narrative used in an intertextual way. The narrative discourse creates a premise to introduce an advocacy-analytical discourse that argues for “necessary policies” - an approach used to advance a legitimation strategy (Fairclough, 1995a, 249) – in the concrete case the legitimation of the presence of IGC in the international discussion of Internet governance. This use implies that the targeted recipient of the statement are governments.

Similar approach is used by Reporters Without Borders (RSF), in which recontextualisation is realised in the gradual move from a combination of narrative-analytical discourse to advocacy-political in the course of the text (“This is the first time we have seen...”, “We point out that in France in the United States, it is up to the courts, not politicians, to decide whether or not a website should be closed” ). Even media discourse is present (“...any restriction ...will affect the entire press”, “playing a useful role by making them available to journalists”) concluding with the assertive ahistorical ideological construction “Reporters Without Borders...has always defended online freedom and the principle of “Net neutrality””. Other civil society actors, such as the Association for Progressive Communicaitons (APC), put emphasis on the analytical and human rights discourse in order to frame and establish a connection between Wikileaks and its own agenda and ideology, built around securing the freedom of Internet and fight against corruption. The text uses narrative, personal, corporate, advocacy, human rights and political discourses in a combination which supports the ideology of the “freedom
to communicate”, and suggests solutions to challenges in front of the online civil society presented as caused by governments. In this way, it assumes a position of an actor that sets the agenda for empowering and representing citizens online and that has a guardian role of the Internet freedom protecting the society from global governmental censorship.

Such censorship, framed within a security discourse advances restrictive dominant governmental practices that aim at overriding the discourse of openness and freedom of the Internet space. The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) claims that “The freedom the internet allows in moving between jurisdictions and technologies makes cyber security an asymmetric challenge....it is a challenge which must be met through global cooperation to strengthen all aspects of cyber security” (ENISA, 2010). The repetitive presentation of the Wikileaks CableGate case as a “challenge” is a way to justify the necessity of the ENISA and EU work towards cyber security and while highlighting the need for global cooperation to face it, the omission of civil society actors in the whole statement suggests that its role is perceived as a disruptive actor threatening the hegemony of power and governance, against which measures should be taken. This tactic is articulated also in the statement of the White House on Wikileaks (White House, 2010.), as well as in Hilary Clinton's – On Internet Rights and Wrongs (Clinton, 2011), in which the discussion is shifted from freedom of information to the intensive articulation of a discourse about endangering the lives of people, and the role of governments, in particular the U.S., in protecting the world from a broad range of threats (Clinton, 2011). The Kenyan prime minister follows similar line of argumentation, articulating though discourses in a more colloquial, personal, but also political way. The recipient of the text is the Kenyan population, who might react negatively to information leaked from Wikileaks, while in the same time, it acts as a stand for democracy and human right values.

These discourses are exploited by the civil society organisations that support the ideology of the right to communicate to advocate for the need of safeguarding the openness and freedom of Internet as a media from governmental intervention. An example is the Internet Society (ISOC), which through advocacy and expert discourses
advances the civil society position of openness of online communication above all contrasting it to the governmental discourse anchored in security. ISOC concludes with a partly colloquial (“entities that acted maliciously to take it off the air”), and partly advocacy-technical discourse (“Until and unless appropriate laws are brought...technical solutions should be sought to ...”) emphasising on the legal framework behind the management of Internet resources internationally, thus implying the absence of such with an international scope of action. Article XIX continues this line defending the media liberty and freedom of speech online through advocacy, analytical and narrative discourses, advancing the idea of higher civil society participation in governance, and giving citizens a voice. Here the participatory and democratic discourses are articulated by building upon the traditional democratic values of the West through representation techniques such as contrasts, and questioning the legitimacy of governmental actions.

A slightly different approach is used by PEN International (PEN), which while sharing the ideology of the right to communicate through an advocacy and media discourse, articulates social and personal discourses which are not present in the statements of the civil society actors working in the field of Internet principles and governance, but are closer to the political strategies and discourses structure. The personal-communication discourse has a legitimizing function for introducing PEN's ideology.

A common pattern for the texts is the relatively high interdiscursivity level in both civil society actors' statements and the governmental ones, which hints eventual processes of social change, in which power balances and dominant discourses related to the Internet freedoms and the online social order are challenged.

**Text**

In the IGC statement, the focus on governments as recipients of the text is indicated through the replacement of “scandalous” with “sad”, “unjust” with “arbitrary”, “global and political communities” with “governments” which speaks about adjustment of the language to fit the targeted recipient of the message. The text is structured around the use of the case with restriction of access to [www.wikileaks.org](http://www.wikileaks.org) as a reason to bring up a
discussion that advances IGC’s ideology. The ideological framework is presented by the contrast between the way in which Internet was before - “a model of decentralised, voluntary self-governance”, into which “self-regulated domain, governments have since stepped” (IGC, 2010). The latter indicates a forceful and unwanted intrusion in the existing online social order created with low governmental intervention. By articulating this opinion, IGC establishes a link to its own self-election to represent the civil society voice in the discussion about Internet principles and policy formulation.

This link is confirmed in the interview with Mueller (2011), who through categorically modal phrasing affirms IGC’s role to converge the civil society positions related to policy and advocacy, presenting it as a fact, and not as a goal as articulated in the IGC statement. The latter is supported also in the future-oriented statement that articulates a political discourse: “There would have to be a process of consensual development and ratification, using an institutional venue such as the IGF.” (Mueller, 2011) The implicit attribution of institutional quality to the IGF while it has a time limited mandate, as well as lack of decision-making power suggests the importance of the IGF forum for the advancement of both the IGC ideology and the civil society groups represented in it. (Mueller, 2011). This assumption is supported by a paragraph in the statement abundant in negations that aim to de-legitimise the regime of truth of the opponents of this vision. The negations build transitively upon each other introduced by the truism about “Internet's inherently trans-border architecture”, and then adding “uncoordinated”, “rarely adequate”, “do not represent”, “not democratically”, “less legitimate”, “against” to construct a picture which underlines the lack of a democratic approach, and disagreement with unilateral government decisions over Internet principles. To suggest measures against these governmental “failures”, IGC establishes a regime of truth that determines the direction of the conversation through advocacy discourse: “What is needed is a framework of principles for Internet governance, which would guide all stakeholders in dealing with trans/border issues...”. Mentioning “all stakeholders” creates a relation of equality between the different actors involved in the IG process in an inclusive way, and is an example of how semiotics works to construct a process of change in an impersonal and ahistorical way (Fairclough, 1995a, 247). The regime of truth of the IGC ideology and claim of a role in the process is strengthened by the use of
low modality constructions such as “it so happens” and “something like this” opening up for dialogue to find a common solution.

APC takes another approach to challenge the governmental hegemony in the context of the Wikileaks events. It takes advantage of the flexible use of the human rights discourse to help advance the ideology of communication rights and challenge the hegemonic domination of governments by renegotiating meaning. The link between the importance of Internet, and human rights discourse is presented with the highly assertive modal statement: “using internet is vital to the realisation of human rights” which is further framed and connected to Wikileaks' “vital role in aiding the fight against corruption in governments and corporations”, working with transitivity to relate events to processes. Having established this connection, APC articulates a strong politically framed discourse with high degree of modality to advance APC's agenda: “The internet must be protected” and “organisations, communities and individuals should be free”. This is important, because as both Mueller (2011) and Sidorenko (2011) suggest in the interviews, the only way for civil society actors to hold governments accountable is through “pressure from global public opinion, other governments, and from pressure from their own citizens”. Therefore, the APC assertive affirmation has a politically-ideological purpose – to advance the role of APC in the discussion about Internet governance, and create a regime of truth in which it sets the agenda of what actions related to the Internet should be done as to guarantee the freedoms of civil society online. This assumption is further asserted with the categorical modality in the conclusion “A stand for Wikileaks is a stand for freedom of expression” - a truism which leaves no room for objection articulating both ideological considerations and advocacy discourse that works on common-sense assumptions (Deacon et. al. quoting Fairclough, 2007, 158).

Similar approach is used by RSF, which advances its ideology with the categorical and ahistorical statement “any restriction (on Wikileaks)...will affect the entire press”. This assertive generalisation works for establishing a hegemony of power of the RSF over activities and discourses articulated by other social groups against its own ideology framed by the restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org. It also helps for reaching
broader recipients and raise awareness, the importance of which is indicated by Sidorenko: “organizations like RSF can help a lot in raising awareness about such issues.” (Sidorenko, 2011).

ISOC takes a different linguistic approach and uses partly colloquial discourse and clichés such as to make a website “infamous through international press coverage and political intrigue”. Thus, ISOC assumes the responsibility to work against the political intrigue and the media in defending citizens rights online, implying the connection between media and politics and establishing a regime of truth in which Internet is seen as an alternative to subjective press coverage and the political intrigue. This responsibility is based in ISOC's ideology articulated through a narrative discourse in the categorical modal statement - “free expression and non-discrimination are essential to preserve the openness and utility of the Internet”. In this manner the focus is put on the processes forming the current Internet principles and not the agents, underlining the need of dialogue between of civil society and governments in forming these principles. This assumption is supported by the emphasis on “cooperation” as a feature of the Internet in the statement. In terms of representation, ISOC uses flexibly the pronoun “we” to first speak with the voice of the civil society, but later “we” changes to takes the meaning of “ISOC”, thus transitively establishing ISOC's role as a representative of the civil society voice. A feature of the statement is that it mentions Wikileaks only 3 times, mostly towards the end, while an impersonal non nominal phrasing such as “a website” is preferred. This indicates the use of framing to assert ISOC's role of a guardian of Internet freedom, for which role the restriction of access to wikileaks.org act as a legitimizing agent.

Another tactic used to challenge the governmental hegemony of truth in the case of wikileaks.org restriction is through stereotypes, such as PEN does. The work of stereotypes is relevant in application of ethnocentrism and suggests the existence of gross inequalities of power (Hall, 1997, 258-259). Thus, when PEN builds upon ideologically grounded stereotypes (“healthy societies”, “rights of citizens”) it suggests both the presence of power imbalances, and an attempt to present an ideal model of society, grounded in the principles that PEN stands for. In this way, PEN's position can
be understood as a way to struggle for hegemony in Gramsci sense (Hall, 1997, 259) through arguing for higher participation, getting a voice and representation on issues related to freedom of expression online. The statement is characterized with categorical modality and truisms, such as “Wikileaks is doing what the media has historically done” and the use of authoritative phrasing such as “marks a significant turning point”, and a look in the future expressed in categorical future tense “will inevitably lead”. In this way it is constructed a highly intertextual text suggesting possibilities for social change anchored around the ideology of the right to communicate online and the existing inequalities of power.

Yet another approach for influencing the power balances in the discussion is to discredit and diminish the authority of the dominating forces, which is used by Article XIX. It builds upon semiotical and linguistic constructions such as calling “foolish”, “irrational”, “counterproductive”, and “overbroad” the act of restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org suggesting governmental incompetence and lack of understanding of the principle of work of the Internet. Similarly to PEN, Article XIX uses a framing strategy to present the case as a violation of human rights law, enforced with a strong metaphor: “Bookstores and libraries are not closed and burned to the ground based on the publication of a single or multiple books”.

The same discrediting approach is used in Kenyan prime minister's statement on Wikileaks where he reduces the information in the cables to “gossip and rumours” in an attempt to diminish its significance. The US government also builds its position on this strategy, which is seen in the expressions: “we anticipate”, “field reporting...is candid and often incomplete”, “not an expression of policy” followed by the projected threats “could compromise”, “can deeply impact”, “put at risk”, “may also include” (White House, 2010), aiming to reduce the degree of truth and weight of statements, in order to regain its discredited authority. A notable feature of the US government discourse is the reassertion of power through paternalistic discourse elaborated Clinton's speech on Internet Rights and Wrongs (Clinton, 2011.), where she states that “to maintain an Internet that delivers the greatest possible benefits to the world, we need to have a serious conversation about the principles that guide us.” She uses her role of a woman
and parent in the assertive modal phrase “we need to have a serious conversation” suggesting strong hierarchical relation of power in which the US government assumes unilaterally a leading role not only to the US nation, but also to the world and its problems, in which the issue about freedom of information and the ideology of the right to communicate online are replaced by the discourse of the global benefits from the US unilateral policy. The feminine role is later replaced by the voice of a leader, by using statements such as “I disagree.”, “Let me be clear.”, “One final word on this matter.” (Clinton, 2011) mixing a feminine, and leadership discourse. The latter is further expressed in through truisms like “The U.S. government’s ability to protect America… to secure the liberties of our people… and to support the rights and freedoms of others around the world depends on…”. In terms of the multi-stakeholder approach to Internet Governance, Clinton's speech suggests a positive attitude seen in the statement “In the past year, we have welcomed the emergence of a global coalition of countries, businesses, civil society groups, and digital activists seeking to advance these goals. We have found strong partners in several governments worldwide.” (Clinton, 2011). However, the use of “coalition” and “partners in several governments worldwide” suggests an ownership and power superiority in this process, assuming once more a leadership position in the conversation, supposedly determining its direction and tone. This acts as a framing tactic, which builds on universal values, and linguistic use to articulate and frame the direction of the US policy on Internet issues, legitimizing its own necessity and presence in the international affairs.

**Social practice**

Despite the difference in visions, structure, operations and driving motives, the statements indicate a general attempt of civil society actors to influence the existing models of governance and international Internet policy formation by using framing tactics by using the Wikileaks case as a context. They tend to take advantage of flexible discourses, such as the human rights or the ideal for Western democracy, and use them in a “normative-tactical” approach (Mueller et. al., 2007, 277) which helps articulate a vision of more direct civil society involvement in decision-making processes that reflects global online communities. It also indicates that communication rights ideology,
along with the process for establishing a multi-stakeholder Internet governance have a rather broad scope and lack determination in terms of actors, power relations and roles, which provides an opportunity to change existing frameworks of governance and attribute a higher role to actors, which have been more passive until now. In the same time, the context of the ideology of freedom to communicate, and the lack of international model of regulation of the Internet opens up “the public space beyond the nation-state and, thereby, to some extent bypasses, or rather escapes, state and market colonization” (Bailey et. al., 2008, 154). It also suggests the power of mass self-communication\(^9\) enabled by alternative media on the Internet, which explains also the strong reactions and restrictive policy discourses articulated by the US government and ENISA. The Wikileaks website have become a channel for such self-communication, exposing improper or unlawful behaviour of politicians highlighting the challenge to policy makers - “there is no longer any privacy for political leaders” (Castells, 2009, 248). It suggests also the power of this new type of communication which allows any news to be released in any form from any source and immediately virally diffused over the Internet thus having the ability to ignite allegations of scandal in a matter of hours (Castells, 2009, 248).

A problem of the statements of the civil society actors is that while there are points in common between the articulated ideology, there are problems related to the representative role of the civil society organisations in governance which remains unclear. While each civil society actor – NGO, group or organisation – takes the authority to give a voice and represent the visions and discourses of certain social groups and interests, the authority to do that in an international context is doubtful. This becomes apparent when trying to influence the discussion about participatory Internet governance. Bailey suggests that it is at this level of representation that tensions and difficulties, such as for example the dominance of civil society representatives from the West, are exposed. (Bailey et. al., 2008, 151). This difficulty is seen in the case with wikileaks.org restriction, where statements of civil society actors outside of the West are scarce, despite that individuals might have an opinion on the case and on Internet

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\(^9\) Self-communication is understood as “a new form of interactive communication...characterized by the capacity of sending messages from many to many, in real time or chosen time, and with the possibility of using point-to-point communication” (Castells, 2009, 55)
principles, as seen from the few interviews taken in this study. There is a need for more representation and a voice and the use of framing tactics, combined with politically-analytical-expert discourses in order to speak to politicians/governments. The use of these discourses suggests that the recipients are governments as the language used is similar to theirs. This also highlights the issues with representation and participation, as well as the higher role in direct governance which civil society actors are more and more trying to play.

**THEME 2. Neo-liberalism vs net neutrality**

In this section I look specifically in the way neo-liberal discourse is articulated, both in civil society actors’ statements, and in governmental positions on the restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org, and how it relates to the concept of net neutrality, and multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance.

The essence of the net neutrality principle is that a “maximally useful public information network aspires to treat all content, sites, and platforms equally” (Wu, 2003) which is usually brought up in economic context, but has later been broadened up to recognize its role for development: “This has enabled the development of a wide range of new ICT activities, industries and services ‘at the ends’ and turns the Internet into an important tool within the wider context of economic and societal development.” (WGIG, 2005, 5). Making explicit the connection between economic and social development suggests a neo-liberal approach to development. In the same report, the WGIG states that the net neutrality is among the important elements when considering the Internet governance arrangements (WGIG, 2005, 5).

**Discursive practice**

In its highly interdiscursive statement called “Wikileaks and the Implications for Companies”, the Global Network Initiative (GNI) articulates, among others, analytical, neoliberal, legal, political and globalization-related discourses that put in opposition private companies and governments, and suggest a working model of multi-stakeholder
decision-making mechanism by example of its own structure. The neoliberal discourse is related to the principle of net-neutrality, and will be further examined in the text (linguistic) analysis, to show how it creates a connection between the case with restriction of access to [www.wikileaks.org](http://www.wikileaks.org), the concept of the multi-stakeholder model of governance, and the ideology of the right to communicate. GNI also emphasises the importance of the private sector in providing the technical solutions for Internet access, and assigns the companies the role of guardians to freedom of expression and privacy online. This is a shift from the positions of most of the other civil society actors whose statements are analysed, and who claim this role to be theirs, and not companies' or government's. Similar vision is shared by The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) which along with political and advocacy-expert discourses also articulates a neo-liberal one. This establishes certain connections to the neo-liberal discourse articulated by US government in Clinton's statement (Clinton, 2010), in which economic growth is marked as an important task and milestone in US's foreign policy, legitimising a broad range of actions of the US government internationally. It also aims at preserving and reaffirming the US values and policy for international development based on neo-liberal policy, which is clearly articulated linguistically in the text.

The neo-liberal discourse can be contrasted to the articulation of an advocacy an scientific-technical discourses arguing for net-neutrality expressed by, for example, ISOC, RSF and Article XIX. The latter organisations advocate for net-neutrality with the argument to preserve the freedom of Internet and of communication online, while not bringing an explicit connection to the neo-liberal agenda. The UN Special Rapporteur statement articulates in turn an advocacy discourse with the aim to advance the necessity of safeguarding the information neutrality from corporate interests. As Sidorenko from Global Voices Russia categorically states, “Restricting access to wikileaks and prosecuting Julian Assange is WRONG. It is an example of careless and hipocritical censorship.” (Sidorenko, 2011)

**Text practice**

In the statement of GNI, Wikileaks is mentioned only three times, all of which used to
underscore the troubles for the companies which they face from governments in relation to the freedoms of expression. In comparison, the word “companies” occurs 12 times in the text, sometimes twice in the same sentence (including in the introductory first sentence in the statement). Thus, it becomes obvious that the text uses the case of restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org as a starting point to advance the role of corporations in the Internet field, presented in the light of defending “customers’” or citizens' interests. The softer tone towards governments, contrasts to the statements of the other civil society actors such as ISOC's which articulates a clear support to the net-neutrality principle and no governmental control in “Free expression should not be restricted by governmental or private controls over computer hardware or software, telecommunications infrastructure, or other essential components of the Internet” (ISOC, 2010). The moderate modality towards the role of governments in Internet issues suggests legitimises their hegemony - “(governments) have internationally recognized obligations regarding the rights of privacy and freedom of expression of their citizens” and that they have “an obligation to safeguard freedom of expression”.

What is more, GNI uses the term “citizens” only once in the very beginning to mention their dependence on digital communication, but the rest of the text uses the term “customers” to refer to the same group of citizens, who use the Internet, implying a corporate and neoliberal discourse. This suggests that despite that GNI also supports the ideology of the right to communicate, it is much more moderate in it comparing to the statements of other civil society actors, and does not question the role of governments in securing the freedom of expression. However, from a neo-liberal perspective, this discourse can also be understood as a way to keep the Internet with as little restrictions as possible, in order to preserve it attractive for users seen as “customers” who will keep paying for the service. GNI also works for legitimising the role of companies in protection of information, connecting the discussion to the multi-stakeholder model of Internet Governance, suggesting/advancing a “confidential, collaborative approach” in support to ICT companies when dealing with “challenges of corporate responsibility in the ICT sector”.

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), as well as the US government advance further the neo-liberal discourse establishing a close connection to net-neutrality. In the case of
the former, this discourse is articulated in the interview with Segal, when in the context of policy recommendations he states “We believed that (the Internet) was primarily a commercial space and we should let commercial actors take the lead and government would basically stay out of the way.” The use of “we” suggests that CFR’s own policy is rooted in neo-liberalism and sees Internet primarily from a commercial but not social aspect. Later on, the case of restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org case is used as an argument to both defend the net-neutrality concept, and to project a picture of the future development of the discussion, speculating with possible developments if not adhering to the policies suggest by the CFR (“as the Wikileaks event has shown, definitions of free speech, of company responsibility, differ by national jurisdictions”). On the other hand, suggestions for a participatory and multi-stakeholder approach are found in the frequent use of common - “common ground” “common, accepted” expressed though in the light of low probability to achieve.

In the case of U.S. government, the neo-liberal discourse builds upon its self-elected role of a guardian of the global economy that frames its role of a global leader and decision-maker: “advancing a robust foreign policy that is focused on advancing America’s national interests and leading the world in solving the most complex challenges of our time, from fixing the global economy....to advancing human rights and universal values.”(Clinton, 2010). The advancement of a neo-liberal policy, and establishment of hegemony of American values abroad is done through personification, articulated in the concluding statement of commitment of the US government “to build a better, more prosperous world for all”, “fixing the global economy”, “advance economic prosperity”, “ensure global economic stability”.

In contrast to the neo-liberal discourse in advancing the principle of net-neutrality, Article XIX builds upon an advocacy-political discourse to present the need of this principle, structuring its statement in a typical for political speech way consisting of premise-implicit-premise-conclusion (Fairclough, 1995a, 249). The premise is built around a narrative-analytical discourse which represents the position and chronology of events around the denial of services to Wikileaks, interweaving elements of the ideology of the right to communicate as seen in “...raise several issues about the rights
of free expression on the internet, which is largely controlled by private companies but still subject to state threats”. This connection is presented as a threat to the freedom of communication on the Internet which is rooted in the intervention of governments and companies in online matters that until now have enjoyed a complete low level of regulation. It reflects the process of appropriation and management of broadband traffic circulating through the “Information Superhighways by the major network operators, who become the ones responsible for restricting free virtual space, while the world has paid attention to protect the freedom of expression online by governments” (Castells, 2009, 107).

Social practice

The case of restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org shows that adhering to net neutrality is a precondition for a multi-stakeholder model of governance, in which civil society, governments, companies and other actors maintain relations of equality. However, the success in implementing this principle in practice might be undermined if the neo-liberal discourse continues dominating, since it impacts media policies and force service providers to adopt a market and efficiency driven approaches (Bailey et.al., 2008, 23). Thus there is a point of conflict between neo-liberal agenda and net-neutrality, provoked by the fact that while companies rely on profits to exist, they can not be expected to adhere to particular civil society ideals and be neutral. As, Chadwick mentions (2009, 393), the neo-liberal approach in relation to the net-neutrality principle brings up a conflict of interest between governments that seek to empower or exploit its citizens, companies trying to manipulate markets, users trying protect their online connections, and the experts working on keeping the integrity of the Internet., and is therefore a threat to the multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance. This in turn highlights the importance of www.wikileaks.org as an alternative media, which as such plays a role of an actor at “...the crossroads of civil society, their elusiveness, and their interconnections and linkages with market and state” (Bailey et al, 2008, 27). This approach is claimed to allow for mapping the threats to the existence of this type of media, such as for example losing financial or other independence (Bailey et al, 2008, 30).
THEME 3. Disruptive practices vs cyber-security

In this theme I look at the relation between extreme reactions from the technical/hackers community to the restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org, and the criminalization and advancement of protective legislation by governments as a response expressed through official statements.

Discursive practice

In the context of the case of restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org, the actions and statement of Anonymous are a position of an activist movement that exists in a different social order built online. This is a feature of the Internet, which “creates a virtual world which often lacks a corresponding real-world counterpart” (Hafez, 2005, 100). However, the distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks of Anonymous aiming at interrupting the operation of Mastercard, and Paypal serve as a bridge between virtual and physical, showing what impact can the virtual world have on the physical one affecting social, cultural and political practices.

Looking at the hackers and hacktivist community statements, both Anonymous and the 2600 Magazine (further referred as 2600) articulate strong military discourse (“assault”, “fight”, “attacking websites”) related to the DDoS attacks against companies which have denied to service www.wikileaks.org. The use of such discourse indicates the efforts of the community to challenge the presumably imposed social order on the (hackers) community (2600, 2011), and trying to establish a different one online by using technology for educating and counteracting to existing social and governance models. Although dominant, this discourse is complemented with articulations of educational, technical and idealistically-political discourses which altogether serve as a legitimation strategy to their respective goals – to “raise awareness about Wikileaks and the underhanded methods employed by...companies to impair Wikileaks' ability to function” (Anonymous, 2010), and help Wikileaks to properly function online (2600, 2010). While condemning the actions of Anonymous, both 2600 Magazine and Anonymous share the ideology of most of the other civil society organisations in focus -
the freedom of expression and the right to communicate online as a human right, evidence of which is seen in the articulation of educational and technical discourses. In the same time, 2600 draws a clear border between itself and Anonymous, on the grounds of authority and reputation in the online technical community through the articulation of a highly corporate discourse (“...has been publishing...for the hacker community since 1984”) and by precedents which it has set. (2600, 2010).

Governmental reaction to the actions of the hacktivist community also articulate military discourse in an attempt to criminalize certain actions that take place online, and applying similar methods of control as for actions outside of the virtual world. For example, ENISA uses a security-defensive discourse, complemented with technical and political ones. In the context of cybersecurity and disruptive practices, these discourses advance the need for creating defence mechanisms on the Internet and assuming responsibility for working towards such mechanisms. Connecting Wikileaks to cybercrime\(^\text{10}\) is a common discourse articulated by governments in their statements on the case, in order to use national security to justify censorship. The US approach is similarly rooted in the traditional way in which governments react to activism, and articulates security-defensive discourses in a way which suggests a lack of understanding of the social order existing online. This is implied by the low interdiscursivity of the US White House statement (White House, 2010) on Wikileaks, in which the status quo is tried to be preserved, by ignoring the emergence and significance of the Internet as a media tool for communication.

**Text practice**

The belonging of the Anonymous to a separate social movement, existing primarily in the virtual world of the Internet is seen in the way it defines themselves - “average Internet Citizens” or “Internet gathering” (Anonymous, 2010). This definition and the articulated discourses suggest that their counteractions against the restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org can be interpreted as an example of the merge of computer

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\(^{10}\) cybercrime, also called computer crime, the use of a computer as an instrument to further illegal ends, such as committing fraud, trafficking in child pornography and intellectual property, stealing identities, or violating privacy. Cybercrime, especially through the Internet, has grown in importance as the computer has become central to commerce, entertainment, and government. (cybercrime, 2011)
hacking with political activism, include information redirection, and website sabotage among others (Dahlgren, 2009, 197). The political activism is obvious in the expression that their actions are “a legitimate expression of dissent”, which suggests that the rest of activities around the restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org were not legitimate, thus needing addressing. The military discourse is built through linguistic constructions such as “the command structure of Anonymous”, “loose and decentralized command structure”, “operates”, “attacks”, the naming of their campaigns called “Operations”, such as “Operation Payback” for Wikileaks, which suggests that the Anonymous experience their actions to be equivalent to a camp against governmental and corporate control. A problem, though is the lack of consistency or permanent adherence to particular goals and ideology, articulated in the phrase “our current goal is”… suggesting that Anonymous are flexible and their reaction, goals and values depending on each single case. In the same time, the idealistically political discourse leads to a placement of Anonymous in its own social category: its structure is based on “ideas rather on directives”, as well as in “our motivation is a collective sense of being being fed up with all the minor and major injustices we witness everyday”, “it is a symbolic action”, “a legitimate expression of dissent” while justifying its actions through an educational discourse. The latter discourse is in turn used by 2600 magazine to differentiate itself from Anonymous, taking a stand for education and not activism. The statement articulates the fears from the consequences of extreme hacktivist actions on the way Internet is regulated - “This will play right into the hands of those who wish to paint us all as threats and clamp down on freedom of speech and impose all kinds of new restrictions on the Internet, … and the exact same types of attacks can be used on “us” as well as “them””. The use of colloquial discourse, the mix of low with high modality (“will play”, “and clamp down”), and the differentiation between “us” and “them” that creates a representational binary in the inferred meaning of which is “us – the hackers, citizens” and them “governments” suggests the inequalities and struggles for shifting the existing power balances which on the Internet are leaning in favour of the citizens due mostly to the lack of legislation. The use of metaphors such as “will play right into the hands”, “paint us all” is important for the choice of representations (Fairclough, 1995b, 114), and implies an ongoing process of competition with governments over determining rules on the Internet, and getting the right for condemning what actions are
right or wrong, seen more as a game by the hackers community. The use of “people” instead of “customers”, “stakeholders” or other term indicates the belonging of the community to a rather social, and not neo-liberal ideology.

The gap between the online communities and governments is highlighted in the White House Statement on Wikileaks, through the expression “...and when the substance ...is printed on the front pages of newspapers across the world...” suggesting that at least in the first days after the release of cables, the US government underestimated the role and power of Internet as a media. This lack of understanding is affirmed also in the interview with Bebinov, who states that the restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org was “a useless procedure — the information anyway got to the reader”11 (Bebinov, 2011). Then Clinton uses an assertive modal statement to disclaim any political activism activities - “...I want to set the record straight: there is nothing laudable about endangering innocent people, and there is nothing brave about sabotaging the peaceful relations between nations on which our common security depends” (Clinton, 2010). Calling the release of the cables “sabotage” is evidence for a military discourse that suggests a criminal character of the actions. In another statement, Clinton presents the Wikileaks case as an “act of theft” (Clinton, 2011) legitimising the actions on elaboration of policy and legislation on cybersecurity which is suggested as a positive for empowering developing countries and the Internet infrastructure - “we are leading the push to strengthen cyber-security and online innovation - building capacity in developing countries, championing open and interoperable standards, and enhancing international cooperation to respond to cyber threats.” Thus it is established a high degree of transitivity, which correlates cyber-security with international development the ground of which will be set by the US in its assumed role of the one setting the tone.

- “And in the coming year, the Administration will complete an international strategy for cyberspace, charting the course to continue this work in the future. This is a foreign policy priority, one that will only increase in importance in the coming years” (Clinton, 2011). Although arguing for similar policies, the ENISA's statement uses discourse and language in a different way, namely through highly impersonal and categorical statements presented as facts, constructing a picture of non-determinism and a relation

11 Translation from Russian is mine.
between political pressure, hacktivism, and irreversibility of information leakage to the need of EU legislation to respond to these “threats” (ENISA, 2010). It thus has a justifying role in the actions of the European Commission when determining its policy. This suggestion is strengthened by the presence of a quote by the director of ENISA who articulates an expert and authority discourse by stating “The freedom the internet allows in moving between jurisdictions and technologies makes cyber security an asymmetric challenge”. The repetitive presentation of the case as “challenge” is another way to justify the necessity of the ENISA and EU work towards cyber security and while highlighting the need for global cooperation to face it, the omission of civil society actors in the whole statement suggests that its role is perceived as a disruptive actor threatening the hegemony of power and governance, against which measures should be taken.

Social practice

Criminalising certain behaviour online opens the path for governmental censorship. This in turn puts a challenge in front of the advancement of the concept of participatory communication and multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance, since the attempts of civil society actors to get their voice heard or disclaim government authority by using the Internet as a media can easily be presented as cybercrime and threats to security. It also confirms Castells' argument that the regulation of Internet has shifted its focus from the Internet itself “to specific instances of censorship and repression by government bureaucracies, and to the privatization of the global communication infrastructure that supports Internet traffic” (Castells, 2009, 115). He further suggests that in this way, the Internet thrives as a communication medium of our age, but submitting to “relentless pressure from two essential sources of domination...: capital and the state” (Castells, 2009, 116). The interdiscursivity in the hackers and hacktivist communities views reflects processes of social change in the light of cultural heterogeneity and individualisation in versions of alternative politics (Dahlgren, 2009, 197). Censorship practices and restriction can make the Internet as a communication tool less profitable, if it loses its main features: interactivity and unfettered communication, regardless of how surveilled it is (Castells, 2009, 421). While this can be a threat for the use of
Internet as a communication channel representing a freedom of expression ideology, it seems hard to control it in a traditional ways. Castells argues that while people can surrender their privacy in order to connect to the Internet and become advertising targets, but once in the cyberspace, they challenge corporate power, dismantle government authority, and change the cultural foundations of our civilization (Castells, 2009, 421). Thus the Internet becomes an excellent medium for civil society empowerment, in which “the more corporations invest in expanding communication networks, the more people build their own networks of mass self-communication, thus empowering themselves” (Castells, 2009, 421).

THEME 4. Development issues and the democratic dimension of the multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance

Although not as intensive as other discourses, the discussion about the restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org touches upon certain issues of development and social change which can be related to participatory communication and the multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance. In this theme I will look closer at these issues, for which the taken interviews will help to build a wider picture.

Discursive practice

Development discourse is articulated in different ways in the analysed texts. For example, the statement by RSF starts with a narrative discourse which focuses on the censorship practices applied by the US Senate committee on Homeland Security, the governments of Thailand and China, and the threat of governmental censorship put by the French government, suggesting similarities in their approaches to freedom of information. This expresses an idealization of the Western model, and the contrast of it to the, suggested, not so good Eastern way of online principles and governance. It articulates a discourse of advancement of a Western type of democracy and civil society participation in decision making through dominating discourses. This approach is criticized in the CFR statement, along with the US approaches related to the regulation of Internet. Through an expert discourse, Segal generalises the restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org as a clear “challenge to the whole rhetoric of Internet freedom”
(CFR, 2010), indicating also a challenge in front of making the Internet democratic. Another approach is used in the UN/IACHR statement where through a narrative discourse efficiency of self-regulation is articulated for transparency and awareness.

While most of the public governmental positions and reactions on preventing the access to www.wikileaks.org have come from the West in the face of the US government, ENISA (EU), and intergovernmental agencies, the statement of the Kenyan prime minister stands out as being one of the few African countries reacting with an official governmental position on the case, including taking a stand for the freedom to communicate online. This suggests that the case is used to make the voice heard of this country on matters in which normally the Western/Northern discourses dominate. The Kenyan statement uses the discourse about human rights flexibly, in order to advance the country's commitment to freedoms of access of information through its new constitution. Thus, the Kenyan prime minister uses the Wikileaks context to frame the political development in Kenya as a legitimising strategy, trying to change the existing human rights discourse into an image carrying positive associations for his country. In the same time, the statement articulates a discourse of fear from the eventual revelations that the cables could show.

Development discourse is also present in the interviews that were taken. A strong example of that is the interview with Schombe (2011) from the Congolese organisation Centre Africain d’Echange Culturel (CAFEC) who articulates a development and advocacy discourses in the context of communication and information technologies, including the Internet. The development discourse is introduced through contrasts and generalisations, and even stereotypes in a way which suggests the interviewee's belonging to a higher social class not concerned with the survival which he talks about, but with development issues. Sidorenko (2011) from Global Voices Russia also articulates a development discourse in connection to the level of education and computer literacy in the country, suggesting their inclusion in strategies for bringing higher attention to a multi-stakeholder model of governance and Internet policy awareness at local level. Bebinov (2011) from GIPI Kyrgyzstan points out through an advocacy discourse the problem with democracy of the Internet governance process,
which suffers from international under-representation of non-Western participants who normally are present at local level.

**Text practice**

The development discourse in Schombe Baudouin's statement is introduced through contrasts and generalisations, even stereotypes, such as “In developed countries”, “Unlike non-democratic countries or developing countries”, and the strong “90% of the population will not understand anything because the focus of their concern is survival.” The articulation of the discourse in third person (“their”) suggests that Baudouin represents a higher social class not concerned with the “survival” (using his term), but with development issues. Remarkable is the establishment of hegemony of truth/power in reducing to equal “non-democratic” to “developing” countries and highlighting the irrelevance of the discussion about CableGate and the restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org from a local perspective. From a broader perspective of communication for development it highlights the problem of representation, particularly relevant for the African countries that tend to be under represented in the global fora. The problem of exclusion in the Internet governance process is indicated by Bailey as existing both within the civil society actors, and within international organisations such as the UN (Bailey et al, 2007, 106). While Baudouin articulates a strong belonging to the participatory ideology and wanting to see civil society participation in governance, it becomes clear through his discourse that this possibility in an African context is limited to a small layer of the society. By using categorical modal statements such as “it is imperative”, “despite the reluctance of some governments” to place the importance of the multi-stakeholder approach in which civil society participation is high, then switching to a more open modality as “it would be desirable” in the same context. The difference in modalities shows an orientation towards different actors – in the first case Badouin's message addresses civil society and governments, while in the latter – to the generic NGOs in “developed countries”. Badouin articulates also the ideology of the right to communicate as human right by articulating an expert discourse in quoting authoritative texts. Personal discourse “in my humble opinion” changes suddenly into the pronoun “we” when talking about wikileaks.org and governments accountability.
The interview features also transitivity in establishing the link between democracy, power of communication, and governments' defects through the metaphor "A government is composed of men and women who have qualities and defects. The use of information technology and communication is specified by texts which have been discussed worldwide during both phases of WSIS in compliance with international instruments especially the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is up to each party to make an objective reading of these instruments in the use of this technology.” (Schombe, interview).

Another way to work with the development discourse is by civil society putting governments into a representation binary, as in the RSF statement by using nominalisation of governments of Thailand and China, and comparing them to censorship practices of US Senate committee on Homeland Security, and the French government on www.wikileaks.org. Such nominalisation works for contrasting the Western democratic ideal of freedom of speech against the Southern model of authoritative governance through censorship, supporting it with a highly modal adjective “shocked” in “shocked to find countries such as France and the United States suddenly bringing their policies on freedom of expression into line with those of China”. This counter-positioning also plays a delegitimizing function against the credibility and trust to Western democratic governments. The lack of trust and application of dual standards serves as a ground to articulate later in the text a mixed advocacy-political and communication discourse, and to defend the need of RSF as a guardian of free journalism both online and offline. Moreover, through the use of mixed discourses, or interdiscursivity, it is underlined the precedence and importance of the case, as well as its uniqueness - “the first time we have seen an attempt at the international community level to censor a website dedicated to the principle of transparency”. It suggests also the problem of governmental accountability, which according to Markovski, can be realised “only in countries with democratic traditions, or democratic institutions; in many countries with restriction of the Internet, that's not the case.“ (Markovski, 2011) The attribution of unique qualities to the case works also for marking a new step, a change in the relations between civil society and governments online, in which civil society threatens the power of governments. Evidence for such
assumption is seen in the sudden switch between the impersonal 3rd person use of “Reporters Without Borders” is replaced with the personal pronoun “we” that suggests identification with the recipients of the message and taking the role of representing them. Thus, the use of “we” becomes clearly strategically-political, and besides meaning the RSF itself, it implies also the “international community”, taking thus the power to become a channel for representing the international community's interests.

The assertion of Western values, or particularly US ones is strongly articulated in Clinton's statement (Clinton, 2010). The speech is focused mainly on the event of releasing documents under the CableGate case, but there are some elements, which make relevant the discussion about civil society participation in decision making. She speaks about “our democracy” suggesting a dominant discourse and imposition of the U.S. model to other countries and processes. This is underlined through a language use that suggests also collective actions and creativity online from a global perspective framed though in the boundaries of the U.S. vision - “we hail from every corner of the world”, “we all shape and are shaped”, “we need to”, “all two billion of us and counting” (Clinton, 2011). After a long introduction full of examples and building upon the message of “us”, and framing the discussion based on human values which the US represents, protects and promotes globally - “It is our values that cause these stories to inspire or outrage us—our sense of human dignity, the rights that flow from it, and the principles grounded in it.” The leadership in all spheres of policy and influence are clearly articulated here, and suggest that other issues such as the way Internet is governed will also become a priority in the US foreign policy when it concerns the US interests.

In the UN/IAHCR statement, in which both organisations assume the role of international, multi-lateral and superseding body acting as a representatives of the global population, advocates for greater civil society participation in policy making and demanding accountability from nation-states: “Without the protection of this right, it is impossible for citizens to know the truth, demand accountability and fully exercise their right to political participation”. This statement is highly transitive, establishing the relation between the freedom of communication as a human right and the civil society
political participation, as well as implies that information provided officially by
governments might not always be trustful. This assumption is confirmed by the
assertively modal statement by Sidorenko (2011) who suggests two main problems that
were caused by the restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org: the first one is what he
calls “Privacy 2.0”, meaning that what is in electronic version has a big chance to leak
online, and second, the “hypocrisy of the U.S. government towards freedom of speech
and a failure to cope with its own transparency issues.” (Sidorenko, 2011). The
advancement of these arguments is a way to empower civil society actors, and promote
the democratic values of the West, by attributing functions such as “consolidation,
functioning and preservation of democratic regimes”, suggesting the necessity of these
three measures.

Mueller suggests the difficulties in introducing a democratic framework of Internet
governance in the interview, calling the assumed sovereignty of the nation-states over
internet policy issues in the UN Tunis Agenda “self-contradictory and unworkable”,
emphasizing through a strong high attitude modality phrase that national governments
have no sovereignty over the global internet and advancing the civil-society ideology
that governments should cooperate with other actors in influencing the internet.
(Mueller, 2011). This opinion is shared by Markovski, who points out that the
framework of governance is a dangerous idea because of the different traditions in
governance of the countries.(Markovski, 2011)

Such fears are expressed also in the CFR statement by the categorical conclusion which
a determined temporal line: “that is going to”, “we're going to see” enforced by the
metaphor of “further balkanization” where the role of governments and their authority
on Internet issues is questioned. “Balkanization” is a political term, used when referring
to the fragmentation or breakup of a region or country into smaller regions or countries.
(Balkanization, 2011). The use of this term in the context of Internet governance
suggests the problems of lack of common agreement on how it should be exercised,
implying a struggle for power and interests of the different social groups involved in the
process. The ultimate message of the text is that regulation is needed to define the roles
of the different actors on the Internet and in the same time guarantee free speech for the
civil society. “Even though [the Internet is] transnational, companies are located in physical spaces and can be prosecuted by specific national governments”. The advancement of this message is used by using the CableGate case as an example, proving both the truth and the need for this approach, and suggesting that if measures are not taken, future problems are to come.

**Social practice**

An issue which emerges from the articulated discourses is the participation of actors from the “global South” in global discussions related to Internet problems, including on discussions related to civil society participation in a multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance (Mueller et.al., 2007, 292). Mueller concludes that the global ideals of “democratic” communication are not meaningful “until and unless the advocates of democracy are able to propose and enact”, meaning the prevailing participation of actors from the “North-West” in the debate. (Mueller et. al., 2007, 292). The general lack of statements by African, and Asian actors suggests a representation problem in process of global scale and importance that lacks addressing, including internally in most of the civil society actors. As Bailey argues, both governments and civil society should work more on inclusive and representation of all interested parties. However, it also reveals constraints such as the dominance of participants form the Northern hemisphere, and of experts and civil society professionals. In order for an actor to be taken seriously a high degree of knowledge and skills is required. (Bailey et. al., 2008, 105)

From a development perspective, the articulated discourses around the Wikileaks CableGate case show a need to advance in an inclusive way international principles for governing the behaviour of the different actors on the Internet. These principles should clearly reflect the ideology of the right to communicate as human right, and empower citizens through higher participation in governance. These questions are directly connected to the debate about Internet governance, in which the UN has a leadership and active position thus suggesting the importance and underlying principles which should be adhered to.
What is contradictory though in the UN/IACHR statement is that while single governments were claimed to exercise pressure on the provision of Internet services to www.wikileaks.org, such practices are condemned by the supreme, intergovernmental bodies. This shows that the bigger representation, the less unilateral control over controversial issues can be exercised, thus laying the path to a multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance.
CHAPTER V. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

Conclusions
After analysing the statements of civil society actors, a question which must be answered in the framework of critical discourse analysis is why did the civil society organisations and groups issue statements on the case with restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org. And why exactly these groups? The analysis suggests that the case was used mostly to advance and defend the ideology of the right to communicate, using the big outreach of Wikileaks as a framing tactic helping to have the voices of the civil society actors heard. The case helped civil society actors to present their positions on the issues related to Internet principles and/or Internet governance in defending the right to communicate online and legitimize their presence in the debate. The arguments of the civil society actors are build around the necessity of governments to follow the laws in cases such as the restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org, but in practice such laws of international character valid for the Internet field are absent. This connects the discussion to the debate about Internet governance and legitimises the necessity of a model of governance of Internet relying on inclusive, participatory and democratic principles. Therefore, the answer to the research question is that while the connection of the restriction to www.wikileaks.org to multi-stakeholder governance of Internet is not explicitly named in the analysed material, the articulated necessity of Internet principles, democratic framework, development issues, the discussion about censorship, cybersecurity, net neutrality and relations with companies, as well as the suggested role of civil society organisations in finding solutions to address constitute the major discussion of Internet governance in which policy solutions to these issues are sought through the multi-stakeholder model of governance.

The main arguments advanced by the civil society and governments in the analysed material are the necessity of legitimate principles and democratically valid framework which would secure the right to communicate and freedom of expression online. While the civil society argues for a need of a joint dialogue with governments, awareness and education on Internet values and social principles online, network neutrality, freedom of expression and protection of online journalism, governmental arguments are anchored
in security, protection, and economic development through neo-liberal policies. In the
governmental statements, unconditional freedom of expression is only articulated in the
UN statement, suggesting a discrepancy between the individual governmental policies
and principles, and the discussions that take place at an intergovernmental level. In the
governmental statements it was also articulated a certain level of underestimation of the
Internet as a media. This was in turn used by the civil society actors to undermine the
authority of governments and by ridiculing the attempts of governments to restrict the
access to www.wikileaks.org, underline the need of participation civil society actors in
policy-formation question.

The threats of articulating a predominantly security discourse and lack of representation
of the so called developing countries is presented by Deibert of significance to the
Internet Governance debate. Deibert (et. al., 2010, 11) suggests that given the strategic
importance of the OSCE region (including 56 participating states), the norms emerging
from this region will have consequence over the world, underlining that the
understanding those impacts will be of paramount importance for Internet governance at
all levels in years to come. He speaks also about the “security first” orientation toward
Internet governance, driven in part by the fear of terrorism and in part by concerns of
protecting vulnerable populations (particularly children) from exploitation, leading to
the normalization of censorship across all sectors of cyberspace (Deibert et. al., 2010,
11). While the case with restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org was not directly
connected to the fear of terrorism, the articulated governmental discourses suggested a
threat to populations caused by the revelations in the published cables, giving a ground
to proceed with discussions about restrictive policies concerning cybercrime and
security. A multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance where all stakeholders are
represented would be able to moderate such practices, so that the freedom to
communicate is ensured, and the governmental hegemony will be moderated.

Social change
The variety and mixture of discourses articulated in the statements of the civil society
actors, and the mixture of language – political, advocacy, expert, colloquial, military,
human rights suggests a process of ongoing social change, while the relative stability in
the governmental discourses – security and economic development – speaks about an effort to preserve the current form of governance and power domination over civil society, and attempt to map online. These discourses and attempts of governments are led by the traditional way of conducting media politics – by attaching text to images (Castells, 2007, 242) and personalization which is seen in all governmental statements part of the analysis, except the UN one. To the contrary, the statements of the civil society organisations lack this personification, but build instead upon ideological constraints and common-sense based framing tactics which suggests the approach of mass self-communication which Castells talks about (Castells, 2007, 246). The self-communication, he develops, leads to the formation of “horizontal networks of interactive communication that connect local and global in chosen time”, and that determine a new communication realm of self-generated content, self-directed emission, and self-selected reception by many that communicate with many. (Castells, 2007, 246).

The Wikileaks CableGate has worked as an alternative medium with the typical qualities typical for such medium: to be capable of bypassing mechanisms of control imposed by either the state and generative alternative discourses (Bailey et. al., 2008, 81). While these mechanisms help for civil society empowerment and for removing the traditional control over information, a common problem is the lack of commonly agreed principles that are of international validity which would safeguard the Western democratic values and the principle of free communication online by avoiding an arbitrary exertion of power by companies, governments or civil society on services and processes related to online information resources. On the other hand, the focus on Western democratic values highlights another problem – the one of representation of other areas and the focus on maintaining the Western hegemony of power through spreading cultural and governance values presented in the light of a necessity to adhere to them. The problem is deepened by the absence of African and Asian voices in the discussion both about wikileaks.org and about Internet governance at an international level thus reducing the possibilities to change the discourse. It also speaks about problems of developmental character – their focus is simply not there, and the case did not have such an importance, because as Schoumbe sad, a vast majority of the people are concerned with their surviving. This problem is summarised by Bailey, stating that
when coming to actual decision-making, the Internet provides access to the process but
does not facilitate full participation in it, and “civil society action is increasingly
influential mainly because it builds common agendas and strives towards consensus”
(Bailey et. al., 2008, 106).

Discussion
With this in mind, the debate around the restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org as a
consequence to the information published by Wikileaks in the CableGate case can be
understood as a struggle for power, reflecting Castells model of self-communication in a
network society where “social movements and rebellious individuals ... build their
autonomy and confront the institutions of society in their own terms and around their
own projects” (Castells, 2007, 249). This struggle takes place on ideological level, a
side result of which is the advocacy of a line of a global activism by the civil society,
directed at “political issues of a transnational kind” and “growing, and increasingly
making use of the Internet” (Dahlgren, 2009, 191). This kind of global activism on the
Internet appears to be according to Dahlgren quoting Jordan et.al. “the only way in
which communities or activist groups can express their choices and needs” (Dahlgren,
2009, 191) and can impact on the mainstream media information. In the same time,
global activism and the activities of “more institutionalized NGO global reformers”
(Dahlgren,2009, 193) ultimately results in a challenge to the neoliberal hegemony in the
contemporary processes of globalization (Dahlgren,2009, 193).

The use of activism through disruptive methods indicates the trends of emergence of
civil cultures that potentially support radical forms of alternative politics, and shows
how the technology interfaces with socio-cultural trends of political importance
(Dahlgren, 2009, 197). As Klang suggests, the alternative uses of technology should be
tolerated by both regulators and citizens, as they contribute to the socio-technical
development in general (Klang, 2006, 235). In the context of Internet governance,
although with doubtful legitimacy, such rather extreme activist positions confirm on one
hand the sense of ownership which the technical and civil society communities have on
the Internet as an alternative communication and social space, while in the same time
raises questions of its regulation and legitimacy of actions of different social groups.
They also reflect processes of the struggle of civil society groups for having their voice heard and for higher participation in a democratic context using alternative methods to achieve this. It also points out the problem mentioned by Klang of our ability to deal with social dilemmas brought about by technology in which social control is a Faucauldian power struggle in which technology is not something we can chose to accept or not due to our existence in a technological state (Klang, 2006, 225). This relates also the hacktivist discourse to the social and power struggle in the process of Internet governance.

Dahlgren suggests that a reason for that is that citizens do not believe in the amenability of the formal political system to intervention (Dahlgren, 2009, 32). The highly unregulated Internet space thus provides a platform for activist politics and trying new models of governance and attempts to shift existing power balances. It also suggests that for achieving some kind of representation in decision on the Internet, this community of online activists can not be neglected, and legitimises the necessity of a multi-stakeholder approach to Internet governance. As Castells postulates, the media have become the social space where power is decided. (Castells, 2007, 238)

In terms of its relation to the discussion about multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance, it has highlighted several problems in front of governments and civil society actors which need addressing: (1) the civil society actors that defend the principles of freedom of communication online, net neutrality, and advocate higher participation in the decision-making process on policy issues lack representation – they work as self-appointed voices which lacks a formal channel for expressing a common voice. This is an argument also articulated by Mueller (et. al., 2007, 292.) and Bailey (et.al., 2008, 106) suggesting that issues related to representation and exclusion need to be addressed, not only by international organisations such as the UN, but also within the civil society itself, as it is at this level that tensions between representation, legitimization and participation emerge.

(2) on the other hand governments seem to treat online content and websites as virtual equivalents of traditional media and try to exercise similar control over them, not taking into account the horizontal structure and basic principles of Internet architecture and social order. In the context of the latter, Castells suggests that our societies shift “the
process of formation of the public mind from political institutions to the realm of communication, largely organized around the mass media.” (Castells, 2007, 259). From a communication and network theory perspective, the discourses and discussion articulated by governmental statements shows the potential of digitization to potential viral diffusion throughout global networks of communication (Castells, 2009, 418). He also suggests a notable feature of the networked communication, and use of Internet as highly positive for the diffusion of the message, but devastating if one wants to prevent its diffusion, which is a contrast from traditional media in which the message is reformatted to the audience accordingly to a corporate strategy (Castells, 2009, 418).

From a broader communication perspective, the attempts of primarily US governments and US based companies to restrict the access to www.wikileaks.org can be interpreted as a yet another representation of the loss of control over the communicative process by the US government in the context of whistleblowing (Bailey et. al., 2008, 82), after which measures towards implementation of restrictive policies are taken. This loss of control is not left unnoticed by the civil society actors who take advantage to break the power hegemony in Foucauldian sense and take the opportunity to highlight it by using strong terms typical for media politics. In this way it is underlined the quality of alternative media to be “transhegemonic, and not exclusively counter-hegemonic, as they oscillate between acceptance and rejection, between resistance and compliance, between restriction and creation” (Bailey et. al., 2008, 153).

In power relations, resistance is always possible by those subjected to power. Castells suggests that when resistance and rejection become significantly stronger than compliance and acceptance, power relationships are transformed, leading ultimately to institutional or structural change (Castells, 2009, 11). It is early to conclude that the processes related to Internet governance, and case of resistance through online alternative media will lead to structural changes, but they have strong enough impact to suggest that processes of resistance and rejection of unilaterally imposed by governments rules on Internet ownership do not have effect, and cause even stronger resistance. Therefore, it can be said that the dialogue about multi-stakeholder Internet governance is an attempt to introduce an institutional change, under the pressure of
resistance such as the case of restriction of www.wikileaks.org has brought up.

The case with restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org as a follow up to the publication of diplomatic cables (which by the time of writing is still inaccessible at this domain) brings up also the question of using Internet for participatory democracy. While civil society actors work with ideological constraints and framing tactics and alternative media in order to legitimize their participation in policy formation, governments try to regain their control over communication flows through legislation that brings closer alternative media to cybercrime in a context of dominating national security discourse. However, it seems that despite these attempts and the participation in the Internet governance discussion, governments have until the www.wikileaks.org case not fully realised the possibilities for civil society influence on the communication processes through the alternative media such as Internet. In order to avoid extreme radicalisation of the social space by the influence of technology (check exact quote in Bailey, 2008, 151), and ensure a functioning of participatory democracy, it is appropriate to speak about a balance between regulatory policy and civil society participation. As Carlsson postulate, “We now see an era of multilevel governance of the media and communication system – an interplay between many different actors, public and private, on multiple levels, from the local to the global.” (Carlsson, 2005, 213). The case with the restriction of access to www.wikileaks.org can be thus seen also as a tactic for advancing the values of participatory democracy highlighting the potential of Internet as an alternative media channel for the civil society actors to distribute alternative discourses and information, organise and facilitate debate (Bailey et al, 2008, 151). The strength of this is in the power of the global civil society to act on the public mind through the media and communication networks in a way which could bring the nation-states to accept the reality of their limited power in exchange for increasing their legitimacy and efficiency (Castells, 2009, 42). A problem of this view, though, is that using communication rights or principles as main arguments in advancing the views of civil-society actors and advocacy groups underestimates the issue of their translation into real processes and institutions (Mueller et. al., 2007, 278) which in turn undermines the practical materialization and legitimation of actual change. As Entman suggests, “the frame determines whether most people notice and how they understand and
remember a problem, as well as how they evaluate and choose to act upon it” (Entman, 1993, 54). This is of particular relevance for creating communication strategies and policy by civil society actors when working with questions about increased participation and advancing certain ideology. A problem of this view, though, is that using communication rights or principles as main arguments in advancing the views of civil-society actors and advocacy groups underestimates the issue of their translation into real processes and institutions (Mueller et. al., 2007, 278) which in turn undermines the practical materialization and legitimation of actual change. As Entman suggests, “the frame determines whether most people notice and how they understand and remember a problem, as well as how they evaluate and choose to act upon it” (Entman, 1993, 54). This is of particular relevance for creating communication strategies and policy by civil society actors when working with questions about increased participation and advancing certain ideology.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Short presentation of the civil society and governmental organisations whose statements are to the analysis.

Internet Governance Caucus (IGC)
Internet Governance Caucus is a civil society group that “was originally created by individual and organizational civil society actors who came together in the context of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) to promote global public interest objectives in Internet governance policy making.”\(^\text{12}\). To the time of the study, it has more than active 100 participants from all over the world\(^\text{13}\) that take part either as individuals or as representatives of organisations working regionally and globally on Internet governance.

Association for Progressive Communications (APC)
APC’s mission is “to empower and support organisations, social movements and individuals in and through the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) to build strategic communities and initiatives for the purpose of making meaningful contributions to equitable human development, social justice, participatory political processes and environmental sustainability. It is both a network and an organisation. \textit{APC members} are groups working in their own countries to advance the same mission as APC. In December 2010, APC had 50 members in 35 countries, the majority from developing countries.”\(^\text{14}\)

Global Network Initiative (GNI)
“All over the world – from the Americas to Europe to the Middle East to Africa and Asia – companies in the Information & Communications Technology (ICT) sector face

\(^{12}\) IGC website, http://www.igcaucus.org/about retrieved 23 May 2011
\(^{13}\) from a personal email with Izumi Aizu, chair
increasing government pressure to comply with domestic laws and policies in ways that may conflict with the internationally recognized human rights of freedom of expression and privacy. In response, a multi-stakeholder group of companies, civil society organizations (including human rights and press freedom groups), investors and academics spent two years negotiating and creating a collaborative approach to protect and advance freedom of expression and privacy in the ICT sector, and have formed an Initiative to take this work forward.”

**Internet Society (ISOC)**

Internet Society (ISOC) is a nonprofit organisation founded in 1992 to provide leadership in Internet related standards, education and policy. The organisation is dedicated to ensuring the open development, evolution and use of the Internet for the benefit of people throughout the world. It has chapters in most countries in the world with the aim to bring together people who reside in a particular geographic region (such as a city, country, or larger area), or who share an interest in a specific Internet related subject.

**PEN International**

PEN is an international organisation which aims “to engage with, and empower, societies and communities across cultures and languages, through reading and writing” and is presenting itself as a “a non-political organisation and has special consultative status at UNESCO and the United Nations”

**Article XIX**

Article XIX initiative is “a human rights organisation with a specific mandate and focus on the defence and promotion of freedom of expression and freedom of information worldwide.“ It is established in 1987, and “fights for all hostages of censorship, defends dissenting voices that have been muzzled, and campaigns against laws and practices that silence....ARTICLE 19 monitors, researches, publishes, lobbies, campaigns, sets standards and litigates on behalf of freedom of expression wherever it is threatened.”

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provides” expertise on international human rights standards and for legislation that protects the right to speak and right to know in countries emerging from conflict, war and genocide or repression.”

**Reporters without Borders (RSF – Rapporteurs Sans Frontiers)**

“Reporters Without Borders defends journalists and media assistants imprisoned or persecuted for doing their job and exposes the mistreatment and torture of them in many countries; fights against censorship and laws that undermine press freedom; gives financial aide year to 300 or so journalists or media outlets in difficulty (to pay for lawyers, medical care and equipment) as well to the families of imprisoned journalists; works to improve the safety of journalists, especially those reporting in war zones.”

**Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)**

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, non-partisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher promoting understanding of foreign policy and America's role in the world. Among its mission objectives is to provide up-to-date information and analysis about world events and American foreign policy on its website.

**Anonymous**

“Anonymous is not a group in the traditional sense — it has no leaders, no head office and no agreed-upon agenda. It resides in anarchic, occasionally disturbing online communities that are also engaged and knowledgeable. Anonymous can be cruel. Sometimes it's a hotbed of creativity; at other times it's simply inane. And it may be responsible for creating your favourite online in-joke.”

**2600: The Hacker Quarterly**

“This is a quarterly United States/American publication that specializes in publishing technical information on a variety of subjects including telephone switching systems,

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Internet protocols and services, as well as general news concerning the computer "underground" and libertarian issues. The magazine is published and edited by its founder Emmanuel Goldstein (a pen name of Eric Corley and allusion to George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four) and his non-profit company 2600 Enterprises, Inc. Additionally, 2600 has been involved in many court cases related to technology and freedom of speech alongside the Electronic Frontier Foundation, perhaps most significantly Universal v. Reimerdes involving the distribution of DVD copy protection tool DeCSS, where courts upheld the constitutionality of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act anti-circumvention provisions.”

**Inter-American Commission on Human Rights**

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) is one of two bodies in the inter-American system for the promotion and protection of human rights. The Commission has its headquarters in Washington, D.C. The other human rights body is the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which is located in San José, Costa Rica. The IACHR is an autonomous organ of the Organization of American States (OAS). Its mandate is found in the OAS Charter and the American Convention on Human Rights. The IACHR represents all of the member States of the OAS. It has seven members who act independently, without representing any particular country. The members of the IACHR are elected by the General Assembly of the OAS. (IACHR, 2010)

**UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and protection the Right to Freedom of Opinion of Expression**

Special procedures" is the general name given to the mechanisms established by the Human Rights Council to address either specific country situations or thematic issues in all parts of the world. Currently, there are 33 thematic and 8 country mandates. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights provides these mechanisms with personnel, policy, research and logistical support for the discharge of their mandates. Special procedures' mandates usually call on mandate holders to examine, monitor, advise and publicly report on human rights situations in specific countries or territories.

known as **country mandates**, or on major phenomena of human rights violations worldwide, known as **thematic mandates**. Special procedures are either an individual (called "Special Rapporteur", "Special Representative of the Secretary-General" or "Independent Expert") or a working group usually composed of five members (one from each region). The mandates of the special procedures are established and defined by the resolution creating them. Mandate-holders of the special procedures serve in their personal capacity, and do not receive salaries or any other financial compensation for their work. The independent status of the mandate-holders is crucial in order to be able to fulfill their functions in all impartiality.\(^{23}\)

**European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA)**

ENISA is the EU’s response to these cyber security issues of the European Union. As such, it is the 'pace-setter' for Information Security in Europe, and a centre of expertise. The objective is to make ENISA’s web site the European ‘hub’ for exchange of information, best practices and knowledge in the field of Information Security. This web site is an access point to the EU Member States and other actors in this field. 'ENISA- Securing Europe's Information Society'.\(^{24}\)

\(^{23}\) [http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/special/index.htm#code](http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/special/index.htm#code) retrieved 22 May 2011