Caucasus Studies 4

CAUCASUS STUDIES: MIGRATION, SOCIETY AND LANGUAGE

Edited by Karina Vamling

Caucasus Studies 4 includes papers presented at the multidisciplinary conference Caucasus Studies: Migration – Society – Language, held on November 28-30 2008 at Malmö University. Researchers on the Caucasus from a variety of disciplinary perspectives gathered around the themes: Armed conflicts and conflict resolution, The Caucasus and global politics, Identities in transition, Migration and identity, Language contact and migration, and Diaspora studies. Papers from this broad spectrum of topics are represented in the volume. The languages of the conference were English and Russian, and the volume therefore includes papers in both these languages.

The organizing of this international conference and the presence of a large number of colleagues from Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and North Caucasus would not have been possible without the generous support from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida).
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   Mukhadin Kumakhov & Karina Vamling

2. Language, History and Cultural Identities in the Caucasus
   Edited by Karina Vamling

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CAUCASUS STUDIES: Migration – Society – Language

Papers from the conference, November 28-30 2008, Malmö University

Edited by Karina Vamling

Malmö University
Department of Language,
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Caucasus Studies 4

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Papers from the conference,
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Preface

*Caucasus Studies* 4 includes papers presented at the multidisciplinary conference *Caucasus Studies: Migration – Society – Language*, held on November 28-30 2008 at Malmö University, shortly after the dramatic events of the Georgian-Russian war. Researchers on the Caucasus from a variety of disciplinary perspectives gathered around the themes: Armed conflicts and conflict resolution, The Caucasus and global politics, Identities in transition, Migration and identity, Language contact and migration, and Diaspora studies. Papers from this broad spectrum of topics are represented in the volume. The languages of the conference were English and Russian, and the volume therefore includes papers in both these languages.

The organizing of this international conference and the presence of a large number of colleagues from Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and North Caucasus would not have been possible without the generous support from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). I would also like to thank the Department of International Migration and Ethnic Relations (IMER), Malmö University, for hosting the conference. Special thanks go to colleagues Revaz Tchantouria, Märta-Lisa Magnusson and Manana Kock Kobaidze and students Maria Hamberg and Karolin Larsson for engagement and support.

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Karina Vamling

Malmö, December 2011
The Uniqueness of the Caucasian Conflicts?

Babak Rezvani

Introduction

Are the ethno-territorial conflicts in the Caucasus unique? Do they have any peculiar characteristics which are not found elsewhere? Does the Caucasus have certain characteristics that make such conflicts more probable? Comparative methods of analysis will be used in this writing in order to answer these questions.

The situation in the Caucasus is comparable with those in Central Asia and Fereydan. Its ethno-political system is similar to that of Central Asia, and its ethnic landscape to Fereydan. Central Asia is a region in the southern periphery of the former Soviet Union, which similar to the Caucasus, shares the legacy of the Soviet nationalities policy. The ethnic landscapes of these two regions, however, are not comparable with each other. In the Caucasus exists (rather small) pockets of relatively homogenous concentrations of indigenous ethnic groups, while in Central Asia many non-indigenous ethnic groups live in major urban areas (or even in villages and towns such as in Kazakhstan). In contrast to the Caucasian ethnic map, Central Asia is less fragmented and the indigenous ethnic groups live in large areas together with other ethnic groups, while vast areas remain uninhabited. Fereydan is chosen because it has no legacy of the Soviet nationalities policy, and subsequently has another political system; although, in ethno-religious terms it is very similar to the case of the Caucasus. It is called the Iranian little Caucasus by many, while others prefer to call it Iranian Switzerland, due to the absence of ethno-territorial conflicts there. Also, similar to the Caucasus, Fereydan contains relatively small homogenous pockets of indigenous ethnic groups.

Fereydan is a region in central Iran in the outmost western part of Ostan1-e Esfahan. The definition of the Fereydan referred to in this paper is the historic region of Fereydan. Aside from the Shahrestan-e Fereydan (proper), the historic region of Fereydan also constitutes the Shahrestans of Fereydunshahr and Chadegan, and the Shahrestan of Khansar is today also integrated into Fereydan. As previously stated, Fereydan is ethnically very heterogeneous and in this respect resembles the Caucasus. The main ethnic groups in Fereydan are the Persian-speakers, the Turkic-speakers, the Bakhtiaris, and the Armenians. Bakhtiaris are highlanders among whom sub-ethnic and tribal identity is very strong. This is similar to the case of the North Caucasian highlanders. Khansaris live mainly in Shahrestan-e Khansar to the north of Fereydan, but a number of them also live in Fereydan itself. Khansaris speak one of the surviving Central Iranian languages. These languages were once widely spoken but are now only spoken in small pockets in central Iran. The Turkic-speakers in Fereydan speak a language close to Azerbaijani Turkic and are in lifestyle very close to the Persian-speakers and Azeris in Iran, and to some extent to those in the Caucasus. The

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1 Ostan and Shahrestan are respectively the first, and second order territorial divisions in Iran.
The migration of Armenians and Georgians occurred in the early seventeenth century. The ancestors of the Fereydani Georgians (were) moved to and settled in Fereydan, mainly for strategic reasons. Owing to its proximity to the Safavid capital, Esfahan, full control of Fereydan by Bakhtiari warlords could endanger Esfahan’s security. Fereydan had water resources and had the potential to become a very important agricultural centre in Iran. Many Armenian peasants were settled by Shah Abbas I in the Fereydani fertile areas which were used for silk and wine production. There is ample evidence of a previous wine production and consumption culture in Fereydan, which has been traditionally attributed to the Fereydani Armenians. Fereydan, which was also important for fruit and wheat cultivation (as well as food supply to the Iranian capital, Esfahan) often had to be defended against the raids and encroachments of the Bakhtiari warlords. For this reason and also to hinder the potential Bakhtiari warlords’ advances to Esfahan, Shah Abbas settled Georgians in or near the mountainous areas in the western part of Fereydan. (Rezvani 2008: 559-560)

Also similar to the Caucasus in the religious sense, Fereydan has historically been one of the most heterogeneous regions of Iran in religious terms. Unlike most other Iranian regions, Fereydan is not homogenous in religious sense, and the religious diversity that typifies the history of religion in Iran has, to a large extent, been preserved in modern Fereydan. Fereydan Georgians, Persian-Speakers, Turkic-Speakers, Khansaris, Bakhtiaris, and Lurs are all predominantly Shi’ite Muslims, while Fereydani Armenians are Orthodox Christians. Although the Shi’ite group is undeniably the largest religious group in this region, there have been historically significant communities of Christians, Jews, and Bahais in Fereydan (and Khansar). Khansar was one of the Jewish centers in Iran; however, the number of Jews and Bahais in the population of this region has dwindled over time. Many Jews have been Islamized in the course of history, while many more have emigrated from Fereydan to major Iranian urban centers and outside Iran. This has been true also for Bahais. As Bahais is an unrecognized religion in Iran, it is believed that many Bahais have either converted to Islam after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, or still live secretly as Bahais concealing their religious identity.

Fereydan has traditionally been one of the major Armenian centers of Iran, and there remain many old Armenian churches in Fereydan (Hovian 2001:156-157; Gregorian 1998). Although the exact date and locus of the Islamization of the Fereydani Georgians’ ancestors is debated and disputed, it is generally assumed to have occurred in the early 17th century. Shi’ite Islam among Fereydani Georgians is not superficial and is an integral part of their identity (Rezvani 2008; Rezvani 2009a; Rezvani 2009b; Sepiani 1979: 144–153).

One has to define ethno-territorial conflicts, in order to answer the question whether or not the Caucasian ethno-territorial conflicts are unique. Ethno-territorial conflicts are violent conflicts (with significantly more than 100 deaths) of two ethnic groups over a disputed territory or between one minority group against the state (and its titular ethnic group) for independence of its territory. Ethno-territorial conflicts can
either be vertical, i.e. between a state and its dominant titular group versus the minorities, or horizontal, i.e. between two ethnic groups at the same level of hierarchy (Rezvani 2010).

The lack of ethno-territorial conflicts in Fereydan compared with their prevalence in the Caucasus can best be explained by the different modes of national and ethnic policies in Iran and the (post-)Soviet Union. These different modes of national and ethnic policies will be discussed first. The cases in the Caucasus will then be compared to the cases in Central Asia and other parts of the former Soviet Union.

**The Nation, the State, and Conflict**

There are generally two definitions of a nation: a civic nation and an ethnic nation. The first definition of nation comprises “all citizens of a state”. This view defines the nation as all citizens of a country. This is prevalent in American terminology, where the concepts of “nation” and “country” are used interchangeably. In the second definition of nation, the concepts of “ethnic group” and “nation” are used interchangeably. This type of nation called an ethnic nation, comprises ideally only one ethnic group. The ethno-nationalists’ ideal is one country for one (dominant) ethnic group, and therefore all other ethnic groups are doomed to take a subordinate position. Ethnic minorities are consequently excluded from the ethnic nationalism which is prevalent in the polity in which they live.

The first step is set for the politicization of ethnicity, if a nation is defined as an ethnic nation. The politicization of ethnicity gets much political relevance when nations are formally (and even in many cases legally and constitutionally) recognized on the basis of ethnicity, and when citizens are entitled to certain rights and privileges are distributed, due to their membership of certain ethnic groups. When certain rights, facilities, and resources are distributed on the basis of ethnicity, or when ethnicity is the main basis of the party system, it seizes to be only a cultural category, and transforms into a political one. Ethnic tensions are highly probable in a political context, in which ethno-nationalism is prevalent and ethnicity is politicized. Even without demanding an independent state or autonomy, politicized ethnic groups can come into conflict as they compete over the resources in (part of a) state. Ethnic nationhood and the accompanying ethno-nationalism means that a state or a polity is dominated by one titular ethnic group, and other ethnic groups are politically, economically, and often culturally subordinated to this group. It is this ethnic discrimination that contributes to the eruption of ethnic conflict. Discrimination can include cases when an ethnic group is systematically excluded from political participation by the titular one. Institutionalized ethno-political subordination catalyzes the outbreak of ethnic conflicts. On the other hand, when different ethnic groups share a civic identity, citizenship, and civil rights are thought to be politically more important than cultural differences. Therefore, the probability of ethnic conflict is lower in political systems where the nation is defined, or de-facto perceived, as a civic nation.

Federalism and ethno-territorial arrangements maintain an ambiguous relationship with the articulation of ethnic grievances. They sanction and legitimize politicization of ethnicity and open opportunities for ethnic entrepreneurs; however, they can also have a moderating effect on the articulation of ethnic grievances and demands.
According to Gurr (2000: 56-57), the negotiated autonomy arrangements and federalism serve as a moderating mechanism by reducing ethnic grievances, or at least channeling them. Conversely, the cases in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union indicate that federalism enhances the probabilities of ethnic conflict. In Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, federalism was not negotiated but was offered to, or even imposed on, the ethnic groups, and consequently, provided opportunities for ethno-political entrepreneurs. According to Knippenberg and Van der Wusten (2001: 288-289) ethnically based territorial arrangements may have a mitigating effect on ethnic strife in the short term, but they result into the dissolution of the state in the long term.

Conclusively, the probability of the eruption of ethno-territorial conflicts is higher in a state where the ethnic nation is the dominant mode of nationhood. Politicization of ethnicity, and especially ethno-territorial arrangements, serve as opportunity structures that enable ethnic entrepreneurs to mobilize and control ethnic groups, thereby contributing to ethnic conflicts. Below, the bases and structures of ethnic policies in the Soviet Union and Iran will be discussed briefly.

The Soviet Model

The Soviet Union was a federal territorial system and its territorial divisions were largely based on ethnicity. This ethno-territorial division was the main outcome of the Soviet realization of the right of national self-determination. The initiator of this policy was the first Soviet leader V. I. Ulianov (1870-1924), better known as Lenin, and the architect of this policy was I. V. Jughashvili (1879-1953), better known as Stalin. The interpretation and implementation of the right of national self-determination began during Lenin's era (1917-1924), but was subsequently consolidated during Stalin's era (1924-1953). The territorial divisions that existed at the time of the Soviet Union’s collapse were mainly created in 1930s under Stalin.

According to the Bolsheviks, the people of the Russian empire/Soviet Union had the right to national self-determination. In their view this was not only a formal right, but contributed also positively to the realization of socialism. Lenin had appointed Stalin as the commissioner of nationalities and gave him the task of investigating the question of nationality in the Soviet Union, in order to be able to implement the appropriate policy. After Lenin’s death, Stalin himself was responsible for the implementation of his own program about the Soviet nationalities. According to Stalin, a group of people was considered a nation when they spoke their own language, lived in a certain territory, were involved in an economic life, and possessed a shared psychological makeup. In practice, however, the “nations” in the former Soviet Union were predominantly identified on the basis of language, while other denominators of ethnicity such as religion and race were inferior and did not play a decisive role in identifying “national” groups.

Contrary to the Austrian Marxists Karl Renner (1870-1950) and Otto Bauer’s (1882-1938) ideas proposing the non-territorial option of cultural autonomy without binding cultural rights to a certain territory, the Bolsheviks chose the option of

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2 See the classical work of Renner on this issue: Renner K. (1918) Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen- In besonderer anwendung auf Österreich. Erster Teil:
federalization. Federalization served as a territorial option for the realization of the right of self-determination. Paradoxical to the formally proclaimed motives of integrating the Soviet people into a union of equal and peacefully co-existing citizens, the Soviet nationalities policy constructed a hierarchic ethno-territorial system, which provoked ethnic competition, and hence, ethnic tensions. Even though the Soviet nation, as a whole, was idealistically seen as a civic nation, in practice the Soviet Union was designed as a collection of many ethnic nations (natsionalnosti), often translated as nationalities in English. With primary regard to their size of population, each natsionalnost’ was awarded its autonomous homeland. The union republics (SSRs) were the highest-ranked autonomous territorial units, the autonomous republics (ASSRs) and autonomous oblasts (AOs) were lower-ranked, while the lowest-ranked units were the national districts (NOs). These NOs enjoyed only very limited autonomous capacities and were exclusively located in the territory of the Russian Federative SSR. Relatively large ethnic groups, such as Russians, Georgians, and Uzbeks, were awarded their own union republics (SSRs). The ethnic groups that were ranked second, third, and forth, such as the Kalmyk, Altai, and Evenk, had respectively their own ASSR, AO, or NO. Many ethnic groups were recognized as a nationality but did not possess any type of territorial autonomy. At the bottom of the hierarchy were the minor ethnic groups that were not officially recognized as separate nationalities. SSRs could incorporate ASSRs and AOs, or NOs (which were only located in the Russian Federative SSR). The Soviet ethno-territorial system was rigid and preserved by the Soviet constitution (see the last modified version of 1977 Soviet Constitution Articles 70, to 88). In Figure 1, the Soviet ethno-territorial system is presented, while in figure 2, the political administrative map resulting from this system in the Soviet Southern Periphery, i.e. the Caucasus and Central Asia, is shown.

This federal system, in which the cultural and “national” rights were bound to territorial autonomy, had given rise to the ethno-territorial rivalry over (status of) homelands. The federal system of the Soviet Union, as the result of the introduction of a non-egalitarian, hierarchical federal system on the basis of ethnicity, had brought about “ethnic competition”. While the ethnic groups saw each other as potential rivals, they saw Moscow, the Soviet Center, both as a master and a protector at the same time. In this uneven distribution of power and ethnic status among ethnic groups, the lower-ranked groups naturally appealed to Moscow for protection against the observed and perceived injustice towards them by the higher-ranked ethnic groups. The Soviet nationalities policies’ legacy is still visible in many post-Soviet states. Figure 3 refers to Bremmer’s interpretation of ethnic relations in the former Soviet Union (1997: 14).

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3 A good source for a better understanding of different aspects of the Soviet nationalities policy is an edited volume by Ronald Grigor Suny & Terry Martin (eds.) (2001), titled as “A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin.”

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Russia: Dagestan, Checheno-Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Bashkortostan, Buryatia, Kalmykia, Karelia, Komi, Mari, Mordovia, Tatarstan, Tyva, Udmurtia, Yakutia
Karachayevo-Cherkessia, Adygeya, Gorno-Altai, Jewish, Birobija, Khakassia
Agin-Buryat, Chukotka, Evenk, Khanty-Mansi, Koryak, Nenets, Taymyr, Ust-Orda, Buryat, Yamalo-Nenets

Figure 1: The autonomous territorial units in the Soviet Union’s Southern Periphery

Map of administrative units in the Soviet Union’s southern periphery (Below)

SSR  | ASSR  | AO         |
-----|-------|------------|
A=Georgia | 1=Kabardino-Balkaria | I=Adygeya |
B=Armenia | 2=North Ossetia | II=Karachayevo-Cherkessia |
C=Azerbaijan | 3=Checheno-Ingushetia | III=South Ossetia |
D=Kazakhstan | 4=Dagestan | IV=Nagorno Karabakh |
E=Kyrgyzstan | 5=Abkhazia | V=Gorno Badakhshan |
F=Uzbekistan | 6=Ajaria |  |
G=Tajikistan | 7=Nakhichevan |  |
H=Turkmenistan | 8=Karakalpakstan |  |
Figure 2: Ethno-territorial division of the Soviet Caucasus and Central Asia
The Iranian model

The Iranian statehood has long roots in history and Iran has always been a multi-ethnic country. The Iranian type of nationhood can be described as civic, without any privileges for certain ethnic groups and without a titular ethnic nation. In contrast to the Yugoslavian and the Soviet systems, which politicized ethnicity and arranged the state’s territory in such a way that it enhanced this politicization, Iran lacks constitutional or territorial bases for ethnic politicization. According to Article 15 of the Iranian Constitution (last modified in 1992), the official language and script of Iran, the lingua franca of its people, is Persian. However, the usage of regional and ethnic languages in the press and mass media, as well as the education of ethnic literature in schools, are allowed. In addition, Article 19 stipulates that “all people of Iran, whatever the ethnic group or tribe, to which they belong, enjoy equal rights; color, race, language, and the like, do not bestow any privilege.”

The Iranian policy on ethnic languages in the last three decades can be described as indifferent. Although Iran has no official governmental policies of assimilation and banning languages as Turkey does, the government, likewise, does not encourage the usage of local and ethnic languages either. Language in Iran has remained in the cultural sphere and, unlike in the former Soviet Union, has not been politicized. Due to the nature of the language situation in Iran, the dominant languages will ultimately win, but particular efforts to preserve and flourish smaller languages will be fruitful if there is popular demand. This means that the Persian language, which historically has had a dominant position and is by far the richest literary language of Iran, will dominate at the cost of the smaller languages. Nevertheless, other languages can persist and even get an improved position if there is substantial popular demand.

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As discussed earlier, according to the Iranian constitution, all languages may be taught and their usage is free in the public sphere. However, in practice, there are only regular broadcasts and significant number of publications in the languages with stronger position. The position of, and attitudes (of the speakers) towards, different languages vary greatly from case to case. Even if regarded as unnecessary by its native speakers, education in ethnic languages and literature is not detrimental, and is allowed by the Iranian constitution. A good example of this is the communal efforts of the Fereydani Georgians (both in the Greater Historic Fereydan and by their descendents elsewhere in Iran), whose aim of educating their children in the Georgian language and alphabet is facilitated (actively or passively) by the local authorities. Due to communal efforts and support, or at least tolerance, from the authorities, there are now Georgian textbooks and educational material produced in Iran. Despite a relatively small number of speakers, Georgian is, nevertheless, a much respected language in Iran, and there have been many symposia and congresses for “appreciation” of the Georgian language (see Figure 4).

Figure 4: Announcements of the first and the second symposiums and Congresses of “Appreciation” of the Georgian language in Fereydunshahr and Yazdanshahr (outside Fereydan but populated by the Georgian Fereydani migrants). The announcements are bilingual and use both Georgian and Persian alphabets.

The first order territorial divisions of Iran are called Ostans. Generally, most ethnic groups inhabit more than one Ostan. Although there are a few ethnically homogenous Ostans, most of them are ethnically heterogeneous. In addition, the constitution does not give ethnic groups privileges in any Ostans. This is in sharp contrast to the case of Soviet Union where ethnic competition was enhanced by a hierarchic ethno-territorial system. Although the Iranian second order territorial divisions, called Shahrestans, are usually ethnically homogenous, the Shahrestans of (Greater Historic) Fereydan are ethnically heterogeneous, and Fereydan proper, Fereydunshahr, and Chadegan are all represented by the same member of parliament. In fact, the general mode of nationhood in Iran as a Civic nation, rather than its territorial division, matters most; the ethnic coexistence in Iran is primarily determined by the Iranian mode of civic nationhood and lack of a hierarchic ethno-territorial federalism.
Despite Iran identifying itself as an ethno-politically unbiased, multi-lingual country without any ethno-territorial arrangements, it is not neutral with regards to its religious diversity. Article 12 of the Constitution states that the Twelver Shi’ite Islam is the official religion of Iran. The same article offers other Islamic schools freedom in their religious practices. Article 13 recognizes Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians as religious minorities, and offers them freedom of practice according to their religious rites and rule within their communities, and Article 14 prohibits the maltreatment of the above mentioned non-Muslim groups. The representation of religious minorities is guaranteed by reserved seats in the parliament (Majles). Jews and Zoroastrians each posses one seat, Christians posses three seats; there is one seat for Assyrians, and two seats for Armenians. Other religious groups are not recognized.

As the non-Islamic minorities are small in numbers, the main sources of ethno-religious problems are found among the Sunni ethnic groups, especially in the border regions where they form large concentrations. The mobilization among the Kurdish and Baluchi separatists can be attributed to both this discontent and foreign manipulation. Hypothetically, (attempts towards) politicization of ethnicity could also be the case among Shi’ite ethnic groups, especially when they border a foreign (kin-state) and when they are exposed to foreign manipulation. In recent years, ethno-political movements have been found among Azeris and in (violent) separatist movements among Khuzestani Arabs in Iran. The first case is not really a separatist movement, but more a Pan-Turkist movement with some racial supremacist aspects, while the second case manifests itself through bombings rather than armed warfare. Although these cases both lack substantial popular support, they still pose a serious threat to public order and inter-ethnic relations in Iran. In both cases, foreign involvement serves a certain geopolitical agenda. It does not necessarily mean that authorities in the republic of Azerbaijan and Iraq support these ethno-political and separatist movements; often the main sources of support for separatists comes from political parties and movements in these (and other neighboring) countries with connections to global networks, or directly from non-regional political actors (See e.g. Abedin & Farrokh 2005; Ahmadi 2005; Farrokh 2005a; Farrokh 2005b; Goldberg 2008; Harrison 2007).

Jeffrey Goldberg (2008) in “After Iraq” and Ralph Peters (2006) in “Blood Borders: How a Better Middle East Would Look” are discussing the future political scenario of the Middle East in their articles. In fact, they are discussing the same scenario that Farrokh (2005b) attributes to Bernard Lewis. Ralph Peter asserts that the borders in the Middle East should be redrawn along ethnic lines. Although Goldberg does not deliberately advocate it, he speculates that it is an unintended consequence of the current geopolitical situation in that region. Reading his article, it becomes clear that he justifies the remapping scenario as more or less inevitable. In addition, the depiction of the ‘possible future map’ on his article’s front page contributes to a formation of such an image in the public mind.

Conclusively, it can be said that the ethnic policies in Iran are relatively liberal, but this does not necessarily mean that ethnic cultures flourish in Iran. Nevertheless, there are no official policies of assimilation and discrimination of ethnic and local cultures in Iran, nor are the Iranian state and its territorial divisions arranged in such a way that it politicizes ethnicity or empowers it politically. Additionally, the speakers of different languages do not have any privileges in the economic, social and political life. The social boundary that matters in Iran is not based on language, but on religion. Iran is a Shi’ite state and many political positions are exclusively reserved for Shi’ites; meanwhile, there are no such privileges with regard to the speakers of different languages. Members of ethnic groups with diverse languages are represented in the Iranian economic and political life. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that despite Standard Persian being the official language of Iran and serving as a lingua franca, the members of the Azerbaijani ethnic group, who speak the Azeri language, are relatively over-represented in the economic and political life of Iran. The Iranian ethno-territorial model does not predict absence of ethno-political dissent, but it lessens its propensities.

The naming of (Greater Historic) Fereydan region of Iran as the Little Caucasus is not senseless. Its landscape and climate, but more importantly, its ethnic and religious heterogeneity resembles that of the Caucasus to a large extent. However, it differs from the Caucasus as it is not struck by ethnic and religious hatred, and is instead exemplary for its mode of coexistence.

**Autonomy and ethno-territorial conflict in the (post-)Soviet context**

Different theoretical explanations, or empirical studies, hold different types of factors responsible for the emergence of ethno-territorial conflicts. Following the buzzword “Clash of the Civilizations”, and especially after the recent political developments in the world, many hold the cultural and specifically, the religious, factors responsible for the eruption of these conflicts. This, however, is not necessarily true. Although it cannot be denied that ethnic and religious heterogeneity play a role in the outbreak of ethno-territorial conflicts, they are by no means necessary or sufficient explanations of such conflicts. The region of Fereydan in Iran, which is heterogeneous in the ethnic and religious sense and where ethnic groups similar to those in the Caucasus live, is not afflicted by ethno-territorial conflicts. This is explicable by the differences between the ethno-political structure and ethnic policies in Iran and in the (post-)Soviet Union, which are already discussed.

Additionally, the examination of the ethno-territorial conflicts in the former Soviet Union shows that cultural factors can neither be regarded as necessary nor as sufficient for the explanation of ethno-territorial conflicts. For example, the Turkic-speaking Sunni Muslim Uzbeks and Kyrgyz have come into ethno-territorial conflict with each other over the region around the city of Osh. Other such cases are the South Ossetian-Georgian and the Abkhaz-Georgian conflicts. All these ethnic groups are predominantly Orthodox Christian, but all have a Sunni Muslim minority too.⁷ On the

⁷ There are Shi’ite Muslim Georgians but their share is very small in the population of the modern day Republic of Georgia. They are mainly concentrated in Iran.
other hand, there are many peoples of different faiths who have not come into ethno-
territorial conflict with each other in the Caucasus, Central Asia, Fereydan, and other
parts of the (post-)Soviet Union, Iran and the rest of the world.

Svante E. Cornell (1999; 2001; 2002) argues that (territorial) autonomy in the
(post-)Soviet Union is responsible factor for the outbreak of conflicts. Territorial
autonomy can function as an opportunity structure in the hands of ethno-political
entrepreneurs, who want to mobilize an ethnic group for an ethno-national cause. It is
particularly conflict-instigating in the former Soviet Union and its successor states,
where ethnicity was politicized in a hierarchical way. In such a system, the titular
ethnic groups in the lower-ranked autonomous territorial units, may come into conflict
with the hosting state (a former union republic).

There is indeed a high correlation between ethno-territorial conflicts and territorial
autonomies in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh,
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Gorno-Badakhshan were autonomous territorial units
which undertook a violent separation from their respective host republics.
Furthermore, two other autonomous territories, Ingushetia and North Ossetia came
into a horizontal ethno-territorial conflict with each other over the disputed
Prigorodnyi district. Although they did not come into conflict with the Russian
Federation, there have been threats of separation and tensions between the Ingush, the
Russian army and the Cossacks. The fact remains, however, that the ethno-territorial
conflict over the Prigorodnyi district complicated the situation which continues to
prevent a new conflict. Furthermore, the Ossetians were and are traditionally Russian
allies and the conflict in South Ossetia has made them realize that they benefit from
Russia.

The correlation between ethno-territorial conflicts and the possession of territorial
autonomy is not a perfect one. First, there are ethno-territorial conflicts which have
erupted without a minority ethnic groups possessing territorial autonomy within the
host republic. An example was the Osh conflict between the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in
Kyrgyzstan. One can regard the participation of localized Uzbek militia in the
Tajikistani civil war, and the involvement of Uzbekistan therein as another case of
ethno-territorial conflict. Elsewhere in the post-Soviet territory, the Transnistrian
conflict between the Slavs and Moldavians in Moldavia is another example of a case
in which territorial autonomy was not a responsible factor.

Moreover, not all autonomous territories are afflicted by ethno-territorial conflict. Even
when we disregard cases in which the territorial autonomous units were not
based on ethnic criteria, e.g. Nakhichevan and Adjara, there are still several auto-
nomous territorial units in the Caucasus (Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-
Cherkessia, and Adygeya) and in Central Asia (Karakalpakstan) that are not afflicted
by ethno-territorial conflicts. There are many more such examples in the Russian
Federation (e.g. Chuvashia, Buryatia etc...). It can be argued that Karachayevo-
Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Dagestan were not mono-titular autonomous
territorial units, and in such a context, ethnic competition may actually enhance the

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8 A significant part of Adjara’s population consists of Sunni Muslim Georgians. They,
evertheless, identify themselves as Georgians, the same way as Mingrelians and Svans do.
These latter subgroups of Georgians are Georgian Orthodox Christians but speak their own
native Kartvelian languages (Mingrelian and Svan) next to Georgian proper (Kartuli).
desire to stay within the realms of the hosting state. Although Adygeya is a mono-titular autonomous territorial unit, its titular population, Circassians, share Karachay-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria with the Turkic-speaking Karachays / Balkars. In this sense, they are involved in the same type of ethnic competition with each other. In addition, Circassians do not compose the majority of the population there. Other autonomous territorial units in the Caucasus, such as North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Chechnya, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh were afflicted by ethno-territorial conflicts. While Gorno-Badakhshan in Central Asia was also afflicted by ethno-territorial conflict, it was blurred by the Tajikistan civil war, in which ethnicity was not the main cause of conflict. Karakalpakstan in Central Asia was not afflicted by ethno-territorial conflict, even though it was a mono-titular autonomous territorial unit. One can argue that this was due to the fact that its titular group, the Karakalpaks, did not compose the majority of the population there; however, this was not different in Abkhazia, where the titular ethnic group, the Abkhaz, composed even a smaller share of the population. In addition, in the Osh conflict (and the Uzbek involvement in the Tajikistan conflict) in Central Asia, territorial autonomy played no role. Conclusively, in the southern periphery (of the former Soviet Union) there is a high correlation between ethno-territorial conflicts and the mono-titular autonomous territorial status and the dominant demographic position of titular groups. Nevertheless, this correlation is not a perfect one and is weaker in Central Asia than in the Caucasus (see Figures 5 and 6).

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9 Karachays and Balkars are in fact the same people, who were arbitrarily divided in two by the Soviet policy makers. It is similar to the case of the Circassians, who were arbitrarily divided in three groups: Adyghe, Cherkess, and Kabards.
Figure 6: Demographic Weight of Titular Groups in Territorial Units and Cases of Ethno-territorial Conflict

It seems that outside the (post-)Soviet southern periphery, the possession of territorial autonomy does not correlate with the ethno-territorial conflict at all. Even if we disregard the lowest-ranked autonomous territorial units (NOs),\(^{10}\) most of the higher-ranked autonomous territorial units were not afflicted by ethno-territorial conflicts. Figure 7 below gives an overview of the situation in the Post-Soviet space.

It is interesting to note that most higher-ranked autonomous territorial units in the post-Soviet space are mono-titular, and in many the titular ethnic group constitutes the majority of population (e.g. Chuvashia and Tuva), but are, nevertheless, not afflicted by ethno-territorial conflicts. There have been certain tensions and clashes in some territorial units (e.g. Tatarstan and Tuva), but these have not lead to warfare (ethno-territorial conflicts by our definition). It could be argued that since most autonomous territorial units are located in the Russian Federation, a large state that is demographically, economically, and militarily strong, such conflicts are not very probable in such a context. It is, therefore, very remarkable that such conflicts have only erupted in the Caucasian part of the Russian Federation. Apparently, although the ethno-territorial conflicts in the powerful Russian Federation hardly emerge, the Caucasus has properties that make the emergence of such conflicts probable.

\(^{10}\) Such an autonomous territorial unit was called a Natsionalnyi Okrug before but now is called an Avtonomnyi Okrug.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Autonomous Territorial Unit</th>
<th>Mono-titular autonomous territory?</th>
<th>Dominant demographic position of the titular?</th>
<th>Higher-ranked autonomy (ASSR and AO)?</th>
<th>Afflicted by the ethno-territorial Conflict?</th>
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1 Khanty and Mansi are related peoples and both speak Ob-Ugric languages.
2 Although officially registered as Tatars, the Buryats are the de facto titular ethnic Group in Gorno-Badakhshan. Unlike Tatars, who are predominantly Sunni Muslims, Buryats are Ismaili Shiites and speak many related Buryat languages and dialects. Unlike the Tatar (Pertu) language that belongs to the Western branch, Buryat language(s) belong to the Eastern subgroup of the Tungus languages. Islam is the main source of identity among Buryats.
3 In the absence of large numbers of Crimean Tatars, Russians are the de facto titular Group in Crimea.

Figure 7: Autonomous Territorial Units and ethno-territorial Conflict

There have also been clashes and tensions in Central Asia, notably in Kazakhstan, between the members of the titular groups and members of some (migrant) ethnic
groups. These clashes could by no means be defined as ethno-territorial conflicts, as there was often no ethnic strife or territorial disputes. On the other hand, territorial claims have been the cause of many clashes and tensions in the Caucasus. These cases, however, cannot be defined as ethno-territorial conflicts either, because their number of casualties has been very low. Notable cases are the tensions and clashes between Russians (notably the Cossacks) and many North Caucasian ethnic groups; between Avars and Chechens; between Laks and Chechens; between Kumyks and Laks; between the Circassian groups and the Karachays/Balkars; the Kumyk and Nogay ethnic strife in Dagestan demanding autonomy; and the Lezgin, Talysh, and Armenian separatism and quest for autonomy in the republics of Azerbaijan and Georgia respectively (Cornell 2001; 2002).

Conclusively, the Caucasus has some peculiarities, which makes the eruption of ethno-territorial conflicts therein more probable than in other regions of the (Post-)Soviet territory. The peculiar character of the Caucasus is probably related to the nature of ethnic nationalism in, or the ethnic geography of, that region.

**Conclusion**

The possession of autonomy contributes in certain circumstances to the eruption of ethno-territorial conflicts. Due to the hierarchic nature of ethnic autonomy in the former Soviet Union and its successor states, the eruption of such conflicts is theoretically more probable there. In practice, it appears that possession of demographic dominance inside an autonomous territory, or even simply mono-titular territorial autonomy by an ethnic group is more likely to lead to ethno-territorial conflicts in the Caucasus than in other regions in the Post-Soviet space. Apparently the Caucasus has some peculiarities which makes the emergence of ethno-territorial conflicts in that region more probable than in any other part of the post-Soviet space. The factors partially responsible for the outbreak of the ethno-territorial conflicts in the Caucasus should be sought in the peculiar character of the Caucasus. These can be factors related to (the level and nature of) ethnic nationalism or the ethnic geography of the Caucasus. The fact that the ethnic map of the Caucasus is fragmented and that ethnic groups live in relatively homogenous pockets of ethnic concentration might contribute to the eruption of ethno-territorial conflicts. This alone, however, is not a sufficient factor, because the same conditions in Fereydan have not led to ethno-territorial conflicts. It can be argued that the uniqueness of the Caucasian conflicts could be explained by a combination of the nature of ethno-territorial autonomy and patterns of ethnic distribution in the Caucasus. There needs to be more research carried out to find out what exactly makes and causes the peculiarities and “uniqueness” of the Caucasus and conflicts therein.
References


Return to Gali – Reasons for and Conditions of the Georgians Return to the Gali District

Kirstine Borch

By the Inguri River in the northwest part of Georgia, you meet a border which does not exist according to the map. To cross the de facto border to Abkhazia you need an Abkhaz visa, and after crossing the border the scenario changes drastically: the roads are in a bad shape; houses are burned or abandoned; and the time zone, phone net and currency follows Russia’s. Despite this de facto status, Abkhazia appears like an independent country separated from Georgia.

Abkhazia’s image as a tourist paradise, where the communist elite enjoyed the Black Sea and the Caucasus Mountains, changed with the breakdown of the Soviet Union; the war between Georgians and Abkhaz in 1992-1993 left the region isolated and without a solution for the future.

The international community\(^1\) recognizes Georgia’s sovereignty over Abkhazia and rhetorically supports the full return of the 240.000 Georgians, who were internally displaced after the war in Abkhazia. However, the international community has never supported this return through a humanitarian intervention. One of the reasons for this is that to support Georgia, is to oppose Russia, who has chosen to recognize Abkhazia’s independence. The international community’s rhetorical support for a Georgian Abkhazia, but lack of actions to avoid imbalance in the international relations with Russia and the “world order”, has a negative impact on reaching a solution of the conflict over this area.

Despite the political elites in Sukhumi and Tbilisi never agreeing on a joined approach on the return of the IDPs, spontaneous returns to the Gali region started soon after the war. Today (2008), approximately 40-45.000 have returned out of a 90.000 pre-war population. During a six month stay in the Gali region (Abkhazia), while working for the Danish Refugee Council, I gathered information from the Georgian returnees on their reasons to return. 80 persons have contributed to the data collection which gives a broad picture of the returnees. This information is very sensitive, yet important in the discussion of Abkhazia’s future status.

**Why are the Returnees interesting?**

In 1989 only 18% (93.267) of the population in Abkhazia was Abkhaz, while Georgians counted for 46% of the population (229.872)\(^2\). Therefore, the displacement was essential for the Abkhaz in their fight for independence, since they would never succeed through a democratic election while the majority remained Georgian.

The return of internally displaced people remains at the centre of the peace negotiation process. Though Abkhaz authorities acknowledge that returnees partly

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\(^1\) By “international community” I am referring to the institutions President Saakashvili mainly is seeking support from; EU, NATO and USA.

\(^2\) The numbers is from the Russian website [http://www.ethno-kavkaz.narod.ru/rnabkhazia.html](http://www.ethno-kavkaz.narod.ru/rnabkhazia.html)
hold the key to gaining international support for economic development in the region, the returnees are also a political threat as they can alter the ethnic balance in favour of the Georgians. The returnees already count for approximately 20% of the population in Abkhazia, which is a significant number.

Many Abkhaz feel proud of their effort to integrate the ethnic Georgians in Gali, but still approximately 200,000 Georgians remain displaced because of Sukhumi’s unwillingness to accept their return.

If the IDPs disappear either through true integration elsewhere in Georgia, or true return to the Abkhaz controlled area, the Georgian state will lose an important “bargaining” tool. Spontaneous return to an Abkhaz controlled Gali region undermines the government appeal for help as a response to the ethnic cleansing. Therefore, the state is trying to downsize the number of returns taken place. A high number of returnees could also be analyzed as a success for the Russian peacekeepers in Gali, which is not in line with the state’s appeal for international peacekeepers. Instead, the Georgian authorities emphasize that they will only accept full return of all IDP’s, if followed by an election on Abkhazia’s future status. To keep the Georgians ready to return, the state has not offered the IDP’s long-term solutions, which means that many have been prevented from integration and resettlement elsewhere in Georgia.

In practice, Sukhumi and Tbilisi never agreed on the circumstances for the return, and consequently, the return has never been formalized by both parties. Until now, the return has taken place according to Abkhaz rules, with procedures that were formalized after the violations in 1998; return is only allowed to the Gali region and only for persons who haven’t fought against the Abkhaz during the war. In reality, anyone with a good connection can get in, and likewise, anyone can be kept out. However, illegal crossing of the border is taking place, and the Abkhaz are not fully in control of the returnees.

**What do they return to?**

Before examining why Georgians return to the Abkhaz controlled Gali region, let’s look at what they return to.

During the Soviet period, Abkhazia was known as a sunny tourist paradise; however, this image has changed after 16 years as a de facto state with economic sanctions and unresolved conflict. Back in Gali, the returnees are, firstly, facing poor housing conditions as most houses have been burned or robbed of everything including flooring, windows and electric wires. Secondly, while there is access to basic social services, it must be noted that both the education and health care systems are in a state of collapse, and neither meets the needs of the people, nor provides quality service. The unemployment in Gali is up to 80% according to UNDP (here the black market should be taken in to account). Most of the returnees take up farming mainly to provide their families with food and to sell at the local market.

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81% of the persons in my data collection do not feel safe being back in Gali.\(^4\)

“Everyone should feel scared living here” Woman from Nabakevi village.

Most of all they fear criminals, the lack of effective law enforcement, and uncertainty regarding their future. The high level of crime and corruption in Gali is connected to the devastating socio-economic situation in the region. It is often stated that the criminals do not have one ethnicity, instead, they can be Georgians, Abkhazians or a mixture of both working together. The high crime rate keeps returnees from improving their income for fear of attracting criminals. In case of violations, the returnees are reluctant to call the Abkhaz law enforcement, who they describe as corrupt. Young men also fear being forced into the Abkhazian military; therefore, many of them move to Zugdidi when the Abkhaz military starts drafting recruits. Finally, the uncertainty of the future is cited as one of the biggest worries for the returnees. Sometimes this insecure future makes it difficult to remain motivated, as described here by a young man from Gali: "Why plant when you don’t know if you have to flee before harvest". The devastating living conditions in the Gali region poses the question; why do people return?

**Why do Georgians return to Abkhazia?**

After gathering the data, I found that there was a pattern between the reasons for returning and where the returnees were living while being displaced.

1. Returnees from Zugdidi - Kutaisi region - 63 % of the data collection.
   
   "I never considered not to return, this is my home” Man from Saberio village.

50 out of the 80 returnees interviewed had been living in Zugdidi or Kutaisi as IDPs and their main reason to return was to improve their living conditions. Half of them returned shortly after the war, because they felt that the inhuman conditions in the collective centers gave them no other choice. A large number returned to the villages in the Gali region, where they are working as farmers. The returnees from Zugdidi or Kutaisi often describe how their lives improved after returning to Gali, compared to the life they had as IDPs in the Zugdidi region. This fact separates these returnees from the returnees from Tbilisi or Russia.

2. Returnees from Tbilisi - 18,5% of the data collection.

   “I had to come home to take care of my parents” Young women returning from Tbilisi.

This group consists mostly of young people under the age of 35, who returned during the last five years (2003-2008). All of the returnees from Tbilisi have settled in Gali city and not in the villages. During their stay in Tbilisi, some of them have been able

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\(^4\) The data was collected between January and July 2008, – it might have worsened after the conflict in August 2008.
to get an education and therefore, this group has an added resource, but back in Gali they have little possibility to find work and use their education. This could be one of the reasons why 80% of them find their life in Gali worse than the life they had as IDPs in Tbilisi.

Their main reason for return is demands from older family members and obligation according to culture and tradition. For example, it is traditional to take care of elderly family members, arrange funeral ceremonies for years after the death of a relative, and allow the older generation to remain in their family house.

3. Returnees from Russia (or elsewhere\(^5\)) - 18.5% of the data collection.

“Physically it is worse here, but mentally I feel better being home” Man returning from St. Petersburg.

Most of the returnees from Russia returned during the last five years (2003-2008) and all of them are younger than 51 years. Compared to the returnees from Zugdidi, they have a higher education and working experience from their time as refugees in Russia.

Georgian-Russian relations have been worsening since 2004, when President Saakashvili came in to power. As Georgia’s ties have strengthened with NATO and the EU, Russia has employed a range of sanctions against the country. Furthermore, Georgian citizens have to apply for visa to enter Russia, despite the fact that the citizens of other South Caucasus countries do not. None of the returnees left Russia out of a political agenda, but had to leave because of the visa restrictions. Some also returned because of demands from family members in Gali, but all of them said that their material life as refugees in Russia was better than the life they are living back in the Gali region (although several did mention the priceless value of “being home”).

To summarize, the two reasons for returning most cited were (1) a way to improve living standards that were sometimes subsistence and (2) family traditions that force them back to Gali; whether it be to die there or to take care of the people who wish to die there.

These two main reasons both say something about the returnees relations to the Georgian state. Firstly, the Georgian state either did not have the means or the will to maintain standard living conditions of IDP’s in their country (this also applies to refugees in Russia). Here, the Georgian government has not been able to keep the “social contract” in terms of providing the IDPs with security and sufficient living standards, and therefore, this group of people now tries to provide for themselves by returning to Gali. Secondly, the people who returned to live under Abkhaz control because of family obligations and traditions, prioritize their family and clan ties over the Georgian nation. Both reasons for returning indicate a weak relation between the Georgians from Abkhazia and the Georgian state.

As part of the data collection, I tried to ask whether or not people would stay or flee if Abkhazia was fully recognized as an independent state. Many refused to answer, but the ones who did, all said that they would prefer to stay if possible. At the same time, all the people included in the data collection still hoped for a Georgian controlled Abkhazia, but no one talked about their return as being a heroic pro-Georgian action. To get a better understanding of the returnees, I have taken a closer

\(^5\) Only a few of the returnees returned from Ukraine or Azerbaijan.
look at their relation to the Georgian state and the state’s way of handling the conflict over Abkhazia.

The government’s appeal and actions – complementing or not?

The Georgian government does not have the power or negotiation skills to gain full sovereignty over the internationally recognized territory of Georgia; therefore, it needs help from the international community. Their appeal to the international community has tried to internationalize the conflict both as a security problem, which might have negative effects on the rest of the world, and as a humanitarian catastrophe which calls for an international intervention:

It is sad to say, but the Soviet Union is back, empire of evil has struck back. Same force, same thinking which led to the invasion and occupation of Baltic States, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Afghanistan is now back. And this force is challenging us today with new dangerous tools, such as ethnic cleansing, accompanied by abusive and militant rhetoric articulated at the highest political level. And we need to respond to it.⁶

Since President Saakashvili was elected president in 2004, he has focused on closer ties to both EU and NATO. This western focus can also be identified in his rhetorical approach when handling the conflict over Abkhazia. Officially, the President supports a peaceful solution of the conflict, and all the way through his presidency he has talked about strengthening dialog and reconciliation between Abkhaz and Georgians.

In March 2008 (shortly after Kosovo was declared independent) President Saakashvili unveiled a new initiative for a resolution to the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, which included decentralization of power, an Abkhaz vice president, the right to veto laws related to the constitutional status of Abkhazia, and the preservation of Abkhaz culture. However, the suggested resolution still keeps Abkhazia under the Georgian state.

The Abkhaz de facto leaders refused to receive the proposal. They considered it to be rhetorical propaganda to achieve “good will” from western countries before the NATO summit in Bucharest in April, and not a resolution that the Georgian government would ever implement. This distrust has been strengthened by several examples of the Georgian state’s action not being in line with its rhetorical focus on dialog and reconciliation.

First of all, Tbilisi upgrading of the military since 2004 has been seen as a threat to a peaceful solution of the conflict. Defense expenditures in 2007 were more than double that of 2006, which constituted 8.8 % of the state’s GDP. The official explanation is that large monetary sums are needed to restructure the army to NATO standards and increase defensive capabilities; however, the budget also involves strong offensive capabilities, especially for the ground forces. Military drafting is

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occurring with much greater frequency and the training appeals to patriotic values with slogans like:

"Don’t sleep Malkhaz [Georgian name] wait for an attack from the Abkhaz" 7

After the five days war in August 2008, the government has vowed to rebuild and strengthen its military capabilities to repel any future Russian attack. Saakashvili’s government has evidently not started questioning its militarization strategy; however, strengthening the military makes it difficult for the Abkhaz to believe in a peaceful solution of the conflict.

Secondly, during my research, I came across several cases where returnees, viewed as traitors, have been threatened with their lives into reporting on the Abkhaz activities by Tbilisi’s Interior Ministry and the pro-Tbilisi Abkhaz authorities in exile.

Thirdly, Georgian media stirs up the conflict as there are daily examples of fabricated stories about attacks against civilians in Gali, although, often the stories are denied by the Georgians there. While I was in the region, the pro-government TV channel "Rustavi 2" fabricated a story about a minor robbery of the local Danish Refugee Council’s office. It was turned into a story that involved kidnapping, sending the signal that it is too dangerous even for international NGOs to work in Gali 8. These kind of stories contribute to growing distrust and insecurity between Georgians and Abkhaz.

The latest example of differences between the pro-peace rhetoric and practice occurred during the five days war in August 2008. I do not want to comment on how the war broke out, since this is still up for discussion. However, the Georgian government’s willingness to use military forces in South Ossetia obviously means that rhetorical promises for a peaceful negotiations are distrusted more than ever in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

In practice, the government’s actions seem in violation with the peace-rhetorical promises for dialog and negotiations; threats and harassments, complicating Georgian return to Gali and focusing on attacks on civilians undermine the government’s claim to be committed to a peaceful resolution. As long as Georgia doesn’t have control over Abkhazia, dialog and reconciliation is regarded as undermining the Georgian appeal for an international humanitarian intervention. Therefore, the government does not have an interest in a peaceful return, if that return is conducted according to Abkhaz rules.

However, until now it looks like Georgia has overestimated international support. Though the government has achieved international recognition and rhetorical support, it is unlikely that Georgia will ever achieve military support:

Since 2004 Saakashvili has sought to internationalize the two conflicts and demonstrated that Russia cannot be a neutral peacekeeper or negotiator. He has now succeeded in both objectives – but has badly miscalculated the consequences, overestimating the ability of the Georgian army to establish

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7 International Crisis Group: June 2008, Europe Report nr. 193, s. 9
8 Rustavi 2, d. 28.april 2008: Danish Refugee Council fired in Gali.
new facts on the ground and the willingness of the US and the EU to confront Russia.\textsuperscript{9}

Since the Georgian state’s foreign appeal to regain power over Abkhazia has internal consequences, it is interesting to observe whether or not this approach is legitimized by the Georgian population. I cannot answer that, but my data collection from the Gali region makes it interesting to look at the relationship between the returnees and the Georgian state.

**Is the government’s handling of the conflict backed up by the affected population?**

It is implicit in democracy that state leaders are authorized to rule on behalf of the people, and in this way different social groups are brought together in one national state. However, democracy is pending on each individual identifying with the society that the state represents, and since, as previously stated, the state’s foreign appeal has internal consequences, it is interesting to see if the state’s handling of the conflict is legitimized by the affected population.

Democratic reforms have been one of the requirements for the Georgian future membership of NATO, but there have been several obstacles in implementing democracy in Georgia. The Georgians are not used to being included in political affairs, and according to my data collection, 95% of them have never tried to vote\textsuperscript{10} while 5% did not want to answer the question. The majority could not see what difference it would make, and several stated that they were nervous going to the voting poles because political activities often are associated with violence. Disproportionate use of force by the government on the 7 November 2007 against public political protests did not help to rebuild trust of the state. Additionally, the few Georgian elections have not had sufficient opposition parties, as they often represent a person rather than a political ideology.

To understand this lack of political involvement, we have to look at the historical relation between people and the state in the Caucasus. 70 years under the Soviet Union has had a strong impact on the political mentality and instead of feeling loyal to the state, there is a strong feeling of loyalty towards the family and clan. It is the clan that is your social security net – not the state. Despite Saakashvili’s plans for reform, it takes time to change the people’s distrust of the state.

This loyalty towards the clan is one of the main reasons for returning to the Gali region: the data collections show that 62,5% returned due to family obligations and traditions. This 62,5% can be split in two. The first group, who are mainly people older than 50, never considered not returning. They mostly returned to the Gali region shortly after the conflict in 1993, some by illegal crossing of the Inguri River, and express strong feelings for the family house, and the importance of being buried at the family’s cemetery. The second group returned because it is expected by the family that the children are there physically to take care of elder family members:

\textsuperscript{9}International Crisis Group: Aug 2008, Europe report nr. 195, s. 7

\textsuperscript{10}The people in Gali has good reasons to try to act as political neutral, this may have affected the high number, which doesn’t correspond to other statistics from the area.
happening to choose between abiding by the formal laws of a state or loyalty to a relative, friend or patron the average middle-eastern, regardless of faith or nationality will feel heavily obliged to accommodate the later rather than suffer the shame for not doing so.\textsuperscript{11}

Georgians returning to Abkhazia, without support from the state, show a close loyalty towards the clan. The multiethnic population in Georgia, plus the clan mentality, make it difficult to create responsibility and equality among all Georgians; instead, loyalty is pending on family ties. Still, I find it wrong when international NGOs talk about building a civil society in Georgia. There is already a civil society, but it is determined according to the clans. The state has not been able to interact with civil society’s strong institutions, and thereby create a political space which is not determined by family, ethnicity or clan relations.

The return to the Gali region underlines that the conflict over Abkhazia is politically rather than ethnically determined. A woman from a collective center in Zugdidi tried to explain it to me like this: "Mingrelian and Abkhazian mothers have forgiven each other the killing of their sons".

Even though there are many different ethnic groups and languages within Georgia, it doesn’t mean that they do not have anything in common. They instinctively understand each other, and act alike whether in terms of revenge, hospitality or table rituals.

All of the returnees in this data collection are Mingrelians, which is an ethnic group under the Georgian nationality. The fact that most Gali Mingrelians refrained from fighting in 1992-93 greatly facilitated their return, and focusing on this identity back in Gali makes life easier, because the conflict is considered to take place between “Georgians and Abkhaz” and not between “Mingrelians and Abkhaz”. In this way they choose the identity which provides them with the best security.

In the Gali region there are several examples of communication and networking between Mingrelians, Russians and Abkhaz. For example, in the Cultural House in Gali, the children are not allowed to sing and dance Georgian style, but they are allowed to sing and dance Mingrelian style. Furthermore, the criminal groups in the Gali region are described as “ethnic mixed” and therefore, the crimes do not seem to be following ethnic lines. The returnees in Gali have been harassed by both the Abkhaz and Georgians and thus they have competing loyalties.

The Georgian return to Abkhazia has to some extent been forced by the lack of protection they were given as IDPs, but their return also shows that by focusing on their Mingrelian identity, they are able to create, not ideal, but closer relations to the Abkhaz.

The returnees see themselves as victims of a political rather than ethnic conflict. They feel let down by the Georgian government, which is one of the reasons why their loyalty to the clan network is more important to them then their loyalty towards the Georgian nation.

\textsuperscript{11}Højris og Yurukel: 1999, s. 6. Here Georgians are described as closely related to the people of the Middle-East.
**Consequences of many years of conflict**

Former interventions have built up expectations towards international involvement in Georgia’s internal conflicts. The state’s appeal to the international community focuses on the violations against human and interstate rights and this cry for help has been followed up by internal actions which underlines the importance of the appeal.

For example, the state has been reluctant to provide the IDPs from Abkhazia with a long term solution. Instead they have been kept waiting for their "great return to Abkhazia". 44 % of the IDPs from 1993 are still living in collective centers under inhuman conditions and these centers are overcrowded with inadequate sanitary installations, which resolves in high frustration and depression.

The states’ appeal for international help also has negative impacts on the lives of returnees in the Gali region. In 1998, Georgian “hit-and run” attacks in Gali led to a second displacement of returnees, and as a result of the last war in August 2008, the number of assaults has gone up. To avoid Georgian attacks, the Abkhaz have closed several bridges over the Inguri River, which makes it difficult for civilians to cross over to Zugdidi, where the main supplies of food and medicine are being procured. In just a couple of weeks, I saw how restrictions on crossing Inguri created high inflation and lack of food in the villages in the Gali region. For the time being, the Gali region can be considered as a “no man’s land” where anarchy and crime have free flow; a result of both Abkhazia’s and Georgia’s (and the international community’s) failure to resolve the conflict.

The appeal supported by actions has not lead to the integration of Abkhazia under Georgia; instead, it has had negative consequences for the Georgian state.

The Georgian state’s lack of effective sovereignty over the recognized territory creates a fight for power, which gives the opposition, mafia networks or militant groups a higher possibility to gain power. When the state is not able to provide stability and safety for its own population, people will start to integrate in other non-state structures to find security and protection. Georgians returning to the Abkhaz controlled Gali region, show how the population seeks support and security in the clan network instead of in the Georgian state. Therefore, it can be questioned whether or not the Georgian state’s fight for Abkhazia is still legitimized by the affected population, as after 16 years they are no closer to a solution.

Even though the returnees are still in favor of a Georgian Abkhazia, they have chosen return due to family obligations and tradition, and as a way to provide their family with a home outside the Collective Centers. Therefore, the return of approximately 45,000 Georgians to the Abkhaz controlled Gali region should pose this question: Can we ever compromise on “justice” by accepting return following Abkhaz rules, to get a solution for the affected population?

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12 UNHCR (working document); 2007: "Protection of internally displaced persons in Georgia: A gap analysis", p. 44.
13 Here it should be added that the historical loyalty between population and state has never been high in this region, but 16 years (2008) without a solution to Abkhazia’s status, haven’t improved the loyalty towards the Georgian state.
References


Народная дипломатия во время карабахского конфликта: обмен селами Керкендж и Кызил-Шафаг

Арсен Акопян

Беженство является следствием разных этно-политических конфликтов. На государственном и международном уровне известны разные формы урегулирования этих миграционных потоков, которые являются международными или государственными инициативами (обмены населенными, трансферты и т.п).

Нагорно-карабахский конфликт также сопровождался беженством. В этом контексте примечательны случаи мирного размежевания. Подобным примером является история обмена поселениями в ситуации карабахского конфликта. В статье описывается обмен поселениями Керкендж и Кызил-Шафаг как инициатива “снизу”, как способ преодоления конфликта и как результат народной дипломатии.

До 1988 г., до начала нагорно-карабахского конфликта, село Керкендж Шемахинского района Азербайджанской ССР было армянским. В мае–июне 1989 г. практически все его жители единой общиной вынужденно переселились в Армению, в азербайджанское селение Кызил-Шафаг (переименованное затем в Дзюнашох) Калининского района Армянской ССР, а азербайджанцы Кызил-Шафага – в Керкендж. В конфликтной ситуации общины договаривались между собой об обмене поселениями.

“Сумгаит”: зарождение тревоги и зарождение идеи обмена

Для армян села Керкендж тревожная ситуация складывалась уже после сумганитских погромов. Одной из жертв этих погромов стал их односельчанин Габриел Традаян, который жил в этом городе. Похороны Традаяна прошли в селе под контролем милиции.

“Современная” история керкенджцев начинается именно с этого события. С него начинают свои рассказы все интервьюируемые, поскольку Габриел Традаян был для них не только односельчанином, но также и родственником, близким или дальним, и это отражается в восприятии событий недавнего прошлого.

Как говорит один из керкенджцев, после Сумгайта ситуация постепенно стала меняться и это чувствовалось. “После Сумгайта, всегда опасность была… Это было заметно. Знакомый [азербайджанец] видит тебя, лицо отворачивает, в другую сторону идешь, не хочешь разговаривать с тобой, кто-то говорит такое, чего раньше не говорил… и ты видишь, что милиция не на твоей стороне…”

1 Исследование велось в рамках проекта «Гражданская инициатива в процессе размежевания азербайджанского и армянского населения на Южном Кавказе (на примере обмена сельскими общинами: Керкендж - Дзюнашох)», поддерживаемом Фондом им. Георгия Беля 2006-2007гг.
2 Погромы армян в азербайджанском городе Сумгаит имели место 27-29 февраля 1988г.
 Это чувство вынудило искать какие-то выходы из сложившейся ситуации. Примечательно, что именно тогда весной 1988 г. зарождались идеи о компактном переселении в Армению или Россию с целью построить новое селение, а также об “обмене” с азербайджанским селением в Армении.

Но эти “проекты” тогда еще не пользовались общественной поддержкой, потому что, как говорили керкенджицы, на такой исход они все же не рассчитывали. Слишком велика была надежда на Советскую власть, к тому же такой выбор в это время был слишком “тяжелым” – “А кому мы будем оставлять наших предков и родственников?” – задумывались люди.

“Сумгант” зарождал тревогу и опасность в жизни общины, но это воспринималось как бы в пассивной форме, к активным действиям это пока еще не наталкивало, точнее, идея действовать активно тогда еще не была присуща всей общине, несмотря на призывы отдельных людей.

Самоорганизация и самообороны армян Керкенджа

Осенью 1988 г. ситуация в Азербайджане резко обострилась, что стало приводить к активным антиармянским действиям (насилие, погромы и т.п.) в городах Баку, Кировабад, Шемаха, а также в других городах и районах республики. Вот как описывает ситуацию в Азербайджане в ноябре-декабре 1988 г. автор “Бакинского дневника” в израильской газете “Круг”.

22.11.88. Шестые сутки подряд народ митингует на площади (г. Баку) круглосуточно, но если 4 дня все ограничивалось площадью, то вчера все выплеснулось в город. Шлияясь толпы народа, кричали: “Карабах!”,”Сумгант!” и т.д. С утра в Арменикенде уже швыряли камни, а сейчас говорят, что уже переворачивают машины... В городе в целом неприятно.

...Доска почета, металлические конструкции для портретов вождей увенчаны лозунгами: “Армяне – вон из Азербайджана”, “Армяне, убирайтесь”. Свободу Ахмедову” (это сумгантский убийца, его огромный портрет висел на Доме правительства). Рядом висят портреты Хомеини, рядом с ним Алиева и Мусульманин. Я видел у демонстрантов плакаты с кариатурами: молодцеватый азербайджанец пинком под зад выгоняет из своего дома подлого вида краснооносых армян, среди которых – женщина с отвислыми грудями и крестом на шее...

1.12. Кипит вся республика. Говорят, что было в Шемахе, где-то еще. Надо сказать, что все это очень не смешно. Выясняется, что Сумгант – это не самое худшее, что могло быть.

5.12.88. Последние дни в городе неважно. Бьют армян, громят квартиры. Напряженность уже почти 3 недели.

В этой ситуации, в ноябре 1988 г. в селах Керкендж и Мадрас приютились армяне, бежавшие из соседних армянских сел Шемахинского района (Калахны, Саган, Мейсари и др.) и города Шемахи. Вспоминает информант [муж. 1955 г.р.], который в это время с братом Аваном и еще несколькими сельчанами, всего их было пятеро, пока еще работали близ города Шемахи, в мастерской, где обрабатывали камни:

Когда в Шамахе началось, на работе в обеденный час пришли [знакомые азербайджанцы], сказали нам, что в армянских квартирах погромы, в домах армян… окна ломают, на улицах нет армян. Вечером уже видим, что народ с верхней стороны [со стороны города] идет в нашу сторону, где мы работали, чтобы напасть на нас… Нет, драки не было. Были люди, что нашу сторону держали. С машиной хотели что-то сделать, ковер с машины сорвали, взяли инструменты… Стычка могла быть, но у Авага был один знакомый в Шамахе, кому он продал свою машину… А это был сын шейха в Шамахе. Этот парень слышал, что здесь творится, и сразу же на этой самой машине приехал к нам… Было много народа. Его прислуживались и позвонили, чтобы мы вышли… Мы сели в машину и выехали. Это было в последний раз… Когда достаточно поднялись по дороге и посмотрели назад, там, где мы работали, уже горело… Там [на работе] были пожилые люди, но они не смогли нас защитить.

Постепенно, когда уже ситуация накалилась, появились первые беженцы из соседних армянских сел, в Керкендже атмосфера была тоже критическая. Как описывает один сельчанин: “народ был в панике, боялся, что сейчас турки6 нападут, сейчас начнется резня… всего можно было ожидать”.

В тревожные дни конца 1988 г. для керкенджцев самоорганизация стала единственным выходом из сложившейся ситуации. Эта самоорганизованность не только спасала их в критических ситуациях, но также была основным и единственным механизмом их переселения и обоснования на новом месте.

Критическая ситуация, которая сложилась в ноябре-декабре 1988 г., вызывает интересные формы и механизмы общинной и индивидуальной самоорганизации в нетривиальных условиях. Порождается “новая власть” в ситуации, когда, как охарактеризовал наш собеседник-керкенджец, “Советы умерли, Горбачев умер…” Эти “власть” рождается в сельских обсуждениях, в дебатах с официальной властью, в разных переговорах и в конце концов в ситуациях, когда надо принимать решения и неотложные меры для самосохранения. Тогда на призыв властей отправиться в Армению жители Керкенджка и Мадрасы не подчинились, потому что это фактически значило бы депортацию и потерю имущества.

События развивались стремительно. Описывается ситуация в конце ноября – в начале декабря 1988 г.:

…приехал этот секретарь [Шемахинского района] и проводит собрание [в Мадрасе]… вышел на балкон [конторы], говорит: «Ну знаете что, нет государства, анархия, мы не можем удерживать… готовьтесь (говорит нашим деревням), я поговорил в Баку, приедут машины. Мужчины, пусть женщины возьмут детей и олежду…» Как будто нас отправляет на дачу. […] И тут я попросил слова, поднялся наверх и говорю: «Мы никуда не поедем, наша деревня никуда не переселится». Он повернулся к нам и говорит: «Знаете что, нет государства, я не могу удержать их, если завтра что-нибудь случится…» А я ему в ответ: «Пусть наступают, никого не пытаюсь удерживать, пусть идут». И тут турки […] подумали: значит, они [армяне] уже настолько уверены в себе, в свои силы, что могут нам противостоять. Мы и на самом деле противостояли бы им. Я не говорю, может, они и смогли бы нас потом побить, но если бы в эту ночь

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6 В бытовой армянской речи азербайджанцев называют t’urk (“турок”). В данном контексте это наименование не носит пейоративного значения.
наступили, мы бы их побили. Потом через несколько дней приехал секретарь и говорит: «Идите на работу, уже есть государств, все как надо». Я опять попросил слова: «Мы не останемся, мы уедем». «Странный ты человек: неделю назад говорил обратное». «Неделю назад так сказал, а сейчас так говорю. Дайте нам дорогу, мы покинем село, не останемся здесь!».

Как видим, важным маркером самоорганизации керкенджских армян в тревожные дни конца 1988 г. стало неподчинение властям. Между тем неподчинение, сопротивление властям, которые уже не воспринимались как органы советской власти7, которые могли бы обеспечить их безопасность, не было самоцелью, а предполагало собственное видение и действие в конфликтной ситуации. В этом контексте первой задачей было самосохранение, и самоорганизация в первую очередь решала эту задачу.

Вспоминает наш собеседник: [муж. 1951 г.р.] “Получилась так, что сразу мы оторвались от Азербайджана, получилось так, что как бы отдельное правительство было. Даже районом раза два пытался войти в село. Не пустили. Закрыли дороги и сказали: районом-райном не будет здесь, пока эти дела не успокоются…” Наш собеседник заметил, что когда в ноябре в Шемахе начались митинги, они уже начали ставить посты. Все знали, что в селе было человек 10-12 охотников, но с увлечением увидели, что “из каждого дома была одна винтовка”.

По словам другого информанта, было до 80 винтовок. Вместе в Мадрасой они организовали самооборону своих поселений. Посторонних не пускали в село.

В контексте самоорганизации общины и осуществления обмена важное значение имеет формирование института лидерства. Этот институт в нетривиальных условиях заполняет вакуум власти – руководит общиной и определенными процессами. Характер и форма лидерства у армян Керкендж имеет свои особенности, которые связаны с конфликтной ситуацией 1988-1989 гг., с определенными условиями, а также с личностями лидеров.

Лидерство в селе Керкендж в 1988-89 гг. взяли на себя не представители административной, хозяйственной или партийной власти, а простые труженики села. В критической ситуации сообщество консолидируется и в этих условиях формирует механизмы самоорганизации. Лидерство формируется в сочетании множества критериев: это и старшинство, и решительность, “лагод”, доверия, жизненный опыт и т.п.


Но интересно также то, что все-таки, как рассказывают керкенджцы, не было такого четкого и жесткого разграничения между лидерами и общиной и они сливаются под общим названием “мы”. Этот период характеризуется “народо-

7 Районные, республиканские власти воспринимались и отождествлялись по этническим маркерам – как азербайджанские, азербайджанцы.
властьем”, когда все решали “мы”, или “народ”. Вот как характеризует ситуацию один из наших собеседников: “Руководители? Село почти что хотело, то и делало. Лидер… Да… Это не полк, которым, скажем, Андраник-паша командовал или Геворг Чауш8 […] Нет, такого не было, народ друг друга понимал…”

Это демонстрирует и то, что “легитимность” лидеров была неоспоримой и выглядела такой естественной, что даже решения, которые “выносили” они, по большому счету не вызывали протестов. Это свидетельствует также о том, что в критической ситуации сообщество консолидировалось. Между тем механизмы взаимодействия в сообществе тоже подчинялись ситуации. Эти два маркера самоорганизации – групповая консолидация в “мы” и особые взаимоотношения в сообществе, где “народ друг друга понимал”, характеризуют адаптацию общины в ненормальных условиях, под воздействием внешних неблагоприятных факторов. Эти маркеры самоорганизации присутствовали также армянам Карабаха в условиях войны.9

Интересен также другой пласт “народовласти”. Важными “очагами” и средой самоорганизации стали кварталы, поскольку самоохранение села организовывалось именно по квартальным принципам. В кварталах ответственность взяли на себя соответствующие лидеры–“руководители”. Примечательно, что квартальный принцип самоорганизации и самоохранения был характерен также для армян Карабаха во время конфликта.10

Самоорганизация и самоохранение керченцев продолжались даже после прихода частей МВД СССР в село, поскольку особой надежды на органы МВД СССР уже не было, даже части милиции не могли остановить происходящее.

В критических условиях 1988-1989 гг. самоорганизация и самоохранение керченских армян были на довольно высоком уровне. Самоорганизация имела следующие этапы и компоненты: неподчинение, сопротивление азербайджанским властям в вынужденном переселении в конце 1988 г., самоохранение – как способ самосохранения и выживания в ненормальных условиях, самоуправление в ситуации кризиса и недееспособности официальной власти. Если бы не самоорганизация и самоохранения керченцев, обмен не состоялся бы, поскольку уже к концу 1988 в Азербайджанской ССР не осталось селений, где жили бы армяне.11

Самым важным аспектом самоорганизации было то, что она не только стала пассивной формой адаптации, но и выдвигала и реализовывала свои проекты выхода из ситуации в условиях, когда влиять на процессы или идти против них было невозможно, но найти какой-то пробел и заполнить его собственным решением оказалось возможным.

Поиски

Как мы уже отметили, после Сумганских погромов в Керченке стали зарождаться идеи о компактном переселении в Армению, в Россию, по обмену. Но

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8 Андраник Озанян, Геворг Чауш – лидеры армянского национально-освободительного движения конца 19 – начала 20 вв. в Османской Турции.
10 Шахназарян Н. Указ раб., с. 55-56.
11 Здесь не имеется в виду Нагорно-Карабахская автономная область, прилегающие к ней армянонаселенный Шумянинский район и несколько селений Ханлырского района. Они представляют собой совсем другое явление.
тогда эти идеи не пользовались общественной поддержкой. В конце 1988, когда ситуация стала критической, стало понятно, что надо искать выходы из ситуации.

Уже в декабре 1988 керкенджцы начали искать в Армении соответствующие азербайджанские села для обмена. Для этого организовались экспедиционные группы и поездки. В поисках разных вариантов обмена и соответствующих мест для поселения были “подключены” также керкенджцы, которые еще до этих событий давно уже жили в Армении. Например, по словам информанта, один из их сельчан, живший в Армении в это время, всю Армению обоехал, чтобы найти подходящее место. В это время даже предлагал временно поселиться в Араратской долине, в одном из азербайджанских сел, в перспективе того, что если потом они другое удобное место найдут, могли бы поселиться там. Однако им не понравилось место и природные условия. Поэтому керкенджцы отвергли идею поселиться временно или постоянно в Араратской долине.

Нельзя сказать, что имелся какой-либо четкий “заказ” из села своим одно-сельчанам, долгие годы жившим в Армении, или, наоборот, что эта идея зародилась у той части керкенджцев, которые жили в Армении. Просто в это время эта идея была такой “естественной” и “всенародной”, что она была просто задействована и активизировалась людей, в том числе живущих в Армении. Последние имели родственников в селе и им была небезразлична не только судьба своих родственников, но и села, общины.

О “естественности” и “всенародности” коллективного выбора и обмена говорит тот факт, что до сих пор люди говорят “мы обменивали”. Говорят один из информантов: “Мы обменивали, мы хотели обменять. Знаете почему? Мы решили село с селом обменивать, чтобы село не разделилось, чтобы переселение было легким…”

Очевидно, что коллективные решения и подходы в подобных сложных и критических ситуациях, по мнению сельчан, должны были обеспечивать по мере возможности “легкий” выход “без потерь” из сложившейся ситуации. “Коллективизм” не только являлся основным механизмом выживания в нетривиальных условиях (самооборона, самоорганизация), он также обусловливал решения и цели относительно будущего (“жить вместе”). Способность и единство как бы гарантировали самоохранение, преодоление трудностей и вместе с тем будущую жизнь. Это четко осознавалось: “Мы обменивались, сказали: вместе будем, вместе пойдем, вместе будем жить”, – говорит информант.

Вышеописанная ситуация диктовала также некоторые разграничения в индивидуальной сфере, особенно в той, которая затрагивала общенные интересы или идею “обмена семьями”. Вот что говорит об этом один из наших информантов: “Мы решили, что надо обмениваться семьями. Несколько раз [азербайджанцы] приходили, чтобы дом купить, но мы не пустили… Например, пришедшие из Иджеванского района, Каджарана, Агара, Амаси (районы и местности в Армении – А.А.) приходили, хотели дома купить в селе, дом приобрести, мы не пустили…”.

А в это время “индивидуальное” “я” сплеталось с общенным “мы”. И индивидуальный выход из положения проходил через “мы”, т.е. община решение предполагало также индивидуальный выход из положения. Но “община”, или “мы” не подавляла индивидуальность, просто в эти “смутные” времена было четкое разграничение уровней – коллективного и индивидуального. Именно приоритетность коллективных решений обеспечила соответствующий выход из положения. Это четко осознавалось и было осознанным выбором. Только в такой ситуации “легитимизируются” разные решения и роль лидеров, которые изыскивают и предлагают не индивидуальные выходы или “проекты”, а “коллективные”. 44
Не только керкенджицы стали искать соответствующее азербайджанское село для обмена в Армении, но азербайджанцы Армении тоже искали соответствующее армянское село в Азербайджане. Эти пути иногда пересекались.

Надо отметить также, что в ноябре 1988 г. в Армянской ССР ситуация тоже обостряется, что приводит к определенным проявлениям насилия против азербайджанского населения республики. Это происходит после девятимесячных мирных демократических процессов, которые не выходили за рамки закона.12

В поисках села для обмена очередная делегация керкенджеев поехала в Армению в феврале 1989 г. После возвращения из экспедиционной поездки стало известно, что их в г. Шемахе ждут представители азербайджанского села Кызил-Шафаг Арм. ССР, которые приехали в Азербайджан с аналогичной целью — искать село для обмена.

В составе азербайджанской делегации были директор совхоза, председатель сельсовета, главный инженер и шофер. Это показывает, что подтверждается и с другими материалами, что в азербайджанской общине институт лидерства сформировался по другой схеме, т.е. вокруг представителей местной власти. В процессе обмена, переговоров и т.п. в качестве лидера и представителя общины главным образом выступает глава совхоза.13

Вот как описывает информант [муж. 1955 г.р.] первые контакты населения Керкенджа с азербайджанской делегацией Кызил-Шафага, когда обсуждали вопросы обмена: “Народ говорил… Да, собрались у конторы… у нас была контора, перед ней собрались, народ говорил. [А что говорили?] Как они не хотели приехать в Азербайджан, так и мы не хотели наши дома оставить…”

Договор об обмене

Село Кызил-Шафаг, как уже говорилось, расположено в Калининском районе Армянской ССР. После встреч в Керкендже, делегация керкенджеев вместе с кызилшафагцами отправляется в Армению, в Калининской район чтобы посмотреть село Кызил-Шафаг.

В составе делегации керкенджеев было четыре человека. Они тоже были старейшинами, но по статусу были простыми работниками села. Переговоры представителей двух общин состоялись в сельсовете Кызил-Шафага.

Какие вопросы обсуждались на этих переговорах? Например, по словам нашего информанта и участника этих процессов, он им сказал, что “наши”, т.е. керкенджские дома по сравнению с нашими (кызилшафагскими) старые, также по количеству домов наше село превосходит Керкендж. Но это обстоятельство не стало препятствием в процессе переговоров.

Обсуждались также конкретные механизмы переселения и принятия решений. Во время встреч лидеров, когда уже была достигнута принципиальная договоренность, надо было, чтобы ее одобрил также “народ”. Именно в этом контексте обсуждались и были задействованы конкретные подходы и механизмы. Как говорил наш информант, после договоренности с лидерами Кызил-Шафага он подчеркнул, что окончательное решение за “народом” и поэтому надо, чтобы керкенджцы сами осмотрели местность и село.


13 Глава совхоза Кызил-Шафага до сих пор руководит общиной, но уже в Азербайджане и в качестве главы сельской администрации.
Об этом вспоминает один из наших собеседников: “Когда мы [представители Керкенджа] пришли сюда [в Кызыл-Шафаг], то поговорили с директором, председателем, мы сказали, что придем, чтобы поменять, но только сделай так, организуй народ и отправь людей, … чтобы “народ” с “народом” поменял, т.е. чтобы осмотрели дома, договорились…”

До начала реального процесса “обмена” состоялось 5-6 встреч лидеров общин. Когда было принято конкретное решение об обмене, тогда уже стал обсуждаться также вопрос о сохранении кладбищ. Как вспоминает информант, они поочередно обсуждали вопросы, связанные с обменом, и тогда уже встала проблема кладбищ. И стороны договорились сохранить кладбища, т.е. армянское кладбище должно было быть сохранено в Керкендже, а азербайджанское – в Кызыл-Шафаге. Это предложение азербайджанцам понравилось и они согласились. “Мы не знали, что будет так [как стало теперь], думали, что сможем потом свободно посещать наши кладбища”, – говорит наш информант.

В общие рамки договоренности входило и то, что было принято решение, что соответствующее государственное имущество без потерь должно быть передано сторонам. В конце концов так это и было сделано, и все было оформлено по закону. По количеству домов и по числу населения Кызыл-Шафаг был больше, чем Керкендж, но это не помешало сделке “обмена”. Договоренность об обмене и о других условиях была устная, но какой-то символический компонент все-таки существовал.

Как передает наш информант, уже потом они передали новым владельцам Керкенджа также его карту: “Карта нашего села сохранилась, передали этим… В наших границах [Керкенджа] они наши земли взяли”.

Говоря о договоре обмена между общинами, надо иметь в виду, что это был не какой-нибудь одноразовый акт, когда люди садятся и все решают зараз, а это был процесс, в ходе которого выкристаллизовывался договор (например, пункт о передаче карты или требование сохранения кладбищ) и были задействованы конкретные механизмы реализации. Стороны договаривались также о том, чтобы избегать конфликтных ситуаций в период, когда в селах во время переселения армяне и азербайджанцы временно стали жить смешанно.

В целом ситуация вписывается в кавказский контекст в смысле того, что для региона присуща была традиция межгрупповых, межобщинных договоренностей в конфликтных ситуациях, когда община представляет собой самодовлеющий социум, который выступает как самостоятельная единица по отношению к внешнему миру. В этих ситуациях именно “старшие” выступают как главные акторы. В нашем случае представление о “старших” также проявляется, но все-таки, как уже было сказано, это не было единственным критерием лидерства. Во всяком случае помимо традиционных черт появляются новые формы самоорганизации и межгрупповых диалогов и контактов.

Если в конфликтной ситуации традиционные формы контактов и диалогов на общинном, горизонтальном уровне эффективно функционировали и стали механизмом преодоления конфликта, то на сегодняшний день на национально-политическом уровне сложилась совсем другая ситуация. У сторон конфликта противоположные позиции насчет горизонтальных контактов и народной дипломатии. В Майндорфской декларации президентов Азербайджана, Армении и России, принятой 2 ноября 2008 г., отмечается важность создания условий для

14 Ачабадзе Ю. Миротворческий потенциал институтов традиционно-бытовой культуры, Традиция разрешения конфликтов на Кавказе и методы институтов гражданского общества, Кавказский форум неправительственных организаций, 2003, с. 282.
укрепления мер доверия между конфликтующими сторонами. В этом контексте насчет народной дипломатии у Азербайджана совсем противоположная позиция, по словам представителя МИД этой страны, “азербайджанская сторона не видит смысла в придумывании новых переговорных форматов. ‘Народная дипломатия’ – это не совсем ясное определение. Самый верный путь как для сторон, так и всего региона – это дипломатический путь решения проблемы”.

А до этого в Азербайджане обсуждался законопроект, чтобы запретить поездки представителей азербайджанских неправительственных организаций в Армению. Автор законопроекта мотивировал эту идею тем, что “государственная политика Азербайджана по сути предусматривает отказ от всякого рода сотрудничества и контактов с Арменией до урегулировании конфликта”. Такой политический подход проявляется не только на уровне НПО, спорта и т.п., но также в повседневности: например, азербайджанцам Грузии, которые посещают Армению, власти Азербайджана запрещают или препятствуют въезду в Азербайджан.

В свою очередь Армения и Нагорный Карабах выступают за контакты и сотрудничество с Азербайджаном на разных уровнях и не препятствуют этим инициативам (например, конференции, семинары, спорт и т.п.).

Между тем в разных экспертных предложениях по урегулированию Нагорно-Карабахской проблемы отмечается важность народной дипломатии и горизонтальных контактов между сторонами для преодоления конфликта.

Обмен
Механизм обмена заключался в том, что “глобальные” вопросы решали лидеры, а конкретные проблемы, связанные с обменами домов, решались уже на индивидуальном уровне.

После встреч лидеров широкая масса керченцев приехала для “просмотра” в Кызыл-Шафаг. Аналогичный механизм был задействован также в случае кызил-

Казимиров В., Народной дипломатии второе дыхание! Открытое письмо азербайджанским и армянским общественными организациям – http://vn.kazimirov.ru/k129.htm
шафагцев. В Керкендже появляется “комиссия” из Кызил-Шафага, которая стала предварительно записывать соответствующие дома для обмена.
Однако решение принимали конкретные семьи по договоренности между собой, а решения “комиссии” были “рекомендательными”, и было много случаев, когда, видя соответствующие дома, стороны не соглашались на обмен, сами выбирали другие варианты и договаривались. Предлагали также денежные компенсации и т.п., если дома не соответствовали по каким-либо критериям. Но были также случаи, что обменивались именно по “выбору” комиссии, но при обусловленном согласии сторон. Следует отметить, что обмен домами оформлялся документально по советским законам.
Наш собеседник [м. 1951 г.р.], увидев предлагаемый “комиссией” дом в Кызил-Шафаге, не согласился на обмен, поскольку этот дом находился в центре села, а он хотел, чтобы дом был на окраине, потому что, по его словам, так легче заниматься сельским хозяйством и скотоводством. Для выбора подходящего дома он два дня оставался в Кызил-Шафаге у уже переселявшихся сюда своих родственников (в это время в селе еще оставались азербайджанцы). Ему удалось выбрать подходящий дом и договориться с домовладельцем об обмене и предстоящей встрече в Керкендже, чтобы тот тоже посмотрел его дом. Как говорил наш информант, этот домовладелец хотел отдать дом в “Госстрах”, но директор совхоза Кызил-Шафага не позволил. Через 10 дней он приехал в Керкендж, чтобы посмотреть дом. Когда в Керкендже он увидел дом нашего собеседника, то с трудом, но все же согласился, а также хотел взять денежную “компенсацию”, поскольку его дом был новым, а этот старым. Но информант сказал, что “деньги-менее у него нет”. “Обмениваем, как есть, пятеро детей у тебя, пятеро у меня. У него было четыре сына и одна дочь, а у меня – один сын и четыре дочки, – рассказывает наш собеседник. – Потом он согласился, мы пили, да, стол накрыли...”. Как наш собеседник в Кызил-Шафаге, так и этот человек в Керкендже на ночь остался у своих односельчан, которые уже переселились. На этой встрече стороны договаривались также о конечном сроке переезда и, как передает наш информант, 14 июня 1989 г. азербайджанец из Кызил-Шафага должен был переселиться в Керкендж, а он на той же машине 15-го июня должен был переехать из Керкендж в Кызил-Шафаг. Но потом наш информант передумал и поехал днем раньше. “Мы договорились на 15 июня, чтобы он на машине приехал [в Керкендж], а я поехал на его машине…” Но потом он подумал, что так плохо получается: “Чтобы турок пришел и меня из дома выгнал? Я сказал: “Я первым уеду”.”
И все же тяжело было покидать родной дом, и в последний момент возникает потребность сохранения самых важных символов памяти о дому. Для нашего информанта это было старая надпись с крестом на фасаде дома. Надпись сделал дед информанта еще в 19 веке, на ней был год постройки дома. Наш информант попросил нового хозяина своего дома, чтобы тот, если не сможет сохранить надпись или если будет перестраивать дом, не разломал бы надпись, потому что грех разбивать камень с крестом, он попросил его просто “спрятать” камень под землю.
Надо также отметить, что имелись дома, которые местные азербайджанцы передали государству, получив компенсацию. Керкенджцы решили оставить село, но почередно. Это по сути было время, тогда уже появились первые индивидуальные договоренности об обмене домами.
Во время процесса обмена в Армянской ССР не было никаких преград, связанных с оформлением документов, пропиской и т.п. Надо отметить также, что в Калининском районе Армении еще в ноябре 1988 г. создавалась комиссия по
делам беженцев. Комиссия способствовала также обмену квартир и домов жителей Арм. и Азер. ССР.

В Азербайджане было намного сложнее. Преграды здесь возникли именно тогда, когда уже все было договорено между общинами и процесс начал переходить в реальную fazу. Эти преграды чинили именно власти. Вот как это происходило, согласно нашему информанту. “В конце было так: их [азербайджанцев Кызил-Шафага] директор и еще 3-4 человека, директор совхоза, председатель сельсовета, их инженер, их асакалы пришли… Нам сказали, что им не позволяют [в Шамахе], чтобы дома, село обменивали со здешними… Райком не позволял, Шамахинский райисполком…” Потом, как передает информант, обе стороны проводили “работу”, чтобы обмен осуществился. Азербайджанцы Кызил-Шафага обратились к ректору Азербайджанского педагогического института, своему односельчанину академику Асаду Курбанову. “Асад Курбанов позвонил им [Шамахинским районным руководителям – А.А.], сказал: люди общий язык нашли, между двумя республиками, два села обмениваются. Почему не позволяешь? [обращение к первому секретарю райкома – А.А.]”.

В конце концов, усилия все-таки дали результат и после этого реально начался обмен. “С мая началось [переселение]. 9-го мая, там у нас так было принято… Мы всегда в день Победы ходили на кладбище. Народ ходил на кладбище… Трудное дело, очень трудное… Потом началось переселение.”

У керкенджцев было ощущение, что они все же вынужденно покидают свое родное село. “Мы село не оставили, чтобы так оставить и бежать…” – говорит информант, подчеркивая их ответственность также перед селом, перед родным местом. В этом выражении переплетаются индивид, община и местность-село, т.е. каждый ответственен не только перед собой, а также и прежде всего перед общиной “мы” и перед поселением. Именно доминирование таких коллективных представлений и подходов обеспечило идеальную основу для групповой самоорганизации. Были в Керкенде некоторые семьи, которые не хотели менять свои дома, хотели получить компенсацию или продать свои дома азербайджанцам. А какая судьба постигла тех, кто остался в Керкенде и не поменял дома?

Рассказывает информант-керкенджец:

В сентябре [1989 г.] из нашего народа около двадцати человек остались там. Хотели дома продать. В этот момент ситуация ухудшилась. Они бежали через Дербент. Они говорили: подождем, виноград соберем… У нас собственные сады были. Я сказал: вы оставайтесь собирайте, я не буду ждать, я уйду. Их дома остались. Они деньги собрали, дали участковому, тот приехал на машине… отвез их в Дербент и высадил. Когда их мало осталось, их начали притеснять, чтобы оставили и уехали… В них кидали камни, не знаю, что делали. Ночью они бежали и спали на поле. Но до каких пор на поле будешь спать?… Турки потом их выгнали, а дома захватили…

С мая 1989 г. процесс обмена пошел интенсивно. Этот процесс тоже регулировался, но как показывают материалы, уже на индивидуальном уровне, т.е. люди договаривались между собой о сроках и т.д.

Интересно также, как решались транспортные проблемы и транспортировка вещей. Как говорили информанты, та же самая машина привозила армянскую

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21 Там же, 8 декабря, № 148.
семью и увозила азербайджанскую. Важным критерием подбора машин явилось знание местности, т.е. если армяне нанимают эту машину и переселяются, то уже ясно, что при возвращении шофер знает, где находится Керкендж и соответственно прямо туда увозит азербайджанскую семью из Кызыл-Шафага. Поэтому, по словам информанта, машины из Шемахи “делом занимались”. Все документально оформили (путевка и т.п.), чтобы на дорогах “не мучили”, потому что было трудное время – “я говорю об апреле, мае и июне месяцев,” – говорит наш информант.

Уже в мае 1989 г. в селе Кызыл-Шафаг появляются первые армянские семьи из Керкенджа, к июлю уже все участвовавшие в обменном процессе керкенджцы переселяются в Кызыл-Шафаг. Кроме керкенджцев, здесь обосновались также армяне-беженцы из других мест Азербайджана, в основном из Баку.

В ситуации Карабахского конфликта были также другие случаи обмена селами, а также неудавшие попытки обмена. Обмен селами Керкендж и Кызыл-Шафаг – единственный случай по сравнению с другими в смысле того, что процесс пошел именно по такому сценарию, т.е. была возможность выбора, экспедиционных поездок, а также имелся в наличии межобщинный договор об обмене, о сохранении кладбищ и т.п.

**Договор об обмене спустя 20 лет...**

Договор об обмене между Керкенджом и Кызыл-Шафагом предусматривал обмен домами, механизмы переселения и т.п., которые по сути осуществлялись на протяжении нескольких месяцев. Но одним из неординарных условий обмена между Кызыл-Шафагом и Керкенджем было сохранение кладбищ. Каждая сторона договорилась сохранить кладбище другой. До сих пор в прежнем Кызыл-Шафаге, т.е. нынешнем Дзюнашохе азербайджанское кладбище сохраняется. Понятно, что кладбище не функционирует и как бы превратилось в “памятник” истории, по крайней мере для села. Но у кладбища есть еще и отдельная функция, которая вписывает ее в контекст активных процессов. Керкенджцы отлично знают о договоренности, которая уж 18-19 лет. Между тем они осознают, что сохранение кладбищ кызылшахагцев гарантирует сохранение их кладбища в Керкендже, несмотря на то, что у них мало возможностей узнать о состоянии их кладбища в Керкендже по сравнению с азербайджанцами Кызыл-Шафага, которым проще посетить пограничное село Дзюнашох. Поэтому азербайджанское кладбище Дзюнашоха как бы напоминает им о кладбище Керкенджа, тем самым и об истории обмена и о самом Керкендже. Следовательно, оно является активным способом поддержания памяти.

“Кладбища” также связывают кызылшахагцев и керкенджцев, поскольку имеют место неформальные “визиты” кызылшахагцев для “просмотра” могил своих родственников, и таким образом на индивидуальном уровне удается сохранять и поддерживать “договоренность”. Наши информанты неоднократно встречали и сопровождали знакомых азербайджанцев на кладбище, в свой прежний дом. Были также групповые посещения.

А для керкенджцев, по понятным причинам основным источником информации о селе и о кладбище является видеокассета, которой уже 11 лет, а также...

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22 Аракелин Г., Харатян З., Взгляд на проблему беженства, газета Харурдайин Айастан, 1989, 19 сентябрь, N 220 (на арм.).
23 Дзюнашох находится близ границы между Арменией и Грузией, а Керкендж в “глубине” Азербайджана. К тому же в Армении власти тоже нормально относятся к “визитам” азербайджанцев.
Summary

The People’s Diplomacy during the Nagorno Karabagh Conflict: A Case of Settlement Exchange

Arsen Hakobyan

As a consequence of ethno-political conflicts, the problem of refugees plays a significant role in the context of political resolution of these conflicts. Different international and state approaches to solve these migration processes are known, for example population exchanges and transfers.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict caused a huge wave of refugees. This article presents, as a result of people's diplomacy, a case of peaceful separation of Armenians and Azerbaijanis in the conflict period.

There are populations, in both Armenia and Azerbaijan, that came to exchange terms during the conflict, and changed their settlements accordingly. This is the case of the settlements exchange at Kerkendj (Azerbaijan) and Dzyunashog (previous name Kyzyl-Shafag, Armenia).

These settlement exchanges took place in 1988-1989 during a conflict period, and it marks a civic initiative as the exchange took place according to an agreement concluded between the two communities. This agreement guaranteed the preservation of cemeteries in these villages, the individual exchange of houses, as well as mutual visitation rights to cemeteries. The agreement continues to be observed even today and informal contact remains between these two communities.

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24 По заказу керкенджцев азербайджанцы сняли на видео село и армянское кладбище и предоставили кассету керкенджцам.
25 Азербайджанское село Ирганчай находится в Грузии и непосредственно граничит с Дзюнашохом, т.е. бывшим Кызыл-Шафагом. В селе Ирганчай есть много родственников и знакомых кызылшафагцев, а поскольку дзюнашохицы, как соседи, часто общаются с ирганчайцами, поддерживать индивидуальные связи с кызылшафагцами не так уж трудно. Село Ирганчай является по сути связующим звеном между Керкенджом и Дзюнашохом.
Preservation of Identity Through Integration: the Case of Javakheti Armenians

Sara Margaryan

The aim of this paper is to show the importance of identity preservation through the example of the Armenian community of Javakheti or Javakhk, a region in Southern Georgia. The main hypothesis of the present research is that the integration of the Armenian minority of Javakheti into Georgian society will be possible only after certain changes in Georgian minority policies occur and certain steps of improvement of socio-economic, political and cultural situation of Armenians of Javakheti are initiated by the Georgian officials. The current state of affairs in Javakheti testifies that the well-being of the community members strongly depends on the preservation of their basic needs, which involve physical and economic security, protection of their national identity from threats of assimilation, as well as involvement of the community members into the social and public life of Georgia. The degenerative state of mutual accusations should turn into a dialogue with understanding of mutual needs and fears, which in turn will lead to collaboration as well as encouragement of the Armenian participation in the integration processes. The improvement of the daily needs of the Armenians in Javakheti will facilitate future negotiations concerning both the integration processes as well as possible status of cultural autonomy or self-government of the region.

By outlining the main characteristics of Armenian and Georgian national identities and analyzing the situation of the present Javakheti Armenians, this paper will bring forward suggestions of how to optimally integrate the Armenian community into the Georgian multinational and multicultural society. Through both thoughtful policies from the Georgian state towards its national minorities, and a more systematic participation of Armenians in the life of the community, a strengthening of the Armenian-Georgian relationship could be achieved.

Identity Discourse

Identity has always been and remains a wide area of investigation in different disciplines. With a stronger focus on identity in the West than in the East, (due to the existence of certain restrictions on nationalism and religion issues during the Cold War), the role of ethnic, national, religious and other identities in the formation and transformation of societies has been of constant interest. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a large number of ethnic groups and nations living under the auspices of the Soviet Empire, have either formed or re-gained their nationhood and statehood. This new, independent life brought with it both positive, albeit slow and unstable, steps towards transformation from a totalitarian state into a democracy, and the rise of nationalist sentiments which, in existing geopolitical realities, led to conflicts and wars in some of the post-Soviet republics. Historical memory forced the re-birth of national identity, which was hidden behind the mask of the Soviet “brotherhood”. The possibility of new ideological perspectives and political allies have been influencing factors causing some of the post-Soviet states to re-evaluate their self-identification.
When discussing contemporary Armenian identity, it is important to mention certain key points which have been central in identity formation. Although Armenians as a people have deep ancient roots, they have been stateless from 1375 to 1918. The reasons for this involve constant oppression by neighbouring powers and Armenia’s need to fight to maintain its nationhood and religion. Consequently, large Armenian diasporas have formed which have learnt to live and flourish throughout the world. Despite this, the national identity of these Armenians has developed with a tight attachment to the historical land of Western Armenia, which now constitutes a part of Turkey. Furthermore, the Armenian language with its original alphabet, as well as a separate branch of Orthodox Christianity, called the Armenian Apostolic Church, distinguishes Armenians from other ethnic groups.

The national identity of contemporary Armenians is traced back to the memory of the genocide of 1.5 million Armenians by the Ottoman Turks. The intense need of almost every Armenian to have the genocide acknowledged can be explained through identity not being an individual entity, but something deeply rooted in the community. The genocide was shortly followed by the imposition of Soviet rule and territorial restructuring during which Armenia lost a large part of its territories – Armenia now occupies only one-sixth of its historical land. The remains of the trauma were revived in the end of 1980s, when the Armenian population of Nagorno Karabakh, a territory transferred to Azerbaijan by the early Soviet leaders, presented claims for independence due to violation of human rights and purposeful de-Armenization of the territory. The re-birth of nationalism had been predicted after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in almost all of its republics, but in some of them it acquired sharper forms.

One of the main signifiers of Armenian identity has been the Church. According to Peachey, “the religious question of the people of the former Soviet Union arises primarily in Christian terms, and those people were formed as nations under Christian cultural hegemony”. Soviet oppression and religious taboo reinforced the tendency to identify some nations with their church. Apart from the revival of national identity, the end of the Soviet rule brought with it a religious renewal. Referring to the European peoples of the Soviet Union, Peachey brings the case study of Armenians as the “people with the oldest ‘national’ Christian church”, whose “national identity, national ethnos, and the national ideology have been forged in the Holy Echmiadzin”. The role of the church in Armenia has been of revitalizing national strength and nurturing ethnic nationalism.

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3 Crimes Against Humanity and Civilization, 2004, in *Facing History and Ourselves National Foundation*, Brookline
4 Rutland, p. 840.
7 Ibid.
Another aspect of historical significance is nationhood. The geographical location of Armenia played an important role in the development of this Armenian national identity, both its falls and its rebirths. Furthermore, the idea of nationhood is also closely connected to the Armenian faith. “It could even be argued, that if Armenians were not Christians, they would have been lost long ago in the winds of history. Yet it was because of the faith and its implications to their nationhood, that they survived”.

With independence, which came in 1991 following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a shift in the national ideology and reshaping of identity could be observed. The transformation from the Soviet past, in some cases, acquired rather definite forms of removing the overwhelming Russian presence in different societal spheres. In Armenia, there took place an abrupt closure of Russian schools and Armenian became the language of all the disciplines taught in the academic sphere.

The rise of nationalism in Armenia did not, however, affect political alliances. Although the actors in the political arena were split between their adherences to either national or European values, the strategic importance of Russia’s alliance was obvious. Being buried in the turmoil of conflict and economic hardships, the Armenian society found it rather complicated to follow vague notions such as shift of values or identity transformation. The surge of emigration was alarming and the need for mobilizing all the national resources became widely evident.

Roeder points to the fact that the ethnic groups with the most successful educational and occupational attainment, such as Armenians, Georgians and Estonians, have advanced the most ambitious agendas for change and engaged in the most extensive protest. It is therefore possible to assume that the high educational level (one of the few resources of Armenia) and the ability to survive, have determined Armenia’s retention of its independence. The primordial strategy of the ethnic group living under the auspices of the Empire, to mobilize for political action (which would assert their national identity and preserve it from the threat of assimilation), can transform into an instrumental strategy, focusing on the pursuit of social and economic interests. As Armenian national identity was no longer under threat after gaining independence, it became possible to make a shift towards more open political relations, which resulted in Armenia following the politics of complementariness. This was dictated by the need to combine security issues and the involvement in international projects proposed by different organizations. With the constitutional reforms adopted in Armenia in December 2005, it was made clear that this country should continue its development in line with European demands and values, thus making one more step towards European integration.

The concept of European integration and European identity has been of importance for both Armenia and Georgia during the recent decades. Although beyond the scope of present research, it is nevertheless worth mentioning that with the extended role of the European Union, and accession of new members into the EU family, there appeared more academic debates on the definition and role of the European identity and its values. Peter van Ham’s paper on Europe’s postmodern identity claims that European identity should be based on multiculturalism with cultural diversity being a

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11 Ibid., p. 203
permanent and valuable part of democratic political society. This idea is in line with the multiculturalism and the ethnic minorities living in Georgia.

The development of contemporary Georgian national identity could be defined as a process of national self-protection against feared domination of Russian culture and its potential for russification. Being a multinational state, Georgia developed its own form of nationalism, which expressed itself in different ways. Under the slogan ‘Georgia for Georgians’, coined by the first Georgian president, most national minorities of Georgia perceived a threat of being underprivileged. The dissolution of the Soviet Union led to the eruption of several ethnic conflicts in Georgia, which according to Toft were partly evoked by an exclusivist conception of national identity, which constantly reinforced a sense of ‘a Georgia for Georgians’. The nature of Georgian nationalizing policies emphasized Georgianness, which was inseparably connected to Orthodox Christianity. Despite the tight religious links with Russia, Georgians have developed a political orientation opposite to that of Armenians, i.e. to choose Turkey and the USA as their political allies.

For two millennia, if not longer, Armenians and Georgians have had recognizable identities, first mentioned in the inscriptions and manuscripts of their Iranian and Greek neighbors, and later (from the fifth century A.D.) in texts in their own languages. This sense of continuous existence was fundamental to the self-conceptions of the Armenian and Georgian intelligentsia of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as they revived the study of national history and literature.

The national identifiers of the Georgians were (and still are) found in their historical heritage, especially the original alphabet (all the other Soviet nationalities, except the Armenians and Georgians, had to use some modifications of the Cyrillic or Latin alphabets), ancient Christian culture, historical statehood, and several battles won in the middle ages. The Georgians also consider themselves as part of Europe rather than Asia. As G. Dijkink noted in a different case, but which may apply to the Georgians as well: “a kind of European identification may have been implicated in the feeling of belonging to the Christian community of faith”.

One of the greatest challenges for Georgians after gaining independence was becoming one nation. The definition of a nation in an exclusively ethnical way, which implied that “Georgians as a nation deserved an independent and indivisible state of their own, but only ethnic Georgians were considered full members of the nation” has created certain challenges for multiple ethnicities living in the Georgian state.

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14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
Rutland’s ideas of close connections between nationalism and democratization\textsuperscript{21} are concurred by Ghia Nodia who states that “nationalism and democracy are not two separate things, but two sides of the same idea or, more precisely, nationalism is a component of the more complex idea called "liberal democracy"\textsuperscript{22}. Monica Toft examined the case of Georgia and its failure to achieve democracy in the transition period, due to the impact of regional institutions inherited from the Soviet Union. She claims that “the dynamic process of independence turned Georgia’s formally functional but largely moribund regional institutions into reactive instruments of fearful ethnic minorities and led to conflict”\textsuperscript{23}. The statement is illustrated by the post-Soviet ethnic conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as Georgia’s fears towards potential conflict hearth in Armenian Javakht.

**Javakheti - A Short Historical Overview**

The region of Javakheti, which includes the Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda districts, is located in the south-eastern part of Georgia with borders to Turkey and Armenia. Armenians constitute more than 95% of the region’s population. There exist divergent views over Javakheti’s historical past\textsuperscript{24}: some Georgian historians believe that Armenians appeared here after the Russian-Turkish war of 1828-1829. However, according to Armenian historians, as well as numerous Georgian (Leonti Mroveli, IV century; Vakhushti Bagrationi), Arabic and Turkish sources (Turkish tax registers of XVI-XVIII centuries), Armenians have constituted the region’s indigenous population from time immemorial\textsuperscript{25} and Armenian was the main language of the region. The ethnic composition of Javakheti was however distorted by the creation of the Turkish dominion, and the Christian population of Javakheti has gradually decreased. The rule of the Russian Empire in the Caucasus in the beginning of the 19th century has largely influenced the historical development of the region and its demographic composition\textsuperscript{26}. Thousands of Armenian families returned to Javakheti under the Russian rule, and for them, this was a 'return to the homeland', and not emigration, as it is generally perceived by Georgian researchers. Therefore, the Armenians of Javakheti do not view themselves in diasporan terms.

**The Socio-Economic and Political Situation in Javakheti**

From the Soviet period through to the present, Javakheti has been one of the most underdeveloped regions of Georgia. Despite the huge labour potential in the region, the Soviet Georgian government did not develop the industrial production of Javakheti, which resulted in the local Armenians moving to other parts of the Soviet Union to find work. On the other hand, at that time Javakheti was one of Georgia’s most important agricultural regions, where animal husbandry, potato growing, and the

\begin{thebibliography}{9}


\bibitem{toft} Toft, p. 123

\bibitem{rtskhilarze} Rtskhilarze, G. 2005, Religion and Conflict Potential in Georgia, in *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Journal of Social and Political Studies, No. 3 (33), pp. 55-57

\bibitem{minassian} Minassian, S. 2006, *The Socioeconomic and Political Situation in Javakheti*, CA&CC Press, Sweden

\bibitem{ibid} Ibid.

\end{thebibliography}
manufacturing of cheese, butter, and other dairy products were among the leading branches\textsuperscript{27}. The situation abruptly changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Nowadays, the region does not have a good railway infrastructure, and the roads are in a neglected state. The strong opinion among the local population is that the officials in Tbilisi have deliberately ignored the economic development of the region, thus encouraging the Armenian population of Javakheti to migrate. The absence of infrastructure and minimal government support, resulting in the collapse of production, have led to mass migrations of Armenians from Javakheti\textsuperscript{28}. A significant percentage of the revenues of the local population is composed of the monetary transfers from Russia and other CIS countries. However, Russia's introduction of a visa system with Georgia has aggravated the situation of many seasonal workers from Javakheti, who found it both expensive and time consuming to return home after completion of their work, and therefore, are compelled to settle in Russia. Another factor aggravating the economic situation of the region was the recent withdrawal of the Russian military base from Javakheti after the Istanbul OSCE summit in 1999. According to the opinion of numerous Western analytical organizations, more than 10.4 percent of the Javakheti population (6-7,000 people) depended directly on this base for its livelihood\textsuperscript{29}, while a much higher number of people depended on it indirectly. As the largest consumer of local production, primarily agricultural, the military base promoted the development of trade and business. The indirect influence of the base on the socioeconomic situation and on the standard of living of the local population was also extremely significant: it provided the people with benefits when traveling to Russia and Armenia, supplied the residential areas in its vicinity with light and heat, educated the local children in the garrison school and offered the local population medical services at the military field hospital.

The withdrawal of the Russian military troops has aggravated the already existing social security threats. An extremely urgent energy situation, high corruption, poor bureaucratic system and lack of elementary sanitary conditions, are problems added to growing ethnic discrimination. The exclusion of Javakheti from the large scale investment projects, such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, as well as minimal benefits from large grants for implementation of socioeconomic projects, make it possible to describe the situation in Javakheti as a humanitarian disaster\textsuperscript{30}.

Almost from the beginning of Georgia's independence (in 1991), the Armenian population of Javakheti has repeatedly appealed to Tbilisi for autonomy. In common terms, the Armenians have asked for the right to govern themselves in issues of local concern. However, the term ‘autonomy’ presents a danger of separatism for Georgians with the already separated autonomies of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. According to the Georgian political scientist Paata Zakareishvili, Georgian society suffers certain phobias concerning any kind of autonomies\textsuperscript{31}. Taking into account the present realities, there might be a need to change the term into ‘self-government’ for it to be accepted more positively and allow a dialogue between Georgians with the Armenians of Javakheti.

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{28} Wheatley, J. \textit{Obstacles Impeding the Regional Integration of the Javakheti Region of Georgia}, ECMI Working Paper # 22, Flensburg, September 2004, p. 28
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{31} Paata Zakareishvili, a member of the Republican Party of Georgia, cited in the article “Gruzija byla by ne protiv predostavlenija avtonomii Dzhavakheti, esli by termin “avtonomija” ne zvuchal tak “zloveshche”?, IA Regnum, 10.04.2007.
At present, when the need of a dialogue is still on the agenda, a number of Georgian researchers evaluate the region’s conflict potential based on the possible separatist sentiments manifested by the local Armenian population. Among the most common descriptions of Javakheti found in both journalistic and scholarly literature, is that of a "potential zone of conflict", "area waiting to explode" and in the more radical accounts “the second Nagorno-Karabakh”. Despite many contrary predictions, Javakheti managed to maintain peaceful interethnic relations and consequently survived in peace and stability. However, in order to maintain this fragile peace and cooperation, much has to be done in terms of minority protection and power-sharing structures within Georgia.

A number of independent Western sources have paid special attention to the situation of the Armenian, as well as other minorities in Georgia, stressing the need of immediate action: Amnesty International voiced concern at “the obstacles faced by minorities in the enjoyment of their cultural rights”, and at “the low level of political representation of minorities.”

The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination called to “increase the use of ethnic minority languages in the public administration”. It has also stressed that “Poverty is a human rights issue and a factor which impedes the full enjoyment by all, including vulnerable minority groups, of those rights. The Committee is concerned about the extreme poverty in which part of the population of the State party lives and its effects on the most vulnerable minority groups for the enjoyment of their human rights and regrets that the State party’s programme to reduce poverty and stimulate economic growth has not yet been adopted.”

The United Nations Committee on Human Rights has called “to undertake all measures to support participation of minorities, especially, Armenian and Azeri minorities in public life. The Georgian state need undertake measures to stop discrimination based on language of minorities”. These are just a few of the evidence reports focused towards the issue of ethnic discrimination in Georgia.

In the light of the aforesaid, is possible to systematize the existing problems of Javakheti in the following way:

1. Unemployment is created by a weak and underdeveloped economy in Javakheti. The lack of industrial enterprises, the withdrawal of the Russian military base, and the unrealized promises of the Georgian government to substitute the Russian base with a Georgian one, have aggravated the already existing poverty and security problems.

2. Unstable demography is a threat to the region of Javakheti. Migration is the largest in Javakheti due to unemployment and poverty, and the migrants constitute around 20-25% of working potential there.

3. The region has language problems, which have appeared in the Soviet times. The teaching of Georgian in the regions with non-Georgian population was on a low level and the number of Georgian language instructors was limited. Nowadays, the Georgian government has taken certain steps towards solving the problem; however,

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these measures are belated. Many people of age will have certain difficulties learning a foreign language and remain without access to employment.

4. Ethnic minorities’ political participation and representation – a key to more effective integration – is disturbingly low. Lack of dialogue between Tbilisi and minorities adds to perceptions of discrimination and alienation.

**Present Realities and Possible Solutions**

As has been highlighted through the Armenian example, the preservation of Armenian national, cultural and religious identities, has actually meant the preservation of their nationhood. The possibility of assimilation and, therefore, loss of identity is viewed by the Armenians of Javakheti as a real threat. National identity in Javakheti today is strongly Armenian, and despite being under Georgian rule, the unofficial culture of autonomy of Javakheti has reinforced the Armenian identity in almost all spheres of life. The insecurity of their existence, in both economic and social aspects, makes the Armenians of Javakheti reluctant towards integration into Georgia, and view Georgian policies as a direct threat towards their identity.

Conversely, the recent ethnic wars in Georgia that led to the separation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, create fears towards any insinuation that can be interpreted as a threat to state integrity, including autonomies. In both cases, it is possible to see the initiation of the mechanisms of identity defense, which leads to inevitable clashes of agendas. In the long term, such clashes can have two scenarios: further deterioration of the situation with an eruption of a violent conflict, that can precipitate other regions of Georgia with minority communities and threaten the existence of the state; or indirect ethnic cleansing, i.e. creation of conditions for displacement of ethnic minority evading assimilation, or in the present case, ‘Georganization’. The under-representation in all spheres of public life, especially government, is problematic for ethnic minorities. A larger representation, which is a key factor for integration, is disturbingly low, and adds to alienation and discrimination in the Georgian society.

The integration is a complicated process requiring efforts from both sides. In the Armenian-Georgian case, the preconditions for integration imply a breach of the reserved circle created by mutual mistrust. One of the main aspects of integration is structural integration, with a view to eliminating the socio-economic disadvantages of the minority members. Socio-cultural perspective presupposes active involvement of the minority members into the social and cultural activities of the state, providing social contacts, necessary education and freedom of religious views. Therefore, the integrating Georgian side needs to take up steps in implementing the rule of law and guaranteeing the security of the Armenian population of Javakheti, both physically and economically: in ensuring the religious freedom and the safety of Armenian sites of worship, by registering the Armenian Apostolic Church as a legal entity in Georgia; in involving more Armenians into public life, especially the government (according to the European report of 2006, Armenians hold only 5 seats in the 235-member Parliament). The practice of ethnic discrimination should be replaced by the maintenance and practice of the legislature’s written laws concerning equal rights of ethnic minorities. This will require Georgia remodeling its ethnic conception of nationhood into a more civic and inclusive one. The close adherence to European

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37 Ibid.
values and norms requires visible verification: the European identity of the Georgians, their belonging to the old Christian church, as well as attempts at democratization must embrace the multiethnicity as a part of national identity. Cultural diversity is a permanent and valuable part of democratic political society.

The reciprocal steps of the Javakheti Armenians need to include a more systematic and positive approach towards learning Georgian as a second language, as well as showing wish of active involvement in economic, political and social life of Georgia. It is equally important to point out the role of Armenia and its insufficient activity in the life of Javakheti Armenians. Despite many components of Armenia’s aid program, such as educational scholarships, enrollment of Javakheti students in Armenian state universities, as well as export of Armenian electricity to that part of Georgia, there exists no distinct policy towards the problems of Javakheti due to Armenia’s economic dependence on Georgia, consisting mainly in direct transportation routes. In the light of this, Armenia has avoided sharpening the ethno-social and cultural problems of Javakheti Armenians by its direct interference. Armenia needs to take effective part in the integration process by securing the Armenian identity of its compatriots in Georgia and by being an advocate of their interests. One positive step could be an initiation of the Armenian-Georgian university in Javakheti to provide the young people with a possibility to stay and study in Javakheti instead of traveling to Armenia for study purposes.

For Georgia, the challenge is to maintain a balanced and complimentary policy to appease all its neighbors; in fact, Georgia is the only country in the South Caucasus that has normal diplomatic relations with all of its neighbors. To be a link among the countries of the region is a potential asset for Georgia.

Creating a strong economy and preserving the Armenian community of Javakheti is equally essential for Georgia as it is for Armenia. Georgian-Armenian cooperation based on mutual respect and an understanding of each other’s priorities could be a catalyst for regional stability and the basis for solving many of the ethnic conflicts in the South Caucasus. Instead of being an outsider in the region, Javakheti can become an integral link between Armenia and Georgia, advocating Georgian interests in Armenia and vice versa. With the gradually decreasing Armenian community in Tbilisi, it is important to preserve the southern Georgian district of Javakheti as the remaining bastion of Armenian identity and presence in Georgia.

References


Armenian Diaspora: Rendezvous Between the Past and the Present

Hripsime Ramazyan and Sona Avetisyan

Migrations have accompanied the whole history of the development of human society; they have determined the development of both different nations and world civilization. The constant interest in migration research is conditioned by the fact that the mobility of people is, inevitably, also accompanied by the “migration” of ideas, styles of life, stereotypes of thinking, behavior, cultural models and so on. In the history of the Armenian people and in the formation of Armenian Diaspora, the migrations, consequently, played a special role. Although the formation of Armenian Diaspora goes as far back as the 4th-6th centuries, a great number of Armenians were scattered all over the world by the tragic events in 1915, namely the genocide of Armenians in Ottoman Empire, which resulted in the extermination of about 1.5 million people. To compare, the population of Armenia today is only about 2 million.

Due to its strategic geopolitical position, Armenia has throughout its history served as a stage of confrontation between the leading powers of Western Asia. The Armenian emigration from their homeland has been caused by three main factors: economic, religious, and political. The Armenian people, left without an independent government of their own, were also driven out by the foreign potentates’ policy of ethnic persecution and oppression. Consequently, mass migration of Armenians occurred in a variety of directions and forms, whether voluntary or forced, by way of deportation and repatriation, and across many states or even continents.

This centuries-long continuous emigration of Armenians from their homeland predetermined their view of the outside world. Life in foreign countries led Armenians to develop traits and traditions that accommodated societies and cultures while preserving their own ethnic and cultural identity.

The living conditions of the Armenian Diaspora communities, like those of any ethnic minority, are a function of the host country’s social, political, economic, and cultural attributes. Thus, the Armenian communities can, by the general characteristics of those countries, be classified into four large groups: communities living in the Orient [Middle East], the West, South America, and the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union (NIS).

The main vector of migrations of Armenian refugees from the Western Armenia was to comparatively close countries in Europe, such as France, Greece, Belgium, Bulgaria and Romania. Additionally, a number of the refugees ended up in more distant countries, including USA, Canada, Argentina, and Brazil. Migration to Western countries by people from the Middle and Near East contributed to the activation of ethno-cultural and political activity of local Armenians, the revival of ethnic self-consciousness, and the creation of a whole network of new institutions (schools, churches, and cultural), side by side with those that already existed. Small groups of Armenians have lived in the countries of Latin America since the end of the 19th century; however, larger Armenian communities formed here in the first decades of 20th century due to the mass migration of Armenians from Western Armenia and Cilicia. The local Armenians were successfully integrated into the social, cultural and economic structure of these societies, and a specific feature of these
communities is that their quantitative growth takes place mainly by means of natural increase in Armenian population.

Important factors conditioning the vital activity of Armenian communities are: the influence of the surrounding social-cultural environment, the way in which Armenian minorities (compact or dispersive) settle, and the degree of intensity of links with Armenia.

**A small excursus into history**

The defining year in the history of Armenia can be said to be the year 301, when Armenia became the first country to adopt Christianity as a state religion; however, at the same time, it turned out to be a fateful year. During the 4th-9th centuries, Christianity spread to Western Europe, and Armenia consequently became a peripheral country of the Christian world for a long period. This circumstance greatly predetermined the fate of the Armenians as other surrounding confessional countries pushed Armenians out of their historic territory, dispersing them all over the world. After the conversion to Christianity in 301 AD, the Armenian Apostolic Church became the most significant institution for the self-preservation and development of the Armenian people against the aggressive cultural and political encroachment of Iran and the Byzantine Empire. Throughout its history, the Church would continue to carry out its role of ethnic preservation, both in Armenia and beyond its borders.

The spreading of the Armenian Diaspora (Spyurq in Armenian) went on for many centuries and despite the Armenian declaration of independence in 1991, it is still continuing today. The following are the circumstances that were of utmost importance in preserving ethnic identification, i.e. culture, language, religion, and lifestyle, within the Diaspora. Firstly, the monophycitism chosen by the Armenian Church, “and taken as heretical by both Catholics and Orthodox, and that’s why finally singled out Armenians in ethnos-religion”\(^1\). Secondly, in 4th and 5th centuries Armenians refused to use Latin or Greek alphabets, and adhered to their original written language created by Mesrop Mashtots. Thirdly, the trade-economic activity, which to a certain degree provided Armenians with political independence, allowed them to defend their cultural autonomy and resist assimilation. The scientist-ethnologist Ernest Gellner mentions Armenians among the economically active urbanized ethnos, having a “long-term tradition of dispersive living as a national minority”\(^2\).

Armenian emigration from their homeland increased dramatically from the 7th to 14th centuries, spurred by the incursion and infiltration into Armenia of different nomadic elements, including Arabs, Seljuks, and Mongols. The Armenians dispersed in many directions, such as Syria, Mesopotamia, Crimea, Romania, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Kievan Russia, and coastal regions of Asia Minor, forming communities in these countries.

The invasion of the Omani Turkish nomads proved to be of crucial significance for the history of the Armenian people as these tribes, unlike their predecessors, settled permanently in the region and eventually established a state of their own. The Turks then began to carry out a hitherto unprecedented and consistent campaign of persecution to Turkify the indigenous Christian population living in the far-flung Ottoman Empire, including the Armenians, Greeks, Bulgarians, and others. In this period, the Armenians emigrated not only from their homeland, but also from other countries conquered by the Turks where they had earlier established Armenian colonies. Thus, the large Armenian community of Crimea was greatly reduced after the Ottoman conquest of 1475, with the Armenian population dispersing to Poland, Russia, and elsewhere.

Before the outbreak of World War I, the Armenians living in foreign countries, such as Egypt, Iran, Lebanon-Syria, India, Russia, France, Bulgaria and the USA, engaged in
activism facilitated by a host of community institutions, including religious, charity, educational, cultural and compatriotic groups. Of particular importance were the Armenian communities of Constantinople (Istanbul) and Tiflis (Tbilisi) which had evolved into the cultural, political, and financial centers of the Western and Eastern Armenians, respectively. Other prominent communities where Armenian cultural life boomed were Smyrna, Moscow, the Mekhitarian Monastery in Venice, Baku, and Calcutta. It is important to note three main characteristics of the Armenian migratory patterns in this period. First, despite the permanent and mass migration of Armenians from their homeland, the majority nevertheless continued to live in their ancestral lands, Western Armenia, Armenian Cilicia, and Eastern Armenia. Second, the emigration flows had largely been of forced or involuntary nature, and on a few occasions the Armenians were deliberately deported from their homeland. Third, the emigrants and their immediate progeny almost always had an opportunity to return.

As far back as in the early 19th century, the Armenian city-colonies in Russia (mainly in the southern part of Russia), formed as trade industrial centers. The industrial capital was under the control of Armenian merchants, and it conditioned the rapid development of bourgeois relations. Such economic position at times allowed freedom from state taxes, as well as preferential duties and other privileges. While 19th century Armenians in many Russian cities had their own structures of self-government, such as court and magistracy, it can be noted that the Armenian communities in Poland in the 16th and 17th centuries were already completely independent.

The years 1915-1922 marked a new era for the Armenian people when, for the first time in their history, the Armenian population residing in the historical Armenian territories ceased to exist. The majority of the Armenians began living outside of the remaining Armenian lands in Eastern Armenia, and finally, the deported population and their descendants no longer had the opportunity to return to their ancestral lands in Western Armenia.

In Turkey, Armenians accounted for 10% of the population in 1914. However, they were responsible for 60% of the county’s import and 40% of its export, plus their share in inland trade was 80%. Armenians were also notable in other spheres, such as culture, medicine, education. Describing the ethnic structure of Turkey the vice-council of Germany in Erzrum wrote: “The population consists of Turks, Kurds and Armenians, in terms of culture Kurds are on the lowest level, Armenians on the highest one”3. Discussing the reasons for the anti-Armenian massacres in 1915, the vice-council wrote rather sincerely: “I do not think that there was possibly another way to destroy the culture, which is older and much higher than the Turkish one”4. The Armenians’ love of their homeland, to the place where they have been living for centuries, is the main feature of their character. They dominate economically in cities and with almost all the trade in their hands their diligence and active enterprise give rise to irritation.

As to the later period, the Armenian citizens of Western democracies were further integrated into the society after so many of them fought valiantly on the battlefields of the Second World War. Some 18,500 young Armenians enrolled in the U.S. Armed Forces, and almost 10,000 Armenians fought on with the British and French against Nazi Germany and the Axis. The Armenian population of France, Greece, and Bulgaria joined the ranks of the Resistance in the Nazi-occupied regions of their host countries.

**Armenian communities in France**

French people with Armenian origin are fully integrated into various fields of French society. Today, the number of Armenian originated French citizens has been estimated to be 400,000-500,000, and consequently, France has become one of the most important
countries of Armenian immigration besides the USA. According to historians, the history of French Armenian communities can be traced to the early Middle-Ages (12th-13th centuries), and in the 15th-16th centuries, Armenian communities were formed in Marseilles, Paris, and Bhuces. Before 1914 however, there were only 4000 Armenians sheltered in this country; the emigration movement to France as a process began after the slaughter of 1915, due to which the Armenian community in France greatly increased, with immigrants mostly settling on the seashores of the Mediterranean Sea. Between the years of 1925 and 1935, 63,000 Armenians immigrated to France from Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, Greece, and Soviet Armenia. Their choice of France can be related to the active presence of an Armenian trade colony there since the 19th century, as well as to the presence of the French in Syria and Lebanon where Armenians lived. After 1945, Stalin gave permission to the Armenian Diaspora to go back to Armenia. The aim was to increase the population of Armenia and prepare an excuse for demanding land from Turkey; however, this experience ended up as a great disappointment for the 100,000 Armenians who returned, and most of them went back to France, which became a shelter country for the second time. These successive waves of immigrants have brought with them their own contributions, and this Armenian legacy can be found in trade, industry, science, fashion, and the arts. In 1654 in Marseilles, and later in 1672 in Paris, the first cafés of France were founded by an Armenian named Harutiun (Pascal), while in 1902, “St. Hovhannes”, the first Armenian Church, was founded in Paris. Armenians have also established printing works, schools, colleges and have been founders of different periodicals. The first generation Armenians born in France provided many celebrities like the singer Charles Aznavour and the film director Henri Verneuil, both sons of refugees, and later still, Formula One driving champion Alain Prost. Armenian refugees were also prominent in the arts; Paris is full of artists famous in their day and entertainers who graced the prestigious stages of the French capital: Alice Sapritch, Grigoire Aslan, and Jackues Helain are just few of them. Today, the increased contact with French officials is having a positive effect on the community. The AGBU’s Alex Manoogian Cultural Center is involved in a multitude of community activities such as organizing regular seminars by top French government officials, city mayors, bankers, businessmen, and municipality representatives to lecture on current affairs, which attract a great number of young people. It is evident that a lot has changed since the first Armenian arrived in France. Though they maintain attachment to their homeland, they have managed to become an extremely dynamic, economic, social, and intellectual component of French society. This is one of the reasons for France’s interest towards the development of relations with Armenia.

Armenian Community of Belgium

The history of the Armenians in Belgium begins in the 4th century, when Armenian merchants, priests, and intellectuals settled in the country. In Bruges, Armenian merchants had their own trading centers, importing cotton goods, spices, perfumes, and other materials from the Orient and exporting European goods to markets in the East. The size of the community was stable and did not start growing until the end of the World War I after the 1915 genocide, when the forced mass exodus of Armenians from Turkey began. The Committee of Belgian Armenians was formed as a result of this, and today the Committee is officially recognized by the Belgian government and represents the 3,000-5,000 Armenians living in the country. Already in the late 1920’s, Armenians were a force to be

* The Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU) was established in 1906. It is aimed at preserving and promoting the Armenian identity and heritage through educational, cultural and humanitarian programs// http://www.agbu.org/aboutagbu/default.asp
reckoned with in the world of business in Belgium: there were several prominent cigarette brands made by Armenian families, which were the only cigarettes available in Belgium at that time. Today, the main business in which Belgian Armenians are still involved is the Diamond industry, and in particular, they maintain a substantial niche in Antwerp’s Diamond Square Mile district.

**Armenian communities in Italy**

According to existing data which refers to the 6-7th centuries AD, the Armenian community in Italy have been engaged in positions such as empire assistants (e.g. Nerses Patrick between 555-565, and Isaac Haikazum from 625-643), whose residence in Ravenna was known as Armenia. Since the 6-7th centuries, a number of Armenians have been involved in the Sicilian army troops. The stabile Armenian settlement in Italy goes back to the 7th century, when more than ten Armenian churches were functioning in nine different towns, the number of which reached more than 40 in the 14th century under one united Armenian Apostolic church. The Armenian Community became active as a result of the Turkish-Persian war and they worked mainly as traders, sailors, ship builders, and captains. In 1512, the first Armenian language book was published by Hakob Meghapart. In 1717, on St. Lazarus Island in Venice, the Mkhitarists’ Order was established, which implements educational and cultural activities.

Today, migration to the USA, and Canada still takes place, but much less intensively; the countries of Western Europe and Russia are, currently, more appealing to Armenians because of the migrants ability to speak Russian. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to fundamental changes in post-Soviet areas and as a result of the economic reforms and challenges of this period, a new wave of migration started. Most of the migrants, who temporarily left their homeland, settled in Russia as labor migrants while simultaneously in Europe, the formation of an Armenian community began.

To examine the basic tendencies and degree of today’s Armenian integration, plus its structure in European civilization, this essay uses the example of the Armenian Community in the Czech Republic to illustrate the most obvious process.

**The formation of the Armenian Communities Today**

The Armenian community in the Czech Republic is very small in number: there are a little more than 1000 Armenians living there. However, this community illustrates an example of successful development of the immigrants association in the Czech Republic. Members of the Armenian association lead an active social life and the social links inside the community are extremely stable and numerous. Additionally, the economic integration of the community members into Czech society is proceeding successfully as the majority of Armenians living in the Czech Republic are involved in small businesses.

Researching the Armenian community in the Czech Republic is interesting because of its very specific position, which is contrastive to other Armenian communities in European countries. Although the Czech Republic traditionally was not a country with a large Armenian population (unlike Poland, in which the Armenian community has been numerous and powerful for several centuries), in the past 50 years, contact between the Armenians, especially those who live in Armenia and former Soviet republics, and the Czechs has significantly increased, compared to contact with countries such as France or the USA. Furthermore, immigration legislation in the Czech Republic, as compared to that of the countries of Western Europe, made immigration there much more realistic than immigration to France or Germany.
Worth noting is the migration situation both to and from the Czech Republic since the 1970s. First, the cultural propinquity of the Czech Republic to countries of Western Europe promoted mass emigration of Czech citizens (this opportunity of emigration existed even in Soviet times). Second, to solve the occurring shortage of a high-qualified labor force, the Czech Republic had to become more liberal than the countries of Western Europe regarding immigration, in an effort to attract the citizens of former Soviet republics.

The Armenians are the most numerous non-Slavonic group from the former USSR who live in the Czech Republic. The proportion of Armenian immigrants who are in the country with a long term residence permit is one of the highest in comparison with other ethnic groups (61, 4 %); the only groups higher in percentage are the Croats (67 %) and the Romanians (75 %)5. As Armenia is recognized in the world as a democratic country with dynamically developing economics, it is not included in the number of states, the citizens of which can expect to get a status of refugee in the European Union.

Citizenship of the Czech Republic is successfully attained by many Armenians; during 1999 to 2003, citizenship of the Czech Republic was achieved by more than 10 % of the Armenian immigrants who came to the country.

Table 1. The structure of employment of the Armenians living in the Czech Republic6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment Type</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private entrepreneurs</td>
<td>41 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hired workers in a Czech company</td>
<td>13 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hired workers in a foreign company</td>
<td>4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hired workers in a company with mainly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian labor staff</td>
<td>9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td>5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensioners</td>
<td>10 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>5 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The economic integration of the Armenian community into Czech society proceeds quite differently. The overwhelming majority of Armenians run their own businesses such as small grocery stores, shoe repairing-shops, and ateliers. Jewelry businesses are also very popular within the Diaspora. It is noticeable that only half of the Armenian wage workers work in Czech companies while the rest work in the labor market and are employees of foreign companies or formal Czech companies with Armenian administration or mainly Armenian staff. The percentage of unemployed among the Czech Armenians is quite small – less than 5 %. Generally, the attitude of the Czechs towards the Armenians is quite positive and if any conflicts do occur between Czechs and Armenians, the reason is the traditional Czech watchful attitude towards foreigners. The living conditions of Armenian immigrants in Czech Republic are quite typical for the local population too. Almost half of the immigrants rent apartments, and a quarter of them have their own houses.

Table 2 . Living conditions of Armenian immigrants in the Czech Republic7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Living Conditions</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Own apartment</td>
<td>8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own house</td>
<td>17 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial rent</td>
<td>48 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dwelling on the basis of refugee settlement program</td>
<td>8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dwelling given by employer</td>
<td>11 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostel</td>
<td>5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living with relatives or friends</td>
<td>3 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Language integration of the Armenian community is heterogeneous. Children born in the Czech Republic or those who left Armenia with their parents usually achieve good results in learning the Czech language, while the older generation mostly adapt to the new language with difficulty. According to information given by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the level of achievement in learning the Czech language in the Armenian community is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of achievement</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fluent level</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle level</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor level</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A factor which has influenced language integration is the Armenian immigrants fluency in Russian, which was a compulsory subject at Czech schools up to the end of 1980s. Because of the small size of the community, Armenians living in the Czech Republic do not only socialize with Armenians but also with other communities formed on the basis of former Soviet republics, mostly thanks to their fluency in Russian.

The Armenian school at the Department of Philosophy at Prague University is the main resource used to give Armenian children an understanding of their own culture, and the faculty teaches them the Armenian language and literature.

It is necessary to mention that members of the Armenian community, who live in the Czech Republic, are generally characterized by a high level of education, which is highlighted in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of education</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Complete higher education</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete high education</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school pupil</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete primary school</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school pupil</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is interesting to note that the Armenians, who have lived in the Czech Republic for a long time, confess that while preserving the Armenian family traditional of prioritizing a higher education for their children, the direction of this education somewhat changes. Along with such traditional goals as learning economics, law and medicine, more preference is now given to sociology and philosophy. The participation of Armenians in most different spheres of cultural and social life of Czech is quite broad as they volunteer in a number of non-governmental organizations, teach at universities and take part in most cultural festivals held in the Czech Republic.

Most researchers emphasize the stable and active links of the Armenian community in Czech Republic with Armenia. Thus, Jan Černík writes in his report: “Armenian community is characterized by significantly firmer links with the relatives and friends left in the homeland than other groups of immigrants living in Czech Republic. Armenians regularly support financially their fellow countrymen in Czech and their relatives in Armenia. The firm social links among Armenians is a part of their national identity”.

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To sum up we can say that although, due to its paucity, the Armenian community in the Czech Republic is not the main player in the relationship between immigrants and the Czech state, its role, however, must not be diminished. The representatives of the Armenian community are notable for a higher level of education, than immigrants on the whole; their urge to improve their educational level and give excellent education to their children is higher than the similar index for the local population. All the researchers note the willingness of Armenian community to integrate into the Czech society, abide by the law, and maintain a high level of their social activity.

The economic activity of their community members is mainly in the sphere of private entrepreneurship: the overwhelming majority of the Armenians who live in Czech Republic are involved in small businesses and they are owners or co-owners of companies working in service and trade spheres.

Furthermore, the objectives of legal and social support of Armenians in the territory of Czech Republic are solved by the community itself. Although a great number of Armenians living in this country consider the opportunity of further migration into the countries of West Europe, the Czech authorities take the community members for a loyal population and willingly grant them Czech citizenship. The Armenian community, while successfully integrated into the Czech society, preserves its links with their relatives and friends in Armenia, enriching the society of a central-European country with traditional Armenian values: mutual assistance, firm social links, openness, and social mobility.

Migration increases rapidly year by year and as stated there were many reasons that caused the formation of Armenian Diaspora such as wars and historical events. The latest migration phase however, was in 1990 when Armenia declared its independence and new building processes occurred to create a modern society and democracy. More than one million people left Armenia at that time. Time dictates its certain rules. The situation in the world nowadays not only brings innovations in Armenian Diaspora, but also changes the identity of the whole South Caucasus region.

References

1 See Тощенко Ж.Т., Чапыкова Т.Н. 1996. Диаспора как объект социологического исследования// СОЦИС, #12, с.36.
4 Ibid, p.124
5 See А.М. Halmuhamedov. 1999. Армянская диаспора как социо-культурный и политический феномен//СОЦИС, №2, с. 54-59
8 Ibid, p.28
9 Ibid, p.31
The factor of the Caucasus in Global Politics

Alexander Tsurtsumia

Various superpowers have often revealed an interest in the Caucasus. Russia maintained an interest in the Caucasus from the 18th century to the beginning of the 20th century, which was based on geopolitical factors. An interesting assessment regarding the Russian 1801 annexation of Georgia was given by the famous Georgian scientist Zurab Avalishvili (Avalov) (1876–1944). In his work The joining of Georgia to Russia, published in 1901, he notes:

The joining of Georgia to Russia was a political event of vital importance. Since the time of this joining, Russia follows the road, which may lead to the Coasts of the Persian gulf. The future is always unclear, but the possessions that Russia now has beyond Caucasus is enough to see all the significance of events, with which, the increase of Russian influence in this part of Asia, actually, develops.¹

I would consider that this assessment is one of the most competent made in connection with geopolitics. It clearly confirms Zurab Avalishvili’s analytical thinking and underlines the important geo-strategic location of Georgia and the whole Caucasus.

With the geopolitical configuration that exists today, it can clearly be seen that Russia’s only opposition for a direct land connection to Iran, its ally, is Georgia. Thus, the question of foreign political orientation of Georgia in the Region and undertaking the global political processes is defined. Following the last decade of the 20th century, there has occurred a confluence of geopolitical and economic interests; geo-economic interests are the most important factors defining world politics.

This paper will also address the question of energy. Russia tries to monopolize energy resources from East to West and the South Caucasus can play the greatest role in providing energy safety. The South Caucasus is an energy bridge between Central Asia, the Caspian Region, and Europe, and the Caucasus can play an important role in the realization of the energy potential, which is owned by Central Asia and the Caspian Sea region. In connection with this issue, Alan Larson notes:

The Caspian Basin has tremendous potential, offering the possibility of production increases from 1.6 million barrels/day (b/d) in 2001 to 5.0 million b/d in 2010. The key issues in Caspian energy development at the moment are to: 1) complete the second pillar of the East-West Energy Corridor by developing the South Caucasus

¹ Avalov, Z. 1901. Prisoedinenie Gruzii k Rossii [The Joining of Georgia to Russia (in Russian)], St.-Petersburg, p. 3. Translation of the Russian original: “Присоединение Грузии к России было политическим событием первостепенной важности. Именно со времени этого присоединения Россия становится на путь, который, может быть, приведет ее к берегам Персидского залива. Будущее всегда гадательно, но достаточно возможности такого будущего, достаточно обладания тем, что Россия теперь имеет за Кавказом, чтобы видеть всю многозначительность события, с которого начинается распространение русских владений в этой части Азии.”
natural gas pipeline; 2) improve the investment climate throughout the region; and 3) bring Kazakhstani oil into the East-West corridor.²

After completing the contradiction between the West and East and the fall of the USSR, the Caucasus, and essentially the South Caucasus, remained the center of attention of the world’s superpowers, and conflicting interests still exist. However, the events which developed after 2001 led us to believe that the animosity between the West and East was entering the new phase.

Among the geopolitical centers, Bzhezhinsky³ names the Ukraine, Azerbaijan, South Korea, Turkey, and Iran. The question is: if Turkey and Azerbaijan are geopolitical centers, why would Georgia not be? There are two main circumstances which lead us to believe that Georgia is a geopolitical center. Firstly, Georgia is located between Turkey and Azerbaijan and geographically connects these two states, and secondly, Georgia functions as an energy bridge between these two states.

It is considered that Georgia should be cited among the world’s geopolitical centers; when Bzhezhinsky’s “The Great Chessboard” was published in 1997, the energy projects which passed Georgia were not yet completed, and this may explain his position. Herewith, maybe attention was not especially paid to Georgia in order to avoid greater suppression from Russia. The main axis of the Caucasus land is the “South Caucasian bridge”.

Political instability is a factor that can be used by one state towards another in order to make the other lose its economic interests. Furthermore, if geopolitical potential is not used rationally by a geopolitical center, then devaluation and possible loss of geopolitical function is expected; such actions took place between Russia and Georgia. The separatist regions (Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region) are the mechanisms actively used by Russia for the purpose of gaining control over Georgia and the Caucasus Region. By losing control over Abkhazia, Russia would lose an important area for controlling the Black Sea.

In 2006, an important statement was made by the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel. According to the German newspaper Die Welt, the chancellor planned to reconsider priorities of EU policy regarding the Caucasus. Merkel considered that this region should become one of the main objects of attention of the European Union, and furthermore that it should move closer to Europe in geopolitical aspects. It should be declared on 11th May before Reichstag, devoted to the future presidency of Germany in the European Union, as Die Welt informed, referring to sources from the governmental circles of the country.⁴ The fact that Europe was significantly involved in settling the conflicts between Russia and Georgia after the events of August 2008 is a confirmation of this view. In an article published several years ago it was stated:

Throughout the epoch of “Clashes of Civilizations” this bridge bears the similar function of an outlet, like Switzerland represented in the past century. Nowadays Europe does not conduct fights on its own territory anymore. The process of expansion of the spheres of influence in the East, the South and the South-East is going on. In the given situation, it is important to manage the clash - of interests among: Russia, European Union (Germany-France), U.S.A. and China. From the above mention geopolitically active figures is observed activity with the objective to establish control over the “Southern Caucasian Bridge”. If the interests of one of the

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² Alan Larson, Geopolitics of oil and natural gas, http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/0504/jjee/larson.htm
⁴ Меркель готовит наступление ЕС на Кавказ// http://lenta.ru/news//2006/04/19/merkel
sides “are not considered” then it is reasonable to expect: the side that was “unfairly shared with” will attempt to destroy "Southern Caucasian Bridge”. In the globalization conditions it could throw us back to the epoch of the “Iron Curtain” and will initiate a new phase of political great power isolation. The interested forces should not aspire to possess "Southern Caucasian Bridge" by opposition. The interested forces should create around "Southern Caucasian Bridge" a safety zone.

The changes instigated through the destruction of the “Southern Caucasian Bridge” were firstly, the Cardinal and important geopolitical changes, which would both breach the equality of powers in the region and incur the suspension of investment capital, and secondly, the long term geopolitical devaluation of the meaning of the region and its function.

It is a misunderstanding that it is excluded with renovation of cold war nowadays and its changing into a new phase. To my mind, one of the most outstanding characteristics of the Cold War was the prolonged local conflicts, the settling of which would require several decades. The conflicts in Abkhazia and Samachablo (Tskhinvali region), following this pattern, are in great danger of prolongation as a result of the events of August 2008.

In August 2008, tension existed between Georgia and Russia that began a new phase of confrontation. However, our aim is not to bring to light the details of this conflict or draw attention to tactical mistakes made by the Georgian side. The most important issues in the post-factum situation were:

1. Open interference of Russian military units in the separatist regimes in regions of Georgia (on the side of the separatists).
2. De jure acknowledgement of the separatist regimes (by Russia).
3. The relocation of the Russian military units being beyond the conflict space in so-called buffer zones.

As a result of maneuvers made by the Russian army, they were located in various populated areas outside the conflict zones in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region. Additionally, they occupied Poti and the Tbilisi-Senaki main high road section from Igoeti to Khashuri, actions which paralyzed the country.

It would be a fair assessment to say that in the history of Georgian-Russian relations, the present stage is one of the most difficult and critical yet. Although the greatest might will be required for the regulation of these relations, no less might will be required for the restoration and maintenance of the pre-August 2008 status quo. This would be of extreme importance from a geopolitical point of view in order to provide safety on the Baku-Supsa Oil Pipeline and Baku-Ceyhan energy main road. Safety is necessary not only for these pipelines, but also for the territories they cross while under the state control of Georgia.

After Russian authorities acknowledging Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent, Russia was less likely to make any concessions or changes to their position. On the contrary, talks concerning Russia creating military bases in both separatist regions began immediately.

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6 The term and the name “South Ossetia” is an artificial one and from an etymological point of view comes in contradiction with the territory it is used for. In 1921, after the annexation of Georgia by the Soviet Federal Republic of Russia, the creation of the autonomous oblast of South Ossetia took place through violent means. This formation within the Soviet Republic of Georgia spread over the historical territories of the Kingdom of Georgia within Shida Kartli and Ksani Saeristavo. To our mind, the term Tskhinvali Region is more appropriate as this territory consists of several units.
in August 2008. This is unsurprising considering the information that Russia wanted to use Sukhumi Port for military ships has been know for a long time, as the country wishes to create an alternative base to the one in Sevastopol, Ukraine. The intention of the Russian authorities to study the shelf at Ochamchire Port once more confirms the nature of the conflict in Abkhazia and one of the main goals of August events and geopolitical factors.

It has to be considered that the events of August 2008 will continue to develop, and in that case, Russia could attempt the relocation of its military formations in the same so called buffer zones, but in a larger area. This is of the upmost importance because of one very significant circumstance – losing control of vertical and horizontal axes (preferably in the area of the crossing of two main axes) will result in the devaluation of geopolitical function.

The conflicts in Georgia require separate, wider, and deeper discussions. The tension within political processes in Georgia and the whole Caucasus may, subsequently, result in a political and economic crisis in the world, as superpowers are involved in these events, which are developing with great speed. The contours of multi police world are revealed more and more clearly. Coordination of actions and the working out of common standards is of vital importance for a stable development in the global world. The multi-polar world can possibly be transformed into an isolated one, where mercantile tendencies will overcome values common to all of mankind.
Северный Кавказ в системе общекавказских, российских и европейских взаимосвязей
Джульетта Месхидзе

Анализируя современную ситуацию на Северном Кавказе и перспективы возможного развращивания событий, помимо внутрирегиональных реалий и особенностей взаимодействия политического руководства его республик с федеральным центром, следует учитывать и фактор «внешнего» уровня влияния, в частности – положение дел на Южном Кавказе и тенденции международной политики вокруг Кавказа в целом. В настоящем докладе очерчиваются отдельные аспекты этих переплетающихся и взаимообусловленных сфер с привлечением некоторых исторических коннотаций.


Политическая, экономическая и идеологическая дипломатия различных международных «центров силы» стала сосредотачиваться вокруг Кавказского региона уже с конца 80-х годов XX века, и к настоящему времени он включен в орбиту прямой – с точки зрения взаимодействия в масштабах «европейской геоэкономической площадки» – заинтересованности Европейского Союза. Однако стратегия сближения, способная привести к обеспечению подлинного сотрудничества и партнерства между Европой и Кавказом все еще находится в процессе становления и обнаруживает неоднозначные подходы. Ряд европейских деятелей воспринимает Кавказские территории в качестве сектора Каспийского ареала и альтернативы российским энергетическим источникам. К примеру, 23 мая 2008 года на энергетическом форуме в Киеве эту позицию озвучил президент Эстонии Тоомас Хендрик Ильвес (2008), призывавший к необходимости единогласия Евросоюза в энергетических вопросах «как единственноному способу противостоять попыткам некоторых государств использовать энергоснабжение для повышения своего политического авторитета». Наряду с этим есть и другая позиция: и прежде, и теперь выдвигаются аргументы в пользу целесообразности такого видения политической Европы, которое охватывает и российскую территорию. Причем, если Шарль де Гольль говорил о единой Европе от Атлантики до Урала,
то ряд современных лидеров – в их числе, например, Сильвио Берлускони – считают предпочтительным продлить ее границы до Владивостока. Подобная трансформация гарантировала бы Европейскому Союзу приобретение не только внушительных природных богатств, но и достижение мощных демографических показателей (около 700 млн. жителей). Перспектива интеграции в данном случае ставится в зависимость от «еволюции интересов России, как на ее южном фланге (Кавказ, Средняя Азия), так и на китайской границе» (Фуше, 1999, с. 130). Вторжение российской армии на территорию Грузии и признание руководством России независимости Абхазии и Южной Осетии внесло определенные коррективы во внешнеполитическую деятельность Европы и повлекло за собой придание «кавказской» политике – и «северокавказской» в том числе – статуса приоритетного направления. Не вызывает сомнений, что для усиления европейского влияния на Северном Кавказе имеется определенный потенциал, как в экономическом, так и в идеологическом (продвижение «западных ценностей») диапазоне. Принимая во внимание факт участия ООН в решении конфликтов на территории Грузии с 1993 года и расширяющиеся в последнее время контакты с НАТО, можно говорить о европейских «ресурсах» в военной сфере.

подчеркнула, что весьма важно знать, «какого типа кулуарные переговоры идут между Западом и Россией. От этого во многом будет зависеть дальнейшее развитие событий». Показательна и точка зрения известного американского философа Френсиса Фукуямы (2008, c. 44) относительно расширения НАТО и получения Грузией «дорожной карты» в альянс: «принятие в НАТО Грузии и Украины не разумно. Я думаю, что мы не в силах адекватно обеспечить их безопасность. Думаю, что правильнее было бы спустить это на тормозах. Кстати, и европейцы против. Это не значит, что мы бросаем Украину и Грузию, но членство в НАТО – не единственный путь противостояния России».

В условиях «поделенного, но оспариваемого пространства» настоящего времени, когда речь идет о согласовании проектов строительства и приоритетном финансировании тех или иных нефте- и газопроводов, в Российской Федерации разрабатываются всевозможные меры для обеспечения национальной безопасности и государственных интересов. Северный Кавказ рассматривается с одной стороны, как очаг террористической угрозы, а с другой – как форпост доминирования на Южном Кавказе и в районе Каспия, вплоть до принятия такой программы действий, при которой «Россия любой ценой, даже угрозой начала тотальной войны, должна остановить проникновение США в прикаспийский регион» (Широкорад, 2007, c. 438). Это в свою очередь усиливает позицию руководства Имеретия Кавказ, которая заключается в том, что «главным условием стабильности, безопасности, мира и предсказуемости на Кавказе является безусловное изгнание России, как главной дестабилизирующей силы в регионе и абсолютно враждебного элемента для кавказских народов» (Удугов, 2008).

Каким образом будет развиваться политическая ситуация на Северном Кавказе – зависит от целого комплекса проблем, включая и систему связей Северный Кавказ – Южный Кавказ / Кавказ – Россия / Кавказ – Европейский Союз и международное сообщество в целом.

Один из организаторов лидер партии «Наша страна» Тамаз Гугуишвили сказал: «Наша организация будет работать над восстановлением этнической самобытности этих народов, их культуры, духовных ценностей» и будет вести работу «против российской империалистической политики в регионе».

В период смены общественно-политического строя в России начала 1990-х годов шло реформирование экономической и политической сфер общественной жизни, юридически формула льгот и «преференции в обмен на лояльность» была запретена в подписанным в 1992 году Федеративном договоре, превратившим Россию в договорную федерацию. Усиление контроля и влияния федерального центра по отношению к социально-экономической, этнокультурной жизни национально-государственных образований, назначение президентов национальных республик, предоставление им индивидуальных полномочий, ограничение федерального вмешательства влияет на положение в субъектах федерации / государство должно взять на себя роль «воспитателя нации» и интегрировать регионы в единое правовое, политическое, социоэкономическое, коммуникативное и образовательное пространство.
Summary

Northern Caucasus in the system of All-Caucasian, Russian and European contacts

Dzhulietta Meskhidze

From the beginning of the 1990s the Caucasian region has been the focus of political, economic and ideological diplomacy among various states. Analyzing the current situation and prospects of possible events it is important to consider internal All-Caucasian conditions (including some historical aspects) as well as world policy.

In the 1980s and 1990s there was a return to non-realized ideas from 1917-1920 of the Mountain Republic and the Caucasian Federation/Confederation. At that time Caucasian-centrist tendencies emerged in the formation and activity of the Assembly of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus (followed by the Confederation of Mountain
Peoples of the Caucasus, and later the Confederation of Mountain Peoples) and the International Forum the Caucasian House. The leaders of the Confederation proclaimed the restoration of the sovereignty of Northern Caucasus as one of their goals. However, they were not able to control the course of events. They do not appear to have been able to prevent the outbreak of conflicts in the region either – nor to achieve an armistice.

In view of the incursion by the Russian army into Georgian territory, and Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the “Caucasian” policy has become a priority matter of external activity for Europe. The potential for strengthening European influence on the Northern Caucasus is apparent, from an ideological (“Western values”) and economic perspective, and – in the case of the deployment of international peace-making forces in the disputed zones in Georgia – within the military sphere.
The North Caucasian and Abkhazian Diasporas; Their Lobbying Activities in Turkey

Ergün Ö zgür

In this paper, the composition the Circassian (the North Caucasian) and Abkhazian Diaspora organizations, federations, foundations and civil initiatives will be addressed. Moreover, the connections of the Circassian and Abkhazian organizations with other organizations in the world will be explained. Thereafter, the Turkish-Georgian military relationships and the lobbying activities of the Circassian-Abkhazian Diaspora organizations, especially during times of wars, etc. in their motherlands will be discussed in detail.

Introduction

The integration of the Soviet Socialist Republics was well organized, but the disintegration of the union happened suddenly and left huge problems behind. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the South Caucasian republics within the union declared their independence and were recognized by the world community (eg. Georgia, 8th April 1991; Azerbaijan, 30th August 1991; and Armenia, 21st September 1991). Some of the autonomous republics within these republics also declared their independence and wars have taken place (like Georgia-South Ossetia; Georgia-Abkhazia). However, they are not recognized by the world community, and they stayed as “de facto” independent states until 26th August 2008 when the President of the Russian Federation recognized the Republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Today these two newly recognized states and the North Caucasus republics within the Russian Federation, except Kabardino-Balkaria, are having demographic problems in their ethnic identity due to having a major Diaspora outside their homeland. The North Caucasian and Abkhazian Diasporas, comprised of several millions of people, live in Turkey. The wars in the Caucasus (Abkhazia, Chechenya, South Ossetia) have strongly enhanced national feelings among Diaspora members. During these wars, meetings were held, solidarity committees were founded, money was collected, and volunteers joined to armed militias.

The collapse of the Soviet Union also generated some possibilities to the North Caucasian1 (the Circassian) and Abkhazian Diasporas to visit their motherlands. This contributed to a rise in ethnic identities among Diaspora members. In terms of the preservation of the cultural peculiarities, the North Caucasians and Abkhazians have to some extent preserved their languages and folklore, especially those living in the villages up to the present. The general customs of the Abkhazians (Apsuwara) and the Circassians (Khabze) have been kept, especially among those living in the villages, or those living in cities but maintaining links with the villages, or having close

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1 The “North Caucasian” and “Circassian” will be used simultaneously in this article.
connections with their associations. But the usage of the cultural and linguistic practices among Diaspora members is diminishing because of the high urbanization rate, mixed marriages, etc. Although there is a diminishing usage rate of the cultural, linguistic practices among Diaspora members, the number of its young members claiming their ethnical identity is rising. This may be a result of the better democratic situation which occurred in Turkey during the European Union integration process and also due to the possibility of establishing connections with their motherlands.

Meanwhile, the Circassian and Abkhazian Diasporas live in a NATO member country, Turkey, in which the government is helping to the new NATO nominee country, Georgia, in terms of commercial and military means. The representatives of the Circassian and Abkhazian Diaspora organizations, civil initiatives and their members who are not happy with their government’s military support to Georgia – support which may have been used against their relatives during the wars (Georgian-Abkhazian [1992-1993]; Georgian-South Ossetian [1991-1992 and 2008]) – are arranging activities to influence their government’s decisions, for example, lobbying activities to influence their government’s policies towards the North Caucasian republics and the Republic of Abkhazia.

The Composition of the Circassian & Abkhazian Organizations in Turkey

In this section the Circassian organizations, civil initiatives, federations and their activities will be addressed.

The Circassian Solidarity Association (Çerkes Teavün Cemiyeti) was the first Circassian organization founded in Istanbul, 1908. The founders were military generals and intellectuals. Soldiers such as the field marshal Merted Abdullah, Berzeg Zeki, Gazi Muhammed Fazıl, General Pooh Nazmi, General Şaplı Osman and Loh Ahmet Hamdi Pashas should be mentioned. Intellectuals like Ahmet Cahit Therkhet (author of the first Adighe Grammar), Met Çunatuka Izzet (the authors of The Caucasus History and The Ancient Caucasus) and General Ismail Berkok Pashas (author of the Caucasus in the History) are also among them (Aksoy, 2003).

The founding aim of the association was expressed as “the independence of the motherland (the Caucasus)” by Dr. Vasfi Güsar, one of the writers of the “Çuaze” (Guide) newspaper (published 1909-1922). The members of this association who wanted to work more actively for “the independence of the Caucasus” founded another association, “The Circassian Progress and Solidarity Association” (Çerkes İtihiat ve Teavün Cemiyeti). Its political body was called “The Northern Caucasus” (שיםלי קמקסה- in November 1908) (Aksoy, 2003).

The fourth organization was “The Circassian Women Solidarity Association” (Çerkes Kadınları Teavün Cemiyeti), founded in Beşiktaş (Akaretler) by the leadership of Met Çunatuko Izzet Pasha in 1918 in Istanbul. The founders were Circassian intellectual women as Hayriye Melek Hunç (chairperson), Makbule Berzeg, Emine Reşit Zalique, Seza Pooh and Mrs. Faika. The education was co-education and Latin scripts were used to teach both Circassian and Turkish (Ottoman). Moreover, the founders of the school published a journal called “Diyane” (My Mother) (Hatam, 2007).

All these associations were closed after the Lausanne Treaty in 1923 because the Circassians and Abkhazian, like other Muslims in Turkey, were not accepted as
minorities in the document signed by Lord Curzon and İsmet Pasha (İnönü) in Lausanne. According to the Lausanne Treaty (1923), only non-Muslims were given the minority rights which allowed them to open schools using their languages and to establish organizations or foundations, etc. As a result, there were no Circassian or Abkhazian organizations in Turkey during the single party regime (1923-1946). After this regime, the first Circassian organization, whose name does not contain any word related with their ethnic identity, “Hand of Friendship Assistance Association” (Dosteli Yardımlaşma Cemiyeti) was founded in İstanbul in 1946. The name changed to “The Caucasus Culture Association” (Kafkas Kültür Derneği) in 1952, just after the multi-party regime came into power. The members of the Association were mainly composed of Adyghe, Abkhazian, Chechen, Ossetians etc.

The democratic situation in Turkey was suitable for opening new associations after the acceptance of the 1961 Constitution, which was very democratic and full of freedoms in comparison to that of 1924. The Caucasus Abkhazia Culture Association was founded in 1967 by members of the Caucasus Culture Association in Istanbul (AbkhazAssociation, 2008). During the 1970’s, political life among the society in Turkey was very active; however, this was followed by a military coup in 1980 which led to the closure of all associations including the Circassians and Abkhazians. The associations started their activities when the conditions for democracy and freedoms were better in mid 1980’s. In addition, the dissolution of the Soviet Union (1990s) helped the Circassian and Abkhazian Diasporas to establish links with their mother lands.

Furthermore, the adaption of the European Integration process of Turkey, with its democratization conditions, allowed for the possibility of the Circassian, Abhaz and other associations to unite as federations in 2001. The change in the Civil Code (4721) on 8th December 2001 led to a change in the articles of the Associations Law (WRCOCA, 2006).

The following year the associations also gained the right to contact and join associations in foreign countries. This right was very important for the Circassians and Abkhazians, as their populations are mostly outside their homelands. Today there are two Caucasian Federations in Turkey and another in Europe. There are also independent foundations, clubs, business organizations, platforms, forums and civil initiatives, etc.

The first federation is called “The Federation of the Caucasian Associations (KAF-FED)”, the nucleus of which was the KAF-DER (The Caucasian Associations), was organized in a center-periphery structure by 35 members in 1993 (KAF-DER, 2008). In 2003 KAF-DER was abolished and all the member associations were reopened as independent organizations. 50 organizations came together under the name of “The Federation of the Caucasian Associations” in July 2003 in Ankara (Ünal, 2008). The members of the KAF-FED increased to 57 in 2008. The Federation of the Caucasian Associations is the widest federation and tries to spread the idea of repatriation to homeland. Some Activities of KAF-FED are as follows: organizing language courses and conferences; publishing a quarterly journal called Nart (the name derives from Nart Epos) since 1997; sending students to study at the universities of Nalchik and Maikop (Kabardino-Balkaria and Adyghei); arranging summer youth camps and visits to Adyghei, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachai-Cherkessia for several years. KAF-FED organized a conference named “Languages Under the Danger of Disappearance: the
Situation of the Abkhaz and Adyghe Languages” on 1st July 2006 in Ankara. Other than these activities, KAF-FED dealt with the publication of books on the Caucasus’ culture, history, literature, etc. Moreover, KAF-FED also dealt with the preparation of documentary films, one of which is the “Birth from the Ashes”. Every year KAF-FED and member associations organize the “Commemoration of the Exile Day” on 21st May (in memory of 1864). Besides KAF-FED, other foundations, independent platforms, civil initiatives (especially the Democratic Circassian Platform), etc also participate to this program on 21st May. Further, KAF-FED is a member of the “International Circassian Association” (Dünya Çerkes Birliği) (DÇB; 2005). Since 2000, the book publication project of the KAF-Fed has been managed by another foundation, the KAF-DAV “The Caucasus Research, Culture, Solidarity Foundation” (Kafkas Araştırma ve Kültür Vakfı) (KAF-DAV, 2008).

The second federation is the “Federation of the United Caucasus Associations,” founded in 2003 in Ankara with fifteen member associations. The member associations are composed not only of Adyghe and Abkhaz but also Chechen, Karachai and Balkarian (BIRKAFFED, 2008). This federation upholds the ideal of “the United Caucasus”. Therefore, they start the commemoration of the exile day almost ten days beforehand (21st May), which represents the foundation of the United Caucasus Republic founded in 1918 during the Soviet times.

There are other organizations, foundations, civil initiatives, committees. Some of them are:

- The Friendship clubs in Istanbul, Ankara and Kayseri
- KAFIAD - Association of the Caucasian Businessmen
- The Caucasus Abkhazia Solidarity Committee (founded just after the Georgian-Abkhaz war of 1992-1993)
- The Caucasus Chechen Solidarity Committee (founded just after the first war in Chechnya)
- The Caucasus Ossetian Solidarity and Humanitarian Assistance Committee (founded just after the war in South Ossetia, August 2008)
- Democratic Circassian Platform (founded in 2003)
- The Friends of Abkhazia (founded in 2008) (www.abhazyanindostlari.org)
- The Caucasus House (http://www.kafkasevi.com, founded in 2007)
- The Caucasus Foundation ( It has a press agency called “Agency Caucasus” working for more than 8 years in Turkish, English, Arabic and Russian languages. It has a rich library on the Caucasus (www.kafkas.org.tr)
- Shamil Foundation (It was founded in 1978 in Istanbul has also very rich library on the Caucasus)
- CA-Circassianacademia (internet based academic group, founded in 2003)
- The Circassian World (http://www.circassianworld.com, Website was created in 2005, it contains several articles on the Caucasus, the Circassians etc)
- The Abkhaz World (http://abkhazworld.com/about-site.html, Website was created in 2009, it contains several articles about Abkhazia and Abkhazians)
- The Circassian Canada (http://www.circassiancanada.com/- Website was created in 2003, new website www.circassiancenter.com/)
Connections of the Circassian & Abkhazian Organizations with Other Organizations in the World

The European federation is called the “Federation of the European Circassians”, and it was founded by six Associations (Almeo, Antwerpen, Basel, Berlin Lyon, and Zwingenberg) in 2003. This Federation has close contacts with KAF-FED in Ankara. Further, the Federation of European Circassians organized the third Circassian Day in the European Parliament on October 6, 2008, which included a program comprised of a conference, meetings and an exhibition. During this day participants from the North Caucasus counties and Abkhazia, especially bureaucrats, had the possibilities to meet EU parliamentarians (EUROXASE, 2008).

The second organization is the “World Abkhaz-Abazinian (Abaza) People’s Association (DAAK- Dünya Abhaz-Abaza Halkları Birliği),” founded in 1992 in Abkhazia. Members are Abkhazians and Abazas from all over the world, including Adyghe, Abkhazia, Adjara, Germany, Jordan, Karachai-Cherkessia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the Nederlands, Russia, Turkey, etc. The Abkhaz-Abazinian Diaspora representatives of the Association from Turkey are also members of the Caucasus Abkhazia Solidarity Committee (DAAK, 2008).

The third organization is the “International Circassian Association,” founded in Nalchik (capital of the Kabardino-Balkaria) in 2000. Its aims are to support the revival of the Circassian cultural and spiritual heritage, to support return to the motherland, to protect national existence, to support the enlightenment of real history, to constitute the conditions for the unification of the Circassians in the motherland and Diaspora, and to organize the formation of a literature language among Circassians (DÇB, 2008).

The Connections with the Motherlands (Repatriation Committees)

There are repatriation committees in the North-West Caucasus Republics and Abkhazia which deal with those repatriates who will return back and resettle in their motherlands. The Caucasus Abkhazia Solidarity Committee in Turkey manages issues related to Abkhazia. Meanwhile, the KAF-FED (Ankara) has contacts with all the North Caucasus Republics and Abkhazia. In 2008 the members of the Friends of Abkhazia have also started to talk about the repatriation issues together with the Abkhaz Social Chamber in Abkhazia (Özgür, 2008)

Turkish - Georgian Relationship and the Circassian and Abkhazian Lobbies in Turkey

All these associations and federations generally work independently and do not have integrated activities. However, this is not the case during times of crises, when their activities become integrated and shared. Several examples of joint activities have been especially noteworthy during the Georgian-Abkhaz War (1992-1993), the Russian-Chechen wars (1994,1996), and the Georgian-South Ossetian Wars (1991, 2008).

The following illustrates such an example: When the former-president of Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze, came to Turkey in 2002, the chairman of the Caucasus Abkhazia Solidarity Committee wrote an announcement signed by 70 associations and 6,675 people and published in one of the popular newspapers in Turkey. It stated that “As we
are the natural citizens of Abkhazia living in Diaspora, we are ready to defend our motherland in case there will be an attack towards Abkhazia....”). This was prepared against the aggressive declaration of Shevardnadze towards Abkhazia at that time.

The same kind of activities occurred several times after the Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili came to power with the “Rose Revolution”. His declaration that “Abkhazia and South Ossetia would follow Adjara” was accepted as a war threat not only by citizens in Abkhazia and South Ossetia but also throughout the Diaspora. After this declaration and during Georgian President Saakashvili’s visit to Turkey (on 20th of May 2004), the Abkhazian Solidarity Committee, the Federation of Caucasian Associations and members of the Democratic Circassian Platform and separate organizations prepared a declaration titled “We are under the service of Abkhazia”. It was published in two leading newspapers and press conferences and private faxes also were sent to appropriate government offices, embassies, the UN, and OSCE (Özgür, 2004).

The Diaspora is also affected by the relationship between Turkey and Georgia. One of them is the military cooperation of Turkey and Georgia. Turkey’s NATO membership since the 1950’s and military assistance to a NATO nominee member, Georgia, serve to generate disturbances among Diaspora members, as they are afraid of the possibility of these weapons being used against their relatives. In 2008 when Georgia started the war in South Ossetia, the Diaspora organized several meetings and protests in front of the Georgian embassy (and consulate) in Istanbul and Ankara.

Another example is the political dimension of the Turkish-Georgian relationship. Although the Russian Federation (26.08.2008) and Nicaragua (04.09.2008) recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Turkey supports the territorial integrity of Georgia. Meanwhile, the country still imposes an embargo on direct passenger ships and direct flights from Turkey to Abkhazia. The Diaspora in Turkey wants their government to solve this problem of travel embargo to Abkhazia in the near future by directing passenger ships and flights to Sukhum, Abkhazia. In order to present this problem to the parliament representatives. The Federation of the Caucasian Associations, The Friends of Abkhazia, The Caucasus Abkhazia Solidarity Committee, etc. are giving briefings to the parliament members, bureaucrats, political parties etc. A new signature campaign was started by the members of the “Friends of Abkhazia” to request the Turkish government to let direct passenger ships and direct flights to Sukhum-Abkhazia (Friends of Abkhazia, 2008a).

The war in South Ossetia in August 2008 was another issue which accelerated lobbying activities of the Circassians, Abkhazians, Ossetians, etc. in Turkey. During the Georgian–S.Ossetian War (started in 7th August and ended 12th August 2008), under the leadership of Alan Foundation (Ossetians), all Caucasian organizations came together and held several press conferences, meetings, and protests (Protest, 2008). During these meetings, “The Caucasus Ossetian Solidarity and Humanitarian Assistance Committee” was founded on 10th August 2008 in Istanbul. The Committee opened an assistance campaign for South Ossetians. Moreover, it contacted the Turkish Red Crescent (Kızılay) to send materials to South Ossetia.

What is more, since the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the members of the Friends of Abkhazia and other organizations have organized several celebration activities in their associations (like Caucasus Abkhazia Cultural Association, Istanbul, KAF-FED in Ankara, etc). In the streets of Istanbul, Ankara, flags were waved from
cars while during their round trips. In addition, the Committee, the Federation of the Caucasian Associations and the Friends of Abkhazia organized trips to Abkhazia in order to celebrate the 15th Independence Day and recognition of the country on 30th September 2008 (The Friends of Abkhazia, 2008b).

The third issue is the economic (also energy) dimension of Turkish-Georgian relationship. In order to protect the safety of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, the Turkish government may not try to establish contact with Abkhazia. After the Georgian-South Ossetian war and Georgian-Russian war, the Turkish prime minister has visited Moscow and Tbilisi, where he suggested the Caucasus Pack, which may cover Turkey, the Russian Federation, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia while not taking into account Iran, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But this project is still under discussion.

On the other hand, Turkey has an economic and a political relationship with Russia, upon which Turkey is dependent for natural gas and energy. The positive Turkish-Russian relations may have a positive effect on Turkish-Abkhazian relationship in the future.

Conclusion

By having major Circassian and Abkhazian Diasporas in Turkey, the North Caucasus republics and Abkhazia will always want to have a connection with them and the Turkish government. However, Turkey has its interest because of the “Realpolitik” — energy and economic reasons; but, today’s politics may change according to new future interests. Hence, the Russian-Turkish relationship may affect Turkey’s politics towards the Republic of Abkhazia. Besides, the Circassian and Abkhaz Diasporas in Turkey will continue to lobby the Turkish government – their government – to establish a relationship with their motherlands.

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Abkhazians live in Georgia, mostly in the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic, with a small number also living in the Adjarian Autonomous Republic, a region in SW Georgia on the Turkish border. The Abkhazians currently living in the Adjarian Autonomous Republic are the progenies of Abkhazian Muhajirs, as in the mid 19th century various historical events forced their resettlement from Abkhazia into Turkey, and subsequently, Abkhazians have been settling in Adjarian territory since 1862. Abkhazians speaking the Abkhazian language also live in Turkey, Syria, and are scattered in the post-Soviet countries.

The major reason for the resettlement of Abkhazians in various countries is muhajiroba, and therefore this essay will primarily focus on this phenomenon. “Muhajir” is an Arabian word meaning “resettled, emigrant”, and this historical occurrence was the tragic fate of many of the North-Caucasian peoples.

Muhajiroba commenced from the time of Ottoman rule in Caucasus and lasted to World War I. The phenomenon was related to the wars in Caucasus, commencement of the peasant reform, and Russian-Ottoman war of 1877-1878. Muhajiroba spread over the Abazes, Abadzakhs, Bzhedughs, Noghais from Kuban, Cherkess, Ubykhs, Chechens, Karachais, Kabardians, Ossetians, Abkhazians, and Muslim Georgians living in Georgia. The Ottoman Empire attempted to settle the Muhajirs in the less populated areas of the Empire and on the Russian-Ottoman border. (As a result of muhajiroba, the nation of Ubykhs was completely eliminated and the Ubykh language disappeared).

The provocative nature of this phenomenon and the accompanying historical processes were both completely based upon Czarist politics of a Russia that did as it desired. Through the resettlement of the mountain population into the Ottoman Empire, they hoped to achieve political peace in this region and use the freed lands for wide colonization.

Muhajiroba commenced in Abkhazia in the first half of the nineteenth century as a result of political defeat and a cruel suppression of the people’s rebellion by the Abkhazian feudal lords of pro-Turkish orientation.

Currently, the largest Diaspora of Abkhazians, resettled at the time of muhajiroba, is in Turkey. There, the number of Abkhazians is about 100,000 alone, while in the Arabian countries the number is about 15,000 in total. Additionally, a small number of Abkhazians live in villages in Northern Greece and they have maintained their language and traditions (Kil’ba, 1983).

To further discuss the progenies of Abkhazian Muhajirs, the earlier mentioned Abkhazians living in the territory of Adjaria, archive materials show that a number of these resettled Abkhazians settled in Adjaria's capital Batumi and surrounding areas. It should be noted that Batumi at that time was under Turkish rule (Kil’ba, 1983).

A further group of Abkhazian emigrants who suffered social and national discrimination in Turkey attempted to return to the territory of the Russian Empire without the permission of the Russian government. These Abkhazians first came to Adjaria before continuing to Abkhazia.
During the 1870-80s, Batumi became the contact point between Caucasus and Turkey, and without any permission, Abkhazians returned to Batumi from Turkey. The Czar of the Russian Empire allowed the long suffering Abkhazians to return to Adjaria but not to Abkhazia. As a result, over twenty villages were created in the territory of Adjaria and settled with Abkhazians and Cherkess muhajirs. Abkhazians settled in Batumi and the surrounding areas of Feria, Fezia, Kveda Sameba, Kaltibauri, Salibauri, Iajadia, Akhmedia, Stepanovka, Shukria, Lufia, Kusiadia, Urekhi, Minda, Angisa, Adlia, and Kakhaberi. They also settled the west side of Chorokhi, which included Charnali, Tkhilnari, Nusreti, Cherkезлuki, and Karashalvari.

At first, the Abkhazians settled on the Black Sea shore and gradually large numbers stopped at Nurie. Consequently, this Abkhazian village became a city. Abkhazians then moved from the city and settled in the surrounding territory in the villages of Urekhi, Stepanovka, and Feria.

There are different opinions about the number of Abkhazians in Batumi. For example, according to the data of V.D. Pal’grev, in Batumi District in 1879, there lived 9,500 Abkhazians and Cherkess, and after the second resettlement (1867) – 1200 (Pal’grev 1882-1883). Sh.V. Megrelidze (1974) writes that in Kvemo, Adjaria, several villages were completely settled with Abkhazians, although their number at the time of Muhajiroba did not exceed 3000. However, the data of G.I. Dzidzaria (1975) suggests that the number refers to 3000 Abkhazian families, and cites 10,000 persons.

In the 1880s, new emigration of Abkhazians to Turkey took place, and as a result the number of Abkhazians in the Adjarian territory decreased. According to the 1886 figures, there were 1,469 persons (155 families) living in Batumi. E. Leozin states that the Abkhazians “maintained their customs and language, some of them speak in Russian. They speak well in Georgian and Turkish” (Leozin 1905-07: 145).

In 1970, according to the All Union Population Census, the number of Abkhazians living in Adjaria was 1361 persons and 982 of them regard Abkhazian as their native language.

Currently, Abkhazians from Batumi live in villages in the Khelvachauri District in Urekhi, Feria, Mnatobi, Salibauri, Kveda Sameba, Chelta, Angisa, Minda, Kakhaberi, Adlia, Charnali, as well as in Batumi itself.

The older generation of Abkhazians from Batumi remember that their ancestors resettled from various districts of Abkhazia. They relate that their ancestors, those Abkhazians who now live in Angisa, Minda, and Kakhaberi, came from Thabon (on the Southern coast of Kelasuri and Dranda) and they call themselves emigrants from Sokhumi (aqla ianocæ). Meanwhile, the other group of Abkhazians from Batumi, who live in the villages of Feria, Urekhi, Salibauri, Kveda Sameba, Adlia, Charnali, and Chelta, came from the territories surrounding rivers Bshipi and Adler and they call themselves emigrants from axalças (axalçis Zlara).

From the scientific point of view, it is of great significance to take into consideration the development of the Abkhazian language, ethnology, culture, and history when studying the characteristic features of lifestyle and speech of Abkhazians living in the areas geographically remote from Abkhazia.

From the political point of view, as the restoration of historical justice is almost impossible regarding the current situation in the world, normal social conditions should be arranged for the Abkhazian Diasporas, without restriction of their “human rights”, language, and traditions. The Diasporas in various countries should have equal rights with the citizens of the host country, where they have found themselves through misfortune.
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«Временнаи жизнь» сезонных трудовых мигрантов из Западного высокогорного Дагестана (Цумадинский район) в Ростовскую область: культурная проекция или культурная трансформация

Екатерина Капустина

Цумадинский район Дагестана считается одним из самых отдаленных в республике. На территории этого высокогорного района проживают представители нескольких этнических групп андо-цезской группы языков, в 1950-е годы в период построения групповых социалистических наций всех их причислили к аварцам. Жители Цумадинского района исповедуют ислам, как и подавляющее большинство населения в республике.

Экономическая ситуация здесь достаточно непростая: в горных селениях, в которых живут около 50 до 300 домохозяйств, существует весьма ограниченное количество бюджетных рабочих мест – это, прежде всего, учителя, фельдшеры, работники сельской администрации, детского сада. Колхозы в большинстве селений фактически не функционируют, уцелевшие хозяйства трудоустраивают в лучшем случае лишь несколько десятков человек. В этой ситуации многие жители района вынуждены зарабатывать вне пределов своего постоянного места проживания, то есть становиться трудовыми мигрантами. Зачастую трудовые мигранты отправляются на заработки всего на несколько месяцев в году, т.е. на определенный сезон. Такой вид трудовой миграции для Дагестана наиболее характерен. Большая часть сезонных рабочих из Цумадинского района едет на сезонные сельскохозяйственные работы по выращиванию овощей (в основном, лука, реже арбузов) на поля Ростовской области.

Прежде всего, следует вкратце описать как организован был дагестанцев на промысле лука. Как правило они объединяются в рабочие группы – бригады, согласно родственным и соседским связям. Порой в качестве наемных рабочих работают и дагестанцы из других селений и районов, но основу бригады, как правило, составляют односельчане. Бригада состоит из нескольких семей, арендующих от 1 до 10 гектаров земли и на них работающих: мужчины работают на сельскохозяйственной технике и решают основные рабочие вопросы, женщины и дети занимаются ручным трудом – прополкой и уборкой урожая. В бригаде есть бригадир, который фактически создает бригаду и решает наиболее важные вопросы. Во время промысла дагестанцы живут во временных балаганах из фанеры прямо на поле. Важно отметить, что мигранты проживают обособленно от местных русских жителей.

Покидая родное селение, горцы почти на полгода (а некоторые и на более длительный срок) переезжают во временные бригадные «поселки» на полях в Ростовской области для выращивания лука. В результате, складывается некая новая система жизни на новом месте и в новых условиях. Но новая ли? Копируют ли хуштадины свой сельский уклад жизни или трансформируют его под влиянием новых условий? В качестве примера практики современного отходничества будет рассмотрена ситуация в селении Хуштада Цумадинского района.
Отношение к земле
Селения, входившие в вольные общества Нагорного Дагестана, в дореволюционный период имели специфическую форму землевладения. Здесь существовало, по мнению М. Агаларова, синтез частной и коллективной собственности на комплект пашен и сенокосов – мегь. Каждый член общины владел на правах частной собственности своим наделом (муль), но вместе с этим подчинялся общим правилам при его эксплуатации [Агаларов 1988: 57]. В частности, существовала такая форма регламентации использования мегь как его «открывание» и «закрывание». Когда мегь был закрыт, никто не имел право собирать урожай или косить сено – на нарушающего запрет налагался крупный штраф или иные санкции. «В целом “мегь” оберегался как таковой, что избавляло хозяев от необходимости оберегать каждому свой участок» [Агаларов 1988: 56].

В современной практике хуштадинского луководства также существует подобное правило: когда лук дает зеленые «стрельы», бригадир объявляет всем о запрете выходить на поля – объясняется это правило тем, что если в этот период повредить зеленые побеги, то луковица не нальется соком в нужном объеме. Этот запрет соблюдают, несмотря на тот факт, что пайщик является самостоятельным арендатором земли и формально не обязан отчитываться перед другими за свои действия. Также коллективизм проявляется в и других видах полевых работ – при опрыскивании, уборке, севе, однако, скорее всего, не является уже культурно-специфическим явлением.

Следует обратить внимание и на практику мовлида (моления по разным поводам, первоначально связанного с днем рождения Пророка Мухаммада) на луковом промысле. Практика мовлида походит на окказиональные обряды, имевшие распространение в Дагестане, хотя и проводится лишь с помощью «истинно мусульманских» обрядов, без примеси местных ритуальных практик.

Помочь – гвай – были повсеместно распространены в традиционной сельскохозяйственной практике Дагестана, особенно при сборе урожая. В Ростовской области помочи тоже существуют: при уборке лука тем, кто не успевает обработать свой участок, остальные члены бригады безвозмездно помогают в течение одного дня (последующие дни хозяин оплачивает их работу).

Однако не стоит полностью отождествлять дореволюционную практику землевладения и современную ситуацию с землей в Ростовской области. Очевидно, главные их различия заключаются в том, что если земля в родном районе воспринимается герцами как своя, собственная, отцовская, то ростовские гектары – лишь арендованные, не свои, чужие (этот факт подчеркивается во многих интервью).

В Хуштаде вопрос «исконной» собственности на землю остался актуальным и по сей день, обострившись после фактического распада местного колхоза. «Вот у меня у отца было столько-то земли, мама знает, старики знают. Я говорю: “Возвращайте мою землю, то, что у меня было”. Никто не против. Она отдаёт, то, что мне положено. Отдаёт, иначе тебе грех (если работаешь не на своей земле – Е.К.)» [ПМА. 2005. Дагестан, Цумадинский район, Магомед Гамзатов, 43 года].

Трепетное отношение к своему земельному участку в селении сохраняется, несмотря на то, что фактически лишь немногие из них обрабатываются в настоящий момент – земля становится символом укорененности в селении, исторически сложившегося социального положения. Чужая земля в Ростовской области, хотя и приносит в хуштадинские семьи основной доход, не имеет такой символической ценности – к ее оценке подходят исключительно с утилитарных позиций (поливная/неполивная, плодородная/неплодородная, дорогая/дешевая и т.д.).
Этим объясняется и то, почему сохранивший определенное значение в селении праздник оцбай – праздник первой борозды, фактически начинающий сельскохозяйственный год, совсем не отмечается цумадицами на месте промысла, в Ростовской области. И это несмотря на то, что именно там идет реальный сев, тогда как в селении немногие оставшиеся трудоспособные сельчане занимаются не земледелием, потерявшим всякую товарность, а скотоводством. Объяснение дается магнитно: «мы не празднуем оцбай в Ростове, т.к. это не наша земля» [ПМА. 2007. Ростовская область, Волгодонский р., Абдулла Абдуллаев, 42 года].

Отчасти по этой же причине подавляющее большинство цумадицев не переселяются на постоянное жительство в Ростовскую область. К примеру, в Мартыновском районе Ростовской области, где уже около 20 лет выходцы из Цумадинского района сажают лук, насосом остался жить лишь один из них, который, к тому же, планирует в старости вернуться в Дагестан. Цумадицев, умерших на промысле, обязательно хоронят в селении – это правило не нарушается ни при каких обстоятельствах.

Гендерные отношения

Вдали от «метрополии» прослеживается тенденция к изменению гендерных уставновок цумадицев. В XX веке в Дагестане вся тяжесть земледельческого труда ложилась на плечи женщин – мужчины занимались лишь посевом и косили косой на ровных участках, которых в горах было немного. Работа в огородах – «копаться в земле» – и сейчас считается женским делом. Мужчина, выполняющий какие-то «женские» работы, подвергается насмешкам и осуждается общественным мнением. Однако на промысле в Ростовской области отношение к этому меняется. «Когда наши поехали в Ростов, там все мужчины на поле работают, тяпкой. Чуть ли не целый день. А почему здесь не работают – здесь это считается позором, это женская работа. Здесь нельзя, там можно. Там Аллах не видит (смеется). Там Магомед не видит... Если я увижу, что в селении Магомед прополку делает, я скажу: «Э, Магомед, тебя жена бьет что ли? Бонишь жenu что ли?» А там не только он, но и я дело, все делают. Так как можно издавать, если и ты сам должен работать...» [ПМА. 2005. Дагестан, Цумадинский район, Магомед Магомедов, 30 лет].

В итоге, под воздействием экономической необходимости, а главным образом из-за выпадения из привычной сельской системы, принцип разделения работ на «мужские» и «женские» на промысле размывается. Подкрепляет это явление и своеобразная круговая порука – не будешь критиковать, т.к. этим занимаешься и ты. Примечательно, что подобное отношение к выполнению мужчинах «женских» работ в селении сохраняется. Дополнительный пример этому – недопустимость в Хуштаде мужчина принести воды от родника, исполнение мужчинами этой работы в Ростовской области (по моим наблюдениям).

Религиозная ситуация и традиционные обычаи

Еще одна особенность селения Хуштада на современном этапе его развития не находит своего продолжения в среде «колонистов» на промысле – фактический запрет шумных немусульманских увеселений, происходящий под эгидой реисламизации. Позиции религии и, в частности, местных мусульманских институтов и лидеров были достаточно сильны в Хуштаде на протяжении всего советского периода. Показательен хотя бы тот факт, что одна из нескольких действующих мечетей в Дагестане находилась именно здесь, здесь же в советское время существовало «подпольное» медресе, многие известные шейхи прошлого и
настоящего жили и проповедовали в этих краях. В. Бобровников даже считает, что в колхозный период произошло слияние мечетской общины и колхоза, указывает на то, что в постперестройочной Хуштаде все дыбыры (имамы мечетей) играли лидирующие роли в политической жизни селения и района [Бобровников 1996: 18-23]. В постсоветский период в селении появились новые религиозные лидеры, воспитанные в арабских странах (Сирия, Саудовская Аравия) на идеях «чистого ислама», не поддерживающего локальные особенности – «суверения». В итоге по инициативе имама и примечательной «двадцатки» запрещено пить спиртные напитки и варить мед – знаменитый хуштадинский хмельной напиток, а также устраивать совместные танцы на свадьбах. Как уже отмечалось, даже один из самых главных сельских праздников – оубай – подвергся значительному купированию (по сути, осталось лишь моление).

При этом в жизни отходников-люководов на промысле есть место весельм посиделкам, совместным танцам и даже некоторым фривольностям. Например, женщины позволяют себе ругаться матом, причем даже при мужчинах, что находится под строгим запретом в селении. В одной из хуштадинских бригад распространенным явлением стали ежегодно проводимые на поле шуточные свадьбы, проведение которых также невозможно в горах. Возможно предположить, что это подобное недосугустное для «метрополии» поведение является сублимацией запретов, налагаемых старейшинами и общественным мнением, почитающим Хуштаду как один из оплотов настоящего ислама в Дагестане. К тому же подобные свадьбы традиционно игрались в соседнем с Хуштадой селении Тинди, жители которого также уже 20 лет занимаются луковым бизнесом. Скорее всего, здесь имеется заимствование традиции, проявившееся лишь в последние десятилетия и очевидно связанное с совместными работами на луке.

Интересно то, что пятикратный намаз и пост в месяц Рамадан, не забывая сельчанами и в атеистическое советское время, соблюдаются и на промысле.

Социальные отношения

При рассмотрении особенностей жизни хуштадинцев на полях Ростовской области обращает на себя внимание и тот факт, что группа сельчан в определенном смысле замыкается в себе и не только консервирует свои бытные и религиозные особенности, но, по сути, воссоздает в своей среде «идеальные» сельские отношения. Здесь следует обратиться к специфике архитектурного устройства Хуштады образца начала XXI века. Старое селение, в значительной мере, опустело, жители предпочитают строить дома в новой, менее гористой его части. Принцип расположения домохозяйств там существенно отличается от расположения домов в старой Хуштаде, где строения тесно прижимались друг к другу, как бы образуя соты. В современном варианте дома удалены друг от друга, окружены большими приусадебными участками. В этих условиях, когда, по словам информантов, люди стали жить обособленно, ходят в гости редко, да и то только к родственникам, а все селение собирается лишь в мечеть на молитву, когда община праздники частью отмели, частью были запрещены местными алиями как противоречащие исламу, социальные, соседские связи в самом селении ослабевают. В этих условиях луковые поля Ростовской области являются тем местом, где происходит «возрождение» «старых» вариантов социальных связей и сельского быта, которые фактически угласи в самой метрополии – Хуштаде. Так, в интервью подчеркивается, что на промысле возрождается уходящее в Хуштаде бывшее тесное общение между соседями. «Здесь вообще хорошее общение. Дома вот… Целый зима мы дома, ну редко ходим в гости, чапитие там, к родствен-
main towns of the Dagestan s labor migration of native villages Western Mountain Dagestan to the Rostov Area: Cultural Projection or Cultural Transformation

The “Temporary life” of Labor Seasonal Migrants from the Western Mountain Dagestan to the Rostov Area: Cultural Projection or Cultural Transformation

Ekaterina Kapustina

This article deals with the labor migration of the rural population from Western Highland Dagestan (Tsumadinsky area). The Combination of a hard economic situation, high levels of unemployment, remoteness from the main towns of the Dagestan Republic, and federal Russian centers, force these people to find jobs far away from their permanent residences. Leaving their native villages, a considerable part of the population of this area move for the summer season to grow vegetables in the flat region of Southern Russia, namely the Rostov area (which has a prevalent Russian population). Usually, the Dagestanians form into working groups (brigades) according to the kindred and neighbors principle; however, there are people from other Dagestanian areas working there as wage laborers. The main crops grown by such brigades are onion and watermelon, the cultivation of which does not allow people to live near the fields for a
long time. Consequently, the majority of them work in the fields only two months in late spring and two months in early fall.

This business has been prevailing for 20 years and is actually a substantial source of income for mountain villages in the concerned area. As a result, people live almost half a year in a place that differs from their native home in terms of other ethnic groups with differing cultural, social and religious practices. Thus, it is evident that these economic and social experiences instigate a process of cultural transformation in the temporary settlements that ultimately influences the style of living in the Dagestanian village society. Being interested principally in the cultural transformation inside the temporary settlements of labor migrants from the Western Highland Dagestanian villages, it is possible to ask if this lifestyle replicates the “traditional” Dagestanian life or forms a new social system.

Rules of land tenure. Traditionally, the societies of Highland Dagestan were agricultural. However, today the majority of land in the mountains is no longer used for growing crops, as people, instead, prefer to use their land for animal husbandry (e.g. cows and sheep), and agricultural practice has gone to the Rostov area. Some elements of the traditional Dagestanian agricultural system can be found in this new agricultural business, for example: meg, a synthesis of private and collective land property; gwy, a system of communal helping; and movlid, an occasional rite for the rain. The main difference, however, lies between the Dagestanians’ attitude to their village lands in Dagestan and the rented Rostov lands. The former are still supposed to be symbolically valuable, as for each member of the rural society it is very important to have his own land, even if he does not use them any more (e.g. “paternal, my” land). The latter, rented lands, are perceived more in the capacity of utilization (e.g. “expensive/cheap, spray or not”, etc and never - my).

Gender roles. In Highland Dagestan, all manual agricultural work is the women’s domain which is considered to be disgraceful for men. Contrastively, in the fields of the Rostov area, men often work with their wives and children, which would still be impossible in a modern Dagestanian village.

Religious situation and traditional customs. In the villages concerned, there has been an active process of re-islamisation. The new religious leaders studied in Arabic countries and returned forbidding some of the traditional customs which, in their opinion, contradict Islam. In the villages, these prohibitions are upheld, while in the Rostov area some of them are been violated, for example, dances and bad words for women. It is interesting to note however, that the shariat norms of: 5 times daily namaz prayer, Muslim clothes for women, and ramazan fasting are still observed.

Social relationships. Old villages from High Dagestan have a specific construction: their houses were built very close to each other, with the roof of one house functioning as the yard for the house above. This helped to save space for agriculture, and additionally, created strong neighbor relationships. However, now when agriculture in the villages is of little importance, new houses are built at a distance from each other and are surrounded by gardens. In such situations, neighbor connections become less intensive. Working in the fields and living close to each other in the temporary settlements, renew these connections and there is more social contact, such as the meeting of young people and the team-work of women, which has almost disappeared now in the villages.

This case of labor migration is specific, because although the labor migrants live near a Russian Christian population, they remain quite isolated, which helps them to maintain their own cultural style of life. However, the decreased influence of the new religious leaders, who cannot totally control situations outside the villages, allow the migrants to return to some traditional customs which are now prohibited in their homes.
Collective Identities, Memories and Representations in Contemporary Georgia: The Theatre-Scape of Tbilisi

Birgit Kuch

During recent years, Georgian society has experienced rapid changes and continuous transformations. The most noted event in this process was the “Rose Revolution” in 2003, which basically could be described as a regime change: Consequently, among other effects, reforms in many sectors and replacement of key positions took place, which tended to result in the loss of older generations’ influence and authority. Mikheil Saakashvili, only 36 years old when he became President of Georgia, symbolizes strikingly these generational shifts that came along with the revolution. Thus, a generation that was not shaped professionally in Soviet institutions, but often in Europe and North America, came into power. Moreover, it is especially the younger ones in Georgia today, who opt for a speeded political and cultural orientation to the West.

In this context of rapid transformation, the ongoing renegotiation of questions concerning cultural distinctiveness, so to say, identities, is directly linked with the complex realms of representations. For instance, inauguration-acts of monuments, depictions of national heroes, as much as performances of folklore dance ensembles are intertwined with collective identity issues. As Kaschuba and Darieva pointed out, representations “…should be understood as “powerful” acts of communication, rhetoric and transmission”. Their power is constituted by “…a communicative reality which, by presenting an absence, actively produces, controls, modifies and finally changes the social order and identities”. (Kaschuba and Darieva, 2007) Thus, representations function as a frame to organize knowledge and meaning. They show their exclusive nature in images of self and other, as well as in the highly selective images of the past. With the collective experience of discontinuities in Georgia nowadays, also a complex and sometimes difficult positioning towards the Soviet past becomes apparent. Which historical moments should be remembered and which ones are better to be forgotten, is still a matter of ongoing discussion and research. Such processes of negotiating the narrative of a common history can often be observed in Tbilisi’s many theatre performances. In this context, the cultural practice of theatre offers a powerful tool to experience and play through the embodiment of contested identities and narratives. The theatre-scape of Tbilisi is thus a public biotope where forms of embodiment become spatially and physically apparent. Theatre appears here as a platform, where the spectators gain an opportunity to participate in the negotiation of collective issues by their and the actors’ presence. In this context, the term theatre-scape refers to an approach that intends to analyse Tbilisi’s theatrical institutions while paying special attention to their interconnectedness and diverse entanglements. Such a focus gives an insight into recent transformation processes that took place on Tbilisi’s manifold stages while at the same time it enables us to study their role as spaces where collective identities are contested, negotiated and affirmed. The time span of analysing those post-revolutionary processes is summer 2005 to summer 2008. As an example for this close investigation of those three theatrical seasons in Tbilisi, I would like to present the case of the Marjanishvili State Academic Drama Theatre. The Marjanishvili theatre, which celebrated its 80th anniversary in November 2008, is a remarkable example of generational change, as well as the aesthetic, thematic and political tendencies which could be observed in Tbilisi’s theatre-scape since the Rose Revolution.
After three years of renovation, the theatre, its picture frame stage and 480 seats, reopened in September 2006 with a new artistic director, Levan “Chola” Tsuladze. With his nomination to the post, a representative of the younger generation of stage directors became artistic director of the Marjanishvili. Tsuladze graduated from the Shota Rustaveli Theatre and Film Institute of Tbilisi (today University) in 1992 where he had received his training as a director. In 1997 he became a co-founder of the free theatre Sardapi, in English better known as “Basement Theatre”, where he staged a large number of productions, mainly comedies and vaudevilles. With this bulk of rather entertaining works he managed to make the Sardapi one of the most popular theatres in town by securing the lasting interest of a predominantly young public. In 2003, the theatre’s success led to the opening of a second Sardapi branch in the Vake district. Today, Tsuladze successfully applies the same strategy of creating attractive spectacles for a young audience, only this time for the Marjanishvili theatre. He has worked for the theatre in the past and in December 2005 he received a medal of honour from President Saakashvili for his accomplishments as a director. At the ceremony Saakashvili gave awards to other honourees who were either too young to have Soviet pasts or who had never been associated with the old elite. At the same time, the President used strong words to verbally attack the so-called “red intelligentsia” (President of Georgia, 2005). This event can be seen as an example of post-revolutionary Georgia’s continuation of traditional Soviet practices albeit with strong anti-Soviet rhetoric. Regarding the repertoire of the Marjanishvili theatre between the reopening in 2006 until summer 2008, a remarkable heterogeneity can be observed in the theatre. During this time span, the repertoire did not only consist of premieres or new performances, but also of productions which were staged before the renovation. Both Georgian and translated foreign plays were performed in the recent years, as they had been ever since in the theatre (Künstler-Agentur der DDR, 1984). They were staged by a variety of directors, among them, of course, Tsuladze. In order to give you an idea of what actually is negotiated on the Marjanishvili’s stage, I would like to shortly introduce three popular productions, which were performed there in the observed period and staged by three directors of different generational backgrounds.
The first production I would like to focus on is Temur Chkheidze’s “Art”. Chkheidze graduated in 1965 as a director from the Shota Rustaveli Theatre and Film Institute of Tbilisi. During the 1980s, like Tsuladze today, he was artistic director of the Marjanishvili. Although during the 1990s he worked full time at the BDT (Bolshoi Drama Theatre) in St. Petersburg, he regularly returned to the Marjanishvili and other theatres in Tbilisi to direct productions such as “Art”, which premiered in October 1999. Three middle-aged friends are getting into a quarrel upon a painting that one of them bought. The entirely white canvas of the piece of art initially causes questions on sense and meaning, but step by step the discussion also threats to challenge their friendship. In his adaption of the internationally highly successful play by the contemporary French writer Yasmina Reza for the Georgian stage, Chkheidze worked closely with the text and used means of high simplicity. There is not much design, besides a carpet which actually functions as a stage, some chairs and of course, the white painting. The main characteristic of the production is the expressive and occasionally comical acting which implies fast verbal exchanges of the characters and sometimes even the breaking of the fourth wall by commenting the discussion towards the spectators. Strikingly, this adaptation for the Georgian stage exceeded the literal interpretation of the play. By giving explicitly Georgian names to the characters and even to the unseen, but oft-mentioned painter, the plot was noticeably naturalized. On the one hand, in staging the international box office hit at Marjanishvili, the theatre and the audience delve into Western culture. This appears to be true as well for the content of the play, which resumes long-lasting discussions on the uses and significations of abstract art. In order to make the plot truly socially relevant for the local audience, however, it seems to have been necessary to transplant the plot to a clearly Georgian setting.

The second production which I would like to present is “Kakutsa Choloqashvili”, which was directed by Levan Tsuladze and first performed in May 2007. The play about the resistance hero Choloqashvili who fought against the Bolsheviks in the 1920s was written by Guram Kartvelishvili, who also received a medal of honour by the Georgian President in 2005. Georgia’s Ministry of Defence was one of the theatre’s main partners, donating 15 guns, which were used to great effect during the performance. Comments by the director himself indicated that the production fits into the context of the intellectual militaristic mobilization that came along with Georgia’s increased military spending long before the outbreak of 2008’s August War: “I hope that the performance will be interesting and important”, the director told the English language newspaper Georgia Today in March 2007. He continued: “It will be a heroic saga that will serve the military aspirations in Georgia that benefit our country”. And:

It is pleasant for me to work on this performance. It does not mean that the theatre will turn into the heroic one but I do believe that this genre is necessary for the Georgian population today. Kakutsa Choloqashvili is my ideal. He was a real hero. I want to restore the popularity of the profession of officer in Georgia, as I believe there can be no better job for a man. (Lomadze, 2007)

Consequently, the central character of Choloqashvili embodies a heroic, rather non-scientific image of the past. The plot carries many features of a patriotic historical master narrative that represents the collective experience of invasions throughout centuries in Georgia via the perspective of brave resistance, carried out by the courageous male fighter. Accordingly, it is a man’s world that Tsuladze constructs in this production, although there are some female characters on stage, too. In addition to depictions of the life, deeds and death of the hero, several battle scenes serve as highlights of the action. They are
accompanied by pathos and bawdy humour. While the producers brought the glorious military performance of the hero, defeated at last, into focus before the August War, a slight, but important shift in meaning has taken place since. After August 2008, the production seems to be a reminder of the Red Army’s 1921 invasion which resulted in Georgia’s forced integration into the Soviet Union. Following the recent war with Russia, the portrayal of the 1921 invasion also now evokes the events of August 2008. In the context of this war, the ideal of heroic resistance against the intruder acquires a new significance, even if this resistance resulted in defeat. Therefore, the historical character of Choloqashvili, who had not been officially remembered for decades, could turn into a symbol of 2008’s “fight against imperialism” (President of Georgia, 2008).

While “Kakutsa Choloqashvili” is in line with contemporary official readings of the past that promote memories of an oppressive occupation by the Soviet empire, another production at the Marjanishvili theatre, “Uriel Acosta”, functions as a vehicle through which nostalgic memories of Soviet times seem to be possible. “Uriel Acosta” was directed by the theatre’s founder Kote Marjanishvili in 1929, and brought back in 2006 by the late actress Sophiko Chiaureli. In the intervening years, the play had been revived several times by Veriko Anjaparidze, Chiaureli’s mother, who first played the lead role, before passing it on to her daughter (Ninik’ashvili, 2006). Thereby, she took care to transmit Marjanishvili’s production in as authentic ways as possible, a principle which was continued by Chiaureli in 2006. As a result, a piece of Avant-garde theatre of the early Soviet years has survived for decades in Tbilisi (Uruschadse, 1985). The play by 19th century German writer Karl Gutschow is situated in Amsterdam’s 17th century Jewish community. The main character, Uriel Acosta, is revolting against the backwardness and narrow-mindedness of his surroundings that have prevented him from marrying his beloved Judith. After Judith is forced to marry another man and Uriel is expelled by the others, the couple commits suicide. While staging “Uriel Acosta”, Marjanishvili clearly emphasised the play’s revolutionary message. Armed with his experiences from Russia’s Theatrical October, he returned to Georgia after the Bolshevik annexation, and continued to create revolutionary theatre, laying the groundwork for modern theatre in his home country at the same time (Gougoushvili, 1994; Trilse-Finkelstein 1995). However, the production’s historical and
political background and its links to the Avant-garde movement do not appear to be the main concern today. For the time being, memories of the bygone stars, who had been involved in the original production, and the good old times they represent, appear to be in the foreground. As a result, there is little room for interpretation for actor couple Nato Murvanidze and Nika Tavadze (who also embodies Choloqashvili), who play the leading roles in the most recent version of “Uriel Acosta”. Their task instead is to incarnate their forbears. It is this system of dynastic transmission of tradition that gives the Marjanishvili theatre its character of a self-referential storehouse of collective memories. Other everlasting attributes of the Marjanishvili were and are its specific topicality, its being in line with the spirit of the times, as much as its closeness to the respective holders of power. Nevertheless, as diverse and even contradictory as they might superficially appear, these three exemplary productions that we presented above indicate that the Marjanishvili theatre hosts many competing images and narrations to answer questions concerning collective issues. On the same stage, several positions in contemporary Georgia’s current identity debates seem to have their place. This fact also reflects the general tendency of Tbilisi’s theatre-scape, which features a contrasted parallelism of antagonistic strategies, discourses and orientations in the realm of constructing collective identities in these times of change. Between old and new theatrical performances, buildings and styles, the Marjanishvili theatre keeps holding its particular position it used to have for already 80 years. The fact that a director whose background lies in the new free theatre scene came to the head of this institution that dates back to the early Soviet years, doesn’t seem to contradict the theatre’s profile. Instead, the recent public successes of the Marjanishvili’s manifold performances show that this event gave the institution a new impulse that precisely forwards its very role in Tbilisi’s theatrical life.

References
Литургическая природа традиций и поиск идентичности в современной Грузии (на примере грузинского застолья)

Гиорги Гоциридзе и Гиорги Кипиани

В современных дебатах о социально-экономических и политических свойствах грузинского государства и постройки современного грузинского общества, традиционное грузинское застолье представляется как главный маркер национального культурного наследия и идентичности.

Сегодня в Грузии, как и во всем мире, происходят неминуемые процессы глобализации, интеграции и вестернизации, которые создают серьезную угрозу потери народных ценностей и традиции как в материальной, так и духовной жизни народа. К числу незаурядных феноменов национальной бытовой культуры, относится традиционный институт застолья, которая, несмотря на резкую трансформацию, по сей день сохраняет своеобразную этническую специфику, сакральную природу и символику коллективной трапезы (Гоциридзе, 2000). Говоря иными словами, грузинская «супра» - пиршество и этикет застолья, высокосформированный институт с четко установленной структурой, которому современное гражданское общество уделяет особое внимание. Заинтересованность проявляется по-разному. С одной стороны, это касается степени сохранения, устойчивости и консервативности традиционных ритуалов, а с другой стороны ее структура стереотипности и модификации. По нашему мнению, это есть в определенной степени - отражение понятий, так наз. бинарного противостояния двух начал - сакальной и профанной. К сакральному можно отнести традиционные ритуальные трапезы (свадебные и поминальные) и этикет застолья в целом, смысл которых состоит в создании определенного круга общества – «социума» с участием семиотической градации и кодификации. К профанному относится современное пиршество, без какой-либо сегментной догматической установки. Такой двойный подход к данной области культуры, делает эту проблему более обстоятельной и широкой. В разработке и в дебатах участвуют ученые различных специальностей - этнологи, социологи, культурологи и др., которых можно причислить к глобалистам и антитрадиционалам (Грузинский банкет и Гражданское общество, 2000).

Исходя из этого, в анализе грузинского общества можно различить два подхода – неолиберальный и традиционный. Неолиберальный подход описывает современное грузинское застолье как секулярный ритуал, «придуманную» в 19 веке традицию, которая широко распространилась в Грузии только во время Советского периода (Брегадзе, 1997). Согласно этому, подходу свяжем с прошлым у грузинского застолья фиктивна, так как уже потеряло свое исконное значение и стало лишь только средством компенсации потерянного суверенитета страны. Следует отметить что грузинское (и вообще кавказское гостеприимство) как основа грузинского застолья, последователями неолиберального подхода рассматривается как укрепление в обществе сильно централизованных, монолитных и авторитарных отношений. Поэтому Кавказское гостеприимство некоторыми западноевропейскими авторами
рассматривается как недемократичное, поскольку подразумевает двухстороннюю ответственность для гостя и хозяина. Следовательно, Кавказские отношения гостя и хозяина оцениваются в неолиберальной трактовке, как препятствие для создания и эффективного функционирования гражданского общества (Mühlfrid, 2005, Tuite, 2005).


Таким образом, этикет застолья в целом является частью сложного социального института, выполняющего функцию своеобразного метаязыка, стабилизатора и регулятора поведенческих норм и взаимоотношений в обществе, где окружающая среда является объектом маркировки действия. Наиболее ярко динамика этой системы проявляется в традиционном ритуальном застолье, т. к. именно в традиционных обрядах заложены пережитки и раннехристианских верований, а также трансформации этих верований. Они представлены на фоне широкой социализации, создавая этим символическую основу микрососкоического центра.

На основе этнографических материалов установлено, что в свадебных обрядах и обычаях профанализация происходит быстрее и динамичнее, чем в поминальных застольях. Здесь постепенно теряется символическое осмысление сакральных действий, но с точки зрения локализации и маркировки, некоторые зрелищные моменты – игры, пляски, музыка – консервативны. Сакральные элементы коллективного пиршества особенно ярко проявляются в порядке размещения гостей по полу-возрастному принципу, правила обслуживания пирующих, правах и обязанностях тамады, смысловом содержании тостов и в других элементах, отличайшихся от застолья других народов Кавказа, хотя оно часто дополнено общаевказскими обрядами. Для иллюстрации вышесказанного приведем несколько примеров:

Тамада
Тамада это руководитель застолья, главный персонаж пиршества, которого назначают или избирают из родственников, соседей и близких друзей. Тамада должен быть красноречивым оратором, отличившимся умением пить вино и произносить тосты соответственно веками установленному порядку.
Тосты

Музыкальное сопровождение тостов
По традиции, в исполнении песен на застолье соблюдается строгая последовательность, находящаяся в полной гармонии с последовательностью и содержанием тостов тамады. В каждом конкретном регионе Грузии исполнялись характерные для него многоголосные песни и песнопения. Эти песнопения церковные, их словесный текст – духовного содержания и исполняются они вне церкви, а за столом, так как застолье тоже сегмент сакральной, литургической природы. Эта традиция сохранилась до последнего времени в регионах Западной Грузии, а в городах она более урбанизирована и трансформирована.

Во время любого пира, а в частности, на свадебном застолье, когда произносится первый тост за благословление господа начинается песнопение «Да вошли мы в сию семью испить напиток священный», а после заздравного тоста за молодоженов, исполнялось песнопение «Ты есть лоза возродившаяся». Во время новоселья, сразу после рассаживания гостей до первого тоста тамады исполнялись «Да благославит бог сей дом новый», «Да вошли мы в сию семью испить напиток священный», «Благость божья, собрала нас сегодня» и т. д.

Этнографические материалы, собранные нами в 70-80-х годах прошлого века, совпадают с данными письменных источников, в частности, со сведениями царя Теймураза II, Александра Джамбакура-Орбелиани и источниками более ранних веков. Они отражают быт не только конца XIX века но и более древней эпохи, что подчеркивали в своих трудах историки И. Джавахишвили, Ш. Асланишвили.


В заключении хотел сказать, что сохранение многовековых традиций, грузинского застолья обогащенных общекавказскими элементами, способствует сохранению национальной самобытности и идентичности, ибо самобытность каждой этнической культуры является органической частью общечеловеческих культурных достижений.
По прогнозам исследователей неолиберального направления в связи с восстановлением независимости, грузинское застолье должно потерять функцию компенсации национальных чувств, что приведет к падению интереса к традиционному застолью. Проведение конкурсов тостов и тамады, рост числа банкетных залов и книг об искусстве тамады показывает, что интерес общества к традиции застолья растет несмотря и на то, что благосостояние народа весьма ухудшилось.

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Summary
The Liturgic Nature of Tradition and National Identity Search Strategy in Modern Georgia: The Case of the Georgian Banquet

Giorgi Gotsiridze and Giorgi Kipiani

In the recent debate concerning the socio-political characteristics of Georgian society and national identity building, peculiarities of the Georgian banquet supra (autocracy of the Toast-maker, conventional sequence of toasts) has been mentioned as one of the key markers of Georgian cultural identity and as a socio-political model of Georgian society. This article differentiates two approaches in the analysis of Georgian society: the first, neoliberal, that mainly emphasizes socio-political aspects of societal development, and the second, traditional, based on ethnological research.
The neo-liberal approach characterizes the currently practiced Georgian banquet *supra* as only a secular ritual. It was “invented in 19th century tradition”, and subsequently, became widely popular mainly during Soviet times as rhetoric tradition. According to this approach, continuity between the Georgian banquet and the historic past is largely fictitious, so the “traditional” banquet has now lost its importance since it was only a means to compensate for lost sovereignty. It should be noted that Georgian (and generally Caucasian) guest-host relations, as foundations of the Georgian banquet, are seen by the followers of the neo-liberal approach as maintaining highly centralized, monologic and autocratic relations in society; consequently, Caucasian hospitality is seen as undemocratic due to mutually obligatory responsibilities for guest and host. Thus, Caucasian guest-host relations and Georgian *supra* are seen as contradictory to both the establishment and the effective functioning of civil society in Georgia (Caucasus).

The second, traditional, ethnological approach states that traditional Georgian *supra* by its roots, content and mission was based on liturgic rituals and syncretic unity of traditions coming from ancient times. As heads of an ancient collective, *supra* were usually priests, so toast-making stems from prayer and sacral actions devoted to different deities and cults. Old names of *supra* are *tadzroba* (*tadzari* - church) meaning head of banquet and *puris upali* meaning “Lord of Bread”, while the Georgian saying *upali tamada* or “Lord Toast-maker”, found in Old Georgian texts and translations of Scripture (11-13th centuries and before), reflects the religious roots of the Georgian Banquet. This demonstrates that prayer formulae have been integrated in the sequence of toasts of the Georgian Banquet for many years, and are still considered to be a traditional toast formulae today.

The strength of religious roots in the Georgian banquet was clear even during atheistic Soviet times, when traditions of the funeral banquet, toast of *tsminda salotsavebi* (sacred places for prayer) and final toast of the *supra* to *kvela tsminda* or *kovlad tsminda* (“all saints” or “Holy Mother”) were emphasized as especially important, even in highly urbanized areas. Furthermore, in modern Georgia, the growth of Orthodox parishes is notable, so religious roots and connotations of the Georgian banquet now become a cementing component, knitting individual and collective identities together.

The establishment of toast-making contests in post-Soviet Georgia, and the growing number of banqueting halls or books on toast-making, show that public interest in banqueting tradition is growing, while conversely, the GNP of the country and wealth of the population has seriously diminished.
The Role of Language in the Loss of Culture of Immigrants: The Chechen Example

A. Filiz Susar and Yeşim Ocak

Introduction

Migration can generally be explained as moving from one residential area to another in a certain period of time. The place that was migrated from, the immigrants and the place that was immigrated to are the components of ‘immigration’ subject (İçduygu and Ünal, 1998). We have always wondered why people left or had to leave their homelands. Another consideration is ‘Do they accept the place that they immigrated to as their new homeland? The reasons for immigration are various, but it is possible to find a common point. That is, leaving a place or settling down in a new place is an effort to reach better standards. The immigrant takes his culture including one of its most important parts – language – to the place that he has immigrated to.

The Circassian people immigrated to the Ottoman Empire from Caucasia in the years 1864-65. The immigrations of these groups can be examined as both external and forced migration. The term Circassian – according to its wide definition (used in this paper) – refers to the peoples who live in the region from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea, in North Caucasia (Ersoy and Kamacı, 1992). The word ‘Circassian’ – which is commonly used by Arabians, Europeans and Turks – is never used in the language of any of the Circassian societies. Societies that live in North Caucasia are divided into four groups: Adıge-Abhaz group, Osets, Karacay Balkars (Malkars), and the Chechen Dagıstan group (Sever, 1999). Circassians (Cherkess) that call themselves ‘Adige’ are made up of these groups: Abadzeh (Abzah), Şapsug, Nadkuac (Natuhay), Kabertay (Kabardey), Besleney, Mihos (Mahos), Kemguy, Hatukay, Bzedug (Bjedug) and Jan (Lyulye, 1998).

1864 was the year when the resistance war of the Circassians against the Russians ended. During that period a lot of Chechens were forced to leave their homeland (Tutum, 2001), and also Dagıstan tribes and Georgians (as well as Osets, Karacays, Acars) migrated to the Ottoman Empire. 3000 families that immigrated to the Ottoman Empire settled in Anatolia, Syria, Jordan and other places which are not within Turkish borders anymore (Ersoy and Kamacı, 1992). Today Chechens are living compactly in the town called Çardak in Kahramanmaraş. About 2,500 people live in Çardak and the half of this population is Chechen. The Chechen population in Çardak increases every summer when close relatives come to stay for their summer holidays. The Chechens from Çardak are the members of Nahço Tribe, where the tribe is divided into families, and each family is called ‘teyp’ in Chechen. They accept each other as close relatives if they belong to the same teyp.

When the generations that were born in Turkey are taken into consideration, 40 percent of the household heads that live in Turkey are second generation, while 50 percent of them are third generation. All of them know how to speak the Chechen language, and they use it in the town. However, the younger generations cannot speak the Chechen language; and, as a result, this language started to disappear. ‘Language, first of all, is a way of communication. But besides this basic function of it, it is also a collective identification factor that unites the speakers. Languages function vitally in
the formation of ethnic identities and passing this on to coming generations (Şadoğlu, 2003).

“Languages are spoken by people, who are members of societies, which have their own distinctive cultures. Social variables, such as class, gender, and status of the speaker, influence people’s use of language. Moreover, people communicate what is meaningful and what is defined by their particular culture. In fact, our use of language affects, and is affected by, our culture” (Haviland, 1997).

As it is known, language also has an important function in passing on the culture to the younger generations; further, it functions as a means of communication and of establishing a relationship. Languages are spoken by the members of a society that has its own culture. Language and culture are interactive: One affects the other. Language should be built up in the communication process, and it can only exist if it is spoken or passed on. The language only dies when a new language takes its place in its all functional fields and when the parents do not pass their mother tongue onto their children. Linguists claim that there are more than 5,000 languages in the world. While half of the 6 billion people of the world speak one of the 15 most common languages (Chinese, English, Spanish, etc.), the rest of the world speak the languages that only have less than 10 thousand speakers. Language can not be transferred to the younger generations especially when it loses its function in social life. When the new generations no longer need to use their mother tongue as a necessity, they will accept the language that is already spoken.

An important ethnolinguistic concern of the 1930s and 1940s was whether language might indeed determine other aspects of culture. The American linguist Edward Sapir first formulated the problem; and his student Benjamin Lee Whorf, drawing on his experience with the language of the Hopi Indians, developed the so called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Whorf proposed that a language is not simply an encoding process for voicing our ideas and needs but is rather a shaping force, which, by providing habitual grooves of expression that predispose people to see the world in a certain way, guides their thinking and behavior (Haviland, 1997).

It should be accepted that the adaptation process of immigrants, whether this brings an obligation or not, will start the new language learning process. The first generation of immigrants learn the new language just enough to use it in certain situations. The second generation immigrants use their mother tongue only at home in order to communicate with their parents. However, they use their new language in educational and social fields and at all work places. As a result, they are bilingual. The third generation and following generations will not feel the necessity of speaking their mother tongue at home anymore. Although the previous generations have learned their mother tongue, they communicate in the new language. This reduces the obligation level of mother tongue learning by the following generations. Either at home or at social life, the mother tongue loses its strength and starts dying.

It is unquestionable that language is the most important element of culture. It is the basic element that passes on many other material and spiritual elements that compose culture to other generations, and provide its continuity. It is a fact that loss of language of the Chechens as an ethnic group, especially the young generations, would lead to loss of culture.

Below, the research methodology of the current fieldwork research on the Chechens will be explained. The aim and scope of the research and the collected data from the field and findings will be outlined. Under the heading of Findings, general characteristics of the village, marriage and wedding traditions, and changed traditions
will be summarized. In particular, the differences between younger and older generations in perceiving traditions will be stated.

**Research Methodology**

In our fieldwork research, the anthropological method is used. The following steps in the research are listed and briefly explained below: (1) The Aim of the Research, (2) Preliminary Research and Planning, (3) The Scope of the Research and Collecting Data From the Field.

**The aim of the Research**

The basic aim of the fieldwork research on the Chechens is to bring out the components and characteristics of Chechen culture, as no field research has been done on the local Chechen Culture until now. The other aim of the research is to try to reach an answer to the question “May an understanding and following of the culture change, especially for the younger generation, when language loss occurs?”

**Preliminary Research and Planning**

Before doing the fieldwork, we contacted people who live in İstanbul and spend their summer holiday in Çardak, via the Association of Chechens. Some members of the research team went to Çardak and spent nearly 10 days there explaining the aim of the research to the local authority and getting permission for interviewing people there. An arrangement for the place which the research team would stay during the fieldwork was made with the local authority.

**The Scope of the Research and Collecting Data From the Field**

We had an interview with all the households in the town, except the ones who were not Chechen. The research part of the project was completed by staying at the village twice in the years 2002 – 2004. Our source of information was: (1) The Elderly People (used oral history technics and recorded them by the camera), (2) Household-Heads and their Wives / Husbands (applied questionnaire face to face), (3) Members of Household who are older than the age of 18 (made unstructured interview).

We have collected data from informants on these subjects: (a) Demography, (b) Migration and Kinship, (c) Features of House, (d) Language Spoken in the Village. (e) Customs of Marriage, (f) Tradition, (g) Working Life and Economy, (h) Habit of Eating and Drinking, (i) Thought of customs, traditions, beliefs and attitudes.

**Findings**

Çardak is a subdistrict of Göksun in Kahramanmaraş in the Mediterranean region of Turkey. It is 26 km to the district center and 120 km to the city center. According to the ‘General Census of Population’, conducted by the State Institute of Statistics in 2000, the total population of Çardak is 2,420. This figure includes both the Turkish and the Kurdish families. It is possible to say that Chechens compose half of this population. There are two mosques in the town. The old mosque, which was built in the early years of the foundation of the village (the years following 1864), is compatible with the structure of the houses in the town. There is a village clinic, a primary school, a secondary school, an agriculture credit cooperation, and a pastry
There are three coffee houses: one for the old Chechens, one for the youngsters and one for the other groups. There are also five bakeries run by women.

**Demography, Migration and Kinship**

The number of the interviewed household heads are 187, of which 81 percent of them are male (Figure 1). Household heads are 59 (mean 58.8) years old. As a median, half of the household heads are over 59, while the other half is under 59. The youngest household head is 21, and the oldest household head is 86. Further, 91.4 percent of the household heads were born in Çardak.

![Figure 1 Gender of The Household-Head](image)

All the husbands of the female household heads in the village, except one, died. As there is not a grown up male child at home, this status belonged to the women. There are 3 divorced women. Being divorced is not acceptable among the Chechen societies.

84 percent of the households have completed an educational institute. All the female households, except one, and the two fifths of the male households, are primary school graduates. The percentage of the male households that had higher education is 24.1 (%). 39.2 percent of the household heads have a job. 35 percent of them are farmers and 21.7% are tradesmen and 10 percent are teachers. The majority of the rest are retired. 78 percent of Household-Heads know who was the first immigrant in their family. Half of the Caucasian immigrants are their grandfather’s father, and nearly 40 percent of them are their father. (Figure 2)

![Figure 2 The First Immigrant in Family](image)

**Features of House, Working Life and Economy**

The houses in Çardak are two storey and made of mud bricks. Wood was used for the windows and the balconies, which are placed in front of the houses. The lower story is
used as a stable, especially during cattle breeding. Toilets and bathrooms are outside the houses.

Except for the salaries of the working people in the house, other sources of income are pensions and the money earned from the apple gardens. 68 percent of the houses have fields for growing apples. The crops that are grown are mainly apple, cherry, peach, walnut, vegetables, etc. Having an apple garden spread after the 1960s, and the economic structure of the village has changed in a positive manner. Also, families have increased their income and have made investments in real estate. Most of the families have a second house in a neighbouring city. Cattle breeding has been abandoned and the work of women has lightened in nature.

**Knowledge of the Chechen Language**

95.1 percent of Household-Heads know the Chechen language. Nearly all of them understand it and speak it very fluently. They have learned the mother tongue from their parents and grandparents. Some of the Household-Heads said that they began to learn Turkish when they started primary school. In town, those over 40 all know their mother tongue and communicate with each other by using it. But it is observed that the younger generations in the town, do not even know the language; consequently, and they cannot understand their own cultural values nor follow them. From their point of view, they see Turkish, which they have been using since they were children, as their native language. Hence, they do not see learning Chechen as a necessity.

The reasons for the youth not to learn their mother tongue or for it not being taught to them are various. To summarize: firstly, families could not or do not want to teach the Chechen language to their children because of both the migration from the village and the effect of television on their children. Secondly, the common language has to be Turkish because of the migration to the village.

**Marriage and Ceremony**

There are no close relative marriages among Chechens as in other Circassian groups; in particular, marriages with the children of uncles and aunts are deemed inappropriate. The Household-Heads’ marriages were arranged by their parents. Some of Household-Heads got married by taking the bride away without her parents’ permission.

The wedding ceremony in Çardak, generally, takes three days, starting on a Friday and ending on a Sunday. Components like henna and the jewelry pinning ceremony have been included in Chechen culture through interaction with other cultures.

Mızıka (a kind of harmonica that is the dominant musical instrument), drum and zurna (a kind of horn) and Turkish folk dance take place in the wedding party. Weddings end on Sunday after the bride’s coming to the bridegroom’s house and having a wedding feast. Most of the Household-Head said that “I was not present at my wedding ceremony, and I did not show myself to my father and neighbors”. In the past, according to tradition, the bridegroom does not show himself to his father and neighbors. It was a shame to show himself to them for a little while, at least for one month. But today this has declined.

The price of a bride has a symbolic meaning in Çardak. Actually, it does not exist: Today they give 10 or 20 thousand Turkish liras to the bride’s mother, which is then returned to the groom’s father shortly after the wedding.
Nearly two-thirds of the households still live in their parents’ house after their marriage. Most of the ones who say ‘a separate house is established’ are the ones who had to live outside the village because of work.

The average marrying age is 26 for men and 19 for women. There are some, but not many, who have been married twice or three times. There are also some men who are over 50 and single.

The music that is played at the weddings has also changed. Drums and zurna have been added to mızıka and akordeon, which were the only instruments played before.

**Tradition**

Most of the Household-Heads said that it is necessary to preserve certain traditions. The tradition of “ayağa kalkma” was the one of them. “Ayağa Kalkma” – “standing up when somebody enters a place” is a very important tradition in this culture. Older or younger, when somebody enters a place, he says ‘hello’ and the people inside stand up, and show him or her a seat. They thought that the meaning of this behaviour is for showing respect.

“Gelinlik Yapma” is another tradition in Chechen Culture. It can be explained as the bride not being allowed to speak with older family members, especially with her father-in-law, until they allow her to speak. If the father-in-law wants her to speak, he has to give her a gift.

**Conclusion**

The elderly people think that most of the traditions have an acceptable meaning; and for that reason, they do not question but follow them. The young generations mostly do not know their mother tongue and they cannot understand the values of their culture that have been transmitted via language. The young generations do not want to follow many traditions, except for the wedding ceremony. The young generations that speak Chechen want to learn the meaning of tradition and try to apply them in their life. Some of the young people want to marry a fellow Chechen as they think it becomes easier to follow traditions if they marry a person who was raised in the same culture. Especially after 1990s, some relations have been established with Caucasus. Moreover, some Chechens (not many) migrated from their town and settled there. Today most Chechens live in Cardak, and consider Turkey as their homeland.

The wedding customs, the types of meals, the dancing, the music and the other traditional values pass to the new generations only by the language. Undoubtedly, a human being can only exist via culture and language.

Çardak is still an introverted society. As has been mentioned before, there are both Turkish and Kurdish families that live there. But the places that Chechen families and these families live are separated from each other geographically. Borders can be described by pointing to certain houses and buildings. Chechens go to one of the two coffee shops in the village center, and Turks and Kurds go to the other one. There is another coffee shop in the village, but only old Chechens go there. Different groups do not congregate in these coffee shops; hence, there is no social relationship between these groups except for funerals and festivals.

The increased migration to the city, especially the past years; the experience that the youngsters brought from the city where they went for their education; and the effect of television programs have started to change the introverted structure of the village. Traditions, and habits have started to be questioned more and are not been practised by the youngsters. The elders are making special efforts to establish a
continuance of some of these traditions. The Chechen language is the mainly spoken language in the village; however, the percentage of the speakers that are 25 or younger is low. The average age in the village is 59. The number of the young people that live in the village all year long is not many.

In summary, it can be expressed that Chechens that live in Cardak, especially the older generation, continue to follow their traditions and speak the language, but the younger generations that left the village for studying, working or for some other reasons, have begun to forget these traditions. Nevertheless, some of the youngsters that live in the village have gained more interest in their own culture, especially because of the effects of the latest developments in Caucasia. But most of these young people who are 25 or younger cannot speak their mother tongue and are unaware of their traditions. When the intercommunication between language and culture is considered, it is impossible for a culture to live and continue without a language. This society which was forced to immigrate from Caucasia 139 years ago has kept basic aspects of its culture, such as being introverted, having numerical majority, etc. However, because of the migration from the village, marrying an outsider and technological developments, the language cannot be learned. As a result of the loss of language, the loss of culture happens. The continuity of culture and passing it to coming generations can only be possible when the language is learned and traditions are comprehended.

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* 2008
Caucasian languages and language contact in terms of religions

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From a historical viewpoint, one of the most striking features in the Caucasian languages is the preservation of archaic linguistic structures, often represented by the active alignment. These languages might have had contact with non-Caucasian languages but the contact-induced changes may not be as obvious as those in other languages in Europe. In this paper, it is argued that the archaism of grammatical structure among the Caucasian languages is somehow related to religion, or more precisely, to religious reformation. The majority of IE languages have changed dramatically after the Renaissance period and Church reformation. A similar change is not found in the Caucasus and this can be a reason for the current grammatical status of the Caucasian languages.

1 Introduction

One of the most striking grammatical features among the Caucasian languages is its grammatical system, known as active alignment, which is not found anywhere else in Europe. Historically, it is possible to argue that almost all languages spoken in Europe once had active alignment, but they have developed into a new structure (Gamkrelidze and Ivanov 1995). In this paper, this grammatical archaism is discussed at length, explaining what makes some language preserve archaic structures. The focus of the paper is not on the historical development per se, but various social-historical actors affecting the archaism are discussed.

The organisation of the current paper is as follows: first, peculiarities of the Caucasian languages are discussed from historical perspectives, indicating that active alignment is one of the clues. Then contact-induced changes are presented in a general term, since the lack of contact can result in grammatical archaism. After these background sections, social factors concerning the linguistic change in Europe are extensively discussed, particularly focusing on the periods around the Renaissance and Enlightenment. This clearly shows how these social and intellectual movements had an impact on linguistic diversity in the current Europe. In case of the Caucasus region, however, a specific feature of those movements, i.e. religion, is considered as a main factor affecting the archaism of the languages spoken there.

2 Languages of Caucasus: its peculiarities from typological perspectives

Caucasian languages are unique among languages spoken in Europe. What makes them so is the archaism in their grammatical structure, since they have preserved an alignment system known as active alignment for the past 6,000 years or so. In terms of historical changes, active alignment is known to develop into either accusative or ergative one (cf. Gamkrelidze and Ivanov 1995). This fact may be considered as a linguistically internal structure, but it also suggests some generic linkage. As suggested by some linguists, notably Greenberg (2000, 2002), languages of northern Eurasia, can be considered to form one genetically related linguistic family known as Eurasiatic, containing Etruscan, Indo-European, Uralic-Yukaghir, Altaic, Japanese-Ainu-Korean, Nivkh, Chukotko-Kamchatkan, Eskimo-Aluet. Earlier
languages, such as Proto-Indo-European, are known to possess active alignment (see among others, Lehmann 2002), which also suggests archaism of Caucasian languages.

There have been some attempts to identify general archaism in Indo-European languages in general (Toyota 2008a; 2008b), or some construction specific remarks such as possessive perfect (Heine and Kuteva 2006: 143-152). These previous works seem to suggest that some language families such as Celtic and Baltic languages seem to be more archaic than the others. What underlies in the change is alignment, i.e. any one of several grammatical systems for classifying noun phrase arguments in the sentences of a language, i.e. the pattern of treatment of subjects and direct objects, referring to the distribution of morphological markers or of syntactic, semantic or morphological characteristics. The change of alignment observed in Indo-European languages is from active to accusative one. What is significant in this change is the emergence of syntactically encoded marking of causation, known as transitivity. In active alignment, language was used to describe situations, but an internal causative structure of events can be expressed in accusative alignment. In other words, expressions such as He killed a rabbit used to be a mere description of an event as a fact, but now it can denote varying degrees of causation from the doer to its recipient, and such cases often imply meaning of suffering from the recipient’s perspective. Although there was a shift of alignment, a number of languages leave various traces of earlier active alignment (Toyota forthcoming).

Caucasian languages, however, still preserve archaic active alignment with varying signs of development. This structure was once considered a case of ergative alignment in the past, but scholars were not aware of active alignment at that time (Lyons 1968: 356-357). Interestingly, languages of North and South America (collectively known as Amerind languages) show similar grammatical patterns and this could possibly show a link between Eurasian and Amerind languages. There have been some other languages with active alignment, such as Ket (language isolate, Siberia), but regions of Caucasus and North and South America contain a number of languages with active alignment.

3 Grammatical change through contact

Contact-induced grammatical changes have been documented. The borrowing of vocabulary and other terms is very well-known, and there is a tendency of what is more likely to be borrowed, known as borrowability hierarchy (cf. van Coetsem 2000; Johanson 2005; Matras 2005; Verschik 2007). Figure 1 represents the hierarchy, and it is based on, as Johanson (2005) says, elements that are active at the discourse level, since they are more likely to be copied. However, there are cases of more grammatical changes. For instance, it is a well-known fact that some Germanic languages, such as English and Swedish, lost the case system and this was due to the contact with different languages, e.g. Old English with Old Norse prior to the fourteenth century, and Swedish and German during the period of the Hanseatic League. In both cases, speakers of different languages were more or less mutually understandable, but the case was an obstacle in their communication, and as a result speakers simplified nominal system and instead of dropping the case, they fixed the word order. This is a clear change after contacts with different speakers were made.
In recent years, Heine and Kuteva (2003, 2005, 2006) claim that contacts among different speakers caused various historical changes in grammatical structures, and impact from the language contacts can be more severe than one may think. They argue that in a contact situation, one community copies a structure in a different language using their original lexicon or grammatical strategies. This is termed replication. This is different from a simple borrowing: in this case, a new grammatical term can be incorporated into a new language without much modification. Heig (2001: 203-4) presents a case of replication in East Anatolia, where a form meaning ‘after’ appears to have been grammaticalised to something like a consecutive clause marker added to the first clause, e.g. [X happened then Y happened] to [[X happened]-after [Y happened]]. In this case, the Turkish structure shown in (1) seems to be a model for a Kartvelian language Laz (2) and an Iranian language Zazaki (3). In a simple borrowing, one would expect sonar from Turkish to appear in Laz and Zazaki, but speakers of Laz and Zazaki used their own lexicon, e.g. ŝuk’ule and tepeyä, respectively, to form the identical structure. This type of changes is pervasive in the four corners of the world.

(1) giyin-dik-ten sonar gitti
get.dressed-NOM-ABL after go.PST.3SG
‘After he had got dressed he left.’ Turkish (Turkic)

(2) ham çitaabi golobioni=šuk’ule omčiru-ş'a bidi
DEM book read.1SG.PFV=after swim.INF-LOC go.1SG.PFV
‘After I had read this book I went swimming.’ Laz (Kartvelian)

(3) ti merdī tepeyä, ez se kerā?
2SG die.PST.2SG after 1SG what do.MOD.1SG
‘After you have died, what should I do?’ Zazaki (Iranian)

These examples may sound like a contradiction, in a sense that there have been many changes in Caucasian languages. However, although they are indeed prone to changes, their basic linguistic organising system, i.e. alignment, has not much changed and changes observed in (1) to (3) are not directly connected to alignment changes. This can pose a question regarding the contact-induced changes, since there have been contacts among different language speakers around the Caucasus region, but something fundamental in grammar has not changed in any significant way. It seems to suggest that contacts can be a vital part in language changes, but there may be something else that could motivate changes, such as social changes.
4 Social factors for changes in Europe

Let us take a case in Europe prior to and around the eighteenth century, focusing on the period of Renaissance and Age of Enlightenment. It is obvious that people were controlled by churches in one way or another prior to the Renaissance period. Some revolutionary thinkers changed this trend and this was spread to wider parts of Europe. This suggests that there was a contact between different regions, and it was not just a material contact, but also intellectual ones, too. Such a contact brought Renaissance to a different level, and during the 18th century, yet another crucial period known as Enlightenment is identified. In this, reason is considered the prime tool to exercise authority, and one has to use his own intelligence without any guidance by others. It tends to start new philosophy of individualisation of man based on his own knowledge and cognitive potential. It can be traced its origin back to the mid 17th century, with the publication of René Descartes’ *Le Discours de la methode* ‘the discourse on the method’ (1637). The term enlightenment is also used in a religious sense, especially in the Eastern religions, e.g. *satori* in Buddhism or *moksha* in Hinduism. In religious sense, the understanding is what underlines in this concept, referring to the state after reaching the supreme understanding of their religious teaching.

Enlightenment is also somehow related to the changes in religious thinking in Christianity. For instance, a thesis proposed by Copernicus about the earth and the universe disturbed the church authority severely, especially in a sense that people were not secure about what they believed in, and they were left stranded in their faith and what appeared to be a new reality. Aided by internal problems of the Churches (e.g. corruptions, misbehaviours of clergies, etc.), such an insecurity escalated the detachment of people from the church, and they may find comfort in individual potential. This is also related to the Reformation of churches, since the old Catholicism is too conservative for the idea of enlightenment, but Protestantism may be better suitable since it has more open-minded attitude.

The impact of enlightenment can be found everywhere in Europe, including both East and West, but to varying degrees. The open-mindedness and individualism are much more detectable in the Western Europe, as roughly indicated in the shaded area in Figure 2. This might be a little hard to measure, but important figures concerning enlightenment include Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Swiss), Immanuel Kant (German) and Montesquieu (France) can be considered as a centre of the shaded region. There were some who could be hailed as “promoter” of enlightenment in Eastern Europe such as Russia, e.g. Nikolay Novikov or Alexander Radishchev, but he was not as influential as the ones in the west. The main cause for the rejection of enlightenment in Russia is perhaps the monarch: under the reign of Catherine the Great (reigning from 1762-1796), there were a number of reforms in Russia according to the trends of enlightenment in the rest of the Europe and Russia has a close contact with France. Catherine the Great herself had a personal contact with French thinkers such as Voltaire or Diderot. This made Radishchev hint at the anticipating revolutionary thoughts in Russia in his 1790 publication, *Путешествие из Петербурга в Москву* ‘A Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow’. However, after hearing about the American and the French revolution, she realised the impact of enlightenment on politics and tightened her control in social orders and politics. As a consequence, those thinkers such as Novikov and Radishchev were imprisoned, and works of Voltaire were burned and forbidden. She also thought that the Polish-Lithuania Commonwealth was a threat to Russia and its influence in Poland, which led to a military campaign. Her action is commonly known as counter-enlightenment. Since Russia has a lot of influence in Eastern Europe, especially Orthodox South Slavic countries (Serbia, Macedonia and Bulgaria), the lack of significant influence from enlightenment in the East is understandable.
All the elements involved in Renaissance and to large extent, Enlightenment, made it possible to have different perspectives on leaning and freedom of thoughts. This is also a period when trades and exchange of cultures became more active, since exchange of cultures can be a learning process and people were more open to it. By trading goods, one may experience new cultures, and in trading, people had to communicate in order to establish business. This is where the idea of replication becomes important, since it can play an important role in linguistic changes in languages of Europe. This may explain the more radical changes observed after 1,500 in Indo-European languages, i.e. the period of renaissance and enlightenment provided a base for people’s freer movement or made the contact with different cultures more necessary. Thus, older languages prior to 1,500 seem more similar to each other within the same language family, but after this period, grammatical structure became much diversified into current state.

There are some exceptions for this claim, however. Some languages, such as the Baltic languages, have not changed their structure even after 1,500. Baltic countries had been pagan for a long time, up until the 14th century, and Lithuania and Latvia are the last countries to be Christianised in Europe. Baltic languages, Lithuanian and Latvian, are both known to the most archaic languages in the Indo-European families, as well as Celtic languages (cf. Lehmann 2002). In addition, Toyota (2008b; forthcoming) argues that the Slavic languages are also archaic, based on various grammatical features such as word order, aspectual system, formation of the passive, etc. What seems to be common among the regions where these languages are spoken is that they are not so influenced by enlightenment, or in other words, enlightenment did not affect these regions as much as it did for the Western Europe. Celtic languages are spoken in the Western Europe, but only in peripherally, and the influence of enlightenment did not reach much of the speakers. The Baltic region, although they had been Christianised by the time of enlightenment, did not get much influence, since they were integrating Christianity with earlier Paganism without realising the influence of enlightenment, and they pursue the traditional Catholicism.

5 Religion as a possible indicator

Countries under the Russian empire, as explained earlier, rejected the movement of enlightenment in fear of revolution and destroying the monarchy. So it is also possible that, apart from the language contact, some social factors such as renaissance or concept of
enlightenment might have had some impact on historical changes, or the lack of such philosophical and intellectual movement prohibited speakers to have much contact with outsiders. This can be the case in the Caucasus region and this may explain the grammatical archaism among the Caucasian languages.

Religious history in the Caucasus region has been reasonably stable. Zoroastrianism is the first religion practiced in this region, which can date back to ca. 6,000 BC, and it can be considered as “the oldest of the revealed creedal religions” (Boyce 1979: 1). This is perhaps as old as the oldest language spoken in Europe that we know now, Proto-Indo-European. There was hardly any challenge to Zoroastrianism until Christianity (Eastern Orthodox) came around the fourth century AD and the Muslims took over the political power in the seventh century. These religions took over from Zoroastrianism, but the transition was also a very gradual one and apart from initial onsets of these religions, people could practice earlier Zoroastrianism. Changes are enforced in subtle ways, such as increased taxation or less chance for establishing a social status to followers of Zoroastrianism. Thus, the conversion was not enforced with power, but by steady social and economic pressure. The nobles and dwellers in large cities were the first to change their faith and it took much longer for peasants to follow suit (Buillet 1978: 59; Boyce 1979: 147ff). The social situation concerning religion had been stable in the Caucasus region, and since the transition was relatively peaceful and very gradual, there was a relative harmony among a couple of religions. This situation is somewhat similar to the case of Christianity among the Celts: Celts were initially pagans, and the way Christianity was introduced into their culture was a gradual integration into their existing Pagan belief. In both cases, there were little blood shed and people could possibly have choice, although there were social pressures.

What is interesting in these cases is that languages spoken in the Celtic culture and the Caucasus region both preserve much archaic structures. Judging from the discussion on intellectual movement in Europe in the previous section, it seems plausible to argue that languages without intellectual movement and religious reformation tend to preserve archaic structures. In addition, as hinted in Section 3, language contact may be another reason for preserving archaic structure. In this sense, the Caucasus region might not have had much contact with the rest of the world partly due to the geographical characteristics of the region, such as mountains and hills, which makes this region not easily accessible. The Caucasian languages seem to fulfil various conditions that can possibly make language preserve archaic structure. In the past couple of centuries, there have been increased contacts in the Caucasus region, resulting in slight changes already seen in (1) to (3), but this is relatively recent and such changes do not affect the overall structure of language, i.e. alignment.

Among these factors, religious stability should be noticed. Contact-induced changes can be important, but this is not powerful enough to change or preserve a basic linguistic structure, and it has been argued here that social factors related to people’s belief are more significant in this respect. Zoroastrianism has a long tradition in the Caucasus region. In other regions with a late introduction of new religions, such as the Baltic countries, they also have archaism in their grammatical system. Religions and languages have not been studied much in relation to historical development, although some previous works identify a possible linkage between concept of death and reincarnation and the future tense from evolutionary perspective (Toyota and Grbić 2007). The case found in the Caucasus region suggests that the stability of religion can play an important role in the preservation of earlier grammatical structures, especially alignment.
Conclusion

It has been argued in this paper how stability in social system and religion can have a possible impact on archaism of languages in a certain region. The Caucasus region has a relatively stable social system and its earliest religion, Zoroastrianism, was practiced for at least 6,000 years almost undisturbed. This earlier religious situation seems to be connected to the grammatical archaism among the Caucasian languages, often represented by the active alignment. These languages might have had contact with non-Caucasian languages but the contact-induced changes may not be as obvious as those in other languages in Europe, perhaps because such contacts are relatively recent. Along with the lack of contact-induced changes among the Caucasian languages, what seems to be more crucial is the religion and its stability and a gradual transition to a new one. The Caucasus region seems to have what is required for the archaism of earlier grammatical structure.

References


On Syntactic Isoglosses between Ossetic and South Caucasian: The Case of Negation*

David Erschler

In this paper, I compare the system of negation in Ossetic to those in other languages of the Caucasus and of new Iranian languages. I demonstrate that South Caucasian is most similar to Ossetic, among as many languages under scrutiny, only Ossetic and South Caucasian (along with Tsova-Tush) possess ‘true’ negative pronouns. Furthermore, in Ossetic, Old Georgian, and Svan, negative pronouns cannot co-occur with preverbal negation markers. However, only Ossetic shows restrictions on the placement of negative pronouns in the clause.

1 Introduction

The Caucasus is a well recognized linguistic area (Nichols 1992: 12 ff); however, there are few features that span the whole region (Tuite 1999), and it is worth looking for smaller scale ‘grammatical isoglosses’, shared grammatical features, between adjacent languages.

One such ‘local’ isogloss is the pattern of wh-movement in Ossetic, South Caucasian, and Nakh: in all these languages, wh-words are obligatorily placed in the immediately preverbal position (see (Harris 1984) for Georgian, (Tuite 1997) for Svan, and (Volk, Erschler 2007) for Iron Ossetic). This sharply distinguishes them from other languages of the Caucasus, and new Iranian languages, which do not show obvious restrictions on the position of wh-items in the clause.

(1) a. Iron Ossetic

\[ M\text{-}\text{EP}-\text{ACC} \quad \text{who} \quad \text{love-PRS.3SG} \]
\[ \text{Who loves Madina?} \]

b.*

\[ \text{who} \quad M\text{-}\text{EP}-\text{ACC} \quad \text{love-PRS.3SG} \]
\[ \text{Idem (intended)} \]

c. Svan (Upper Bal dialect, field materials)

\[ \text{who.ERG} \quad \text{gave.him} \quad \text{boy-DAT} \quad \text{book} \]
\[ \text{Who gave the book to the boy?} \]

* Ossetic materials were collected in the course of fieldwork in North Ossetia in 2007-2009. I thank Aslan Guriev, Fatima Eloeva, Elizaveta Kochieva, and Albina Ozieva for the help in organizing these trips. I am grateful to all my consultants for their patience and willingness to co-operate. Thanks are due to Nino Amiridze, Alexander Rostovtsev-Popiel, Bela Shavkhelishvili, Nina Sumbatova, and Yakov Testelets for helpful discussions; to the audience at the Conference on Caucasus Studies 2008 for the feedback; and to Ekaterina Lyutikova and Alexander Rostovtsev-Popiel for the permission to quote here their unpublished field data. The research was partly supported by RFH grant 09-04-18029e.
Furthermore, in Ossetic, negative pronouns are also placed in the preverbal position, and their ordering obeys the same restriction as that of wh-word:

\[(2)\]

Iron Ossetic

- a. \(\text{ni-kvuj \ ni-sy } \text{qygdar-y}\)
  
  NEG-who.acc NEG-what disturb-PRS.3SG
  
  ‘Nothing disturbs anybody.’

- b.* \(\text{nisy ni kvuj qygdary}\)
  
  Idem (intended)

- c.* \(\text{nisy qygdary ni kvuj}\)
  
  Idem (intended)

Therefore, it is natural for an Ossetianist to inquire whether the analogy between Ossetic, South Caucasian and Nakh wh-movement extends to negative pronouns. The present paper explores this question.

The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I review some parameters used in description of negation. In Section 3, I present basic facts about Ossetic sociolinguistics and grammar, and describe some traits of the Ossetic grammar that are arguably contact-induced. In Section 4, I describe the morphology and syntax of negation markers and negative pronouns in Ossetic. In Section 5, I compare the Ossetic system to those of cognate Iranian and neighboring Caucasian languages, and observe that substantial similarities exist only with Tsova-Tush, (Old and Modern) Georgian, and Svan systems. Section 6 is a conclusion.

2 Describing Negation: Typological Parameters

2.1 Sentential vs constituent negation

Languages differ in whether they allow only negation of whole propositions (sentential negation) or separate constituents:

\[(3)\]

- a. Sentential negation: the whole proposition is in the scope of negation
  
  \(I \text{ don’t want to work today.}\)

- b. Constituent negation: only one constituent is in the scope of negation
  
  \(I \text{ want to work not today.}\)

The difference between the two notions is sometimes not very clear cut, see discussion in (Horn 2001), but I will disregard these complications here. While the ability to express sentential negation is arguably a universal trait of human languages, it is not so with constituent negation. In particular, Ossetic does not allow it:
2.3 Negative pronouns: morphology and placement in the clause

Negative pronouns are “special indefinite pronouns that are used in negative contexts where the scope of negation extends over the indefinite” (Hauspman 1997:31). However, some languages use combinations of more general indefinite pronouns with the sentential negation for this purpose.

1 From the site http://www.finnlectura.fi/verkkosuomi/Syntaksi/sivu3421.htm.
A test that distinguishes ‘true’ negative pronouns from more general indefinites is that only the former are able to express negation in elliptical contexts (Haspelmath 1997:194):

A: Who came?
B: Nobody / *Anybody

To the best of my knowledge, there are no typological studies of the syntax of negative pronouns.

2.4 Double negation
Languages vary as to the possibility for negative pronouns to co-occur with sentential negation and with each other:

a. *Nobody knows anything about this. (A.A. Milne, ibid., ch. 10)
b.? *Nobody knows nothing about this. = Somebody actually knows something about this. / * Nobody knows anything about this.
c.* *Nobody doesn’t know anything about this.
d. Russian

ni-kto ni-čego *(ne) znaet ob etom.
NEG-who NEG-what NEG knows about this
‘Nobody knows anything about this.’

When a language requires negative pronouns to co-occur with the sentential negation, or allows for multiple negative pronouns to be present in the clause, the language is said to show the negation concord.

3 Ossetic: Trivia

3.1 Genetic affiliation and sociolinguistic data
Ossetic is a Northeast Iranian language spoken in the central Caucasus. Actually, Ossetic is a cover term for two closely related idioms, Iron\(^2\) and Digor. The former serves as the standard literary language as Iron speakers form a majority. However, no precise figures are available. These two idioms are substantially similar in what is relevant to us. According to the 2002 census, in Russia there are 515,000 Ossetians (Iron and Digor), and some 70,000

\(^2\) Sometimes Dzhav (spoken in South Ossetia) is listed as the third dialect. However, according to (Abaev 1949, Bekoev 1985) Dzhav is one of Iron subdialects, and there seems to be no reason to treat it separately.
live in South Ossetia. The number of (potential) Digor speakers can be roughly estimated as 40,000[^3].

Despite the relatively large number of ethnic Ossetians, the language is losing ground to Russian (Kambolov 2007): there are no monolingual speakers anymore and at least 40% of Ossetians are more fluent in Russian than in Ossetic. There is no published data on the sociolinguistic situation in South Ossetia.

### 3.2 Contact-induced and inherited traits in Ossetic grammar

Written sources on Alan/Old Ossetic are almost absent[^4]. However, despite the lack of direct diachronic evidence, we can formulate plausible conjectures about the loaned and inherited traits in Ossetic, comparing it on the one hand to the living and documented extinct Iranian languages, and on the other hand to the neighboring Caucasian and Turkic ones.

Some of grammatical traits in Ossetic are distinctly ‘non-Caucasian’: for instance, it lacks ergativity (accidentally, the ergativity is present in many other Iranian languages). Needless to say that Ossetic has numerous lexical borrowings from Caucasian languages (Abaev 1958-1984, Bielmeier 1977). For the sake of brevity, I only give examples of South Caucasian loans[^5]:


Some typically Caucasian traits are present in the Ossetic grammar as well. The most salient of them is a series of glottalized consonants: *k’, p’, t’, c’, ç’. Besides that, unlike the rest of the New Iranian, Ossetic has a sizeable case system with numerous spatial cases, and a system of preverbs with spatial (andaspectual) semantics.

In these instances, it is difficult to establish a precise source of ‘syntactic loans’: for example, it is often argued that the case system in modern Ossetic has developed under Caucasian influence (Vogt 1945, Abaev 1949). Actually, the case inventory of Ossetic is quite common for North Eurasia. Therefore, firstly, it is impossible to tell which Caucasian language families have influenced the case system and secondly, the impact of early contacts with Turkic or Uralic languages cannot be ruled out either.

In the rest of the paper, I show that the system of negation in Ossetic shows more affinities to the South Caucasian negation systems than to those in fellow Iranian languages or other languages of the Caucasus.

### 4 Negation is Ossetic

Ossetic lacks the constituent negation (4). For the sentential negation, it uses two preverbal markers: *ne* for the Indicative and *ma* for the Imperative. In the rest of non-indicative moods both markers are used, with a rather complex distribution.

[^3]: Digor Ossetians live mostly in Digor and Iraf districts of North Ossetia, and this is the population of these districts according to the census.

[^4]: The earliest monuments are one Alanic tombstone inscription from 10-12 century, a few lines in Alanic in a 12th c. Byzantine manuscript, and some glosses in an Old Testament manuscript, also conjecturally dated by the 12th century. First ‘real’ texts date back to the late 18th — early 19th century (translations from Church Slavonic and Georgian). The language of the latter differs little from modern Iron, see (Tedeeva 1985).

[^5]: Borrowings in the opposite direction are also attested: for instance, the Georgian *ludi* ‘beer’ is considered a borrowing from Alanic (*cf* Ossetic *æluton* ‘a sort of beer mentioned in the Nart epos’).
The negation markers are adjacent to the verb. They can be separated from it only by 2P clitics:

(13) Iron
   a. \( ne \quad \underline{=jv} \quad \text{żon-yn} \)
      NEG   =ACC.3SG   know-PRS.1SG
      ‘I don’t know him/her.’
   b. \( ma/\underline{ne}=jv \quad a\text{-}fx\text{vr} \)
      NEG.IMP=ACC.3SG   PREV-insult:IMP.2SG
      ‘Do not insult him/her!’

Negative pronouns are formed by combination of the negative marker, which again depends on the mood, with a wh-word: \( ni/\text{ma-}\ddot{c}i \) NEG-who ‘nobody’, \( ni/\text{ma-}\text{s}y \) NEG-what ‘nothing’, \( ni/\text{ma-}\text{ked} \) NEG-when ‘never’, etc. They immediately precede the verb (15a-c) and cannot co-occur with the preverbal negative marker. However, multiple negative pronouns may co-occur, (15b). A combination of indefinite pronouns with the negative particle allows only specific reading⁶:

(14)  Digor
   \( Jes-\text{k}t\ddot{d} \quad Jes-\dot{c}i \quad n\ddot{a} \quad \text{rajiv-}t\ddot{o}n \quad \text{nemucag-}aw \)
   IDF-when    IDF-what    NEG    translate-PST.TR.1SG    German-COMP
   a.*  I’ve never translated anything to German.
   b.\( _{ok} \)  Once, I didn’t translate something to German.

The negative pronouns can be separated from the verb only by 2P clitics (15a), and comparative adverbials (15d).

(15) Iron
   a. \( ni-\text{k}tj \quad \underline{=zy} \quad (\ddot{a} \ddot{m} \ddot{e}) \quad \text{fed-}t\ddot{o}n \)
      NEG-who:ACC  =LOC.3SG   NEG   see:PST-TR:PST.1SG
      ‘I haven’t seen anybody there.’
   b. \( ma-\text{k}tj \quad ma-\dot{k}d \quad (\ddot{m}a) \quad a\text{-}fx\text{vr}\)!
      NEG.IMP-who:ACC  NEG.IMP-when NEG    PREV-insult:IMP.2SG
      ‘Never insult anybody!’
   c.* \( ma-\text{k}tj \quad (\ddot{m}a) \quad a\text{-}fx\text{vr} \quad ma-\dot{k}d \)
      Idem (intended)
   d. \( \dot{s}\ddot{o}slan \quad \text{madin-}t\ddot{j} \quad ni-\text{k}tj \quad \underline{fyldr} \quad \text{warž-ta.} \)
      Soslan Madina-ABL   NEG-who:ACC   stronger   love-TR:PST.3SG
      ‘Soslan never loved anybody stronger than he loved Madina.’

Negative prefixes, however, cannot be separated by clitics from wh-stems⁷:

(16) Iron
   a. \( ni-\ddot{c}i=jv \quad \text{żon-y} \)
      NEG-who=ACC.3SG   know-PRS.3SG
      ‘Nobody knows him/her.’

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⁶ See (Haspelmath 1997:31-52) for a definition and discussion of this notion.
⁷ Compare with Old Georgian, example (30).
Thus it is possible to speak of “negative movement”: negative pronouns are obligatorily moved into the preverbal position. The only restriction on the ordering of multiple negative pronouns is that ‘nobody’ should precede ‘nothing’, notwithstanding their syntactic positions and / or semantic roles:

(17) Iron (example 2 repeated)

a. $ni=je \quad \ddot{c}i \quad \ddot{z}on-y$
   
   $\text{NEG=ACC.3SG \ who \ know-PRS.3SG}$

   $\text{Idem (intended)}$

   ‘Nothing disturbs anybody.’

b.* $nisy \ \dddot{n}i\dddot{k}j \ \dddot{q}yg\dddot{d}a\dddot{r}$

   $\text{NEG-who.acc \ NEG-what \ disturb-PRS.3SG}$

   $\text{Idem (intended)}$

c.* $nisy \ \ddot{q}yg\ddot{d}a\ddot{r} \ \dddot{n}i\dddot{k}j$

   $\text{Idem (intended)}$

A completely similar restriction is operative in ordering of wh-words:

(18) Iron

a. $\dddot{c}i \ sy \ ba-lx\ddot{v}t-ta?$

   $\text{who \ what \ PREV-buy.PST-PST.TR.3SG}$

   ‘Who bought what?’

b.* $sy \ \dddot{c}i \ ba-lx\ddot{v}t-ta?$

   $\text{what \ who \ PREV-buy.PST-PST.TR.3SG}$

   $\text{Idem (intended)}$

5 Negation in cognate and neighboring languages

5.1 Negation in Iranian

The majority of Iranian languages have two (types of) negation markers, cognate to the Ossetic $ma$ and $me$ (Avestan, (Reichelt 1909:317), West Iranian: Old Persian (Kent 1950:92), Persian (Rubinchik 2001:249,257,258), Caucasian Tati (Grünberg 1963:60), Sorani Kurdish (MacKenzie 1961:88-89, 181), Kurmanji Kurdish (Kurdoev 1978:165), Balochi (field data); East Iranian: Pashto (Tegey, Robson 1996:125,133), Wakhi (Grünberg, Steblin-Kamensky 1976:594), Roshori (Kurbanov 1976:117), Rushani (Fajzov 1966:101), Ormuri (Efimov 1986:236), and some others.) In this case, indicative clauses allow only the $me$-type particle, and imperative clauses usually allow only the $ma$-type particle. In some dialects of Kurmanji, both $ne$ and $me$ are possible in the imperative (Kurdoev 1978:165).
Other languages have only one, *n*-type, particle. It is so in Yazghulami (Edelmann 1966:85), Sarykoli (Pakhalina 1966:44), Gilaki⁹ (Rastorgueva 1971:129), Yaghnobi (Khromov 1972:50) and some other Iranian languages. An exception is Munji, which has only one (obviously non-cognate) negation marker *či* (Grünberg 1972:426).

All Iranian languages I have data on (except Ossetic) lack true negative pronouns, and use free-choice indefinite pronouns or wh-words in this capacity. These items do not need to be placed in the immediately preverbal position (19c).

(19) a. Persian (South West Iranian), data from (Haspelmath 1997:283).
   
   (hič) kas-i zang na=zad
   IDF who-IDF.ART ring NEG=hit
   ‘Nobody called.’

   b. ‘specific unknown’ pronoun
   
   *i-čiz* cə=kʃəjí maž-i aga car
   IDF-what if=hear:2SG L:OBL-ACC awake do:2SG
   ‘If you hear something, wake me up.’

   c. same pronoun used in the negative context
   
   *me* pšad *i-čiz*
   NEG.IMP touch IDF-what
   ‘Do not touch anything.’

   d. Munji (Grünberg 1972:419)
   
   *kdi* či-kərkint da qura laghay-o
   who NEG-can PREP hill enter-INF
   ‘Nobody can climb this hill.’

However, most New Iranian languages are either closely related to, or heavily influenced by Persian and thus a comparison to them is not very revealing. It makes more sense to compare Ossetic negative pronouns to those in *Old and Middle Iranian*. Unfortunately, the corpora of extant texts are fairly small, moreover (for Middle Iranian) many of the texts are translations, and therefore, they are not a very reliable source on syntax.

5.1.3. Old Iranian

The very few examples of negative pronouns in Avesta¹⁰ indicate that they were formed as NEG+wh, but not placed immediately preverbally:

(20) Young Avestan (Avesta, Yašt 10, 122 quoted from Reichelt 1909:257)

   *mā čiš = mē* zaoθra-nəm fraŋuθarət
   NEG who=1SG.GEN drinking.sacrifice-GEN drink
   ‘Nobody should drink a drinking sacrifice’ (Es soll mir keiner von den Z. trinken)

There are no negative pronouns in the Old Persian corpus (Kent 1950).

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⁹ The negative particle there has a number of phonologically distributed allomorphs.

¹⁰ The two languages of Avesta, Old and Young Avestan, are the most archaic of the recorded Iranian languages, sometimes considered North-Eastern.
5.1.4 Middle Iranian
Most closely related to Ossetic MI language is Sogdian (North East Iranian, Central Asia, monuments from 2nd-10 centuries CE). There, negative pronouns were apparently formed not as NEG+wh:

\[(20)\] a. 't wc’q ny ’dy nbnty
and tomorrow NEG someone with
‘and tomorrow it belongs to no-one’ (Sims-Williams 1985:89, 48V:17\(^\text{11}\))

\[(20)\] b. 't pr wyny fm’n ny nyc\(^\text{12}\) bntq’
and in his order NEG nothing be:3PL.FUT
‘And at whose command they will become nothing’ (Sims-Williams 1985:146, 69V:20)

Consequently, the existing data on Iranian presents ambiguous evidence as to whether the syntax and morphology of negative pronouns in Ossetic are an innovation.

5.2 West Caucasian
Negation markers are verbal affixes, which can show up in different slots of the verb form, there are no true negative pronouns, the negative affix is obligatory:

\[(21)\] a. Adyghe, Shapsug dialect (Kapitonov 2008:297)\(^\text{13}\)

\[\begin{align*}
    &ar \quad ted-jo \quad rek'w-a-\#-*(ep) \\
    \text{he.ABS where-and go.PST-NEG}
\end{align*}\]
‘He hasn’t gone anywhere’.

\[(21)\] b. Abkhaz (Chirikba 2003:34)

\[\begin{align*}
    &ak’-g’\text{a} \quad \#-s-tax\text{-m} \\
    \text{one:NH-even it-I-want-NEG}
\end{align*}\]
‘I don’t want anything.’

5.3 East Caucasian
All East Caucasian languages, except Bats, lack true negative pronouns (23, 24). A negative marker on the verb is obligatory.\(^\text{14}\)

\[(22)\] Lezgian, (Haspelmath 1997:296)

\[\begin{align*}
    &d\text{çwe} \quad mad \quad sadra-ni \quad sa \quad kasdi-z-ni \\
    \text{war again once-even one person-DAT-even}
\end{align*}\]
\[\begin{align*}
    &q'ismet \quad ta-\text{çu-raj} \\
    \text{destiny NEG-be-OPT}
\end{align*}\]
‘May war never again be anyone’s destiny.’

\(^{11}\) I.e. fragment 48, verso, line 17.

\(^{12}\) ‘what’ is cw, so at least synchronically it is not NEG+what.

\(^{13}\) Glosses somewhat simplified.

\(^{14}\) These observations have been already made in (Imnaishvili 1953), who presents data from Chechen, Avar, Lak, Dargwa, Kabardian and Tsoda-Tush, p. 54-58. Unfortunately, Imnaishvili does not discuss the syntax of negative sentences and, in particular, does not give examples of complete sentences, and not just of the pronouns and adverbs under scrutiny.
It obviously makes more sense to compare Ossetic to the neighboring Nakh languages, than to the rest of the North East Caucasian. In Chechen, the corresponding negative polarity items even do not have to precede the verb:

(23) Chechen (field materials)
   a. Musa *(ca) xilla cqa-ṭa cha
      M. NEG was ever-even one
      ‘Musa has never been anywhere’
   b. Musa cqa-ṭa cha *(ca) xilla
      Idem

An exception is Tsova-Tush\(^\text{15}\), which has wh-based true negative pronouns and shows negative concord (25a), where the negative pronouns do not have to be placed in the preverbal position (25b). The combination of preverbal negation and an indefinite pronoun yields specific reading (25c).

(24) Tsova-Tush (Bela Shavkhelishvili, p.c.)
   a. zurb-en co-han-na co-m (co) d-at-i
      Zurab-DAT NEG-who-DAT NEG-thing NEG 5CL\(^\text{16}\)-give-PST
      ‘Nobody gave anything to Zurab.’
   b. zurb-en co d-at-i co-han-na com
   c. zurb-en co-han-na yum co d-at-i
      Zurab-DAT NEG-who-DAT something NEG 5CL-give-PST
      ‘Nobody gave something to Zurab.’

Negative pronouns do not obligatorily agree in modality with the preverbal negation:

(25) co-han-na ma-m a†
      NEG-who-DAT NEG.IMP-thing say:IMP
      ‘Do not say anything to anybody!’

5.3 Turkic

Most Turkic languages lack true negative pronouns, and use sentential negation with indefinites:

(26) Karachay-Balkar (E. Lyutikova, p.c.)
   a. madina erttenlik-ten beri aberi-(da) asha-ma-ulan-dy
      M. morning-ABL hither thing-(EMPH) eat-NEG-PERF-3SG
      ‘Madina hasn’t eaten anything since the morning.’
   b. madina erttenlik-ten beri aberi asha-ulan-dy
      M. morning-ABL hither thing eat-PERF-3SG
      Madina has eaten something since the morning.

\(^{15}\) As is well known, Tsova-Tush has undergone a strong Georgian influence (Desheriev 1953:6), thus its differences from other East Caucasian are hardly surprising.

\(^{16}\) Numeration of classes according to (Desheriev 1953:137).
5.4 South Caucasian

5.4.1 Old Georgian

Old Georgian had a number of modality dependent preverbal negative markers (Schanidse 1982: 167). It allowed constituent negation:

(27) odes igi ara [cei ćem-i col-i] ars
   if this NEG my-NOM wife-NOM is
   ‘As this one is not [cei my wife].’ Pass. Shush. 7.\textsuperscript{17}

Negative pronouns were formed as negative marker + wh:

(28) da ara-vin icoda ćem-sa ćareše
and NEG-who know.IPF.3SG I-DAT except
   ‘And nobody knew that, except me.’ Pass. Shush. 15.

The negative prefix could be sometimes separated from the wh-word by a clitic:

(29) num = ca vin ścivals xilv-a-d mi-sa
   NEG.IMP=and who go.3SG look-NMZ-ADV (s)he-DAT
   ‘And nobody should come to look at her.’ Pass. Shush. 7.

Negation doubling is unattested in Old Georgian (Boeder 2005:65). I am not aware of examples with multiple negative pronouns or with negative pronouns not in the immediately preverbal position.

5.4.2 Modern Georgian

Preverbal negative markers depend on the modality, and negative pronouns are formed as a combination of a (modality dependent) negation marker (ara(a)/ver(a)/mu) with a wh-word (however, araperi/nuraperi ‘nothing’ is based on a non-wh item). In some instances, constituent negation is possible:

(30) vap’ireb c’avide ik ara [śabat-s],
   I.intend.PRS I.go.OPT there not Saturday-DAT,
   aramed k’vira-s
   but Sunday-DAT
   ‘I intend to go there not on Saturday but on Sunday\textsuperscript{18},

In modern colloquial Georgian, negation doubling is optional:

(31) dyec pizk’a magrad davc’ere muuxedavad
   today physics cool I.write.AOR irrespective
   im-isa rom ara-per-i (ar)
   that-GEN COMPL NEG-color-NOM NEG I.know.AOR
   ‘I did physics well, although I knew nothing.’

\textsuperscript{17} Examples from TITUS electronic edition of Martyrium Susanicæ (the earliest non-translated Old Georgian text, dated by the 5th century C.E.),

\textsuperscript{18} I thank Nino Amiridze for this example.
In the absence of the negative particle, the negative pronouns are strictly preverbal. However, in the presence of overt preverbal negation, negative pronouns may be separated from the verb by some material (33 a) or placed postverbally (33 c).

(32) a. vano-s ara-per-i dyes *(ar) c’aiuk’itxavs
    vano-DAT NEG-color-NOM today NEG read.PERF. 3SG
    ‘Vano hasn’t read anything today.’
    b. vano-s dyes ara-per-i c’aiuk’itxavs
       Idem
    c. ar vici ara-per-i
       NEG know.PRS.1SG NEG-color-NOM
       ‘I don’t know anything’ (Testelec 1998:247).

5.4.3 Svan

Svan has a large number of modality dependent negative particles: no, nosa, de, deš, ma:ma, etc. (Palmaitis, Gudgedjiani 1986: 93-94). Negative pronouns are of the type NEG+stem\(^\text{19}\), double negation is disallowed (34a,b), negative pronouns do not need to be all placed in the preverbal position (34 c):

(33) Upper Bal dialect of Svan (fieldwork\(^\text{20}\))

    a. d-ás dem-čiks (*de) xočda Mars-ţi
       NEG-who NEG-ever NEG was Mars-on
       ‘Nobody has ever visited Mars.’
    b. no-s nom-čiks (*nom) xačigrawi
       NEG-who NEG-ever NEG insult
       ‘Don’t ever insult anybody!’
    c. nos xačigrawi nomčiks
       Idem

5.4.4 Megrelian

Megrelian preverbal negative markers, va (with allomorphs) and nu (with allomorphs) are also modality dependent (Kipshidze 1914:117). In negative contexts, Megrelian uses indefinite pronouns considered by (Kipshidze 1914:49,145) as not inherently negative\(^\text{21}\). Modern data (Rostovtsev-Popiel 2006) and field materials of my own corroborate this:

\(^{19}\) The stems of negative pronouns are not necessarily cognate to wh-words: for instance, in dem-čiks ‘never’, the stem čiks does not coincide with any wh-word. I gloss it ‘ever’ only for the sake of convenience. A wh-based negative pronoun is also available:

(i) d-ás dej-šoma xočda Mars-ţi
    NEG-who NEG-when was Mars-on
    ‘Nobody has ever visited Mars.’

\(^{20}\) I thank David and Nona Kochkiani who provided these examples.

\(^{21}\) Kipshidze also mentions negative pronouns mi-ta who-SUFF ‘nobody’and mu-ta what-SUFF ‘nothing’ (Kipshidze 1914:50). For these pronouns, double negation is disallowed (Kipshidze 1914:145). Modern Megrelian speakers recognize them, but apparently do not use them anymore (A. Rostovtsev-Popiel, p.c., field data). In particular, according to my consultant, they would be infelicitous as responses in (35-36).
(34) Megrelian, (Rostovtsev-Popiel, p.c. and my field data)

a. A: *mu (k)iši?  
   B: mutunu  *(va-r)
   ‘What have you got?’  ‘Nothing’

b. A: tīna mi rdu?  
   B: mitin  *(va-r)
   ‘Who was that?’  ‘Nobody’(i.e. ‘I won’t tell you.’)

These negative pronouns are not sensitive to the choice of the verb negation, and they do not have to be placed in the preverbal position:

(35) tēši mutun-sī nām o-txinkī k’osī
   that.way nothing-DAT NEG.IMP VER-you.lend man.DAT
   ‘Then don’t lend him anything.’ (Tsagareli 1880:58)²²

(36) va tku mitin-s mutun-i-a
   NEG tell nobody-DAT nothing-NOM-REP
   ‘Don’t tell anything to anybody, he said.’

Thus the morphology of Megrelian negative pronouns differ considerably from that in Svan and Georgian.

6 Conclusion

In many Caucasian and Iranian languages, including South Caucasian and Ossetic, the shape of negative particles is modality dependent, but that can hardly be considered as an outcome of any language contact: on the Iranian side, this evidently goes back to the common Proto-Iranian.

There is a similarity in the morphology of negative pronouns in Ossetic and the South Caucasian languages it had the opportunity to come in contact with, namely, Old and Modern Georgian and Svan. (For geographic reasons, intense direct contact between Alans/Ossetians and Megrels is less plausible). Furthermore, Old Georgian and Svan do not allow for negative pronouns to co-occur with the preverbal negation markers. However, unlike Ossetic, South Caucasian languages do not show obvious restrictions on the position of negative pronouns in the clause.

Can we claim that the observed morphological similarities are due to language contact? In general, it is impossible to ascertain, and indeed languages that share certain features may never have been in contact. For instance, in English and in Biblical Hebrew, the numeral is placed before the plural-marked noun. Needless to say, this isogloss is due to mere chance.

(37) a. English
   four cows

b. Biblical Hebrew
   va-pełeπ  šīz-im
   and-thousand goat-PL
   ‘and thousand goats’ (Sam 1:25:2)

However, for the traits under scrutiny in this article, the contact story is not implausible for a number of reasons which include: the geographic proximity of Ossetic to South

²² Re-checked with a native speaker.
Caucasian, the presence of these traits only in a handful of languages of the Central Caucasus, and absence of these traits from Iranian languages other than Ossetic. It is for historians to determine whether sufficiently intense contact between early Ossetians and South Caucasians have indeed ever taken place.

References
Bielmeier, Roland. 1977 *Historische Untersuchung zum Erb- und Lehnwortschatzanteil im ossetischen Grundwortschatz,* Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main — Bern — Las Vegas.


**Abbreviations**

1/2/3 1st/ 2nd/ 3d person; 5CL 5th class; ABL Abitative; ACC Accusative; ADV Adverbial; ALL Allative; AOR Aorist; ART Article; AUX Auxiliary; COM Comitative; COMP Comparative; COMPL complementizer; COP Copula; CVB Converb; DAT Dative; EMPH Emphatic; EP Epenthetic; ERG Ergative; FUT Future; GEN Genitive; HAB Habitual; IMP Imperative; IDF indefinite; INESS Inessive; IO Indirect object agreement; IPF Imperfective; J-CLASS Latative; LOC Locative; NEG Negation; NH Non-human; NMZ nominalizer; O Object agreement; OBL Oblique; OPT Optative; PART Partitive; PL plural; POSS Possessive, PREP Preposition; PRES Present; PREV Preverb; PRTC Participle; PST Past; REFLEX Reflexive; REP Reported speech; SG Singular; S Subject agreement; TR Transitive.
Semantics of Deictic Pronouns in the Daghestani Languages

Sabrina Kh. Shikhalieva

The development of an information approach to linguistics concedes that information not only goes beyond knowledge of the language, but includes knowledge of the world in a social and cultural context, for example mental bases of speech comprehension and production. The sphere of such knowledge includes deictic elements and the study of their peculiarities. The Daghestani languages possess a peculiar, multi-step deixis system which, considering the aspect mentioned above, has been given comparatively little attention.

Caucasian linguistics maintains two points of view regarding the presence of a multi-step deixis system in the Daghestani languages. According to the first viewpoint, the given system reflects degrees of denotats from the speaker at various levels (an object or person being next to, higher than, below, or on the same level as the speaker/listener). The presence of this multi-step deixis system is explained by the location of the Daghestani languages in a region of abruptly billowy landscape. Linguophysics takes a different point of view, asserting that a mythologema of the archetype “head” is the basis of the language units used for man’s evaluation of his anatomy, appearance, and interaction with the environment. In all cultural traditions, the head correlates with the top, the sky, with the centre of cognitive processes, and the feet with the bottom or the ground. Agreeing with both the above mentioned points of view, this essay asserts that the multi-step deixis system represents some symbiosis of reflection of the space orienteering branching system in man’s consciousness.

Space indication in the Lezghian languages (the Daghestani group) is represented by two microsystems, different in semantic character and functional structure properties: they all characterize persons and objects by their remoteness from the space where the speech takes place, qualifying them as close or remote objects.

Demonstrative pronouns in the Lezghian languages are the language coordinates, as they correspond to a reference point fixed directly in the utterance itself, in relation to the “speaker” (near, far). They are expressed as heterogeneous semantic elements, referring to one deictic category and are characterized by a complex deixis system, based both on the visibility / invisibility and the rationality/irrationality of the referent to the speaker, and on the referent’s position being higher or below the speaker.

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<thead>
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<th>Horizontal dimension</th>
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<tr>
<td>TL</td>
<td>(1) closeness to the speaker</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSL</td>
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<td>RL</td>
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Table 1. The system of demonstrative pronouns in the Lezghian languages
Summarizing the material of the Lezghian subgroup (Table 1 above), we may distribute the demonstrative pronouns in a model-scheme, consisting of six horizontal elements and six vertical elements. Let’s consider the horizontal group. Each of these lexemes represents an autonomous lexeme. The system of demonstrative pronouns in the Lezghian languages’ subgroup is directed to the speaker and to the listener. It includes six elements across the scheme.

The remoteness can take various meanings: something that is far from the communicants can be in the sphere of the second person (the 4th element). The 4th element can denote an object remote from both the speaker and the listener, but within the sphere of the second person: we call it the first degree of remoteness of the pronoun. The 5th and 6th elements of the system (out of the communicants’ sphere) are less considerable from the speaker’s position, as the object is remote from the speaker. The 5th element is far from the communicants and is called the second degree of remoteness, while the 6th element is both far and invisible and is called the third degree of remoteness.

The remoteness is determined from the speaker’s point of view. The same situation can be described differently depending on the distance between the object, the speaker, and the addressee. The central role is given to the speaker, not to the addressee.

The first three elements are the elements of the close deixis and this is represented in all the Lezghian languages. The far deixis is represented in three degrees of remoteness in the following languages: the 1st and 2nd degrees of remoteness are represented in the Tabassaran, Rutul, and Agul languages, while the Tsakhur language contains pronouns of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd degrees of remoteness. The presence of the pronouns with m, t, and h formants are characteristic of the far and close deixis. The demonstrative pronouns of the m-series are used when an object is in the sphere of the speaker, the demonstrative pronouns of the t-series are included into the sphere of the addressee’s actions, and the h-series is used to indicate some remoteness of the object from the speaker or the addressee.

Deictic pronouns have the closest relation with gestures as they can be regarded as verbal means of duplicating a gesture. The demonstrative pronouns are not used without an accompanying gesture and therefore, the observance of demonstrative pronouns shows that a language or dialect speaker conceives the world as continual and non-segmented. The indication to closeness or remoteness is pragmatically determined.

Table 2. The system of demonstrative pronouns in the Lezghian languages

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<th>Vertical dimension</th>
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However, the indication expressed by these words cannot always be referred to the speaker’s figure, as the demonstrative pronouns go beyond words, expressing remoteness or closeness. They also indicate (by lingual means) that the speaker or another participant of the conversation conceives their position (or another object’s position) in two-dimensional space, the basic measurements of which are represented.
vertically in the Lezghian languages. As was stated above, the reference point of such measurements is a person as a conceiving subject. Describing the situation, based on visual conceiving, the space relation coordination centre is the plane of vision direction in man’s normal position (vertical position). The objects of conceiving, situated higher than this conventional plane, are characterized in space relations as higher, and the objects that are situated below the conventional plane are characterized in space relations as below. They represent locative words with the meaning of vertical space orientation, and have a different semantic structure, in which there is no place for the observer imagined by the speaker. The demonstrative pronouns with vertical semantics represent symmetrical relations, as the observer’s position is irrelevant. The vertical demonstrative pronouns represent semantic valency for the orienteer, the function of which is to be taken by the observer’s figure in case this valency realization fails. Such a reference point is the person’s eye direction in normal conditions. These normal conditions are determined by the natural conditions of human existence. According to the correlation with coordinates, the reference point of which is the subject of conceiving, the space relations named can be divided into two types: three-dimensional and one-dimensional.

The three-dimensional type forms the lexical opposition: higher – lower (the Lezghian, Tabassaran, Agul languages), while the one-dimensional type does not form lexical oppositions. The one-dimensional type includes the demonstratives of the Tsakhur and Rutul languages, and they do not indicate the difference in the object position in the vertical space. They can only concretize the speaker’s position regarding the object or the person, indicated by the speaker.

Table 3. The full model of orientational meanings in the Lezghian languages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Horizontal dimension</th>
<th>(1) closeness to the speaker</th>
<th>(2) closeness to the listener</th>
<th>(3) closeness to both the speaker and the listener</th>
<th>(4) remoteness from the speaker and the listener</th>
<th>(5) remoteness from the speaker and listener at a larger distance</th>
<th>(6) remoteness from the speaker and the listener at a larger and invisible distance</th>
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- denotes absence

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vertical dimension</th>
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<th>(8) still higher</th>
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The full model of orientational meanings of demonstrative pronouns (12 elements) is present in none of the languages of the Lezghian group. The Lezghian, Tabasaran, and Agul languages are expressed in three-dimensional space. The Tsakhur and Rutul languages are presented in one-dimensional space. The full deixis is presented in the LL, TL, RL, and the AL, and the partial deixis is presented in the RL and the TSL. The horizontal system in the Lezghian languages consists of two grammemes: “close deixis” and “remote deixis”. Three deictic pronouns immediately indicate “closeness zone” and three indicate “remoteness zone”.

In the Lezghian languages (across), three pronouns are presented horizontally in TL, RL, AL, – five, in TSL – six, and vertically in the LL, TL – four, in AL – five. The complicated interweaving of indication types shows that the same pronouns can be included into different semantic subsystems. Among all the Lezghian languages the largest number of demonstrative pronouns is found in the Agul language (ten). There are nine in the Lezghin and Tabasaran languages, six in TSL, and five in RL. In the AL the demonstrative pronouns are more egocentric than in the other languages.

The space differentiation is impossible without an object in the field of vision. Visionary conception reflects the remoteness and extension of the objects, which are to be expressed by linguistic means. One has to assume that the demonstrative pronouns with the spirant -h- appeared earlier, and later there appeared pronouns, indicating the object, which is beyond the field of conception.

**Abbreviations**

LL – Lezghian language
TL – Tabassaran language
RL – Rutul language
AL – Agul language
TSL – Tsakhur language
Lexemes Expressing Migration and Problems of Language Identity in Modern Georgia

Tinatin Turkia

The main theme of this report addresses issues reflecting lexical and linguistic identity of the internal migration processes in modern Georgia. General pragmatization, on the basis of language learning, plays an important role in modern linguistics. Today, it is not sufficient for dictionaries to simply give the main definitions of a word; their objective is to describe all nuances and give qualification of a word in contextual use. These requirements are important in computer linguistics, and especially in machine translation, which needs maximal definition of the word and formulation of optimal semantic fields.

This paper highlights interesting examples of high social sensitivity and specific types of semantic change in vocabulary influenced by Georgia’s modern political situation. Vocabulary reflects the migration of the native population, and word-phraseology demonstrates integration difficulties of the population in their new place of living. The Georgian language uses numerous lexical items to define the migration of the native population and these words have had different meanings in different periods of Georgian history.

Data for this study have been collected on the basis of chancellery documentation of the Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories and Refugees. Sociolinguistic questionnaires were answered by IDP students and faculty members of the Sukhumi University in Tbilisi as well as IDP students of the Ilia State University (total number of questionnaires: 70). These lexical items include: “persecuted, refugee, migrant, runaway, homeless, installed in, lodged in, passenger, traveler and wonderer”.

A short characterization of these words:

1. დიდვილი devnili - “Persecuted” (1): people leaving their own home because of war.
2. შობილი olvili - “Refugee”: a person who has left his home not because of his wish, but due to threatening circumstances, such as war.
3. მიჭრილი mogzauri - “Traveler” and მოჯავარი mgzavri - “Passenger” (2): a person who is moving by his own wish (these are neutral terms).
4. მიჯანი xizani - “Migrant”, გაკეული gakceuli – “runaway”, მიუსაპარი miusapari - “homeless”, სასახლებული časaxlebuli - “installed in”, შესახებული šesaxlebuli - “lodged in” (3): terms expressing the status which the person is awarded from the receiving country. All these words contain reasons for the movement: “migrant, runaway” is a person who is sheltering himself in someone’s home (and he is supposed to return), “homeless” is a person who is left without home and protection, “installed in” is a person who will never return, “lodged in” has meaning of settling in someone’s home.
These lexical items can be increased by affixes found naturally in the Georgian language. It should be noted that migration and movement terminology differ from each other, for example: გაიხსნათ შესახებ “to move in”, გაიხსნათ ჩასახებ “to install in”, გაიხსნათ დასახებ “to settle in”. The use of these terms varied and had different actuality in the Georgian language at different periods in Georgian history. This was a result of invasions by enemies, rather than the peaceful life which was typical in Georgian history. Unfortunately, from the end of twentieth century, these lexical items have become more actual and occur particularly in social-political contexts.

As a result of recent political and social processes, Georgian people have had to leave their home several times. This population migration can usually take the form of internal or external migration, which can happen for different reasons, such as population increase, ecological disasters, state activities, military conflicts, and economic issues.

In the Georgian annals and in documentation there exists special terminology, which, influenced by the military situation, expresses the nature of the population’s migration and social status. Part of this terminology is still used in Georgian even today, but nowadays it reflects not only the migrant’s situation but their social status as well. If a person is considered a migrant of any category and is enrolled in social welfare, this accordingly defines their further living conditions. The division of people into social groups has historically taken place the world over and Georgia is no exception. This division can be based on race, nationality, profession, or education, and language defines these groups by the specific terminology.

Today, the world is actively watching the processes of migration; however, parts of the Georgian population have sadly been forced, for different reasons over the last two centuries, to leave their homes and change their place of living. The term “other place” refers to migration inside the country and as well as involuntarily migration. These kinds of internal migration movements are problematic, and additionally this type of population needs appropriate terminological definition.

Television and mass media actively adopt and assimilate new terminology, and thus increase semantic and connotative changes in the languages. The terminology surrounding the migrant population is rarely of positive content. People leave their homes under threat of war, and suffer hunger and discomfort as a consequence of the social situation. The result of this is an increase of synonyms, which define the internally displaced persons. These people can include politically persecuted persons asking for political shelter in foreign countries or a native population migrating inside their own country, for whom a special tent city is opened. The less forceful related lexical units are fewer in number (tourist, traveler, passenger, wanderer, guest). Language quickly creates or gives hierarchical classification, not only cause and effect reflecting terminology, but also terminology which describes migration status social protection. Historically, the vocabulary in the Georgian language has reflected population migration (internal or external) undergoing semantic and connotative interpretation and representing trends of a national-linguistic identity change. Observing this material, characteristics of migration and status reflecting lexical specific hierarchy can be found. The examples of this hierarchy can be grouped in the following ways:

a) Vocabulary which expresses reasons for leaving a place of living (ქალაქიდან იტოვილი “refugee”, ეკავდი დევნილი “persecuted person”, ყოფილა ახალშესახები ქორა იჭუქი გადაადგილებული პირი “internally
displaced person”, ქართულად ქალაქ „runaway”) (1).

b) Vocabulary which expresses the result of leaving a place of living (ქართულად ნიაბათ „homeless”, ქართულად „shelterless”, ქართულად ქართულად ქართულ „gareše darėnili “left without aid”) (2).

c) Vocabulary which expresses the emigrant’s nature of adaptation (ქართულად ქალაქ „lodged in”, ქართულ „installed in, ქართულ „take shelter in”, ქართულ „sought shelter in”) (3)

d) Vocabulary which reflects the attitude of the “host” society towards the migrant people (ქართულ ქართულ ქალაქ „gave help”, ქართულ „shares”, ქართულ „supported”, ქართულ ქართულ ქალ „gave out”, ქართულ „gives charity”, ქართულ „shows charity”, ქართულ „donates”, ქართულ „contributes”) (2).

It must be noted that society itself is divided in several parts according to this terminology:

a) Who helps (who gives a hand, supports, donates, shelters, gives, gives to charity, gives patronage, harbors).
b) Who was forced to give a place to the migrants, who was forced to share, who was oppressed.
c) Who is helped.
d) Who is “lodged in”, “in share with somebody”

When assessing the civilian mood of the persecuted population in their homeland, it reflects extremely hard on the unity of that society. The extent of the Georgian population persecuted has increased since 1992 and their psychology is suffering bifurcation. On one hand, they feel ashamed of being homeless in their own country, whereas they could bear this fate better outside their own country, as being in another country is more natural; in this case they are gone, exiled, or have set off, but not “persecuted”. On the other hand, the status “persecuted” should guarantee further social protection, because the psychological problems of the persecuted population are not well studied and language is not yet ready to start working appropriately in order to solve the problem. The society that represents the unity of the “host” and the “guest” gradually loses civilian unity, and it becomes difficult to overcome this obstacle which divides the persecuted person from his “equal” compatriot. Language is persistently looking for vocabulary that can soften such confrontations (the expressions seem comparatively neutral: persecuted from Abkhazia, from Samachablo (South Ossetia) persecuted people, who arrived during the Shidakartli problems); however, this “spontaneous diplomacy” gradually becomes useless. Part of the “host” population feels that the persecuted person, who once was a guest, gradually becomes a hard burden, their problems cannot be solved and their repatriation process is stretched. The persecuted population cannot feel at home in the “host” environment and the crack within society is deepened.
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Отражение процессов глобализации на бесписьменных языках (на материале цова-тушинского (бацбийского) языка)

Бела Шавхелишвили

Процессы интенсивной глобализации, характерные современному миру, болезненно отражаются на языках малых народов, особенно бесписьменных. Общезвестно, что каждый этнос зарождается и формируется на вполне определённой территории и в соответствующем природном окружении, духовными интересами и языком. Этно-лингвистическая картина позволяет её носителю в любой момент адекватно ответить на вопрос «кто мы есть?», причём используют понятия происхождение, история, язык, духовные ценности, традиции и, тем самым, идентифицируют себя с ними. Однако, на протяжении веков, все эти характеристики были подвержены процессу трансформации и, в конечном счёте могли повлечь за собой самизоляцию или исчезновение одних культур и становление других.


Чем же они обусловлены и какая доля вины ложится на процессы, которые сейчас называют одним термином «глобализация»? Чтобы правильно понять процессы, происходящие в социуме и соответствующем ему языке, давайте, по возможности, хронологически проследим их трансформацию на материале цова-тушинского (бацбийского) языка. В этом плане, данный язык интересен, тем, что в силу своей давней консервации, он даёт возможность поэтапно проследить эти процессы, и на основе их анализа, создать некую модель, которая возможно поможет в других языках обозначить какие-то рычаги для приостановления языкового сдвига. Почему я упомянула слоган «в других языках» наверно понятно, ибо в нашем случае, думаю, что процесс цова-тушинского языкового сдвига пошёл настолько далеко, что догнать его практически невозможно. К счастью, это не грозит их этнической идентичности, ибо, в силу своего исконного грузинского самосознания, его они сохраняют ещё долго – до тех пор, пока будет живо грузинское этнолингвистическое самосознание.

Плохо другое – потеря языка влечёт потерю ещё одной самобытности, от которой грузинская богатая и многолика культура, с её древними языками и диалектами, в определённой степени, потускнеет. Плохо и то, что уже есть прецедент...

Краткая справка
Тушетия один из регионов Грузии, который занимает северо-западный горный массив, аборигены, которые исторически составляли 4 Общества – Цовата, Пиркити, Гомецари и Чагма; население цова и частью пиркитинцы занималось
овцеводством, поэтому им был характерен оседло-кочевой образ жизни; чагамцы и гомещарцы вели оседлый образ жизни; в силу стихийных катаклизмов тушины стали переселяться с гор на равнины в конце XIX в. и обосновались в с. Земо и Квемо Альвы в Кахети; на сегодняшний день они представлены как цова-тушины, владеющие языками, частью родственному вейнакским языкам и чагама-тушины, говорящие на диалекте грузинского языка.

Надо заметить, что цова-тушинский (бацбийский) язык находился и находится в гуще многих факторов, способствующих ускорению его самозабвения. Вместо весь спектр вопросов в рамки одного доклада, наверно, сложно, поэтому мы попытаемся дать хотя бы схематический анализ некоторых процессов.

Начнём с того, что в социуме тушин — цовцев можно выделить следующие этапы, назовём их, модернизации, которые отражаются в языке.

Первый этап

В создании данной отрасли участвовали, по-видимому, все горцы Восточной Грузии, однако из исторических Обществ Тушети (Цова, Чагма, Гомцевари и
Пирикити), изначальная миссия её ведения, по-видимому, была отведена представителями Общества Цова и частью Пирикити, т. к. образ их последующей жизни – осёдло-чечевой, выражался в непременном условии наличия соответствующего хозяйства как в горах, так и на плоскостях. В связи с этим, в горах и в Алаизской долине (в Кахети) они имели по 8 сёл. Остальные Общества (Чагма и Гомецаран) овец держали для личного пользования в малом количестве и, в основном, занимались разведением крупного рогатого скота.

Этот же этап связан с периодом язычества (идолопоклонства), т. к. сохранилось множество традиционных тушинских ритуалов, которые связаны с овцеводством – например, приношение ягнёнка в жертву в святые праздники, колыбель овцей на очажной цепи, обозначение овцы или ягнёнка на надгробных плитах, которые по сей день сохранились в Горной Тушети (в знак чистоты и незыблемости ценности самого этого феномена). Выражение «Господи, помоги мне преодолеть эти беды и, в знак благодарности, я каждый год, в честь тебя зарежу по одному барану», вы услышите только среди тушин-пациев. Овца давала все блага – продукты (мясо, сыр, которые хранились почти целый год, молоко), из шерсти делали одежду, головные уборы, предметы домашнего обихода и первой необходимости – матрацы, одежда, паласы, из кожи – обувь, не выбрасывали даже кости – из них делали для детей игрушки.

Второй этап
Второй этап – это период принятия Христианства. Он характеризуется созданием нового порядка, появляется новая система знаний о мире, его видения и понимания в целом. Многие обычаи и ритуалы народных традиций возводятся в духовно-нравственные рамки, отрабатываются способы контроля за формированием духовных ценностей, отвечающих национальным интересам и т. д. Все эти процессы моментально отражаются в языке – происходит демаркация старых значений, образование новых и заимствование лексических единиц.

Надо заметить, что когда Святая Нино пришла в Грузию с миссией распространения Православия, то среди племён, встречавших и принявших её Проповеди были гудамакары, колхи, пиховы, цобони (т. е. цовы) и др., т. е. с самого начала Крещения Грузии. Тушетия приобщилась ко всему тому, что происходило в стране – все святые места и уже имеющиеся мелочи получили новое обновление, началось строительство Православных Храмов и т. д., и самое главное – вся духовная терминология буквально растворилась в лексике цова-тушин – их много; перевод частей Библии, которые сделаны Иовом Цискаришвили в 1847 г. является ярким тому свидетельством. Переведены «Отче Наш» и «Символ веры» с древне-греческого языка; текст перевода ложится легко и свободно и воспринимается благоговейно и спасительно, потому что сам древне-греческий является носителем Истины Божьей. Он прост и доступен. Самое интересное то, что нормативный церковный на некнжий цова-тушинский пересходит без смысловых отклонений и особых новообразований, а заимствованная лексика обрамляется в грамматические формы цова-тушинского языка, к примеру: Дад тхе, мече ва о ламу, цлалибах цхе це –... «Отче наш, еси на небесах, да свестись имя Твоё...» (ср., груз.: mamo chveno, romeli xar cata shina, c’minda iq’avn saxeli sheni...) (2.).

Сравнив первые два этапа трансформации этнолингвистических процессов, можно выделить те, которые сродни глобализации (скорее модернизации):

(а) Несмотря на то, что на протяжении данного промежутка истории (начало эры и средние века) Грузия находится под натиском арабо-исламской экспансии, она не затронула выделенные нами основные показатели, более того, материално-
ное благосостояние (куда входило и овцеводство) и духовная жизнь поставлены на службу интересам государства, что дало возможность консолидировать все человеческие и социальные ресурсы воедино и выжить;

(б) Глобализация этого периода не сопровождалась языковой унификацией, наоборот, цари и правители, хотя и считали чрезвычайно важным условием вести беседу с народом на государственном грузинском языке, однако в беседах с населением провинций часто использовали слова и выражения из лексикона их же языков или диалектов, показывая, тем самым свое доброжелательное отношение к их домашнему языку или говору. Мы имеем множество таких примеров во время визитов царей Грузии в Тушетию. Не думаю, что это делалось преднамеренно — скорее уровень интеграции самого населения Грузии вокруг его правителей был очень велик, а жест государственных мужей был всего лишь ещё одной возможностью приласкать и приобрести свой народ, который перманентно находился под натиском иноземных захватчиков и поработителей.

(в) С появлением государственных структур (суд, приходские школы и др.) входит соответствующая терминология, увеличивается языковой лексикон, то есть, глобальный процесс идёт во благо... думаю, что произошло то, что в своё время произошло в Японии, которая в эпоху Мэйдзи открылась внешнему миру, подверглась модернизации и, заимствуя очень многое извне, не утратила своей культурной самобытности. Учитывая полу-кочевую общину жизни тушин — цовцев, и здесь многое извне привносилось и закреплялось (ввиду пастища для овец снабжения далеко за пределами территории Грузии — Трабзон, Кубань, Калмыцкие степи и т. д., а сыр вывозился в Европу и возможности ознакомиться с внешним миром было больше), например, как варить мясо, как печь хлеб, как из шерстяной нити делать полотно и шить одежду, из кожи — обувь и т. д. Заморские впечатления и предметы обихода сами тушинцы тоже часто привносили в свою жизнь, так например, букант «гармонь», от слова «музыкант» (ср., груз. «гармони»).

Почти во всех пунктах, куда выгонялись отары овец (а их было такое количество, что порой не хватало пастища на родине — на семью приходилось от 1000 до 9000-12000 голов) и где приходилось останавливаться тушинам-овцеводам, везде они оставляли свой след в виде терминов - этнонима или топонима (ср. осет. гула (от сл. гула «курдюк»)), топоним «Тушминир» в Сванети (12 век), к ним же, думаю относится топоним Тушин (по историческим сведениям вместе со своими отарами они доходили до Киева и Москвы), топонимы обязательно должны быть на территории Турции, т. к. о наличии тушинских пастищ в Трабзоне упоминается в архивных источниках. Возможно в силу своего образа жизни и личных качеств (образования (знания языков), смелости и бесстрашия, терпимости и т. д.), тушинцы — юва и чагма, всегда были близки к грузинскому Царскому престолу, сопровождали их и нередко участвовали в дипломатических переговорах и миссиях.

(г) Постепенно исчезли многие традиции, связанные с культом овцы (клятва на очажной ипии, Выкуп при кровной мести и т. д.).

Второй период, думаю, наиболее длительный и, с точки зрения социолингвистических процессов, наверное относительно стабильный, в особенности для языка. Происходило восприятие глобальных процессов извне и их конвергенция, как на уровне социума, так и на уровне языка. Созидательная сторона процесса глобализации, выражалась в модернизации культуры, ибо происходило трансформирование заимствованных извне в соответствии с собственными традициями и ценностями, при этом отсекалось то, что с этими ценностями несовместимо, например, как не старались арабы и турки навязывать свой образ жизни и провести
исламизацией Восточной Грузии — у них ничего не получилось. Хотя есть другой пример — после подписания «Русско-грузинского Трактата» (1801 г.) стало престижным изучение русского языка и обучение своих детей в городах России. Возможно это происходило под влиянием государственной политики, хотя возможно стимулировало единообразие — скорее и то, и другое вместе.

Надо заметить, что история и культура цоа-тушин своими корнями связана с грузинским этносом, однако, язык в настоящее время, по сути представляет собой симбиоз древне-грузинского и вейнахских языков. Именно поэтому, случай с носителями данного языка совершенно неординарный, т.к. их грузинское самосознание не соотносится с их речью, которая для окружающих сейчас воспринимается как чужая.

Думаю, что здесь произошло следующее: мы знаем, что грузинский как язык государственный, из его древнего до состояния современного прошёл путь, насчитывающий несколько этапов, цоа-тушинский же законсервировался на том этапе и в том состоянии, когда общий лексикон древне-грузинского языка с вейнахами был жив и им активно пользовались, т. к. сферы влияния и степень интеграции с северо-кавказскими племенами были высоки, так, например, в сванском языке много общих слов с кабардинским языком, а в абхазском — много общих слов с языком мегрельским, в грамматической структуре языков тоже больше общего, чем различия. Однако, думаю, что всё это всего лишь результаты степени консервации — в одних языках она произошла раньше и степень общности, соответственно, больше, в других — позже.

Третий этап
Третий этап уже связан с советским периодом. Его отголоски чувствуются до последнего времени. Он связан с более радикальными изменениями в языке и социуме, хотя в меньшей мере они коснулись духовной жизни цоа-тушин и это большое благо. В то время, когда шло гонение на религию, среди тушинского населения шёл процесс особой консолидации вокруг церковных ритуалов — крещение детей, отпевание усопших по-христиански, соблюдение духовных праздников (Рождество, Воскресение Христова), Новый год отмечали по-старому стильно – 14 января и т. д. Всё это делалось втихоря и дома, поэтому репрессий по этому поводу среди населения не было, разве только среди партийных служащих. Овцемовство тоже было возведено в рамки совхозов, были ограничения на индивидуальное их владение, поэтому весь акцент жизнедеятельности населения был перенесён на образование. То ли согласно давней традиции (ведь ещё в XVIII-XIX в. в. высокую степень образованности тушин-пастухов отмечали А. Гольденштедт (1809) и Н. Марр (1922), то ли понимание значения самого образования и профессионализма, население Тушети (Цоа, Гомецари, Пирикити и частью Чагма), к этому времени уже полностью переселившиеся на Алазанскую долину Кахети, ринулись в вузы и в профессионально-просветительские учреждения. В Кахети самый большой процент молодёжи с высшим образованием был в Ахметском районе, из них 80% приходилось на сёла Земо- и Квемо Алавани.

В этот период характеристики глобализации вычёркиваются более чётко и интенсивно, т. к. идёт всеобъемлющий процесс советизации — актуализация русского языка, интеграция во все структуры союзного значения — армия, политики, молодёжные комсомольские и пионерские организации и т. д. В языке всё это, естественно, отражается пополнением словарного состава за счёт появления новых кальк и заимствований. Благо и то, что полного вытеснения старой лексики и старых грамматических норм и конструкций всё же не произошло. В речи меньше стало слышно церковной лексики, и то — в среде младшего поколения, но
в целом, сравнивая с языковым материалом, представленным в рукописи Иова Цискаришвили (1847 г.), можно отметить, что они немного упростились и видоизменились, но в целом — мало различаются.

Таким образом, в начале XX в. языковой сдвиг цова-тушинского ещё не ощущается, несмотря на то, что глобальные процессы советизации, по идее, должны были послужить его началом. Активно владеющих языком почти 100%.

Начало языкового сдвига связан с 80-ыми годами XX в. и происходит это под давлением совершенно непредвиденных и скорее нелепых причин: — как известно, для того, чтобы разобьсти население коммунистическая пропаганда в случае необходимости использовала лозунг «разделий и властвуй» и, при случае, его активно применяла. Вот и в нашем случае, для разжигания мелких сепаратистских настроений их пропагандисты стали дезинформировать население о том, что тушины, имеющие свой язык якобы вейнахи, переселившиеся на территорию Грузии приблизительно с XVII в. и в подтверждение их единого генезиса приводили цова-тушинский язык, в котором не секрет, что есть определённый процент вейнахского языкового материала... Активно манипулировались термины бацбийский (баца) и цова-тушинский в противовес тушинскому, которым обозначался чагма-тушинский диалект грузинского языка. Появилась опасность лишения цова-тушин исторического прошлого и родных корней, т. е. этнической самоидентичности из-за языка, который сопутствовал им всю историческую жизнь и волею судьбы подвергся консервации так давно, что визуально потерял связь с языком своего самоосознания — с древне-грузинским или каким-либо более древним языком. Вследствие этого, по немой договорённости, молодое поколение тузин — цова перестали учить своих детей домашнему языку. За последние 18-20 лет выросло поколения, которые вообще не владеют языком и, поверьте, дискомфорта от этого не чувствуют.

Вот Вам прямой эффект издержек советской глобализации, за которым обычно следует исчезновение многих традиций и обычая, церемоний, ритуалов, форм поведения и других характеристик, которые придают этносу индивидуальность, очерчивание и колорит.

Четвертый этап

Последний этап связан с сегодняшним днём; на цова-тушинском языке говорит 30% всего населения (в совокупности оно составляет не более тысячи человек) и то — в основном старшее и среднее поколение. Глобализация нашего времени, на фоне исчезновения разделявших мир национальных перегородок, порождает глубокие перемены и открывает невиданные возможности проникновения различных (в том числе и культурной) продукции стран Запада в самые отдалённые уголки планеты. Не обходят они и тушины. Каждый год растёт миграция населения из-за материальных нужд, обуревавших страну. Вообще, как вы заметили, миграции с целью создания своего семейного благосостояния не чужды цова-тушинам исторически, поэтому надежда, что «всё вернётся на круги своя» есть, т.к. детей они оставляют на попечение своих родителей в с. Земо-Алвани, а заработанные деньги продолжают вкладывать в свои же отцовско-дедовские хозяйственные уголья – ремонтируют старые дома и на месте уже развалившихся строят новые.

Как мы уже отметили, языком владеет очень маленький процент молодёжи и именно их язык тоже характерны процессы трансформации, из которых я перечислю некоторые:
2. сужение дифтонгов, приведших к появлению умляуга и долгих гласных: дуйих – дуих «одежда», мейндли – мэндли «платок» и др.;
3. унификация назальных гласных;
4. смещение показателей эргативного падежа в именах человека и вещи: кнам-ев – кнам-е «мальчик»;
5. расширение функций обобщённого классного показателя «д» и др.

Подытоживая всё вышеперечисленное, можно выделить какие-то рычаги, которые в определённой степени могут продлить жизнеспособность бесписьменных языков, вставших на путь самоизоляции: первое и может быть главное – единое духовное начало, которое даст возможность сохранить обычай и традиции, более того, создать условия их культтивации на фоне исторических знаний о своём крае; этот процесс поможет воспитать у молодёжи чувство гордости за свою индивидуальность, которая украшает их родину, появится чувство ответственности перед предками, которые донесли все эти блага до них и самоуверенности, что они тоже достойно передают их предшествующему поколению. Второе – это создать мини-предприятия и рабочие вакансии на местах и, тем самым, поднять экономическое благосостояние населения, что сократит процессы миграции. Третье, не менее важное – создать новые технологии, которые позволят иметь контакт с любой точкой планеты с одновременным автоматическим подключением понятного аппарата... И наконец, последнее – политика страны, которая наличие множества языков и диалектов сочетает за государственное достояние и богатство, также, как музыку, архитектуру, редкие виды животных и растений и другие государственные ценности и создает условия для их процветания.

Не знаю насколько это исследование в полной мере показало поэтапную трансформацию цов-тушинского (баэйского) языка и причины, приведшие к столь плачевному результату – к его самоизоляции, однако, думаю, выяснилось, что случай с этим языком на редкость неординарный, когда языковой сдвиг носителей языка проходит по доброй воле самого населения, ибо имея грузинское самосознание и воспринимая оба языка (грузинский и цов-тушинский) на уровне родного, рассаться с тем языком, который уже себя изжила как инструмент, не так сложно, как это на самом деле кажется. Выяснилось и другое – все эти процессы, в основном, связаны с социально-политическими явлениями, а на данном этапе – ещё и с проблемами глобализации.

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Summary

The Influence of Globalization Processes on Languages without Scripts (Based on Tsova-Tush (Batsbi) materials)

Bela Shavkhelishvili

Intensive globalization processes, characteristic of the modern world, have a painful influence upon the languages of small nations, especially upon languages without scripts. The disappearance of languages will cause disappearance of the culture of these nations. Nowadays only 30% of the whole Tsova-Tush population (of more than 1000 people) speaks the language. It is thus very important to try to achieve a consolidation of internal lingual processes in order to overcome the internal social influence, as well as political ones. This is a quite complicated task. As discussed with reference to Tsova-Tush, there are many factors that make this self-isolation process develop faster.

The roots of Tsova-Tush history and culture are connected with the Georgian ethnos, but the language itself is a symbiosis of the Old Georgian and Vainakh languages. We explore the gradual transformation of the language and discuss what caused these results. This is basically due to social processes, connected to chronological characteristic processes, that help us finding the reason why the language loses its self-identity and why it is endangered. The most remarkable fact in this situation is that language change takes place in accordance with the Tsova-Tush people’s wish. As they have Georgian self-identity and the ability to understand both languages (Georgian and Tsova-Tush) as their mother tongues, it is not difficult for them to forget one language that seems to have run out of all its resources.
Globalization and Language Problems: the Case of the Georgian Language

Manana Tabidze

Politics and science both contribute to the regulation of the processes of globalization (that to a certain degree used to be self-regulated) and take a greater part in the responsibility for the results. However, at the same time, responsibility can be assigned to everybody as natural historical development has been disturbed. It is impossible to stop the mechanism of globalization. It is inevitable not to follow this process, trying to predict extralinguistic phenomena. In particular, this applies to language policy and planning, where mistakes may often provoke language shifts and oppositions that sometimes develop into political or violent conflict.

The Georgian language with its long history has passed through different periods of globalization, but it has managed to survive and maintain cultural self-preservation. However, the situation today has become far more complex as we are now experiencing a period of unprecedented globalization, due to technological development and access to information. This forces people worldwide to try to adapt to a new reality and find general values while maintaining the specific and most valuable features of their own culture that have been gathered through many years of history.

Experience has been accumulated through the centuries by mankind, and has been transformed through the different stages of globalization and acquired special values. Examples of this kind of globalization include global social and economic formations; global religious processes through the distribution of Christianity, Islam, and other religions; global cultural processes such as European romanticism, realism, and fashion; global wars, including the First World War, Second World War, and the Cold War; and global states like the colonial countries, the USA, and the Soviet Union.

Due to the tendencies of globalization, the modern Georgian language now faces a set of urgent problems:

1. Search for new political and educational structures to overcome language difficulties that have arisen from differences between languages and solve the problems created by intercultural interaction.

2. Definition of moral and ethical foundations, values transferred by language through available linguistic means such as calques, loans, and interference, which are necessary for the preservation of language and the ethno-cultural integrity of the state. This is promoted actively by factors such as a state language, collective identity, general educational system, mass media, and so forth.

3. Both acceptance through the understanding of (and respect for) the ethno-cultural origins of members of society and development of those historically significant aspects of collective consciousness, which has always played an important role in helping both people and the state to remain united.

4. It is necessary to study and take into account both global migration tendencies in the modern world and the complexities of language integration of migrants (permanent or
temporary) in a new society. This problem is closely connected to such language phenomena as bilingualism, multilingualism, intermediary languages, diglossia, language conflicts, language legislation, language socialization, the teaching of modern languages, and the problems of translation (including machine translation).

Those who study or teach language often encounter difficulties of a discursive character, mainly found in grammatically correct texts (or translations) that lack communicative qualities as cultural context has not been taken into account. For this reason, applied linguistics has shown more and more interest in the problems of discourse and intercultural communication.

Intensive language contact brings up the unsolved problems of communicative exactness. People from different countries often encounter difficulties in understanding, even though they are speaking the same language. There are several types of language contact: (1) the conversational language spoken is native for both communicators, (2) the conversational language spoken is native for one of them and not for other, and (3) the conversational language spoken is not native for either of the communicators.

Difficulties in understanding are distinctly noticeable in the (2) category, when semantic and connotative perception is of high quality for one but not for other. In the (1) category, language contact is of high quality, while in the (3) category, the communicative task is narrow, and, thus, language contact easily achieves a desired result. Difficulties in the (1) category are related to the multiplicity of language variants and situational alternations of these variants. It is almost impossible for a communicator speaking a non-native language to master variant diversity and knowledge of social contexts.

During language contact, different factors influence the quality of understanding among the communicators. These factors include the so-called geography of language spreading such as ethnographic peculiarities, the remoteness and closeness of the spreading areas of the contact languages, the character of attitude towards informational novelties, the prestigious character of the contact languages, the social and political basis of contact between languages, and the quality of national consciousness and cultural conservatism.

Intercultural communication is highly specific as differences in the communicative competence of the participants greatly influence the success or failure of their communication. Communicative competence includes knowledge of symbolic systems and rules for how they function during communication. Intercultural communication is characterized by the fact that its participants use special language variants and discursive strategies that differ from the ones used within their own culture.

In the production of oral discourse or a written text, it is essential to pay attention to the hierarchy of speech varieties within the Georgian language, which includes non-standardized language, conversational language, non-literary language, regional (dialectal) speech, euphemistic words and phrases, figurative speech, denotative/connotative varieties, and technical language. Each speech variant contains alternative forms, and their distribution demands relevant recommendations according to their situational context.

The flow of new lexical borrowing is conditioned by the intensive broadening of informational space and qualitative changing of language contact, and, consequently, terms are frequently borrowed. A term is not ambiguous by nature; it is exact and, as such, easily accepted, but this is only at first glance. Many terms meet locally formed words or
words that have already been adopted, and, consequently, the functional area is limited for borrowed lexical units while they are established in the language. That is the reason why borrowed English terms such as manager or computer contain, for an Englishman, additional information or meanings gained from different times.

In her study of borrowing in business vocabulary, Jgarkava remarks in her MA thesis¹ that borrowed words in the fields of business and economics are rendered in the receiver language in their initial meaning. The changing of meaning is mostly caused by mass media; for instance, in Georgian mass media, borrowed words are often both understood and even translated incorrectly.

The process of borrowing undergoes a transitional phase when parallel forms are used side by side in a language; for example, lexical units of Georgian and English origin. The language often retains both of them and draws a line between comparatively narrow meanings or connotative differences. In an analysis of interviews with groups who had little knowledge of foreign languages, such as schoolchildren, students, teachers, non-

philologists, and economists², it was noted that they demonstrated a tendency for simplified recordings of foreign words.

In the language of mass media and fiction, semantically close pairs are still used; for example, გეგმუ / ველოექ / გელი / პერმერი ‘peasant / farmer’; მეჭერე / ბოლოექ / მეჭერე / ბოლოექ / სტამპერ / სტამპერ / უნივერსალ / უნივერსალ / სანაპირო / სანაპირო / ჰოლზეი / ჰოლზეი / რიელ ‘department store / supermarket’. Yet, publicistics use these pairs to avoid tautology, and distribute them according to their stylistic needs. Through so-called discriminative connotation, the chronologically older part of this vocabulary (including Georgian) is evaluated on a socially lower scale.

The discursive organization of Georgian texts has also changed due to the influence of modern verbal advertising. Advertising has become an international branch, even when a national product is advertised. The reasons for this are both the textual laconism of advertisements and social conditions. As sociologists remark, an advertisement informs users of not what they want to hear, but rather makes them think what they want to hear. That is the reason why advertisements promote the selling of common market products wherever it is possible. The dual nature of advertising text is explained through its ability to make effect of constant novelty while also sending the same approved


² Our MA student S. Jgarkava researched experimentally the following lexical, phonetic, orthographic, and semantic borrowing variants in Georgian; e.g. გერამატ/ ტანსკრი / გერამატ/ ტანსკრი; მუდმივი / სურეიერი; მოლექ / რიელ / მოლექ / რიელ / შორეჯი / შორეჯი / ფულუპო / ფულუპო / ეუროპო / ეუროპო / გერამატ / გერამატ / ეუნაი / ეუნაი / დრაკა / დრაკა / პრანცაიზი / პრანცაიზი / იუდრე / იუდრე / ანგულ / ანგულ / ქალაქ / ქალაქ / სექ / სექ / პან / პან / რე და სხვ. It is noteworthy that phonetic simplicity gained priority among the variants, although percentage differences in variant choices are not very great; e.g. შორეჯი / რიელ / გერამატ / ეუნაი / დრაკა / პრანცაი / ანგულ / ქალაქ / სექ / პან / რე და სხვ.
message many times to a reader or listener, from whom it expect a relevant reaction. Thus, a list of psycho-linguistically relevant lexemes is formed, and they frequently occur in advertising texts. It should be noted that, adjectives are often used in this context.

We compared the 20 most characteristic verbs and adjectives in English language TV commercials with verbs and adjectives used in modern Georgian advertisements and found a significant homogeneity (the work was carried out in 2000 at the I. Chavchavadze University of Language and Culture)⁴.

Adjectives: new (ახლოს axali), good / better / best (არის k’argi, უკეთსადვი uk’etesi / საუკეთესო sauk’eteso), free (თავისუფალი tavisupali), fresh (ახალი axali), delicious (საუკეთესო saucxoo), full (საკუთარი savse), sure (საორიენტერი saimedo), clean (ბოროტი supta), wonderful (ხასადიოთი šesamšnavi) special გასატაბსუბალი gansak’utrebli), crisp (ხელური xramuna), fine (ხელური činebuli), big (ბიჯი didi), great (ხელური didebuli), real (ნამდვილი namdvi), easy (საორიენტერ nateli), extra, safe (უკეთსადვი uvnebuli), rich (ხელური mdidruli).

Verbs: make (გახდება gak’eteba), get (მიღება miyeba), have (ყოფა kona, ყოფა q’ola), give (მიგეგო micema), see (მოკვლი ოხვაvanxva), buy (ყიდვა q’idva), come (მოხვა mosvla), go (კვლევა c’asvla), know (იცნობა codna), keep (დაკვლით k’aveba, ყოფა ოხვაva), look (მოცემული შვეძვა šexedva), need (მოცხერდილა dač’rveba), love (სიყვარული šiq’varuli), use (გამოყენება gamoq’eneba), feel (გრძნობა grznoba), like (სიყვარული moc’oneba), choose (არჩევით ამორჩევა amoq’oneba), take (გემოვნება ayeba), start (დავიწყება dac’q’eba), test (გამოვიყურება dagemovneba, გამოვიყურება gasinžva).

In the Georgian texts, 90% of these lexemes turned out to be among the most common words used in advertising. The reason for this is that an advertisement enters Georgia from the outside world accompanied by foreign social motivation, and most advertising texts are translated as accelerated rates of economic and social relations do not allow this to follow the natural course of development. Foreigners frequently send advertisements and products for sale to Georgia taking into consideration the attitudes of the Georgian population. This means that they have a better knowledge of the taste and linguistic preferences of our mass consumers than we have or, at least, they try to study and understand these attitudes. The present poverty and primitiveness of Georgian advertising text shows that foreignness in advertising is considered to be prestigious as it gives a foreign color to the text (even in the form of calques).

The borrowing of terms is less controversial than borrowing from casual speech. Discourse morphousness in any language weakens its expressiveness, and, thereby, causes a devaluation of literature. We will attempt to bring forward some noteworthy illustrations form the Georgian language from this point of view:

1. People get used to visual messages to such an extent that they activate their imagination less during the perception of texts. This point is supported by research which we carried out at I. Chavchavadze University in 2004 and 2005 (and is

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particularly shown in an MA thesis\textsuperscript{4} under my supervision); frequency of use and peculiarities of emotional vocabulary in modern Georgian translations were studied. In particular, one interesting fact was disclosed. In the Georgian translations (as well as in the originals), the so called imaginary senses are weakened, and the visual aspect of emotional expression is foregrounded (e.g. გულამზებული ჩ’ავიდა ‘He went away with a heavy heart’; მოხდა მოხდა რძელი მოკ’უმშა, მოხდა მოხდა ხელი დაეხეთ ჩ’ათავა ‘He/She went away with a heavy heart’; ქუჩი ქუჩი საჭირო საჯარო, ქუჩი ქუჩი საჯარო ჩ’ებილი დააკრე’იალა ‘He/She tautened his/her muscles, clenched his/her hands, gnashed the teeth’ instead of ჰაეთ, ჰაეთ შემოა ჰაეთ ‘He/she became tense’; საჯარო საჯარო თაველი მახუშა, საჯარო საჯარო თავი უკ’ან გადააგდო, საჯარო საჯარო მზინარეს დაემგავანა ‘He/she closed his/her eyes, inclined the head back, looking like he/she was asleep’ instead of საჯარო საჯარო ანთ ჯარი ჯარი ჯარი ‘He/she is blissful’ and others).\textsuperscript{5}

2. Discursive peculiarities in translations of numerous films and TV series occur. The attitudes of the television industry towards the quality of translation are careless, and the translations are, generally, of low quality, mechanical, and include calques, vocabulary that is not translated. In many cases, curious examples of translated phraseology enter into Georgian from different languages, although mostly through translations from Russian. Voluntarily or not, this process undermines the prestige of Georgian as television viewers assume that the Georgian language is simply not able to express a certain point and not that the translator has difficulties. Furthermore, the translation of a film is accompanied by an element of cultural assimilation as any phrase or proper name pronounced in the original language is considered by the listener to be native and characteristic for their own language. At a glance, there appears to be nothing alarming in this, but we must not forget that any borrowing (including lingvo-cultural borrowing) is characterized by the fact that the borrowed unit is one-sided and non-polysemantic. Thus, borrowings are contextually narrow as when they are introduced, a long time is required for them to “become familiar” and to be adapted. However, the intensity of our current informational life does not allow for this long development period, and new vocabulary appears and disappears so rapidly that there is no time for it to adapt. At the same time, the native semantically and connotatively varied vocabulary of the language becomes a victim of neologisms, and gradually becomes less used and inactive. That is why the following expressions dominate in television: პოლონური მოდი, დავილა’რაკ’ოტ ‘let’s speak’ (and not ქართული მოვილ-პ’არაკ’ოტ ‘let’s talk’); მოხდა მოხდა რძელი მოკ’უნშა ამ ბრე’ში ვარ შექ’ვარეხული ‘I’m love

\textsuperscript{4} Ana Kikalishvili’s MA thesis: The Modern Language Tendencies in Georgia and Georgian Authors’ Works, supervisor Prof. M.Tabidze, 2006, Tbilisi.

in this boy’ (and not ბიც’ზე var შეკ ‘varebuli ‘I love this boy’); დავიწყება dagviesemeset ‘make your sms’, (or ‘Let’s have you sms’, ‘send us your sms’); დავიწყება dagvimeset ‘Make your message’, (or ‘let’s have your message’, ‘Send us your message’); გაძლიერება p’artize vart ‘we are at a party’; გადაკადავა gaap’aires ‘They made PR’; სივის gagzavna ‘Send a CV’.

Summing up, due to an unconscious negative influence from media and modern nomenclature circles, borrowings into the language from different branches reach the public with incorrect meanings as they do not understand them properly. This causes the establishment of duplicates and semantic variants (mostly incorrect). These terms with improvised meanings are incorporated back into the branch language again which creates misunderstandings in the process of text organization. The most obvious outcome is that the discourse of Georgian texts is disturbed, and, moreover, that it is not possible to form a new basis.
The Problems of Teaching and Learning: the Official State Language in Certain Regions of Georgia

Tinatin Bolkvadze

The Ethnic/Linguistic Composition of Georgia

The present paper discusses not only the problems of learning and teaching Georgian as a second language, but also the issues necessary to achieve civil integration of Georgia’s linguistic minorities. I will, therefore, occasionally have to dwell upon the establishment of economic infrastructure and its on-going development; however, the principal issue is the hierarchy of languages in Georgia.

According to Article 8 of the Georgian Constitution, the official state language is Georgian in Georgia, and Abkhazian in Abkhazia, while other languages (such as Azerbaijani, Armenian, Ossetian, Hebrew, Russian, Ukrainian, and Kurdish) are spoken by minority groups. Additionally, several other languages are spoken by various smaller minority groups which make up about 1% of the population. The regions where some of the minority languages are spoken in Georgia are:

- Samtskhe-Javakheti (Armenian)
- Kvemo Kartli (Azerbaijani)
- South Ossetia (Ossetian)

Hebrew, Russian, Ukrainian and Kurdish can be considered “non-territorial” languages.

Table 1. Ethnic / Linguistic Composition of Georgia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic / Linguistic Composition</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4371535</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td>5400841</td>
<td>100,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgian</td>
<td>3661173</td>
<td>83,7</td>
<td>3787393</td>
<td>71,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijani</td>
<td>284761</td>
<td>6,5</td>
<td>307556</td>
<td>5,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>248929</td>
<td>5,7</td>
<td>437211</td>
<td>8,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>67671</td>
<td>1,5</td>
<td>341172</td>
<td>6,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ossetian</td>
<td>38028</td>
<td>0,8</td>
<td>164055</td>
<td>3,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>15166</td>
<td>0,4</td>
<td>100324</td>
<td>1,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>7039</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>52443</td>
<td>1,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abkhazian</td>
<td>3527</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>95853</td>
<td>1,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdish</td>
<td>2514</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>33331</td>
<td>0,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td>2333</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>10312</td>
<td>0,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>40394</td>
<td>0,9</td>
<td>71191</td>
<td>1,3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Two districts in the region of Samtskhe-Javakheti, Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda, are inhabited by a very large number of ethnic Armenians, who speak either Armenian or Russian as their first language. According to the 2002 Georgian Government Census, the proportion of Armenians in the districts of Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda were 94.3% and 95.8% respectively, and the Azeri population was 12% in the Kvemo Kartli districts of Bolnisi, Dmanisi, and Gardabani (see Table 1 above).

However, the data presented in the 2002 census did not reflect the current state of the ethnic and linguistic composition of the population of Georgia. In the 90th Recommendation of the Second Report on Georgia (adopted on June 30, 2006, by ECRI (The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance) it was stated: “Both the authorities and representatives of civil society observed that the results of the 2002 census did not reflect the present situation in the country with regard to the number of ethnic or other minorities. ECRI has been informed that the next census will be carried out in 2010, which seems a long way for the improvement of the data collected during the 2002 census.”

The Armenian and Azerbaijani languages in the regions above are used not only in domestic situations but also in education, media, and local administration; consequently, the overwhelming majority of representatives of the Azeri and Armenian linguistic minorities do not speak the state language, that is, Georgian. This is the legacy of Soviet language policy, having been targeted by the authorities of Georgia. On the one hand, supporting the development of minority languages is an obligation of the state, parallel to that of offering teaching of the state language and inclusion in the civil society. Ultimately, language ignorance and civil isolation causes marginalization, and this harms the citizens who are marginalized and, as a result, the country itself. Georgia is trying to build a democratic state, but this is difficult when a significant chunk of the population does not speak the same language. The government needs to establish a comprehensive, effective education system to teach Georgian as a second language to minorities. However, Georgian authorities have frequently been criticized by both minority groups and international organizations: “But while a new generation is educated, minorities should not be discriminated against, especially in hiring for state jobs” (Georgia’s Armenian and Azeri Minorities in: Crisis Group Europe Report №178, 22 November 2006).

In order to grasp the essence of this issue, it is worth mentioning the Soviet language policy in Georgia (which will be discussed further in the following section) as far as the linguistic situation in present-day Georgia has been generated by its difficult past.

Besides the Soviet legacy, other factors, characteristic of post-Soviet Georgia, hindered the integration of Azerbaijani and Armenians into Georgian society. Jonathan Wheatley writes that since 1995, the policy of the Georgian state towards Javakheti can be classified only as one of benign neglect. On one hand, the Georgian government has made no effort to intervene in the cultural affairs of local Armenians, and attempts to teach the state language have been regarded as more symbolic than real. On the other hand, the government has made no effort whatsoever to develop Javakheti economically or to integrate it in any meaningful way within the Georgian state. A point in case are the schools, which have not been repaired for at least fifteen years; the roofs of school buildings are often degraded, and in some schools, panes of glass are even missing in the windows. Heating the school buildings is, therefore, a major problem as there are no central heating systems and harsh climatic conditions in winter. Consequently, in many villages, children have to bring their own wood to school in order to supply the wood stove, which is usually the only source of heat in school premises (Wheatley 2004: 3,
Apart from the government’s mere formal nod towards the integrating potential of the state language and the weak communication infrastructure (including the degraded school buildings), deepening estrangement, there is a further problem. The Azeris in Kvemo Kartli and the Armenians in Javakheti are incorporated into the linguistic and cultural space of the neighbouring states which is detrimental to their social ties with Georgia, and this estrangement is aggravated even further in Javakheti by geographical isolation and poor communication infrastructure (Svanidze 2006:27). These circumstances are enduring.

**Soviet Roots are the Problem**

During the Soviet period, the Georgian language was given the status of an official language of Georgia. Above it there was the main state language, Russian, and, generally, Russian was the lingua franca as it was used as a means of communication between the various language communities of the Soviet Union.

Armenian and Azerbaijani in Georgia have the status of local languages, and Armenian and Azeri school pupils learn four languages: the native language (i.e. Armenian or Azeri), Georgian, Russian, and one of the European languages (Bolkvadze 2006: 35-36).

Although Georgian was spoken on a level suitable for their everyday needs, the Russian language was obligatory. Not knowing the Russian language created serious obstacles for those who wanted to achieve elevated positions in society; the same cannot be said about the Georgian language.

In the Soviet era, Russian speakers enjoyed advantages in Georgia; for example, fluency in Russian gave a wider territorial scope for employment than fluency in Georgian. At the Armenian and Azeri schools of Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti, Georgian was either learned only to a minimal extent, or not learned at all.

Students graduating from schools that did not teach the state language were hindered both in accessing university-level education and in their ability to compete in the local job market.

The attempt to spread Russian inside the Soviet republics was based purely on ideological and political reasons: it served “russification” well, and ensured the demolition of historical links and relations among nationals within these republics. This, in turn, strengthened the creation and secured the boundaries of the Soviet Union. While the Georgian nation made efforts to ensure the survival of its native language and, thus, preserve its national identity, the people from different ethnic groups who lived within its borders, especially those living in regional areas, moved from the Georgian language towards the Russian language and political domain. In doing so, they lost all kinds of unities with the Georgian state. In Georgia, as in other Soviet republics, the ethnic majority showed more resistance to the Soviet regime, from dissidence to open protests. Ethnic minorities living in the republics not only distanced themselves from anti-Soviet movements and activities but were often scared of and actually opposed the idea of self-identification. During the demise of the Soviet regime, the republics often showed sympathy for one another’s aspirations, but within the boundaries of their territories one did not notice any interethnic solidarity, and protests by representatives of ethnic minorities were rare. Linguistic isolation of ethnic minorities in Georgia occurred because anti-Soviet information (in oral, underground, or literary forms) was only in Georgian, whereas official information and ideological flow was in Russian (Tsipuria 2006:20). The fact that the overwhelming majority of linguistic minorities in Soviet Georgia did not involve themselves in the Georgian national movement, and, moreover, did not consider those problems to be theirs, gave rise to the idea that a considerable
number of Georgia’s ethnic minorities lived in this country temporarily for the sake of the Soviet assimilatory policy (the same cannot be said of Jews or a number of Armenians who have both been documented as historically inhabiting Georgia). Furthermore, in newly independent Georgia, they would plan a future that was apparently associated back with their historical homelands. As a result of this, ethnic and linguistic minorities were often referred to as ‘guests’ by representatives of the national liberating movement. However, such a reference should in no way be understood as offence, because in Georgia, a guest has always been associated with the most favorable and elevated imaginations. A guest has always been regarded as God’s gift, and hospitality has been viewed as the obligation of every worthy Georgian. Therefore, the evaluations of some foreign experts are the mere opinions of laymen when they state that the Georgian people have not been loyal to ethnic minorities, because they sometimes refer to them as ‘guests.’ In 2004, Jonathan Wheatley wrote:

While few political leaders in Georgia today would go so far as to echo Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s characterisation of ethnic minorities as ‘guests’, there is, in the minds of many Georgians, a suspicion that ethnic minorities must necessarily be disloyal. This perception is shared by many members of the political elite, who does not consider ethnic minorities as vital human capital that could contribute to the future development of the country. (Wheatley 2004:32)

Certainly, all inhabitants of Georgia, irrespective of their ethnic and linguistic backgrounds, are invaluable and, thus, vital human resources and contributors to the country’s future.

The Main Goals of Present-day Georgian Language Policy and Support of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s High Commission on National Minorities (OSCE)

According to the language policy currently being pursued in Georgia, they would like the country to resemble an endoglossic state where the national language is the native language of the majority of the population. However, in order to achieve this, it is necessary to expand the sociolinguistic functions of Georgian to help establish it as the lingua franca for the whole population.

The main focus of present-day Georgian language policy is to support multilingualism in Georgia, and a typical example of this would be linguistic humanism. This issue deals with the establishment and retaining of national and cultural identity, which, in its turn, requires social integration based on the mutual respect of language and culture. Thus, linguistic humanism is not only a tool but also a feature of a tolerant society.

Javakheti and some areas of Kvemo Kartli are isolated linguistically. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of the population of Javakheti does not speak Georgian, and, thus, has no command of the state language of Georgia. This situation has major consequences as the language barrier makes communication with the central authorities difficult.

As stated above, the main goal of the Georgian authorities is to make Georgian the lingua franca, and today, the government prioritizes teaching Georgian as a state language to its minorities. Special Georgian textbooks and programs for Armenian and Azeri populations have been compiled and published, plus bilingual schools have been opened in ethnic minority regions.
In order to improve proficiency in the Georgian by students of non-Georgian schools, the state budget has allotted capital in order to compile the “Georgian Language Learning Program for non-Georgian Schools”. Additionally, in 2005, the Georgian Ministry of Education and Science started implementing a new policy for teaching the state language and introduced new standards for teaching it in non-Georgian schools. These standards are based on the “Common European Framework of Reference for Languages: Learning, Teaching, Assessment”. The main goals of “the Georgian Language Learning Program for non-Georgian Schools” are:

 […] to create the curricula and textbooks of the Georgian language and literature, having so far been in effect in non-Georgian schools, have turned to be inappropriate for the current language situation as far as they were based upon a distinct premise – students’ knowledge of Georgian. However, actually, in the regions of compact settlement, even high school students did not speak Georgian at all, and that pre-determined the impossibility of achieving the goals, envisaged in the curriculum. Students finished school without speaking the state language, and it was an impeding factor for their future activities. They were deprived of either university or professional education, and of being competitive at the local labor market. As a result, the young potential left the country and ethnic minorities were further isolated from common civil processes.

The implementation of the goals outlined by the program, which were both to produce, publish, and distribute new textbooks in non-Georgian schools and to train teachers to use new methodologies of teaching, will yield because:

The problem of no command of the state language among the youth of ethnic minorities of Georgia will be consistently solved, the equal availability of education will be provided, the perspective for receiving of professional and higher education will increase. It will prevent their leaving of the country, it will facilitate to the further integration of ethnic minorities in Georgia’s state, political, cultural, and civil space.

However, new textbooks and teachers’ professional development are, in themselves, not sufficient for teaching the state language effectively. It is necessary to create a good educational environment with repaired school buildings and classrooms, appropriate facilities, good roads, and regard for the well-being of the students’ families. All this will, in its turn, affect the economic well-being of the country and contribute to the elimination of isolation among various provinces of Georgia. The Georgian state has budgeted for a special program for the rehabilitation of school buildings “Iakob Gogebashvili”. Within the framework of this program, numerous schools, including non-Georgian ones, were rehabilitated and roads were constructed and repaired in order to connect both districts and villages within districts.

Special language teaching materials were prepared for students of non-Georgian schools within the framework of the “State Language Program”. The same program included the special direction of the “Endorsement of Polylingualism and Civil Consent in Georgia” which had two goals. Firstly:

To support students of non-Georgian schools to receive education in their native tongues, which would facilitate to their development and guarantees the preservation of their cultural individualism. Within the changed political context
in present-day Georgia, education in minorities’ languages, as different from Soviet policy, does not contradict to the spread of Georgian as the state language, and linguistic diversity is not viewed as a threat to the country’s unity.

Secondly:

Overwhelming majority of non-Georgian speaking population either has no command of Georgian or has so scarce knowledge that it would hardly be sufficient to be a perfect member of the society. This makes serious problems to the civil integration, generates estrangement, which may even be followed by ethnic conflicts, also inherited from the Soviet Union. In these circumstances, it is of utmost importance for the state to endorse adult non-ethnic Georgians to learn the Georgian language. Besides, it is necessary to persuade them that their knowledge of Georgian is no discrimination and that it is aimed only at their integration.

Within the framework of the “State Language Program”, village or district non-Georgian schools were encouraged to become centres of Georgian language teaching not only for students of that school but also for various age groups and professionals living in the region. For this reason, teachers of Georgian at non-Georgian schools designed special programs which were then discussed by a special commission at the Ministry of Education and Science. More than 60,000 GEL has been spent on the projects submitted by Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti in 2007.

Beside the activities of the Georgian state, there were two projects that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Highest Commission on National Minorities (OSCE) implemented (partially in 2005 and fully in 2006-2007) to ensure improved standards for teaching the Georgian language in non-Georgian schools:

- Supporting the Teaching of Georgian as a Second Language in the Minority Schools of Kvemo Kartli;
- Supporting the Teaching of Georgian as a Second language in the Minority Schools of Samtskhe-Javakheti.

Additionally, at various training courses, the level of teaching among the teachers of Georgian as a second language is very low. This is because the teachers have little motivation due to low salaries. Quite a large percentage of local teachers (about 30%) are not even liable to retrain as they do not understand the Georgian language, although, in spite of this, they still work in schools. There is great a deficiency of professional teachers in Kvemo Kartli, and with the absence of trained and qualified teachers of Georgian language, all of the efforts to teach Georgian in Kvemo Kartli will be under serious threat (Second Narrative Report of the coordinator of the project Supporting Teaching of Georgian as the Second language in Minority Schools of Kvemo Kartli).

This conclusion, reflecting a sad reality, once again highlights that there is still a lot that needs to be done. There are a number of activities still waiting to be conducted in order to meet one of the most significant recommendations of the Second Report on Georgia (issued on February 13, 2007) by The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance: “ECRI strongly recommends the Georgian authorities to maintain their efforts to improve all resent or intending officials’ command of Georgian. In this connection it would point out that this is a long-term solution as a language cannot be learnt overnight. Alternative provisional measures are therefore necessary”
(Recommendation 112, Second report on Georgia, Adopted on June 30, 2006 by The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance).

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Caucasus Studies 4

CAUCASUS STUDIES: MIGRATION, SOCIETY AND LANGUAGE

Edited by Karina Vamling

Caucasus Studies 4 includes papers presented at the multidisciplinary conference Caucasus Studies: Migration – Society – Language, held on November 28-30 2008 at Malmö University. Researchers on the Caucasus from a variety of disciplinary perspectives gathered around the themes: Armed conflicts and conflict resolution, The Caucasus and global politics, Identities in transition, Migration and identity, Language contact and migration, and Diaspora studies. Papers from this broad spectrum of topics are represented in the volume. The languages of the conference were English and Russian, and the volume therefore includes papers in both these languages.

The organizing of this international conference and the presence of a large number of colleagues from Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and North Caucasus would not have been possible without the generous support from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida).