

# CURRENT THEMES IN IMER RESEARCH

NUMBER 12

SWEDEN'S POPULATION GROUPS ORIGINATING  
FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:  
Change and Integration

Pieter Bevelander & Inge Dahlstedt



MALMÖ UNIVERSITY



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**Pieter Bevelander & Inge Dahlstedt**

Pieter Bevelander and Inge Dahlstedt are researchers at Malmö Institute for Studies of Migration, Diversity and Welfare (MIM), Malmö University, Sweden. We are very grateful for the comments, improvements, tables and figures received from our co-project members, Miroslav Macura, Rasmus Hvoslev Bilde, Lars Östby and Benny Carlson.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report deals with the integration of individuals originating from the six non-western immigrant countries of Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Turkey and Vietnam and their descendants in Sweden in the ten-year period 1998-2008. The central aim of the report is to analyse the integration patterns of these groups in three important areas: demographic behaviour, educational enrolment and labour market integration. This research has three objectives. The first is to determine when the groups came into being and how they have developed, with a focus on key features of population change, i.e. the overall growth, components of growth and age-sex-structure shifts. The second objective is to analyse two specific aspects: the groups' integration and participation in the educational system, i.e. educational enrolment, and their integration patterns in the labour market, with a main focus on employment and unemployment. In order to provide a bridge between the analyses of population change and integration, compositions of the groups by selected traits, such as immigrant generation and duration of residence, are also examined. The third objective is to study, where feasible, the impact of selected public policies and practices, particularly those pertaining to immigration and integration.

Over the last six decades the size of Sweden's immigrant population (immigrants and their descendants) has steadily increased. Migration flows into the country have been associated with societal phenomena such as labour demand in the growing economy, family reunions and refugee streams due to wars and political conflicts. Although earlier migration streams appear to have integrated relatively well, concern about the current streams is high on the political agenda. It is thought that more in-depth knowledge about the integration patterns of the demographic, educational and labour market domains could lead to improved integration policies.

In 2010, almost one fifth of Sweden's population consisted of immigrants or descendants of immigrants. To be more exact, 14.7 per cent of the country's 9,415,570 inhabitants are immigrants in Sweden. Descendants of immigrants amount to 412,960 persons, or 4.4 per cent of the total population. In other words, immigrants from the countries that are in focus in this report and their descendants constitute 20 per cent of the immigrant population in Sweden, with individuals from

Iraq making up the largest immigrant group and people from Pakistan the smallest.

Since the end of the 1960s Sweden has made use of a number of integration strategies to accommodate immigrants into several areas of society. Of these, Swedish language proficiency and integration into the economic domain have been the most important. According to The Migrant Integration Policy Index (2007), Sweden scores very highly when it comes to granting immigrants access to and rights in the labour market.

To summarise the most important results and at the same time return to the first objective of this study, namely the demographic integration in the period 1998-2008, we can see that all six immigrant groups have grown. In particular, the Iraqi and Somali groups have experienced a substantial increase in number. For Iran, Iraq, Somalia and Vietnam the growth is due to both net migration and an increasing number of descendants. For Pakistan, the main reason for the increase is net migration. Overall, the population growth in Sweden in this period is mainly a result of net migration and higher birth rates among immigrants and to a somewhat lower degree their descendants. As might be expected, “older” immigrant groups that have been in Sweden for a longer period of time have more descendants than “younger” immigrant groups. Iran, Turkey and Vietnam can be depicted as “older” groups and Iraq, Pakistan and Somalia as “younger” ones.

With the exception of Iran, all the immigrant groups show a higher crude birth rate than that for native Swedes. The immigrant groups are still younger than the native population and have a far lower crude death rate than natives. In general, immigrants are married to individuals from the same group, whereas their descendants tend to be married to natives or individuals from other immigrant groups. The total fertility rate is higher among most of the immigrant groups compared to that for natives. Again, Iranian women are the exception, where descendants show a lower fertility rate than their immigrant parents.

The second objective of the study – to analyse two specific aspects of the integration of the groups – includes participation in the educational system, i.e. educational enrolment, and integration patterns in the labour market, with a focus on employment and unemployment. When it comes to enrolment in education, the immigrant groups show a variation. Iraqi and Iranian men and women, as well as males from Pakistan and females from Vietnam, match the enrolment levels of native men and women in the age group 16-19. Moreover, the descen-



dants of immigrants generally show a higher enrolment level than their immigrant counterparts.

A positive development is visible over time. Both immigrants and descendants have higher enrolment levels in education at the end of the period compared to the beginning, i.e. 2008 versus 1998. However, Somali men and women have a lower enrolment level at the end of the period compared to the start. Major migration to Sweden and difficulties of entering the regular educational system could be reasons for this result.

Descendant females show a higher enrolment level than descendant males. The pattern is similar for immigrants, but at a lower level.

For higher education, the results indicate a gender gap with more female than male students.

The employment integration of individuals in the core labour market ages of 25-54 is relatively low. However, a positive trend is visible over time. Both females and males from the six immigrant groups have higher employment rates at the end of the period. The gender gap shows that males have higher employment levels than females. The largest gap is detected for Pakistan and Turkey.

The employment rates for young immigrants aged 16-24 are lower than those for natives. For women we see no positive development over time, but for males an increasing employment rate is visible. Male and female descendants in this age group have lower employment rates than natives, but higher employment rates than their immigrant counterparts.

Following the cohort of 25-39 year-old immigrants over time from 1998 to 2003 to 2008, increasing employment levels can be observed for both females and males. The exceptions are Pakistani and Somali males, which show no increasing employment levels between 2003 and 2008.

The unemployment rate for both immigrant females and males drops during the ten-year period, with the exception of Iraqi and Somali immigrants. Female youth unemployment also drops over time for most immigrant groups, again with the exception of Somali immigrants. For males, youth unemployment also decreases. The exceptions here are Iraqi, Somali and native males. Descendant unemployment levels are mainly in parity with or lower than native levels.

Inactivity is higher for all immigrant groups compared to natives. However, the inactivity rate drops substantially over the period.

With regard to the third objective of the study – to provide insights into the impact of selected public policies and practices, particularly those pertaining to immigration and integration on the chosen aspects of change and integration – we can highlight the following issues.

No particular integration policy aimed at immigrant groups deals with demographic aspects. The observed change in the demographic behaviour of the descendants of the six immigrant groups, albeit to differing degrees, is voluntary and shows an adaption to the behaviour of the population in general.

Integration policies have a strong focus on educational and labour market integration in Sweden. In addition to the general positive economic business cycle, the economic integration of six immigrant groups and their descendents shows a gradual positive development.

Integration policies aimed at immigrants and education policies aimed at the population in general have also had an effect on the successive larger educational enrolment of immigrants and their descendents.

## CHAPTER 1

# INTRODUCTION

The size of Sweden's foreign-born population (immigrants and their descendants) has steadily increased over the last six decades. Migration flows into the country have been linked to societal phenomena such as labour demand in the growing economy, family reunions and refugee streams due to wars and political conflicts. Whereas earlier migration streams integrated relatively well, concern about the current streams is high on the political agenda. It is thought that more in-depth knowledge about the integration patterns of the demographic, educational and labour market domains could lead to improved integration policies.

This report is part of cross-country comparative, register-based research into selected key features of population changes and the integration of Danish, Norwegian and Swedish population groups having roots in Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Turkey and Vietnam. With one or two exceptions, these six groups are the largest of the many foreign-origin groups hosted by the three Scandinavian countries today. In accordance with how these countries define their residents of foreign origin, the groups include immigrants and their immediate descendants, i.e. children born to immigrant couples. This introduction highlights the comparative research in which the present report is embedded and ends with a brief overview of the report.

The research was motivated by the following two considerations. First, in Scandinavian and many other European countries, opinions on and responses to the spread of developing-world-origin population groups and their integration have often been clouded by a dearth of information, knowledge and insight into the phenomena. If this situation does not improve, the confusion and mistrust that has surrounded people's ethnic, religious or racial backgrounds in recent years is likely to persist and deepen. Hence, an empirically grounded understanding of these groups and their integration is necessary, especially as they seem set to multiply and increase in size. An active and sober public discourse on this sensitive topic and the formulation and implementation of informed policies are thereby essential.

Second, there are essentially two basic motives for admitting foreigners into a country that does not promote immigration as a

means of nation-building: economic and humanitarian. The former primarily arises from the need to complement domestic labour with foreign workers in times of excess labour demand. The latter has to do with the ethical stance that a society, if capable of doing so, has a moral obligation to offer protection to foreigners fleeing war, political prosecution and the like. Denmark, Norway and Sweden continue to honour this obligation, despite a growing realisation that the contributions that foreign workers, refugees and their family members have made to the economy and society at large have been inadequate. The extent of this inadequacy needs to be far better understood than is the case at present.

The research in question has sought to achieve three objectives. The first is to determine when the groups in the three Scandinavian countries came into being and how they have developed, with a focus on the key features of population change, namely overall growth, components of growth and age-sex-structure shifts. The second is to analyse two specific aspects of the groups' integration, i.e. participation in the educational system and in the labour market. Due to data limitations, the first aspect only concerns school enrolment, while the second pertains to employment and unemployment. In order to provide a bridge between the analyses of population change and integration, compositions of the groups by selected traits, such as immigrant generation and the duration of residence, were examined. A third objective is to study, where feasible, the impact of selected public policies and practices, particularly those pertaining to immigration and integration.

### **Data, methods and limitations**

Research into various aspects of demographic behaviour and the integration of population groups originating from different developing countries has repeatedly shown cross-group differences. It is for this reason that our research has focused on individual groups and the largest groups, rather than composite groups of people with roots in many different developing countries. This group-oriented approach not only facilitates the identification of interesting differentials, but is also far more useful to policy analysts and policymakers. Policies, particularly those aiming at enhancing integration, cannot be of the type 'one size fits all'. Unless the policies take account of the specificities of the various groups, they cannot help to alleviate the varying problems of the different groups. Due to various limitations associated with the data in the three Nordic countries, the research has focused on the ten most recent years at the time of data processing, 1998-2008.

From the outset we decided to make use of the similarities of the three countries. First, the countries have much in common in terms of the patterns of immigration over the last half century and the consequent rise of developing-world-origin population groups. Although their immigration and integration policies differ, they have basic goals in common. Second, the individual-based registers of the three countries have many similar features. The information that they provide about population and integration processes is more comparable across national borders and richer than the relevant data that exists elsewhere in Europe and beyond. Third, and related to this, the concepts, definitions and classifications that are used in the three countries are basically the same. Thus, with these salient features, the potential of establishing a common empirical and analytical basis for public policy pertaining to immigration, foreign-origin groups and integration is promising. This research is an attempt to exploit this potential.

Comparisons of the different groups were performed as part of the research. The groups were also compared to the native or total population. Moreover, generation was a main dimension of this research. As often as was deemed desirable, immigrants and their descendants were studied separately. In other words, the immigrants or descendants of any given group were compared to the immigrants or descendants of the other groups, as well as to the native or total populations. Here it should be noted that as descendants are less numerous than immigrants, fewer comparisons are possible. Also, as some of the groups in the three countries have only come into existence relatively recently their descendants are either in their teens or younger. In such cases, indicators like fertility, educational enrolment and labour force participation could not be computed or, at best, could only be derived and used in comparisons of the oldest, but still relatively young, descendants.

Gender is another principal dimension of the research. Whenever meaningful, the indicators have been separately quantified for females and males. Research findings systematically highlight gender differentials. The findings point to gender equalities and gender inequalities. In particular, the results contrast gender inequalities in, say, school enrolment and labour force participation across the population groups, as well as between the groups and the native or total populations. They thus help to draw attention to the disparities between the various groups and natives regarding gender equality. Gender inequality among immigrants and their descendants has also been compared.

The research is descriptive, not explanatory. The reason for this is threefold. First, population change and population compositions are typically analysed in a descriptive manner because these topics do not lend themselves to explanatory analyses. Second, although explanatory studies of integration may be preferred to descriptive ones, the explanatory route has not been open to the researchers collaborating in this project. This would have entailed more time and greater financial resources than the project could have secured. Even if the requisite time and resources had been available, description, which normally precedes explanation, would have been a natural first step. Third, as the research sought to be relevant for policymaking, the descriptive analysis was considered preferable, because such results are usually more accessible to relatively non-specialised audiences, including policymakers.

The analyses make use of both well established and novel indicators. Some of the indicators pertain to flows and others to stocks. Some are of period variety, others of cohort type. The novel indicators were developed for parts of the education system and labour market integration analyses. They were invented to help compress large amounts of information into relatively few statistics. Observations for the various indicators were computed from tables prepared by processing individual-level register data in each of the three countries. Due to occasional data limitations, in rare instances these tables could not fully conform to the standard tables designed early on in the project to ensure high comparability of results. The observations of the indicators formed the empirical basis of the research.

### **Outline of the report**

Following this introduction, this report starts with a description of the Swedish national setting and covers the immigration history since 1945, an overview of the population in Sweden over the last decades, the accompanying migration and integration issues and selected research on these issues. Specifically, the report takes up broad features and trends in the economy and the labour market and how population groups originating in the developing world have fared in these areas. It also sketches national population trends and pays special attention to demographic changes at national level occasioned by the rise of these population groups. Immigration and integration policies pertaining to humanitarian and economic immigration are described and post-war immigration and the rise of foreign-origin groups addressed. Finally, the shift in the composition of immigration and of foreign-origin groups in favour of those having roots in the developing world is considered and illustrated.

In the third chapter, two key aspects of population change within the groups are analysed: change in the population size and the ageing/rejuvenation of the groups. We make comparisons among the groups and also compare them with the native and total populations of the country. Note that comparisons of the groups with the native and total populations are made in the report as and when appropriate, although this is not repeatedly emphasised. The analyses are cognizant of the fact that, during the last decade, the different groups originating in the six developing countries have passed through distinct phases of development that may not be readily comparable. This chapter also considers selected features of immigrants, such as duration of residence and composition of the groups by generation, typically subdivided into immigrants and descendants.

The fourth chapter is about the integration of the groups into the educational system. Here the focus is on the key aspect of integration, i.e. educational enrolment. The analysis allows for disaggregation by *level of education*, i.e. *ISCED-1997* levels suitably aggregated for the purposes of this study. Three levels are distinguished: low, intermediate and high. Comparisons are made across the different population groups. The groups are also compared with the native (total) population. The early design of the research envisaged that another important aspect of educational-system integration would be studied, namely educational attainment. However, this proved impossible due to a lack of data relating to the educational attainment of immigrants and the fact that many of the descendants have not yet completed their education.

In the fifth chapter, integration into the labour market is analysed in broader terms than usual. Firstly, the common indicators relating to employment and unemployment are discussed and analysed. Secondly, attention is paid to employment among young people, youth unemployment and employment by cohort. Economic inactivity, especially among women of certain groups, is also accorded considerable attention. As the analysis discriminates between the sexes, broad age groups of the working-age span and generations, it sheds light on how men and women of different ages (among both immigrants and descendants) cope with these various states. Finally, we look at those who are inactive, i.e. are not working, studying or looking for work.

In Chapter 6 we summarise the key findings and draw conclusions. These pertain, inter alia, to the strengths and limitations of the findings.

## Chapter 2:

# THE NATIONAL SETTING

### **An overview of the history of immigration to Sweden since 1945**

After the Second World War, most of the refugees who had fled to Sweden from other Nordic countries during the war either returned home or left for new destinations. The Swedish population was at that time homogeneously native and ethnically Swedish, with the exception of a couple of small minority groups. However, the immigration wave of the post-war period changed the composition of the Swedish population once and for all. In 2010, about 14 per cent of the total population consisted of immigrants. About one fourth of the immigrant population was of Nordic origin, one third from other European countries and the rest from non-European countries.

Post-war immigration to Sweden occurred in two waves. In the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, labour immigration from the Nordic and other European countries was a response to the demand for labour due to the rapid industrial and economic growth of that time. The organised recruitment of foreign labour and a general liberalisation of immigration policy facilitated migratory moves to Sweden. The lower rate of economic growth and increased unemployment in the early 1970s led to a reduced demand for foreign labour. As a consequence, migration policy became harsher (Castles & Miller 2003). Labour immigration from non-Nordic countries ceased in the 1970s, while the number of labour immigrants from other Nordic countries decreased gradually.

Since the early 1970s, refugees and tied-movers have dominated the migration inflow, coming primarily from Eastern Europe and non-European parts of the world. However, the fact that labour migration dwindled did not mean that immigration to Sweden stopped. On the contrary, other types of migration to Sweden increased. In the 1970s, and more so in the 1980s and 1990s, the proportion of non-European refugees and tied-movers increased. Major contributions to the immigrant population in the 1970s were refugees from Chile, Poland and Turkey. In the 1980s, the major immigrant groups came from Chile, Ethiopia, Iran and other Middle Eastern countries. In the 1990s, immigration from Iraq, former Yugoslavia and other Eastern European countries dominated. A similar pattern has been observed in the past decade, with Iraqis, Iranians, people from former Yugoslavia and Somalis as major immigrant groups.



The above pattern is indicated in Table 2.1 and shows the 10 largest immigrant groups by country of birth for each year from 2000-2009. When ten new member states joined the European Union in 2004 the migration from these countries increased. This applies to Poland in particular. Historical migration patterns in other Nordic countries and in Germany are also still prevalent. Family migration is the main cause for migration from Thailand and guest students come from China. Immigrants from Iraq, Poland Germany and Denmark are groups that have grown substantially in Sweden in the last decade.

Overall migration to Sweden has increased steadily since WWII. Even during the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009, when Sweden's GDP dropped substantially, immigration to Sweden continued to increase and in 2009 over 100,000 individuals obtained residence permits.

Migration statistics for the last decade show that the majority of the inflow to Sweden consists of family reunion migrants (see Table 2.2). Refugees and migrants from the EES area compete for second place and sometimes dominate. As refugee migration was strong in 2006 and 2007, an increase in family reunions can be observed for the years 2008 and 2009. The table also shows an increase over time for guest students. During this decade Sweden was one of the countries that offered free education and, as a result, attracted an increasing number of foreign students.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, a large group of people from the EES/EU migrated to Sweden during this decade. Finally, the table also shows an increase in the number of temporary migrants in the period 2005-2009. The government's relaxation of the rules for temporary migration at the end of 2008 also seems to have had an effect on this type of migration during the crisis year of 2009.

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1 This policy will change in 2011 when foreign students from outside of the ESS-area will be obliged to pay for their education (Prop. 2009/10:65).

**Table 2.1. Number of immigrants per year to Sweden, from the 10 largest countries of birth each year.**

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
<b>Total number of immigrants</b>	<b>58 659</b>	<b>60 795</b>	<b>64 087</b>	<b>63 795</b>	<b>62 028</b>	<b>65 229</b>	<b>95 750</b>	<b>99 485</b>	<b>101 171</b>	<b>102 280</b>
Sweden	13 482	13 797	13 266	12 588	11 467	11 066	12 821	12 340	13 388	13 985
Finland	3 433	3 349	3 262	3 151	2 716	2 793	2 553	2 494	2 390	2 385
Norway	2 893	3 104	3 443	3 168	2 573	2 425	2 477	2 371	2 239	
Denmark	1 918	2 418	2 969	3 226	3 203	3 494	4 365	4 319	3 371	3 010
Germany	1 834	1 806	1 883	1 998	2 010	2 147	3 100	3 745	3 492	2 845
United Kingdom	1 343	1 433	1 449							
Yugoslavia	2 747	2 316	2 140	1 600						
Bosnia-Herzegovina				1 405						
Serbia Montenegro					1 479	1 756	3 228			
Poland						3 525	6 442	7 617	7 091	5 261
Rumania								2 632	2 595	
USA	1 278	1 250	1 245							
Russia	1 087									
Turkey				1 378	2 552					2 213
Iraq	6 681	6 663	7 472	5 425	3 126	3 094	11 146	15 642	13 083	9 543
Iran	1 250	1 444	1 587		1 610	1 365	2 274			2 976
China		1 060		1 434	1 563	1 749		2 485	2 925	3 462
Thailand			1 326	2 075	2 175	2 205	2 571	2 695	3 235	3 165
Somalia							3 008	3 941	4 218	7 021

Source: Statistics Sweden

<b>Table 2.2. Immigration by admission status, 2000-2009.</b>								
	<b>Refugees</b>	<b>Family</b>	<b>Labour</b>	<b>EES/EU</b>	<b>Guest students</b>	<b>Adoption</b>	<b>Temporary Labour Migration</b>	
<b>2000</b>	10 546	22 840	433	7 396	3 073	876	-	
<b>2001</b>	7 941	24 524	441	6 851	3 989	758	-	
<b>2002</b>	8 493	22 346	403	7 968	4 585	869	-	
<b>2003</b>	6 460	24 553	319	9 234	5 509	782	-	
<b>2004</b>	6 140	22 337	209	14 959	6 021	825	-	
<b>2005</b>	8 076	21 908	293	18 071	6 837	805	5 985	
<b>2006</b>	20 663	26 668	349	20 461	7 331	623	6 257	
<b>2007</b>	18 290	28 975	543	19 387	8 920	540	9 859	
<b>2008</b>	11 173	33 184	796	19 398	11 186	503	14 513	
<b>2009</b>	11 119	34 082	81	17 606	13 487	622	21 582	
<b>Total</b>	<b>108 901</b>	<b>261 417</b>	<b>3 8671</b>	<b>141 331</b>	<b>70 938</b>	<b>7 203</b>	<b>58 196</b>	

Source: Migration Board, Sweden.

## Immigrant population

Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show the stock of natives and migrants in Sweden categorised according to descent and country of birth. In 2010, the total population of Sweden was almost 9.5 million individuals. Almost one fifth or, 19.1 per cent of the Swedish population had an immigrant background, either because they were born outside Sweden or both their parents were born outside Sweden (Figure 2.1 and Table 2.3). In Sweden the proportion of descendants from two immigrant parents is 4.4 per cent.


**Table 2.3. The population of Sweden by origin, 2010.**

	Swedish born	Foreign born	Descendants	Total
Individuals	7 617 681	1 384 929	412 960	9 415 570
Percentage of total population	80.9%	14.7%	4.4%	100%

Source: Statistics Sweden

Figure 2.1 shows the development of the immigrant population in Sweden since 1980. Over the 30 year period from 1980 to 2010 the immigrant population almost doubled – from 7.5 per cent to 14.7 per cent of the total population. The proportion of people of foreign descent increased from 2.4 per cent to 4.4 per cent of the total population between 1994 and 2010.

**Figure 2.1. Percentage increase of immigrants and descendants, 1980-2010**



Source: Statistics Sweden

Table 2.4 shows the immigrant population in Sweden by country of origin in 2010.<sup>2</sup> The largest immigrant group originates from Finland with almost 170,000 individuals. The second largest group originates from Iraq with about 120,000 individuals. Other larger groups with over 50,000 individuals are from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Yugoslavia, Iran and Poland. Over 40,000 people from geographically close countries like Denmark, Norway, Germany and Turkey also live in Sweden. All the other listed countries have between 15,000 and 40,000 individuals in Sweden.

**Table 2.4. The immigrant population of Sweden, 2010.**

	Immigrants	Proportion of all Immigrants
Bosnia-Herzegovina	56 183	4.1%
Chile	28 378	2.0%
Denmark	45 548	3.3%
Finland	169 521	12.2%
Iraq	121 761	8.8%
Iran	62 120	4.5%
Yugoslavia	70 819	5.1%
China	23 998	1.7%
Lebanon	24 116	1.7%
Norway	43 430	3.1%
Poland	70 253	5.1%
Rumania	19 741	1.4%
Russia	15 511	1.1%
Somalia	37 846	2.7%
Syria	20 758	1.5%
Thailand	31 378	2.3%
Turkey	42 527	3.1%
Germany	48 158	3.5%
Hungary	15 339	1.1%
USA	17 179	1.2%
Other countries	420 365	30.3%
Total	1 384 929	100%

Source: Statistics Sweden.

### **Migration and integration policy**

As indicated earlier, in the decades following the Second World War, Sweden, untouched by the war, experienced a labour shortage due to a rapid expansion of the economy. The demand for manpower was high and in the 1950s skilled labour from North-Western Europe

<sup>2</sup> Only countries with more than 15,000 individuals are listed.

(mainly the Nordic countries) started to complement the Swedish labour force. In the 1960s the demand for skilled labour shifted as Swedish industry entered a rationalisation phase. While labour immigration continued from other Nordic countries such as Finland, new immigration countries like Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey started to emerge. By the end of the 1960s the labour shortage had begun to decline and the trade unions were critical of the continuing labour migration. In their view labour import had negative side effects, such as a delay in industrial transformation and pressure on wages due to the supply of workers. In 1968 labour migration policy was tightened (with the exception of Nordic migrants) and the stream of labour migration dried up. Nordic labour migration also declined in the early 1970s when living standards in the Nordic countries levelled out and the Swedish economy began to decline due to the oil crisis (Lundh & Ohlsson 1999).

The guest worker system was never a significant part of the Swedish migration system. The possibility of labour migrants being reunited with their families was debated in the 1960s; the idea being that this would help immigrants to settle and feel at home in Sweden. By the end of the 1960s it was much more difficult to come to Sweden to work, although at the same time the possibilities of entering the country as a tied-mover increased. Spouses, children, parents or other dependants could migrate to Sweden if they could prove that they had arranged accommodation. In practice, Swedish family reunion policy has been rather liberal and the policy change had some unintended consequences. In actual fact, the policy that was originally intended to help labour migrants unite with their families mainly benefited refugees when this kind of migration increased (Lundh & Ohlsson 1999).

It is possible for both skilled and unskilled immigrants to come to Sweden as legal labour migrants, although the system has been fairly regulated and is not very flexible. Prior to 2008, an employer who had the intent of hiring a third country national had to report the vacant position to the County Labour Board. A person from a non-Scandinavian or non-EU country could obtain a work permit if the Migration Board, who consulted the National Labour Board and the employee union in question, decided that there was a need for this. The National Labour Board carried out a labour market test to confirm the need for foreign labour. The employer also had to guarantee that the guest worker was paid a proper wage, had accommodation, that he or she was covered by insurance and that other terms of employment were fair and in line with the collective agreement. The National Migration Board and the County Labour Boards had overall respon-

sibility for matching the supply and demand in the labour market and could determine who entered Sweden as a labour migrant (Johnsson 2008). However, the present government changed the rules for labour migration in 2008, with the aim of making the system more flexible; the idea being that it is the employer, not the authorities, who should assess the need for the recruitment of foreign labour since he or she knows which skills are necessary. It is easier to obtain a permanent residence permit if the person is *employed* in Sweden, because a temporary permit can become permanent after four years. The employer still has to guarantee that the rules of the Swedish labour market are followed, though. Citizens of the EU/EES and Switzerland have precedence, although guest students and asylum seekers who were previously rejected can now apply for a work permit from within Sweden (Prop. 2007/08:147).

According to The Migrant Integration Policy Index (2007), Sweden scores highly in terms of granting immigrants access to and rights in the labour market. If you are a migrant and have had a residence permit for one year or more you are eligible to work in most sectors of the economy. If you are a migrant and have been living in Sweden for two years, you have equal access to study grants. Migrants who find work have the right to change their permit and if they lose their job they do not necessarily have to leave the country. All migrants with a residence permit have the right to work, including their family members. It is also the case that family members can apply for a residence permit in their own right after three years. They also have the same rights as their sponsor to education, healthcare and housing. Migrants are eligible for long-term residence permits after five years of legal residence in the country. When the new policies on labour migration were made more flexible in 2008, gender concerns could be brought into the analysis. This was not possible before 2008, since the former labour market regime tended to exclude occupations in which women were traditionally employed (OSCE 2009). The new government also introduced tax reductions for domestic work, thereby legalising certain “moonlighting” jobs. This may also have led to an increase in the demand for female migrant workers, although as yet this has not been investigated.

According to Bevelander (2009), 80 per cent of those who have been granted residence permits in the last few decades are relatives or refugees. Today the largest group of immigrants consists of relatives and refugees, whereas students and labour migrants constitute a minor part. This is due to the fact that a work permit is difficult to obtain for people who were not born in a Nordic country, a Western European

country or a country that is a member of the European Union. If we look at the number of residence permits granted and the residence permits registered in the year 2009, we can see that the biggest groups were different groups of relatives (around 40 per cent). Around ten per cent were different kinds of refugees. Twenty five per cent came to work, while 16 per cent were students (Migrationsverket 2009). It should also be noted that there has been an increase in recent years in the ratio of labour migrants. The fact that relatives and refugees constitute a large part of the immigration to Sweden affects the socio-economic integration of immigrants. Since refugees and relatives come to Sweden for reasons other than work, they are expected to assimilate into the labour market at a slower pace than labour migrants.

In 2004, ten new member states from Eastern Europe joined the EU and were followed in 2007 by Bulgaria and Romania. As these new member states became part of the European Union, some old member states applied to implement transitional rules for these potential migrants. Sweden did not do so and there was some debate about what the consequences of this might be. Some argued that there would be a problem with a crowd of eastern European migrants eager to take advantage of the Swedish welfare system. Wadensjö (2007) studied the effects of the enlargement of the EU on the migration and labour market participation from these countries. The conclusions were that even though it is still too early to tell what the effects of the enlargement might be, some tentative answers are in place. For example, this study shows that migration from these countries increased about four times between the years of 2003 and 2006, especially from Poland and the Baltic states. The employment rates for these migrants are lower than those for Swedes, although the differences are quite small and as yet there are no indications that these migrants are overrepresented in the welfare system.

Today, when it comes to migration and integration policymaking, the most important national actors are the government and the Migration Board. The Ministry of Justice is responsible for the different migration and asylum policy areas, while the Ministry of Employment is responsible for policy areas concerning citizenship, discrimination issues, integration, urban development and national minorities. The Migration Board enforces policies relating to visas, asylum, residence permits, citizenship and return migration. When the Integration Board was closed in 2007, the regional level was strengthened with regard to migration and integration issues. The Integration Board supervised the development of integration issues and when it closed some of these responsibilities were moved to the County Administrative Boards,



which now have operative responsibility when it comes to negotiations with municipalities on the settlement of refugees. It can be said that they are the link between the state and the local level in matters concerning the resettlement and introduction of refugees, since they negotiate and supervise the introduction programme and the labour market attachment of immigrants. Health Care Regions have some responsibilities when it comes to providing health care for asylum seekers and refugees, such as emergency health care for asylum seekers (Bevelander & Rönnqvist 2010).

Sweden's municipalities have been operatively responsible for the introduction of newly arrived migrants since the 1980s and financially compensated for this service by the state. The introduction programmes include language education, information about Swedish society and labour market training. In practice, it means that the municipalities have to arrange introduction programmes for some categories of newly arrived immigrants (migrants with a residence permit or those who are refugees on humanitarian grounds). In general other migrants are not eligible for introduction programmes, although in some municipalities all migrants are welcome. All migrants are entitled to Swedish language courses, however. How the reception and introduction of immigrants is structured varies between the municipalities. In some municipalities the social services are responsible for organising the programmes and in others this is dealt with by a separate unit. Employment agencies disseminate information about the Swedish labour market and cooperate with municipalities in the introduction programmes. How close the municipalities work with the employment agencies and other authorities varies. It can also be said that voluntary organisations play a somewhat limited role in these areas (Emilsson 2008).

However, when the Social Democratic Party lost the election in 2006 and the centre-right parties formed a coalition government, policies changed with regard to the admission and reception of refugees and immigrants. The introduction programmes that were put in place to integrate immigrants into society and the labour market have often been targets for different forms of critique. It has been argued in different reports and evaluations that the programmes lack effective measures that prepare immigrants for entering the labour market and that the cooperation between the different authorities should be improved. The Swedish language education programmes have been criticised for not being efficient enough and that too many people either drop out altogether or achieve poor results (Emilsson 2008).

Measures are also taken to increase the possibility for immigrants to have their skills recognised and to complement different forms of higher education, so that the individual can practice his or her profession in Sweden. Different measures have been introduced during the last ten years that make it possible for migrants to validate their home country education. However, research (Dahlstedt 2009) shows that it is not only formal procedures that are of importance. Employers differentiate between different kinds of education and, if a person is educated in Sweden, he or she is more likely to get a job. Furthermore, when it comes to foreign education, it is easier for a person with vocational skills to gain employment. New measures have also been implemented in order to make it possible for newly arrived immigrants to move to municipalities with better job prospects.

Institutional factors also have an important effect on the labour market integration of immigrants. The rules and regulations relating to the Swedish labour market may induce a stronger insider/outsider situation for immigrants in comparison to, for example, the US labour market. In the US, immigrants tend to end up in lower paid jobs than natives, whereas in Sweden immigrants are overrepresented as non-employed, although when employed there is little difference in their payment scales (Lundh et al 2002; Bengtsson, Lundh & Scott 2005).

There has been an extensive debate about the settlement of refugees in Sweden. This debate is mainly driven by local politicians in cities that receive a disproportionate number of new immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees, such as Malmö, Södertälje and Gothenburg. Today asylum seekers can choose between staying with friends or relatives and, if they lack resources, can obtain some kind of support to cover their costs. The other option is to stay at a refugee centre. This system was regulated in law in 1994 to counteract the negative aspects of the former system of controlling the settlement of asylum seekers; the idea being that a greater freedom of choice would have a more positive effect on the integration of refugees. For example, it was hoped that refugees would become more active, have better job opportunities and would learn about Swedish society through friends and family. The effect of a compulsory dispersal policy for refugees who arrived between 1985 and 1994 and were granted residence permits was also subject to economic analysis. Comparing immigrants arriving before and after the implementation of this policy, Edin *et al.* (2000) suggest that earnings were 25 per cent lower eight years after arrival as a result of the new policy. Idleness also increased by about six per cent for those groups arriving during the reform (from 1985), compared to

immigrants that came in 1982 and 1983. However, some municipalities have questioned asylum seekers' rights to settle due to the amount of pressure that this puts on big cities. They claim that this system leads to increased segregation and overcrowding and makes it difficult for municipalities to plan and provide services. In 2003, the financial support for refugees who settled on their own was reduced in order to relieve the pressure on some big city areas, although this measure did not have any major effects. Research suggests that asylum seekers who choose to live with relatives or friends have a stronger labour market position and are more likely to own their own homes or apartments in the long run (Bevelander, Emilsson & Hagström 2008). Resettled refugees in Sweden are the one immigrant group that does not have the possibility of settling in a municipality of their choosing. If a resettled refugee is accepted, a permanent residence permit is issued before coming to Sweden. Before their arrival in Sweden, accommodation is arranged and the individual is placed in a municipality. According to Hagström (2009), this can help to explain why resettled refugees take longer to enter the labour market. The majority of resettled refugees are placed in municipalities with high unemployment rates and shrinking populations due to the lack of available accommodation in the larger cities.

Qualitative sources suggest that refugees have very different experiences of the labour market and institutions that are responsible for reception and integration. These differences often depend on age and gender, type of education, placement in Sweden, time of arrival, physical and psychological condition, language skills etc. (Frykman 2009; Rönqvist 2009; Wikström 2009). Interviews conducted in the above-mentioned studies show that refugees are grateful for the opportunity of starting a new life in Sweden, although they are also somewhat critical of the tendency for authorities and institutions to make decisions and policies without recognising their perspectives and needs. For example, Frykman found a pronounced critique among her Bosnian respondents of the Public Employment Office that was perceived as not being of much help and of other authorities that often showed paternalistic tendencies.

These studies suggest that the different actors involved in the reception and integration of refugees need to be more sensitive to the people who are at the receiving end – in order to make the measures more efficient and to increase the agency of the individual in the integration process.

In the 1990s the issue of ethnic discrimination entered the political agenda. The main reason for this was the apparent problematic

situation for immigrants in the labour market in the aftermath of Sweden's economic crisis. Measuring the extent of discrimination in Swedish working life is not an easy task, although different studies have tried to address this (see e.g. Höglund 2008; Carlsson & Rooth 2008). These studies claim that it is probable that immigrants and people with dark skins face different kinds of discrimination.

In 1994, Sweden introduced its first law against ethnic discrimination in working life. This law, which was tightened in 1999, compels employers to take active measures against discrimination. This has led to an increased awareness among employers of the importance of the discrimination issue. In 2009 the previous seven laws prohibiting different forms of discrimination were replaced by one law and an Ombudsman was installed. This law aims to combat discrimination and promote equal rights and possibilities regardless of gender, transgender identity, ethnicity, religion or belief, ability, sexual orientation or age. In the mid-1990s the American Diversity Management idea was introduced and diffused in Sweden by consultants and leaders in the private and public sectors. While the anti-discrimination paradigm focused on human rights and the negative consequences of unequal treatment for individuals and society, the diversity movement tried to convince working life organisations that there could be potential benefits in taking a more proactive approach to the demographic changes occurring in society. From this perspective, it can be argued that if organisations adapt their processes and structures to the new circumstances, and to the needs of different categories of co-workers, they will be rewarded. The attention that has been directed towards discrimination issues and the diversity perspective has contributed to the development of new ideas and new personnel policies in organisations. Although there is some evidence that the market- and utility-driven diversity perspective has been seriously challenged in the Swedish context, it does seem to have contributed by stimulating discussions about how market adjustment and service are changed as society changes demographically. The new legislation and demands for active measures against discrimination have put some pressure on organisations to reassess their personnel policies and their recruitment processes. Now it is common for organisations, especially in the public sector, to have policies and plans that cover diversity and integration and how these issues can be promoted. What effects these policy changes will have remains to be seen. So far the evidence suggests that awareness grows slowly and in an incremental way (Rönneqvist 2008).

According to The Migrant Integration Policy Index (2007), Sweden does well when it comes to policymaking in the anti-discrimination

area. Swedish law covers a wide range of areas (work, training, education and use of public goods and services) and is applicable in both the private and public sectors. However, MIPEX also concludes that the enforcement of the law could be more efficient. An employer who does not meet the required legal standards can in fact be obliged to compensate the discriminated victim. However, the levels of compensation are probably not sufficient to encourage organisations to proactively eliminate discrimination altogether. There is some evidence that leaders of working life organisations generally consider discrimination issues to be of minor importance (see for example Fackförbundet ST 2006). Furthermore, the legislation does not really combat more indirect forms of work life discrimination, such as network recruitment (Höglund 2008).

## Chapter 3:


# DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE

This chapter has two sections. The first looks at two key aspects of population dynamics – changes in population size and to the immigrant groups originating in the six developing countries covered in this report. Standard demographic indicators are used to analyse population changes. The second section deals with the composition of the immigrant groups in terms of selected traits, such as duration of residence and composition by generation.

### Population dynamics

We begin our analysis of the demographic integration of immigrants and descendants by showing the population development between 1998 and 2008 in Sweden. Figure 3.1 illustrates this for the six groups. Firstly, the chart shows that all the groups have grown to some degree over this decade; some more and some less. In particular, the immigrant groups originating in Iraq, Somalia and Pakistan increased during this period. In Table 3.1 we show the extent to which this growth is due to immigration or natural growth, i.e. a growth in the number of descendants.

**Figure 3.1. Population development of immigrants and descendants in Sweden, by country of origin, 1998-2008.**



Source: Statistics Sweden

In Table 3.1 we can see that that all the immigrant groups increased as a result of immigration and an increased number of descendants. A closer look at the table shows that Iraqis, Pakistanis and Somalis have either doubled, or, in the case of the Iraqis, trebled in this ten year period. However, when looking at the percentage growth for both immigrants and descendants, the Pakistani group shows a larger immigration growth, whereas the Iraqi and Somali groups have a higher growth rate among the descendants. The latter tendency also applies to the somewhat more established groups from Iran, Turkey and Vietnam, which in general have lower population growth rates and where the descendants have a higher growth rate than immigrants. Finally, the table shows basically no growth for people of Swedish origin. The growth of 4.5 per cent for the total population in Sweden is due to immigration and descendants of non-Swedish origin.

**Table 3.1. Percentage growth and population numbers for immigrants and descendants, 1998-2008, by country of origin.**

	Immigrants	Descendants	Total	1998	2008
Iran	14.6	66.8	22.2	58 793	71 864
Iraq	188.7	268.9	201.8	45 291	136 677
Pakistan	170.1	68.2	135.0	4 345	10 209
Somalia	101.2	120.5	106.3	17 028	35 129
Turkey	26.6	38.5	31.1	49 968	65 517
Vietnam	33.1	68.1	42.1	13 684	19 442
Swedish origin	-	-	-0.3	7 618 755	7 595 421
<b>Total</b>	-	-	<b>4.5</b>	<b>8 854 288</b>	<b>9 256 345</b>

Source: Statistics Sweden

Table 3.2 shows the immigrant population after duration of residence in the year 2008. As earlier established in Table 3.1, the Iraqi, Pakistani and Somali groups have grown strongly during the last decade and, given this fact, large numbers have been in the country for only a relatively short period. Table 3.2 shows that in 2008 more than 60 per cent of the immigrants from Iraq, Pakistan and Somalia had been in Sweden for less than 10 years. For the other groups the proportion is about 25-30 per cent, with the majority having been in Sweden for 15 years or more.

**Table 3.2. Population proportions after duration of residence, by country of birth, 2008.**

	0-4	5-9	10-14	15-19	20+
<b>Immigrants</b>					
Iran	13	9	9	29	41
Iraq	41	27	16	11	5
Pakistan	58	10	5	6	21
Somalia	50	13	18	17	2
Turkey	17	10	10	15	48
Vietnam	16	13	11	28	32

Source: Statistics Sweden

Table 3.3 shows the number of births, the crude birth rate and the standardised birth rate for immigrants, Swedes and the total population. The table shows that, with the exception of Iran, all the immigrant groups have higher birth rates than natives or the total population. The crude birth rates for Iranian women is slightly higher than that for Swedish-born women, but lower when we standardise for age (see SCBR). In fact, when standardising the crude birth rate almost all the groups show lower birth rates. Besides Iran, Vietnam has an SCBR in parity with the total population in the period 2004-2008. Iraqi, Pakistani and Somali women have crude birth rates and standardised crude birth rates that are two or three times greater than those of the total population.

**Table 3.3. Number of births, crude birth rate and standardised crude birth rate among immigrants by five-year periods and country of origin.**

	Births		CBR		SCBR	
	1999-2003	2004-2008	1999-2003	2004-2008	1999-2003	2004-2008
<b>Immigrants</b>						
Iran	3 506	3 388	11.4	10.0	8.4	7.6
Iraq	8 053	12 866	25.3	25.0	19.9	20.0
Pakistan	472	809	19.2	21.7	16.2	20.6
Somalia	3 653	4 721	37.5	35.6	26.6	25.7
Turkey	3 718	4 136	14.0	13.6	12.8	14.1
Vietnam	1 367	1 354	18.0	15.1	12.1	11.2
Swedish origin	366 787	399 029	9.7	10.5	9.6	11.0
<b>Total population</b>	<b>467 337</b>	<b>527 804</b>	<b>10.5</b>	<b>11.6</b>	<b>9.9</b>	<b>11.4</b>

Source: Statistics Sweden



Both the composition and dynamics of a population group are also affected by *death*. Table 3.4 shows the number of deaths and the crude death rate between 1998 and 2008 for immigrants, natives and the total population. The table shows much lower crude death rates for all the immigrant groups compared to natives and the total population. The crude death rate for the total population is consequently lower than that for the Swedish-born population. Both are indicators of the fact that relatively few immigrants have reached age cohorts associated with death compared to the Swedish born population.<sup>3</sup>

**Table 3.4. Number of deaths and crude death rate of immigrants by five-year periods and country of origin.**

	Deaths		CDR	
	1999-2003	2004-2008	1999-2003	2004-2008
<b>Immigrants</b>				
Iran	502	711	1.6	2.1
Iraq	358	678	1.1	1.3
Pakistan	45	53	1.8	1.4
Somalia	78	139	0.8	1.0
Turkey	695	784	2.6	2.6
Vietnam	102	132	1.3	1.5
Swedish origin	430 250	411 450	13.3	10.8
<b>Total population</b>	<b>468 247</b>	<b>455 013</b>	<b>10.5</b>	<b>10.0</b>
Source: Statistics Sweden				

Table 3.5 shows the *natural change* of the population by immigrant group, Swedish origin and total population. Since natural change is based on births minus deaths, we see that all immigrant groups grow in size, whereas the number of people of Swedish origin diminishes during this period. The growth of the population is due to the growth of the immigrant population.

3 Low mortality rates in the immigrant populations can also be due to the problem of registering out-migration from Sweden without notifying the authorities.

**Table 3.5. Natural change and the crude rate of natural change of immigrants by five-year periods and country of origin.**

	Natural Change		CRNR	
	1999-2003	2004-2008	1999-2003	2004-2008
<b>Immigrants</b>				
Iran	3004	2677	9.8	7.9
Iraq	7695	12188	24.2	23.7
Pakistan	427	756	17.4	20.3
Somalia	3575	4582	36.7	34.6
Turkey	3023	3352	11.4	11.0
Vietnam	1265	1222	16.7	13.6
Swedish origin	-63 463	-12 421	-1.7	-0.3
<b>Total population</b>	<b>-910</b>	<b>72 791</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>1.6</b>

Source: Statistics Sweden

The growth of the population of Sweden can also be due to immigration being greater than emigration. Table 3.6 shows the immigration in numbers, the *crude immigration rate* and the standardised immigration rate. As shown in the tables at the beginning of this chapter, the crude immigration rate and its standardised variant show that all groups have grown during the last decade: Iraqi, Pakistani and Somali immigrants very much so and Iranian, Turkish and Vietnamese groups to a lesser extent. Controlling for age and sex lowers the crude immigration rate for all groups, except for the total population and Swedes.

**Table 3.6. Immigration, crude immigration rate and standardised immigration rate by five-year periods and country of origin.**

	Immigrants		CIR		SCIR	
	1999-2003	2004-2008	1999-2003	2004-2008	1999-2003	2004-2008
<b>Immigrants</b>						
Iran	6860	9388	22.3	27.6	19.6	23.3
Iraq	31966	46668	100.4	90.6	96.3	81.7
Pakistan	1309	5239	53.3	140.5	42.2	76.4
Somalia	4176	14037	42.9	105.9	49.1	96.7
Turkey	5023	7917	19.0	26.0	14.4	18.4
Vietnam	2054	2410	27.0	26.8	19.7	21.0
Swedish origin	56530	50197	1.5	1.3	1.5	1.4
<b>Total population</b>	<b>289780</b>	<b>414629</b>	<b>6.5</b>	<b>9.1</b>	<b>6.4</b>	<b>9.1</b>

Source: Statistics Sweden

Emigration from Sweden during the period is shown in Table 3.7. The increase in emigration in the second part of the period is particularly noteworthy. All groups including Swedes have a higher out-migration between the years 2004-2008 compared to 1999-2003.

**Table 3.7. Emigration, crude emigration rate and standardised emigration rates by five-year periods and country of origin.**

	Emigrants		CER		SCER	
	1999-2003	2004-2008	1999-2003	2004-2008	1999-2003	2004-2008
<b>Immigrants</b>						
Iran	3576	4537	11.6	13.3	11.5	12.9
Iraq	1722	4356	5.4	8.5	5.4	7.7
Pakistan	424	1295	17.3	34.7	17.3	27.4
Somalia	2484	4841	25.5	36.5	23.7	32.4
Turkey	1426	2276	5.4	7.5	5.8	7.1
Vietnam	361	573	4.8	6.4	4.4	5.8
Swedish origin	70269	75000	1.9	2.0	-	-
<b>Total population</b>	<b>161082</b>	<b>199435</b>	<b>3.6</b>	<b>4.4</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>

Source: Statistics Sweden

The net migration, immigration minus emigration, affects population change. Table 3.8 shows that the net migration for all the immigrant groups is positive but is negative for natives, which means that immigrants constitute a larger proportion of the population by percentage. In other words, population increase in this period is partly due to the net migration of immigrant groups.

**Table 3.8. Net migration, crude rate of change and standardised crude rate of change due to migration by five-year periods and country of origin.**

	Net migration	CRC		SCMR		
		2004-1999-2003	1999-2003	2004-2008	1999-2003	2004-2008
<b>Immigrants</b>						
Iran	3284	4351	10.7	14.2	8.1	10.4
Iraq	30244	42312	95.0	82.2	91.0	74.0
Pakistan	885	3944	36.1	105.8	24.9	49.0
Somalia	1692	9196	17.4	69.4	25.4	64.3
Turkey	3606	5641	13.6	18.5	8.6	11.2
Vietnam	1693	1837	22.3	20.5	15.3	15.1
Swedish origin	-13739	-24803	-0.4	-0.7	1.5	1.4
<b>Total population</b>	128698	215194	2.9	4.7	6.4	9.1

Source: Statistics Sweden

Table 3.9 depicts the composition of the immigrant groups by sex, age and generation. The ‘total’ column shows that about 60 to 80 per cent of the groups consist of immigrants. The “younger” the immigrant group, the fewer descendants in its total population. The table also shows that descendants are still largely in the 0-15 age group and that no descendants have yet reached the retirement age of 65. It is clear that of the groups shown in the table, the Turkish group has the longest migration history in Sweden. This group shows the highest *proportion of descendants* in the age groups 0-15 and 16-64.

**Table 3.9. The composition of the group and its age-sex sub-groups by generation and year, 2008.**

Age groups		Total	0-15	16-64	65+
<b>Iran</b>					
Female	Immigrants	79.7	11.4	92.4	100.0
	Descendants	20.3	88.6	7.6	0.0
Male	Immigrants	80.8	11.5	93.1	100.0
	Descendants	19.2	88.5	6.9	0.0
Total	Immigrants	80.2	11.4	92.8	100.0
	Descendants	19.8	88.6	7.2	0.0
<b>Iraq</b>					
Female	Immigrants	78.6	40.3	97.7	100.0
	Descendants	21.4	59.7	2.3	0.0
Male	Immigrants	80.1	41.7	98.0	100.0
	Descendants	19.9	58.3	2.0	0.0
Total	Immigrants	80.1	41.0	97.8	100.0
	Descendants	19.9	59.0	2.2	0.0
<b>Pakistan</b>					
Female	Immigrants	66.3	23.5	82.7	100.0
	Descendants	33.7	76.5	17.3	0.0
Male	Immigrants	80.2	22.5	90.7	100.0
	Descendants	19.8	77.5	9.3	0.0
Total	Immigrants	75.3	23.0	88.2	100.0
	Descendants	24.7	77.0	11.8	0.0
<b>Somalia</b>					
Female	Immigrants	72.2	32.6	97.7	100.0
	Descendants	27.8	67.4	2.3	0.0
Male	Immigrants	71.1	32.4	97.6	100.0
	Descendants	28.9	67.6	2.4	0.0
Total	Immigrants	71.6	32.5	97.6	100.0
	Descendants	28.4	67.5	2.4	0.0

<b>Turkey</b>					
Female	Immigrants	58.6	7.9	70.6	100.0
	Descendants	41.4	92.1	29.4	0.0
Male	Immigrants	61.0	8.0	73.0	99.9
	Descendants	39.0	92.0	27.0	0.1
Total	Immigrants	59.9	8.0	71.9	100.0
	Descendants	40.1	92.0	28.1	0.0
<b>Vietnam</b>					
Female	Immigrants	71.6	30.8	88.0	100.0
	Descendants	28.4	69.2	12.0	0.0
Male	Immigrants	67.2	8.0	85.5	100.0
	Descendants	32.8	92.0	14.5	0.0
Total	Immigrants	69.5	8.0	86.8	100.0
	Descendants	30.5	92.0	13.2	0.0

Source: Statistics Sweden

### **Composition of immigrant groups by selected traits**

In the following section we analyse the composition of the immigrant groups by means of a number of selected traits. The first is the average duration of residence for both females and males in the years 1998, 2003 and 2008. We also show the changes that have taken place over the period 1998-2008. This measure shows the differences between the immigrant groups and indicates whether an immigrant group grows “older”, i.e. has a longer duration of residence over time.

Also, as observed earlier, immigrants from Iran, Turkey and Vietnam show more change over time and have a longer average duration of residence in Sweden than the other three groups. The Pakistani group in particular seems to have become “younger” over time due to a new wave of migration.

**Table 3.10. Average duration of residence of immigrants by age group, sex, year and country of birth**

	1998	2003	2008	change
<b>Immigrants</b>				
<b>Iran</b>				
Female	9.4	12.9	15.7	6.3
Male	10.7	14.7	17.7	7.0
Total	10.1	13.8	16.8	6.6
<b>Iraq</b>				
Female	5.4	6.5	7.9	2.5
Male	6.6	7.6	8.4	1.8
Total	6.1	7.1	8.2	2.1
<b>Pakistan</b>				
Female	12.4	14.0	12.5	0.1
Male	14.5	14.3	8.7	-5.8
Total	13.6	14.2	9.9	-3.7
<b>Somalia</b>				
Female	5.0	7.8	7.5	4.8
Male	5.6	8.8	8.2	2.7
Total	5.3	8.3	8.2	2.7
<b>Turkey</b>				
Female	14.6	17.6	19.6	5.0
Male	15.4	18.0	19.1	3.7
Total	15.0	17.8	19.3	4.3
<b>Vietnam</b>				
Female	10.1	12.8	15.2	5.1
Male	11.0	14.2	16.8	5.7
Total	10.6	13.4	15.9	5.4

Source: Statistics Sweden

Table 3.11 shows the marriage rate for immigrants, or rather the extent to which individuals are married to or live with a *registered partner*. As an indication of integration, the table shows the *proportion* of those who are married to people from their own groups, to native Swedes, or to people born in a country other than Sweden or their own country. Again, our aim is to find out if there are gender and/or generational differences.

The marriage rate for immigrants is substantially higher than that for descendants, since this population is much younger. In general, more individuals in the older age groups are married.

The table shows that descendants marry Swedish-born individuals or individuals from other immigrant countries to a greater degree. Gender differences can also be observed. With the exception of Vietnam, immigrant and descendent males marry Swedes to a greater extent than females. With the exception of Pakistan and males from Turkey, descendants also marry individuals from other countries to a larger extent than immigrants.

**Table 3.11. Proportion of persons with a partner by country of birth, background of the partner, sex, generation in 2008.**

<b>Nationality of the partner</b>		Own	Swedes	Other	Marriage rate
<b>Iran</b>					
Female	Immigrants	85.0	8.8	6.3	49.7
	Descendants	50.0	37.9	12.1	2.7
Male	Immigrants	78.8	9.9	11.3	46.1
	Descendants	44.0	44.0	12.0	1.1
Total	Immigrants	81.8	9.3	8.9	47.8
	Descendants	48.2	39.8	12.0	7.8
<b>Iraq</b>					
Female	Immigrants	94.5	1.1	4.4	63.8
	Descendants	47.2	15.1	37.7	4.9
Male	Immigrants	88.8	2.0	9.2	55.4
	Descendants	35.0	55.0	10.0	2.1
Total	Immigrants	91.5	1.6	6.9	59.1
	Descendants	43.8	26.0	30.1	3.4
<b>Pakistan</b>					
Female	Immigrants	71.8	7.1	21.1	76.1
	Descendants	63.2	17.6	19.1	18.1
Male	Immigrants	64.9	13.0	21.1	42.6
	Descendants	67.3	20.0	12.7	10.2
Total	Immigrants	68.1	10.2	21.6	52.7
	Descendants	65.0	18.7	16.3	13.5



<b>Somalia</b>					
Female	Immigrants	90.9	1.8	7.3	55.9
	Descendants	-	-	-	2.0
Male	Immigrants	92.2	0.9	6.9	53.7
	Descendants	-	-	-	0.5
Total	Immigrants	91.6	1.3	7.1	54.8
	Descendants	-	-	-	1.2
<b>Turkey</b>					
Female	Immigrants	82.3	8.8	9.0	67.0
	Descendants	53.1	32.5	14.5	28.7
Male	Immigrants	69.5	17.0	13.4	67.5
	Descendants	43.2	45.6	11.2	17.9
Total	Immigrants	75.4	13.3	11.4	67.3
	Descendants	49.1	37.8	13.1	23.1
<b>Vietnam</b>					
Female	Immigrants	73.4	14.7	12.0	47.1
	Descendants	13.8	41.4	44.8	3.7
Male	Immigrants	85.4	2.2	12.4	48.1
	Descendants	18.2	18.2	63.6	1.3
Total	Immigrants	79.0	8.9	12.2	47.5
	Descendants	15.0	35.0	50.0	2.5

Source: Statistics Sweden

Table 3.12 shows the total fertility rate for immigrants, native Swedes and the total population as well as for the descendants of immigrants. Women from Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Turkey and Vietnam have fertility rates between 2.0 to 4.3, which is substantial higher compared to Swedish- and Iranian-born women, with fertility rates of 1.5 and 1.4 respectively. The calculated TFR rates at specific age intervals, which are useful for studying the fertility rates of descendants - most of whom are young - and for comparing their fertility to that of immigrants and others, show a reduction in levels for all age groups. Comparing the first half of the decade with the second shows decreasing TFR's for Iranian, Somali and Vietnamese women. Increasing rates are observed for Iraqi, Pakistani and Turkish women.

When the number of observations allows us to calculate TFR's, descendants show lower total fertility rates that are more in line with the TFR levels of Swedish women.

**Table 3.12. Total fertility rate at the ages of 39, 29 and 24 for immigrants and descendants by five-year interval.**

	1999-2003				2004-2008			
	TFR	TFR	TFR		TFR	TFR	TFR	
	TFR	39	29	24	TFR	39	29	24
<b>Iran</b>								
Immigrants	1.4	1.3	0.6	0.2	1.4	1.3	0.5	0.1
Descendants	-	1.5	0.3	0.1	-	1.9	0.3	0.0
<b>Iraq</b>								
Immigrants	3.2	3.0	1.8	0.8	3.2	3.0	1.7	0.8
Descendants	-	-	0.9	0.2	-	-	0.7	0.1
<b>Pakistan</b>								
Immigrants	2.8	2.7	1.7	0.8	3.7	3.6	2.3	1.2
Descendants	-	-	0.5	0.1	-	-	0.6	0.2
<b>Somalia</b>								
Immigrants	4.3	3.8	2.0	0.8	4.1	3.6	1.8	0.8
Descendants	-	-	-	0.0	-	-	0.9	0.1
<b>Turkey</b>								
Immigrants	2.3	2.2	1.4	0.7	2.6	2.5	1.6	0.8
Descendants	-	2.1	1.0	0.4	-	1.9	0.9	0.3
<b>Vietnam</b>								
Immigrants	2.1	2.0	1.2	0.5	2.0	1.9	1.1	0.4
Descendants	-	-	0.0	0.0	-	-	0.3	0.0
<b>Swedish origin</b>								
	1.5	1.5	0.7	0.2	1.8	1.7	0.7	0.2
<b>Total population</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>0.7</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>1.8</b>	<b>1.8</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>0.2</b>

Source: Statistics Sweden

## **Summary**

With regard to demographic integration, the most important results in the period 1998-2008 are that all six immigrant groups from Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Turkey and Vietnam have grown. In particular the Iraqi and Somali groups have experienced a considerable increase in numbers. The growth for Iran, Iraq, Somalia and Vietnam is due to both net migration and an increased number of descendants. For Pakistan, the main explanation for the increase is net migration. On the whole, population growth in Sweden in this period is mainly due to net migration and growth due to higher birth rates among immigrants and, to a somewhat lower degree, their descendants. In general, “older” immigrant groups, i.e. those that have been in Sweden for a longer period of time, have more descendants than “younger” groups. Iran, Turkey and Vietnam can be depicted as “older” groups and Iraq, Pakistan and Somalia as “younger” ones.

With the exception of Iran, all the immigrant groups show a higher crude birth rate than natives. The age structure of the immigrant groups indicates a younger population compared to the native population. They all have a far lower crude death rate than the native population too. In general, immigrants are married to individuals from the same group, whereas their descendants show a greater tendency to have partners who are either natives or from other immigrant groups. The total fertility rate is higher among most immigrant groups compared to natives. Again, Iranian women are the exception. Descendants show a lower fertility rate than their immigrant parents.

## Chapter 4:

# ENROLMENT IN THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

In this chapter we describe the educational enrolment of immigrants and descendants from the six immigrant countries covered in the study and compare it with the enrolment of the total population. We begin by examining the general enrolment in education. After that, enrolment in tertiary education is scrutinised. The focus is on the status of enrolment in the school year 2007/2008, progress over the school years 1997/1998, 2002/2003 and 2007/2008 and on the gender differences within the groups.

### **Enrolment in the Swedish educational system in general**

Table 4.1 shows the overall educational *enrolment rates* in the school year 2007/2008 for male and female immigrants and their descendants in the age groups 16-19, 20-24 and 25-29 from the six countries in focus and for the total population. The table shows that among the individuals in the youngest age group, 16-19 years, immigrant men have a somewhat higher enrolment rate than immigrant women. However, the children of these immigrants show the opposite picture, and in this age group females generally have a higher enrolment than males. Vietnamese male descendants in the age group 16-19 have the highest enrolment rate of 91.6. Turkish descendants in the age group 25-29 have the lowest enrolment rate of 9.6.

In general, the enrolment rates become lower as people get older. The most obvious reason for this is that individuals start work after completing their studies. However, in the 25-29 age group we can observe a high enrolment rate for Pakistani men.

Comparisons across countries and age groups show that immigrants from Turkey and Somalia have the lowest enrolment rates. Compared to the enrolment rates for the total population, Iraqi and Iranian immigrants, Pakistani males and Vietnamese women have similar or higher enrolment levels in the age group 16-19. In the age group 20-24, Iranian and Iraqi female immigrants and Iranian, Vietnamese and Pakistani male immigrants have higher enrolment rates than the total population. All the descendant groups have higher enrolment rates than the total population in the age group 20-24.

**Table 4.1. Proportion of immigrants and descendants enrolled in education in the age groups 16-19, 20-24 and 25-29, by sex and country of origin. School year 2007/2008.**

	16-19		20-24		25-29	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
<b>Immigrants</b>						
Iran	80.1	83.8	59.6	49.2	38.0	35.8
Iraq	83.3	83.9	42.2	30.9	25.4	17.6
Pakistan	78.3	84.1	20.6	67.1	23.5	54.8
Somalia	73.7	75.8	25.9	33.7	16.9	22.1
Turkey	68.5	74.0	29.9	22.7	22.4	11.9
Vietnam	88.3	66.1	31.6	35.9	22.1	14.9
<b>Descendants</b>						
Iran	88.6	87.8	71.5	56.1	29.9	29.6
Iraq	89.9	87.2	61.5	43.3	-	-
Pakistan	91.2	84.1	64.7	55.7	23.8	22.4
Somalia	88.8	85.6	73.1	45.8	-	-
Turkey	86.3	82.9	43.1	29.6	14.0	9.6
Vietnam	91.4	91.6	61.3	51.6	22.0	26.1
Swedish origin	80.8	80.1	41.1	28.5	22.6	15.9
<b>Total population</b>	<b>80.9</b>	<b>80.3</b>	<b>41.2</b>	<b>29.6</b>	<b>23.0</b>	<b>16.7</b>

Source: Statistics Sweden

Table 4.1 shows a detailed picture of the educational enrolment in 2008. The changes that have taken place over the last decade are addressed in Table 4.2, which shows the enrolment growth from school year 1997/1998 to 2007/2008 in percentage points. The general tendency is that in the age groups 16-19 and 20-24, immigrants and their descendants have a higher rate of enrolment than the total population or natives. This is partly due to a lower initial enrolment rate for these groups. In the age groups 20-24 and 25-29, the negative growth for Somali men, and to a lesser extent for Somali women could be due to the large numbers of Somalis migrating to Sweden in the last decade. Their difficulties in gaining employment and joining the educational system could explain the lower enrolment rate over time.

As in Table 4.1, high enrolment rates and growth are visible for Pakistani male immigrants. This immigrant group has grown during the last decade. To some degree this can be explained by changes in the family reunion rules in Denmark, which have especially affected younger immigrants' possibilities of marrying and living in Denmark

or moving to Sweden instead. An increase in the number of international students from Pakistan in the last decade could be another explanation. The relatively high growth rates among descendants in the age group 20-24 indicate a growth in the number taking up post-secondary studies.

**Table 4.2. Growth in the total enrolment rate of - immigrants and descendants in the age groups 16-19, 20-24 and 25-29, by sex and country of origin. School years 1997/1998 to 2007/2008. Percentage points.**

	16-19		20-24		25-29	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
<b>Immigrants</b>						
Iran	-4.2	-0.4	5.1	-3.1	-4.1	-0.3
Iraq	13.1	9.3	8.8	-8.6	2.3	-4.7
Pakistan	10.8	2.6	-2.8	38.9	-0.4	35.7
Somalia	9.2	4.8	-6.6	-20.4	-4.1	-20.3
Turkey	-2.6	4.0	2.3	1.7	0.4	1.8
Vietnam	12.6	6.5	-3.9	0.6	-0.3	-3.2
<b>Descendants</b>						
Iran	-1.5	9.7	16.9	2.3	-	-
Iraq	1.7	3.4	23.1	6.5	-	-
Pakistan	3.9	-9.5	-0.2	-9.8	-	-
Turkey	6.6	8.7	16.4	3.3	-4.4	-5.4
Swedish origin	-0.1	<b>1.4</b>	<b>-2.3</b>	<b>-4.3</b>	<b>-1.9</b>	<b>-1.5</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>1.8</b>	<b>-1.5</b>	<b>-3.6</b>	<b>-1.8</b>	<b>-1.0</b>

Source: Statistics Sweden

Table 4.3 shows the gender differences in educational enrolment. This is achieved by calculating the ratios of the enrolment rates women to men for the school years 1997/1998, 2002/2003 and 2007/2008. The table shows that, in general, descendants have ratios above 1.00. This indicates that female descendants have a higher enrolment rate than male descendants. The table also shows that this higher enrolment rate for women is less pronounced among immigrants.

Patterns over time are clear for descendants and natives – with increasing enrolment rates for women in the age groups 20-24 and 25-29. This also indicates that women born in Sweden to immigrant parents, like native Swedish women, have a higher enrolment in post-secondary education than their male counterparts.

No clear pattern is visible for immigrants, though. Some groups, such as Turkish, Iranian, Vietnamese and Iraqi immigrants, show increasing ratios over time. This either means that the enrolment of women has grown or that of men has diminished. The ratio for Somali and Pakistani immigrants decreases over time.

**Table 4.3. The ratio of the total enrolment rate of women to men immigrants and descendants in the age ranges 16-19, 20-24 and 25-29, by country of origin. School years 1997/1998, 2002/2003 and 2007/2008.**

	16-19			20-24			25-29		
	1998	2003	2008	1998	2003	2008	1998	2003	2008
<b>Immigrants</b>									
Iran	1.00	1.00	0.95	1.04	1.12	1.20	1.17	1.28	1.06
Iraq	0.94	1.05	0.99	0.85	1.08	1.36	1.04	1.21	1.44
Pakistan	0.83	0.91	0.93	0.83	0.56	0.30	1.25	0.61	0.42
Somalia	0.91	1.00	0.97	0.60	0.84	0.77	0.50	1.11	0.77
Turkey	1.01	1.03	0.92	1.30	1.54	1.31	2.17	1.70	1.88
Vietnam	0.96	0.95	1.04	1.00	0.93	0.88	1.23	1.27	1.48
<b>Descendants</b>									
Iran	1.15	1.01	1.00	1.01	1.01	1.27	-	-	1.01
Iraq	1.05	1.06	1.03	1.04	1.32	1.42	-	-	1.34
Pakistan	0.93	1.01	1.08	1.01	1.05	1.16	-	0.94	1.06
Turkey	1.07	1.05	1.04	1.01	1.29	1.45	1.21	1.38	1.44
Swedish origin	1.03	1.01	1.00	1.32	1.32	1.44	1.41	1.29	1.42
<b>Total</b>	<b>1.02</b>	<b>1.01</b>	<b>1.01</b>	<b>1.28</b>	<b>1.29</b>	<b>1.39</b>	<b>1.40</b>	<b>1.29</b>	<b>1.37</b>

Source: Statistics Sweden

Note: Ratios are calculated as the enrolment rate of women divided by the enrolment rate of men. The closer the ratio is to 1, the more equal the enrolment rates of women and men. A ratio of more than 1 means that the women's enrolment rate is higher than that of the men's.

### Enrolment in tertiary education

Table 4.4 depicts the enrolment in tertiary education for the age groups 20-24 and 25-29. The table indicates a gender gap that was already visible in the earlier tables. Women in the age group 20-24 have a ten percentage point higher enrolment in tertiary education. The gap diminishes to four percentage points in the age group 25-29.

Both men and women born in Sweden to immigrant parents have higher enrolment rates than native men and women in the age group 20-24.

Among immigrant women, only those from Iran have higher enrolment levels than native women. Immigrant men from Iran, Pakistan and Vietnam have higher enrolment levels than natives. Immigrant men from Pakistan, Somalia and Vietnam have higher enrolment levels in tertiary education than their female counterparts. Among descendants the opposite relationship is visible – women have higher enrolment rates in tertiary education than men, which is in line with what is observed for natives and the total population.

**Table 4.4. Proportion of immigrants and descendants enrolled in tertiary education in the 20-24 and 25-29 age groups, by sex and country of origin. School year 2007/2008.**

	20-24		25-29	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
<b>Immigrants</b>				
Iran	41.9	34.4	25.7	27.5
Iraq	16.5	13.1	6.4	5.7
Pakistan	13.4	63.0	12.9	53.7
Somalia	7.9	9.2	2.9	3.8
Turkey	16.1	15.4	7.7	7.0
Vietnam	18.4	25.8	10.4	10.4
<b>Descendants</b>				
Iran	56.2	44.3	28.5	25.2
Iraq	44.1	30.2	11.7	11.9
Pakistan	52.9	42.8	20.2	20.4
Somalia	42.3	37.5	-	-
Turkey	32.9	21.9	9.6	6.7
Vietnam	55.1	43.4	20.2	17.4
Swedish origin	31.1	21.8	18.2	12.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>30.2</b>	<b>21.8</b>	<b>16.9</b>	<b>12.9</b>

Source: Statistics Sweden

Table 4.5 shows the growth in enrolment between 1997/1998 and 2007/2008. In the age group 20-24 all the groups (immigrants and descendants, males and females) have a higher growth rate than the total population and natives.

The growth rate is especially high for Pakistani immigrant males in the age groups 20-24 and 25-29. While the growth rate for natives is relatively low, the growth rates for descendants are particularly high and indicate an increase in the post-secondary enrolment of



immigrants and descendants in Sweden over time. The increase is less prominent in the age group 25-29 than in the age group 20-24.

**Table 4.5. Growth in the proportion of immigrants and descendants enrolled in tertiary education in the age groups 20-24 and 25-29, by sex and country of origin. School years 1997/1998 to 2007/2008. Percentages points.**

	20-24		25-29	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
<b>Immigrants</b>				
Iran	15.7	8.0	8.2	6.6
Iraq	11.0	3.5	3.3	1.3
Pakistan	6.3	50.3	5.5	46.9
Somalia	6.1	6.9	1.8	-1.8
Turkey	9.5	8.7	4.8	3.9
Vietnam	6.2	10.8	7.7	4.9
<b>Descendants</b>				
Iran	22.9	9.7	-	-
Iraq	36.4	14.5	-	-
Pakistan	15.4	11.8	-	-
Turkey	19.6	10.5	7.7	0.6
Swedish origin	2.5	-1.0	5.0	1.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>3.4</b>	<b>0.1</b>	<b>4.4</b>	<b>1.8</b>

Source: Statistics Sweden

Table 4.6 shows the gender balance in tertiary enrolment rates by calculating the ratios of the enrolment rates for women and men in the school years 1997/1998, 2002/2003 and 2007/2008.

The development in the total population shows a gender imbalance. Females in the population have a higher enrolment in tertiary education over time. The same pattern is visible for the descendants of immigrants. Basically, all the groups, with the exception of the Pakistani group, show the same development as natives and the total population.

For immigrants, this pattern is visible for Iran and Iraq in the age groups 20-24 and 25-29 and for Vietnam in the age group 25-29. Turkish immigrants show an increase in higher female enrolment between 1998 and 2003, after which it drops again. The Somali women show an increase in gender ratio, albeit at a low level, although they are still below the enrolment level of Somali men. Pakistani women also lag behind their male counterparts and show a negative

development in the gender ratio, which could be the result of the large influx of male foreign students from Pakistan.

**Table 4.6. The enrolment rate ratio of women to men immigrants and descendants in tertiary education in the 20-24 and 25-29 age groups, by country of origin. School years 1997/1998, 2002/2003 and 2007/2008.**

	20-24			25-29		
	1998	2003	2008	1998	2003	2008
<b>Immigrants</b>						
Iran	0.99	1.17	1.21	0.83	1.00	0.93
Iraq	0.84	1.14	1.64	0.81	0.99	1.26
Pakistan	0.55	0.30	0.21	1.09	0.22	0.23
Somalia	0.82	0.75	0.86	0.20	0.29	0.50
Turkey	1.12	1.31	1.11	1.11	1.47	1.19
Vietnam	0.81	0.85	0.71	0.48	0.64	0.99
<b>Descendants</b>						
Iran	0.96	1.18	1.26	-	-	1.02
Iraq	0.48	1.57	1.45	-	0.34	0.98
Pakistan	1.20	1.08	1.23	-	0.98	0.99
Turkey	1.15	1.36	1.50	0.30	1.26	1.43
Swedish origin	1.25	1.33	1.42	1.14	1.25	1.41
<b>Total</b>	<b>1.24</b>	<b>1.31</b>	<b>1.38</b>	<b>1.12</b>	<b>1.22</b>	<b>1.31</b>

Source: Statistics Sweden

Note: Ratios are calculated as the enrolment rate of women divided by the enrolment rate of men. The closer the ratio is to 1, the more equal the enrolment rates of women and men. A ratio of more than 1 means that the women's enrolment rate is higher than that of the men's.

## Summary

When it comes to enrolment in education, the immigrant groups show a variation. Iraqi and Iranian men and women, as well as males from Pakistan and females from Vietnam, match the enrolment levels of native men and women in the age group 16-19. Moreover, descendants of immigrants show a generally higher enrolment level than their immigrant counterparts.

A positive development is visible over time. Both immigrants and descendants have higher enrolment levels at the end of the period than at the beginning, i.e. 2008 versus 1998. However, Somali men and women have lower enrolment levels at the end compared to the start

of the period. Major immigration to Sweden and difficulties in joining the regular educational system could be the cause of this result.

Descendant females show higher enrolment levels than descendant males. For immigrants the pattern is the same, but at a lower level.

For higher education the results show a clear gender gap, with more female than male students. Descendants in a number of groups show even higher enrolment rates than natives.

Generally, enrolment rates for immigrants should be lower than those for natives and descendants, since some will seek – and find – employment rather than continue their education.

## Chapter 5:

# LABOUR MARKET INTEGRATION

### Introduction

Studies relating to the economic integration of immigrants in Sweden show a very high labour market attachment during the 1950s and 1960s. In this period, income and employment rates were relatively high, with resulting low unemployment rates (Wadensjö 1973; Ekberg 1983). During the 1970s and 1980s, unemployment was quite low in Sweden compared to most other OECD countries. Nevertheless, dating back to 1977, when unemployment began to be reported separately for different nationalities, the rate for foreign citizens was at least double that of Swedish citizens. In the first half of the 1990s, the unemployment rates of both Swedish and foreign citizens increased dramatically, mainly due to the crisis in the Swedish economy.

However, current research into the employment situation of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s shows a slightly different picture, namely a gradual decline in the immigrant employment rates for both men and women compared to natives. Starting in the 1970s, a negative trend is observed in the employment rates for immigrants. After 1970, the employment rate for foreign-born men decreased gradually compared to native-born men. Foreign-born women showed an increased employment rate over time, although this was not in parity with the increase observed for native-born women. It seems clear that the deep economic recession of the early 1990s widened the gap between natives and immigrants even further, whereas the economic recovery of the late nineties seems to have served to reverse the negative development to some extent (Bevelander 2010).

In this chapter the starting point is the late 1990s. The chapter outlines a descriptive analysis of the employment, unemployment and non-activity rates of the six immigrants groups and their descendants between 1998 and 2008.


### Employment rates 1998-2008

Figure 5.1 shows the employment rate for female immigrants from the six countries covered in the study and the total population in the age group 25-54. The table shows that all the immigrant groups have a lower employment rate than the reference group, i.e. the total female population. If we just look at the year 2008, we can observe a 20 per

cent point gap in employment between women from Iran and Vietnam compared to all women. The gap increases to about 30 per cent for women from Turkey and 40 per cent for women from Pakistan. The employment gap between all women and women from Iraq is even larger: 50 per cent in 2008. Finally the largest gap, 55 per cent, is found between all women and women from Somalia.


The picture includes a positive development for most of the groups. With the exception of women from Pakistan, all the groups have an increasing employment rate over time.

**Figure 5.1. Employment rates for female immigrants and total population, by country of birth, ages 25-54, 1998, 2003 and 2008.**



Source: Statistics Sweden

**Figure 5.2. Employment rates for male immigrants and total population, by country of birth, ages 25-54, 1998, 2003 and 2008.**




Source: Statistics Sweden

Figure 5.2 shows the employment rates for immigrant men and the total population in the core working age group 25-54 for the years 1998, 2003 and 2008. All men show an employment rate of close to and above 80 per cent in these three years. If we focus on the year 2008, we observe that Turkish and Vietnamese males have about 10-15 per cent lower employment rates. Iranians have a gap of about 20 per cent. The gap increases to about 40 per cent for males from Iraq and Pakistan. Somali males have the lowest employment rate of about 35 per cent.

The employment rate for all male immigrant groups with the exception of Pakistanis shows an increasing trend over time. For example, Iranian males have a 20 per cent higher employment rate in 2008 compared to 1998.

**Figure 5.3. Gender gap in employment rates for immigrants and total population, by country of birth, ages 25-54, 1998, 2003 and 2008.**



Source: Statistics Sweden


The gender employment gap depicted in Figure 5.3 is about 3-4 per cent for the total population, which indicates that in Sweden males have a higher employment rate than women. The gap is significantly larger for the immigrant groups. The biggest gaps are visible for immigrants from Pakistan and Turkey. No clear patterns over time are observed. For some groups the gap decreases, whereas for others it is either stable or increases.

### **Employment among young people 1998-2008**

This section describes the employment situation for young people between the ages of 16-24. Here figures relating to immigrants and descendants from the six countries are compared to the total population by gender and over time. When studying the employment and unemployment rates a strong influencing factor is the enrolment of individuals in education in this age category (see Chapter 4).

Figure 5.4 shows the employment rate for young female immigrants. Overall, about 35-40 per cent of all young people were employed in the period 1998-2008. Again, most of the immigrant groups have substantially lower employment rates. Some groups show an increase in the percentage employed over time, e.g. women from Iran, Iraq and Vietnam. However, a clear pattern of increasing employment levels due to a better economic situation in Sweden cannot be identified.

**Figure 5.4. Employment rates for female immigrants and total population, by country of birth, ages 16-24, 1998, 2003 and 2008.**




Source: Statistics Sweden

Figure 5.5, which shows the employment rate of young male immigrants over time, demonstrates higher employment levels compared to their female counterparts, especially for immigrant males from Iran, Vietnam and Turkey. In addition, Iranian, Turkish, Somali and Iraqi males have increasing levels over time, thus indicating an improved economic situation in Sweden during the decade. On the other hand, the Pakistani group shows a decrease over time, which could be due to large numbers of immigrants and the educational enrolment of this group during these years.




**Figure 5.5. Employment rates for male immigrants and total population, by country of birth, ages 16-24, 1998, 2003 and 2008.**



Source: Statistics Sweden


Figures 5.6 and 5.7 depict the employment rates of young descendants compared to the total population, by gender and over time. Figure 5.6 shows that children born in Sweden to immigrants have lower employment rates compared to the total population. However, all the groups have higher employment levels than people in the same age group who migrated to Sweden (see Figure 5.4).

**Figure 5.6. Employment rates for female descendants of immigrants and total population, by country of birth, ages 16-24, 1998, 2003 and 2008.**



Source: Statistics Sweden

**Figure 5.7. Employment rates for male descendants of immigrants and total population, by country of birth, ages 16-24, 1998, 2003 and 2008.**



Source: Statistics Sweden


Figure 5.7 show that male descendants of immigrants have substantially higher employment rates than their immigrant counterparts. In addition, all the groups seem to have been helped by the increasing economic activity of the Swedish economy, in that all show increasing employment rates over time. However, this has not been enough to close the gap in the employment rate between these groups and that of the total population, even though in 2008 Turkish males come close to this.

**Employment by cohort 1998-2008**

The following figures show the employment rate of the 25-39 age cohort in 1998 and how this develops between the years 2003 and 2008. Figure 5.8 is for female immigrant groups. As we can see, the employment rates for all groups increase with increasing age. In addition, the increase is greater for the immigrant groups compared to the total population and indicates a so-called “catch up” in employment integration. In other words, the gap is narrowed over time.

This figure also shows considerable differences in the employment levels of the immigrant groups.


**Figure 5.8. Employment rates over time of female immigrant groups and total population of age group 25-39 in 1998 and measured in 2003 and 2008.**



Source: Statistics Sweden

By and large, the patterns for females and males, as shown in Figures 5.8 and 5.9 respectively, are very similar. Increasing age enhances employment integration for all groups, but the observed 10 year period is not long enough for a “catch up” with the total population. Levels for males are generally higher than for females. Some immigrant groups, such as Pakistani and Somali males, also have lower upward trends than others.

Figure 5.9. Employment rates over time of male immigrant groups and total population of age group 25-39 in 1998 and measured in 2003 and 2008.



Source: Statistics Sweden


#### Unemployment rates 1998-2008<sup>4</sup>

Figures 5.10-5.13 show the unemployment rates of immigrants from the six countries and the total population in the years 1998, 2003 and 2008. We begin by analysing the unemployment rates for females and males in the age group 25-54.

4 As can be seen in the glossary of terms provided at the end of this report, we ask the reader to note that we use register data to calculate our indicators. For the indicator unemployment this means that an individual can only be in one state, e.g. employed, enrolled in education (see Chapter 4), unemployed or inactive. Regularly published unemployment figures are based on *Labour Force Surveys* in which the informant can be both enrolled in education *and* unemployed, and due to this have higher unemployment rates. This is particularly the case for youth.

All the female immigrant groups have higher unemployment rates than the female total population. However, for most of the groups and for the total population the unemployment level decreases over time: a firm drop between 1998 and 2003 and a somewhat slower decline between 2003 and 2008 for Iranian and Vietnamese women, but increases for the other immigrant groups. In the case of Iranian women, the unemployment rate declined by over 50 percent. Somali women experienced a decrease from 1998 to 2003, but also a substantial increase in the period 2003-2008.


**Figure 5.10. Unemployment rates for female immigrants and total population, by country of birth, ages 25-54, 1998, 2003 and 2008.**



Source: Statistics Sweden

Figure 5.11 depicts the male unemployment rate for the age group 25-54 by immigrant group and total population. A similar picture is visible for males in comparison to females (Figure 5.10). Immigrant unemployment levels are substantially higher compared to the total population. Almost all the groups show a drop in unemployment levels between 1998 and 2003. Except for Iraqi and Somali males, all the other groups experienced a reduction in unemployment in the subsequent period of 2003-2008. Like the total population unemployment level, the Iranian, Pakistani, Turkish and Vietnamese levels are just below 10 per cent.

**Figure 5.11. Unemployment rates for male immigrants and total population, by country of birth, ages 25-54, 1998, 2003 and 2008.**




Source: Statistics Sweden

### Youth unemployment 1998-2008

Figures 5.12 and 5.13 show the youth unemployment rates for female and male immigrants in 1998, 2003 and 2008. Figure 5.12 shows that youth unemployment declines between 1998 and 2008 for most of the groups; Somalia being the only exception with an increase in the unemployment of young people between 2003 and 2008. Interestingly enough, in 2008 Iranian, Pakistani women have the same level of youth unemployment as the total population (4 per cent).


The unemployment rate for male youth can be seen in Figure 5.13. The unemployment rates for all the groups drop between 1998 and 2003 and 2003 to 2008. Males from Iraq and Somalia are the exception, with slight increases between 2003 and 2008. Pakistani and Vietnamese males have lower unemployment rates than all males in this age group.

**Figure 5.12. Unemployment rates for female immigrants and total population, by country of birth, ages 16-24, 1998, 2003 and 2008.**



Source: Statistics Sweden

**Figure 5.13. Unemployment rates for male immigrants and total population, by country of birth, ages 16-24, 1998, 2003 and 2008.**



Source: Statistics Sweden

Finally, the youth unemployment rates for descendants are pictured in Figures 5.14 and 5.15. For both female and male descendants we find lower unemployment rates than among their immigrant counterparts. Especially when we compare unemployment levels in 2008, most descendant groups have lower levels. For the year 2008, no general difference in unemployment levels are found between females and males in the total population and descendants.

### **Inactive 1998-2008**

So-called “*inactive*” individuals are in focus in this section. Here inactive refers to individuals who are not working, actively seeking work or attending any education or training course. Table 5.1 shows the proportion per age category, sex and generation in 2008 and changes in this situation from 1998 to 2008. Again, a comparison with the total population is included.


From the table we can see that all immigrant groups, irrespective of age and sex, have higher inactivity levels than the total population. The highest inactivity level in the age group 16-24 is represented by women from Pakistan, and among the 25-54 and 55-64 age groups by Somali women. Both these groups have migrated to Sweden in large numbers in the past few years, which could explain their levels of high inactivity.

In contrast to the higher levels for immigrants and with the exception of women and men from Somalia, female descendants of immigrants have a somewhat lower level and male descendants a slightly higher level of inactivity compared to females and males in the total population. This can be seen as an indicator of integration.

The change over time that is visible in the table shows that many groups have a positive development, with lower inactivity rates in 2008 compared to 1998. Especially in the age category 55-64, lower inactivity is measured for all the groups, including the total population, and can be seen as an indication of a gradual reduction in early retirement levels and the fact that people generally work up to the retirement age of 65.




**Figure 5.14. Unemployment rates for female descendants and total population, by country of birth, ages 16-24, 1998, 2003 and 2008.**



Source: Statistics Sweden

**Figure 5.15. Unemployment rates for male descendants and total population, by country of birth, ages 16-24, 1998, 2003 and 2008.**



Source: Statistics Sweden

**Table 5.1. Proportion of immigrants and total population in the age ranges 16-24, 25-54 and 55-64 who were inactive in 2008 and the changes between 1998 and 2008, by sex and country of origin.**

	16-24		25-54		55-64			
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men		
	Immigrants	Descendants	Immigrants	Immigrants	Immigrants	Immigrants		
Iran	16.2	12.3	7.6	11.2	21.9	20.0	56.9	35.0
Iraq	26.2	17.3	9.3	13.2	39.1	26.2	74.9	57.5
Pakistan	44.3	17.4	9.7	12.5	41.1	29.4	65.9	49.0
Somalia	37.9	26.6	17.1	22.2	46.8	33.2	83.0	55.0
Turkey	34.7	21.7	10.2	12.7	34.4	22.0	77.9	51.5
Vietnam	17.5	18.3	6.7	7.5	23.5	19.3	50.4	34.2
<b>Total population</b>	<b>10.9</b>	<b>10.4</b>	<b>10.9</b>	<b>10.4</b>	<b>12.0</b>	<b>10.3</b>	<b>27.1</b>	<b>22.2</b>
<b>Change 1998-2008</b>								
Iran	-1.2	-2.2	2.6	-3.8	-2.5	0.7	-17.7	-11.4
Iraq	-11.5	-5.9	-1.8	0.9	-4.5	-1.8	-10.3	-4.5
Pakistan	7.6	-3.3	-1.7	2.5	-2.6	1.7	-19.6	-0.5
Somalia	-6.1	2.1	-	-	-9.8	6.1	-6.5	-11.9
Turkey	4.2	-4.0	-5.9	-5.3	-6.2	-4.1	-11.0	-18.0
Vietnam	-6.2	3.4	-	-	-4.0	2.9	-14.6	-12.6
<b>Total population</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>0.8</b>			<b>1.5</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>-8.6</b>	<b>-7.7</b>

Source: Statistics Sweden

## Summary

The employment integration of individuals in the core labour market ages of 25-54 is relatively low compared to natives. However, a positive trend is visible over time. Both females and males from our six immigrant groups have higher employment rates at the end of the period compared to the beginning. The gender gap shows that males have higher employment levels than females. The largest gap is detected for Pakistan and Turkey.

The employment rates for young immigrants between the ages of 16-24 are lower compared to natives. For women we see no positive development over time. For males an increasing employment rate is visible over time. Male and female descendants in this age group have lower employment rates than natives, but higher employment rates than their immigrant counterparts.

When following the cohort of immigrants in the 25-39 age group during the periods 1998 to 2003 to 2008, increasing employment levels can be observed for both females and males. The exceptions are Pakistani and Somali males, who do not show any increasing employment levels between 2003 and 2008.

The unemployment rate for both immigrant females and males drops during the same period, with the exception of Iraqi and Somali immigrants. Female youth unemployment also drops over time for most of the immigrant groups, again with the exception of Somali immigrants. For males the youth unemployment also decreases. The exceptions here are Iraqi, Somali and native males. Descendant unemployment levels are mainly in parity with or lower than native levels.

Inactivity is higher for all immigrant groups compared to natives. However, the inactivity rate drops substantially over the studied period.

## Chapter 6:

### SUMMARY OF RESULTS

Over the last six decades Sweden's immigrant population and their descendants have grown steadily. Migration flows into the country have been associated with societal phenomena such as labour demands in the growing economy, family reunions and refugee streams due to wars and political conflicts. Whereas earlier migration streams integrated relatively well, concern about the current streams is high on the political agenda. It is thought that a deeper knowledge of the integration patterns of the demographic, educational and labour market domains could lead to better integration policies.

In 2010, almost one fifth of Sweden's population were immigrants or had immigrant parents. Or, to be more exact, in that year 14.7 per cent out of a total number of 9,415,570 inhabitants were immigrants. The descendants of immigrants totalled 412,960, or 4.4 per cent of the total population. The immigrants and their descendants in focus in this report constitute 20 per cent of the immigrant population in Sweden, with Iraq bring the largest immigrant group and Pakistan the smallest.

Since the end of the 1960s Sweden has implemented a number of integration policy measures to help immigrants integrate into several areas of society - the most important being Swedish language proficiency and economic integration. According to The Migrant Integration Policy Index (2007), Sweden scores highly when it comes to granting immigrants access to and rights in the labour market.

To summarise the most important results and return to the first objective of this study of demographic integration during the period 1998-2008, it is clear that all six groups have grown during this period. In particular, the Iraqi and Somali groups have substantially increased in number. The growth for Iran, Iraq, Somalia and Vietnam is due to net migration and an increase in the number of descendants. For Pakistan, the main reason for the increase is net migration. On the whole, the population growth in Sweden in this period is mainly due to net migration, higher birth rates among immigrants and to a somewhat lower degree among their descendants. "Older" immigrant groups that have been in Sweden for a longer period of time consist mainly of descendants rather than "younger" immigrant groups. Iran, Turkey and Vietnam can be depicted as "older" groups and Iraq, Pakistan and Somalia as "younger" ones.

With the exception of Iran, all the groups show a higher crude birth rate than natives. The groups are still younger than the native population and have a far lower crude death rate than natives. In general, immigrants are married to individuals from the same group, whereas all descendants have higher marriage rates with natives or other immigrant groups. The total fertility rate is higher among most groups compared to natives. Again, Iranian women are the exception. Descendants show a lower fertility rate than their immigrant parents.

The second objective of the study was to analyse two specific aspects of integration: participation in the educational system, i.e. educational enrolment, and integration patterns in the labour market with a focus on employment and unemployment.

When it comes to enrolment in education the immigrant groups show a variation. Iraqi and Iranian men and women, as well as males from Pakistan and females from Vietnam, match the enrolment levels of native men and women in the age group 16-19. Moreover, descendants of immigrants generally show a higher enrolment level than their immigrant counterparts.

A positive development is visible over time. Both immigrants and descendants have higher enrolment levels at the end of the period compared to the beginning, i.e. 2008 versus 1998. However, Somali men and women have a lower enrolment level at the end of the period compared to the start. Large immigration to Sweden and difficulties in joining the regular educational system could be reasons for this result.

Descendant females show a higher level of enrolment than descendant males. For immigrants the pattern is the same, but at a lower level.

For higher education the results indicate a gender gap with more female than male students.

The employment integration of individuals in the core labour market ages of 25-54 is relatively low. However, a positive trend is visible over time. Both females and males from the six immigrant groups have higher employment rates at the end compared to the beginning of the period. The gender gap shows that males have higher employment levels than females. The largest gender gap is detected for Pakistan and Turkey.

The employment rates for young immigrants between the ages of 16-24 are lower than those for natives. For women we see no positive development over time, although for males an increasing employment rate is visible over time. Male and female descendants in this age group have lower employment rates than natives, but higher employment rates than their immigrant counterparts.

Following the cohort of immigrants aged between 25-39 over time, from 1998 to 2003 to 2008, increasing employment levels can be observed for both females and males. The exceptions are Pakistani and Somali males, who show no increasing employment levels between 2003 and 2008.

The unemployment rates for both immigrant females and males drop during the period, with the exception of Iraqi and Somali immigrants. Female youth unemployment also drops over time for most immigrant groups, again with the exception of Somali immigrants. For males, youth unemployment also decreases. The exceptions here are Iraqi, Somali and native males. The unemployment levels for descendants are mainly in parity with or lower than native levels.

Inactivity is higher for all immigrant groups compared to natives. However, the inactivity rate drops substantially over the period.

With regard to the third objective of the study, which was to gain insights into the impact of selected public policies and practices, particularly those pertaining to immigration and integration on the chosen aspects change and integration, we would like to highlight the following issues.

As described in Chapter 2, with regard to the national setting and immigration and integration policies, no integration policy aimed at immigrant groups deals with demographic aspects. Instead, integration policy focuses on a general education for all residents and a specific education for newcomers. Here the term 'newcomers' mainly refers to refugees or their family members who obtain a residence permit. Labour migrants and other migrants are directed towards adult education for Swedish language training. General schooling and Swedish language training are compulsory for immigrant children. The educational enrolment of the immigrants and their descendants covered in this study shows that descendants have a higher enrolment than their immigrant counterparts, which can be seen as an adaptation to the general/native enrolment level and a positive outcome of Swedish educational policy. However, the increasing and higher levels of enrolment of descendants compared to natives could also be an indicator of discrimination. In order to get good jobs, immigrants and descendants have to be involved in education for longer periods and at higher levels. Another feature that shows a change of behaviour enhanced by educational policy for both males and females is the higher enrolment rate for females over males in all the groups, including natives, in the age category 20-29.

Labour market integration policies aimed at immigrants are designed to enhance their employment opportunities as soon as

possible after arrival in the country. Introduction courses, including language proficiency courses, general labour market information and the upgrading of specific skills, are the main ingredients for incorporating immigrants in the labour market. Such policies, complemented by a discrimination policy, can lead to the conclusion that the outlined policies are ineffective, especially as the results relating to labour market integration outlined in Chapter 5 show that the studied groups find it difficult to enter the Swedish labour market. Major differences between the immigrant groups and natives are visible. The results also indicate that the groups catch up over time and by generation. Despite this, they never reach the native employment level. The exception to this is descendants with a lower youth unemployment rate than natives. A higher enrolment rate in education, with a view to avoiding unemployment and securing a better and higher education level, could be the reasons for this.

Although no direct policies are aimed at the demographic behaviour of immigrants, the observed changes in the demographic behaviour of the descendants from the six immigrant groups, albeit to differing degrees, are voluntary and show an adaptation to the behaviour of the population in general.

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## GLOSSARY OF TERMS

This glossary provides definitions of the terms used in this study. In many cases the definitions pertain to indicators. In order to keep the glossary relatively simple, the definitions do not deal with issues relating to the estimation of indicators when these cannot be computed directly, but have to be estimated from relevant data. The estimation issues are considered in the Methodological note.

The glossary consists of three sections, each of which deals with terms pertaining to population dynamics, integration in the education sector and labour market integration. In each section the items are in alphabetical order. Whenever a particular item is mentioned in a definition of another item, it is italicised. If it is mentioned more than once in a given definition, it is only italicised when it appears for the first time.

In part, the glossary draws on the glossaries of relevant international organisations, in particular the United Nations, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation.

### Population Dynamics

**Average duration of residence of immigrants:** The average number of years that immigrants of a population group have lived in the country of residence.

**Birth:** In the case of a population group, any of the births to immigrants of the population group. In the case of a native population, any of the births to natives.

**Crude birth rate:** The number of births in a population during a specified period divided by the number of person-years lived by the population during the same period. It is expressed as the number of births per 1,000 inhabitants.

**Crude death rate:** The number of deaths in a population during a specified period divided by the number of person-years lived by the population during the same period. It is expressed as the number of deaths per 1,000 inhabitants.

**Crude emigration rate:** The number of emigrants, i.e. persons leaving a population due to *international migration* during a given period, divided by the number of person-years lived by the population during the same period. It is expressed as the number of emigrants per 1,000 inhabitants.

**Crude immigration rate:** The number of immigrants, i.e. persons joining a population due to international migration during a given period, divided by the number of person-years lived by the population during the same period. It is expressed as the number of immigrants per 1,000 inhabitants.

**Death:** A death taking place in a population.

**Descendant of a population group:** A person born to two immigrants, both of whom are members of a same population group, provided that his or her birth occurred in the country of parents' residence and that the person resides in it. Also, a person born to a women immigrant, who is a member of the population group and to a non-native man who is not a member of the group, provided the birth occurred in the country of the mother's residence and that the person resides in it. (See *Birth to immigrants of a population group*)

**Emigrant:** A person who leaves his or her country of residence with the intention of taking residence elsewhere and who, in the process, leaves a population of which he or she is a member.

**Immigrant:** A person who arrives in a country with a view to taking up residency there and who, in the process, joins a population as its new member.

**International migration:** Movements of individuals between different countries. From the perspective of a population of a given country, this includes the arrival of people coming to take up residency in the country and joins the population and the departure of residents leaving with the intention of taking up residency elsewhere, thus leaving the population.

**Native:** A person born to a native mother and/or to a native father. Also, a person born to a woman who, at the time of birth, is a descendant of a population group. In other words, any person who is not an immigrant or a descendant.

**Native population:** All the resident natives of a country.

**Natural change:** The difference between births and deaths in a population.

**Net migration:** The difference between immigrants and emigrants in a population.

**Partner:** A person who is currently married to another person or who lives in a registered consensual union with another person.

**Population:** A group of people residing in a given country and sharing a certain characteristic, such as a country of birth. Two types of groups are distinguished: resident persons originating from another country (referred to as a foreign-origin population group or a population group for short) and resident natives of a given country who collec-

tively make up the native population of the country. A total population of a country comprises the native population and all the existing population groups in the country.

**Population group:** A group comprising immigrants residing in a given country who were born in the country in which the group has its origins, along with their immediate descendants born in the country of the immigrants' residence. For the sake of convenience, the population groups bear the names of the nationals of the countries in which they have their roots, such as Iranians or Turks.

**Proportion of descendants:** A proportion that descendants of a population group represent with respect to the total size of the population group. The proportion is expressed in per cent.

**Proportion of immigrants:** A proportion that immigrants of a population group represent with respect to the total size of the population group. The proportion is expressed in per cent.

**Proportion of people with a partner of a given background:** A proportion that people with a partner of a given background represent with respect to all people with partners. The types of background distinguished are: member of the same population group, native, other. The proportion is expressed in per cent.

**Standard age-sex distribution of a population:** A distribution of a population by age and sex, the proportions of which add up to one. It is used to compute *standardised crude rates* of change. The distribution used in this study is an unweighted average of the proportionate age-sex distributions of the total populations of Denmark, Norway and Sweden in 2008.

**Standardised crude rate:** A crude rate of change that is observed in a population during a specified period if its age-sex distribution is equal to a *standard age-sex distribution of a population* rather than its actual one. The following standardised crude rates are distinguished: standardised crude birth rate, standardised crude death rate, standardised crude immigration rate and standardised crude emigration rate. In addition, two other standardised rates are distinguished: standardised crude emigration rate among immigrants of a population group and standardised crude birth rate of among descendants of a population group.

**Total fertility rate:** The average number of children that a hypothetical cohort of women would have at the end of their reproductive period if the women were subject to the *age-specific fertility rates* of a given period throughout their lives and were not subject to mortality. It is expressed as children per woman.

**Total fertility by age x:** The average number of children that a hypothetical cohort of women would have by age x inclusive if the women

were subject to the age-specific fertility rates of a given period and were not subject to mortality. It is expressed as children per woman. The values used for  $x$  are 24, 29 and 39.

### **Integration in the Education Sector**

**Enrolment rate:** The number of students in a particular age group that is enrolled in educational institutions of a given level of education and/or *sub-level of education* at a given date, divided by the total number of people in that age group on that date. The age groups used are: 16-19, 20-24, 25-29 and 30-34.

**ISCED:** The International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED 1997) is the revised version of the International Standard Classification of Education, which was adopted in 1997 by UNESCO's General Conference as a replacement of the former version.

**ISCED 1 - Primary education:** Education that usually begins at the age of five, six or seven and lasts for four to six years. Programmes at the primary level generally require no previous formal education, although it is becoming increasingly common for children to have attended a pre-primary programme before entering primary education.

**ISCED 2 - Lower secondary education:** Education that generally continues the basic programmes of the primary level, although here the teaching is typically more subject-focused. This type of education may either be "terminal" (i.e. prepare students for working life) and/or "preparatory" (i.e. prepare students for upper secondary education).

**ISCED 3 - Upper secondary education:** Education that corresponds to the final stage of secondary education. Instruction is often more organised along subject matter lines than ISCED 2. The entrance age for this level is typically 15 or 16 years. There are substantial differences in the usual duration of ISCED 3 programmes both across and between countries, typically ranging from two to five years of schooling. ISCED 3 may either be "terminal" (i.e. prepare students for working life) and/or "preparatory" (i.e. prepare students for tertiary education).

**ISCED 4 - Post-secondary non-tertiary education:** Education that straddles the boundary between upper secondary education and post-secondary education from an international point of view, even though this might clearly be considered as upper secondary or postsecondary programmes in a national context. Although the content of this type of education may not be significantly more advanced than upper secondary programmes, it serves to broaden the knowledge of participants who have already gained an upper secondary qualification. The students tend to be older than those enrolled at the upper secondary level.

ISCED 5A - Tertiary-type A education: Education comprising programmes that are largely theory-based and designed to provide sufficient qualifications for entry into advanced research programmes and professions with high skills requirements, such as medicine, dentistry or architecture. The full-time programmes have a minimum, cumulative, theoretical duration of three years, although they typically last four or more years.

ISCED 5B - Tertiary-type B education: Education comprising programmes that are typically shorter than those of tertiary-type A and that focus on practical, technical or occupational skills for direct entry into the labour market, although some theoretical foundations may be covered in the respective programmes. These full-time programmes have a minimum duration of two years.

**Level of education:** A broad section of the education “ladder”, i.e. the progression from very elementary to more complicated learning experience, embracing all fields and programme groups that may occur at that particular stage of the progression.

**Student:** A person who attends any regular educational institution, public or private, for systematic instruction at any level of education.

### **Labour Market Integration**

**Inactive:** A person who at any given time is not employed, unemployed or enrolled in education.

**Employed:** A person over a specified age who is either in paid employment or self-employed.

**Unemployed:** A person who, at any given time, has no employment but is available to start work within the next two weeks and has actively sought employment at some time during the previous four weeks. Also, a person who, during the reference week, has no employment but has been offered a job that is due to start later.

**Employment rate:** The number of *employed* persons of a particular age at any given time divided by the total number of people employed of that age at that particular time.

**Unemployment rate:** The number of *unemployed* persons of a particular age at any given time divided by the total number of people of that age at that particular time.







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