The Development of UN Peacekeeping
A study of human security and robustness in peacekeeping then and now

Abstract:
United Nations (UN) peacekeeping principles affect all peacekeeping, thus it is important to understand their development. Many important changes in peacekeeping concern robustness and human security. This paper investigates developments in these two areas and their interrelation by means of a literature review, document analysis and case studies of two contemporary UN peacekeeping missions. It identifies three generations in UN peacekeeping marked by changes in human security and robustness and relates these changes to the concept of sovereignty. Further, it identifies human security as the main motivation behind increasingly robust UN peacekeeping and finds that robust peacekeeping can, but does not necessarily, lead to greater human security.

Key words: United Nations, robust peacekeeping, human security, sovereignty, use of force
# Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRRR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Repatriation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMIL</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States' Mission in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States' Military Observer Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LURD</td>
<td>Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODEL</td>
<td>Movement for Democracy in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPFL</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCDDRR</td>
<td>National Commission of Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Repatriation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCDivPol</td>
<td>United Nations Civilian Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEF</td>
<td>United Nations Emergency Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOGIP</td>
<td>United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Assistance Group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2 Introduction

The United Nations (UN) has a long history of peacekeeping and through the years there have been many ideas of what peacekeeping consists of. In the beginning peacekeeping was mainly about observing ceasefires; it has developed into nation-building, and has been compared with western imperialism (Zisk Marten 2004). Peacekeeping has moved from focusing on national security, the security of states, to focusing on human security, the security of individuals, which might lead to the conclusion that to ensure human security the international community can disregard sovereignty; this development has been understood as two 'generations' (Ramsbotham, et al. 2007:134).

The main contemporary UN document on human security and the protection of civilians in peacekeeping is the UN Brahimi Report, published in 2000 (A/55/305-S/2000/809). The report states that peacekeepers need clearer and stronger mandates that allow them to use force and to protect civilians, since this has been lacking in previous peacekeeping. It is possible that, if what the Brahimi Report called for has been enacted, that it started a 'third generation' in peacekeeping.

The aim of this paper is thus to examine the development of UN peacekeeping and the relevance of the Brahimi Report in relation to human security and the increasing robustness in UN peacekeeping, in both historical and recent peacekeeping.

To study this is important for the field of peace and conflict studies. The UN is the largest peacekeeping organisation and as such both conducts most peacekeeping and sets the principles for other peacekeeping. Therefore, when UN peacekeeping principles change it is very important to document how and to look for the reasons behind and consequences of these changes.
2.1 Problem Statement

Peacekeeping has changed a lot over the years. My interest area is two specific changes: The focus on human security and the use of force, which in modern peacekeeping is referred to as 'robustness', two factors that have gradually changed during the development of peacekeeping. These changes might be seen to have culminated in the Brahimi Report (A/55/305-S/2000/809) since it proposed radical changes to both the use of force and to human security in UN peacekeeping. Since the Brahimi Report is very recent we cannot know if only a change in theory has occurred, or also a new generation of peacekeeping in practise. So, the focus of this paper is how and why human security and robustness in UN peacekeeping missions have changed over time and how they relate to each other.

I will also relate this to the issue of sovereignty, since intervention for human security can be seen as the opposing the principle of sovereignty. This important to take this into account since sovereignty is one of the fundamental principles of international relations, and thus of UN peacekeeping (Stanford 2010), and it can help when trying to understand the relationship between robustness and human security in peacekeeping.

2.2 Research Questions

Main question:

What is the relation between human security and robustness in UN peacekeeping?

The main question is operationalized through four sub-questions:

1. Has the UN changed towards more robust peacekeeping in the last 60 years?
2. Is there a 'third generation' in the practise of UN peacekeeping marked by changes in human security and robustness, and if such a change occurred, was it initiated by the Brahimi Report?
3. Is human security a main motivating factor for more robust peacekeeping?
4. Does more robust peacekeeping achieve greater human security?

These questions will be answered by examining the development of UN peacekeeping and case studies of two UN peacekeeping missions.
2.3 Theory

This paper will have two main theoretical focus points: the concept and understanding of human security and the consequences of this for sovereignty.

Human security is a concept that has a long history and in recent times it has received growing attention. It can be defined as: “the security of people – their physical safety, their economic and social well-being, respect for their dignity and worth as human beings, and the protection of their human rights and fundamental freedoms” (R2P 2001:15). Human security thus focus on individuals and is often opposed to state security, which frequently translates to state sovereignty. The reason for this opposition is that states have been known to either themselves violate their citizens' human rights or to let other forces do so. For a long time this was seen as the individual state's business and, in the Westphalian tradition\(^1\), sovereignty was valued over all else. But today some say that there “has occurred [...] a conceptual shift from a Westphalian towards a post-Westphalian framework in which, according to the rhetoric, human security has complemented state security” (Richmond 2001:32).

The start of this shift towards human security was after the end of the Holocaust, and the creation of the UN (1945) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Mary Kaldor (2008:21-22) conceptualizes this new ethical approach by questioning the old *jus ad bellum*, 'law in war'. She argues that “the rights of individuals supersede the rights of states and that, therefore, international law that applies to individuals overrides the laws of war” (Kaldor 2008:21). From this Kaldor draws the conclusion that only self-defence is an acceptable reason for war (Kaldor 2008:30). While this might be true it has also been argued that a shift from national security to human security is only possible when there are no direct state security concerns, which means that only when the state's own concerns are not interfering is there room for human security (de Wilde 2008:225).

Another effect of the rise of human security is the idea that the state exists to protect its citizens, which is opposed to the idea that the citizens exist to further the state's interests. This direction of

\(^1\) *Westphalian tradition*: The Westphalian tradition is named after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which was the peace at the end of the Thirty Year War. It is seen as having created the international system of sovereign states in Europe, a system that would later spread to the rest of the world. Part of the idea of the sovereign state was the principle of non-interference with other sovereign's governance. Thus sovereignty is defined as supreme authority within a territory. Sovereignty covered all domestic decisions, such as those concerning religion, and this ended the religious wars that had characterized previous times. This concept of sovereignty is also what has what led to the perspective that nation states are the only actors in international relations (Stanford 2010).
thought is further strengthened by international human rights norms (R2P 2001:13). This gave rise to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which is a document, produced by the Canadian government in 2001, that tries to define the role of human security in relation to sovereignty and peacekeeping. In this document sovereignty is seen to have two different meanings: 'sovereignty as control' and 'sovereignty as responsibility', which both have internal functions and external responsibilities. 'Sovereignty as responsibility' is seen as the contemporary form of sovereignty, and it has three implications: “First, it implies that the state authorities are responsible for the functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare. Secondly, it suggests that the national political authorities are responsible to the citizens internally and to the international community through the UN. And thirdly, it means that the agents of state are responsible for their actions; that is to say, they are accountable for their acts of commission and omission” (ibid.:13).

This describes the move from Westphalian state sovereignty, which can be translated to “supreme authority within a territory” (Stanford 2010), to what as been named the second movement of sovereignty, the “circumscription of the sovereign state” (ibid.), which culminated with R2P.

From the R2P understanding of sovereignty a state that does not protect its citizens' human security has failed and thus lost its right to sovereignty, this in turn gives the international community the right to interfere, in the sense that they assume the role of state authority when the state cannot. Thus the international community has the responsibility to use force if needed to protect human security, to interfere in intrastate conflicts with military force and to preform the traditional duties of the state, such as policing and organising elections, when the state cannot. The change in focus towards human security might thus be a reason for the change in UN peacekeeping, since a lot of “UN peacekeeping has become police work with military means” (de Wilde 2008:226).

### 2.4 Method

The research in this paper will mainly be explanatory, meaning it will “identify causes and effects of social phenomena and to predict how one phenomenon will change or vary in response to some variation in some other phenomenon” (Chambliss, et al. 2006:11), when studying the relationship between human security and robust peacekeeping. For this to be possible much of the research will also be descriptive, meaning that “the findings simply describe differences or variations” (ibid.:11).
The three main methods in this paper are literature review, “a critical summary and assessment of the range of existing materials dealing with knowledge and understanding in a given field” (Jupp 2006:162), document analysis, “The detailed examination of documents produced […], taking a variety of forms from the written word to the visual image” (ibid.:79), and case study method, “An approach that uses in-depth investigation of one or more examples of a current social phenomenon, utilizing a variety of sources of data” (ibid.:20).

The reason for using literature review is that the issues this paper deals with took place both over a long timespan and far away. It would be possible to study peacekeeping by only using primary sources, but that would have been a waste of resources, since peacekeeping has been extensively researched previously.

Document analysis will be used with my primary sources, which are various UN documents. The combination of these two methods has allowed me to make use of a variety of sources and thus achieve greater validity of explanation. Validity of explanation, also known as internal validity, is how valid a generalization of the research results can be and this can be gained, as it will be in this study, by using many independent sources (ibid.:311-312).

Further I will conduct two descriptive case studies; what characterises a descriptive case study is that it “will attempt to provide a full portrayal of the case or cases being studied” (ibid.:20). Descriptive case studies are needed for my research since they are an efficient way to give a picture of contemporary peacekeeping. Few scholars have yet analysed the missions deployed after the Brahimi Report, this means that without the case studies I would only have theoretical data describing contemporary peacekeeping, and without practical data it is impossible to conduct a complete analysis of peacekeeping.

I chose to study the UN missions to Sierra Leone and Liberia. The reason this is that Sierra Leone was the last mission before the Brahimi Report and Liberia the first major one after. A more recent mission might have given better results since more of the recommendations in the Brahimi Report might have been implemented, but I lack the material to do so. Further, the times of deployment of these missions makes it possible to study both contemporary peacekeeping and the Brahimi Report.
2.4.1 Source Criticism

Source criticism is a way to test if the sources used are reliable, but it is just a method and certainly not infallible (Thurén 2003:76). But even though conscientiously examined sources still can turn out to be unreliable source criticism is an indispensable tool when doing research.

I have two types of sources, primary and secondary. Since I am using the method of document analysis for dealing with my primary sources there are some essential points that have to be considered. The most prominent questions that have to be asked concern the documents' authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning (Jupp 2006:80). To establish that a document is authentic, produced by the author, is comparatively simple in this study since the primary sources are taken directly from the UN's website and there are various signs, such as resolution number, that assures their authenticity. I am treating the UN as one actor, while still sometimes stating which UN body published the document, so I escape the problem of which individuals are the actual authors and who were involved in creating the documents (for more see chapter 2.4.2).

Also the credibility of the documents, defined as: “The credibility of the document as evidence hinges on the truth and accuracy of its reference and how widely it represents the phenomena the researcher is investigating” (ibid.:80), is easy to establish since the documents are used to represent the UN's actions. Mandates and documents published by the SG and the SC are the opinions and actions by two of the leading UN organs and as such are very credible. This also makes them indispensable for this study.

Further I make extensive use of secondary sources, such as books and articles, which are associated with a number of source related problems. The main problem is that these sources have already been interpreted by another, or many other, scholar(s) (Thurén 2003:56) and that I cannot know the purpose behind their research. Tendency, the possibility of bias, is something that researchers always have to be vigilant of. It is hard to know both whether the researchers that generated the information were biased and in what direction that bias might go (ibid.:61). To escape this I have tried to diversify my secondary sources and to stay critical while making use of them and thus reach greater 'validity of research'; “The degree to which the research findings are true” (Walliman 2007:215). Diversification of sources can also be called 'triangulation of data', meaning combining “data drawn from different sources and at different times, in different places or from different
people” (Jupp 2006:305), this is a common validation strategy.

Further the fact than many of my sources describe historical facts, such as years and events, while recognizing that bias might exist in the selection process, makes it possible for me to make use of them to draw my own conclusions.

In source criticism a source is considered more reliable the more contemporary it is (Thurén 2003:44). Because of this I have done my best to use contemporary sources and, when not, to be able to support the information in older sources with the newer ones.

When writing about the missions in Sierra Leone and Liberia I made use of a mixture of primary sources from the UN and secondary sources, in the form of previous research, on the two missions. It was significantly harder to find information on current missions than it would have been if I had chosen to write about older ones, but for my study it is important to be able to analyse contemporary peacekeeping.

It was harder to find source material on Liberia than on Sierra Leone, the reason for this probably being that the mission in Liberia is still deployed. Since I did not want to use only UN sources, as they, even though they are primary sources, well might have a bias for the UN, I made use of some media publications. This is problematic since many of the facts presented there cannot be substantiated. A rule when dealing with unreliable sources is to not believe them if you do not have at least two independent sources which supports each other (Thurén 2003:77). This is hard when dealing with media in general since different media outlets might get their information from the same sources. It is even harder in my case since I have not found sources that write extensively or name their sources when dealing with Liberia. Despite this I have chosen to include the information I have found in the media, though I will not talk of my findings here as facts, but as rumours and unsubstantiated information, and will try to use as little of this information as possible.

2.4.2 The UN as an Actor

In this paper the UN will be treated as an actor. This means that I will write that 'the UN' acts or decides. This is problematic since it is an organization composed of 192 member states who themselves are independent actors; the UN can be viewed as only an institutional arena where the
member states can present and effect their foreign policies (Weiss, et al. 2004:lii).

Also the Security Council (SC), the Secretary-General (SG), the General Assembly, and individuals employees often disagree and can be seen as separate actors. Further this paper will be limited to mainly dealing with expressed opinions and documents by the SG and the SC, since they are the primary UN actors in peacekeeping missions.

'The UN' will thus include all actions carried out by independent persons representing the UN, such as UN force commanders or the SG, and actions by nations which were carried out under UN command.

The main reason for treating the UN as one actor instead of a number of different ones is that this paper is too limited to cover all the actors and that the focus will be on official documents and their implementation.

2.5 Delimitation and Further Research

This paper deals with possible changes in UN peacekeeping, because of the limited scope of the study I cannot cover this field fully. This is why I have limited the study to focusing on a more general description of older peacekeeping and two case studies to be able to analyse contemporary peacekeeping. This is also the reason for dealing with the UN as one actor instead of many and only discussing UN peacekeeping; the same issues that are studied in this paper could be applied to regional peacekeeping, this is something I would wish to do in further research. Further, I would like to extend my case studies to include an analysis of the roles of the different actors inside the UN.

With a more extensive time-frame I would have liked to conduct case studies on older peacekeeping missions, and to compare them in more detail to the contemporary missions and thus gain a deeper insight into the relationship between human security and robust peacekeeping. Further studies of the missions after the Brahimi Report would also shed more light onto the characteristics of contemporary peacekeeping. Finally, I would have liked to conduct further research into the question, whether the changed methods of the UN actually help ensuring greater human security, and the role of human security in other departments of the UN.
2.6 Disposition

This paper starts by in chapter three presenting the development of peacekeeping, from after World War II to modern times; it is split into three sub-chapter, discussing what can be seen as three 'generations' in UN peacekeeping, with regard to human security and the development in use of force. The third and last generation is too contemporary for extensive research to have been conducted yet, thus it is a question if it exists in theory only, which is discussed in chapter 3.3, or also in practise, which is investigated in chapter 4. There two case studies are presented, one on the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and one of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). The case studies will be split into three parts. The first one describing the background of the conflict, the second one will look at mandates and official UN documents concerning the mission, and the third one will concern how the mission was carried out on the ground. This is followed by an analysis of the two studies in chapter 4.3. Chapter five builds on material presented earlier in the paper and investigates the relationship between human security and robustness in peacekeeping.

Research question 1 will be answered in chapters three and four, question 2 in chapter four, questions 3 and 4 in chapter 5. In chapter six you will find answers to all research questions and my final conclusions.
3 The Development of UN Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping was never mentioned, and thus never defined, in the UN Charter (1945). It is a later development and has been constantly evolving, because of this the definitions of it vary. Peacekeeping is not exclusively used by the UN; it has been used by both regional organisations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and single states. It consists of a multilateral force, a force with several levels of actors, often of both civilian and military elements, which is deployed to a conflict zone. In such a conflict zone fighting is still ongoing or, as is more often the case, fighting has recently stopped, and neutral outsiders and funding are needed to enforce or/and observe that peace agreements are followed (UN 4).

Only clear-cut peacekeeping will be discussed; peacemaking, which addresses conflicts in process, like peacekeeping, but by diplomatic non-violent methods, and pure enforcement missions, that are characterised by a full-scale use of force which is similar to traditional interstate wars (A/55/305-S/2000/809 art. 18), such as the Gulf and Korean Wars, will be left to others to study.

In this chapter the principles and practice of UN peacekeeping from the end of WW II until today will be presented. The chapter is split into three sub-chapters, describing different development periods in peacekeeping. In the sub-chapter on the third period mainly the theoretical changes will be presented, since the practical ones are not well documented and will be studied in the form of case studies in chapter four. Each sub-chapter is split into two parts, the first discussing the change in use of force, or robustness, and the second the relationship between human security and sovereignty in that period.

3.1 Peacekeeping From UNEF I to the End of the Cold War

When analysing UN peacekeeping missions it has become common to categorize them in different ways. The period from the start of UN peacekeeping in the 1950s to the end of the Cold War has many names, it has been called 'truce-keeping' (Schmild 2000:5), 'traditional peacekeeping' (Sjöberg 2006:37) and 'first generation peacekeeping' (Ramsbotham, et al. 2007:134). In this paper 'first generation' will be used, referring to both a specific time-period and the main kind of peace-
keeping that was practised then. The first generation of peacekeeping starts at the end of WW II and lasts until the end of the Cold War.

The principles of first generation peacekeeping came from the first peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) I, created in 1956, and were more principles than clear rules. A probable reason for this is that peacekeeping is not defined in the UN Charter and the rules had to be invented later and thus came about in an 

*ad hoc* manner (Sjöberg 2006:37). Since UNEF I was the first peacekeeping mission where military personnel was armed it laid the ground rules for the use of force in UN peacekeeping (Findlay 2002:20). From this one could draw the conclusion that already from the beginning it was clear that UNEF I might be called upon to use military force.

### 3.1.1 The Use of Force

In the following paragraphs the development of the principle of 'self-defence' during first generation peacekeeping will be outlined. The development of the term will shed light on the development of the use of force during this period.

The main function of first generation missions were to monitor borders and establish buffer zones after ceasefires had been negotiated (Ramsbotham, *et al.* 2007:134). These duties do not fall completely under either Chapter VI, pacific non-enforceable measures to resolve conflicts, or under Chapter VII, enforcement measures. From this came the idea of 'Chapter VI-and a half' (Weiss, *et al.* 2004:38). This left a lot of leeway and the use of force in a mission could vary widely both in the different mandates and in the interpretations of it on the ground. It also left a lot flexibility in what could be called 'peacekeeping'.

UNEF I's mandate was under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which means it could only employ non-enforcement measures. It was deployed to Egypt where its main objectives were to enter the areas from which France and Britain withdrew and to maintain law and order in them until Egypt could take over; and to supervise the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Egyptian territory (Findlay 2002:20-22). UNEF I was not a fighting force, but “a symbolic, non-fighting force which would assist in implementing the withdrawal agreements rather than enforce them” (ibid.:22). So it was clear from the start that UNEF I would not be a robust mission, but the exact rules for the use of force were still unclear. The principle of self-defence, which is seen as having been created during UNEF I and has been used in numerous missions after it, was largely improvised and not clearly defined. Additionally rights, such as freedom of movement, which were seen as fundamental to
peacekeeping, were not allowed to be enforced (ibid.:24, 48).

The codification of UNEF I's use of force rules came later in a summary report written by SG Dag Hammarskjöld in 1958 (ibid.:47). In this report concerning the use of force by UN peacekeepers Hammarskjöld wrote:

A reasonable definition [of self-defence] seems to have been established in the case of UNEF, where the rule is applied that men engaged in the operation may never take the initiative in the use of armed force, but are entitled to respond with force to an attack with arms, including attempts to use force to make them withdraw from positions which they occupy under orders from the Commander, acting under the authority of the Assembly and within the scope of its resolutions. The basic element involved is clearly the prohibition against any initiative in the use of armed force (A/3943).

This defined the self-defence doctrine and separated it from more robust peacekeeping that would need a Chapter VII mandate.

In later UN peacekeeping missions the fact that force was only was allowed in self-defence was seen as fundamental, and necessary for peacekeepers to be able to be impartial and carry out their mandates. But the principle was untested and how it worked on the ground varied (Findlay 2002:82). Problems during coming missions arose from not having agreed on what 'self-defence' entail, this lead to two lessons for following peacekeeping missions. The first one was to stay out of intrastate wars, since these wars lead to more use of force that might result in peace enforcement, this was done by keeping first generation missions small. The second lesson was to clarify the self-defence doctrine so that it would not be misunderstood (ibid.:87-89).

The resulting definition of the self-defence principle was wider than the previous understanding of 'self-defence'. 'Self-defence' now contained, as can be seen in the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) (which was established in 1964 and is still deployed), among other things, using force was now allowed when resisting being disarmed, protecting the civilian components, establishing buffer zones and defending them with, freedom of movement was restricted, and finally if hindered in carrying out the mission commander's orders (ibid.:92-93).

In UNEF II, a peacekeeping force in 1973 sent to supervise a ceasefire between Israeli and Egyptian forces, the use of force was taken one step further and the UN expanded the classical self-defence principle to 'defence of the mission', meaning that “Self-defence would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the
Security Council” (ibid.:100). Thus force could now be used to ensure that the mandate was carried out. However it could still not be used pre-emptively, only as a reaction, and though the 'defence of the mission' principle was established during the first generation of peacekeeping, it was not to be commonly used until later.

3.1.2 Human Security and Sovereignty

In the following paragraphs the impact of the traditional understanding of 'sovereignty' on human security in first generation peacekeeping will be examined.

Most first generation missions were deployed in interstate wars and this shaped them. When codified the main principles of first generation peacekeeping were: to gain consent from the conflicting parties before deploying, the non-use of force except in self-defence, political neutrality, impartiality, commitment to the mandate, and legitimacy (Ramsbotham, et al. 2007:134). All these principles support sovereignty and give priority to state security over human security, which is not mentioned. Also, to only deploy to interstate wars can be seen as an indication that the only relevant conflicts were those, where one nation violated another and that it was then the UN's job to make sure that the violated state regained sovereignty.

Consent of the parties was seen as the most important principle of peacekeeping, there were three reasons for this: First, it isolated the decision-making process from dissent by any of the great powers of the time. If the parties asked for UN help it was much more probable that the mission would be accepted by both sides of the political blocks of the Cold War. Secondly, to have consent also helped to ensure the safety of the peacekeepers and minimize the risk that they would encounter resistance while implementing the mandate. Thirdly, to send a mission without consent by the parties, would be to engage in peace enforcement instead of peacekeeping (Sjöberg 2006:38; Weiss, et al. 2004:38). This shows how tactical the principles were and gives an idea of the spirit of the time. Peacekeeping missions that risked to upset any of the political blocks were not worth it, and neither was peacekeeping that endangered the peacekeepers. Peacekeeping was a tool for the countries that wanted it, not a pressure that could be exercised on a country (or other actor) to make peace. This is supported by the fact that one of the main aims of peacekeeping at the time, according to former Under-SG Sir Brian Urquhart, was to keep regions that were not directly involved in the East-West confrontation out of the Cold War and thus avoid a new world war (Schmild 2000:10), and might also be part of the reason of why first generation peacekeeping was successful (Sjöberg 2006:39).
First generation peacekeeping did not deal with the underlying causes of conflicts. One consequence of this is that some missions could not withdraw since the conflicts did not end. Examples of this are UNFICYP and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) which were deployed in 1964 and 1948 respectively and are still deployed. The main reason for this is that the missions were not designed to work towards a settlement of the conflict, but to ensure a stable environment for high-level diplomacy (Richmond 2001:34; Sjöberg 2006:40), this might also be seen as an effect of human security not being a priority at the time.

At the end of the Cold War and after it a large political barrier between the permanent members of the SC disappeared, which resulted in more ambitious peacekeeping missions. This is seen as the split between the first and the second generation of peacekeeping, though it was not a clean break. Despite initiatives like The Agenda for Peace in 1992, which attempted to override the principles of consent and minimal use of force, the principles created during UNEF I continued to define UN peacekeeping until the mid-1990s. However there have been exceptions to this. One example is the UN Mission to the Congo (ONUC), deployed in 1960. It was both robust and deployed into an intrastate conflict, which has led many researchers to view ONUC as second, rather than first, generation peacekeeping. There have also been missions after the Cold War which have been seen as belonging to first, rather than second, generation (Ramsbotham, et al. 2007:134; Sjöberg 2006:40-41). Thus the generations of peacekeeping should not be seen as clear splits in time, but rather in character.

3.2 Peacekeeping After the Cold War Until the Twenty-First Century

This new period in peacekeeping has, just as the previous one, gotten many names. It has been called 'wider peacekeeping', 'strategic peacekeeping' (Schmild 2000:5), 'multidimensional peacekeeping' (Sjöberg 2006:41), and 'second generation peacekeeping' (Ramsbotham, et al. 2007:134). As in last the chapter, the term 'generation' will be used, so this will be the 'second generation' of peacekeeping.

Between 1978 and 1988 no new peacekeeping missions were initiated. It was first at the end of the Cold War that new peacekeeping missions were launched, and, though many changes were not immediate, this is when peacekeeping started to change (Weiss, et al. 2004:41). Consequently this is when the second generation is seen to begin, and it would last until the end of the 1990s.
3.2.1 The Use of Force

The rules for use of force in peacekeeping did not change greatly during the second generation, there were some changes though. The second generation was characterised by a successive move away from authorizing missions under Chapter VI towards authorizing them under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Chapter VII includes coercive measures that allow the UN to enforce peace. The strongest of these measures is set forth in article 42, which states that the UN: “may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security” (UN Charter 1945:Chapter VII, art. 42), though the mandates authorised under Chapter VII at this time did not make use of the strongest articles, and instead tried to stay inside Hammarskjöld's imagined 'Chapter VI-and a half' (Thakur, et. al. 2001:232).

The role of the military did not change though, in second generation peacekeeping, like in first, "The role of the military is basically to help maintain a secure environment in which the civilian component can work" (Sjöberg 2006:43), but some missions deviated from this and a few peacekeeping missions even, when on the ground, developed into peace enforcement (Goulding 1993:452-453).

The most significant change was that the 'defence of the mission' principle was more often employed. This allowed peacekeepers to use more force than they had in earlier missions, a consequence of this was higher casualties among peacekeepers. Between 1948-1990 only 398 died, between 1991-1995 456 peacekeepers died (Sjöberg 2006:43). The higher death numbers resulted in many rich western nations sending fewer troops than before, despite this troop-contributing countries increased greatly in the 1990s (Ramsbotham, et al. 2007:136; Schmild 2000:16). So despite that the rules for use of force did not develop much wider mandates combined with the use of 'defence of the mission' made peacekeeping more dangerous than previously and in practise the use of force increased.

In the end of the 1990s, as a consequence of the higher death numbers and failed UN missions, the UN:

was unable to fulfil expectations of managing more complex operations – and wisely limited itself to organising smaller, more limited missions, […] For more complex missions, a division of labour has emerged which allows governments to make use of capabilities and strengths of various actors, the UN's role being often limited to providing a mandate and some components of missions (Schmild 2000:17).
This is how many UN missions have turned out, with a nation or a 'coalition of the willing', like NATO, providing the military force and the UN mainly authorizing for helping (ibid.:17), and how it would be until the beginning of the third peacekeeping generation.

The reasons for the changes in the use of force can be many. The end of the Cold War is commonly seen as the reason for the move from first generation to second generation peacekeeping. The reason for this is that the Cold War had in many ways dead-locked the UN General Assembly and SC. This implies that states had wanted to use more force during the first generation, but had been hindered by the war. The principles developed during the first generation, such as consent and neutrality, contradicts this conclusion. From the principles and reasons behind them it would seem that peacekeeping during the first generation was not only hindered by the Cold War from having the same characteristics as second or third generation, it was in principle different. It is important here to remember that many of the first generation principles are still important in both second and third generation, though they progressively started to be questioned and circumvented. Then there needs to be some other change that motivated the change in peacekeeping principles and practise.

### 3.2.2 Human Security and Sovereignty

Distinctive for second generation peacekeeping is that most UN peacekeeping of this time were sent to intrastate or ethnic conflicts (Thakur, *et. al.* 2001:230), these had during the previous generation of peacekeeping been largely ignored. Further, for the first time, the international community started taking responsibility for the functioning of internal political structures that had been destroyed in civil wars (Marten 2004:3); in other words, human security started to gain attention. Moreover this shows a willingness to go against the previously untouchable concept of state sovereignty, or to re-evaluate what sovereignty consists of.

Defining for this period in peacekeeping are wider mandates and larger civilian components. In the mandates there were now objectives concerning wider security, humanitarian help and several political objectives, such as free elections. This indicates that an underlying goal of peacekeeping was human security; to satisfy basic human needs, human rights, economic equality and political participation (Ramsbotham, *et al.* 2007:136-137). Moreover the mandates now tried to deal with the underlying causes of the conflicts by focusing on helping refugees, disarming combatants and even administering territory. These activities have later been called peace-building (Sjöberg 2006:41-42) and part of the goal might have been to avoid the eternally deployed missions of the first generation.
All this moves away from the previous focus on international peace and security, defined as peace between nation states, towards a focus on human security and a more comprehensive view on what 'peace' might entail.

With the change towards engagement in intrastate conflicts also the perception of the role of peacekeeping changed. The main failures of UN peacekeeping missions during the 1990s were perceived to be when UN peacekeepers stood by powerlessly during the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the massacre of civilians in the UN protected town Srebrenica in 1995 (Ramsbotham, et al. 2007:137-138). It was now seen as the responsibility of the UN to protect civilians in war zones.

The reasons for the changes in peacekeeping during the second generation can be many. Certainly one aim was to make the missions more effective, but there might also have been others. Kimberly Zisk Marten (2004:33) argues that the UN's failure in Rwanda and Srebrenica to protect the civilian populations, together with the failed peacekeeping mission in Somalia (1993-1995), lead to the subsequent change in peacekeeping. If this is true human security is one of the major motivating factors for the more robust mandates under Chapter VII that were distinctive for second generation peacekeeping from mid-1990s and onwards. Further evidence for human security being a motivating factor behind the change is that the missions had the authorization to use force to protect humanitarian aid (Pouligny 2006:2), while in most of the 16 missions before the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia (1989-1990) the mandates did not even specifically mention humanitarian tasks (Thornberry 1996:226).

There was a certain optimism in the beginning of the second generation. It can be seen in 'An Agenda for Peace' (1992) by former SG Boutros Boutros-Ghali, where he, among other things, wrote that the “demands of the United Nations has surged. Its security arm, once disabled by circumstances it was not created or equipped to control, has emerged as a central instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and for the preservation of peace”, further he wrote that “the time for absolute and exclusive [state] sovereignty, however, has passed” (Ramsbotham, et al. 2007:134). This clearly shows that sovereignty was not considered as untouchable as during first generation peacekeeping, though even if the time for absolute sovereignty might have passed, sovereignty itself was still considered one of the fundamental principles of international relations (ibid.:134; Richmond 2001:33).

This early optimism of second generation peacekeeping soon dissipated. New tensions had risen to
replace the ones that had paralysed the UN during the Cold War. It has been argued that the UN was “no longer trapped by conflicting ideologies but by a more basic tension between human security and sovereign state claims and interests that are inherent to the international system” (Richmond 2001:33).

The issues and failures of UN peacekeeping during the 1990s lead to the conclusion that peacekeeping had to change. UN reports concluded that “faced with attempts to murder, expel or terrorize entire populations, the neutral, impartial and mediating role of the United Nations was inadequate” (Ramsbotham, et al. 2007:138). In 2000 this situation lead to the creation of the 'Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects' (S/2000/809), more commonly known as the Brahimi Report, and initiated a third generation of peacekeeping, at least in theory.

To conclude, during the second generation of peacekeeping human security was on the rise and this was in conflict with the idea of sovereignty as inviolable. It was perceived as the UN's responsibility to prevent human catastrophes such as the genocide in Rwanda, and when peacekeeping did not prioritizes human security it was seen as a failure. This led to wider mandates that tried to deal with the causes of conflicts and protect the rights of civilians. At the same time as this was happening the idea of sovereignty was still strong, but more questioned and objected to than during the first generation.

### 3.3 Peacekeeping in the New Millennium

Many scholars do not recognize a 'third generation' of peacekeeping, but some do of the basis of the more robust missions and role of human security (Ramsbotham, et al. 2007:141), the type of peacekeeping that is typical for this period has also been called 'quasi-enforcement operations' (Richmond 2001:34). Here it will be presented how third generation peacekeeping looks in theory. The reason for this is that third generation peacekeeping started around the millennium shift and little of it has been put into practice, and where it has been put into practice little research as yet to be done (for third generation in practice see chapter 4).

Third generation peacekeeping is defined by a greater focus on human security, individuals and a separation of victims and perpetrators. This can most clearly be seen in the Brahimi Report (A/55/305-S/2000/809).
The break between second and third generation peacekeeping is, at least in theory, clearly marked by the Brahimi Report, which evaluated and asked for drastic changes in peacekeeping. The Brahimi Report contains a number of recommendations to make UN peacekeeping more effective and from the desired changes some conclusions can be drawn concerning the underlying aims of peacekeeping. Among other things the Brahimi Report called for more robust peacekeeping, the argument for this was that the missions in the 1990s had failed to protect civilians. The Brahimi Report can thus be seen as the theoretical start of a third generation of peacekeeping (A/55/305-S/2000/809; Ramsbotham, et al. 2007:138).

3.3.1 The Use of Force

The Brahimi Report starts by stating that: “When the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence with the ability and determination to defeat them” (A/55/305-S/2000/809 art.1), and that “no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force” (ibid. art.3), and that the key conditions for success are “political support, rapid deployment with a robust force posture and a sound peace-building strategy” (ibid. art.4). Meaning that stronger mandates allowing peacekeepers to use more force are needed. The Report continues to elaborate on this point by stating that:

> Once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandate professionally and successfully. This means that United Nations military units must be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission’s mandate. Rules of engagement should not limit contingents to stroke-for-stroke responses but should allow ripostes sufficient to silence a source of deadly fire that is directed at United Nations troops or at the people they are charged to protect and, in particularly dangerous situations, should not force United Nations contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers (ibid. art. 49).

This clearly allows peacekeepers to use force pre-emptively and strike back with more force than had been used towards them. This very different from the self-defence principle that held in the past.

The Brahimi Report continues by challenging the principle of impartiality by arguing that impartiality must be to adhere to the mandate and that the mandate being impartial is not the same as equal treatment of all parties, “In some cases, local parties consist not of moral equals but obvious aggressors and victims, and peacekeepers may not only be operationally justified in using force but
morally compelled to do so” (ibid. art. 50). An example of when force should be used in this way is the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 (ibid. art. 50). This means that not only international security can motivate peacekeeping missions any more, but also moral issues and especially human security. So not only the use of force but also the reasons for doing so have widened. By separating aggressors and victims and the allowing for pre-emptive force peacekeepers are now allowed to make choices in who and when to attack.

3.3.2 Human Security and Sovereignty

Priority of human security is one of defining traits of third generation peacekeeping. Former SG Kofi Annan (1999) said that “When we read the charter today we are more that ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those that abuse them”. Further Annan’s annual speech to the General Assembly in 1999 (SG/SM/7126) addressed the need for humanitarian interventions and to limit state sovereignty. He started the speech by stating that it is now widely understood that the state is the servant of its people and not vice versa, and discusses “the universally recognized imperative of effectively halting gross and systematic violations of human rights with grave humanitarian consequences” (ibid.). Further, the UN Charter says that the UN should act for the common interest; Annan believes that we have to consider what this interest is and then we will realize that it lies in a commitment to our common humanity and peace. He ends his speech by explaining his hope for the future and stating that “This developing international norm in favour of intervention to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter will no doubt continue to pose profound challenges to the international community” (ibid.). This clearly argues that human security should not only be a factor when deploying missions, but a reason to deploy them. It is then no longer violations of state sovereignty and threats to the international peace that needs to be the aim of UN peacekeeping missions, if not peace has a different meaning when Annan uses it than it had previously.

Like in the 1990s, in the 2000s intrastate conflicts continued being the norm. 'State failure', meaning that states could not fulfil their function, becomes a common concept during the third generation and a reason for the UN to intervene, since a state's main function was now seen as the assurance of human security (Thakur, et. al. 2001:230-231). This implies a shift in the meaning of sovereignty, from 'sovereignty as power' to 'sovereignty as responsibility'. Such a shift may also explain how missions deployed into intrastate conflicts were not perceived as in conflict with sovereignty, but following an “international norm in favour of intervention”.
A further indicator of the priority of human security at this time, both as a cause for intervention and as a responsibility of the state intertwined with sovereignty, is that the UN moved away from needing, though they often sought it, consent from the warring parties before deploying a peacekeeping mission. Oliver P. Richmond (2001:34) puts it like this:

“the increasingly multidimensional approach of peacekeeping has given rise to tensions between the disputants’ claims to ‘sovereignty’ and the political interests of the organization [UN]. Multidimensional peacekeeping forces have depended on consent so as not to be seen as imposing order. Yet the logic of human security led to the concept of ‘peace-enforcement’ based on the claim of normative superiority and UN legitimacy”, meaning that the normative view of the UN, which gives priority to human security, is now overriding traditional sovereignty. These observations lead to the conclusion that the purpose of peacekeeping has changed fundamentally since its first generation. A goal of third generation peacekeeping is “fundamentally about establishing justice for all in societies that have been unjust” (Marten 2004:11). This means that international peace might not be the main goal of peacekeeping any more, or it might imply that the concept of ‘peace’, as previously stated, has changed. If the goal of peacekeeping has changed, it would explain that the methods have too.

The change in the meaning of sovereignty, the priority of human security and the possible change in the understanding of what 'peace' entails may have led to a change in discourse on what a 'threat to international security' is, since intrastate conflicts have more and more come to be seen as threats to international security (Thakur, et. al. 2001:232-233), even when the conflict is limited to one country. This leads to the conclusion that national borders have lost some of their relevance, since a national threat can be seen as a threat to the international security, or possibly 'international' is no longer perceived as meaning 'crossing a national border'.

To conclude, during third generation peacekeeping human security led to a redefinition of sovereignty. Sovereignty is now seen as something that has responsibilities that to be fulfilled if it is to be claimed. These responsibilities involve protecting the human security of its citizens, if a state fail to do this it can be named a 'failed state', and then the UN is not only allowed to intervene, it is its responsibility to do so. This is a simplified image of the situation during the third generation, there are still voices that strongly support the classical Westphalian sovereignty and thus oppose all UN missions that has not gained consent from the parties. But the general trend in peacekeeping is that human security now can be used as motivation for a peacekeeping mission, even if no clear threat to international peace and security can be perceived, if not 'peace' has also gained a new meaning through human security.
4 Third Generation Peacekeeping in Practice

In this chapter two case studies will be presented and analyzed. The purpose of these case studies is to test if there is a third generation of peacekeeping not only in theory but also in practice. For this two UN missions are used, the first, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) took place just before the Brahimi Report, and the second, the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was the first major mission after the Brahimi Report. These two missions can thus both establish if a third generation in peacekeeping in practice had started by the time of these missions, by comparing to material presented in previous chapters, and if the Brahimi Report would be the start of such a generation. The case studies will be followed by a chapter where they are compared to each other and to previous peacekeeping.

4.1 United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

In this chapter the UNAMSIL (1999-2005) will be presented. The chapter is split into three sub-chapters. The first will present the background of the conflict; the second review the mandate and other UN documents relating to the use of force and human security in the mission; and the third describe how the mission was carried out.

4.1.1 Background

Sierra Leone is a country located on the West African coast and most would not consider it strategically important. Since the country's independence from British colonial rule it has had a long history filled with political coups, ethnic rivalry and rulers furthering their own ethnic group (Ofuatey-Kodjoe 2003:128-129, 131; Olonisakin 2008:5, 10-11, 14).

The most recent conflict in Sierra Leone started in 1991 when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), motivated by the conflict in neighbouring Liberia, rebelled in the eastern part of Sierra Leone, close to the Liberian border. The RUF's forces were largely composed of youths, and rape and mutilation of the civilian population were common intimidation methods of employed by the RUF (Bones 2001:56).
The aim of the RUF was to overthrow the government, situated in Sierra Leone's capital Freetown. In the beginning the national army managed to defend against the RUF, but in 1992 the army turned and overthrew the government. The RUF continued its attacks on the new military government. After negotiations in 1996 new parliamentary and presidential elections were held and the junta stepped down. The RUF did not recognize or participate in the elections and the fighting continued. In November 1996 new negotiations were held, which resulted in the Abidjan Accord, an attempt at a cease-fire and peace agreement between the government and the RUF. This fell through because of a new military coup in May 1997. This time the army joined forces with the RUF and together formed a ruling junta under Major Johnny Paul Koroma and his Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC). The AFRC/RUF rule was characterised by extensive cruelties against the population, such as "murder, torture, looting, rape, and the virtual criminalization of state functions and institutions" (Bones 2001:58; Olonisakin 2008:21; UN 3).

The first UN involvement in the conflict was in 1996 when a Special Representative of the SG was sent to Sierra Leone, this was at the request of the current government and was to be an aid in negotiations with the RUF. The UN helped to reach the Abidjan Accord but their involvement was minimal for a long time after that (Ofuatey-Kodjoe 2003:133; UN 3). First in August 1997, six weeks after the coup, did the SC respond to by voting in favour of an arms and oil embargo against Sierra Leone. The embargo was left to the Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS) force in Sierra Leone, the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG), to monitor and enforce. Over all there was a very weak response from the international community to the civil unrest and extensive human rights violations (Bones 2001:58; UN 3).

ECOWAS' troops were attacked at a number of occasions by the AFRC/RUF and in February 1998 they responded by launching a military attack which forced the AFRC/RUF to leave Freetown. After this the democratically elected president Kabbah was returned to office and the UN embargo lifted. Following this the UN decided to create the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), with the mission to monitor and advise in the efforts to disarm combatants and restructure the Sierra Leonean military. Since UNOMSIL was unarmed they were under ECOMOG's protection (UN 3).

In 1998 ECOMOG continued fighting a loosing battle against the AFRC/RUF and in January 1999 Freetown was overrun for two weeks by the AFRC/RUF. Casualties from these two weeks of
murder, arson and dismemberment were approximately 6000 civilians deaths and 2000-2500 missing children. In the end ECOMOG managed to retake the capital, but their casualties numbered around 1000 dead soldiers; this contributed to their decision to withdraw from Sierra Leone when it had returned to civilian rule. Also after the capital was retaken the fighting continued in other parts of Sierra Leone. This offensive has been named “Operation No Living Ting” by the RUF, and left 5000 dead in its wake (Bones 2001:59; Olonisakin 2008:33).

Extensive negotiations were started between the Sierra Leone government and the rebels which lead to the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement, a ceasefire which also contained extensive directions for how to rebuild the country. On 22\textsuperscript{nd} of October 1999 UNAMSIL was created to replace UNOMSIL and to help carrying out the provisions of the Peace Agreement (UN 3). A possible for deploying the stronger UNAMSIL force was the UN's concern for human security, as A. Bones (2001:56) writes: "the UN finally recognized the plight of the civilian population of Sierra Leone", the UN also recognized that when ECOMOG withdrew there would be nothing to stop a renewed civil war (ibid.:59).

4.1.2 The Mandate and UN Documents

UNAMSIL's creation and mandate was set forth in resolution S/RES/1270 by the SC on the 22\textsuperscript{nd} of October in 1999. It starts by stating that the situation in Sierra Leone is a “threat to international peace and security in the region”. In article 8 the UN decides to create UNAMSIL with the following mandate: a) to implement the Lomé Peace Agreement; b) to assist the government of Sierra Leone with the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants; c) to that end, to be present at key locations throughout Sierra Leone; d) to ensure the freedom of movement to all UN personnel; e) to monitor adherence to ceasefires, as stated in the ceasefire agreement of May 18 1999; f) to encourage the parties to create confidence-building mechanisms and to support their functionality; g) to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance; h) to support the operations by UN civilian officials; and i) to provide support for elections in Sierra Leone.

To achieve these ends UNAMSIL was launched under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and “may take the necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence” (S/RES/1270 art. 14). This article allows for a wide use of force by UNAMSIL and makes UNAMSIL to a robust peacekeeping mission. According to the following
article UNAMSIL personnel should include people trained in humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, this indicates that the mission will work both with the underlying causes of the conflict and with human security. Article 18, which states: “emphasizes that the plight of children is among the most pressing challenges facing Sierra Leone”, is even clearer in its concern for human security since the 'plight of children' rarely directly threatens international security.

The mandate allowed for 6'000 military personnel but a number of subsequent resolutions raised this number. In February 2000 resolution S/RES/1289 raised the military component of UNAMSIL to 11'100 troops, in May 2000 resolution S/RES/1299 raised it to 13'000 troops, in March 2001 S/RES/1346 further increased the number to 17'500, and when the mission was at its largest in March 2002 it amounted to 17'368 military personnel (S/RES/1289; S/RES/1299; S/RES/1346; UN 2). This indicates that the UN had failed to predict how large a force would be needed.

Resolution S/RES/1289 did not only raise the military component but also, in light of the conditions on the ground, enlarged the mandate. It now included the facilitation of the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance, the provision of security at all sites of DDR, and help with the surveillance and disposal of weapons, ammunition and other military equipment collected from ex-combatants. UNAMSIL was also authorized to take the necessary actions to fulfil these tasks, including the use of force (S/RES/1289 art. 10). The resolution also expanded the permissible use of force further than before. The rules for use of force are even more clearly stated in a report by the SG (which is supported by the SC according to S/RES/1346 § 3):

In its movement and deployment forward, UNAMSIL will continue to project the necessary military strength and determination to deter any attempt to use force against the United Nations and its mandate in Sierra Leone. The Mission's rules of engagement allow it to respond robustly to any attack or threat of attack, including, if necessary, in a pre-emptive manner (S/2001/228 § 60).

This clear and strong language strays far from the previous self-defence doctrine and even from the 'protection of the mandate' principle since it allows for pre-emptive attacks by the peacekeepers. The language is close to the one used in the subsequent Brahimi Report concerning the use of force (see chapter 3.3.1).

UNAMSIL's mandate was under Chapter VII, had a large military component, viewed pre-emptive attacks as self-defence, and use of force was allowed to be used to protect civilians and to secure DDR areas. Further it said that UNAMSIL should send “robust patrols” into RUF areas (S/2001/228 § 61). This is in line with the recommendations of the Brahimi Report which urged for stronger
mandates and more robust peacekeeping. There are also many references to the protection of civilians in the mandate and other documents of the SC and SG on Sierra Leone. This indicates that the dedication and time that the mandate allows for is spent on analysing the condition and protection of civilians in Sierra Leone, as well as the military force used for this purpose, goes beyond what can be motivated if the only goal is to stop a threat to international peace and security.

4.1.3 The Mission in Practice

From the start UNAMSIL failed to exercise its robust mandate. The real crisis started in May 2000, there had been warning signs but the UN was still taken by surprise by the strong resistance they meet from the RUF.

The RUF continuously challenged UNAMSIL, which responded by not using force to “preserve its freedom of movement or even in self-defence” (Findlay 2002:315). The RUF started disarming UN troops on the 1st of May, and the day after, when the RUF tried to disarm troops again, the UN troops tried to defended themselves but failed. Following this “mass detentions of UNAMSIL troops took place, often, it appears, without any resistance” (ibid.:316). This resulted in almost 500 UNAMSIL troops being taken as hostages and some killed by the RUF (Olonisakin 2008:3, 53).

What lead up to the hostage situation, and what might have been a reason behind it, was a miscalculation by the UN. Just as the ECOMOG troops started to withdraw UNAMSIL moved to start DDR in the Koidu area, the centre of the RUF diamond mines. This made the RUF feel threatened and is seen as a major reason for their strong resistance (Findlay 2002:300-301). Though this reaction by the RUF has also been viewed as evidence that UNAMSIL was succeeding to bring stability to the region and the RUF reacted against this. If this is true the real problem was that UNAMSIL was not prepared to deal with the RUF (Bones 2001:62).

Soon the RUF marched on Freetown and while the UN spokesman Fred Eckhard declared that UNAMSIL was preparing for a battle and would do what was needed to defend themselves and the government, the national contingents declared that they were not ready to put the lives of their soldiers on the line for what was a “British problem”, since the British colonial rule could be seen as blameable for the current situation. At this point UNAMSIL was at the verge of a total collapse (Findlay 2002:300-301; Ofuatey-Kodjo 2003:137). All this indicates that the strong mandate provided by the SC was mostly ignored, a reason for this being that the UN troops did not want to risk their lives for others human security.
In response to the situation the SG appealed for capable states to provide a force to support UNAMSIL. This force was to be used for deterrent purposes and to solve the hostage situation, Great Britain decided to intervene and at its height it deployed 1'200 troops (Olonisakin 2008:63). Their official purpose was to evacuate British and other foreign nationals that were trapped in Sierra Leone, but in reality the British military did much more than that. They were soon: “helping organize and train UN troops, establishing fortified positions, manning roadblocks, securing Freetown and its airport, conducting joint patrols with UNAMSIL, and coming under fire and returning it robustly in self-defence” (Findlay 2002:301). The British forces worked closely with UNAMSIL and, according to UNAMSIL Lieutenant-Colonel Philip Wilkinson, they “arguably rescued the UN mission and certainly played a significant part in averting a full-scale humanitarian catastrophe” (ibid.:302).

After this the UN started deploying more troops and UNAMSIL gained some of the robustness it had previously lacked. On June 5th UNAMSIL force commander Jetley sent two companies to by force retake a strategic crossroad. The troops encountered little opposition while breaking through the RUF’s roadblocks, but did respond robustly when fired at. This and further military actions by UNAMSIL show that the troops were now willing to use military force to defend themselves, the mandate, and civilians (ibid.:302-303; Olonisakin 2008:91).

On the 15th of July UNAMSIL, together with British troops, mounted a rescue of the remaining hostages. This was done with troops backed by helicopter gunships. Initially they met no resistance but later in an ambush six UNAMSIL troops were injured and one died, and there were many RUF casualties. The extensive use of force at this point in the mission met critique and the UN answered by stating that: “since intensive diplomatic and political efforts, at all levels, to seek a solution by peaceful means were unsuccessful, UNAMSIL decided to launch a robust military operation to ensure the security of United Nations personnel and to restore their freedom of movement, in accordance with its mandate and rules of engagement” (Findlay 2002:303).

After this the mission turned and has been named a 'Model Mission' since UNAMSIL “was able to carry out a massive disarmament program, successfully organize election, and most important, provide a secure environment. When it left Sierra Leone at the end of 2005 there was much for the UN to celebrate” (Olonisakin 2008:111), also Sierra Leoneans seemed to agree with this since in a public opinion survey in 2005 nearly 100 % said that the security situation had improved immensely due to UNAMSIL's presence (ibid.:2).
4.2 United Nations Mission in Liberia

In this chapter the UN peacekeeping mission to Liberia (2003-ongoing) will be presented. It is, like the previous, split into three sub-chapters. The first will show the background of the conflict; the second a review of the mandate and other UN documents relating to the use of force and human security in the mission; and the third describe of how the mission was carried out.

4.2.1 Background

The conflict in Liberia started in late 1989 and by 1990 hundreds of people had already died. The roots of the conflict consisted mainly of antagonism between different ethnic groups and goes all the way back to when Liberia first became a state. By October 1990 refugees in neighbouring countries already numbered 600'000 and “the conflicting parties used civilians as the primary war objectives and the focus of violence” (Olonisakin 2003:113-114). The initial fighting was between governmental forces and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), who were led by the former government official Charles Taylor, but by 1995 eight warring parties were recognized. The reason for this was that when the government lost power local warlords appeared. ECOWAS was involved almost from the start. They undertook initiatives to solve the conflict with peaceful means, and, in 1990, established an observer force, the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) which would be deployed until 1997. The SG also appointed a Special Representative to assist in the talks between the forces and ECOWAS (Abiodun, et al. 1999:28; Olonisakin 2003:114; UN 1). The war was very brutal and took a high toll on the civilian population.

In 1993 negotiations lead by ECOWAS resulted in a peace agreement in Cotonou, Benin. The UN established the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) to help ECOMOG to implement the Cotonou Peace Agreement. The implementation was delayed though and this lead to resumed fighting. In the following months the Peace Agreement was renegotiated and by July 1997 national elections were held in which Charles Taylor, the leader of NPFL, was elected president (Abiodun, et al. 1999:41; UN 1).

The peace did not last, a reason for this being that “Taylor acted like a graduate of the Al Capone school of government and effectively ran Liberia like the leader of an organized crime syndicate” (Cleaver & Massey 2006:181). During this time systematic human rights abuses continued, often perpetrated by the new government, and exclusion and harassment of political opponents made the situation in Liberia deteriorated, and fighting resumed (UN 1).
Two main rebel groups emerged in 1999 and 2002, respectively, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), both with the aim to overthrow president Charles Taylor. In the beginning of 2003 the two rebel groups occupied almost two-thirds of the country and threatened to attack the Liberian capital Monrovia (S/2003/875 § 5, § 9).

On the 1st of August 2003 the UN authorized a multinational force to Liberia to help stabilize the country (UN 1) and on the 11th of August, after substantial national and international pressure president Taylor resigned and left for exile in Nigeria. From this the situation started to improve. The 18th of August the warring parties signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Accra and ECOWAS subsequently deployed a force to Liberia. After this the UN decided to create a peacekeeping force to help enforce the ceasefire and implement the CPA (Cleaver & Massey 2006:183, 187).

4.2.2 The Mandate and UN Documents

UNMIL was established in resolution S/RES/1509 by the SC on the 19th of September 2003. Paragraphs two to six sets the tone for the mission since they describe the condition in Liberia at the time. They describe problems concerning the lack of human security in Liberia; from the problem of refugees, to the lack of access and security for humanitarian workers, to the “widespread sexual violence against women and children” (S/RES/1509). In the whole document there are few mentions of threats to international peace and security, instead it focuses on violations of human rights and “the need for accountability for violations of international humanitarian law […] ensure that the protection of human rights and the establishment of a state based and of an independent judiciary are among its highest priorities” (ibid.). Here justice and state-building are prioritized to ensure human security, while the issue of sovereignty is not mentioned.

UNMIL was deployed under Chapter VII and included 15’000 troops, 250 military observers and 1’115 UN civilian police (UNCivPol). The mandate is set forward in article 3. It states that UNMIL shall support and observe the CPA, observe disengagement of military forces, develop a plan for the implementation of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation (DDRR) program, collect and destroy weapons and ammunition and provide security at key locations. Concerning the use of force the mandate only states that: “to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, without
prejudice to the efforts of the government, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities” (ibid. § j), and “to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, including by helping to establish the necessary security conditions” (ibid. § k). There are more mentions of human security in the resolution; Articles 9 reminds of the special need to protect children in armed conflict and in article 10 the UN “Demands that all parties cease all use of child soldiers, that all parties cease all human rights violations and atrocities against the Liberian population, and stresses the need to bring to justice those responsible”, article 11 points out the importance of gender perspective in peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building, and encourages UNMIL to address the issue of “violence against women and children as a tool of warfare” (ibid. art. 11).

A clearer statement concerning the use of force can be found in the SG's report to the SC (S/2003/875) made on 11th of September 2003. When motivating the use of Chapter VII, it states: “this will enable the Mission to take a robust approach, to have the capacity to react adequately to changing circumstances and pre-empt potentially destabilizing events” (ibid. art. 57). This is clearer than the mandate but still leave much space for different interpretations.

UNMIL's deployment was extend many times without any revisions of the mandate. This could indicate that the implementation of the mandate was continuing according to plan, but, as Festus B. Aboagye and Alhaji M. S. Bah (2005:102) states “this does not mean that the mandate is sufficient for the tasks in hand to set Liberia on a path of sustainable peace-building”.

4.2.3 The Mission in Practice

UNMIL was the first major UN operation after the Brahimi Report (A/55/305-S/2000/809) and the recommendations in the report were implemented in UNMIL, this can be seen as a reason for UNMIL's two main responsibilities: to protect and support. It can also be seen as a reason for why UNMIL could deploy its troops so quickly. In December 31st 2004, 15 months after the establishment of UNMIL, it consisted of 14'501 military troops, only 499 or 3,3 % under its authorized strength (Aboagye & Bah 2005:103-104; GCSP 2004:12). Over all the humanitarian emergency in Liberia in 2003 was met with both regional consensus and international support for the rapid deployment of both ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) and UNMIL, which is a major reason for why it could deploy to quickly (Aboagye & Bah 2005:282).

One of the main duties of UNMIL was, in accordance with the CPA and its mandate, the disarmament and demobilization (DD) of all combatants, this was to be done together with the National
Commission of DDRR (NCDDRR), which was a body made-up of all national and international stakeholders in Liberia. In the beginning of the DD process UNMIL was overwhelmed because they lacked both the number of personnel and facilities to carry it out properly. After this the DD program was suspended while the implementation was gone over, this lead to a limiting of the number of combatants to 250 per cantonment site per day. In October 2004 UNMIL officially declared that the DD was done, though in some areas it continued longer (ibid.:189-191).

In January 2005 UNMIL announced that 103'109 combatants had been disarmed; before the program started UNMIL had predicted that there were 38'000 combatants that needed to be disarmed, this miscalculation lead to a number of changes in the implementation of the program. In the initial program 21 days were allocated to each individual, but soon they was reduced to five, and the initial $1'400 allocated to each person was reduced to under $800. Another problem with the program was that very few heavy weapons were handed-in, while there were indications of heavy weapons being smuggled into neighbouring countries. Also the reintegration and repatriation (RR) program had problems and was behind schedule, mainly because of lacking sufficient funds. By the end of the program only half of the 21'000 child soldiers had gone through RR (ibid.:189-191).

Despite UNMIL's strong Chapter VII mandate there was reports of atrocities committed in the vicinity, and sometimes even in the presence, of UNMIL troops (Cleaver & Massey 2006:189). There were even reports of sexual abuse of minors by UN peacekeepers and aid workers (New York Times 2006). Though these had been hard to substantiate this puts the peacekeepers commitment to human security in question, but does not necessarily say anything about the UN's commitment.

It is said that UNMIL made it a priority to have many women as part of the mission. Because of this women accounted for 14 % of the UNCivPol part of UNMIL. Gender was a big issue during the civil war since a lot of the violence during the civil war was sexual violence directed towards women and children. The UN tried to be conscious of this both in resolutions and in the composition of UNMIL (New York Times 2010).

UNMIL is also made up of a large UNCivPol component. It is their mission to help restructure the police. The Liberian Police Service had been so corrupted under Taylor that it was disbanded and a new police force was created to take its place. UNMIL also helped to restructure the national army. In both the army and the police force all efforts were made to ensure that the new recruits had not participated in any human rights violations (Cleaver & Massey 2006:193).
In October 2004, three days before the end of the DDRR program, disarmed fighters rioted in Monrovia. The riots lasted for three days and 400 people were wounded and 15 killed (Doctors Without Borders 2004). The reason for the riot was said to be that combatants claimed they had not been paid as much as they had been promised during the DD (New York Times 2004).

UNMIL is still in Liberia, though it is already considered a success in UN peacekeeping (UN Foundation; UN 5).

4.3 Examination of UNAMSIL and UNMIL

UNAMSIL was the last UN peacekeeping mission before the Brahimi Report, in fact the decision to investigate UN peacekeeping methods (which later became the Brahimi Report) was taken just as UNAMSIL started to unravel (Findlay 2002:332-333), UNMIL, on the other hand, was the first large mission after the report and a number of the recommendations proposed in the Brahimi Report is said to have been integrated into the mission. For all this it is hard to see an obvious difference between the missions. Both were deployed under Chapter VII, ECOWAS was heavily involved in both, the conflicts were in some parts connected since Sierra Leone and Liberia border each other. Both dealt with a number of warring fractions in countries that has long experienced ethnic violence, both missions were created under the same SG, Kofi Annan. Both also seem, by the UN at least, to be considered successes. This indicate that the Brahimi Report did not affect peacekeeping much, and thus that a third generation of peacekeeping did not start with the report, but there were differences.

4.3.1 The Use of Force

Both UNAMSIL and UNMIL had robust mandates, but on the ground neither displayed much robustness. UNMIL was not opposed and UNAMSIL failed to uphold the mandate before British forces intervened.

Pre-emptive force is allowed in both missions, though the rules for the use of force are much more explicit in UNAMSIL than in UNMIL. Similar for both missions is also that force to protect civilians is allowed. This clearly differs from second generation peacekeeping and is what the Brahimi Report called for. So both missions were robust in theory.
But in practice UNAMSIL was not as robust as its mandate. A probable explanation is that the national rules of engagement often are not 'in sync' with the rules of the mission. This can lead national contingents to decline to use force when ordered by the mission commander, without authorization by their national authorities, “Consequently, when the use of force becomes necessary, the supposedly robust mandate is rendered toothless” (Aboagye & Bah 2005:288). This leads to the conclusion that even though the peacekeeping tradition in the UN has changed, if the nations that contribute troops do not fully agree with this change it might not be enacted. The question then becomes if UN peacekeeping can be split from what is practised on the ground.

UNMIL’s mandate is under Chapter VII, but it did not have the opportunity to show if it was truly robust. This makes it harder to know if it in practice would have behaved like UNAMSIL, which can be likened to second generation prior to the British intervention, or it would have been truly robust.

Is there then a reason for this “robustness, if only in name”? The answer to that is 'yes'. To give UNMIL a Chapter VII mandate, when it might have been able to carry out its duties under a Chapter VI one, serves as a deterrent. Just as the peacekeepers of UNEF I had weapons, which they were not allowed to use, served as a deterrent (Findlay 2002:18). To allow for more force than is needed, or even that you believe the countries committing troops might be willing to allow, might help to ensure than no force will be needed. As the Swedish Military History Commission concluded after ONUC that: “UN units must be of such strength, quality and conduct that they earn the respect of all parties affected. In the Congo some of the fighting could probably have been avoided if the weakness of the UN units had not encouraged the parties to [commit] acts of violence” (ibid.:83), the same could possibly be said for UNAMSIL and UNMIL. So, even if appearance is not everything, it can mean a lot, for “the more powerful the force the greater the deterrent and the less likely it is that force will need to be used” (ibid.:83). This means that the robustness that the Brahimi Report asks for and that characterise third generation peacekeeping might sometimes come from a robust mandate, and not a truly robust mission, since this might be as successful in achieving greater human security.

So while UNAMSIL had clearer and stronger rules for use of force and can thus be seen as more robust than UNMIL, compared to second generation peacekeeping though UNMIL too was a robust peacekeeping force. The conclusion that can be drawn from this is than a third generation of peace-
keeping exists not only in theory but also in practice, since both these mission fall within the framework of 'third generation peacekeeping'. Another conclusion is that the Brahimi Report partly called for something already in existence, UNAMSIL did not lack a more robust mandate, it lacked people willing to carry out the robust mandate. Thus third generation peacekeeping started before the Brahimi Report, but the reasoning represented by the Brahimi Report is still the core of third generation.

4.3.2 Human Security and Sovereignty

When comparing both UNMIL and UNAMSIL to previous generations of peacekeeping they are very explicit in their care for human security. Human security is one of the main focus points of the missions, examples of this is UNMIL's explicit purpose 'to protect and support', and the condemnations of human rights violators, which is a clear step away from the previously unquestionable principle of neutrality, and also something that is called for in the Brahimi Report. Further this indicates that both missions belong in third generation peacekeeping, which would mean that it started before the Brahimi Report.

But there was a stronger human perspective in UNMIL than in UNAMSIL. UNMIL's mandate considers different kinds of fighters, the problems concerning children in war and gender issues. The gender of the peacekeepers were also taken into account since sexual violence had played a large role in the Liberian conflict, this kind of policy shows a strong focus on human security. Though the Brahimi Report might be the cause of this difference it can also be attributed to the fact the two missions were deployed during different phases of the two conflicts.

The UN engages in state-building, such as helping with elections, in both missions. This, as well as the human security policies, shows a support for 'sovereignty as responsibility' rather than 'sovereignty as control', since it shows a care for individuals that needs to be fulfilled before the mission can withdraw. Especially in UNMIL's mandate and practise a focus on justice can be seen, this is something that is only needed to take into consideration if the goal is to re-establish the state's sovereignty and sovereignty is understood as responsibility, not control. In fact, the only way to re-establish 'sovereignty as responsibility' is through enhancing justice and human security.

To conclude, the Brahimi Report might not start a third generation in practise since the focus on human security and robust mandates it calls for can be found in UNAMSIL, which was deployed before the report. But it still represents the third generation in peacekeeping well since that which
deviates for previous generations of peacekeeping, both in theory and practise, is well reflected and argued for in the Brahimi Report. It is thus a sensible tool when defining 'third generation', but should not be seen as a dividing line.
5 The Relationship Between Human Security and Robustness in UN Peacekeeping

This chapter attempts to answer two of the research questions by making use of the facts and thoughts presented in previous chapters. It is split into two sub-chapters, the first tries to answer the question: 'Is human security a main motivating factor for more robust peacekeeping?'; the second tries to answer: 'Does more robust peacekeeping achieve greater human security?

5.1 Is Human Security a Motivator Behind Robust Peacekeeping?

Human security and the development towards robust peacekeeping are two simultaneous developments in UN peacekeeping, but this does not mean that they are necessarily related or that one is the cause of the other, since correlation does not imply causation. But from the reasoning presented in the previous chapters human security seems to be a motivating factor for questioning the principles of first generation peacekeeping, such as neutrality, and also for the more complex missions under the second generation, and this in its turn would seem to have, at least partly, motivated the more robust missions. The fact that force can be used to protect civilians in later peacekeeping is in itself a sign of both, the human security as motivator, and that peacekeeping has gotten more robust.

The movement in human security is connected to the change in the perception of sovereignty. In first generation peacekeeping the understanding of 'sovereignty as control' is clearly dominant. The principles of peacekeeping created during the first generation, such as consent and neutrality, are all in support of it and formulated in such a way that state sovereignty will be respected. Further the purpose of peacekeeping in first generation was to help sovereign states, to observe, and to ensure that international peace and security, understood as ensuring that states' sovereignty, were not violated.

This can be contrasted with third generation peacekeeping. There governments can be seen as perpetrators, so that their consent, while being asked for, is not a necessity any more. This, as well as the robustness of third generation peacekeeping would violate the old understanding of sovereignty. This implies a redefinition of sovereignty as 'sovereignty as responsibility' since the UN is
expressly commitment to upholding state sovereignty, as can for example be seen in the UN Charter (1945 art. 2), and its Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty of 1965. The understanding of sovereignty as responsibility leads to the conclusion that the principle of consent, as applied during the first generation, does not lead to greater respect for sovereignty, since the state, if labelled perpetrator, has already lost its sovereignty; legitimate consent can only be obtained, if there is a legitimate 'sovereign' to issue it.

Since the greater focus on human security is a development that can be seen in the whole UN (Annan 2000), and since 'sovereignty as responsibility' is in many ways 'sovereignty as protecting human security', this leads to the conclusion that the greater movement towards human security is the motivating factor behind the change in sovereignty. This also means that concern for human security is necessary for gaining and keeping sovereignty, from the perspective of the UN.

This redefinition of sovereignty is necessary for robust peacekeeping since in the older definition it would had violated the state's sovereignty, which the UN, according to its Charter, is trying to sustain and protect. The redefinition of sovereignty as responsibility also necessitates robust peacekeeping, since it is believed to achieve greater human security, and thus the best way to protect and re-establish sovereignty. From this it can be concluded that human security motivated the greater robustness in UN peacekeeping, by leading to a change of sovereignty, which the UN is trying to protect.

5.2 Does Robust Peacekeeping Achieve Greater Human Security?

This an extensive question and any answer found from the facts presented in this paper will not be conclusive, but this does not mean that it will not increase our knowledge on this issue.

If the motivator for more robust peacekeeping is human security, as argued for in the previous chapter, then the most relevant question for the future development of peacekeeping is: Does robust peacekeeping achieve greater human security? Since if it does not, new methods will have to be found.

If greater human security is the motivation behind the change towards more robust peacekeeping in the third generation, there is a fundamental problem with one of its premisses: that previous genera-
tions of peacekeeping were ineffective with regard to human security (Zisk Marten 2004:27-37). While it is true that some major tragedies could have been prevented with greater use of force, wars, genocides and war casualties have all been steeply declining since the end of the Cold War (Human Security Report 2005:23, 29, 40). This leads to the conclusion that second generation peacekeeping was, from a larger point of view, fairly effective. This puts the call for greater use of force in peacekeeping on questionable ground. Furthermore, greater use of force may have unforeseeable consequences for human security. However, robust peacekeeping missions have been deployed for over ten years, and we should look to them, not the past, when trying to answer this question, since it is possible that even if more robust peacekeeping would not necessarily have led to greater human security in general during the 1990s, it might today.

Because of this we will look to the previously presented case studies for the answer, since they represent third generation peacekeeping in practise.

But UNAMSIL and UNMIL were robust, when compared with peacekeeping before the twenty-first century, and they were also successful in securing human security. This is yet again a case of two correlating factors were it is easy to assume that correlation means causation, but this does not have to be the case.

In the case of UNMIL one might conclude prematurely that the strong force did ensure human security, since after the CPA was signed it was useful to have a strong deterrent force in the area so that all parties would follow the agreement. The deterrent role that UNMIL played by being militarily strong and deploying in force probably made its mere presence helpful to ensure stronger human security, since it helped carry out DDRR. However it is impossible to know whether this deterrent effect was really necessary. Especially in light of the strong commitment to the peace process of all local parties, the necessity of a strong UNMIL becomes slightly dubious.

UNAMSIL is more complicated. It is clear that peacekeepers endangered their own security by not making use of their robust mandate. It is further possible that the pure robustness of the mandate combined with too small and unwilling a force could have contributed to some of UNAMSIL's problems. The mandate made both the RUF and the Sierra Leonean population believe that UNAMSIL would take over where ECOWAS left, it might have created both too high expectations and made them seem more of a threat than they were, or was necessary. This shows the dangers for human security with a robust mandate and a force that will not support it. It is possible the failed
attempt to deter by a robust image endangered both the UN troops and the civilian population more than a less robust mandate would have. As it was UNAMSIL was seen as a party in the war by the rebels, and as a force that could protect them by the civilians, when it was neither.

Despite all this, both UNMIL and UNAMSIL are considered successes, but whether this is true for UNAMSIL is debatable. While the UN calls UNAMSIL “a Success Story in Peacekeeping” (UN 3), the deployment and practice on UNAMSIL was in many parts a failure, it has even been called “a textbook example of the weaknesses of UN peacekeeping” (Findlay 2002:296). What the UN refers to when calling the mission a success is probably the end result. The conflict in Sierra Leone is over and human security and the state has been strengthened. But was robust peacekeeping by UNAMSIL the cause of the end result? In some part, as we have seen UNAMSIL was first only robust in a theoretical sense, since the troops failed to use force even when under attack. But the later British force's robustness, which did make also UNAMSIL more robust, is a key reason for the successful outcome in Sierra Leone. From this it can be concluded that robust peacekeeping did achieve greater human security, and though it was not the mainly the UN's robustness; if UNAMSIL had been more robust it is well possible that the British would not have needed to intervene.

The conclusion that can be drawn from the experiences of UNMIL and UNAMSIL is that while a truly robust force in both cases did not hurt human security it might not have been needed in the case of UNMIL; UNAMSIL, on the other hand, would have greatly benefitted if the force had been truly robust at the time of deployment. When a force is robust in name and not in action this can endanger human security more than a less robust force would have. So, robustness does help to ensure greater human security in some cases, but is far from needed in all, and if a force is robust in name it has to be robust in nature too, otherwise it might end-up hurting human security instead of ensuring it.
6 Conclusion

As UN peacekeeping developed it clearly got more robust. During the first generation, mainly deployed in between the end of the WW II and the end of the Cold War, the use of force was very restricted and mainly used in self-defence. Human security had a very low priority during this period, while state sovereignty was viewed as inviolable. The second generation, mainly deployed in the period from the end of the Cold War until the 2000s, was characterised by stronger mandates, more complex missions, interference in intrastate wars and more focus on human security. This created tensions between the will to support human security and state sovereignty, which now was loosing some of its special status.

During the third generation, mainly deployed from the millennium shift on, the missions got even more complex, a stronger human security focus could be seen in the mandates, as showed in UNMIL and UNAMSIL, and peacekeeping concerned itself more with state-building. The tension between human security and state sovereignty still exists but human security seem to be winning, since a new understanding of sovereignty, 'sovereignty as responsibility' is gaining ground. A sign of this is that when states cannot protect their citizens they are considered 'failed states', and it is seen as the UN's responsibility to intervene in their domestic politics. Without this new understanding of sovereignty robust peacekeeping would be violating the state's sovereignty, something that would go against parts of the UN Charter and other UN resolutions.

'Sovereignty as responsibility' is in many ways 'sovereignty as protecting human security'. Furthermore this understanding of sovereignty requires more robust peacekeeping, if, as is commonly believed, more robustness achieves greater human security. Since the UN, through peacekeeping and peace-building, wants to protect and re-establish states' sovereignty more robust peacekeeping seems to be demanded, as it is in the Brahimi Report in 2000. This leads to the conclusion that human security is a main motivating factor for more robust peacekeeping.
Third generation peacekeeping is very recent and thus there have not been many missions or studies of them, because of this two case studies were conducted to gain a better understanding third generation peacekeeping in practice and the role played by the Brahimi Report.

These case studies showed that a clear third generation of peacekeeping exists not only in theory, and that it is defined by wider mandate, which allows more use of force, and a strong focus on human security. They also showed that more robust mandates do not have to result in a more robust mission. One mission, UNAMSIL, took place before the Brahimi Report and the other, UNMIL, after. UNAMSIL, though failing to be robust on the ground, did have much clearer use of force rules than the UNMIL, this indicated that the Brahimi Report was not as radical as it has been supposed and that the start of third generation peacekeeping was before the report. Despite this the reasoning and motivation presented in the Brahimi Report represents both missions well and can thus be seen as a good example of third generation peacekeeping, in practise as well as in theory, but more research remain to be conducted on how the third generation will develop.

The case studies were also used to investigate whether robustness in peacekeeping achieves greater human security. What could be derived from the case studies were that while robustness is not always needed to ensure human security, robustness is sometimes needed, since in UNAMSIL more robustness in practise would have prevented many of the problems of the mission. Furthermore, the fact that UNAMSIL was robust in theory and then not in practise may have endangered human security more than a less robust force would have. To conclude, robust peacekeeping is sometimes needed to ensure human security, but only if it is robust in practise as well as in theory.

The relation between human security and robustness in peacekeeping complex. The generations in peacekeeping of use of force go in hand with the growing influence of human security. This is not only a coincidence, human security is a motivating factor for more robust peacekeeping and sometimes robust peacekeeping is needed to ensure human security. The third generation in peacekeeping is new, though this study helps a bit on the way, there will still be much in relation to it that needs to be studied. What is certain is that this is, in relation to the use of force and human security, a new generation in UN peacekeeping.
7 List of References

7.1 Published Sources


7.2 Internet Sources and News Papers


## 7.3 UN Documents

- **United Nations, SG/SM/7126 of 20 Sep. 1999. Secretary-General presents his annual report to the General Assembly**