LONE WOLF TERRORISM

A CASE STUDY: THE RADICALIZATION PROCESS OF A CONTINUALLY INVESTIGATED & ISLAMIC STATE INSPIRED LONE WOLF TERRORIST

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The existing research on lone wolf terrorism and the use of case study research within this field and criminology is discussed and reviewed. In an attempt to find how an investigated and IS inspired extremist commits an act of lone wolf terrorism without any suspicion of authorities was the key focus. Through the use of a case study utilizing a chronological time-series analysis, Man Haron Monis responsible for the Martin Place Siege in Sydney, Australia in 2014 was examined. The analysis produced eleven significant events contributing to his radicalization. His radicalization process and the causal factors were examined against two radicalization pyramids developed by McCauley and Moskalenko (2014) that placed him at the most dangerous level of a lone wolf about to act. This thesis also indicates the limitations of lone wolf terrorism research and the further steps required in order for authorities to effectively identify and disrupt lone wolf terrorists prior to terrorist acts.

Keywords: Case Study, Counter-Terrorism, Islamic State, Lone Wolf Terrorism, Man Haron Monis, Martin Place Siege, Radicalization
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1. INTRODUCTION

Lone wolf terrorism is arguably becoming one of the most important trends in terrorism today (Hoffman, 2006; Joosse, 2015). During September of 2014, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, the official spokesman for the terrorist group Islamic State (IS), urged followers, sympathizers and Muslims living in western countries to “kill in any manner” (Lister, 2014; Kirkpatrick, 2014), “a disbelieving American or European – especially the spiteful and filthy French – or an Australian, or a Canadian or any other disbeliever” (Lister, 2014; Kirkpatrick, 2014). The undetectable and unpredictable threat of lone wolf terrorism is the fastest growing form of terrorism threatening western civilizations (Weimann, 2012). Lone wolf terrorism however is not a new phenomenon (Spaaij, 2012; Spaaij, 2010). The recent spate in IS inspired lone wolf attacks during 2014, suggest Islamic extremists are increasing threats, developing radical opinions and shifting to radical actions without any interference or detection. The recent attacks committed by Man Haron Monis in Australia, Zale Thompson in U.S.A, Martin Zehaf-Bibeau and Martin Couture-Rouleau in Canada, Omar Abdel Hamid El-Hussein in Denmark and Mehdi Nemmouche in Belgium, support the increased threat. With the increase in lone wolf attacks comes an increase in research. Although research surrounding lone wolf terrorism remains vastly scarce (Weimann, 2012; Gill, Horgan , & Deckert , 2014; Zierhoffer, 2014), significant studies regarding lone wolf terrorism have recently increased (see Spaaij, 2012; Zierhoffer, 2014; Gill, 2015; Meloy & Yakeley, 2014; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014), however unanswered questions are still impending our knowledge of lone wolf terrorism. The research thus far has provided some insight into the ideologies, motivations, behaviors and pathways that lead to lone wolf terrorism, however has failed to establish a usable and typical profile of a lone wolf, due to the individuality of each case (Gill, Horgan, & Deckert, 2014).

How an individual radicalizes, overcomes the socio-psychological and physical barriers and decides to undertake violence absent of any orders or formal terrorist group membership is vaguely understood (Gill, Horgan , & Deckert , 2014). In particular, the process in which an individual moves from radical opinion to radical action is limitedly known and studied (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014). Furthermore, a review of the literature has failed to identify studies focusing on publically active extremists well known to law enforcement and intelligence authorities that go on to commit acts of lone wolf terrorism despite being constantly investigated and monitored. Recent studies have focused on lone wolves who have managed to keep publically quiet and undetected until their attacks such as Anders Breivik, the far-right extremist responsible for 77 dead in Oslo, Norway (see Appleton, 2014; Gill, 2015) and Major Nidal Malik Hasan, the Islamic Fort Hood killer who killed 13 people on a Military Base in Texas, U.S.A (see Pantucci, 2011; Gill, 2015). The question of, how does an extremist who is publically active and constantly under investigation by
authorities develop radical opinions and turn to radical action without any interference, is still unanswered. This question causes significant concern regarding the ability of a lone wolf being able to successfully hide indicators of intent or actual intentions to commit acts of violence. Furthermore it highlights the significance of understanding various types of lone wolf terrorists. Not only due to their individuality, but also for further development of counter-terrorism strategies to mitigate the risks posed by such individuals. This thesis will address said issues and attempt to provide answers and suggestions to improve the understanding of lone wolf terrorism and in particular IS inspired.

1.1 Defining Key Concepts

1.1.1 Terrorism
Before lone wolf terrorism is understood, what is meant by terrorism must first be addressed in order to distinguish the differences. Although some definitions of terrorism are too broad or vague, a definition created by the European Union and supported by Rahimullah, Larmar, & Abdalla (2013) offers a simplistic and practicable definition. The definition defines a terrorist act as intentional acts that were committed with the aim of “seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization” (European Union, 2002, p. 4).

1.1.2 Lone Wolf Terrorism
Lone wolf terrorism thus far has suffered numerous definitional issues, indicating identification issues of lone wolf terrorists in this increasing form of terrorism (Nesser, 2012). To distinguish lone wolf terrorists from other types of terrorists such as group-based terrorists, home-grown terrorists or Pantucci’s (2011) four different types of lone wolves, is crucial in order to successfully identify intelligence and policing gaps that are allowing lone wolves to slip through. Due to the definitional issues failing to accurately identify differences between types of terrorists, creates difficulty in identifying lone wolf terrorism as a unique phenomenon and when and how lone wolf terrorist attacks occur (Nesser, 2012). Pantucci (2011, p. 9) categorizes lone wolf terrorism as “individuals pursuing Islamist terrorist goals alone, either driven by personal reasons or their belief that they are part of an ideological group (meaning a group of individuals who all claim to believe or follow a similar ideology: in this context, those who might be described as either members or followers of Al Qaeda or adherents to Al Qaedaism)”. This definition offers some similarities to others however is quite vague surrounding membership or involvement in terrorist groups. It already assumes that the lone wolf is Islamic and appears to support the possibility that a lone wolf may have psychological issues leading to them believing they are part of a terrorist organization. Before a definition can be applied, it should be precise with minimal or no limitations.
A narrower definition offered by Spaaij (2010) attempts to isolate the phenomenon of lone wolf terrorism and specifies, a lone wolf terrorist may identify or sympathize with extremist movements or terrorist organizations, however if they join an established organization, they cease to be deemed as a lone wolf. Ramon Spaaij who also conducted one of the most comprehensive studies in 2012 on lone wolf terrorism thus far, offers the most practicable definition in regards to this thesis. This definition is also used due to its distinct difference from other forms of terrorism. Spaaij (2010, p. 856) defines lone wolf terrorists as individuals who “(a) operate individually, (b) do not belong to an organized terrorist group or network, and (c) whose modi operandi are conceived and directed by the individual without any direct outside command or hierarchy”. This and the terrorism definition distinguish the differences from group-based terrorists and describes' what actions are considered as terrorism and when it is considered as lone wolf terrorism.

1.1.3 Radicalization

Thus far, scientific studies and researchers have failed to develop and agree on a universally accepted definition of Radicalization (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). Veldhuis and Staun (2009) identify limitations in the scientific knowledge of sociological and psychological processes that explain violent actions of extremists. This causes the inability to generalize core causal factors in which violent radicalization occurs, signifying the difficulty of creating a definition. In one of the only studies to focus solely on the radicalization process of lone wolf terrorists, McCauley and Moskalenko (2014) offer the most practical definition. Due to this thesis also utilizing the theoretical framework of the radicalization pyramids developed by McCauley and Moskalenko (2014), it is practical to adopt the same definition. Their definition defines political radicalization as “changes in beliefs, feelings, and actions in the direction of increased support for one side of a political conflict” (p. 70).

2. BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE

2.1 The History of IS

Before the history and rise of lone wolf terrorism is discussed, a brief history of IS must first be understood in order to understand the radicalization of an IS inspired terrorist selected for this thesis. IS, which is now the richest terrorist organization in the world, is not only a terrorist group, but also a political and military organization (Friedland, 2014). Once responsible for more than 5,500 deaths in Iraq alone within only four to six months (Cumming-Bruce, 2014) IS has a reputation for brutality. IS makes approximately one million dollars a day through smuggling oil, extortion, kidnapping ransoms and placing taxes on controlled areas. Dismissed by Al-Qaeda for being too extreme, IS shows no hesitation in immediately killing anyone who opposes their ideologies or refuses to adopt their radical interpretation of Islam (Friedland, 2014).
In a report by Friedland (2014) on behalf of The Clarion Project which is a nonprofit organization dedicated to exposing and challenging Islamic extremism, contains an extensive history of IS, which will be utilized for this analysis of their history. Originally established by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 1999 and first referred to as Jamaat al-Tahwid wa-i-Jihad (JTWJ), IS then focused on changing regime in Jordan. After the 2003 United States (U.S) invasion of Iraq, JTWJ became the most ferocious and brutal insurgency against American Forces. Before performing bay’ah, the oath of fealty to Osama Bin Laden in 2004, JTWJ were responsible for numerous high profile terrorist attacks, which included numerous beheadings, and the 2003 attack on the United Nations (UN) compound in Baghdad resulting in 22 dead, among many others. After pledging allegiance to Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, JTWJ became an official Al-Qaeda affiliate changing its name to Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). AQI began building up its own network of supporters and fighters during the Iraq insurgency, and although subjected to conditions of central Al-Qaeda, AQI developed its own “ultraviolent brand of jihad” (Friedland, 2014, p. 7). Ultimately this created a separation of fighters who became more aligned with Osama Bin Laden and fought in Afghanistan, and those who aligned with AQI in Iraq, specifically the current Islamic State leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Under instruction of Al-Qaeda’s central leadership, in 2006 Zarqawi subsumed small groups of fighters to enforce Sharia law as a state and develop the required infrastructure to do so. Shortly after, Zarqawi was killed in a U.S airstrike. AQI then changed its name to the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), and announced its intention to conquer Iraqi territory and create a Sharia-based state. Following this, the local population amongst the Iraqi territories turned against them. Supported by U.S forces and tribal militias, ISI were pushed out and in 2009, towns and cities in Iraq were handed over to Iraqi forces as the U.S started to withdraw.

Since Zarqawi’s death, two others led ISI, however were both killed in 2010. In 2010, the now leader of IS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took over ISI and developed the organizations strength and later joined the Syrian Civil War in 2013. Instead of attempting to defeat the regime of Bashar al-Assad, they began building their Islamic state and renamed the organization, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (or Islamic State in Iraq and Levant - ISIL). This decision caused tension amongst Al-Qaeda’s affiliates in Syria and eventually the two groups split when the leader of Al-Qaeda disowned ISIS. Through late 2013 to early 2014, ISIS started to build its powerbase in Syria, establishing strongholds, seizing territories and enforcing Sharia law. In early June 2014, ISIS captured Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul. On June 29, 2014, ISIS became the Islamic State (IS) and declared itself an Islamic caliphate with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as Caliph, or, head of the state. Posing a direct challenge to Al-Qaeda IS called for immediate loyalty to all Muslims throughout the world.
The idea of a caliphate state is a system of government in which the Caliph has sole religious and political jurisdiction over the entire Muslim nation. Their ideology lies within Salafist-jihadism, which is based on returning to the pure form of Islam, rejecting later additions as innovation and un-Islamic. This form of Islam allows IS to declare Muslims who deviate from this doctrine as Takfir (heretics) and punish them with death. Previously recruited from former Iraqi tribal militias who were not integrated into the Iraqi Military after fighting alongside U.S led forces, IS has now recruited fighters from over 100 countries through the use of the propaganda materials on the internet. Social media platforms such as twitter, which is estimated to have at least 46,000 pro-IS accounts (Berger & Morgan, 2015) and their magazine Dabiq, are being used to recruit and build followers. According the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as of September 2014, IS had between 20,000 to 31,500 fighters (Sciutto, Crawford, & Carter, 2014). Now aiming nothing short of world domination, IS is encouraging followers and sympathizers to carry out lone wolf attacks on western countries and any Muslims who disagree with their movement.

2.2 The History and Rise of Lone Wolf Terrorism
Lone wolf terrorism was supposedly built from a strategy of leaderless resistance dating back to the 19th century when anarchists conducted political assassinations and bombings under the message of “propaganda by deed” (Nesser, 2012; Woodcock, 1962). With the majority of these attacks being undertaken by individuals, after World War II anti-communist Americans utilized leaderless resistance against Soviet allies in Eastern Europe and Latina America (Nesser, 2012). Towards late 1980s and 1990s, American white supremacists such as the Ku Klux Klan resisted against the U.S government. During crackdowns on domestic racist movements they insisted individuals or small cells guided by common ideology was the only way to prevail against the government (Nesser, 2012). Catching the attention from leaders of Al-Qaeda in late 1990s, they adopted similar tactics and leaderless guerrilla warfare and individual terrorism was called upon (Nesser, 2012). More recently, Al-Qaeda and IS have began encouraging the tactic of leaderless resistance through encouraging individual terrorism, which is now being carried out by individual terrorists known as lone wolves (Nesser, 2012).

Although the focus of this thesis is on IS inspired and Islamic lone wolf terrorists, other types of lone wolves must also be acknowledged, as radicalized Muslims are not the only perpetrators of lone wolf terrorism. In 2011, far-right Norwegian terrorist Anders Behring Breivik committed his atrocities aimed at left wing supporters and political parties (Appleton, 2014). After detonating a car bomb outside a government building in Oslo, he opened fire on a summer camp organized by the Norwegian Labour Party’s youth association, the Workers Youth League (AUF) (Appleton, 2014). In 2013, Ukrainian Pavlo Lapshyn, a white supremacist and anti-Muslim terrorist murdered a Muslim pensioner and plotted three explosive devices at mosques in the West Midlands, U.K (Palmer, 2013). Both
Breivik and Lapshyn have been deemed as lone wolf terrorists and both indicate that no matter what the cause or ideology, an individual can become radicalized. Although further research is needed on all aspects of lone wolf terrorism, the current rise of IS is causing concern about the next generation of terrorists.

As defined previously, lone wolves are lone operators, isolated from any organized terrorist networks and pushed to violence without assistance. Spaaij’s (2012) previously referred to study, examined and presented general statistics on 88 lone terrorists responsible for 198 attacks and an in-depth case analysis of five well-known cases. It offers significant insight into the ideologies, motivations and radicalization processes of lone wolf terrorists. As there is no agreed upon profile or typical lone wolf terrorist due to individuality and rarity of occurrence (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014), researchers have still manage to find some common characteristics. These consist of; greater propensity to suffer mentally and socially (Nesser, 2012; Spaaij, 2012), criminal history (Gill, Horgan, & Deckert, 2014), tendency to mix personal frustrations with extremist ideologies and externalizing blame and their own problems on others (Nesser, 2012; Spaaij, 2012), depression, grievance, personal crisis’s (e.g. loss of job, financial problems, stress), weapons experience (Gill, Horgan, & Deckert, 2014; Nesser, 2012), and that they rarely commit acts out of impulsivity (Gill, Horgan, & Deckert, 2014).

Although ideologies of terrorists and lone wolf terrorists may be the same, typical terrorists often radicalize in different ways. Often they travel abroad for training, start associating with known terrorist or extremist organizations and purchase weapons or make explosives prior to an attack which generally bring them to the attention of law enforcement and intelligence agencies (Zierhoffer, 2014; Pantucci, 2011). The planning conducted by lone wolf terrorists generally goes unnoticed until it is too late (Pantucci, 2011; Zierhoffer, 2014). Today lone wolves generally acquire training online, researching ways in which to inflict harm in the name of their ideology and connecting with other radicals in order to develop their ideologies and motivations without any direct contact (Zierhoffer, 2014; Spaaij, 2012). Although some common characteristics have been identified, an attempt to find any research conducted on IS inspired lone wolf terrorists in general proves unsuccessful; signifying the importance of understanding IS inspired lone wolf terrorists.

2.3 The Radicalization Process

While no single factor can be held accountable for a lone wolf’s radicalization (Harris-Hogan, 2014; Precht, 2007), radicalization often begins when individuals become frustrated with their lives, society, or government policies both foreign and domestic (Precht, 2007). According to Precht (2007), a typical radicalization process is that individuals meet similar people and together, they go through series of events and phases
that ultimately can result in terrorism. Some factors that have been attributed to the radicalization process are; social and religious identification, social interaction and integration, prison, family and friend influences, socio-economic status, government polices, personal experiences, criminal history, globalization, racism, psychological state, the internet and global political, cultural and economic developments (Rahimullah, Larmar, & Abdalla, 2013; Veldhuis & Staun, 2009; Precht, 2007). In order to completely understand the radicalization process, it is essential to individually examine factors and behaviors that lead to radicalization (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009).

Today, the Internet is regarded as one of the most worrying contributors to the radicalization of lone wolves (Fredholm, 2011; Precht, 2007). Although some regard it as a minor contributor (Rahimullah, Larmar, & Abdalla, 2013; Veldhuis & Staun, 2009), others identify it as a significant catalyst (AVID, 2006; Borum, 2011), however this most likely depends on the cases selected. The Internet enables potential lone wolves to connect with others who share attitudes and ideologies, in which lone wolves can enhance their opinions, express their grievances and potentially feel part of a group or cause (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). In the case of Anders Behring Breivik, he explained how he used the Internet to gain tactical inspiration from Al-Qaeda and engage in extremist forums, in order to conduct his solo terrorist attack in Oslo (Nesser, 2012). The exposure to extremist propaganda materials and violent ideologies that potential lone wolves can access with limited detection on the Internet is endless. Mixed with the influence of a spiritual leader, sense of alienation, marginalization, political oppression, discrimination, perceived wrongdoings of western governments and the ambition of “wanting to do something”, are considered major contributors in the radicalization processes of individuals (Precht, 2007). Thus far extensive research has been conducted on radicalization processes of terrorists and home-grown terrorism. Currently the research lacks a serious knowledge on the radicalization of lone wolf terrorists. Previous studies have also failed to accurately distinguish between lone wolves and individual terrorists with connections or affiliations to terrorist organizations and networks (Nesser, 2012). While the results of this thesis will not be generalizable due to the use of only one case, it will hopefully provide some further insight into the radicalization process of a lone wolf.

2.4 Single Case Studies in Criminological Research

Lone wolf terrorism thus far has experienced quantitative and qualitative research including the use of case study methodology. Spaaij’s (2012) study incorporated five in-depth case studies, which proved successful in delivering understanding of lone wolf terrorism. Other studies have also successfully utilized case studies in order to explain their research questions (see, Joosse, 2015; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014; Appleton, 2014). Some studies comparing lone wolf terrorists to other types of lone offenders have identified similar criminological traits shared between both
offenders (see, McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014; Zierhoffer, 2014), which will also later be discussed in-depth (see, 6. The Significance of Criminological Research). Not only are case studies evidently important in providing an in-depth understanding into particular cases of lone wolf terrorism, within criminology they have also proven to be significant. The significance of criminological research to occur within the field of lone wolf terrorism is essential. As a majority of case studies seem to include more than one case, two famous single case studies written by two influential sociologists and criminologists will be mentioned in support of this method.

First written by Clifford Shaw in 1930 who is also known for introducing the Social Disorganization Theory alongside Henry McKay in 1942, The Jack-Roller focused on a delinquent boy referred to as Stanley. The study examined experiences, influences, attitudes and values of Stanley through the use of years of interaction between the author and Stanley. It offered a life history that provided a deep understanding into delinquency. Today this book is still well known amongst criminologists and although over 80 years old, it still provides relevant insight into delinquency (Maruna & Matravers, 2007). Another famous single case study was The Professional Thief by Edwin Sutherland in 1937 who was also known for his Differential Association Theory (1939). This study was a personal account of professional theft written by Chic Conwell, a man with more than twenty years experience as a pickpocket, shoplifter and conman. This study provides a rich depiction of professional thieves, their perception of the legal system and the methods and techniques used to evade the law. The study offers a valuable contribution to the understanding of crime and insight into preventative measures against professional theft. Single case studies from over 80 years ago are still being referred to today signifying the relevance this methodology still currently holds. Although this methodology appears to be forgotten, some recent studies focusing on lone wolf terrorism have successfully incorporated this method (see, Appleton, 2014; Gartenstein-Ross, 2014), highlighting the valuable information it can provide.

3. CASE STUDY PROTOCOL

3.1 Purpose of Protocol

A case study protocol can be regarded as a guide, which contains the procedures and general rules to be followed throughout the case study. Robert Yin (2009) who has published numerous books on the systematic procedures of case studies emphasizes the importance of following a procedure in order to produce a reliable and valid case study. Therefore the remainder of this thesis will follow procedures outlined by Yin (2009). According to Yin (2009) a case study protocol significantly contributes to the reliability of case study research. It intends to guide the investigator in carrying out data collection, identifying specific questions and methods to assist in data analysis, along with outlining how the case study will be
reported and presented. At first, the case study protocol was constructed as a guide however since the analysis has now been completed the case study protocol will be presented in present tense. It will indicate what has been done in order to conduct the analysis, present the findings and reach specific conclusions.

3.2 Overview of Case Study

3.2.1 Research Questions

1. Without the suspicion of authorities, how does a continually investigated extremist commit an act of lone wolf terrorism?

2. How can authorities effectively develop counter-terrorism strategies in order to identify lone wolves prior to an attack?

3.2.2 Project Objectives

The aim of this study is to address the issues previously identified through the use of a single case study in an attempt to gain further understanding of how a lone wolf turns to radical action. Following the research questions that arose upon completing a literature review of lone wolf terrorism and the radicalization process, it was identified that a case study would be the most effective option in an attempt to answer the research questions posed. When the “how” and “why” questions are posed, there is limited control over events, and the focus is on contemporary issues, case studies are the preferred method in order to address the research questions posed (Yin, 2009).

3.2.3 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework that will be utilized for this thesis comes from a study conducted by McCauley and Moskalenko (2014) that attempted to create profiles of lone wolf terrorists and identify what moves them from radical opinion to radical action. The reasoning for selecting this framework comes from a review on literature regarding radicalization models and frameworks, a majority in which hasn’t focused on lone wolf terrorists. A continually updated report published by Homeland Security Digital Library and written by Greta Marlatt (2015), compiles all literature regarding lone wolf terrorism including journal articles, books, reports, hearings and theses. After reviewing this list McCauley and Moskalenko’s (2014) framework offers the most recent and relevant framework in regards to this thesis and the research questions. McCauley and Moskalenko (2014) developed two pyramids, first being Radicalization of Opinion (see figure 1) and second, Radicalization of Action (see figure 2). McCauley and Moskalenko (2014) concluded the most dangerous indicator of a lone wolf is the combination of radical opinion with means and opportunity for radical action. The criteria for each level has also been included next to the figures in order to simplify the understanding of how an individual can be placed on a particular level.
In this pyramid, the bottom level contains Muslims who do not accept the west is waging against Islam and do not believe in fighting against disbelievers in defense of Islam. The second level consists of those who sympathize with the first stages of beliefs by extremists and Jihad that the west is waging war against Islam not terrorism. The third level is Muslims who believe Jihadists and Islamic forces in this case IS, are fighting in defense of Islam and their actions are justified morally, politically and religiously. The highest level that is the most radicalized level of the opinion pyramid is a Muslim who believes there is an individual duty to defend Islam against disbelievers and criticizers.

The bottom level contains all Muslims who are politically inactive despite whether their beliefs or feelings are at any stage of the opinion pyramid, meaning they must not be taking any action on their views. The second level consists of those who engage in legal and nonviolent political action whether it's individually or with an activist group. If this group is an extremist group it still applies however if it's deemed a terrorist organization or network it no longer fits the definition of lone wolf terrorism and should be disregarded. The third level contains Muslims who engage in any illegal political action that may include violence. Although the authors do not clarify this, it is assumed this level incorporates any illegal actions or behaviors that are politically motivated. For example if a protest breaches the legal threshold by including violence this would be

Muslims who feel individual duty to participate in defence of Islam
Jihadists are acting in defence of Islam and actions are justified
West is waging war against Islam
Do not accept any global jihad narrative

Radicals who target lethal violence at civilians
Engaged in illegal political action that may include violence
Engaged in legal and nonviolent political action
Politically inert despite any beliefs or feelings
considered as the Radical level of action. Lastly, the top level consists of radicals who target lethal violence at civilians in order to fulfill their cause, thus becoming a terrorist.

McCauley and Moskalenko (2014) indicate that the borders between each level of the action pyramid represent the most significant transition points in the radicalization process. Understanding how an individual starts at no action and moves from legal action to illegal action, and then overcomes the barriers to commit terrorism, was the most significant focus of the case study analysis. Although it is not a stage theory, its purpose is to identify levels that an individual may go through during radicalization. This theoretical framework was utilized to analyze the data and identify events which suggested what level and in which pyramid the individual was (see 3.3.3 Analysis Method, for more information).

3.2.1 Selection of the Case
Following the development of the research questions, a specific criterion was required in order to locate a suitable single case that could be effectively used in regards to the theoretical framework. The reason for only selecting a single case is due to the limit of the thesis and the in-depth analysis that occurred on the specific case. The criterion that was drafted in order to find a suitable candidate was; the individual must fit the previously mentioned definition of a lone wolf terrorist, media and or governments must refer to the individual as a lone wolf, and the individual must of been a known and publicly active extremist who had been under constant periods of investigation. The first point of search was conducted through the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI), however these databases offered no options for selecting an individual or lone wolf terrorist when sorting incidents by the perpetrator category. Following this, searches were conducted on Google under the Web and News sections with the keywords of, lone wolf terrorist, extremist, radical, and lone terrorist attack. Given the increased lone wolf terrorist attacks during 2014 and the attention in which media has given to this phenomenon, resulted in extensive results. To narrow this down, consideration was given to the countries previously mentioned in the introduction that witnessed incidents in 2014. From memory, a heavily publicized incident occurred in Australia during the end of 2014, therefore the keywords; Australia and lone wolf terrorist were entered into Google. Through a review of the results, the incident that occurred in Sydney at the Lindt Café known as the Martin Place Siege was produced. Committed by a known extremist Man Haron Monis, upon reviewing numerous credible sources regarding this incident it was evident that Man Haron Monis successfully met the criteria.
3.2.2 Case Background

Siege:

On December 15 2014 at approximately 8:33 am, 50-year-old Man Haron Monis walked into the Lindt Café in Martin Place located in the heart of Sydney’s Central Business District (CBD). Producing a sawn-off shotgun, he took 18 people hostage and declared, “this is an attack, I have a bomb” (Bibby & Hall, 2015). In the most devastating terrorist attack to occur on Australian soil post 9/11, the siege lasted for 17 hours resulting in numerous hostages escaping throughout the siege and Monis executing one hostage. Several other hostages and a police officer were wounded and another hostage killed as a result of police bullet fragments ricocheting off walls in the exchanging of gunfire that killed Monis (Bibby & Hall, 2015; Thawley & Comley, 2015). During the siege Monis ordered hostages to stand by a window and hold up an Islamic-style flag whilst declaring the attack was by IS. During the siege he claimed he had planted numerous radio-controlled bombs throughout Sydney CBD, however these claims were later revealed as false (Bibby & Hall, 2015). The flag Monis had was later identified as the Black Standard Flag, which encompasses the Shahada that translates to “There is no God but Allah, and Mohammed is the messenger of God”. During the siege Monis made three demands, direct contact with Australia’s Prime Minister, delivery of an IS flag and for the media to broadcast the siege as an attack on Australia by IS (Massola & Wroe, 2014). It is understood that none of these demands were met. After the siege ended, IS never claimed association with Monis or the attack however have praised the actions of Monis through their propaganda magazine Dabiq.

Brief Personal Background:

Originally from Iran, Monis received political asylum in Australia in 1996 and from this date until the attack, had been well known to authorities in relation to his infatuation with extremism, criminal activities and public activism. Monis had been subjected to numerous law enforcement and security investigations whilst living in Australia, however no investigations or continuous assessments of information related to Monis had provided any intentions related to a potential act of terrorism or violent attack. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation’s (ASIO) final assessment of Monis during an investigation in 2008-09 deemed that Monis was not a threat to national security. Despite this final assessment, Monis remained the subject of numerous Joint Counter Terrorism Team (JCTT) meetings regarding concern over statements made by Monis and information provided by the public regarding his social media accounts.

The evidence did not provide any insight into whether or not Monis had substance abuse issues, however it is presumed that he didn’t due to it not being mentioned. It is also unclear whether Monis had any mental health issues, however in 2010 and 2011 he received treatment at a community mental health center. Following the siege, The New South Wales (NSW)
Chief Psychiatrist reviewed the medical documentation on Monis. It was concluded that at no time did Monis represent a potential risk to others or himself and at no time was it necessary to admit him to hospital for treatment of mental illness (Thawley & Comley, 2015). Although it was concluded he showed no evidence of mental instability, several media outlets have released statements from previous lawyers and associates of Monis that question his mental stability. Monis was previously refused further legal representation by one lawyer due to his behavior and another lawyer described Monis as “mad as a cut snake” (Lukov, Taft, Lawson, Coleman, Dawson, & Poole, 2014).

Monis had a “long history of provocative, attention seeking behaviour and unreliable or false claims” (Thawley & Comley, 2015, p. v). He was a prolific social media user, and was attracted to high-governmental officials as he had contacted the Queen, Barack Obama, Tony Abbott and numerous other politicians and authorities. Monis claimed he fled Iran due to being a former spy and that he was suspected of leaking information to foreign governments and therefore would be executed if returned to Iran. The Iranian government had a different story as they tried on numerous occasions to have Monis extradited back to Iran to face fraud charges. It is alleged that Monis fled Iran due to embezzling approximately US$200,000 whilst working at a travel agency. Monis had left his wife and two children to flee to Australia and while living in Australia he met Noleen Payson Hal whilst self-employed claiming to be a spiritual healer. After having two children with Pal, their relationship eventually ended due to Pal no longer willing to tolerate Monis’s behavior. Monis later met Anastasia Droudis who later converted to Islam and renamed Amirah Droudis. Droudis appeared to be influenced by Monis as she had conducted a protest on behalf of Monis and allegedly murdered Pal. On national television, the Muslim community rejected Monis claiming they had never heard of him and challenging him to come forward. Although he brought his perceived injustices against himself by committing numerous criminal offences and publicly criticizing the government, Monis believed he was right. He appeared as a mentally unstable individual who believed Islam and himself were being constantly discriminated against by the Australian government, their policies and their involvement in the Middle East. The results section will further explore the background of Monis and highlight the most significant events in order to understand his case and how he radicalized.

3.3 Methodology

3.3.1 Data Collection Procedure

Data was collected from sources that were readily available over the Internet as witness statements, victim statements and confidential assessments and information on Monis and the Martin Place siege have not been released due to an inquest into the deaths and the siege currently underway. The sources used revealed numerous credible evidence in regards to information on Monis. The data incorporated multiple sources including documentation, archival records, and other
sources such as social media accounts, videos and photos. The documentation consisted of a governmental review written for Australia’s Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, which was compiled by numerous sources including health records and reports and assessments provided by law enforcement, intelligence agencies and immigration. Other documentation incorporated investigative reports regarding complaints submitted by Monis to the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) and court cases regarding Monis and Droudis’s appeal to the High Court of Australia. Archival records were selected with caution to eliminate any unreliable or skeptical sources. Only past and current news articles from credible and major foreign and Australian news sources such as The Australian, Herald Sun, The Sydney Morning Herald (SMH), The Daily Telegraph, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Cable News Network (CNN), Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) and TIME were selected. This was conducted in order to increase reliability of evidence. In total there were 42 news articles that were selected and analyzed. Information and statements from social media platforms belonging to Monis specifically, Twitter and Facebook and videos and photos released by News sources were also gathered. In order to create a conclusive and corroborated analysis and result, data triangulation was performed on the sources gathered for the analysis. This was done by collecting information from all sources with the aim of corroborating facts and events from multiple sources in order to increase reliability and construct validity. The list of sources used for this analysis can be found in the Appendix section of this thesis.

3.3.2 Case Study Questions

This section outlines the specific questions that were kept in mind whilst collecting data and for identifying the sources and evidence most likely to assist in answering the research questions.

1. When and why did authorities start and stop investigating Monis?
2. Can Monis be identified with any of the levels of McCauley and Moskalenko’s (2014) radicalization pyramids?
3. Does Monis gradually adopt stronger opinions or do they develop suddenly?
4. What were the motivating and causal factors of Monis’s attack?
5. Are there any rival explanations as to why Monis radicalized and committed this attack?

3.3.3 Analysis Method

A time-series analysis, specifically a chronological analysis was performed in order to trace and identify significant events over time and investigate the causal relationships between events. Yin (2009) identifies five analytic techniques, pattern matching, explanation building, time-series analysis, logic models and cross-case synthesis. The reasoning behind the selection of a chronological time-series analysis was the ability to trace significant events over time, a major strength of case studies (Yin, 2009).
Moreover, this method incorporates numerous types of variables and is not limited to a single independent or dependent variable such as logic models (Yin, 2009). If followed strictly and correctly, a chronology allows the investigator to compare to a predicted path guided by an explanatory theoretical framework (Yin, 2009). As advised, the chronology was compared to McCauley and Moskalenko’s (2014) theoretical framework and the conditions of a chronology identified by Yin (2009) were followed in order to successfully perform the analysis. Yin (2009) indicates the theoretical framework used must meet a specific condition; “some events must always be followed by others, on a contingency basis” (p. 148). From the four conditions mentioned, this one was chosen due to McCauley and Moskalenko’s (2014) two radicalization pyramids identifying a predicted path through levels of radicalization on a case-by-case basis as they indicate although possible, a person is not required to progress through each level in a linear fashion. The objective of this analysis was to examine “how” and “why” questions between the relationships of events and postulate potential causal relationships. Yin (2009) emphasizes the importance of causal propositions in chronologies, as without it chronologies become descriptive chronicles. Consideration was also given to rival explanations or other possibilities in order to increase internal validity amongst inferences as advised by Yin (2009). Yin (2009) specifies an interruption in the time-series is the occasion for postulating such causal inferences. Yin (2009) identifies an essential feature of a chronology in order to guide the analysis and increase explanatory validity and reliability, is to specify the three following conditions prior to collecting and analyzing data. The factors decided for this thesis are added under the conditions.

1. Specific indicators to be traced over time
   - Levels of McCauley and Moskalenko’s (2014) opinion and action pyramids
   - Individual radicalization indicators identified by McCauley & Moskalenko (2011)
     - Personal Grievance (perceived harm or injustice to self)
     - Political Grievance (perceived harm or injustice perpetrated upon or threatening a group the person identifies with)
     - Slippery Slope (engages with radical group or individuals espousing radical ideologies)
     - Power of Love (initially engages with radical group or individuals espousing radical ideologies due to social or emotional bonds to members)
     - Status and Thrill Seeking (lured to radical group to elevate social status or gain perceived power by living dangerous life of a terrorist)
     - Unfreezing (destabilizing life event e.g. loss of family, loss of liberties, that removes social/lifestyle barriers to radicalized activity)
   - Means of committing an attack (e.g. purchases weapon)
2. Specific time intervals to be covered
   - From the date the terrorist act was committed (2014) back to Monis’s arrival in Australia in 1996. Time intervals will cover as many years as needed in order to identify the radicalization process of Monis.

3. Presumed temporal relationships between events
   - It is presumed the temporal relationship between an event and a development of opinion by Monis will be gradual and quite slow in the beginning.
   - It is presumed that leading up to the attack on December 15 2014, the timing of the causal relationship between an event and outcome will become shorter due to Monis having to overcome the barriers to commit an attack.
   - It is presumed that the events leading up to his attack will have greater impact on his radicalization, whether they are numerous events within a short time period or more significant events than previous.

The above conditions were considered when collecting and analyzing the data. Specific events were identified through the guidance of case study questions, indicators and the theoretical framework. Following this, a chronology was composed of the most significant life events that were identified as contributing to the radicalization of Monis.

4. RESULTS

The analysis of the data provided comprehensive answers to the research questions. A brief answer will be provided under the research questions for simpler understanding before being later discussed in full.

1. Without the suspicion of authorities, how does a continually investigated extremist commit an act of lone wolf terrorism?

   Answer: Monis was on the ASIO’s watch list until their final assessment concluded Monis was not a threat to national security in 2008-2009. Monis never escalated to the legal thresholds of Australian terrorism legislation that would promote authorities to treat him as a priority investigation. It is believed that Monis was not within the top 400 counter-terrorism investigations within Australia at the time of the siege. The government has indicated the intelligence of Monis in that he never crossed the line and knew what constituted as inciting terrorism. The current counter-terrorism measures and legislations of Australia allowed Monis to remain out of suspicion. He was at the most critical point of a lone wolf about to act and had the means and opportunity to commit an attack without the knowledge of anyone. Although Monis was radicalized and against the government, it appears he kept his intentions to himself and truly fit the definition of a lone wolf terrorist.
Question 2 regarding counter-terrorism measures will be mentioned in section 8, Future of Counteracting Lone Wolf Terrorism.

The analysis produced eleven significant events. These events have been considered significant in understanding the radicalization process of Monis and answering the research questions. The results will be presented through identified events in chronological order rather than dates of occurrence, as some events overlapped others. This has been done in order to create an easier understanding and following for the reader. It should be identified that at first some events may appear insignificant. When considering all the events and the causal relationships between events, this provided merit in determining the events as significant in order to understand how another event might of occurred. Following the description of the events, the results will be discussed and compared to McCauley and Moskalenko’s (2014) opinion and action pyramid.

Event 1 – Monis applies for a protection visa
Monis first arrived in Australia in 1996 on a business visa however soon applied for a protection visa in November 1996 claiming that if he were to return to Iran he would be executed for cooperating and leaking information to foreign governments. Monis claimed he was a top-level Iranian spy, a cleric and had involvement with Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and had connections with high-level officials in Iran. Monis also claimed association with the Ahmadi sect of Islam which practices peaceful Islam. This was identified as evidence that Monis did not have radical views during this time and was yet to become radicalized. In support of his claims, Amnesty International also provided a letter to Immigration supporting the claims of Monis. After numerous security assessments by ASIO Monis was finally granted his protection visa nearly four years later in August 2000. Shortly after this Monis appeared on a Farsi radio station expressing negative remarks about the Australian government and blaming ASIO for the delays in his visa. This was identified as the beginning of Monis’s frustration towards the Australian government. In January 2014, Amnesty International made a media release saying they had been conned by Monis and his claims into thinking he would be put at risk if returned to Iran and therefore they wrote a letter in support of his claims.

Event 2 – Sexual assault offences
After being issued with a security guard license from 1997 through to 1999 it is believed Monis may of worked for a brief period as a security guard. In 2000, it is believed Monis opened a spiritual healing and clairvoyant service claiming he was an expert in astrology, numerology, meditation and black magic. Attracting women through various advertisements, Monis began sexually assaulting women from August 2002 to December 2003 whilst disguising his actions as a spiritual healing technique and warning women not to tell anyone. During August 2003 to December 2006 and
again during February 2008 to September 2010, Monis allegedly committed further sexual assault offences. All his alleged offences were committed during the same circumstances as his first offences.

No charges were ever made until April 2014 when Monis was arrested and charged with three counts of sexual assault from 2002 and was remanded in custody until May 2014. Two months prior to Martin Place siege, Monis was charged with a further 37 sexual assault offences from 2002-2010 in October 2014. With bail conditions that he must not approach or contact the women he assaulted, a court date was set to 27 February 2015. This is when Monis would answer to over 40 sexual assault offences. This was considered a major influence in his motivation for the siege, as Monis was most likely facing a lengthy term of imprisonment for offences which he claimed were politically made against him comparing himself to the case of Julian Assange the founder of whistle-blowing website Wikileaks.

**Event 3 – Australian citizenship**

In October 2002, Monis applied for Australian citizenship. After concerns raised by ASIO and numerous security assessments, Monis was granted citizenship two years later in October 2004. During this time, Monis made several complaints about delays in his visa. His legal representatives complained on his behalf, as Monis believed he was being discriminated against due to being a Muslim.

**Event 4 – Beginning of Monis’s activism and grudge against Channel 7 and the Australian government**

On July 4 2007, Australian TV network Channel 7 aired a segment during their morning TV program Sunrise, regarding doctors in the U.K as well as an Australian doctor whom had been arrested in suspected connection with the 2007 Glasgow terror attacks. The following day Monis wrote to Channel 7 condemning the segment believing the comments made by the TV hosts and guest speakers were “insulting Muslims generally and Muslim doctors particularly...portray Muslims doctors in a negative light”. A year later in June 2008, Monis’s partner Amirah Droudis conducted a protest at Martin Place outside the Channel 7 building in regards to the segment Monis had criticized. Following this, police questioned Monis in relation to the protests as it was evident he encouraged Droudis to protest. Asked whether he is planning anymore protests, Monis replied, “Well, it depends if the Australian government condemns the terrorist comment which was broadcast by Sunrise (then) I don’t have to continue but if the Attorney-General doesn't condemn Channel 7 for its terrorist act I believe it is my religious duty to continue”. During their discussion Monis also stated “If our fair defence against your unfair attack is called terrorism we are proud to be called terrorists”. Monis then continued to send ranting letters to authorities about the Sunrise program and referred to the comments made as terrorist acts as he indicated the “failure” of authorities in investigating “terrorist acts at Martin Place, Sydney, Australia”.

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During this time Monis also wrote complaints to ACMA and an investigation was made, however the complaints were dismissed as no evidence of discrimination was found. Assuming this infuriated Monis, he later continued his grudge against Channel 7 during another segment, which was aired about him during 2009, however this will be highlighted in another event. It was also identified that during 2012, Monis wrote on his website Sheikharon.com, “That from 2001 I was silent, I was dead”. “Until 4 July 2007 I was in a deep sleep. Sunrise woke me up! God can awaken a person by many different means even by a terrorist broadcast from the program Sunrise on Channel Seven from the Australian TV!” “I thank god and I wont give up until the Australian government condemns that broadcast which was instructing terrorism”. This event was identified as a major influence in the frustration that Monis developed and held with the Australian government. Prior to this event, it was also discovered that Monis travelled overseas on 21 separate occasions from September 2003 to July 2007, generally for less than a week and sometimes for only one day. The purpose of the travel is unknown however once this period of intense travel ended, almost immediately a period of heightened activism began from 2007 until the Martin Place Siege.

Event 5 – Monis begins using the Internet to voice his injustices

In August 2007, Monis created his website Sheikharon.com which has since been taken down following the siege. He used this to post provocative statements about the Australian government, the war in Afghanistan and to post the letters he sent and received from various agencies and authorities in regards to his complaints. From 2007 to 2010, the Attorney-Generals department had at least ten letters that represented Monis’s extremist beliefs. During this time he contacted politicians, police, public officials, prominent members of Muslim communities, the Queen and Barack Obama. In 2007 Monis appeared convinced the Liberal Party were plotting a series of explosions within Australia and planning to blame Muslims. Some of the most alarming statements he made were during April 2008 when he wrote a Fatwa, which is more or less an Islamic ruling, which is supposed to be written by an expert in religious law. This Fatwa referred to the U.S, U.K and Australian heads of states as war criminals. Following this, Monis wrote in support of the Mujahidin in Pakistan, which are guerrilla fighters in Islamic countries whom fight against non-Muslim forces. He stated “I hope one day I will be able to Jihad in the higher levels as you do”. In 2009 after the Victorian bushfires in Australia, which claimed the lives of 171 people, Monis celebrated the deaths in claiming it was the work of Allah who punished Australia for seeking the death penalty for the Bali Bombers whom killed 202 people, 88 of them Australian. These statements along with another event, which will be referred to next, indicate the development of Monis’s extremist views and support for Islamic forces fighting against the west.

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Event 6 - Offensive letters sent to killed Australian soldiers

In November 2007, Monis began his campaign of offensive letters when he wrote a letter to a father of an Australian Commando killed fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan stating that he “can’t be proud” of his son who “died for nothing” in an unjust war against innocent people. Due to this letter and content on Monis’s website ASIO commenced an investigation into Monis in April 2008 which would be their final assessment of Monis before the Martin Place siege. In May 2008, one week after the death of another Australian soldier killed in Afghanistan, Monis wrote to the family comparing Australian soldiers to Nazi’s, writing, “we shouldn’t be honouring them as we don’t honour Hitler’s soldiers”. In December 2008, another Australian soldier was killed and Monis’s opinions appeared to become more hostile as he wrote to the parents of the soldier, “such a son is evil, and an evil son deserves hell” and “anyone who attacks another country and oppresses its people... is in the evils side and... she/he will go to hell”. Monis continued to write, “all Australian soldiers and supporters of their invasion into Afghanistan are evil” and “why should we call a pig a hero? Why should we respect the contaminated body of an Australian soldier?” “We must speak out against the wrong policy of our Government”. In January 2009, a Jewish Australian soldier was killed in Afghanistan and Monis wrote “I am wondering why a Jewish person enjoys the killing of innocent people”, “some Jews who blame Hitler for violations of human right are not much better than him”, “they are dirtier than pig”.

Following this, ASIO concluded their investigation in December 2008 indicating there was no information to suggest Monis or his known associates in Australia and overseas are a threat to national security. ASIO’s report also stated “while Monis endeavors to use language that is ambiguous and open to interpretation, he makes sure not to cross any lines and tries to ensure he can protect himself from allegations of inciting terrorism”. In August 2009, Channel 7 news program Today Tonight aired an investigative report on national television exposing Monis and the letters he was sending to families of fallen soldiers. Referring to Monis as a “fake sheikh”, Monis was outraged and filed another complaint with ACMA claiming the report insulted Muslims and misrepresented his viewpoints. After ACMA investigated, Monis’s complaints were dismissed. This was identified as the second injustice that Monis experienced from Channel 7. After being arrested and charged with seven counts of using a postal or similar service to menace, harass or cause offence, in relation to the letters in October 2009, Monis chained himself to a railing outside a Sydney Courthouse protesting the charges. In May 2010, Monis was charged with a further six counts of postal offences and pleaded not guilty. After a number of appeals Monis was convicted on 12 counts of postal offences in August 2013. During this time, Monis’s partner Droudis also pleaded guilty to one count of aiding and abetting him.
Event 7 – Monis threatens to shoot his ex-partner

In July 2011, shortly after leaving Monis, the mother of Monis’s two children, Ms Noleen Hayson Pal sought the attention of police following a confrontation with Monis. It was alleged that Monis asked to urgently see Pal and that they argued about a family dispute whilst Pal’s parents remained in the car waiting for Pal. It is evident during this dispute, Monis was demanding that Pal come back to him and when she refused Monis threatened her saying “If I don’t get to see the boys more than I’m seeing [them] now,” “I will make you pay, even if I have to shoot you”. Following this Monis was charged with stalk or intimidate intending to cause fear of physical or mental harm. Ten months later in May 2012, a Sydney Magistrate found Monis not guilty. Despite the NSW police requesting an Apprehended Domestic Violence Order (ADVO) be placed on Monis to protect Pal, this was dismissed during sentencing. Although this event doesn’t directly connect to the radicalization of Monis, Australian authorities attempted to convict him of this offence and lost and it is likely Monis would have seen this as a victory.

Event 8 – Monis is deemed not a fit and proper person

In June 2012, Monis applied for a renewal of his security guard license to only be declined. He was informed that he was not a “fit and proper person” to hold a security guard license. Monis then tried to appeal this decision however was dismissed as NSW police had recommended against the decision based on the postal offences and other concerning behaviors of Monis. This event was considered another injustice for Monis as he was directly informed that he was too unstable to hold a license he had previously held.

Event 9 – Monis begins association with an extremist organization

In June 2012, Monis attended a protest conducted by Hizb-ut-Tahrir a known extremist organization. Its aim is to resume the Islamic way of life and convey it to the world in order to create a society that operates under Sharia law and thus create an Islamic State. It was established that Monis began associating with Hizb-ut-Tahrir in 2012 and continued to do so until the Martin Place siege. At the protest, Monis could be seen conversing with the leader of Hizb-ut-Tahrir Australia, and since this date has continued to his show presence at various meetings and protests held by the organization. During September 2014, two months prior to the Martin Place siege, Monis was at meeting held by Hizb-ut-Tahrir in response to terrorism related raids on a dozen houses within Sydney. During this meeting Monis engaged in a recorded conversation with a reporter from the Sydney Morning Herald. During this recording he is heard saying, “we just want to voice against injustice, and we want to express our feelings that this is not a war against terrorism, it is a war against Muslims.”
He continues to discuss his numerous letters he sent to the government and expressed the authorities do not accept what he has to say and that “if the person is not Muslim they just don’t do anything”. He then states, “I believe the speech is not enough, we need to do something”. These behaviors of Monis clearly indicated his desire to defend Islam against the policies and actions of foreign countries and in specific, Australia. Monis was evidently associating with similar-minded people who railed against the government, the west and the media, which is a suitable environment for radicalization. His engagement with and support of this organization was considered as an influence in the further development of his radicalization as this event also represented the Slippery Slope indicator identified by McCauley & Moskalenko (2011).

**Event 10 – Monis is charged with accessory to murder**

On April 21 2013 Monis’s former partner Pal was murdered being stabbed 18 times and set alight. During November 2013, Monis’s current partner Droudis was charged with the murder and Monis was charged as an accessory to the murder. It was alleged that Monis went to elaborate lengths to create an alibi, faking a car accident outside a police station and complaining of chest pains in order to be taken to a hospital whilst also filming someone when asking them the time. After the charges were laid, bail was refused and Monis was jailed for more than six weeks. After his release in December 2013, Monis claimed he was tortured in prison as the prisoners and guards despised him for his political views and offensive letters regarding Australian soldiers. Monis claimed to his lawyer he was assaulted every time he tried to sit or lie down and his lawyer claims Monis became frightened and furious from this and that “he was totally broken”. At one stage Monis staged a protest outside courthouses in Sydney wearing chains and holding a sign claiming he had been tortured for his political views. Following this In April 2014, Monis claimed ASIO and NSW Police were involved in the murder of Pal and requested a local court to investigate however this request was denied. The next court date in relation to the charges is unknown as it may not of been set yet or the authorities have not released the information.

**Event 11 – Monis loses his final bid to overturn his unjust convictions**

On December 12, 2014 Monis’s legal representatives appeared in the High Court of Australia on behalf of Monis in order to overturn the convictions from the offensive letters. Monis believing the letters were “condolence cards” and aimed at gaining support from the families, desperately wanted exoneration from these offences. The appeal was dismissed and Monis had lost his final bid to overturn his convictions. His previous appeals that he based on the constitution of free political speech meant all his options to appeal the charges were exhausted. This event was considered a major tipping point for Monis along with personal and political grievance.
5. DISCUSSION

The events identified from the analysis, indicated the increase in Monis’s extremist views leading up to the siege and the factors that influenced his radicalization process. During Monis’s time in Australia, it is evident he had negative experiences with the Australian government from the date he entered Australia and first applied for his protection visa. Almost immediately he felt discriminated against, yet he remained willing to live in Australia. Leading up to the siege, Monis had over 40 sexual assault offences and an accessory to murder offence that he had still not been sentenced for. He also felt grave personal and political injustice when held in custody at the end of 2013 and early 2014 as he experienced torture for offences he felt wrongfully charged for.

Monis was frustrated at Australia, their policies and their war against what he claimed was Muslims not terrorism. It appeared as though it was only a matter of time until Monis would attempt to go beyond words and turn to actions to get his message across. Perhaps the message conveyed by IS in September 2014 urging all Muslims to attack disbelievers encouraged Monis. This along with personal and political grievances, likelihood of lengthy imprisonment and that he would be even more cut off from his children were considered as causal factors. Although only speculation can be made on the motivations of Monis, the analysis of the data supported McCauley & Moskalenko’s (2014) action and opinion pyramids and provided answers to the research questions. The discussion will focus on the causal relationships between each event, the radicalization indicators identified by McCauley & Moskalenko (2011) and how the events compared to the radicalization process of McCauley & Moskalenko’s (2014) action and opinion pyramids.

When Monis first arrived in Australia he expressed his affiliation with the Ahmadi sect of Islam, a peaceful form of Islam that condemns bloodshed and strives on justice and morality. This is when the first level of McCauley & Moskalenko’s (2014) opinion pyramid, Neutral, was identified during Event 1. The first level of the action pyramid, Inert, was also identified as at this stage Monis had not conducted any actions related to political views. Event 1, Event 2 and Event 3, all demonstrated Personal Grievance, the perceived injustice or harm to self. This was evident from the beginning of Monis’s time in Australia and this indicator was also considered a major contributor to the radicalization and motivations of Monis. In Event 1, the lack of extremist views and support for Jihad was evident as there was no information to suggest otherwise. This event was when the first perceived injustice occurred as Monis condemned the Australian government for the delay in his protection visa.
In *Event 2*, Monis claimed the Australian government was discriminating against him for being Muslim. After this, *Event 3* witnessed Monis being charged for sexual assault charges that he later perceived as unjust, and believed the government was charging him for political reasons. The delays in both the protection visa and Australian citizenship, made Monis feel discriminated against and ultimately this is when he first developed his negative views of the Australian government. In the first three events the causal relationships between each of those events were not clearly evident and also not particularly important. These events seemed to have stronger causal relationships with later events in which Monis’s personal and political grievances increased causing him to adopt more drastic measures in an attempt to convey his message. Although his religious and political views seemed quite calm at first, Monis presented with an infatuation of terrorism and seeking the attention of high governmental officials prior to his development of radical opinions.

Prior to *Event 4* Monis developed several theories relating to terrorist acts. The day after the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Centers, Monis contacted ASIO and claimed Iran funded the attacks and then asked for a reward from the U.S government, however ASIO dismissed his claims after an investigation. Throughout his period of intense overseas travel between 2003 and 2007, Monis contacted ASIO claiming to have urgent information on suicide attacks. Providing a theory he developed following the 2005 London Bombings, he asked for his information to be passed onto U.K and U.S intelligence agencies. After meeting with ASIO and offering to be an informant for them as he claimed to have contacts with information on Al-Qaeda, ASIO assessed his information as not credible and declined his offer. During this discussion he also raised concerns of the Australian government harassing Muslim clerics as he was searched at Sydney Airport. The reasoning behind the false claims continually made by Monis is unknown however it appears as though he was almost desperate for the attention of authorities and wanting to be heard. The possibility of these smaller events causing personal grievance to Monis should also be acknowledged, as Monis appeared to feel injustice on the majority of rejections he faced.

Following this and his intense travelling, *Event 4* occurred along with the development of increased activism. During this event, the radicalization indicator Political Grievance was identified. Monis claimed the TV program was discriminating Muslims and therefore creating injustice and harm to a group in which he identifies with. In 2012, Monis claimed he was awoken by the broadcast, which he labeled as terrorism. It is unclear if this event along with his already perceived injustices acted as a trigger in the beginning of his activism and progression into radical opinions and actions. Perhaps Monis developed more intense political and religious views whilst on his overseas travels. Although no conclusions can be made as the purposes of his travels and whom he visited are unknown due to the lack of information. The report submitted to Australia’s Prime Minister regarding Monis also claimed to have no information regarding

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the travels. Therefore, it is assumed that Monis’s heightened activism occurred from this event and his already perceived injustices. The beginning of this event moved Monis from the Inert level to the Activist level of the action pyramid. His letters to Channel 7 and the protests conducted on behalf of Monis by Droudis demonstrated non-violent and legal political action. Monis was attempting to persuade the Australian government and Channel 7 to acknowledge and condemn the broadcast in respect of the injustices and harm caused to Muslims and for instructing terrorism. Soon after this event, Monis seemed to edge closer to the Radical level of the action pyramid with the beginning of his offensive letter campaign to the families of killed Australian soldiers.

The results showed Event 4, Event 5 and Event 6, overlapped each other as they all first occurred in 2007. In 2007 between July and November, Monis had felt injustice from the Channel 7 broadcast, had taken to the Internet expressing his support for Jihad and grudge against the Australian government, and had begun writing the offensive letters. During this time Monis quickly moved from Neutral to Sympathizer and then to the Justifier level of the opinion pyramid. In 2007, Monis believed the Liberal party was plotting an attack in order to blame Muslims and he claimed a killed Australian soldier had died for nothing in an unjust war. These actions of Monis indicate the Sympathizer level as he is suggesting the west is waging war against Islam and the Muslim people by blaming them and discriminating against them. Although this was considered as Monis progressing to the Sympathizer level, it was quite a weak progression. Monis later developed stronger opinions consistent with the sympathizer level in Event 9. During this event Monis explicitly stated the war was against Muslims not terrorism, which accurately demonstrates the Sympathizer level.

During events 4, 5 and 6, Monis demonstrated stronger opinions consistent with the Justifier level of the opinion pyramid rather than the Sympathizer level. During these events, Monis claimed that anyone who attacks a country and oppresses it people deserves to go to hell and that all Australian soldiers are evil. His online Fatwa also expressed his desire to one day “be able to Jihad in the higher levels”, and following this his comment “If our fair defence against your unfair attack is called terrorism we are proud to be called terrorists”, support strong justification opinions. These statements indicate the actions of Muslim fighters defending against the actions of non-Muslim Australian soldiers are morally and religiously justified. He believed Muslims were only trying to protect themselves and their country from what he claimed were evil Australian soldiers. Considering his desire to one day join the war against disbelievers, and his pride in Muslims who defend from unjust attacks being referred to as terrorists, represents the Justifier level of the opinion pyramid. The possibility of Monis progressing through the Sympathizer level earlier than identified must be acknowledged, as the data did not rule out this possibility, instead it supported a slow progression into the

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Sympathizer level and then almost an immediate progression into the Justifier level.

After the first letters Monis sent in 2007, the content of the letters became increasingly more offensive and it could be argued they became violent. Although he may not of known his actions were illegal, his letters wished death and hell upon Australian soldiers. This could be considered as verbally violent as he also instructed that the bodies of dead soldiers should not be accepted or respected. Eventually these letters ended in criminal charges against Monis and therefore his actions were illegal. The Radical level of the action pyramid specifies this level as illegal political action that may include violence. Monis’s letters aimed to change the policy of the Australian government and were clearly both politically and religiously motivated. Regardless of whether he knew his actions were illegal or not, his actions accurately fit within the Radical level of the action pyramid and therefore Monis progressed from an Activist to a Radical between 2007 and 2009.

The relationships between events 4, 5 and 6 all interact with one another and Event 4 saw the beginning of Monis’s increased activism. Most likely due to the personal and political grievances he felt from this event, hearing of an Australian soldiers death in late 2007 provided him the perfect opportunity to further convey his message witnessed in Event 6. This is supported in a letter addressed to Australia’s Prime Minister in 2013. In this letter Monis claimed he wrote to the families in an attempt to request them to voice against an unjust war, as the Australian authorities were not listening. Although this supports the possible reasoning as to why Event 6 occurred, Monis was clearly condemning the soldiers and not trying to gain the support of families as claimed. The increasingly offensive content of his letters in Event 6 was therefore likely a result of his complaints to authorities and the ACMA being dismissed in Event 4. The further personal and political grievances he felt through these events is evident within his letters as his opinions became stronger and more offensive and he began publically protesting the charges that condemned his letters. With the increase witnessed within his letters, it was also witnessed in Event 5 through the increase in public activism as he began conveying his messages over his website and through letters to various governmental officials. It is assumed he did this to reach a broader audience and gain followers as his attempts thus far had failed to gain satisfactory following or agreement.

After these three events, Event 7 saw Monis charged with another criminal offence as he threatened to shoot his former partner. Although this event appears disconnected from the previous events, Monis represented violent behavior during this event in an attempt to gain more access to his children and reengage his relationship with Pal. It was also identified that Pal had previously claimed Monis assaulted one of their sons and had expressed concern of his controlling behavior during a hearing relating to
this event. This again suggests the violent nature of Monis that may have been underestimated by authorities. The possibility of Monis believing the charges relating to his actions as unjust must be considered as potential personal grievance due to him believing the Australian government was against him. Although the charges were dismissed in court, it must be acknowledged that Monis may of considered this as a victory against the Australian government. In 2010 prior to Event 7, Monis was charged with further offences regarding his letters, however apart from this, 2010 and 2011 were relatively quiet years in terms of significant events. During this time no significant events occurred that would of contributed to his radicalization. Perhaps Monis did feel some sense of victory in 2011 from his charges being dismissed, which may explain why no significant events occurred until June 2012. If he finally felt some victory against the government, this would decrease the need for him to complain and protest against his causes. It therefore could be assumed that if the charges weren’t dismissed it is possible Monis would have protested them just as he has done with all his other criminal charges. During this time he was receiving some treatment at a mental health center however the circumstances around this are unknown. This period of Monis’s life should be investigated further if investigating Monis as it is unclear whether anything occurred during this time that might of contributed to his radicalization.

In June 2012, Event 8 and Event 9 occurred. During Event 8 Monis was denied a security guard license and informed he was not a “fit and proper person” to hold a license he previously had in the late 1990’s. Monis later appealed this decision in July and it is assumed this event further developed his personal grievance as he was basically told he was too unstable and his appeal was dismissed. Soon after Event 8 and before his appeal, Event 9 occurred which witnessed the beginning of Monis’s association with the extremist organization Hizb-ut-Tahrir. Described as a political and legal activist group by McCauley & Moskalenko (2014), the media has recently compared them to IS as they have some similar ideologies. The media has also claimed that the Australian government has expressed deep concern over their ideologies and their aim to raise an army to impose Sharia law within Australia (Su, 2015). Monis’s involvement with Hizb-ut-Tahrir was considered more within the Activist level of the action pyramid rather than Radical, as their activities were legal and non-violent. This event also further developed Monis’s political grievance and introduced the Slippery Slope radicalization indicator.

The beginning of Monis’s relationship with a known extremist group that expressed similar ideologies to his, which is the Slippery Slope indicator, is believed to of significantly influenced his radicalization process. Although at the beginning his involvement at their meetings seemed quite calm, towards the end the results showed he became more involved and publically active. In terms of why he pursued association with this group could have been influenced from Event 6. During this event Monis was deemed as a fake Sheikh by Channel 7 and members of the Muslim
community also reported they had never heard of Sheikh Haron or Monis, challenging him to come forward. It is possible Monis was seeking the attention of this group as he had failed to grab the attention of the Australian government and authorities as his actions and opinions are usually dismissed or result in criminal charges. Gaining association with an extremist group, who share similar ideologies would have most likely been considered by Monis as a further method of conveying a message and gaining the support he was in search of. Before the remainder of Event 9 can be discussed, Event 10 and parts of Event 2 must be discussed as his public statements from Event 9 were made after the occurrences in these events.

In Event 10, Monis’s former partner Pal was murdered allegedly by his partner Droudis with Monis suspected of being an accomplice. Although this event fits parts of the Unfreezing radicalization indicator, this event did not accurately fit. Pal did not appear to act as a barrier impending Monis’s ability to take action. It is alleged Pal’s murder was part of a custody battle and therefore was not considered as a destabilizing life event that would result in and allow Monis to be unrestricted and more determined to commit an act. During this event Personal and Political Grievance was identified as Monis claimed ASIO and NSW Police were involved in the murder and requested they be investigated, however this was dismissed. This likely explains why Monis believed it was a political case rather than criminal as it is assumed Monis believed the government was discriminating against his claims once again. Another dismissal of his claims and the torture he experienced whilst in custody from this event, appeared to cause further significant injustices for Monis. Staging a protest about his unfair treatment in custody, Monis was evidently determined to make further stands against the government. From this it could be argued that the torture Monis experienced in custody further developed his radicalization. Following his accusation against ASIO and NSW police being involved in the murder, in the same month of April 2014, Monis was charged with sexual assault offences from 2002-2003 in Event 2. With bail being refused Monis was yet again held in custody until the end of May. No information was identified that indicated Monis had protested about this or faced further torture, however the possibility should not be dismissed. Between his release and September 2014, the analysis offered no information of what occurred during this time, however it is assumed that Monis was still engaging with Hizb-ut-Tahrir.

After beginning by simply attending protests and meetings in Event 9, in September 2014 Monis was recorded voicing out against the injustices to Islam and himself caused by the Australian government. When stating, “I believe the speech is not enough, we need to do something”, it could be argued that this was Monis edging closer to the most radicalized level of the opinion pyramid, Personal Moral Obligation. During his recorded conversation, Monis claimed he alone has defended Islam and the Muslim people against injustice through his numerous letters, protests and online statements however no one has listened and therefore more needs to be
done. These statements made within this event are evidently caused by and related to the previous events where he felt injustice and received rejections. It is evident that Monis felt an individual obligation to defend Islam, as he believed it was unfairly targeted and blamed. Although this fits with the Personal Moral Obligation level, McCauley & Moskalenko (2014) only state the person must believe there is an individual obligation to participate in the defense of Islam. It fails to distinguish whether the defense refers to using violent and forceful measures to defend Islam or if the individual can use other means to defend as evident in the case of Monis. Whether or not Monis felt the sole responsibility to defend Islam or that the Muslim community or Hizb-ut-Tahrir should take action is unclear. What is clear is at the time of Martin Place Siege, Monis felt personally obliged to act and defend Islam due the demands he made. If he did not feel personally obliged it is likely that the siege might not of occurred or his demands would have been different.

Soon after this statement, Monis was charged with a further 37 sexual assault offences as a result from Event 2 in October 2014 with bail being continued. Due to these charges being from 2002-2003, it is likely Monis believed he had eluded these charges. Following this, Monis became increasingly active on his social media accounts Facebook and Twitter, in the final month leading up to his attack. His increase is assumed to most likely be a result from the amount of significant events which were beginning to occur within a shorten period leading up to the siege. It is evident Monis’s world was crumbling down and the authorities were coming down on him with criminal charges from almost 14 years ago.

On December 6 2014, he posted on Twitter “Islam is the religion of peace, that’s why Muslims fight against the terrorism of America and its allies”. Justifying the actions of Muslims fighting in defense of Islam, two days later he posted “This is team Islam against Australian oppression and terrorism” and then on December 9 2014, he posted “Shame on those racist and terrorist Australians who support the governments of America and its allies”. Following this, further comments were made on his Facebook page in the week leading up to his attack, however due to his Facebook page being no longer available no reference can be directly made to it. Between December 9 and 12, Australia’s National Security Hotline received 18 calls concerning statements made on Monis’s Facebook page. Although ASIO investigated and deemed them as non-threatening with no desire or intent to engage in terrorism, perhaps they underestimated how radicalized Monis actually was.

On December 12 2014, Monis lost his final appeal in the High Court of Australia to overturn his convictions in relation to the postal offences from Event 6. At this stage, Monis had exhausted all legal options to overturn the offences against his letters, which he deemed as words of advice and labeled them as “condolence cards”. He had also been tortured in prison for his views and claimed numerous personal and political injustices from

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the Australian government. At this stage, Monis was at the Personal Moral Obligation stage of the opinion pyramid and the Radical stage of the action pyramid. McCauley & Moskalenko (2014) suggest the strongest indicator of a lone wolf terrorist about to act is when they feel the Personal Moral Obligation and have the means and opportunity to do so. Although Monis used an illegally bought gun, the authorities had no information prior to the event to suggest he had a weapon. It is evident Monis was at the most critical stage as he had the opportunity and the means to act and was able to evade all detection from authorities.

These last events in late 2013 and throughout 2014 were considered more as a tipping point for Monis as his options had run out and he could no longer attempt to get out of the criminal charges against him. This along with the association of similar minded people is considered the factors that pushed Monis from the Radical to Terrorist level of the action pyramid. The radicalization indicator Unfreezing is evident in the final events as Monis’s freedom could be considered as the barrier, which was most likely going to be taken away due to the number of criminal charges he was facing. If this was his barrier to radicalized action, then it can be argued that Monis had nothing to lose. His attempt to gain custody of his children had failed, his current partner Droudis was facing a murder charge and he was most likely facing a lengthy term of imprisonment with his fate being determined during his next court date in February 2015.

Monis was radicalized and determined to further convey a message. It is safe to assume that Monis believed taking innocent civilians of a country that is against him and Muslims hostage and claiming it as an IS attack would be the perfect opportunity to gain the attention of the whole nation and the world. During his attack, Monis achieved just this. His attack was broadcasted across the world and received non-stop coverage by all major TV channels within Australia. Although there is some speculation about the planning of his attack and the original target, Monis gained the attention he could of only ever dreamed about. Even the IS propaganda magazine Dabiq, hailed him as a hero referring to the killed hostages as kāfirs (disbelievers) and stated that Monis added his name to the list of Muslims who have answered the Khilāfah’s (head of IS) call to strike against those waging war against the Islamic State. Claiming that Monis prompted mass panic and terror to an entire nation and triggered evacuations in parts of Australia’s largest city, Dabiq praised his efforts and referred to him as “brother Man Haron Monis”.

Although Monis’s claims that it was an IS attack have thus far proven to be false, he was determined to be associated with IS. He knew claiming it as an IS attack would cause more fear and publicity, however it appeared Monis’s attack was driven by more than just political reasons. Although his attack was an act of lone wolf terrorism and he fits the definition accurately, his ideologies and motivations appear to evident significant criminal elements. As identified his personal grievances appeared to be a
significant causal factor in his decision to attack. His target, the Lindt café did not have any relevance to his cause, however it was across the street from the headquarters of Channel 7. Within the media there has been speculation that he first planned to enter Channel 7 however due to their high security, he was turned off and instead went into a nearby café. Although this appears to be a unique case, in other cases of IS inspired lone wolf terrorism, targets relevant to the cause have been selected.

Recently two separate IS inspired attacks occurred in Canada during 2014. Within the space of two days, two separate Islamic lone wolf terrorists both targeted Canadian soldiers. The first event occurred on October 20, 2014 when Martin Couture-Rouleau rammed two soldiers with his car resulting in the death of one soldier, before being shot dead by police (Corcoran, 2014). The second event occurred on October 22, 2014 when Martin Zehaf-Bibeau fatally shot a soldier on duty at the Canadian National War Memorial and then drove to Canada’s Parliament building in Ottawa (Gollom, 2014). In an attempt to storm the building, he was shortly shot dead by police and security guards before he was able to inflict further damage. In both these cases it was proven they had grudges against Canada’s military involvement in the Middle East and that the west was waging war against Islam. With similar ideologies, why did Monis not attempt to inflict harm on the Australian government or its soldiers as evident in these cases? Perhaps he was more concerned about being noticed or having his message heard by deciding to take hostage innocent civilians and create fear through falsely claiming he had bombs placed around the city.

This discussion has indicated that Monis progressed through the radicalization stages identified by McCauley & Moskalenko’s (2014) theoretical framework. The results supported the authors in that it is not a stage theory in which the individual must progress through each stage before reaching another. Throughout the events Monis at times evidenced opinions and actions from the higher levels of the pyramids before the lower levels, specifically within the opinion pyramid. The proposed temporal relationships were proved to be true as leading up to the siege, the events were less spread out and had more impact on his radicalization and motivations. In the beginning the events were more spread out and seemed to take longer time in influencing his radicalization.

6. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CRIMINOLOGICAL RESEARCH

After analyzing the data, the attack conducted by Monis did not seem significantly different from a standard criminal that would take people hostage in a non-terror related siege. The amount of planning by Monis is unclear. It could be argued that Monis was planning to do something if his final bid to appeal his convictions was lost, however it could also be
argued that it was an impulsive decision influenced by frustration and anger. Although the motivations are different to non-terrorist lone offenders, how is this hostage situation different to others that are committed by criminals? One of the most infamous hostage situations occurred in Stockholm, Sweden. The Norrmalmstorg Robbery occurred in 1973 and is best known as the origin for the term, Stockholm Syndrome (Westcott, 2013). Although the offender was a bank robber who took hostages in a bank and demanded money, how is this method of fulfilling the desired outcome different to Monis’s? How is a bank robber who is desperate for money and takes civilians’ hostage, different to an extremist doing the same thing in order to be heard and taken seriously? How is Monis’s motivations and characteristics different from other criminals who take hostages to get what they want, or inflict harm as a means of revenge or making a stand? These are important questions for researchers and in particular criminological researchers. Gill et al (2014) found a majority of the 199 lone wolf terrorists in their sample had performed acts of criminality prior to their attacks. The authors suggested that future research might benefit from analyzing lone wolf terrorists from a criminal careers perspective. Identifying how a lone wolf terrorist desists from one illegal activity and transitions towards other politically and socially driven illegal activity would provide significant insight into these individuals (Gill et al, 2014). The similarities between their findings and the case of Monis signify the importance of criminological research within lone wolf terrorism. Not only to understand the similarities and causes but to also work towards prevention strategies.

Monis was an extensive and almost a career criminal. He was wanted for fraud in Iran, had a history of sexual offending, and violent and harassing behaviors. Although it is unclear whether he was suffering from mental illness, his actions and behaviors appeared to be psychologically, politically, religiously and criminally driven. Although some of his statements on social media claimed anyone who supports the governments of America and its allies are racist and terrorists, he never expressed grudges against innocent civilians. So why select targets and victims that might believe in your cause? How do lone wolf terrorists and other criminals differ and are they similar to other types of lone attackers?

McCauley & Moskalenko (2014) also compared their individual radicalization indicators and lone wolf characteristics to those of school shooters and assassins whom they claimed are also violent lone actors. The authors claim that school shooters and assassins perpetrate their violence fueled by grievance, whereas most criminal violence in the U.S is committed through impulse or greed. They identified that Personal and Political Grievance and Unfreezing were the most common indicators in their sample of school shooters and assassins. The authors claim that “Grievance is a motive for violence” and “Unfreezing lowers the opportunity cost of violence as the perpetrator has less to lose” (p. 82). These indicators found within school shooters and assassins indicated a similar pattern amongst their sample of lone wolf terrorists and it is evident
that Monis also represents characteristics of other violent criminals. Through reviewing the limited studies on lone wolf terrorism, a majority of them are based from a terrorism and political science perspective. Perhaps more criminological researchers and possibly sociologists need to focus their attention on this issue, as there is evidently more to it than political, religious and cultural agendas. As mentioned in the background of radicalization research, numerous factors and influences have been connected to radicalization. These factors are also connected within explaining specific criminal acts and must draw more attention by future research.

To approach cases of lone wolf terrorism from a criminological perspective in an attempt to establish what social, contextual and environmental factors may impact the radicalization of a lone wolf terrorist is crucial. In particular, to study what may contribute to the radicalization of a lone wolf terrorist with a focus on what influences may first of all make a person susceptible to radicalization should be studied. Although studies on recruitment and radicalization of adults and school-aged youth by terrorist organizations or extremist groups have been conducted, lone wolf terrorists have proven to be significantly different from your average group based terrorist. Although they may believe in the same cause, they chose to operate alone. Regardless of whether the focus is on Islamic, Far-Right or Anti-Islamic extremists, studying and comparing what factors are evident amongst lone wolf terrorists within their childhood and adulthood from a criminological perspective may be of interest. Testing criminological theories against cases of lone wolf terrorism and their radicalization process may also be an interesting topic for further research. If an individuals social bonds’ to society, family or school is weakened or broken, can this be linked to radicalization and in particular lone wolf terrorism? Hirschi’s (1969) Social Bond Theory suggests that once a social bond is weakened or broken, then unusual behavior may occur or at least make the individual more susceptible to engage in unusual behavior. Is this evident in cases of individuals who radicalize and engage in lone wolf terrorism?

Although the case presented incorporated a 50-year-old man, other lone wolf terrorism cases such as Abdul Numan Haider who attacked and stabbed two Australian police officers in September 2014, was only 18 years old (Australian Federal Police, 2014). What makes a person become radicalized at such a young age has failed to be significantly addressed in studies of lone wolf terrorism. Cross-sectional investigations of the lives of terrorists during early adulthood and the period of adolescence are scarce (Rahimullah, Larmar, & Abdalla, 2013). Through reviewing research on lone wolf terrorism these studies have also proven to be scarce within this field. De-radicalization programs would thus benefit from this research, however due to lone wolf terrorists being typically quiet about their beliefs and intentions, it may be difficult to first of all identify a person at risk of becoming a lone wolf. More will be discussed on this within section 8 of this thesis.
7. LIMITATIONS

Although a case study was decided as the method for this thesis, disadvantages of this method must also be acknowledged in an attempt to avoid the pitfalls of case studies. Yin (2009) specifies a concern of case studies is the lack of rigor due to case study investigators failing to follow systematic procedures and allowing biased views to influence findings and conclusions. For this thesis, the systematic procedures identified by Yin (2009) were strictly followed in order to produce a reliable and valid case study. Although the data was derived from secondary sources, the case study still offered significant insight into the radicalization process of Monis as planned. The information was selected through reliable sources and the data was triangulated in order to arrive at a fact that all information supported. Although this occurred, case studies are beneficial when including primary sources such as interviews and observations (Yin, 2009). Primary sources if gathered correctly can give extensive insight in regards to the research aim. As of 2014 there had been no interviews with lone wolf terrorists (Gill et al, 2014) and through researching, it still appears this way. When primary data can be collected, this will improve and limit the limitations faced with only conducting case studies, as it will allow a larger array of information and methods to be used.

Perhaps the reason for lack of interviews is it appears as though a majority of lone wolf terrorists end up being killed by authorities during their attack as witnessed in Denmark, Australia, USA and Canada last year. This creates difficulty for researchers in obtaining primary information from the perpetrator and possibly explains why a majority of studies on lone wolf terrorism have included case analyses. Although case studies provide significant insight into the radicalization and behavioral patterns of lone terrorists, it risks leaving out important factors (Nijboer, 2012). For example if researchers were able to gather the lone terrorists own account of their intentions and motivations, it could support the causal propositions or hypotheses made. The findings from case studies so far have failed to be generalizable. To generalize findings to other individuals or situations is difficult not only due to the lack of research (Nijboer, 2012) but also that IS-inspired lone wolf terrorism is relatively new. At this time ethical considerations were not required and did not limit this study as this study purely contained information that was available to the public. It had no access to any identities or information that would require ethical approval to be used within this thesis. If further research is to be conducted using primary sources, this will undoubtedly raise ethical concerns, as access to members of religious communities, cultural groups, witnesses and or family members of terrorists being studied will require ethical consideration. If researchers attempt to gain access to these groups they will need guidance in their formation of research questions and interviews in order to limit any potentially offensive or culturally adverse issues. The use of translators and or members of religious communities to assist in formulating appropriate research questions and interview questions should be used to limit any ethical issues that may arise. Until further research is
conducted on lone wolf terrorism in general, the limitations of methods used to examine the cases will likely remain.

8. FUTURE OF COUNTERACTING LONE WOLF TERRORISM

Counter-terrorism, law enforcement and intelligence agencies are extremely impended when it comes to lone wolf terrorism. As lone wolf terrorists are generally extremely difficult to find, identify and arrest (Weimann, 2012), this creates major challenges to counter-terrorism measures. If the counter-terrorism measures already in place were adequate enough to detect and disrupt lone wolf terrorism, than it could be assumed that fewer attacks would be occurring, however this is not the case. The results suggested Monis was radicalized, had years of perceived injustices and all of a sudden had nothing to lose prior to committing his attack. The sudden realization of losing all liberties and the likelihood of being sentenced to imprisonment was seen as a trigger for Monis to finally act on his injustices and ideologies. If authorities had expected a reaction to the latter events prior to his attack, then it is likely he could have been monitored and disrupted from committing the attack. Although after the fact this seems simple, it is not. Monis was not treated as a priority and the evidence the Australian government had at the time didn’t suggest he should be. If every known extremist could be allocated 24/7 police or intelligence monitoring, this would likely reduce the ability for extremists to act and become lone wolf terrorists. In a perfect world, this would be ideal, however it is not just about the resourcing and budgets of law enforcement agencies and authorities. Human rights also come into debate when considering intrusive surveillance measures. Although this is a whole other topic, further research into the advantages and disadvantages of stricter surveillance measures as a measure of counteracting lone wolf terrorism is required. In particular with online surveillance, policy makers will have to assure their communities that the legislations cannot and will not be used in an unreasonable manner reducing privacy and freedom of speech.

Research and understanding of lone wolf terrorism is only a new phenomenon, specifically amongst IS-inspired lone terrorists. Although it is near impossible to completely eradicate a specific act, lone wolf terrorism needs further attention and the following sections provide some suggestions. To answer research question two, authorities must incorporate a counter-terrorism measure that focuses heavily on counter-extremism with assistance from the society, religious communities and the authorities. The push for educational campaigns and further research will likely be an effective tool in further counteracting and identifying lone wolf terrorism. This combined with strict security measures such as an enhancement of technological surveillance is likely to serve as an effective starting point.
8.1 Research

Although some lone wolf terrorists may develop extreme radicalized views, some also remain radicalized and never attack, abandon their views or are intercepted by authorities. Researchers have expressed the need to investigate individuals during their radicalization process or who abandon radical ideologies (Rahimullah, Larmar, & Abdalla, 2013). Comparatively examining lone wolf terrorists to lone extremists who never attack despite how radicalized they are also needs further investigation (Gruenewald, Chermak, & Freilich, 2013). Gill et al (2014) place emphasis on comparing lone wolf terrorists to group-based terrorists. They indicate the need to determine whether specific experiences and behaviors are inherent to one group or if they are part of a broader path into terrorism itself. The authors also state that little is known about the socio-psychological and practical constraints required to be overcome to undertake an act of lone wolf terrorism. How attacks are formulated is also a significant question that needs addressing (Weimann, 2012; Bakker & de Graaf, 2015). The U.K have previously shifted focus from 'who' to 'how' questions as a counter-terrorism measure (Henry Jackson Society, 2010). If authorities and researchers continue to adopt this measure, once significant knowledge is gained around how attacks are formulated, only then can researchers and authorities comprehend how an individual radicalizes and commits a terrorist act.

Cases of lone wolf terrorism will likely continue to demonstrate similarities and differences, however these differences are important in identifying and understanding the radicalization process (Weimann, 2012). Understanding and comparing the triggers and catalyst events amongst lone wolf terrorists is also important if attempting to proactively deter an already radicalized population (Bakker & de Graaf, 2015). Perhaps in-depth case analyses that adopt and use the same definition of lone wolf terrorism is an effective starting point. An analysis of lone wolf terrorist attacks conducted by Sarah Teich (2013) considered the Boston Marathon Bombing, which was committed by the two Tsarnaev brothers Dzhokhar and Tamerlan, as a lone wolf terrorism incident. The definition used in this thesis would not consider this as lone wolf terrorism as lone wolves must operate alone. In order to select cases and successfully compare them, researchers have to select cases using the same definition. Besides the lack of current primary data on lone wolf terrorism, the other major issue is that a majority of lone wolves have fewer interaction with others meaning their planning is less talked about and more concealed (Gruenewald, Chermak, & Freilich, 2013). To study the areas mentioned researchers and authorities are posed with the incapability to detect lone extremists who decide not to act or abandon their ideology.
8.2 Counter-Terrorism

In an attempt to successfully identify extremists and potential lone wolf terrorists, focus has recently been shifted towards the Internet. Gruenewald et al (2013) identify three current key elements of counterterrorism policy, partnerships, technological surveillance and sharpening threat assessment. Under technological surveillance the authors discuss monitoring powers of law enforcement and intelligence agencies. They express that authorities should attempt to build relationships with the individuals who moderate chat rooms that attract sympathizers, justifiers or radicals. They express a developed relationship could result in moderators providing useful information about extremists who are removed from chat rooms for not following rules. Although the authors’ state these strategies are likely to be currently used, they state authorities should also create websites that engage extremists. This would allow authorities to attract extremists and thus identify them and monitor their future online activity. Although this could be an extremely useful tool, authorities will likely encounter a large amount of criticism, as they would basically be setting people up in order to identify potential threats.

Western countries specifically France, Canada and Australia have recently introduced new laws surrounding technological surveillance. Canada has recently passed a new anti-terror law expanding the powers of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). CSIS are now able to intercept financial transactions, prevent a suspect from boarding a plane, and intercept online message services such as hacking a social media account used to recruit jihadists (ABC, 2015). In the wake of the Charlie Hebdo terrorist attacks in France earlier this year, new surveillance laws have been introduced. These laws allow intelligence agencies to tap phones and emails, bug suspects houses with cameras and microphones, and add keyloggers to computers to track keystrokes all without a warrant or permission from a judge (Chrisafis, 2015). They also have the power to force Internet providers to install complex algorithms that will identify online suspect behavioral patterns using keywords, sites visited and contacts made (Chrisafis, 2015). Australia has also introduced a similar law in that ASIO is now able to seek only one warrant to access a limitless number of computers on a computer network when monitoring a target (Grubb, 2014). It has been argued that this would potentially allow the whole Internet to be monitored, as it is a “network of networks” (Grubb, 2014). Although these laws seem intrusive and have gained negative public debate, with the correct procedures and strict guidelines, it is likely these will be successful in identifying potential lone wolf terrorists. Lone wolves are known to become radicalized on the Internet or as in the case of Monis express radicalized opinions over the Internet. It is unclear whether ASIO had strictly monitored Monis's online activity, but future possibility to strictly monitor extremists despite any intrusion of civil liberties, could ultimately save innocent lives.
Although lone wolf terrorists are not involved within terrorist organizations, a current fear of western governments are returning IS fighters. IS fighters are returning radicalized and at-risk of committing acts of terrorism. Although this may not fit the definition of lone wolf terrorism, governments are particularly worried about these individuals deciding to commit an act of lone wolf terrorism. An approach to counteract this situation has caused widespread discussion amongst politicians and the public within Sweden. Sweden’s National Coordinator Against Violent Extremism, Mona Sahlin is attempting to introduce tax-funded support to returning IS fighters by giving them jobs and offer counseling services in an attempt to develop reintegration (Farquhar, 2015). Her ideas seem to be inspired by Denmark’s Aarhus Model that aims to create trust between the authorities and societies or groups, which radicals operate or are involved in (Crouch, 2015). This model also helps to assist returning IS fighters’ reintegrate into society and help de-radicalize those who want to fight abroad.

Whilst some Scandinavian countries seem to be determined to de-radicalize and assist IS fighters and extremists, other countries are taking tougher measures. The Australian government has made it an illegal offence to travel to certain conflict zones other than for legitimate purposes (Griffiths & Cullen, 2014) and have intentions to revoke or suspend citizenship from dual nationals fighting alongside terrorist groups (BBC News, 2015). This can include restricting the ability of individuals leaving from or returning to Australia and their access to consular services overseas (BBC News, 2015). In France, authorities can seize passports and Identity cards from those suspected of imminent departure to conflict zones in order to wage jihad (The Sydney Morning Herald, 2015). Although these measures may improve the capabilities of authorities intercepting potential terrorists, it will likely not succeed in identifying lone wolf terrorists. To identify IS inspired lone wolf terrorists, authorities will need to focus their attention to the Internet, Muslim communities, educational campaigns and anti-IS propaganda combined with the security measures. Counter-terrorism policies should not only focus on security dimensions, but also on more comprehensive measures.

8.3 Counter-Extremism

Instead of approaching the issue from a counter-terrorism perspective, perhaps a more counter-extremism approach should be adopted. An attempt to prevent the development of radical ideologies is evidently going to limit the amount of individuals who go on to become terrorists. Harris-Hogan (2014) places emphasis on addressing close family and friendship influences, which has shown to draw people into the Australian jihadist network. During childhood we are often educated about drug use, safe sex and important factors to be aware of when growing up. Awareness programs aimed towards schools, universities, parents and religious communities about radicalization, the warning signs and how to report it, could potentially be an effective counter-extremism measure. Bakker & de Graaf (2015) supports this and expresses the need for effective
community engagement to promote passive and active aversion with the help of respected community members. If communities are going to be educated about lone wolf terrorism and radicalization, all authorities either national or international must also share information, ideas and data and vice versa. This is crucial in order to develop effective counter terrorism and extremism measures (Bakker & de Graaf, 2015). Although a lone wolf operates alone, most individuals in this world are not truly alone. If societies and in particular religious communities are educated and feel supported by their governments, this may encourage more people to come forward and report concerning behaviors.

9. CONCLUSION

Man Haron Monis was a known and continually investigated extremist. He operated alone and evaded all suspicion of authorities regarding intent to commit a terrorist act. The results indicated that although Monis was continually investigated and gained continuous attention by authorities and the public, he was careful enough to never incite terrorism or share his intentions. For a lone wolf to successfully carry out an attack, they need to stay under the radar and keep their intentions to themselves. They need to avoid all suspicion from authorities specifically regarding the purchasing of weapons. This is exactly what Monis did. Whilst not all may do this, some lone wolves will discuss their opinions and intentions with close family or friends that will hopefully lead to authorities being notified and the individual being apprehended. Although many family and friends would find it hard to notify authorities about their concerns, this is crucial in order to successfully mitigate lone wolf terrorism. Monis reached McCauley & Moskalenko’s (2014) most dangerous indicator of a lone wolf about to act however did so without the knowledge of authorities. His only close relationship was his partner Droudis who was on bail for the murder of his former partner, had converted to Islam after meeting Monis and appeared brainwashed by Monis. It is definitely possible that Monis advised Droudis of his intentions however in this case, Monis had no other family members or close friends that could potentially develop suspicion about his behavior and report it. The radicalization process of Monis was complex and indicated more than just political and religious etiological factors. His frustration and injustices caused by the Australian government and in particular their policies and involvement in the Middle East eventually contributed to Monis’s terrorist actions.

McCauley & Moskalenko’s (2014) radicalization pyramids were empirically tested against the chronological events identified through the analysis of Monis’s life whilst living in Australia. The analysis identified Monis in the highest level of the opinion pyramid, Personal Moral Obligation and the third highest level of the action pyramid, Radical. The eleven events identified from the analysis, indicated the personal and political grievances experienced by Monis and the barriers he needed to overcome in order to commit the terrorist act. Although the results are difficult to generalize,
Monis evidenced similar motivational factors and ideologies to those of school shooters, assassins and other IS inspired lone wolf terrorists. The ability to generalize is dependent on the future focus of research. If authorities wish to create an effective counter-terrorism strategy to identify and disrupt lone wolves, the assistance from societies, religious communities and authorities combined with societies being educated about radicalization and triggers will serve as an effective starting point. This will also increase further counter-extremism measures that should also be at the forefront of counteracting lone wolf terrorism, as successfully reducing extremism will eventually reduce terrorism. The monitoring of extremist sites and chat rooms along with identified extremists also requires further strict monitoring allowed by changes in legislations. As legislations are recently being changed in order to account for this, the focus of researchers is essential in developing significant counter-terrorism measures. The results showed that Monis was a unique individual with numerous motivational and causal factors, however the ability to successfully apply these findings to other studies is limited due to the lack of in-depth analyses of lone wolf terrorists and in particular ones that are IS inspired. Further exploration is required into the understanding of IS inspired lone wolf terrorism especially with the threat IS currently poses and their ability to successfully encouraged further radicalization and support.

This thesis has provided significant insight into the motivations and radicalization process of a continually investigated and IS inspired lone wolf terrorist. The limitations identified have slightly impeded the outcome of this study however issues that require further attention have been identified in order for research to progress within the field of lone wolf terrorism. For lone wolf terrorism to be appropriately addressed, researchers must first dedicate appropriate attention to the topic in order to assist in the influencing of future policies and counter-terrorism and extremism measures.


10. REFERENCES


Lone Wolf Terrorism
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APPENDIX

News Sources


finds-man-haron-monis-was-not-treated-as-a-top-terrorism-priority/story-fni0cx12-1227234175861


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Amirah Droudis v. The Queen, S179 Appeal 2 (High Court of Australia 2013).

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Social Media & Miscellaneous
