Partnership as a solution for neighborhood improvement?

Identifying challenges of network governance in BID Sofielund's partnership – with an emphasis on meta-governance

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Urban Studies
Two-year Master Program
Master's Thesis, 30 credits
Spring Semester 2017
Supervisor: Magnus Johansson
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Summary
This study aims to understand a swedish BID (business improvement district) partnership as a local form of urban governance in neighborhood improvement. The study explores challenges with the collaborative governance of various actors with a majority of private property owners. It highlights the need of public meta-governance and the challenges the network's public leader face in its governing of the network. As a framework for this, the study uses governance theory, which discusses the effective and democratic implications for network governance and how it can be improved by a meta-governor. It also uses various perspectives of BIDs as governance networks and its influence as urban actors. The empirical data is collected through qualitative interviews with involved network actors as well as the network leader, and focus is on their perceptions of the partnership's role and challenges with the collaborative governance.

The findings of the study demonstrate the complexity of a multi-organisation partnership as well as the challenges to manage it. The results suggest that the partnership's practice of meta-governance do not live up to the definition presented by the theorists, due to a weak political accountability, and the network actors' governing are therefore left to be determined by their intentions. However, if their intentions are good, the network has the potential to create a well-functioning and committed local democracy with an effective decision-making process with less bureaucracy.

Of importance for the discipline of urban studies, the identified aspects of diverging interests and the partnership's weak bond with public deliberation, BIDs as a way of managing space should be questioned in ways of who's interest is taken into consideration in the planning and development of our public spaces.

Key words: governance network; urban governance; BID Sofielund; partnership; urban actors; meta-governance; urban policy; Business Improvement District; public spaces; neighborhood improvement; local governance
"All the world is not, of course, a stage, but the crucial ways in which it isn't, are not easy to specify."

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1.0. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Partnerships in the context of urban studies

Cities face a pressing challenge – how to provide economic prosperity and social cohesion while achieving environmental sustainability? In response, new collaborations are emerging in the form of collaboration models that can be used as a form to design, test and learn from innovations in real time. The high urbanization rate and the pressure on cities have made many of today’s challenges and problems centralized to cities. As the challenges in many cases are so complex, it means that a variety of actors must be involved in the work. Together, in different collaborative constellations, organizations and actors need to work to contribute to a more sustainable urban development, because no actor alone can solve the problem (Årstrand & Sannestad, 2015). The extent of the challenges require knowledge exchange, resource exchange and a holistic approach to success. Collaboration between different actors is considered in a broad context to be obvious and necessary for a sustainable urban development to be achieved, but how easy is this cooperation process between different actors actually? The fact that these actors will work together towards a common goal can be considered an ideal, but is often much more complex than that.

Due to the urban multi-actor partnerships, governments must provide a political mandate to guide actions on the ground that recognize the diverse contexts of local public authorities, support collaboration between them and other actors and help develop local capacity and financial resources. New governance mechanisms can not take away from the urgent need for effective and decisive governmental action, and governance beyond the state can sometimes be a useful supplement especially when it avoids being captured by powerful interests and focus on problem amelioration, argue Biermann, Abbott and others (2012).

Partnerships increasingly play a major role in determining and implementing major policy drives in localities, and understanding how partnerships may provide value is therefore essential to understand governance principles (Huxham, 2000). The collaborative process entails a special need of coordination and management, and the question is how a network of autonomous actors should be governed. Sorensen and Torfing, discussed by Åstrand and Sannestad (2015), believe that the attempts to control networks must take into account that the network is basically self-governing which should not be undermined. It is, however, important to understand that networks need to be governed, in order for formal bodies to exercise some form of control over decentralized forms of decision-making organizations, an action that is defined as meta-governance.

A new form of private-public partnership in the realm of local governance known as a business improvement district (BID), operates in the neighborhood of Sofielund in Malmö. The partnership is an example of a network-based form of governance, an urban governance, that has mobilized relevant stakeholders in a local effort to combat local problems. The network offers a variety of incentives that makes it beneficial for the actors to get involved in the area development, as the goal is to make it more attractive. An interesting procedure is that the network leader is employed by the City of Malmö, that means a public actor has the overall responsibility for a network that is run by private
actors, mainly property owners. The idea is that the leader should not act as controlling, but encourages the network actors to work autonomy towards clearly defined objectives. The leader has an important role for the network's management and its implications as an urban actor. This fact makes BID Sofielund's network an unique case when it comes to collaboration. Thus, it also becomes a relevant research object for studying and analyzing challenges and possibilities with the network's governance and the democratic implications of the network's outputs.

1.2. Problem, aim & research questions

The interest is to examine and get an increased understanding of this new partnership model, BID, working with urban revitalization and the challenges to manage this with the involvement of many actors. BID is a model of close cooperation between the municipality and local property owners, with the aim to improve an area. The study will emphasis on governance challenges for the network as well as the leader, the meta-governor, to investigate if the area development serve any strong interests or the public good. The object of study is the collaboration model for neighborhood improvement in Sofielund in Malmö, working with a locally adapted tool of BID.

The ongoing change in cities creates a need for new forms of cooperation, and it is therefore important to investigate the challenges this new forms of governance networks face in urban development. Oscar Larsson, Researcher in Political Science (2015), describing networks as webs of cooperation between private and public agents that are both self-regulating and also manage issues that concern the wider public. It indicates that they may exercise influence over public politics, that not only concern the policy issue but the forms and procedures through which they are produced and implemented.

The BID Sofielund's partnership can be examined as an example of today's challenges with governance of urban development, in terms of different forms of governance with an emphasis on meta-governance and the network leader's role as the meta-governor governing the network. Different forms of governance mean challenges with the BID network's governance in relation to the city, the larger governmental context, politics as well as the various network actors' influence of the network's governance and the decision-making process.

The unit in the analysis will be to look at the network as a governance tool and factors inherent in the collaborative form that have various implications for the governance of the network and the task of governing it. Given the complexity that exists in collaborative processes and that network governance can take several forms, the purpose of this thesis is to contribute to an increased understanding of network actors collaborating around complex problems as well as the challenges they face with the governance, and the possible implications it can have on the area’s development.

The study will analyze to what extent a network is democratic ensured, which in the current case relates to an area development that addresses the interests of the general public, which depends on its meta-governance. Therefore will the level of meta-governance in Sofielund's network be identified in the study. By identifying theoretical and empirical challenges of network governance in BID Sofielund's network, the study examines the relations between the network actors and if they engage in collaborative or conflictual relations.
To find out the aforementioned concerns how we manage an area development with the involvement of a variety of actors, the study is designed by following research questions:

What governance challenges are identified in BID Sofielund's network?

What governance challenges are the development leader facing as the meta-governor?

Does the challenges of the governance network of Sofielund mean a distortion of the development of public space?

The questions contribute in different ways to the overall purpose of the thesis. The study will highlight both strengths and weaknesses of the collaboration model's governance, in order to understand if the partnership can work to find joint solutions and enable various professional actors to co-create a sustainable neighborhood.

The study will show how a partnership in itself is a challenge in urban governance, as well as how it faces challenges as a governance network. What I find interesting with BID Sofielund is that it is a partnership that is in the tension between municipal influence and an alternative governance model.

1.3. Previous Research

1.3.1. Previous research of governance networks and meta-governance

Scholars argue that the debate whether society should be organized from the state or the market now has to give way to the new forms of governance. Previous research have focused on the shift that has taken place from municipal government to urban governance, which has been accompanied by questions concerning democratic accountability. Studies aim to analyze how governance networks contribute to the governing of our increasingly complex and fragmented societies. Their research can be seen as a second generation of governance network research that focus on new questions about the dynamics of governance networks, the conditions for their success and failure, the attempt to meta-govern governance networks and their democratic problems and potentials. Relevant network governance theorists renewing the debate on the use of governance networks in public policy making are among others: Eva Sorensen; Jacob Torfing; Bob Jessop; Jan Kooiman; Erik Hans Klijn; Paul Hirst; Rod A.W Rhodes; Keith G Provan and Fritz W Scharpf (Sorensen and Torfing, 2007).

Marilyn Taylor (2007) uses governmentality theories in her study to help explain the ways in which new governance spaces are a contradictory process, whereby on the one hand, the spaces can be characterized as arenas of co-option inscribed with rules of engagement that continue to be framed by government actors. On the other hand, the new spaces allow the implementation of alternative agendas, where self-steering actors outside the state not only collaborate in the exercise of government but also shaping and influencing it.

Today, there is a growing interest in the study of meta-governance, and the expanding literature comprises both theoretical contributions and empirical studies. The theme of meta-governance has appeared in the literature in response to the potential problems associated with the rearrangement of democratic procedures that accompanies network governance. The analytical vantage point from where interactive forms of governance and meta-governance are envisioned tends to differ between different groups of researchers.
Hence, when organization sociologists analyze the new interactive governance arrangements, they tend to see them as ways of getting things done and promoting societal transformation. They raise important points about how to ensure good and constructive interaction through the exercise of a process-oriented leadership within partnerships. By contrast, public management researchers tend to see interactive governance arrangements as tools for dealing with different kinds of uncertainty, which lead them to consider how the public managers who are dealing with partnerships can affect the functioning of these through different kinds of network management. Finally, when political theorists look at partnerships, they tend to perceive them as a new and attractive mode of governance that supplement public hierarchies and private markets. This prompts them to raise questions about how public authorities should use different interactive modes of governance and how government can hold interactive policy arenas and governance arrangements to account. Despite their different views of the role of interactive governance, the three groups of researchers all pose highly relevant questions about how meta-governance should be exercised. Still, the main difference when answering these questions regards where they locate the meta-governor. Therefore, the meta-governor is variably portrayed as a leading network actor, a network manager who is simultaneously inside and outside the network, and the state aiming to govern the interactive arenas from a distance (Torfing, Peters and others, 2012).

Governability theorists such as Jan Kooiman and Fritz Scharpf put considerable emphasis on the need for meta-governance. They even insist that hierarchical regulation of self-regulating networks are a precondition for making networks an efficient form of governance. It rests on the assumption that unregulated networks are unstable because the individual network actors tend to choose individual strategies for optimizing their interests instead of developing a shared strategy together with the other network actors (Sorensen & Torfing, 2007).

Oscar Larsson (2016) has investigated if it is possible to overcome familiar problems with governance networks through a strategic network management by analyzing a specific case of Malmö, the Commission for Socially Sustainable Malmö, in the study “Meta-governance in the city – promoting governance, knowledge alliances and democracy in Malmö”. The empirical findings show that meta-governance has not succeeded in its realization. His study states that meta-governance is a difficult and fragile practice and turning to meta-governance as a way to govern and control organizations in networks is not necessarily a way to increase the democratic quality of network governance, but may instead lead to further fragmentation and distortion in public politics.

Most relevant to this specific study, are Eva Sorensen and Jacob Torfing's (2009) perspectives of how public authorities use modes of governance networks and how they can hold the network’s policies and outputs into account.

1.3.2. Previous research of perspectives of BIDs in urban governance

To better understand the empirical BID model in this study we will review previous research about concerns and successes of BID as a new governance framework. The ongoing research discuss the role of BIDs in urban governance and urban policy as well as its way to blur the line between the traditional notions of public and private. In response, researchers have put forth several theories to understand this new phenomenon, according to Hoyt and Gopal-Agge (2007), that are “new governance”, “new regionalism”, the “third way” economic paradigm, “new urbanism” and “network governance”. Various perspectives of the BID model are discussed in the article “The Business Improvement
District Model: A Balanced Review of Contemporary Debates” by Lorlene Hoyt, Assistant Professor at the Massachusetts institute of technology and Devika Gopal-Agge, Researcher at the same institute (2007). They emphasize the question whether BIDs are democratic or not and provide a review of the key debates associated with this relatively new urban revitalization strategy. In the following part the research of relevance for this study will be presented in various themes, although some are intertwined.

**BIDs and its democratic challenges**

One perspective discussed is that the Business improvement district partnerships have been charged to be less than democratic in their structure and operation. Researchers have criticized the organizational structure of BIDs where boards have unfair representation of the less privileged class and the legally enabled provision of weighted voting that devolves larger property owners more authority. Critics argue that such practices are not democratic as they serve the interests of and concentrate power with the privileged classes, and allege that BIDs function more like “clubs” of property and business owners that have been given the power to manage public spaces, Hoyt and Loukaitou-Sideris mean, discussed by Hoyt and Gopal-Agge (2007). Other scholars challenge this by asserting that networks can be seen as a more democratic governance in terms of a more inclusive decision-making process when actors who do not otherwise engage in social issues are given an opportunity to participate (Sorensen & Torfing, 2009). In BIDs, many stakeholders influence the entire chain from problem articulation and the development of solutions to implementation (Holmberg, 2014).

**BIDs and its accountability challenges**

Different perspectives regarding if BIDs are accountable are also discussed in previous research. In a democratic system, elected representatives are accountable to the public for their decisions and activities, and the issue of accountability underlies the notion of one person, one vote. However, the question of accountability here is essentially a matter of the city government’s willingness to engage in a system for regularly monitoring BIDs. With powers ranging from the authority to operate a community court to the acquisition of state and federal funds, BIDs have been criticized for being autonomous legal entities that are not accountable to the district’s residents or other communities in areas whom their decisions affect, the authority in which they operate, or the BID’s business or property owner constituents, argue Morçöl and Zimmermann according to Hoyt and Gopal-Agge (2007). On the other side, supporters argue that BIDs are politically accountable as long as certain measures such as annual reports or outside reviews, mean Briffault, Hochleutner and Wolf, referred by Hoyt and Gopal-Agge (2007). As Briffault points out, it is unclear whether governments simply ignore their legal obligations and let BIDs operate in virtual independence or whether they try to hold BIDs accountable to the enabling laws.

Scholars discuss the accountability of BIDs in relation to accountable to who and what organization or person should be held accountable and the multi organizational and complex nature of governance networks worsen the accountability challenges, as Agranoff, Kettl and Rhodes mean, discussed by Morcöl and Wolf (2010). Hochleutner, discussed by Morcöl and Wolf (2010), does not think that the BID accountability issue is problematic, because they are created by local governments, and therefore are simply subject to them. Schaller and Modan (2005) mean that due to the BID board with private actors and that their decision-making process is removed from public deliberation, BIDs are structured as a mean of managing space rather than a democratic model of governance, and they are legitimized by the concept of improved efficiency.
BIDs and its relation to the local government
As many academics have pointed out, BIDs are created under the authority of and subject to local government and cannot employ coercive authority except under the sufferance of the governing municipalities that maintain the authority to dissolve them, argue Briffault, Justice and Goldsmith (Hoyt & Gopal-Agge, 2007). Few researches, though, have study the relation between BIDs and local governments. These studies indicate that although the existence of a BID depends on legal authorization by a local government, BIDs are both autonomous and interdependent with governments, as the Professors of public administration and policy Göktug Morcöl and James F. Wolf (2010) argue. In their article “Understanding Business Improvement Districts: A new governance framework”, it is showed that BIDs cannot exist without governments, but the fact that BIDs are taking over some of the responsibilities of local governments suggests that local governments are becoming more dependent on them for the delivery of local services. Morcöl and Wolf also discuss how we should not view BID as a tool in urban development because it is somewhat misleading and conjures up the image of a “tool user” and thus connotes a one-way power relationship between the government authority and the BID. Instead of a “tool-using government” it is often the representatives of the property owners that initiate the process of creating a BID with the purpose of promoting their own commercial interests, which may coincide with the economic development goals of local government. Researches have observed that BIDs relation with the local government can take three forms, collaborative, dominating or co-optative, and it depends on the level of common values, shared purpose and trust. Kevin Ward (2007), Professor of human geography, argues in his article “Creating a Personality for Downtown: Business Improvement Districts in Milwaukee”, that the actors that form a BID have much to gain from forging a local alliance to protect their interests. Levy and MacDonald, referred by Ward, depict BIDs as a more focused and flexible form of governance than large municipal bureaucracies, which channeling private sector agency towards the solution of public problems.

Morcöl and Wolf (2010) have identified four different conceptualizations in the literature that characterize BIDs, that are, in addition to BIDs as a tool of government policies, also BIDs as public-private partnerships, quasi-governmental entities and private governments. They themselves prefer to see BIDs as actors in urban governance networks, because they play roles in determining public policy goals and shaping collective action.

BIDs and its inequalities in the delivery of public service
Another relevant question from previous research is if BIDs create inequalities in its delivery of public services. According to a long-standing critic, BIDs serve narrow commercial interests, ensure a continuum of middle class work and concentrate efforts within their spatial boundaries. Contrary, BID advocates explaining that BIDs are formed as a response to the local government’s inability to meet basic requirements (Hoyt & Gopal-Agge, 2007).

BIDs and its implications of public space
Another important issue concerns to which extent BIDs regulate public spaces. The increasingly influential role BIDs are playing in policy making and in the provision of urban services has become a challenge to the conventional notion of public administration. Garodnick and Reeve, discussed by Hoyt and Gopal-Agge (2007), suggest that there is often a conflict of values and priorities between BID managers and the local authority officers with many critics supporting the view that BIDs threaten to undermine the use of public space. There is considerable debate in the literature on the subject of whether BID’s activities, namely the provision of supplemental security and maintenance services, over-
regulate public space. Proponents claim at the same time that downtown managers of BIDs are often the only ones to draw together the fragmented world of social services, advocates of the homeless, business leaders, and the police (Hoyt & Gopal-Agge, 2007). Critics also argue that BIDs dilute the vitality of the areas they seek to revitalize and suppress the varied expressions of human interaction. Shaller and Modan (2005) mean that the improvement respond to certain desires and do not consider perceptions of what public spaces mean defined by less privileged groups, the one's use of space that also often is regulated. In contrast, practitioners say that these activities are simply the necessary cost of “doing business and delivering a quality experience” and should not be viewed as an over-regulation of public space, mean Levy, Caruso and Weber, referred by Hoyt and Gopal-Agge (2007).

In the book Stad till Salu [City for Sale], the authors Mats Franzén, Nils Herttting and Catharina Thörn (2016) give a review of how local property owners and BID networks have taken more power over the design and use of public space, and how the municipalities support this work. Entrepreneurial urbanism is an international phenomenon coming from globalization and neoliberalism, and the book shows how it is described as a natural development, when it basically is based on municipal decisions and private corporate lobbyism. Rather than accepting that the network develops the city in everyone’s interests, the authors want to point out the importance of asking the question “in whose interest” the city is transformed. Also Ward (2007) means that BIDs establishment involves public spaces coming under the control of an institution informed by private interests. They contribute to new energy, new resources and new leadership. In the words of the BIDs themselves, the emphasis is to make the urban area “clean, safe and friendly” and by pursuing these sorts of strategies BIDs have become bound up in debates over the securitization and privatization of public space (Steel & Symes, 2005).

**BIDs and its management challenges**

There are very limited research on the management challenges that BID managers and the local government officials face and the new skills they need, however, it is found as one of the main challenges the new governance pose to public administration. The research to this date mean that negotiation rather than command and control should be the bases of management philosophy and enablement skills are required. The management needs both general and political leadership skills to navigate the relations among property owners as well as between them and the local government officials (Morcöl & Wolf, 2010).

**BID governance in Sweden**

Jenny Stenberg (2010), associate Professor at Chalmers, has investigated the governance of a neighborhood in the BID partnership of Gamlestaden in Gothenburg, and means that it is a partnership that promotes private interests, i.e giving business stakeholders privileged access to public policy, since the public employees only are adjunct members. She also means that the local partnership succeed in persuading the city to prioritize their neighborhood by cooperating with them.

This study is part of the ongoing research about governance processes in partnerships, with focus on dilemmas found in the BID partnership in Sofielund, Malmö. The study will contribute to knowledge why it is complex to involve many actors in the governance, and to understand the governance of a partnership with private actors run by a public leader, and its management challenges.
1.4. Layout

The next part of the study, the 2\textsuperscript{nd} chapter, will be the methodology chapter, which will specify the approach and methods that are used in the empirical study, followed by the limitations that are made, primary and secondary data that are included as well as the reliability of the sources. The 3\textsuperscript{rd} chapter, the theoretical framework, will present theories that aim to give an understanding of the complexity with governance networks and why they need to be meta governed to ensure a public control of the autonomous self-regulated network. The study proposes that a network governance and meta-governance perspective are needed to understand the roles of BIDs in urban areas and their complex nature in terms of governance challenges and inherent factors in the collaborative form. The 4\textsuperscript{th} chapter is a description of the object of study, that is the BID partnership process. It starts with an insight of the background of the model, how it started and is used internationally, to then describe the swedish inspired BID model and further on to give an overview of the partnership case in Sofielund in Malmö. The results and analysis part, the 5\textsuperscript{th} chapter, is divided in two parts where the first one presents the empirical data and findings and the second part interprets and analyzes the data in relation to the theoretical framework. To capture the different aspects of governance challenges identified in the network, the data is categorised regarding common themes. The findings of the study are then repeated in the 6\textsuperscript{th} chapter, the conclusion and discussion part, which also includes an evaluation of the results. It addresses whether the study has answered the questions and fulfilled its aim, how it adds to the theoretical perspective and if the findings are supportive or not to the previous research. Finally, it reflects on what new knowledge the study adds to the field as well as to the field of urban studies.
2.0. METHOD

The purpose of this part is to describe how different choices have been made, from the choice of research design, methods applied, limitations made, type of primary and secondary data and the reliability of the sources used in the study.

2.1. Research design and methods applied in the study

The study uses a qualitative research design case study methodology, as John W. Creswell, William E. Hanson and others (2007) define in “Qualitative Research Designs: Selection and Implementation”. The characteristics of the case study design are explained in terms of when a researcher has a case bounded by time or place that can inform the problem. The focus of case study research are on the issues with the individual case selected to understand the problem. Case study research build an in-depth understanding of the case, relying on multiple data sources, according to Yin, discussed by Creswell, Hanson and others (2007). The researcher explores a bounded system (a case) through data collection involving for example interviews, observations and documents and reports a case description and case based themes. In the single instrumental case study the researcher focuses on a concern and then select one bounded case to illustrate this issue. Another type of case study is an intrinsic one in which the focus is on the case itself, because the case presents an unique situation. This study is more related to the latter one. The intrinsic case study resembles the focus of narrative research, but the case study’s analytical procedures of detailed description set within the case’s context, still hold true. A procedure to conduct case study is to collect, describe and analyze the data and then focuses on a few key issues or themes to understand the complexity of the case. The researcher uses to end with interpreting the meaning of the case and whether it comes from learning about the issue of the case or of the unique situation (Creswell, Hanson and others, 2007). The strategy focuses rather on processes than measurable end products. The point of a case study is to analyze the situation and come up with concepts that can explain what are happening and why, in the specific case. Case studies can both mean testing theories on reality and to formulating theories based on what you actually observe (Denscombe, 2014).

The chosen empirical case study, a partnership model working with local neighborhood improvement with BID as a tool in the area of Sofielund, Malmö, is an example of a challenge with today’s governance of urban development, and therefore it is a relevant object of study linked to the purpose of the study. Furthermore, as Larsson (2017) points out, insofar as “governance” has becomes a practice, it is important to discover how it is applied locally and produces meaning.

In order to find out the challenges with the network’s governance and what that mean for the area improvement, we need to take part of the involved network actors perceptions and how they explain their BID-model. Therefore, the empirical data are gathered mainly through interviews, but also by observations during workshops, attended meetings, group discussions and an ongoing dialogue with the key informants. The study is also conducted through a literature review on theories of governance networks, meta-governance and previous research of BIDs as a phenomenon of governance networks as well as case study-specific documents about BID Sofielund.
A total of 9 in-depth interviews with various stakeholders were carried out, 2 workshops and group discussions and the BID Sofielund partnership's annual meeting were attended. The interviewees were selected through purposive sampling, based on their field of activity and participation within the network, both public and private actors. These include the development leader of the network, several active property owners in the network, private as well as public, relevant city representatives from the City of Malmö, one of whom is adjunct board member in the network, a business actor member of the network as well as an actor from a housing association in the neighborhood of Sofielund who is not part of the network. In addition, I have interviewed a researcher at LUCSUS, Lund University, with interest and expertise in sustainable and inclusive city development. During the partnership's annual meeting a local politician as well as the network's chairman commented on the BID process, which are included in the study's empirical data.

The interviews were conducted as semi-structured, which means that we discussed on various themes more than specific questions. I had prepared questions as a framework for the themes, but was open for new questions to occur and created the interview more as a dialogue (See APPENDIX: Interview guide). The duration of the interviews varied between 1.5 – 3 hours. The advantage of this approach is that it is sensitive and people-oriented and offers the chance for the researcher to have a more wide-ranging discussion that a questionnaire would allow. The researcher has the chance to ask the same questions in different ways in order to explore issues thoroughly, and interviewees can explain the complexities of their experiences. One strength of this approach is that it allows respondents to raise issues that the interviewer may not have anticipated (Flowerdew & Martin, 1997).

To attend meetings and workshops with the network participants gave me insights in processes that not only interviews would give. However, the main empirical material for the analysis is based on what was produced during the interviews, and has been used in an interpretative work process linked to the concepts that are addressed in the theory section as well as perspectives of the BID model.

Zolner discussed by Sandeberg (2010) argues that in the study of governance networks, interviews are a useful tool as it gives rise to knowledge that is not available in written documents, such as the participants’ inner experiences of how they see a particular process, how they value different aspects of the network and the ability to explain, for example, how the cooperation or a policy process work and which actors they think are the most driving.

The study wants to know how the professional actors involved in the network perceive the collaboration and the conditions for partnerships to create sustainable living environments in order to understand the network as a force in urban governance. It includes benefits and conflicts with the collaboration model related to various governance forms, for example the challenge of the city's involvement and the network's composition of actors. The goal of the interviews is to get the actors perception of BID as a collaboration tool in the neighborhood improvement.

2.2. Limitations of the study

The present case study and partnership in Malmö can be seen as a test arena, a new way to work with neighborhood development in Sweden, and therefore it is important to understand this process because it will be able to scale-up and play a role for our future
living environments. However, the BID model that is studied is specific and variations in the form can differ from place to place, so the results from this case study should not be seen as general and adaptable to other BID partnership work.

The study wants to get the professionals’ views of the partnership’s work and therefore it focuses on interviews of the involved network actors. The study also includes empirical data in form of taking part of a presentation held by a municipal politician at the network’s annual meeting, about its view of the partnership work. But the study does not include an interview by any relevant politician to get a deeper understanding of their view. A reason for this is partly lack of time, partly an unclearness of who this person should be and even if it exists one politician responsible for the process, which on the other hand strengthens the problems of the networks accountability discussed in the analysis. The study also has limitations in that the analysis lacks some valuable and in-depth details about the development leader's management strategies, questions that has evolved during the study and was not foreseen in the early stage. Some of the new questions have been answering via email but some needed to be answered face-to-face and their was the limit a lack of time.

Also, to understand challenges and dilemmas that are connected to the networking and facilitation aspects as well as influences of interests and governance structures in the decision-making, are difficult to grasp just by discussing it with involved members. There are processes that need to be taken part of, in terms of observations during a longer period in order to get an entire and deep picture of what is going on. However, the researcher has attended meetings and group discussions that contributed to a better understanding of the process, but it was still difficult to grasp the network’s practicality as governance tool by just listening and observing dialogues, and by not taking part of for example the daily management or the collaborations' actions and performances. This could have addressed the ways in which the network interact, such as influences between the local authority, the network leader, the actors and the network’s outcomes. It is also, however, not sure an outsider can understand a bounded network’s function without being an insider.

2.3. Primary and secondary data

The main primary empirical data in this study is produced in the interviews. Secondary data is data someone else has interpreted before. In this study, secondary data is a literature review based mainly on one perspective, but that does not means it ignores other theorists within the field. The theoretical framework is mainly based on the theorists Sorensen and Torfing's approach on governance networks and their notion of meta-governance. The study also uses theories from the book *Governance in Swedish*, where Hedlund and Montin (2008) write about interactive governance and meta-governance by referring to Sorensen and Torfing's approaches. The fact that their text is in Swedish, the author's mother tongue, facilitated the opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of a complex subject.

2.4. Reliability

In qualitative research the role of the researcher is the primary data collection instrument, that necessitates the identification of personal values, assumptions and biases in the outset of the study, according to Creswell (2014). The main concern according the reliability of the sources and the investigator's contribution to the research setting, is that the empirical data focuses on meanings of policies, values, feelings, and beliefs that involves actors' expressions in various interviews, where the essence of the arguments often has to be
understood indirectly, which highlights a need for the researcher to be able to uncover connotations and see underlying tones. In addition to this difficulty, the researcher is also aware that its ability, or inability, to understand and interpret complex problems can affect the credibility of the results.

Also, the study aims to understand influences, power relations, regulations, control and pressure between actors, which might be sensitive issues to direct ask about. Even if asked, the respondents can answer in a neutral way unwilling to point out someone, or put himself or herself in a uncomfortable situation that could adversely affect future cooperation. The respondents’ attitude and position in the network can therefore affect the way they answer the questions, which lead to a possible risk for bias in the empirical data. It means that the findings that are based on the interpretations of the empirical data might have risk of bias, due to the respondents' bias and the researcher's interpretations.

The limitation of using interviews as data collection is according to Creswell (2014), that it provides information filtered through the views of interviewees and provides information in a designated place rather than the natural field setting. The researcher's presence may bias responses and not all people are equally articulative and perceptive, which should be taken into account.
3.0. THEORY

To be able to identify challenges in urban governance that the partnership's face, one need to understand the dynamics of network governance. Network governance can be defined as an institutionalized collaboration between public and private actors who together address various public issues with a degree of autonomy from public institutions and the state. However, networks also stand in need of coordination to align objectives, interests, resources and initiatives as networks may run into delicate problems. A public authority that accepts and takes on the responsibility to promote and manage self-governing networks is often said to engage in meta-governance (Larsson, 2016). More specifically, the need for meta-governance is based on the fact that networks may fail to sustain processes that serve public purposes (Sorensen & Torfing, 2009).

A governance framework is believed to offer a better understanding of BID partnership's roles in urban governance (Hoyt & Gopal-Agge, 2007), as well as a better understanding of relations among the actors, between governments and BIDs and the role of the network manager in the formation and operation of the network. The BID partnership in Sofielund can be seen as an example of network governance and through its public manager it is also well connected with the concept of meta-governance. Therefore, these concepts are introduced and discussed in the following part.

Among different perspectives, the study focuses on the framework of network governance and meta-governance introduced by the Danish Professors within politics and institutions versus public administration and democracy Jacob Torfing and Eva Sorensen. The theoretical framework starts to address theories concerning network governance and its contested democratic merits. The second part, and the most comprehensive, proposes that networks can be improved through the art of meta-governance and contains the definition of the concept as well as the practice. To demonstrate why it is complex to work in a partnership, the conceptual framework also examines the problem of collective action and conflicts in collaborative governance. While the first two parts deal with aspects regarding if collaboration is good in relation to societal and democratic aspects, the latter deals with the conditions to collaborate.

3.1. Governance networks

The formulation and implementation of public policy increasingly take place in and through interactive forms of governance involving a plurality of public, semi-public and private actors, where the state is to an increasing extent “de-governmentalized” as it no longer monopolizes the governing of the general well-being of the population in the way that it used to be (Sorensen and Torfing, 2007). The surge of governance networks is discussed in Eva Sorensen and Jacob Torfing’s (2009) article “Making governance networks effective and democratic through metagovernance”. A governance network can be defined as a network of interdependent yet autonomous actors engaged in institutionalized processes of public governance, based on negotiated interactions and joint decision making. Sorensen and Torfing (2009) define governance networks as:

A stable articulation of mutually dependent but operationally autonomous actors from state, market and civil society, who interact through conflict-ridden negotiations that take place within an institutionalized framework of rules,
According to Maarten Hajer, Professor of Urban Futures, and Researcher Wytske Versteeg, discussed by Sorensen and Torfing (2009), there are no agreed upon norms, procedures or constitution to predetermine where and how a legitimate decision is to be taken, when a governance network first is formed. The ongoing interaction of the network actors will eventually lead to the formulation of a framework of rules, norms, values and ideas that is doubtful and incomplete. The institutionalized interaction facilitates a self-regulated policy-making process cast by public or private meta-governors who are capable of regulating and reducing the self-government of the network, argues the political scientist Fritz W. Scharpf, discussed by Sorensen and Torfing (2009). Sorensen and Torfing express governance networks as an aim to mobilize the knowledge, resources and energies of free and responsible actors aiming to govern themselves on the basis of narratives, objectives and standards that are intrinsic to the new governmentality.

The new interactive governance arrangements take part in the authoritative allocation of values for a society. Sorensen and Torfing (2009) mean that we must therefore ask whether governance networks contribute to fulfil the key ambition of modern society: producing and delivering public policy in a manner that is both effective and democratic. Governance networks often contribute to make public governance more effective in policy settings characterized by a multiplicity of social and political actors, vague problem definitions and the need for specialized knowledge. However, given their informal character and the influence of private actors, there is a need to consider their democratic performance. Further, governance through the formation of networks composed of public and private actors might help solve complex problems and enhance democratic participation in public policy-making, but it may also create conflicts and deadlocks and make public governance less transparent and accountable. In order to ensure that governance networks contribute to an effective and democratic governing of society, Sorensen and Torfing (2009) argue that careful meta-governance by politicians, public managers and other relevant actors is necessary.

3. 2. Making governance networks effective and democratic through meta-governance

The question how to assess the contribution of governance networks to an effective and democratic governing will be discussed in the following part. The impact of effectivity is important because the need of governance networks often justifies with the need to increase the effectivity of public governance. The impact of democracy is crucial since democratic problems in terms of the lack of accountability and the privileging of strong and resourceful elites is a danger in a networked polity, mean Sorensen and Torfing (2009). According to Larsson (2016) the meta-governance approach resides upon a general acceptance of networks, but it is still attentive to their potential failure and democratic shortcomings. Meta-governance is thus about promoting and facilitating governance networks while at the same time avoiding the negative side of networks.

Meta-governance refers to the need of formal public organizations to exercise some control over devolved and decentralized decision-making organizations. As knowledgeable and
resourceful actors, politicians and public managers at different levels of government, have a special responsibility for unleashing the potentials of governance networks, and thus can embody the role as the meta-governor. They have a capacity for strategic leadership and are also charged with defending public interests. There is no guarantee that they will assume this responsibility though, because they are also engaged in political conflicts and power struggles and may seek to exploit their privileged position to pursue particularistic interests. Sorensen and Torfing (2009) declare that democracy forces them to justify their rule and legitimize the overall system of governance in the face of hegemonic norms, prescribing that public governance should be both effective and democratic.

The move towards collaborative forms of governance through networks, can increase the efficiency by networking with stakeholders in the use of common means and in the pursuit of common ends. The output of governance networks can be difficult to quantify, because it includes intangible results such as joint problem understandings, common values, future visions, enhanced coordination and cooperative processes. The governance networks are seldom in control of the production of the tangible and intangible policy outputs. Collaboration with stakeholders helps mobilize additional resources, and negotiated coordination makes better use of the available resources, however, the transaction cost of networking is often high and networks might fall into the joint decision trap, Scharpf argues, discussed by Sorensen and Torfing (2009). The definition of the policy goals is subject to ongoing conflicts as well as to negotiations among the network actors, which leads to unclear competing goals. The presence of diffuse and multiple objectives is a problem in the assessment of goal attainment, and they are constantly changing due to mutual learning and shifting power relations. The presence of relatively stable and coherent objectives might facilitate the assessment of a governance network’s capacity for goal attainment, and the governance networks often share the responsibility to reach the goals with a host of government agencies. Moreover, the real strength of governance networks will often lie in defining a complex set of objectives that reflects the complexity of the policy problems rather than in delivering the outputs that produce the desired outcomes, mean governability theorists such as Jan Kooiman, Erik Hans Klijn and Joop Koppenjan, discussed by Sorensen and Torfing.

The interest of Sorensen and Torfing (2009) is how governance networks contribute to an effective formulation and implementation of public policy through an ongoing process of trust-based interaction. Effective network governance begins with the identification of policy problems and ends with building capacities for future cooperation. The broad picture is that governance networks provide effective and comparatively better policy solutions through negotiated interaction. Further on, in order to be effective, networks must be able to adjust to changes in the environment and provide a institutionalized framework for sustained negotiations that can facilitate the alignment of goals, values and produce a stable coordination of actions in the face of diverging interests. In other words, governance networks require a careful and deliberate governance and must be meta-governed to contribute to the effective governing of society, the network governance theorists Walter J.M. Kickert, Bob Jessop, Keith Provan and Patrick Kenis mean, discussed by Sorensen and Torfing (2009).

The democratic potentials of network governance are seldom foreseen, and the decision makers find it difficult to see whether they can enhance democracy. Judged on the basis of the traditional liberal norms of representative democracy, governance networks seem to be rather undemocratic.
There is no equal participation of the citizens within a given territory, since only the relevant and affected groups have access to a particular governance network. There is no free and open competition among different political elites to represent the relevant and affected citizens, as the participating stakeholder organizations often possess a monopoly in representing particular functionally defined groups of people. Finally, democratic control and accountability is weak due to the fact that the network participants are not elected, but rather (self-) appointed (Sorensen and Torfing, 2009:243).

Only if governance networks are themselves democratic, they contribute to the democratic functioning of the society, mean Sorensen and Torfing. A governance network is democratically anchored to the extent that it is monitored by elected politicians capable of influencing the relatively self-regulated policy processes proceeding within the network. The democratic impact of governance networks depends on their particular form and function, that in turn depends on how these are designed and managed. Effective and democratic network governance depends on how they are meta-governed by public authorities or other legitimate agents, conclude Sorensen and Torfing.

3.3. The concept and exercise of meta-governance

The performance of networks depends on the societal context, the institutional design and the political struggle that determine their form and functioning. In order to maximize the merits and minimize the problems of the governance networks, we need to be able to assess their performance through a reflexive and strategic meta-governance, Sorensen and Torfing (2009) mean.

Meta-governance can broadly be defined as “the governance of governance”. It refers to a higher order of governance transcending the concrete forms of governance through which social and economic life is shaped, regulated and transformed. It is a reflexive and responsive process through which a range of actors aim to combine, facilitate and shape governance in accordance with specific procedures embodying the hegemonic conception of what constitutes “Good Governance”. How public managers can manage complex networks in order to facilitate mutual learning and trust building and influence actual governance processes through different kinds of interventions, asking the professors of public administration Erik Hans Klijn and Joop Koppenjan (Sorensen and Torfing 2009).

A challenge for public meta-governors is to regulate the network via some indirect forms of governance seeking to shape the free actions of the network actors in accordance with a number of standards and substantial goals defined by the meta-governor. The regulation of the self-regulation occurs through creating a plurality of free, empowered and responsible actors and technologies of performance shaping the conditions for the exercise of free action within complex networks. Meta-governance allows public authorities to mobilize knowledge, resources and energies of a host of public and private actors while retaining their ability to influence the scope, process and outcomes. They can exercise power while sharing the responsibility for public governance with other actors, and employ different tools in their efforts to meta-govern governance networks. Network design, network framing, network management and network participation are forms of meta-governance tools. The first two are performed “hands-off”, at a distance from the network, and the last two “hands-on”, which means in close interaction between the meta-governor and the network.
The network design tool aims to influence the scope, character, composition and the network’s institutional procedures. It might help meta-governors ensure a broad inclusion of actors in governance networks and avoid external exclusion. Network framing is an ongoing process aimed at shaping the arena for network interaction through the use of indirect means such as the formation of the overall goals and discursive storytelling that defines the joint mission of the network. The dissemination of “best practice” can be used to influence the means by which the network actors aim to reach particular goals. Meta-governors might also attempt to strengthen the interdependence among the network actors to stimulate resource exchange. The network management tool attempts to reduce tension, resolve conflicts, empower particular actors and lower the network’s transaction costs. The final meta-governance tool is network participation, which striving to influence the policy agenda, the range of feasible options, the premises for decision making and the negotiated policy outputs. The meta-governor becomes one among many network participants, in the participation tool, but should retain a reflexive gaze in order to influence the network’s operations. According to sustained cooperation among the actors, the meta-governor can, by participating actively in the network, help produce the kind of quick victories obtainable by picking the lowest hanging fruits and creating a sense of joint ownership through a repeated emphasis on the contribution of the participating actors, which in turn foster further commitment and willingness to share resources and risks. Scharpf, referred by Sorensen and Torfing (2009), means that the sustained cooperation must build on some degree of trust in order to decide whether to choose a cooperative or competitive strategy. The behavior of the actors will often depend on the other actors, and everybody waits to see which game is being played. If first actor displays trust, others might follow and expect everybody else to abstain from exploiting interests to their own advantage.

A governance network should be formed around a number of clearly defined policy objectives. Focusing on policy goals rather than policy programmes brings up the question of which actors that can contribute to goal attainment. To stimulate effective interaction, the meta-governor might want to set a number of deadlines for the delivery of the policy outputs. A number of milestones can be defined in order to keep the actors focused on the production of outputs (Sorensen & Torfing, 2009).

### 3.4. Meta-governance dilemmas

Meta-governance dilemmas can occur if a public meta-governor grants priority to short-term interests in advancing their own agendas and policy solutions through an instrumental co-optation of the stakeholders and a strategic manipulation of the networked policy processes. In respect of the self-regulating character of the networks, the meta-governor must abstain from exercising direct control and be content with more or less explicit threats of changing the composition of the network. One key dilemma facing public meta-governors concerns the question of how to ensure a high level of democratic legitimacy in a networked polity. Another dilemma is how to avoid insufficient meta-governing. When the meta-governance is too tight it can results in reducing the actors’ willingness to participate and invest themselves in the joint problem solving. On the other hand, if the meta-governance is too loose and vague, it might lead to underperformance.

Another dilemma concerns the complexity of the more inclusive participation of stakeholders in a governance network, the more democratic, while at the same time it reducing its ability to formulate clear and sustainable compromises. Likewise, a tightly knit network with actors that know each other well might be effective in responding to emerging problems but will often lack a democratic legitimacy. Hence, open and inclusive
Governance networks tend to enhance democracy to the detriment of effectivity, whereas closed governance networks might be effective but undemocratic. If the compromises obtained through negotiations with the public meta-governors are not respected by the government, public meta-governors face another dilemma with increased implementing resistance and therefore less opportunities for continued network negotiations.

In the article "Participation and Sustainable Development: The role and challenge of mediating agents", Jeppe Laessö (2008) Associate Professor with research about empowerment for democracy related to sustainable development, highlights dilemmas for a third-party mediator, that has parallels to the meta-governor and the role as network manager. One dilemma that Laessö highlights is about the involvement versus the independence of the third-party mediator. As described earlier, a third-party mediating agent is ideally characterized by being independent of the actors, yet, the mediator cannot just go about its own business. In order to fill their networking and facilitating roles they have to involve themselves and build relations with the actors. But this compromise with their autonomous position and can make them unable to facilitate the actors, because their involvement can cause bias. We could say that the network leader's role cannot stay beyond the top-down versus bottom-up issue, and the role can vary depending where it positions itself. The network leader's close contact with the network members can imply that local authorities can benefit from its knowledge and utilize his/her as their "extended arm". It can also take a role when it acts as a critical opponent towards the local authority. This distinct position, free to work both as partners and opponents to the local authority and free to move between relevant actors, lets the mediator to promote synergy and cooperation, and it has potential to work as the dialogue-building third party who can help overcome barriers by encouraging conflict-solving among the local authority and the other local actors.

Another dilemma about the same problem is about the mediator's professional distance versus engagement in the process. The mediator has to be good at facilitating a process that will enable local players to make progress in their work, and they need both knowledge and commitment to the issue at hand to assess the progress of their work. It implies a double risk that the process on the one hand ends up as a purely technical exercise, and on the other a committed facilitator can cause its views and values to control the participant actors' processes. Third-party mediators are not robots but people with particular backgrounds and social contexts, that are both tainted by and can taint views, and the question is how much mediators actually influence the construction of participative processes, Laessö (2008) means. He describes the mediator as an independent professional agent that has the role of facilitating participation in local sustainability initiatives. It means a process of coming between different social interests and guiding the involved actors with a view to finding a way forward from what is in danger of becoming inertia. To have participation as their professional task and to bring people together, can be seen as a way of potentially strengthening democracy in complex network societies. A challenge for the mediator concerning how to involve participants in relation to sustainable development, is the tension between listening to various voices versus trying to motivate them to transcend their own narrow interests to a responsibility for the common good where everybody has to contribute and collaborate.
3.5. The strategic and collaborative competences required for meta-governing governance networks

Three basic conditions must be met in order to understand the potentials of the public meta-governors, that are; a required knowledge of the organizational and political landscape to act as meta-governor, a sufficient understanding of how to influence the governance network's form and function to contribute to effective and democratic governance, and they must possess strategic and collaborative competences in order to execute and revise their meta-governance strategies. The final point concerns the personal capacity to meta-govern the networked polity. A meta-governor of governance network needs to require, except planning, budgeting and decision making, also tasks such as forming, activating, arranging, stabilizing, integrating and developing networks, according to William D. Eggers and Stephen Goldsmith, discussed by Sorensen and Torfing (2009). The strategic competences include negotiated goal alignment, risk assessment, flexibility, project management and the ability to tackle unconventional problems. The collaborative competences include communication skills, storytelling capacities and talents for coaching, cooperation and trust building. These competences are not generally found among lower level public managers, and some public managers will be unable to change their role from rule-observing bureaucrats to strategic developers, and from case and programme managers to network managers. This new type of public managers would advantageously have a background and temperament that enable them to mobilize and connect a plurality of actors to perform programmes that are implemented by a host of public and private actors.

3.6. Collaborative governance, collective action and network-level goals

The organizational theorists and public management scholars Keith Provan and Patrick Kenis (2009) focusing on the critical role of network governance and its impact on network effectiveness in their article “Modes of network governance: structure, management and effectiveness”. The effectiveness is viewed at the network level, and is defined as the attainment of positive network-level outcomes that could not normally be achieved by individual organizational participants acting independently. When Provan and Kenis define the term network they focus on groups of legally autonomous organizations that work together to achieve not only their own goals but also a collective goal. Their definition focus on “goal-directed” as opposed to “serendipitous” networks, where the goal-directed networks are important for achieving multi-organizational outcomes. Addressing complex issues that demand multilateral coordination, requires more than just achieving the goals of individual organizations. It requires collective action and the governance of these activities, and Provan and Kenis argue that this is critical for effectiveness. Unlike organizations, networks must be governed without benefit of hierarchy or ownership, and in addition, participants have limited accountability to network-level goals and conformity to rules and procedures are purely voluntary.

Chris Huxham (2003), researcher within collaborative work, also discusses the collective action and view it in relation to the conditions for a successful cooperation in her article “Theorizing collaboration practice” that gives an overview of two contrasting concepts. Collaborative advantage is concerned with the potential for synergy from working collaboratively, while collaborative inertia relates to the often disappointed outputs in the reality. As Provan and Kenis (2009) argued above, Huxham (2003) also means that to get the real advantage out of collaboration something has to be achieved that could not have been attained by any of the organizations acting alone, which is also often the purpose of the collaboration. One issue that captures the complexity that underlies collaborative
situations is the notion of common aims and goals, discussed by Huxham. A common wisdom is that it is necessary to be clear about the aims of joint working if partners are to work together to operationalize policies. In practice, however, it appears to be difficult to agree on aims and joint purpose due to the variety of organizational and individual agendas. Huxham identifies the kinds of goals and distinguishes between the goal of the collaboration, the goal of each organization and the individual participant's personal goals. Some of the difficulties that arise out of the need to communicate across different organizational and professional cultures are unlikely to assist the negotiation process. Other advantages that Huxham brings up with collaborative action are access to resources and skills, shared use of resources, shared risk and when the situation requires collaboration for solutions. The difficulties with cooperation are, on the other hand, differences in the goals of the participating actors, lack of trust between the organizations, differences in decision-making processes and that the collaboration requires sustained commitment.

In Chris Huxham and Siv Vangen’s (2000) article “The challenge of collaborative governance” the factors inherent in collaborative forms are described as well as their practicality as governance tools and what collaborative governance is intended to achieve. A common conception of collaboration sees it as counterpoised with conflict or competition, or it can be a work between actors towards win-win outcomes. Though, harnessing the synergy needed to achieve collaborative advantage is not simple. For example, the procedural differences in each organization can make it hard to get things done if more than one organization is involved. And if there are power differences, no-one is in charge. An agreed sense of what the collaboration is aiming to achieve is seen as an essential precursor to take joint action. However, in practice there is often expressed frustration at the lack of direction and support for heading there. On the other hand, the political economist Elinor Ostrom and contributor to the research field of collective action, referred by Holmberg (2014), states that the solution to achieve shared profits is an institutionalized cooperation with a long-term agreement that enables sustained management and development of joint assets.

In next part, we will get a presentation of the object of study that is a description of the BID collaboration model – international, Swedish and down to local level and the present case BID Sofielund partnership.
4.0. PRESENTATION OF OBJECT OF STUDY

4.1. The International Business Improvement District Collaboration model

A business improvement district (BID) is an internationally proven collaboration model for urban development, where property owners, the municipality and other stakeholders join together to drive improvement in a particular area. The idea behind Business Improvement Districts can be traced back to the 1930s and 1940s in the United States. During this time, property owners and business owners created the first voluntary cooperative organizations in cities like Detroit and Chicago. The organizations aimed at increasing the attractiveness of the city centers, as companies, commerce and customers increasingly began to abandon the inner city to establish themselves in new suburbs. The organizations worked with the promotion of the city center and jointly lobbied towards municipalities to promote better parking opportunities and advocate the transformation of nearby demolished and deserted urban environments. How the model is formed varies from place to place depending on the factor that triggers the formation of a BID and the local legislations. In the United States, the reasons have varied over time. Previously, BIDs were started due to detachment, lack of cleaning and insecure streets. Now is the reason often a renewal need (Olsson, 2017).

In the mid-1960s, a group of business owners in Toronto, Canada, began to address the issue of a model that would eliminate the problem of so-called "free riders" in the voluntary cooperation model. "Free riders" were the business owners and property owners in the area who benefited from the efforts made, but who were not interested in contributing themselves. Because of that, the group began to investigate the possibilities for providing an independent, privately owned organization with the power to collect additional tax from all involved actors with the purpose of financing local investments within a defined area. When the legislation that allowed this came into place in Toronto in 1969, the so-called BID model was born (Olsson, 2017).

Despite its widespread adoption and use, there is no standardized term or definition for the BID model. Throughout the United States there exist a range of designations such as special improvement districts (New Jersey), public improvement districts (Texas) and neighborhood improvement districts (Pennsylvania). In Canada, where the model originated, BIDs are known as business improvement areas. In South Africa, they are called city improvement districts. BIDs can be defined as privately directed and publicly approved organizations that supplement publics services within geographically defined boundaries by generating multi year revenue through a compulsory assessment on local property owners and/or business (Hoyt & Gopal-Agge, 2007).

4.2. BIDs in Sweden

Because Sweden lacks BID legislation, the forms of cooperation that arise there are on a voluntary basis, and often take the form of an association. Typically, the formation of a BID starts with the creation of a plan for business and budget by a group of initiators, in a well-defined geographical area (Olsson, 2017).
In Sweden, the municipality and other authorities also have a much greater influence on local development than in many "BID countries" such as the United States and the United Kingdom. The fact that the municipality has a clear monopoly and is responsible for the physical planning is a contrast to the system in the United States, where property owners and business actors have a major influence over the planning direction. Common to areas where BID or BID-inspired co-operation exist, is the local commitment to work together in order to address problems and challenges in the immediate area. In Sweden, from an international perspective, it is a more expanded and inclusive community service with organized systems and clear division of responsibilities. The efforts made in the BID-inspired cooperation in Sweden are therefore about measures to improve and expand existing social services, not to replace it. These may include joint ventures on refurbishment, operation and maintenance, activities and marketing of the area. Increased attraction, competitiveness and in the long-term raised real estate values are the usual driving forces. To reach this, an safe area is required. Therefore, the activities usually financed and carried out by BIDs concern local security and attractiveness measures. In many cases, there are security issues that trigger the formation of a BID. In the most basic form, a BID often uses its budget to provide unified local service through, for example, cleanup and security measures. The fact that areas and their challenges differ at different places makes the BID model also differ in its design. Financing is usually based on the size of property ownership in the area. It also happens that municipalities sub-finance different functions and that other external financing solutions are added (Olsson, 2017).

The model has been successful in the cities of Gothenburg, Stockholm and Malmö. The BID-inspired urban development project in the neighborhood Gamlestaden in Gothenburg is operated by the partnership Property Owners in Gamlestaden, a non-profit association with various property owners (Holmberg, 2016), and the model in Stockholm is initiated by the organization Property owners Stockholm (Olsson, 2017). They suggest that there should be at least one network in every city between the public and local business, with the intention to develop both the site and its real estate market.

In BID Sofielund in Malmö, the municipal involvement is extensive and Malmö City supports the process with coordination resources. It differs from previous BID projects in the country (My newsdesk press release, 2014).

4.3. The case of BID Sofielund – Property Owners Sofielund partnership

Photos taken by the author during a workshop at BID Sofielund, February 2017
In Malmö, Sweden, the BID concept has been adapted to local conditions in the neighborhood of Sofielund, a district located in the southern inner city of Malmö, focusing on housing, integration and participation. It is a partnership between the public, private and civil society, where several actors work together to increase the security, well-being and cohesion in the area. The partnership is organized in the association Property Owners Sofielund (Fastighetsägarna Sofielund), with about 40 members of local property owners, companies, housing associations, village communities and compounds who work in close cooperation with Malmö city and contribute economically and resourcefully. The BID model is run through the association, where the city of Malmö financing the administration and a development leader who governs and coordinates the work. The members of the association pay a membership fee and a service fee (Property Owners Sofielund's homepage, 2017).

The non-profit association Property Owners Sofielund was founded 2014 on the initiative of Property owners Syd [Fastighetsägarna Syd] and the City of Malmö. BID was introduced as a tool to break the negative development of the area. One of their goals is that the area should be characterized by a serious property management. Their slogan is "together we develop Sofielund to an attractive part of Malmö”. Together with the residents and the city, they want to develop Sofielund to a neighborhood where everyone can feel safe and an area to be proud about (Property Owners Sofielund's homepage, 2017). The association was formed as a response to an acute need of the current situation in the neighborhood with problems such as unserious and non present property owners. The interviewed and involved property owners (2017), agreed that the area was in a position where something had to be done, and the city's previous area program had not been able to make any noticeable changes. The impetus behind the creation of the BID is explained as both a critique to the services that the city government did not manage to deliver and an understanding that more could be done collectively. The network of Property Owners Sofielund was formed in a common effort to work on solutions together and push the development forward themselves, and they created an action plan for the area with defined objectives. Their common goal is to improve the area, the properties and the spaces around the houses, in order to get a more safe and attractive area that will increase the willingness to invest there (Interview property owners, 2017). Property Owners BID Sofielund's Action Plan 2017 is based on seven priority areas based on the 2014 annual meeting. They are 1. Safe and secure, 2. Clean and tidy, 3. Traffic and accessibility, 4. Urban environment, 5. Sustainable development: ecological, social, cultural, 6. Membership and Communication (Property Owners Sofielund's Action Plan, 2017).
5.0. RESULTS & ANALYSIS

In this part the empirical data will be presented and analyzed in relation to the theories. The first part, Empirical results, presents the results from the interviews, and the second part, Analysis, analyzes and interprets the results in relation to theories. The interpretations of the empirical results are analyzed mainly on the theoretical framework in this study, Sorensen and Torfing’s approach on governance networks and the notion of meta-governance. In order to increase the understanding of the topic, the analysis also brings in perspectives of dilemmas a “mediator” faces, because there are many parallels to the role of the meta-governor and the challenges it faces. Likewise, it uses perspectives and arguments of BIDs as a phenomenon in urban governance. To make it easier to follow, both parts are divided into themes that relates to identified challenges with the network’s governance.

As a reminder of this study, the BID Sofielund partnership is seen as an example of a challenge in today’s urban governance, in terms of different forms of governance with an emphasis of meta-governance and the development leader’s challenges as the “meta-governor”.

The area of Sofielund. Source: author
5.1. Empirical results

The development leader's role

What does the development leader mean for the members in the network?

The interviewed property owners (2017) were all positive about having the development leader co-ordinating their network. They like the fact that he is engaged in the area, want to improve it and that he has a well developed network among relevant actors. They agree on that his fantastic contribution is a key factor for the partnership's successful job.

Another beneficial factor is his presence in the area. The property owners express attributes that are linked to him as a person before they mention any advantages or disadvantages of him being employed by the city. However, having the development leader as a link between the network members' and the city's interest in the process of Sofielund means a lot for the members. The development leader (2017) himself does not see it as a difficult task to be the key person and link between the involved actors, and believes that it is positive that he is employed by the city. It can initiate discussions about the area, while at the same time it entails disadvantages such as long processes due to the municipal bureaucracy.

What does it mean for the network that the development leader is representing the city?

The Property owners (2017) find that the contact with the City of Malmö sometimes can be problematic. They find it easier to have a dialogue with the development leader who is close to their own reality. The property owners are also doubtful whether the development leader gets hearing from all parts of the organization of the City of Malmö. They think that the city's will is good, but is worse in implementing decisions. According to the network members (2017), the development leader has a commitment and willingness to make the area good, and through his wide network he reaches out to a lot of people and got many members on board, and the network has got through ideas thanks to his position. "For any change to occur, you need to have all with you", a property owner (2017) clarifies. The development leader (2017) thinks that the city's involvement is an important strength for the network and to include as an active force, and means that the city's interest for the BID process is great. "There are actors who do things in the area outside of the BID model, but the best thing is that it goes through me because it will be best if we do it together", the development leader (2017) argues. Another issue raised by several property owners (2017) concerned the fact that the relationship between “them” and the “leader” has a mutual exchange. The development leader gets support from the actors by having them with him instead of against him. And the fact that the city provides the network with financial support, makes it easier for their work. One property owner (2017) expresses it as: “Thanks to the BID tool, the network can make its voice stronger against the city if there is something we want to implement. If 40 members push a common interest, it is easier to convince". The development leader (2017) argues that their efforts have made a difference and that the area begins to turn to a safer and cleaner place, and explaining it is because of the BID model, where he has strong property owners and business with him when lobbying towards the city.

In the cooperation, the network members are controlling the processes, and the city is there to facilitate their work by accelerating processes and listening to the members' will. The representative of the City Planning Office and adjunct board member of Sofielund's
network (2017), assists the network's work and act as a direct contact to the city. “If the network members wonder something, I can take the question to the municipality and make sure it comes to the right person. I can also provide them with information on how to relate to the city’s processes”, the representative says. Further on, the representative believes that the development leader has a key role in the work and that he means a lot for the private actors, because he understand the municipality’s organization and can canalize the network's interest in the city, something that would be difficult if the network only consisted of private actors. The development leader can be seen as a bridge between the public and private, and can make public procurement via the association, when required. Another advantage with having a public leader, that the representative from the city (2017) highlights, is that the leader has no self-interest in the process. However, it requires an enthusiast like the leader of Sofielund to do the efforts he makes. Another representative from the City's Environmental Department (2017) also sees the development leader as an actor who never underestimates the area’s need, driven by a community commitment. The representatives of the city (2017) do not see the development leader as a person who gets stuck in bureaucracy, but rather “sees through things” in order to be an "enabler". The network actors (2017) believe that the qualities that the development leader possesses are difficult to replace, including his good local knowledge of the area. One property owner (2017) means that the leader’s role as the engine in the network is something positive, but also vulnerable.

*Is the leader's qualities personally bound according to the members?*

At the Property Owners Sofielund’s annual meeting (30/3-2017), the challenge whether their BID model is person-bound was discussed. If a strong and driving person quit, is there any structure yet? There were concerns from the members about what will happen if the development leader quit, and some of the anxiety can be related to the City of Malmö’s ongoing reorganization. The members of the meeting agreed, however, if the situation would change, they will finance the leader's employment themselves (Property Owners Annual meeting, 2017).

**Challenges with BID**

*Who should do what? The boundary between the network's and the public's responsibility?*

The representative of the City Planning Office (2017) believes that a problem area as Sofielund needs a holistic approach to be improved. She means that the area can get a positive boost if the property owners invest and raise the value of their properties at the same rate as the city “develops” its residents by helping them to employment etc. “The social needs of the area go far beyond what a property owner can do”, the representative believes. The city needs to go hand in hand with the investors (property owners), and the representative points out the role of the development leader as important here. Without him, the private actors lose contact with the municipality and then the physical investment issues are the only ones that remain. It is the property owners' interest to care for their properties, and if the city also invests in the spaces between the houses, it is a win-win situation. Further on, the representative of the City Planning Office explains that the city finds the network's commitment positive that someone else than the municipality drives the area development. Thus, the municipality will be further involved and will provide increased features for the network’s security measures in the coming years, she admits.
One property owner (2017) thinks that the association should be clear about that the BID process is a business, and to get more property owners in the area to understand that. “There are no property owners who do not see the business benefit in the social benefit”, the property owner (2017) says, meaning that business benefits and social benefits should go hand in hand. The property owner emphasizes the importance of being careful about what efforts the network should do, and where to set the limit. “It is about working long term with the area so people want to live here, and the efforts we make need to have this goal in mind”, the property owner (2017) explains. It means there is a thin line between working for the network’s goals and taking over the city’s responsibility. The city will, for example, maintain the streets, and that responsibility should not be taken over by the association. However, the network currently makes such efforts, because it has the budget for it. The property owner (2017) discusses that a possible problem can arise, if the network's take-over of responsibility will retreat other actors. It may be a risk that the city redistributes their resources to other areas if the city knows that the BID process takes care of Sofielund. The property owner perceives the BID process as a participation model, but which also should give something back to the business, that means the network members who invest in the model. The concern that BID Sofielund’s local model makes it easier for the city’s politicians to redistribute the city’s resources to other areas was echoed by another property owner (2017). The representative of the City Planning Office (2017), however, sees no risk that the city will retreat its responsibility due to BID's commitment. The work of the City Planning Office is independent of what is happening in Sofielund, she means. The city sees the engaged property owners and their commitment as an extra layer in the urban development. The partnership can be effective if the city also syncs its efforts with the network’s efforts, so that many things happen simultaneously in the area. The representatives believes "there are no luxury renovations we talk about, it is about raising the quality to a normal level, an area where you can go outside and feel safe. We can not reverse the trend in the area unless we do it together, and BID is an example on how a common interest can do just that". However, the interest can not been seen without taking the government context into account, meaning that the top priority of the City Office affects the city’s area development, the representatives (2017) concludes.

The network's goals and the decision-making process

Who decides what the network should deliver? Are the participants agreeing on what to deliver?

The question of how much power the network members have to decide the directions or actions in the neighborhood work, was raised during the interviews with the property owners. One property owner (2017) explains the decision-making process as “if you come up with an idea, you bring it to the development leader, and then he brings it up on our board meeting, where everyone has the right to say what they think about the proposal, and then the decision is made”. If it would be a conflict of interest, it is the majority of the voices that win, but that situation has not yet occurred. However, some voices are heard more than others. The property owner (2017) goes on explaining that their decision-making process does usually not take long time, but when the decisions are taken on to the municipality, the process is longer.

The property owners (2017) inform that it is the partnership’s board that owns the decisions that are made through the association. The basic idea is that those who pay a charge to the member association, those are the ones who make the decisions about what to do within the BID-process. The development manager is not part of the board, nor is he
or the City of Malmö a member of the association, and therefore they do not own the network board’s decisions. The leader’s task in this situation is someone who holds the network actors together, drives and keeps track of the board, an important task as it acts as an engine for the network and speed up things. According to the development leader (2017), he can make most of the network’s decisions himself, but larger sums must go through the network’s board or the work committee in the city district’s administration that he is employed by. He means that he often needs to make own decisions, but informs the board continuously and the members at the annual meetings. Regardless of who owns the decisions, they all agree (2017) that they have created the association to make it better for everyone in the area.

The representative of the City Planning Office (2017) says in the name of the city’s adjunct board member, that the city does not have the purpose of influencing the network’s interests in any direction, and believes that the network’s decisions, which they carry out with their own financial resources, do not need to be reviewed. The representative sees no risk with private actors providing public service, since the city has laws and policies to relate to. The network can not decide on matters relating the public place, since their interests must be tested as all other proposals in urban development. The representative (2017) also discusses the concern how to get a general perception among many actors, but thinks it is not a problem for the decision-making process in the BID board, where the participants are in agreement and have joined due to a common interest. The city is positive about the issues that the network drives, and thinks they have serious objectives.

**The BID actors and their possible impact of the area development**

*Does the network actors’ approach favor a long-term perspective?*

The network members (2017) explain that the network’s board consists of actors who are not part of bureaucratic organizations, but decentralized with fast decision-making processes. The actors can see a need in the area and meet that need quickly. They have a *proximity* to the area, the other professional actors and the residents, which make them able to catch up signals, trends and how the area “feels”, and they have a better understanding of the area’s problems and how it wants to be changed. It is a short distance between ideas and actions. “It is powerful to agree with the others in the network what the area needs, and then discuss it with politicians and officials”, one property owner (2017) says. Furthermore, the property owner emphasizes the importance of the combination of representatives in the network’s board, which includes partly those who have local knowledge and proximity to the reality, partly those with high positions in their organizations, thus having power to make decisions quickly. The board decides what the members within the network should do, but then it is up to everyone to decide what they want to do with their properties, because everybody owns the mandate for their houses. However, a property owner (2017) explains one can act as a good example, and by addressing issues – BID can raise the level of the daily management in the area. “If just one property owner cleans outside the house it is not noticeable, but if everyone does, it shows. The board can agree on a minimum level that is allowed for, for example, rubbish”. Further on, to improve the area it is not enough to renovate just one property, but the whole area, the property owner (2017) concludes.

The property owners (2017) see themselves as free actors, and mean that the network is based on the fact that the actors come up with ideas and the development leader encourages them. The ideas are connected with the network’s overall goal through joint
discussions, according to the development leader (2017). He means that the property owners are engaged but thinks they are comfortable with him doing much of the work. There are long processes that can take up to five to seven years before they show results, and challenges for the partnership include perseverance and patience. The development leader states that the key to success is that BID is a non-profit organization that can create an attractive area without having to make any profit. On the other side, all interviewed network members (2017) believe that the strength of the BID collaboration is that it consists of local actors who want a long-term improvement of the area with the common goal to increase its attractiveness and the values of their properties. Their shared problem image reinforces the parties’ commitment to involve in the BID partnership. The fact that there are the members who finance the area development means that the actors can be sure that the resources and engagement will sustain, even when the area is getting better, in comparison with a time limited project that may end when it reaches its goal.

**Political perspectives**

How do politicians see the Sofielund collaboration?

During the Property Owners Sofielund’s annual meeting (2017), a local politician and Deputy Mayor in City of Malmö, says that there is a need for a systematic approach in area development, meaning that the Property Owners Sofielund is a force, since they are not dependent on politics because it is not a project, and "stays there whatever happens". Solutions that address challenges of various areas may look different, and regarding the improvement for Sofielund, politicians want to continue working on what is already done by the frequent cooperation of the BID actors and their work based on the area's problems. The chairman of the board (2017), expresses during the same meeting that politicians see the BID cooperation as something positive. The development leader (2017) calls their partnership a local democracy that works close to politicians in the area. According to the development leader there are no politicians in charge of the BID cooperation's decisions. The politician closest to his work is the City of Malmö’s Deputy Mayor for Technology, Safety and Environment. However, the development leader highlights that it is important to distinguish between processes run within BID that Property Owners Sofielund has allocated funds for, and the decisions that the city must take in order for the network to be able to implement their efforts. One is usually dependent on the other, the development leader concludes.
5.2. Analysis

Understanding how the partnership can provide value is essential to understand governance principles. Likewise, to understand how the partnership is governed is essential to understand their contribution of policy drives in localities. This analysis aims to understand governance challenges identified in the network of BID Sofielund, that is the partnership’s governance as well as the challenges the leader faces as the meta-governor, and what these challenges mean for the development of the public spaces.

Challenges with BID

Why would networks and close collaboration between public and private actors be regarded as problematic? One reason can be that the actors’ goals relate to different interests that may cause difficulties for collaboration, as Huxham and Vangen (2000) mean. The struggle for agreement may not be obvious. Organizations come together bringing different resources and expertise together which create the potential for collaborative advantage. Yet, actors have different reasons for being involved, and therefore seek to achieve different outputs from the involvement. Sorensen and Torfing (2009) argue that a governance network should be formed around a number of clearly defined policy objectives. The BID Sofielund network has set up clearly defined policy objectives to work with and share a common vision (Property owners, 2017), still there are several examples of disagreements regarding who should do what in the collaboration. According a property owner (2017) it is a challenge for the network to do actions that goes in line with their goals, and to not cross the line and take over the city's responsibilities. There is a tension between the city’s and the network’s actors concerning what they should
be responsible for in the area development. The property owners will not take over the city’s responsibility of the daily management, and there is a worry that the city can retreat its responsibility if they know that the BID process takes care of Sofielund (Property owners, 2017). On the other hand, the representative from the City Planning Office (2017) believes that the property owners alone can not solve the social conflicts in the area without syncing their efforts with the city’s. The discussion about empowerment versus responsibility is highlighted by Christine Wamsler (2017), Associate Professor at Lund University Centre for Sustainability Studies. Wamsler means it is a fine line between owning the process or taking over too much responsibility. In Sofielund’s network, this doubt about who does what, or on the other hand, strong opinions about which actions that match their goal, might have negative consequences for the area. The conflict between the actors and the unclear division can lead to that some commitments fall in between. Actions that no one is in charge of is an example of collaborative inertia according to Huxham and Vangen (2003). A possible situation can be a contrast to the holistic approach that the network has potentials to create, mentioned by the city representative (2017). Instead of actors that make sure many things happen simultaneously, it might be a situation where you expect someone else to do the actions.

However, the representative of the City Planning Office (2017) sees no risk that the city will retreat its responsibility due to BID’s commitment, because the work of the City Planning Office is independent of what is happening in Sofielund, meaning that the property owners’ commitment is seen as (just) an extra layer in the area development. On the other hand, the representative of the City Planning Office (2017) declared that the trend in the area can only be reversed by working together, and BID is an example on how a common interest is doing just that. The interviewed actors all agreed on that the area needs to be improved. However, the city representative permits that the interest needs to take the government context into account, because the City Planning Office control what to prioritize in urban development, therefore is the BID network influenced by these priorities. This state the important understanding that government and governance are dependent on each other. As Sorensen and Torfing (2009) argue, referring to Scharpf, the ongoing interaction of the network actors always proceeds in the “shadow of hierarchy” cast by meta-governors who are capable of regulating and reducing the autonomy of the network. Wamsler (2017) highlights how the level of stakeholder involvement is dependent on the broader governance context and the associated power constellations in which stakeholders act. BID Sofielund network is dependent on what priorities are made from top down in terms of resources in time, money and expertise. Though, as the development leader argues (2017), it is important to distinguish between processes run within BID that Property Owners Sofielund has allocated funds for, which can thus be seen as more independent of the context, and the decisions that the city must agree on in order for the network to implement their efforts. Yet, one is usually dependent on the other. The relation between BIDs and the local government is discussed by Morcöl and Wolf (2010), who indicate that BIDs are both autonomous and interdependent with governments. "BIDs cannot exist without governments, but the fact that BIDs are taking over some of the responsibilities of local governments suggests that local and state governments are becoming more dependent on them for the delivery of local services".

There are features inherent in the complexity of a network that have impacts for the area’s development. One factor is the actors that the network is composed by, and their approach to urban governance. We will now look at the BID Sofielund’s actors governance approach and its possible impact.
The BID actors and Long-term concern

The property owners (2017) explain that the BID network’s board consists of property owners who are not bureaucratic, but decentralized organizations with fast decision-making processes. They can see a need in the area and meet that need quickly. Due to their proximity to the area they have a better understanding of what the area needs, which means a shorter path between idea and action.

The question is if the network actors respond to crises, can they work proactive with long-term needs of the area? If property owners meet immediate needs and make fast decisions, how will that affect the outputs? Many network actors (2017), however, point out that for them BID means beyond short-term concerns, because in their local collaboration they will be there as caring actors even in the long term. Further on, the stable collaboration that is financed by its members, mean that the engagement and financial resources will sustain in comparison to a time limited project. Rudolf Antoni (2017), development manager at Property Owners GFR, means that when problem description and action plan come from actors directly concerned by the area’s problems, as in a BID collaboration, are good for the local development. The BID agreement allows the participants to know that the other participants care for the area, thus a way of control of the behavior of others, what Ostrom, referred by Holmberg (2014) means is a key factor that allows for long-term management of common assets.

Even if BID is a long-term cooperation, the question remains if they can work with long-term development. However, the network actors (2017) imply that they work with long processes that can take up to five to seven years before showing results, and challenges for the partnership includes patience. That indicates that BID Sofielund is not just going through quick processes in their area development, but is based on long-term thinking.

The concern if BID can create long-term improvement should also be viewed in relation to the decision-making process of the network. Larsson (2017), author of “Meta-governance and the segregated city –Analyzing the turn to network governance, knowledge alliances and democratic reforms in Malmö City, Sweden”, suggests that there are rarely any formal sanctions that a network actor can impose on others, and the possibility to command either the network or its actors to comply with a decision is limited. Also, the governance networks interact through conflict-ridden negotiations (Sorensen & Torfing, 2009). Since the decisions are subject to negotiations among the actors with a limited availability to command, it can lead to that the actors foregrounding consensus and make their suggestions as concrete as possible. For example, in BID Sofielund the actors (2017) have decide that everyone should make an effort to clean outside of their houses, which might mean that they are satisfied with the agreement, but will not involve in more complicated problems.

However, the property owners (2017) emphasize the benefits of the combination of representatives in their board, partly those who have local knowledge and partly those with high positions, thus having power to make decisions quickly. Various scholars have give attention to the new interactive networks as “innovative” in terms of breaking through the bureaucracy. Hoyt and Gopal-Agge (2007) discuss that their is some consensus that BID models represents a success story because it generally functions to harness private sector creativity and solving complex municipal problems effectively. BIDs are commonly perceived as “net contributors to public life” and a response to the “obsolescence of traditional municipal boundaries as BID governance migrates upward to respond to
challenges best addressed on the regional level at the same time that it moves downward to handle opportunities best realized through a local focus” (Hoyt & Gopal-Agge, 2007).

However, the network's ability to make quick decisions by those with high positions can be questioning in relation to if the BID process can take shortcuts in the municipal bureaucracy, could that be a problem?

**Challenges for the development leader / meta-governor**

The BID partnership in Sofielund can be seen as a form of meta-governance, and can be examined as an interesting example of this process, where the development leader can be seen as the public meta-governor. The development leader is supposed to govern the network by co-ordinating it and its activities, a governance of governance, using Badie, Berg-Schlosser and others (2011) term of meta-governance.

The presence of relatively stable and coherent objectives might facilitate the assessment of a governance network’s capacity for goal attainment. Therefore, networks need to be meta-governed to provide a institutionalized framework for sustained negotiations that can facilitate the alignment of goals and values (Sorensen & Torfing, 2009). In the face of diverging interests in the network there is a challenge for the meta-governor to produce a stable coordination of actions (Torfing, Peters & others, 2012), and to make the actors work together to achieve not only their own goals but also a collective goal (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Except to manage a range of actors towards their common goal, a challenge is also to lead them in the direction towards a sustainable development, something that Laessö (2008) highlights as a challenge for the leader. Laessö discusses the role of a “mediator” or “professional organiser” that has parallels to the challenges that the development leader in BID faces. Laessö’s mediator is hired to run and facilitate the participation process in local sustainability initiatives, from an independent third-party position. It is a process of "coming between" different social interest and break through barriers with a view to find a way forward from what is, or is in danger of becoming, a dead-end or inertia. The challenge for the development leader in BID Sofielund’s network is to govern the property owners collective actions and to link their engagement with the “bigger picture” (sustainable development), for the network to be able to develop sustainable living conditions in the neighborhood. According to Laessö, challenges for the “mediator” is to see participation as a tool for promoting learning processes that aims to replace narrow interests with a collective responsibility for a sustainable future. The network of Sofielund consists of many actors with organizational business interests, and the development leader needs to make sure that nobody's own interest takes over. However, it can be difficult to promote social benefits for network actors who do not see that without seeing a business in it, something the property owners admitted (2017).

The BID network's link with the city, as the development leader constitutes, is essential for the network’s sustainable governance of the area, according to the representative of the City Planning Office (2017). Without that link, the network will lose its contact with the municipality and will be left with just physical investment issues, and the area’s development needs to go far beyond what a property owner is possible to do, the representative means. But if the property owners and the municipality sync their efforts it is a win-win situation for the area development, she adds. The network leader's distinct position, has potential to promote this synergy and cooperation, as Laessö (2008) points out, a position that according to the development leader (2017) is not difficult to handle.
Given the challenges the development leader faces, there is a need to understand the importance of the meta-governor and how it manages its role. As Sorensen and Torfing (2009) mean, the quality of governance networks depends on their particular form and functioning, that in next turn depends on how these are designed and managed. In other words, the quality of the self-regulated governance network depends on how the network are meta-governed, a practice that we now going to examine how the BID leader manages.

**Tools of Meta-governance**

The exercise for the meta-governor is to improve the functioning of the complex network and it can do so through the deployment of various management tools. A key challenge for public meta-governors is to avoid regulating governance networks in ways that end the network's capacity for self-regulation. At the same time, they must regulate the network via some indirect forms of governance seeking to shape free actions of empowered and responsible network actors in accordance with a number of standards and substantial goals defined by the meta-governor (Sorensen & Torfing, 2009). According to BID Sofielund's development leader and property owners (2017), the network actors have free space to act while taking their responsibility, and the network is based on the fact that the members come up with ideas while the development leader encourages them and shapes the process so that the member's actions are in line with the network's goals. Meta-governance means that public authorities have a responsibility to mobilize knowledge, resources and energies of a host of actors while retaining their ability to influence the process and outcomes (Sorensen & Torfing 2009). Meta-governance is both a governance of and a governance with the network.

The tool network design might help meta-governors ensure a broad inclusion of actors in the network and avoid external exclusion (Sorensen & Torfing, 2009). The development leader (2017) explains that when BID Sofielund was established he got strong actors in the board already in the beginning, that was significant property companies, and then it was easier to convince others to join. This indicates that the governance structure of the collaboration are designed deliberately. Another tool, according to Sorensen and Torfing (2009) is network framing, that is an ongoing process aimed at shaping the arena for network interaction through the formation of the overall goals and discursive storytelling that defines the joint mission of the network (Sorensen & Torfing, 2009). The development leader (2017) holds together the members and shapes BID's policies in common with them. He is the main spokesman of the network presenting its visions and ongoing work and marketing the image of the network's joint mission for external actors. Sorensen and Torfing (2008) mean that meta-governance can spread an image of the network as being part of a democratic political system that subscribes to a set of democratic values such as mutual respect and communality that refer to the network actors as “responsible and interest organizations”. Meta-governance should enhance solidarity and a strong sense of communality among the involved actors within the network through the creation of shared meaning and common visions that facilitate consensus. This has the development leader succeeded with in the BID network, where all the interviewed network members (2017) agreed on the joint mission and ownership of the process, where they see the participants in the network as a common powerful actor.

In the network management tool we can see the development leader in BID reduces tensions in terms of reducing the barrier between the city’s and the network actor’s reality. In the participating tool the meta-governor can exercise power while sharing the responsibility for public governance with other actors, by participating actively in the
network and create a sense of joint ownership (Sorensen & Torfing, 2009). A meta-governor which become one among the others, can influence the policy agenda and the negotiated policy outputs. However, one need to retain a reflexive gaze in order to do so. There might be a risk that the development leader in Sofielund loses this reflexive gaze if he gets too committed by the network actor's interests and get influenced by them, rather than influences them. The BID network members (2017) admit that the network leader feels closer to their reality than the municipality, and they act together as a “strong actor lobbying” towards the municipality to easier push forward their interests. Laessö (2008) recognizes this dilemma about the involvement versus the independence of the third-party mediator. It concerns the inability to facilitate the network because of its own involvement, being too biased in their work. On the other side, in order to fill the networking role the leader has to involve himself and build relations with the other stakeholders, which, however, compromises with its role as independent.

**Competencies required as a meta-governor**

The meta-governor needs specific qualities in order to manage its role. It will appear that it is required both specific competencies as well as personal qualities, and the quality of the network and its outputs become an empirical question who the person is that performs the leading role.

Except networking and facilitation, the meta-governor also needs to know where different decisions should be anchored (Sorensen & Torfing, 2009). In the current case it means that the leader of Sofielund’s network needs to know when the decisions need to be taken via BID’s board, through the city administration’s work committee, or when the decisions can be made by himself.

Sorensen and Torfing (2009) mention three basic conditions that must be met in order to understand the potentials of the public meta-governors, that are; a required knowledge of the organizational and political landscape to act as meta-governor; a sufficient understanding of how to influence the form and function of governance networks so it contributes to an effective and democratic governance and how they can influence their form and function; and they must possess strategic and collaborative competences in order to execute and adapt their meta-governance strategies. The latter concerns the personal capacities to meta-govern the networked polity and talents for coaching, enabling and trust building. This new type of public manager has advantageously a background and temperament that enables them to mobilize and connect a plurality of actors (Sorensen & Torfing, 2009). Sofielund's development leader must manage to be a “bridge” between the various actors such as the municipality's representatives and the network's members. He needs to understand the various landscapes in which he acts, understands the profits with collaborative governance and be able to collaborate. An ability to listen, capture ideas, solve problems and meet people at different levels are personal qualities required. Therefore, the characteristics required for the role as the meta-governor of Sofielund's network can be seen as personally dependent. The BID network's dependence of their leader is expressed by the network members. The property owners (2017) perceive the leader's role as crucial to the success of the partnership's work, and he help them overcome barriers with the city and is presence in the area. While at the same time being irreplaceable as acting as the network's engine the role is also vulnerable. The representative of the City Planning Office (2017) agrees that the qualities that the leader possesses, as being an enabler with a well-developed network with trusted actors, are difficult to replace. The members of the BID Sofielund's annual meeting (2017) mention
that they could even think of financing his employment themselves if needed, which confirms his great importance for the network.

The representative of the City Planning Office (2017) believes that the leader suites well as the network coordinator, because he does not have any self-interest in the BID process. Sorensen and Torfing (2009) mean that politicians and public managers are suited as meta-governors because they are charged with defending public interests. There is no guarantee though that they will assume this responsibility, because they are also engaged in political conflicts and power struggles and may seek to exploit their privileged position to pursue particularistic interests.

Thinking of meta-governance as policy decision making, brings to the fore a more complex reality of meta-governance that needs to be treated seriously. It becomes an empirical question as to whether public authorities are at all involved at the meta-level. It can be that other actors sometimes set the basic rules of the game, for example can various network actors themselves seek to take action at one of the meta-levels, interested in shaping actions (Sorensen & Torfing, 2007).

Next part will have a closer look at who sets the goal in the network, if they are agreeing and, perhaps most important, who has the power to implement them.

**Challenges with the decision-making process**

To which extent have the network actors the power to decide what to do in the neighborhood? The Sofielund network’s decisions are made by the network’s board members and they own their decisions, according to the property owners (2017). The network has a municipal influence through the role of the development leader and adjunct board members from the City Planning Office, but they are not part of the board nor the decisions. The development leader’s role is to govern the network, co-ordinate and keep track of the actors, as the property owners (2017) declare. According to Sorensen and Torfing (2009), networks may lack transparency in the decisions processes, when the decisions can be seen as not open for public in BID Sofielund because they are owned by the network member’s board. But on the other hand, as city representatives are present in the board, it means that the decisions are open for public.

The representative of the City Planning Office (2017) means that the role as adjunct board member does not function as a way for the city to influence or control the network’s decisions and outputs, but instead works as a way to facilitate their processes and actions. The city thinks it is positive that someone else than the municipality is driving the area development as long as the actors have serious objectives, which the network of Sofielund has, according to the representative.

Sorensen and Torfing (2007) mean that it may be easier for a network to “work freely” if their policies are consistent with what the city wants to achieve. In Sofielund’s case, it may be that the city tries to achieve something that they want through the property owners. The BID network was partly initiated by the City of Malmö (Property Owners Sofielund homepage, 2017), and as the network is managed by a leader paid by the city, it is obvious that the city has a major role. Hedlund and Montin (2009) argue that it should be considered whether networks are initiated by political institutions to increase their governance. Even bureaucrats may have realized that it is a good idea to create networks with key players, not least those you are trying to control or, because you can not manage
to do it yourself. An example of this interdependence and the city’s need for partnership with external actors is explained by a representative (2017) from the Environmental Department at the City of Malmö. The city needs those who own the needs, such as property owners, for things to be realized. It is about creating relationships, where the city cannot make any claims because it is the property owners who decide, and have the ability to implement the needs, but the city can use the dialogue as a tool to convince. This concerns the question of who decides what the network should deliver.

The extent to which the BID network can affect the area development or even take over the delivery of public service, the representative of the City Planning Office (2017) sees no risks. The response is that there are city legislations and policies to relate to, and the network’s interests must be considered in the same way as other proposals for urban development. However, that does not prevent the actors in Sofielund to set up their own priority goals for the area, as we have seen, and fits with Sorensen and Torfing’s (2009) definition of a network with free and operationally autonomous actors who facilitate self-regulated policy. As we already have discussed, some part of the decisions that the BID Sofielund network make need to be approved by the city to be implemented, but some decisions can also go directly from the network’s ideas to actions. According to Morcöl and Wolf (2010), BIDs as actors in urban governance networks, seen by network governance theorists such as Keith Provan and Milward Brinton, are determiners of public purpose and play a role in shaping collective actions.

According to Sorensen and Torfing (2009), one dilemma concerns how to ensure a high level of democratic legitimacy in a networked polity. An open participation of relevant stakeholders in a governance network can make it more democratic, while at the same time reducing its ability to formulate clear and sustainable compromises. Likewise, a tightly knit network with actors that know each other well might be effective in responding to emerging problems but will often lack a democratic legitimacy. For the BID Sofielund network it has not yet been any problem with conflicts in their negotiations and decisions, as they agree on the benefits of collaborating and have a shared problem image, due to the members (2017). Because the network consists of mostly like-minded policy actors, property owners who in the long-term want to increase the values of their properties, a concern can be that they are effective in their decisions but will lack democratic legitimacy because they are representing a homogeneous group with a special strong interest and perspective. In addition, some voices were heard more than others, according to a property owner (2017). It reflects the democratic problem that Sorensen and Torfing (2009) highlight of the privileging of strong and resourceful elites as a danger in a networked polity. Their concern of the democratic performance in a network also concern the fact that the board members are self-initiated by the network members themselves, and lead us to the issue of the network’s actions accountability. Who is accountable for the actions that the network make?

It is argued that governance networks can be perceived as problematically associated with increased governance of independent organizations and limited opportunities for accountability (Hedlund & Montin, 2009), as well as the BID model (Morcöl & Wolf, 2010; Ward, 2007). The actions and solutions in networks take place where there are no clear rules and norms according to which politics are to be conducted and policy measures are to be agreed upon, Larsson (2015) adds. In opposition to this criticism, supporters of creations of BIDs, such as Holmberg (2016), means that when the initiative to create a BID, as well as their action plan, is approved by the municipality, their development strategies are also anchored in the representative democracy. However, the basic idea of
meta-governance is that through the meta-governor the representative elected organizations can control the network and thus indirectly be held responsible for what the network does, mean Sorensen and Torfing, referred by Hedlund and Montin (2009). Therefore, we need to investigate to which extent the meta-governor in Sofielund is politically controlled and whether the BID network is anchored in the representative democracy.

Political challenges

Different answers to the process of meta-governance as a way to create a political framework for the private sector (Sorensen and Torfing, 2009), are identified in the BID network.

Regarding the Sofielund network, the development leader (2017) has been delegated a lot of responsibility to take care of the process. Meta-governance may imply a delegation of responsibility from politicians, but the link to the political level must still exist and be an active part of the governance of the network and create opportunities for accountability from other parties, according to Sorensen and Torfing (2009). The development leader (2017) means that he can make many decisions himself, but in the case of large sums he has to make certain decisions through the city administration’s work committee and some via the network’s board. This means that the decisions that go through the city’s board are politically controlled, but the other decisions can be considered to be “free” from political control. A contributing reason for this is also that some of the funds used by the network come from external parties as well as the network’s own budget, which reduces direct political influence.

Based on Sorensen and Torfing’s (2009) claim about the meta-governor, the development leader can to some extent be seen as the guarantor for the political control of the network, but to some extent not. It is an important person for the BID network, where a lack of him would mean that the actors in the network would be disconnected from the influence of the municipality, and the control and expertise that comes with it, according to the city representative (2017). At the same time, if we agree that the development leader is responsible to govern the governance network and its outputs in Sofielund, who is then responsible of his actions and can ensure that he constitutes good governance? Who (politician) can pronounce that this (the network’s actions) are good? Is there an active responsibility or a lack of control? Due to the unique situation in Sofielund, the development leader (2017) has initiated his own role as the network’s manager, and can be seen as a result of his commitment. As a reminder, a committed mediator as Laessö (2008) discusses, can be questioned in terms of how its values cause to control the participatory process. According to the development leader (2017) there are no politicians in charge of the BID cooperation’s decisions. The politician closest responsible to his work is the local politician for Technology, Safety and Environment. The same municipal politician commented at the network’s annual meeting, in a positive sense, that Property Owners Sofielund’s network is a strength in the area development, because it is not dependent on politics and “is a project that will remains whatever happens” (Property Owners Sofielund Annual meeting, 2017), which reinforces the claim that the Sofielund network has a weak political control. Hence, if the control of the Sofielund network is weak, so is the BID networks accountability to the local government and the general public.
Due to Sofielund partnership’s weak political influence in combination with its possibility to determine and implement policies in localities, is the area’s best based on the fact that the network with the leading property owners want the area and its residents well? Likewise, if there is no responsible person for the development leader, is the governing of the partnership based on the fact that the development leader is a good person. Consequently, there is a chance that the actors’ own interests as well as the value that the partnership provide can take over, and we can argue that the network may cause a risk for the development of public places aiming to benefit the public interests.

As we have discussed, networks that have problems with a democratic anchorage mean that those outside the network can not influence the decisions, because networks can be said to represent those included in the network. When this decisions affect our public places, this problem becomes even more problematic, Hedlund and Montin argue (2009). It raises questions if we should expect that a network of organized interests can formulate and implement a policy that can be seen as a collective action for a whole community and not just the network itself? What do we do if we not like the network’s policies?

According the dilemma if BID Sofielund network is serving their own agenda and not the wider community, there is one answer not far away. A representative from a housing association (2017) in the same area as BID operates, explains that they have taken an active decision not to be a member in the network. One main factor is that they do not prioritize the same objectives as BID Sofielund does. They do not want to invest in issues related to the area’s security, since there is not the same urgent need for them in the northern parts of Sofielund. However, they still want to engage in and care of the surroundings in their neighborhood, but the housing association representative admits that there is a problem that they, as non-members, are not being heard. Likewise, she means that it is a problem if there is a belief from the City of Malmö that BID is an inclusive area development process that serving the area with what is suppose to be its best and public interest, when it exists interests that may not be visible, especially when it comes from those living in the area. Furthermore, the Sofielund network’s meta-governance solely dependence by its development leader and his formation and implementation of the collaboration’s policy agenda to ensure its democratic and effective performance (Sorensen & Torfing, 2009), makes the quality of the network fragile, because the management can easily be shattered for example by a change in the organization.

The act of the meta-governor is further challenged in the Sofielund network, due to the identified position of the development leader being close to the network actor’s reality. To act as the actors extended arm means a risk for bias and an inability to shape the network (Laessö, 2008). If the “network’s side” is dominating, the influence of the network actor’s interests will increase which might pose a challenge to the political framework. Larsson (2015) argues that networks govern on conditions favorable to the network, mean a step away from the public politics, transparency, and the possibility of holding politicians accountable.

Based on the experiences from the network in Sofielund, they do not correspond to the degree of meta-governance that is required to fit the definition of Sorensen and Torfing’s (2009) form of meta-governance. For a network to be democratically anchored, the networks need to be direct monitored by politicians accountable of the networks decisions, and that is not the case in Sofielund.
However, despite the absence of a fully functioning meta-governance, the partnership has advantages that provides values for the area. If the network has good intentions, it has the potential to create a well-functioning and committed local democracy with an effective decision-making.
6.0. CONCLUSION & DISCUSSION

On paper, complex conflicts in cities are easily resolved by promoting partnership that has gain external legitimacy. But, things are rather more difficult in practice. The challenge is not just to internally function as a network with many actors involved, but also to be externally governed, and to fit with the world outside.

The BID partnership allows various actors to come together in an agreement and joint effort to invest in the common owned area. One challenge is a mutual cooperation with the local government, to be able to make a holistic change with physical as well as social improvements in the area. From the empirical data it is showed that the partnership has potential to create synergies for a win-win situation for the area, when the property owners alone do not have the capacities required. It is argued that the development leader's role embodies this important link between the public and private, where it works as a guarantee for the municipal influence. However, the city means at the same time that it is not their intention to control the partnership but to facilitate their actions. Thereby, the development leader's engagement in the practice of meta-governance can be seen as a role that both promoting and utilizing the network in Sofielund, a finding of the role of a meta-governor that also Larsson (2017) proving.

The success of collaboration depends on to which extent the partners' goals are shared and agreed (Provan & Kenis, 2007), and even though the partnership in Sofielund has a shared motive to collaborate and strong conditions for cooperation, it encounters conflicts. Among the Sofielund network's actors it turns out as a confusion about responsibilities and a struggle between doing actions that are in line with the network's goals and to not take over the city's responsibility of the area management. The engagement of BID Sofielund is seen as an “extra layer” in the urban development, which is appreciated in the local governance of Malmö. However, it is also showed that the network is depending on the priorities of the City Planning Office, which goes in line with previous findings of BIDs as a governance dependent on the government, and vice versa (Morcöl & Wolf, 2010).

The interviewed network actors all agree that the collaboration is beneficial for their business. The statement that the network makes them a stronger force towards the city, indicates on a competitive relation rather than a collaborative (Huxham & Vangen, 2000), which means more focus on their own organizational goals and less commitment to network-level outcomes. However, synergies from working collaboratively find in the BID network are a form of pressure on certain commitments that you as a member should make, where the BID arena may serve as a way to raise the level on commitments, thus leads to a collective action. Therefore it touches the collaborative advantage concept (Huxham, 2003) which means the synergy from working collaboratively.

Overall, the role of the meta-governor is to influence and shape the network in what Sorensen and Torfing (2009) define as democratic and effective governing. The development leader in Sofielund, though, is not perceived as authoritative by the network members, but someone that helping them to implement their ideas of interest. That raise other questions of the ways in which the network actors have the power to influence, which to some extent are the decisions they can make through their BID board. In addition, the
network can set their policies and values on what they define as good area improvement. The network actors’ perception of improvement is seen differently by other local groups and according to a housing association representative in the same area, BID Sofielund’s concentrate power rather serves the agenda of a narrow set of actors than the wider community. However, the decision making in the Sofielund network is problematic, and it turns out to be up to the leader to know where to anchor various issues.

The collaboration poses challenges for the meta-governor as it must master new and appropriate ways to govern without command or regulate the network. The development leader’s challenge is to overcome tensions, and this link that he constitutes is not only important but also vulnerable, and the success of the work of Sofielund network seems to be dependent on the development leader’s personal competencies. The case study also illustrates that the leader to some extent is the network’s democratic anchorage, because of its public employment, and the responsibilities that comes with it.

The empirical data implies, thus, that the definition of meta-governance is not working in Sofielund’s network, due to a weak political control and weak accountability of the leader’s and consequently the network’s actions. The suggestion is that the governance of the network depends on the actors’ intentions, meaning that those outside can not influence the decisions, and consequently there is a chance that the network actor’s own interest take over the area development. This leads to another finding, that BID Sofielund partnership as an important force in urban governance might pose a challenge for the development of public spaces that serve the public interest.

The study reveals the idea that the BID Sofielund network extends democratic channels beyond the representative democracy. Why this knowledge is interesting for the discipline of urban studies, is that the BID partnership risks contributing to private interests taking over the design and management of our public places. Various scholars (Hoyt & Gopal-Agge, 2007; Morcöl & Wolf, 2010; Steel & Symes, 2005; Schaller & Modan, 2005; Ward, 2007) have discussed BID’s implications on the privatisation and the contesting of public space. As Morcöl and Wolf’s (2010) research shows, BIDs raise concerns about the expansion of the private sector taking over actions that should be the responsibility of elected local government, leading to a decline in local democracy and accountability. What public spaces might lose when they are subjects to private interests in BIDs remaking of urban areas, if the increase in exchange values is the leading rationale for improving public spaces, is explained by Professor of Sociology Richard Sennet referred by Ward (2007), as a move from being places in which people can learn to live with strangers and enter into the experience of unfamiliar lives, to increasingly resembling selectively exclusionary spaces with emphasis on a commodified version of difference, as actors produce a securitized urban landscape. Seeing it from this view, BIDs are more than a new way of governing spaces within cities, they appear to constitute an example of the neoliberalization of the city. BIDs reassess functions performed in the area development, as well as contribute to new actors “running the city”. What perhaps is remarkably, and as we also have experienced from our case, is that the municipality encourages the new initiative and sees it as a natural part of the development to work with business in partnerships, when it in fact is based on political decisions and private corporate lobbyism, means Ward (2017). On the other hand, since property owners nevertheless have a decisive influence on urban development processes, should processes that have gone through an agreement with the municipality and other actors lead to increased transparency and increased opportunities for consensus and common direction, argues Holmberg (2014).
How our case, however, differs from the statement above is that BID Sofielund, after all, is a non-profit association that can improve the area without having to make a profit. To be further discussed is if the network's aim benefits the area or just the narrow constituency and then serves as a business interest function. Who's interests are BID taking into consideration in the remaking of the area? Will the current citizens benefit from the upgrades or will the goal of a more attractive area includes more attractive citizens than the existing ones? Complex relations and roles raise critical questions how the influence of various actors impinge on aspects such as power, powerlessness, manipulation, legitimisation and so on. In other words there is every reason to take a closer look at what goes on in actual practice in a network, to develop a rather more differentiated understanding of governance challenges in its various forms. That is, to employ reliable methods and to undergo the processes whereby the implications and effects of the BID model can be critically assessed. As well, more research on BIDs practical actions can open a window into a better understanding of the larger phenomenon of network governance.

On the whole, the study has contributed to a better understanding of a Swedish particular BID partnership's role in urban governance, the conflicts of governing and its ability to impact urban areas, as well as its complicated public accountability and management challenges, which was the purpose of the study. Various attempts have been made to understand BIDs in the light of urban governance before, but the previous research of meta-governance in relation to BID models is limited, and therefore this study contributes to the understanding of that phenomenon. The unique model in Malmö with a public manager is an example of how you can try to overcome those conflicts we have seen between the actors, where the manager due to its public anchorage strengthen the legitimacy and the potential to improve public policy in the self-regulated network. In comparison to previous research where Larsson (2016) finds out that meta-governance can make a network's governance even more fragmented, this study states that the lack of its fulfillment makes the governance doubtful. Though, to propose that the network has a politically weak control would had required more empirical data in form of politicians' statements on the matter, to give a deeper reason to the claim. It is one of the weaknesses, while it is beyond the scope of this study to directly address the controversies regarding accountability since it is based on indirect statements by a politician during a meeting as well as explanations from the development leader.

BIDs are examples of the blending of the public and private spheres from previous research. The notion of public and private sphere gets even more blurred in the BID Sofielund case due to its public employed leader. The BID Sofielund model appears to be more than a simple public-private partnership, it appears to be located in-between the public and private sectors, being an extended arm of the city through the development leader but at the same time autonomous with decisions free from public consideration. According the previous research that the BID model is subject to the local government, is partly true in the Sofielund case. At the same time the weak meta-governance shows that the model is to some extent independence from the local authority system.

The empirical case also has some disconnection with the theory. When the theory assumes that the meta-governor and the art of meta-governance should be made by a public authority, that is an elected politician or other keyful person, it does not match the reality in the case. The development leader is a public authority, but he is not elected but public employed, and can not live up to that expectations. His unique role can be seen as in between anchored in the city’s organization and an independent actor who has created “an external process”. This complexity is at the same time a finding in the study and highlights
the importance of a political control. However, in the analysis it is a bit difficult and sometimes confusing that on one hand assumes that the development leader is a public authority that should shape the network, and on the other hand discusses that he is not properly anchored in the local authority and that his actions yet not can be compared to the ones discussed by the theory. In addition, the position of the meta-governor can in the Sofielund case be seen as someone who is simultaneously inside and outside the network.
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Wamsler, Christine, Associate Professor at Lund University Centre for Sustainable Studies (LUCSUS) and a trained Architect and Urban Planner, 20/4-2017
APPENDIX: Interview guide

The questions were prepared before the interviews but worked more as a guide to themes to follow, than asking the exact questions in right order. The interviewees were free to raise their own subjects or to go deeper into some questions, and in those cases I often came up with follow-up questions on issues that I had not thought of from the beginning, which are not included here. Thus, the questions presented here can be seen as something I assumed from, but then I let the interview follow the subjects we came across and it was more as a dialogue, thus adapting the interviews to the interviewees and the various subjects raised. The interview guide differs slightly between the network members, the development leader and city representatives. The questions are not just about governance challenges, but some are more general about the process and collaboration in order to reach the actors’ view of the partnership and to initiate a dialogue and an interest in the process. The duration of the interviews varied in time from one and a half to three hours.

The Network members:

What is your contribution to the partnership?

What is your main commitment in the partnership?

What are the goals with the partnership?

Pros and Cons with BID Collaboration and working in a BID?

What do you think of BID as a tool for sustainable urban development?

What role does Malmö City’s involvement play for the partnership?

What is the significance of the development leader’s role for the partnership?

How do you perceive the role of the development leader?

How do you as private property owner regards the fact as having a public leader employed by the City of Malmö?

The advantages that Malmö City cooperates with you?

How do you perceive the cooperation with the other members?

How do you cooperate with each other in the network? Is it someone you cooperate closer with?

What do you gain from engaging in the BID network?

What do you gain from engaging in the area development?

The problem description & action plan, how are they determined?

Who decides what to deliver and what action that should be taken?
How does the decision-making process work? Who owns the decisions?

Who has the power to implement the decisions? Your proximity to the decisions?

Who does what in terms of different functions/actions in the partnership?

Do you have different responsibilities?

Are the links between the actors in the network weak or strong?

Is it profitable to join the BID network?

Have there been any conflicts among the members?

What positive results come from being involved?

How do you rely on those non-members in the area, so-called free riders?

Do you feel free to act as a network member?

How do you perceive the development leader's management and coordinator skills?

How does it interweave different stakeholders' interests?

How do the network manage so the network's actions align with the network's goals?

What actors are good to include in the network and which are less good?

Could you have improved the area development without using BID?

The network leader:

How do you perceive the collaboration in BID?

Pros and Cons with the collaboration?

What is your role in the partnership?

How do you perceive your role as development leader?

The difficulties in coordinating all actors?

How do you coordinate various interests and conflicts?

How do you make sure the actions are in line with the network's goal?

Are the actors free to come up with ideas and suggestions for the area development?

How can you coordinate the various members so that they have free space to act while taking responsibility?
How does Malmö city’s interest go through you to the property owners?

Does Malmö city want to achieve something with the help of the property owners?

How do you perceive the interests of the different parties?

Are there any conflicts of common goals?

Is there a common goal?

What does the action plan look like?

Who owns the question and what to deliver?

Can you make decisions on behalf of the partnership?

Do you need to make a public procurement on decisions taken by the network?

How does the decision-making process work?

Why is Malmö City not a member of the network?

What is Malmö City's interest in the BID network?

Who is your boss?

What administration in Malmö city does you belong to?

Who is responsible for BIDs governance?

Is there any local politician responsible for your actions and the decisions of BID?

In cases where decisions can be made via the BID board, what kind of decision can it be?

What is the guidelines? policies? An own program?

How does your dialogue with the private actors work?

How does the cooperation with the property owners work?

How important is the BID tool for the area’s development?

**The city representative:**

What does your role mean as a member of the BID board and the city's representative?

How do you perceive the BID collaboration?

Can you, as representative of the city, influence the property owners’ decisions or the direction of their actions?
For what reason does Malmö City have representatives in the BID Board?

Is it because of the ability to control their decisions that Malmö city has board members or is it to facilitate the property owners work?

How do you consider the importance of the city's participation in the network?

The importance of the public employed development leader?

What do you think the development leader's role means for the network?

How do you think the partnership with private actors can affect the area development?

Is there any concern that they, the network, can take over the development of the city?

Are there faster processes in urban development thanks to the network?

Advantages of property owners who take their responsibility?

Challenges in cooperation with property owners?

The importance of collaborating with property owners?

Are the BID actors free actors or do they have limitations?

What actions do they need permission for by the City of Malmö?

How does the relationship between the network and the local government work?

How are BID's goals going in line with Malmö City's overall agenda and goals?

Do you see BIDs decisions as non-transparent or open to public?

Do you think property owners can develop a neighborhood?

How does the cooperation between property owners and city officials work and how can you manage the area development together?

According to some property owners, there is an anxiety that the City can retreat its responsibility due to BIDS existence, is there any risk?