A Quantitative Content Analysis of Newspapers from Florida’s Cuban Diaspora.

To what extent is soft power expressed in the writings of journalists and other editors? (July, 2016 - July 2017).

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**ABSTRACT:** This thesis explores the US-based Cuban community through conducting a Quantitative Content Analysis (QCA) on three of the most popular, diasporic newspapers. The manifest content of 30 editorials and other news articles was analysed, utilising deductive reasoning to uncover the presence of soft power. Consequently, the results communicate the diaspora’s support for less coercive measures and policies that welcome increased relations, and often wish to support island-based Cubans. This contradicts the community’s characterisation as a group, who overwhelmingly supports the use of hard power, and wishes to restrict Cuban engagement. This study fits in an underdeveloped area of International Relations (IR) and, therefore, seeks to clarify that the diaspora are not monolithically in favour of hard power policies (that enforce isolation and economic coercion) to achieve its goals. In sum, the study utilises a combined theoretical framework that includes diaspora politics, identity, and soft power to analyse the findings, thus illustrating a frequent presence of soft power throughout many of these diasporic writings.

**Key Words:** Cuba, Soft Power, Cuban Diaspora, Media, Quantitative Content Analysis.

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Table of Contents

1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1
  1.1 Objectives and Research Question................................................................................... 2
  1.2 Structure of the Thesis ..................................................................................................... 3
  1.3 Limitations ....................................................................................................................... 3

2 Literature Review ................................................................................................................. 5
  2.1 Diaspora Politics and the Florida Community ................................................................. 5
  2.2 Soft Power ........................................................................................................................ 7
  2.3 Diasporic Identity Through the Media Limitations ......................................................... 9

3 Theoretical Framework ...................................................................................................... 12
  3.1 Defining Soft Power ...................................................................................................... 12
  3.2 Defining Hard Power ..................................................................................................... 13
  3.3 Defining the Concept of the Diaspora ........................................................................... 14
  3.4 Diaspora Construction and the Importance of Identities ............................................... 15

4 Methodology ........................................................................................................................ 17
  4.1 Methods .......................................................................................................................... 17
  4.2 Data Selection and Sampling ......................................................................................... 17
  4.3 Unitising ......................................................................................................................... 20
  4.4 Coding ............................................................................................................................ 20
  4.5 Operationalisation .......................................................................................................... 21
  4.6 Limitations and Delimitations........................................................................................ 22

5 Results .................................................................................................................................. 23
  5.1 Discussion ...................................................................................................................... 24
  5.2 Credibility and Interpretation ......................................................................................... 25
  5.3 Morality .......................................................................................................................... 28
  5.4 Soft power and Diasporic Identity ................................................................................. 33

6 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 35
  Appendix A - Codebook ...................................................................................................... 37
  Appendix B - Results from the QCA ................................................................................... 43

7 Bibliography ........................................................................................................................ 47
List of Abbreviations.

Content Analysis
Florida International University
International Relations
Media Content Analysis
Miami Herald Media Company
Non-Governmental Organisation
United States
Unit of Analysis
United States Agency for International Development
Quantitative Content Analysis

CA
FIU
IR
MCA
MHMC
NGO
US
UoA
USAID
QCA
1. Introduction.

Florida’s Cuban diaspora has long been characterised as a monolithically conservative-bloc, recognised for their staunch anti-Castrism, campaigns for a “watertight” embargo, and stern opposition to positive forms of homeland engagement (Eckstein & Berg, 2009, p.159). This depiction largely emanates from its more radical ‘right wing’ elements, who subscribe to an ‘exile ideology’ that fiercely opposes Cuba's ‘socialist’ government (Girard, Grenier, & Gladwin, 2012). Lohmeier (2014) explains this enduring characterisation, noting that Florida's Cuban Americans have continued to attract attention, “some of it good, some of it bad and a lot of is rather one-dimensional. With a strong right-wing presence, the shades of grey within the Cuban-American community often get lost.” (p.2) Thus, the rightwing leanings of the Cuban American “hardliners” have become synonymous with the diaspora as a whole (Eckstein & Berg, 2009, p.159). Further, their reputation as a politically conservative monolith has been solidified by the Florida-based media. Lohmeier (2014) and David (2008) confirm such theories, detailing notorious cases where journalists received US government payments to forward its ‘rightwing’ agenda. These newspapers displayed highly unethical practices, and subsequently made national, and at times, international headlines.

To briefly summarise the complex relations that established this politicised community, attention must focus on the events following the 1959 Cuban Revolution. Firstly, Fidel Castro’s government abruptly overthrew the US-backed General Batista, prompting scores of dissenting Cubans to flee to regions such as Florida (Duany, 1999, p.76). Over the decades, many Cubans remained in a state of exile, as the existing tensions were later antagonised by Cuba’s partnership with a major US rival, the Soviet Union. This was followed by the US’ implementation of an economic embargo in 1960, which only intensified the breakdown in bilateral relations (Duany, 1999, pp.77-85). Consequently, Florida’s Cubans established their own politically active communities, which traditionally supported the hardliner’s agenda of maintaining the trade embargo and a policies of isolation (Eckstein & Berg, 2009, p.159).

More recently, US-Cuban relations have drastically improved, in what was termed the “Cuban thaw”. Obama’s policy of rapprochement increased US-Cuban interaction through a series of measures, such as reducing the stringent business and travel restrictions that had separated the two countries for decades (Shifter, 2016). Although not a total transformation to past hostilities, these new developments foster a far greater range of bilateral interactions, which have been well-received by many, including much of the Cuban American community (FIU, 2016, p.3).
1.1 Objectives and Research Question.

Political science has theorised about the Cuban diaspora in various ways, yet much of this research has focused on their past participation and support for more coercive measures. Further, many of the studies on diasporic-views are primarily based on past accounts, which do not reflect the more recent changes in bilateral relations. This is somewhat one-sided and would benefit from greater exploration in the wake of these improved relations. To assess this phenomenon, the thesis utilises a research question: To what extent is soft power expressed in the writings of journalists and other editors? (1 July, 2016 - July, 2017).

Led by a priori knowledge, this study tests the theory that soft power is present in the writings of Florida newspapers. Therefore, the research utilises a soft power framework that is led by Nye’s (1990) concept as well as other relevant literature. Further, it undertakes a QCA of n=30 newspaper editorials, opinion pieces, and news articles, evaluating the overtly visible and quantifiable manifest content. Additionally, the data was selected from some of the diaspora’s most popular news outlets: The Miami Herald, El Nuevo Herald and South Florida Sun-Sentinel (BurrellesLuce, 2017). This enables the analysis of opinions on US-Cuban engagements over a recent, one-year period. Thus, providing an insight into Florida’s current political and ideological views.

Researching newspapers produced within the US’ “diasporic heartland” should provide greater clarification about the community’s views within the present-day context. Moreover, the Florida Cubans are an interesting case, as firstly, their community is located just 90 miles from Havana, thus entailing that more people with Cuban origins reside in Florida than in any other state (López, 2015, p.3). Secondly, Florida has become an epicentre for bilateral decisions, aided greatly by their high-profile and influential politicians, who operate at a national level (Duany, 1999, p.90). Lastly, recent opinion polls indicate that diasporic views on Cuban engagement appear to support ideas that are more in-line with the rest of the US (FIU, 2016). This illustrates there is a preference to engage with Cuba, rather than isolate it, thus contradicting the community’s prescribed characterisation.

Analysing diasporic views (i.e. the type of measures they support) can prove valuable to global politics, as Florida’s Cubans are well-recognised for shaping the discourse on US-Cuban relations (Duany, 1999). This highlights the significance of the local sphere, as views from this Latino diaspora have proven to infiltrate the national stage, and successfully influence public opinion (Lohmeier, 2014; Duany, 1999). In sum, their ideas have influenced the global sphere, as “media coverage and social media content played major roles in influencing both public
knowledge of and attitudes toward Cuba as a country.” (Fullerton, Kendrick & Broyles, 2017, p.1) And although this thesis does not aim to measure the influence of these diasporic-views, it does recognise that the unique and personal experiences of Cuban Americans have influenced the opinions of the wider public, as well as US foreign policy. However, this research contributes to IR literature by demonstrating the types of views, prevalent in the current context; whilst highlighting that expressions for soft power are now commonplace. Furthermore, this shows that despite the lingering grievances towards the Cuban government, the Florida community now support policies that increase US-Cuban engagements, and foster improved relations between the two countries. Thus, we should not underestimate the relevance of diasporic-views and their role in global politics.

1.2 Structure of the Thesis.

This section briefly outlines the structure of the study. To begin with, the literature review illustrates IR’s current state of research, highlighting core themes from existing academia, whilst also establishing how the thesis situates itself within relevant IR research. Consequently, three key concepts emerged from the literature review: diaspora politics, soft power, and identity. The next stage clarifies these concepts, noting how Nye’s (1990) concept of soft power can assess the diaspora’s support for less strict and conservative policies. Additionally, the concept of the ‘diaspora’ helps explain the community’s politicised nature. This is intrinsically-linked to identity, which is shown to dictate the diaspora’s power dynamics and political persuasions (Fulger, 2012; Girard & Grenier, 2008; Pérez, 1986). Thus, a theoretical framework of a combined design emerged: this can help analyse diasporic writing, whilst also illustrating the political and ideological beliefs of the Cuban community. Afterwards, sections within the methodology chapter refer back to the literature review. Past studies inform the use of QCA, its analysis of the data’s manifest content, and its operationalisation of the variables. The limitations and advantages of this method are then outlined, before answering the research question stated at the beginning of this study. Finally, the last sections discuss the findings, which is followed by the thesis’ conclusion that centres on the significance of these results.

1.3 Limitations.

The purpose of this thesis is to extend knowledge on Florida’s Cuban community. Thus, by analysing Florida newspapers for expressions of soft power, it is possible to challenge the diaspora’s image as a monolithically conservative-bloc, which favours hard power measures.
As with all research methods, a number of limitations affect the outcome of this case study. Therefore, it must be acknowledged that its reliance on QCA as the sole analytical device appears as somewhat limited. Further, this method cannot claim to fully capture or account for the entire range of diasporic opinions. However, QCA can quantifiably record the presence of soft power, and its inclusion of both Spanish and English language content can adequately maximise the representation of diasporic views. Further, the unobtrusive nature of QCA, and the decision to focus on its manifest content, ensures that the analysis is less biased towards the researcher’s own interpretations of the data. Thus, it remains more specific and objective when detailing its findings (Prasad, 2005, p.7).

The study centres on a 12 month period, which can appear as a rather short timeframe. Yet, this timeframe was selected as it follows a typology conducted in previous newspaper CA (Loh, 2017; Szostek, 2014; Marvasti, 2004). Further, this cross sectional approach was deemed suitable as the thesis is not concerned with revealing the influence of soft power, but with the actual presence of soft power. Consequently, through establishing the presence of soft power, it can be determined that the diaspora holds greater political and ideological variations than previously regarded.
2. Literature Review.

This section presents an extensive overview of relevant scholarly work that can help develop the study. Existing academic knowledge can be divided into three core areas, providing an overview of many important theories, concepts, and notions that currently exist. This allows the thesis to situate its own study in the broader theoretical framework, whilst exploring any potential oversights or key areas missing from previous studies. The first theme illustrates the diaspora’s unique and significant character, further explaining their contribution to the US’ political, social, and cultural spheres. The second theme relates to soft power, whilst primarily focusing on how newspaper CA has explored it within different contexts. Finally, the last theme emphasises the significance of identity, outlining how media portrayals of Florida’s Cubans have influenced diasporic identity, and often added to their characterisation as a homogenous group.

2.1 Diaspora Politics and the Florida Community.

Many scholars have researched the events that led to the waves of Cuban ‘exiles’ or immigrants entering the US at various points in time. Eckstein & Berg (2015) outline their motivations to leave the island, and how the formation of US-based communities emerged. The authors’ framework distinguishes between the different waves exiting the island, and highlights the generational divide that appears to correlate to a group’s political persuasions, affluence, and ability to wield its influence. Their research is historically grounded and focuses on the ‘diasporic generation formation’ of Cubans within Spain and the US. This assists in clarifying the distinctions present in the Cuban American population, which is calculated at approximately 2 million people (López, 2015, p.1).

This thesis centres on the Florida community, as this is where the vast majority of Cubans have settled, whilst its population has continued to assert US-Cuban relations into the national agenda. López (2015) argues that this is an impressive accomplishment, as despite their comparatively small number, the community are considered to be the US’ most significant Hispanic group. Thus, Cuban-Americans far surpass other Hispanic groups in terms of affluence, education, and political involvement (pp.3-4). Yet, there is little scholarly research pertaining to diasporic-views on Cuban engagement, particularly following the improvements ushered in under the Obama administration.

However, the scholarly work that does exist, is useful in illustrating that the community is not a homogenous group as often considered (Eckstein & Berg (2015). In fact, Fulger (2012)
notes that there are many divisions, in which an apparent hierarchical structure is present among Florida’s Cuban Americans. These findings were retrieved through analysing various articles, censuses, and documentaries to illustrate the presence of this complex power dynamic. Many other sources also depict the highly inflexible environment (that internally constricts economic mobility for its members) as Florida’s Cuban community are ruled by their powerful white elite, who hold the monopoly over many aspects of their society (Fulger, 2012; Girard & Grenier, 2008; Pérez, 1986).

Further, Girard and Grenier (2008) analysed surveys through a logistic regression, in order to test a hypothesis about exiles, and their overwhelming preference for the Republican Party (also see Girard, Grenier, & Gladwin, 2012). Contributing to the research on exiles, Girard and Grenier (2008) comment on the presence of Florida's ‘enclave effect’ and its impact on a political ideology that is distinct to the Cuban diaspora (p.530). Girard and Grenier’s (2008) contribution adds clarification to the Cuban Americans’ preference for hardline policies; explaining how elements of this enclave community have persisted in insulating, and regenerating their ‘exile ideology’. Thus, this ideology informs certain members’ views on US-Cuban relations, and therefore, leads to the support of more coercive policies that aim to isolate Cuba. Consequently, such theories can help analyse the data retrieved from newspapers, whilst clarifying the presence of any expressions that do not support soft power.

The presence of the diaspora’s exile ideology is supported by Eckstein and Berg (2015), who explore this theme through a framework of Florida’s generational-divides. This is a key influence on Florida’s diasporic identity, and therefore, is explored in more detail in the next section. Yet, the authors posit that the exiles tend to be more politicised, as they are influenced by their own (or known persons’) experiences of fleeing Castro’s socialist government; and thus, advocate their notorious hardline ideology. Duany (1999) similarly undertook an investigation of Cuban migratory waves, and substantiates these claims; noting how the exiles staunchly support hardline engagements with their homeland (p.100). Additionally, Eckstein & Berg (2015) argue that Florida’s ‘exiles’ exist in stark contrast to its ‘New Cubans’, who are generally less affluent and possess less political influence (p.159). These accounts are highly useful as they provide an insight into the community’s dynamics, whilst substantiating claims that the diaspora's profile oversimplified and does not account for the diaspora’s heterogeneous character (Duany, 1999, p.100).

Consequently, much of the aforementioned research explores the motivations behind Cuban settlement, its political formation in the US, and the deep-resentment of the Cuban government by some diasporic elements.
2.2 Soft Power.

The second area of existing literature relates to Nye’s (1990) concept of soft power. Nye (2004) posits that it is possible to influence other people’s behaviour through attraction and persuasion; asserting the immense value of culture, political values, and foreign policies. Furthermore, soft power is not limited to countries, as institutions and even individuals are included in Nye’s definition, which emphasises how desired outcomes are achieved through the co-optation of people and institutions in other countries (2017; 2004, pp. x, 5-8, 14, 31, 44-62). Moreover, Nye (2017) explains how the US exemplifies soft power, which is represented by the country’s “universalistic values, open culture and vast popular cultural resources ranging from Hollywood to foundations and universities” (p.2). Importantly, soft power can also circumvent the over-reliance on hard power, and its more coercive methods, such as military pressure or restrictive economic policies. (Nye, 2004, pp. x, 5-8, 31). This is easily applicable to the Cuban case, where a breakdown in relations has notoriously been enforced by the US’ militant tactics, and its coercive economic policies (such as the long-running trade embargo).

Much of IR’s scientific enquiry on soft power has focused on the way that the concept has been utilised, and further by whom. Relevant studies illustrate its presence in various different contexts, yet specific to this thesis, is its use in the context of newspapers (Loh, 2017; Szostek, 2014) as well as its relationship to diasporic groups (Murthy 2017; Antwi-Boateng 2012). Scholarly reaction to Nye’s concept has been somewhat mixed, yet much of the literature recognises how soft power can influence opinions. Most notably, various CAs have analysed the presence of soft power in newspaper articles: using quantitative, qualitative or mixed methods. Szostek (2014) exemplifies this case, analysing factors that have shaped Russia’s image when reported from the Ukraine. The study documents how criticism of certain parties or agents can be influenced when the outlets have Russian shareholders or partners. This was achieved through a mixed methods approach, backed-up by original interviews with the outlets’ editorial staff.

Further, Loh (2016) illustrates how reports in newspapers can function as soft power. This was achieved through conducting a MCA on popular newspapers produced on the Chinese mainland. The analysis centred on the English language content of three outlets, and their coverage of the pro-democracy protests of Hong Kong’s Umbrella Revolution in 2014. Thus, the study explored “how the protests became sites for Beijing’s representations of Chinese national image(s)”, whilst further positing that Nye’s concept “can be used to understand the
process in which Beijing made such representations and projections.” (Loh, 2016, p.117) Loh’s contribution is highly useful as it operationally defines ‘defensive soft power’ to illustrate that the use or construction of certain media images are required in order to appear more favourably.

Additionally, Fullerton, Kendrick and Broyles (2017) contribute to soft power literature, revealing how US opinions on both Cuba and US-Cuban relations were influenced by media coverage. The study explores attitudes towards Cuba and the media’s agenda-setting function following 2014’s rapprochement under Obama. In order to gauge opinions, the researchers analysed survey data, evaluating the respondents’ awareness to various themes, both in the context of before and after the announcement to reengage. This contribution is highly useful as it documents features, such as the “levels of perceived knowledge, salience of attributes, as well as attitudes toward Cuba after the joint proclamations.” (Fullerton, Kendrick, & Broyles, 2017, p.1) Thus, the findings can help conceptualise soft power in the context of US-Cuban relations, whilst also highlighting some of the key variables that are required for this thesis. Furthermore, the study demonstrates the key role the media has played in this issue, in which its substantial coverage has greatly informed US views.

The aforementioned literature shows that newspaper reports can be linked to a variety of objectives by those involved in their production. They display how soft power can be used to influence the reader, convey messages to a much wider audience, or reinforce commonly held assumptions. As previously mentioned, Girard and Grenier’s (2008) study of Florida’s exile ideology also reveals that “receiving news from English-language media-outside the enclave’s institutional matrix-reduces the likelihood of support for the exile ideology” (p.530). Therefore, the thesis will take these aspects into consideration and will analyse both Spanish and English coverage.

Whilst the diaspora’s politically conservative character is well-developed in IR, literature that reports a more complex version of the community is less extensive (Duany, 1999, pp.100-1). Yet, Nye’s concept has been applied to other US-based communities. As Murthy (2012) explains how the Telugu diaspora operates as a soft power agent, harnessing the effects of globalisation and mass media to assert its influence on bilateral relations. Further, Antwi-Boateng (2012) posits similar accounts of the soft power capabilities of the Liberian community. Although the objectives of this thesis, differ from these two studies, they can assist in providing a background to other US-based communities. Particularly as Antwi-Boateng (2012) analysed the media’s role and conducted in-depth interviews with journalists to ascertain a support for soft power, which largely replaced forms of hard power. Thus, obvious comparisons can be made with the Florida community and their similar experience with
coercive measures. Further, these studies clarify the importance of diasporic views and the significant role played by the media.

As previously stated, the objectives of this thesis and the aforementioned studies differ, yet the existing academia demonstrates the capacity to explore soft power in IR. This illustrates its presence in US-based diasporas, and how it has been researched using CA. However, soft power will be needed to be clarified in order to apply it to the views expressed in the Florida newspapers. Therefore, a comprehensive outline of this concept will be presented in the theory section that follows.

2.3 Diasporic Identity through the Media.

Mass media's relationship with the US’ Hispanic communities is well-developed in various scholarly fields. Thus, Rodriguez-Medina and Emerson’s (2015) “quantitative mapping” explores the proficiency of certain communities, and reveals the overwhelming success of Hispanics in operating and owning major US media outlets. Yet the scholars acknowledge that their study lacks a deeper understanding of Hispanic views, and cannot gauge their opinions or preferences for certain policies etc. (p.342). Further, with the exception of a number of scientific studies (Lohmeier, 2014; Lohmeier & Pentzold, 2014; Marvasti, 2004), there is limited relevant literature that explores the representation of political views contained in diasporic media. However, many of these existing studies contribute in other ways that can assist in answering the research question.

Lohmeier and Pentzold (2014) are one such case, highlighting useful themes through their qualitative undertaking of media ethnography, in-depth interviews, and participant observations in order to document diasporic views. Thus, the significance of identity emerged from their findings, explaining how Cuban Americans often express a strong connection to both countries. Moreover, much of the aforementioned research refers to Anderson’s (2006) ‘imagined communities’, which can be applied to the diaspora’s imagined or idolised version of their homeland. This is highly relevant when understanding diasporic-identity, as it is intrinsically linked to the exile mentality, which harbours great resentment towards the Cuban government. Further, there is a tendency for even the smallest issues to become politicised and this is frequently played-out in the Florida press (Lohmeier, 2014, p.66).

Identity is an important factor when analysing Florida-based views. Thus, closer analysis of Florida’s Cuban Americans reveals its apparent variations, which can challenge the diaspora’s homogeneous characterisation. Past studies have acknowledged this occurrence,
noting how Cuban American identity is largely linked to its political and ideological positions. David (2008) confirms such accounts, describing how Florida’s Cuban Americans were divided on the 2006 Martí reports. This controversy involved a number of Florida-based journalists, who moonlighted for Radio/TV Martí, whilst working for El Nuevo Herald (pp.158-9). This incident placed the Cuban community in the spotlight, as Martí is an American government news agency that is notoriously biased against the Cuban government (David, 2008). Consequently, many Cuban Americans staunchly defended the journalists’ actions, whilst others condemned their unethical practices; deriding this as typical of the methods advocated by the hardline, or exile elements. Such incidents clarify notions of identity, illustrating that not all diasporic elements share such strong political convictions, thus Cuban American identity is more complex than its oversimplified rightwing portrayal (Lohmeier, 2014; Duany, 1999).

Eckstein and Berg (2015) similarly note such occurrences when commenting on previous attempts by members of the diaspora to deny media access to those who did not share some of the more hardline beliefs on US foreign policy towards Cuba (p.171). Marvasti (2004) equally notes the complex dynamics that exist between conservative Cuban factions, and their involvement in controversial legislature. Through undertaking a CA on The Miami Herald, the qualitative findings illustrate how different groups lobbied for or against the use of the Spanish language in an official capacity. This is useful for the thesis, as it illustrates how aspects (such as language) are linked to Latino identity, and how this often motivates the region’s political discourse. Furthermore, the study can help clarify how these themes are expressed and reflected in the Florida media.

In sum, much of the previously conducted research highlights the diaspora’s past interactions with mass media, and how in many ways, this has further characterised Florida’s Cubans as overtly conservative. Although much of this literature refers to their negative influence, the studies also demonstrate the highly politicised character of the diaspora, which is greatly informed by its diasporic identity. Therefore, through evaluating recent newspaper content, the research can analyse for the presence of ideological and political differences. Thus, contributing to IR literature through challenging the community’s portrayal as a homogenous group, which remains committed to its hardline views.
3. Theoretical Framework.

The aforementioned literature contains a range of complex and overlapping concepts and theories. Therefore, this section clarifies aspects that operate as the theoretical framework for analysing the thesis’ findings. Firstly, the concept of soft power is outlined: explaining how the concept differs from hard power, and how it can be applied to analysing newspaper content.
Following this, working definitions for both identity and the diaspora are presented. This can help with the task of theorising diasporic-identity, showing how it underpins Florida-based views. Lastly, the concept of diaspora is clarified, as this is another key factor in shaping Cuban American views on political and ideological issues.

3.1 Defining Soft Power.

Nye coined the term ‘soft power’ in 1990, whilst a series of additional works illustrated its significance as “an analytical tool, and its gradual development as an instrumental concept used in political discourse in Europe, China and the United States.” (Nye, 2017, p.1) Yet, we must first establish an appropriate conceptualisation of soft power, in order to analyse how it is expressed in editorials and other writings. Conversely, a clearer definition of what constitutes as hard power must also be presented, as this will help further define soft power. Thus, we will first address the significance of soft power and how it manifests.

Principally, soft power’s currency is attractive foreign policies, culture, and political values. These asserts are highly appealing and can influence the behaviour of others through attraction and co-optation. For example, a country can utilise the apparent success of their asserts to co-opt institutions and people in other countries, thus attaining its desired outcomes (Nye, 2004, pp.x, 2, 5-8, 14, 44-62). The US, France, and Britain are just some of the countries that yield significant levels of soft power. Yet, the soft power capabilities of various non-state entities, such as organisations and people are also included in Nye’s theory (Nye, 2017, p.2). Therefore, the issue of soft power and who essentially possesses it, has been subject to considerable scientific enquiry, in which Szostek (2014) confirms that the “media are closely associated with the concept of “soft power” in international relations” (p.463). Thus, the media have become vehicles for different political expressions, whilst their interactions with soft power have also appeared in many different contexts.

Firstly, the media have gained increasing significance in the political sphere as Nye (2004) explains that within the traditional world of power politics, concern has usually focused on whose has the winning economy or military. Yet, within this new era of information, politics can now be viewed as a “contest of competitive credibility”, where it “may ultimately be about whose story wins” (p.106). In this effort to compete, there is a struggle between the interpretation of events and the way they are framed. Nye (2004) outlines the events of Kosovo in 1999 and Serbia in 2000 as examples of soft power in action. This reveals that state controlled information had to compete with the vast popularity of radio stations and internet
sites that provided Western news, and therefore, competing Western views (pp.106-7). In sum, Nye (2004) describes this as a contest, in which “Governments compete with each other and with other organizations to enhance their own credibility and weaken that of their opponents.” (2004, p.106) Accordingly, we can apply the soft power concept to a government, non-state actor or individual. Yet, the involved elements are essentially competing, as their ability to present an appealing image is crucial to attaining their desired outcomes.

In applying the devised theoretical framework, it is possible to analyse the selected newspapers for expressions of soft power. The operationalisation section will clarify these key variables, yet it is beneficial to establish the context of these soft power expressions. These expressions could be represented by views that positively refer to the US’ values; noting the positive attributes of its political and social freedoms. Similarly, when considering ideas of economic prosperity in the US, expressions that portray this in a favourable light would also be included. For example, this includes opinions that express how Cuba benefits from the US system, particularly through its financial aid packages or even the practice of sending remittances to family and friends (FIU, 2016). Further, soft power would be expressed as views of support for increased interactions between US citizens and the island-based Cubans. This would include removing travel and business restrictions, whilst encouraging cultural and educational programmes. Again, these examples illustrate a more positive way of engaging with Cuba, which recognises Nye’s (2004) theory that elements are essentially competing with each other. Therefore, it is crucial to appear in positive terms, as this illustrates legitimacy, enhances credibility and helps achieve desired outcomes (p.106).

### 3.2 Defining Hard Power.

In order to conduct a MCA that focuses on expressions of soft power in the writings contained in newspapers, the research must also consider the presence ‘hard power’. Therefore, clarifying hard power is an essential task, primarily as distinguishing between the two powers can sometimes prove difficult (Nye, 2017, p.2). Firstly, we can consider hard power as the more coercive forms of achieving outcomes or having others change their position. This is most closely associated with threats of military might or economic sanctions (Nye, 2004, p.104). Yet, the literature review contains many relevant examples, which illustrates hard power in the context of the coercive measures the diaspora have previously advocated. As traditionally, Cuban Americans have expressed their support for US policies that have attempted to isolate Cuba. Most notably, diasporic support had focused on discontinuing foreign aid packages,
enforcing the trade embargo, and stopping assistance programmes that offer educational and cultural exchanges (Duany, 1999; FUI, 2016; Lohmeier, 2014). Similarly, Cuban Americans have advocated other restrictive policies that would fulfil Nye’s hard power criteria, such as policies that limit business and travel opportunities between the two countries (FUI, 2016). Importantly, the aforementioned instances of hard power received significant support from the diaspora, which encouraged the US’ strict foreign policy towards Cuba. This encouragement was achieved through its political activities, such as lobbying, campaigning, and establishing NGOs. However, some diasporic elements have been highly vocal and prominent in their interactions with the media, undertaking sustained attempts in deriding the Cuban government and influencing public opinion against Cuba (Lohmeier, 2014; David, 2008). Consequently, we can use these examples to construct a refined definition of hard power, which can be applied for the context of this topic.

3.3 Defining the Concept of the Diaspora.

Providing an appropriate definition of the Cuban diaspora is crucial, and must be outlined, in order to show how support for soft power measures can be expressed by its members. Therefore, this section presents a more comprehensive understanding of Florida’s Cuban community and their political motivations. Yet, we must first address the complexities of the term ‘diaspora’ as it has become an ‘all-purpose’ word, which is frequently grouped-together with transnationalism (Faist, 2010, p.14). However, Bauböck’s (2010) contribution helps distinguish between the two terms, noting that the diaspora is an “evocative political term” and a much older concept, whilst “transnationalism is primarily an academic concept that refers to a set of empirical phenomena and a perspective that groups them together and suggests a framework for studying them.” (p.317) Thus, the Florida community are better represented by the term diaspora, as much of content from the aforementioned literature review expresses how this high-profile Hispanic community are overtly political in character.

Further, Shain and Barth’s (2003) definition of a diaspora can help clarify the position of the Cuban Americans as “people with a common origin who reside, more or less on a permanent basis, outside the borders of their ethnic or religious homeland” (p.452). This demonstrates the enduring importance of their Cuban homeland, which often governs much of their political activity (Duany, 1999, p.90). Moreover, Shain and Barth (2003) recognise how conditions can impede members from returning to their homeland. This is a theme noted by much of the existing literature, which often attributes this to the long-running bilateral feuds.
that have prevented many from returning to Cuba. Yet, Eckstein and Berg (2009) also assert how staunchly conservative elements have refused to return to Cuba on principle, due to continuing presence of the country’s socialist government.

Moreover, these exile or hardline elements have remained vocal in their objections to the Cuban government, essentially forming “a pressure group to defend their interests in U.S. society. As a result, their voice has been heard more clearly in local, state, and national arenas.” (Duany, 1999, p.90) Thus, these overtly conservative elements (despite being a minority) should not be disregarded, as the existing literature demonstrates how the hardliners have previously brought their grievances to the national spotlight, in which their views have the ability to sway option on US-Cuban relations (Lohmeier, 2014).

3.4 Diaspora Construction and the Importance of Identities.

As previously stated, the theoretical framework includes concepts and theories that are often intrinsically-linked and tend to cross-over. Whilst the previous section conceptualised the concept of the diaspora, it also included themes related to Florida’s Cuban identity. Therefore, this segment conceptualises the term identity, and clarifies its use in this context. This is a crucial step, as identity underpins the Florida community’s highly politicised nature, yet it is also a highly complex and fluid concept that requires clarification.

Firstly, much of Florida’s Cuban community have developed a unique and strong sense of identity, in which the “U.S. mass media and some academic researchers have tended to perceive the immigrants as a modern-day version of the American dream.” (Duany, 1999, p.100) This portrayal was established in the post Revolution period, and has largely been maintained throughout the US; particularly by its media and political figures, who praise the Cubans’ efforts in fleeing from Castro’s communist regime. As Duany (1999) explains, “The Cuban exiles have often been portrayed as noble heroes caught in the Cold War between Cuba and the United States.” (p.100) Moreover, this has served to characterise the diaspora in highly positive terms, as “they have been praised for their entrepreneurial spirit, work ethic, and thirst for freedom” (Duany, 1999, pp.100-1). Yet, it is also important to note the heterogeneous character of this Latino community, which contains various ideological, political, and social distinctions. As not all diasporic members share the hardliners’ overtly conservative stance, which is linked to the anti-Castro grievances of the early exiles. However, the later waves of economic immigrants were less politically motivated and far more diverse than the predominantly white, elites of the post-1959 era. Such observations are crucial and help dispel their homogenous
characterisation, whilst illustrating that diasporic Cuban identity is formed by different components.

The importance of this diasporic Cuban American identity is addressed throughout the literature review. Most notably, Shain and Barth (2003) explain how concepts of identity and the diaspora are intrinsically-linked, as the experience of residing in a host country can operates as a force of identity formation (p.127). Thus, members often retain a strong sense of identity, where individuals can still “reside outside their kin-state but claim a legitimate stake in it” (Shain & Barth, 2003, p.127). This dynamic is highly evident in the Florida context, as despite the community’s differing political and ideological positions, members remain committed to conditions in their homeland. Further, Shain and Barth (2003) explain that members often create a construction of their homeland and, “whether that homeland is real or symbolic, independent or under foreign control” its value does not diminish (p.452). Such definitions acknowledge the ‘symbolic’ importance of the homeland and what it represents for the Florida community.

Incidentally, much of the existing research refers to Cuban Americans as either ‘Latino’ or ‘Hispanic’. López (2015) explains that despite the linguistic differences, the community hold no preference for either term (pp.4-5). Therefore, both terms will appear interchangeably throughout the thesis. However, Cuban Americans are more concerned with other areas of identity. Their preferences denote the community’s strong sense of Cuban identity, in which the vast majority identify as specifically ‘Cuban’ and not ‘American’ or any other term (López, 2015). In sum, we can ascertain that Cuban diasporic identity composes of multiple elements, and there is a greater level of diversity, which corresponds to their differing past experiences. In turn, this is represented by a heterogeneous group of political and ideological views, although culturally, the group strongly identify as Cubans. Thus, we should not conflate their identity to that of the purely conservative persona of the exile hardliner.

4. Methodology.

The aim of this thesis is to extend knowledge on the diasporic community, challenging their characterisation as an overtly conservative and monolithic-bloc, highly opposed to more positive (soft power) forms of engagement. Subsequently, this theory is tested through a case study that encompasses media content analysis (MCA) with a theoretical framework that combines identity, the diaspora, and soft power. The framework both guides and clarifies the
data findings, whilst its cross-sectional approach focuses on a 12-month period (July 1, 2016 - July 1, 2017) of coverage produced by Florida-based newspapers, thus revealing current diasporic views, regarding Cuban issues and opinions linked to bilateral relations.

MCA was chosen for this study as it is a method that aims to answer the pertinent questions contained in Harold Lasswell’s (1948) summation of an act of communication: “Who says what, through which channel, to whom, with what effect” (as cited in Shoemaker, & Reese, 1996, p.10). Lasswell pioneered the methodology from the 1920s onwards, yet it has remained a much-used research technique, deemed highly useful for analysing mass media. Therefore, the use of MCA can help navigate the complex datasets, whilst helping analyse the articles’ core categories (Macnamara, 2005). Additionally, the quantitative approach focuses on recording the manifest content: which refers to the clearly stated, surface content. This avoids a more interpretive reading into the underlying, surface-level data needed for analysing the latent content (Macnamara, 2005).

4.1 Methods.
The methodology section has explained why the use of MCA is suitable for this task. Therefore, the next section outlines the process of selecting the materials, collecting the data, as well as the methods used for conducting this MCA. Furthermore, through fully disclosing the specifics of this process, the research achieves a greater level of transparency that allows for the judgement of validity (Krippendorff, 1980). Therefore, the details of the MCA and how it was conducted follow, whilst some of the method’s limitations are also presented at the end of the chapter.

4.2 Data Selection and Sampling.
Due to the extensive number of different newspapers available for analysis, a purposive sample was created, which helped ensure the suitability of potential sources. Benoit (2011) explains how this typology has been undertaken by other newspaper studies and “involves the selection of texts for analysis with a particular goal (purpose) in mind.” (p.272) This preliminary sampling technique was influenced by prior studies (Lohmeier & Pentzold, 2014; David, 2008; Marvasti, 2004) as well as some investigative research on newspaper availability and popularity in the US. Consequently, a number of Florida-based media outlets emerged as particularly popular and influential. Therefore, the decision was made to focus on the content from:
(1) *El Nuevo Herald* is the US’ second largest Spanish language daily newspaper. It is the part of the Miami Herald Media Company (MHMC) and primarily focuses on issues in South Florida, Latin America and the Caribbean. Inclusion of the newspaper (through its online archive) has been chosen as it provides representation of the Spanish speaking population. Despite the presence of other Spanish-language newspapers in Florida, *El Nuevo Herald* was selected due to its prominence in the diasporic community, which is mentioned by several of the scholars in the literature review; although the aims of this research somewhat differ from their objectives.

(2) Similarly, *The Miami Herald* has been chosen as it is one of the diaspora’s leading newspapers, where “The market is dominated by two editions of the Herald” (Lohmeier, 2014, p.40). This represents the English language edition, and is regarded as the flagship newspaper of the Miami-Dade County, a highly politicised area that is greatly concerned with Cuban American relations (Lohmeier, 2014). The paper has been embroiled in previous controversies, relating ethical conflicts of journalists producing anti-Castro reports whilst receiving payments from the US government (David, 2008). Additional to the distribution and online viewing figures, the newspaper has several other formats that enable it to transmit its messages. This MHMC is also involved in publishing Miami.com as well as InCubaToday.com, which are a bilingual site and work in partnership with *el Nuevo Herald* to provide detailed information on Cuba.

(3) *The South Florida Sun-Sentinel* is a major competitor of the other two papers included in this study. Coverage spans the entirety of South Florida, whilst the paper was involved in establishing a full-time foreign bureau in Cuba in 2001. Their Havana-based newsroom is shared with Tribune Co., in which it is the only South Florida newspaper based permanently on the island. Although, this study has focused on newspaper coverage, it should be noted that the Sun-Sentinel has a variety of online platforms available to them, such as SunSentinel.com, CityLinkMix.com, and SouthFlorida.com. Further to this, its website has news video from two of South Florida’s television stations. The Spanish-language version El Sentinel began being published in 2002; it is also available online and is often distributed throughout the region free of charge. The newspaper is distributed for free on Saturdays to Hispanic households in Broward and Palm Beach counties and is also available in racks in both counties.
The selected media outlets have online archives, which retain replica versions of the newspapers available in the US. These archives enabled research of the timeframe that the thesis is concerned with. Moreover, this medium of investigation avoids some of the difficulties experienced when researching platforms such as television and radio, which can present problems with data-availability and issues with incomplete archives (Macnamara, 2005; Krippendorff, 1980). The process of retrieving the articles was undertaken by using the search engines contained in the newspapers’ archive section. Applying the timeframe: 1, July 2016 - 1, July 2017, then entering the term ‘Cuba’ returned a total of 498 results from the three outlets. Superficial checks were undertaken to ensure the suitability of the articles, whilst altering the search engines’ ‘relevance’ features, reduced the total to only substantial forms of coverage. Namely, this discarded much shorter articles that briefly included the term ‘Cuba’ (for example, film reviews, culinary related content or travel advice). The process resulted in a combined total of 205 replica articles. Following techniques outlined by Krippendorff (1980), the use of a random number generator ensured the selection of 10 articles from each outlet. This ensured that each article had an equal chance of being pulled for the sample. This technique was chosen due to the a priori knowledge of the phenomenon, whilst it effectively

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<th>Newspaper:</th>
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<tr>
<td>South Florida Sun-Sentinel</td>
<td>Tronc</td>
<td>151,413 Daily (1)</td>
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<td>206,175 Sunday (1)</td>
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<td>Digital Traffic: - N/A</td>
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<td>The Miami Herald</td>
<td>The McClatchy Company</td>
<td>129,907 Daily (1)</td>
<td>Florida’s Miami-Dade, Broward County, and Monroe County.</td>
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<td>191,323 Sunday (1)</td>
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<td>Digital Traffic: 11,483,826 (2)</td>
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<td>59,617 Sunday (4)</td>
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1 Alliance for Audited Media’s distribution figures for The Miami Herald and Sun-Sentinel for 2014, cited in BurrellesLuce, 2017.
2 Average number of unique visitors per month for El Nuevo Herald (McCleatchy 2017a) and The Miami Herald (McCleatchy 2017b).
3 Average number of monthly page views, El Nuevo Herald (McCleatchy 2017a) and The Miami Herald (McCleatchy 2017b).
4 Print distribution figures for 2015, McCleatchy (2017a).
yielded a smaller and more manageable sample of articles (n=30) for closer analysis (Macnamara, 2005).

4.3 Unitising.
Having outlined the sampling units above, the remaining Unit of Analysis (UoA) refers to the unit of text classified for coding. Krippendorff (1980) explains how the thesis’ concepts and research question should inform the chosen UoA. Therefore, the ‘measuring units’ include individual words, phrases or sentences; whilst the ‘content units’ include any additional paragraphs that can enable clarification of the measuring unit. Moreover, all other elements such as accompanying images and information outside of the sampled articles have been disregarded for coding purposes.

4.4 Coding.
The next step in performing the QCA was to develop the content categories, which act as ‘pigeon holes’ for the data and have “explicitly stated boundaries into which the units of content are coded for analysis” (Prasad, 2015, p.11). Krippendorff (1980) explains that these categories must be mutually exclusive, whilst also exhaustive, so that all examined units are contained in their appropriate category (p.75). This is a highly significant stage, in which Berelson (1952) remarked that CA “stands or falls by its categories.” (p.147) Thus, the development of a study’s categories requires great care. Prasad (2008) suggests that this is assisted by both the research question, relevant literature, and should be “constructed in response to the query: What classification would most efficiently yield the data needed to answer the research questions raised?” (pp.11-2). Therefore, the categories that were developed for this thesis were largely influenced by previous studies, such as Fullerton, Kendrick and Broyles (2017) Loh (2016) Szostek (2014) and Marvasti (2004). Further, the thesis employs a deductive scientific approach, which entails that “all decisions on variables, their measurement, and coding rules must be made before the observation begins” (Neuendorf, 2002, p.11) The details of this process are outlined in the next section, whilst explaining how these variables materialise in the codebook and its accompanying guidelines; which fundamentally allows other researchers to replicate the study in order to challenge or confirm the findings (Macnamara, 2005, p.13).

4.5 Operationalisation.
This section outlines the operationalisation of the MCA’s categories, illustrating how this is conducted with an a priori design. Firstly, we will establish the operational definitions of each category, which are outlined in the Codebook, appearing as a comprehensive list of variables or UoA (see Appendix A). This is an important stage as it outlines what is to be “researched and provides researchers involved in the project with a consistent framework for conducting the research.” (Macnamara, 2005, p.9) Therefore, the initial entries include some of the data’s descriptive variables, representing the article’s ID (V1), the name of the newspaper (V2), the date (V3), author (V4), page number (V5) and word count (V6).

The subsequent variables (V8-13) deal with operational definitions, which allow for the presence or expressions of soft power to be measured. Importantly, the existing research helps establish key variables, as Fullerton, Kendrick and Broyles’s (2017) study can help construct categories for (V7-V9). This helps define soft power as positive perceptions of the US government and how this can be contrasted with the more negative images of the Cuban government. Further, (V10-V11) can be established from other aspects of the existing literature, which outline a requirement for policies and action appear credible and legitimate (Loh 2017; Szostek, 2014). Whilst, contributions by Antwi-Boateng (2012) also help construct measurable units of soft power expressions, through illustrating that the US are open to engagement and interested in cultural, educational and exchanges. Furthermore, our last two variables can be constructed by a combination of the aforementioned literature. Thus, (V12) relates to the US’ role in regards to Cuban engagement, whilst (V13) addresses how the US should proceed with engagement, measuring views on whether to strengthen or limit its interactions with the country. For these two variables, we can identify soft power as being more positive forms of interaction, which aim to project the US’ role in positive terms, whilst other relevant expression include views in support of strengthening relations with Cuba. Finally, any measures of hard power will be assessed as the more coercive expressions of military intervention, economic pressure, and policies that aim at disengagement and isolation (Fullerton, Kendrick & Broyles, 2017; Loh, 2017; Duany 1999).

4.6 Limitations and Delimitations.

There a number of limitations contained in any research method and the use of QCA is no exception. Therefore, previous sections have outlined the specifics of the QCA process, which increases the method’s transparency, and helps enhance the study’s validity (Krippendorff, 1980). Presenting the specifics of this process is important as scholarly opinion is somewhat divided on quantifiably analysing texts; arguing that a mixed methods approach would be a
more suitable form of analysis (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p.32). Yet, this thesis employs a quantitative approach, which was originally devised for studying mass media (Krippendorff, 1980, p.14). Further, this research is more concerned with the quantifiable presence of soft power, which is obtained through objectively measuring the newspaper content. Thus, the QCA ensures that it is not so heavily influenced by the researcher’s own interpretation of the data.

Generalisability is another concern for the study, as its focus is limited to only including three newspaper outlets, which perhaps reduces its ability to account for all diasporic views. Yet, the methodology has been thoroughly considered, as it follows a typology from the existing literature: this helped select some of Florida’s most popular newspapers, whilst also confirming that all three outlets produce different content. Additionally, the thesis has undertaken a relatively large newspaper sample (n=30) of both English and Spanish language content, which helps in attaining a wider representation of views. Therefore, these attempts at addressing the aforementioned limitations should ensure that the “research findings can be applied to and taken as a measure of the target population generally” (Macnamara, 2005, p.13).

Lastly, the issue of replicability has also been a consideration of the research process, as other researchers must be able to replicate the research in order to challenge or confirm the findings. Thus, a number of items have been included in this process, including a codebook, along with its coding instructions and guidelines for the coders; which details the method employed to code the data using human coding (Macnamara, 2005, p.13).

In conclusion, this study would benefit from a greater exploration of other forms of mass media, especially as research shows Cuban Americans are actively involved in other aspects such television, radio, and even social media platforms. This is something that could be explored in future studies.

5. Results.

This section details the findings of the content produced by three Florida-based newspaper outlets. Yet, before presenting the main findings, we will first address some of the data’s more descriptive variables. Firstly, the data was retrieved from (V2) The Miami Herald (n=10), The Sun Sentinel (n=10) and El Nuevo Herald (n=10), ensuring that thirty separate units were sampled (n=30). The data focuses on a one-year timeframe (V3) that spans: July 1, 2016 - July 1, 2017. Further, the results of this purposive sample returned a mixture of different formats, ranging from regular newspaper articles, letter from the public or editorials etc. Firstly, it was
possible to identify the author (V4) in each case, in which (n=21, 70%) of the units sampled were regular news articles, were written by staff writers. Yet, other examples include contributions from the newspaper’s editorial board (n=2, 6.67%) opinion pieces by members of the public (n=2, 6.67%) and contributions by executive directors of Florida-based NGOs (n=3, 10%). Further, other descriptive aspects, such as the unit’s word count (V6) was also measured. This revealed that all the articles contained in this sample ranged between approximately 469-2,429 words, whilst the majority of articles (n=11, 36.67%) ranged from 5,000-1,000 words in length (see appendix B for results on all variables and their frequencies).

The remaining variables concentrated on the manifest content of these online replicas. Away from the more descriptive variables, our first two variables focused on how both the (V7) Cuban and (V8) US governments are viewed. This revealed some rather negative opinions about the way Cuba is governed, as only (n=2, 4.35%) described the government as ‘reasonable’, whilst higher frequencies were gauged from overwhelmingly describing negative terms, such as either ‘repressive’ (n=18, 39.14%) or ‘corrupt’ (n=10, 21.73%). In comparison, the US government received lower recorded frequencies as ‘repressive’ (n=1, 2.56%), yet they are not exempt from critical views as the data recorded that the US government are seen as ‘problematic’ (n=9, 23.08%). More positive views were expressed when identifying the US government as ‘liberators’, with a majority (n=14, 35.90%) of the sample recorded under this section.

Other somewhat negative views, commonly appear in descriptions of the island’s current living conditions (V9). This is apparent in the data, as only minor mentions for more positive terms appear in this category, such as the view that Cubans are ‘satisfied’ with their current living conditions (n=3, 4.88%). Furthermore, the joint two highest recordings were for expressions that portrayed Cubans as ‘desperate’, which equally noted their ‘withheld rights’ (n=12, 29.27%). Following this, over two-thirds of the data from (V10) affirms that island-based Cubans are in need of assistance. Although this variable does not detail the type of assistance Cuban’s require, other sections of the data identify this with more specificity. Most notably, various policies and measures that provide assistance are outlined in (V11). These include mentions of support for foreign aid (n=3, 4%) funding programmes (n=5, 6.67%) and sending remittances (n=6, 8%) to family and friends on the island, whilst there were no mentions of discontinuing any of these programmes or assistance packages.

Further, this variable contains 14 different policies or action, which span a range of different political, social, and cultural spheres. Most prominent were the ‘pro-tourism’ views, which appeared in half of the articles, and advocated trips and holidays to Cuba. Other
measures that similarly encourage closer-ties and enhanced interactions were also frequently mentioned. Thus, some of the highest recorded frequencies were for business-themed policies, where support for either the Cuban ‘private sector’ (n=11, 14.67%) or the presence of the US through its ‘business opportunities’ (n=13, 17.33%) were both highly advocated. Moreover, the majority of these policies or activities appear alongside mentions of the US role in engaging Cuba (V12). Thus, the highest measure was assigned to the US’ role to ‘encourage democracy’, in which the correct or effective policies can help increase democracy on the island (n=8, 18.18%).

Finally, the last of the data’s findings illustrates views on how the US should engage with Cuba (V13). Thus, the view for encouraging interaction between the two countries is advocated more than any other, in which the desire for ‘limited engagement’ registers in (n=6, 20%) articles, whilst greater levels support having closer-ties with Cuba, in which two-thirds (66.67%) advocated strengthening relations. This section has outlined some of the most evident details from the data's findings. Yet, this is now evaluated in closer in the next section, in which the previously discussed theoretical framework is applied.

5.1 Discussion.
The previous section presented a brief overview of the results of the manifest content, whilst briefly outlining some of the key observations from (V1-13). The next stage will expand upon some of the aforementioned points, in an attempt to answer the research question. As previously mentioned, the variables helped measure the types of views present in the diaspora, illustrating a range of views that spanned different political, social, and cultural spheres. Although the dataset is rather substantial, closer analysis with the devised theoretical framework can help illustrate how the presence of soft power is expressed in Florida-based newspapers.

5.2 Credibility and Interpretation.
Some of the data’s most notable features relate to our conceptualisation of soft power, illustrating the aforementioned “contest of competitive credibility”, in which there is a need to influence the interpretation of events between these competing parties (Nye, 2004, p.106). In this context, we focus on how soft power is expressed through written portrayals, comparing elements such as the conduct and policies of the US and Cuban government. Thus, Nye (2004) posits that the ability to achieve desired outcomes, crucially depends on the winning party’s
ability to present a more appealing image. Further, we can apply this particular notion to our data, as it contains various elements (i.e. government policies and actions, etc) that are represented in either favourable or unfavourable terms, hence, they are in competition with each other (p.106).

This case is illustrated when comparing the recorded frequencies for (V7) ‘view of the Cuban government’, when compared to (V8) ‘view of the US government’. The clearest indication of views concerning the Cuban government are linked to the category of ‘repression’ (n=18, 39.14%), which illustrates a common theme, in which it is characterised by its more oppressive style of governing. This frequently appears throughout the dataset, and is best exemplified by comments that deride the government and its leadership. This view is represented in The Miami Herald, as Ordoñez (2016) quoted Trump when explaining that Fidel Castro was “a brutal dictator who crushed his people for almost six decades” (p.4B). All three outlets contained similar representations of the Cuban government’s repression, whilst contrary to this, the US government only received minimal mentions as ‘repressive’ (n=1, 2.56%).

Similarly, Loh (2016) expands upon Nye’s concept, defining the reactionary role of soft power in Chinese newspapers to “(1) fend off negative national images and (2) project positive national images.” (p.117) We can apply this to the Florida context, as the majority of diasporic views, positively refer to the US government as a ‘liberator’ (n=14, 35.90%). This was encapsulated in an article by El Nuevo Herald, which detailed the exiles’ efforts in supporting the Cuban people. Further, this revealed how a Miami-based event was organised to condemn the Cuban “dictatorship”, whilst highlighting the US’ position as a liberating force. The staff writer also compared the US to other nations when explaining the event’s purpose as,

“the world seems to have forgotten Cuba’s decades of suffering, yet Cuba will be free. No president will lift the sanctions against this tyranny until the country is free country.” (Escobar & Pentón, 2016, n.p)

Such views are frequently echoed throughout the data: as writings portray the repressive “tyranny” of the Cuban government, whilst referring to the US government as liberator, striving to “free” the Cuban people. The positive representation of the US government is further evident, when Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen notes that

“the situation in Cuba has gotten worse, reflecting in the thousands of young people who go through the jungles of Central America every day or cross the Strait of Florida seeking freedom.” (Escobar & Pentón, 2016, n.p)
This presents the Cuban government in a highly negative light, as Ros-Lehtinen’s criticises the regime through expressing concern over the freedom of the Cuban peoples. Moreover, the US’ political values of increased freedoms are reflected in appealing terms, as it describes the image of young people fleeing Cuba to reach Florida; hence depicting the US as a safe haven from this oppressive regime. Furthermore, as a prominent Cuban exile, Ros-Lehtinen often exemplifies the hardliner’s position, as later in the same article, she stressed in the need to strengthen the trade embargo, instead of lifting it (Escobar & Pentón, 2016, n.p). Importantly, this kind of support for hard power, appears to counter many of the expressions of soft power, as their views indicate that the hardliners are less willing or engaged in influencing others via Nye’s approach. Yet, we should evaluate the way in which these diasporic views manifest in the findings, before deciding on whether they present themselves as soft power expressions.

Therefore, through applying our devised theoretical framework, certain views are clarified. This demonstrates that they correlate to an individual’s own background and past experiences, which underpin their preference for certain policies (i.e. soft or hard power). Eckstein and Berg’s (2009) analysis of Florida’s generational divide supports these notions, explaining that “politicians in Miami had either emigrated at a young age at their parents’ initiative, during Castro’s first years of rule, or were US-born children of Exiles.” (pp.170-171) Consequently, the ‘first wave’ has largely remained galvanised by their experiences of fleeing their homeland and living as exiles in the US. The scholars posit that these exiles have maintained their position as hardliners, often passing on to “their progeny their own views toward Cuba, such that antipathy toward Fidel as well as Raul Castro, and toward the revolution” (2009, p.171). Hence, the presence of views that support isolation, limited interaction with the Cuban government and more coercive economic policies.

The Miami Herald contains an opinion piece, written by US senators Rubio and Menendez, and US representative Diaz-Balart⁶, which outlines these remaining hostilities,

“For more than 50 years, the Cuban people have yearned for real change, many preferring to risk their lives in makeshift rafts than live under an oppressive and malevolent regime. They have sought freedom from the ruthless, tyrannical dictatorship that violates their God-given rights and fears democratic values... the U.S. sends the message that America stands firmly on the side of the oppressed, not the oppressor.” (Rubio, Menendez & Diaz-Balart, 2017, p.17A)

These politicians are undoubtedly important US decision-makers, whose comments directly

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⁵ This primarily refers to the white Cuban elites, arriving shortly after the 1959 Revolution.
⁶ Some of Florida’s most prominent hardliners Rubio, Menendez & Diaz-Balart.
express a preference for limiting the US’ interactions with the Cuban government. Eckstein and Berg’s (2009) aforementioned notion clarifies the hardliner’s position, explaining that certain perceptions of US-Cuban relations are largely marred by an ‘exile identity’ that speaks of a greater level of frustration and anger towards the Cuban government (pp.170-2). Although Nye (2017) argues that successful outcomes often require a combination of both hard and soft power (p.2), the hardliners appear to represent a position and an approach, not greatly favoured across the three newspaper outlets. Thus, the data indicates that their views are contrary to the more prevalent soft power expressions, which will be elaborated on in more detail below.

In sum, much of the data contained in (V7) and (V8) illustrate views that portray the two governments in highly opposing terms, characterising them for their positive or negative attributes. Nye (2004) argues that this is a crucial element within in the aforementioned “contest of competitive credibility”, as these portrayals often influence the interpretation of each government. Applying this to the context of Florida’s diasporic newspapers, many of the views can be seen to represent the US government in a way that aims “to enhance their own credibility and weaken that of their opponents.” (2004, p.106) The data appears to substantiate this notion, as other negative characterisations include references to the Cuban government as ‘inept’ (n=5, 10.87%). This criticism is commonplace across all three outlets, as these views emphasise that Cuba’s economic failures are a sign of government incompetence. Pentòn and Escobar’s (2017) article for The Miami Herald typifies this case, explaining that Cuba is

> “Facing a pension system that is increasingly non-viable, a harsh economic recession and an expected impact on social services as a result of the aging population, the island is confronting one of the biggest challenges of its history” (p.2A).

Fundamentally, the authors illustrate Cuba’s economic failures and the relative decline that has plagued the country, following the post-1990s ‘special period’? Such examples are able to undermine the Cuban government’s credibility, through portraying an image of ineptitude, and the inability to provide adequate facilities, services, and commodities for those it governs.

Moreover, comparisons can be made with Loh’s (2016) contribution on the use of soft power in Chinese newspapers. This highlights how national images can be projected in favourable terms, aiming to influence the interpretation of events to achieve desired outcomes (Nye, 2004). This is applicable to our data, as portrayals of the US government as a ‘scapegoat’ (n=3, 7.69%) are contained in Weissenstein and Rodriguez’s Sun Sentinel article. Berta Soler,

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? The ‘special period’ refers to the Cuban-Soviet relationship that afforded many benefits and proved a highly prosperous time for the island.
the dissident leader of the Ladies in White⁸ explains that “The Cuban regime will always find an excuse to blame the U.S. government” (p.4A). Hence, asserting that the US are not at fault. Again, similar portrayals of the US government as the wronged party appear within The Miami Herald, in which the staff writers explain that Cuba has continued to “blame its economic woes on yanqui “imperialism.” (Mazzei & Gámez Torres, 2016, p.5A). In sum, these comments capture how the US government have been incorrectly assigned blame, often for Cuban failures. Whilst, these writings help portray the US in a more positive terms, and as a far more credible side in this complex dynamic.

5.3 Morality.

A key aspect of Nye’s (2004) concept is the issue of moral authority, which is a crucial requirement when attempting to influence and persuade others through non-coercive means. Therefore, those wishing to influence others must demonstrate morally sound policies or action, as this is paramount to soft power success. As a result, (V11) includes a wide range of policies, which help us to establish the kinds of support registered in the newspaper content. One of the data’s most noticeable observations was the lack of support for hard power policies, as this was operationally defined as the more coercive measures that attempt to influence the Cuban government. Thus, the findings reveal that there is only minimal support for economic sanctions, in which, this singularly refers to enforcing the US’ trade embargo (n=7, 9.33%).

Closer analysis of the data also shows that this support emanates from the hardliners, who have traditionally backed stricter economic policies and advocated using military force against the Cuban government (Duany, 1999, pp.100-1). Interestingly, support for the use of the US military failed to register within newspaper content sourced under this timeframe. Therefore, the limited support for these coercive measures could be compared to the Liberian diaspora and its conscious move from hard power to soft power (Antwi-Boateng, 2012). Therefore, we could theorise that some of the diaspora’s more conservative elements (i.e. the Republican hardliners, who traditionally favour hard power measures) recognise the limitations of past policies as

“A return to the failed isolationist policy in Cuba has a price tag that seems to been overlooked...six out of ten Republicans oppose changes to the Obama policy. Whatever the size of the loss, were there no loss at all, continuing the Obama policy is the right thing to do. Fifty-five years of a failed policy is not a persuasive argument for continuing it.” (Sun Sentinel Editorial Board, 2017, p.7A)

⁸ This is a high-profile dissident group, formed of the female relatives of imprisoned dissidents.
The Sun Sentinel’s editorial highlights the lacking support for Cuban isolation, as more specifically, it derides the way in which the trade embargo has “failed” over this period. Further, this criticism emphasises how a return to isolationism would spell a huge financial loss for the US, whilst crucially revealing that Republicans are now less inclined to support such hard power measures. This suggests that strict and coercive means appear more implausible in the current climate, particularly in the post Thaw-era.

Consequently, the data indicates that there is limited interest in these hard power policies, yet through closer analysis of the other variables, we can expand on how these writings convey expressions of soft power. Firstly, (V10) discusses the issue of ‘external assistance’, revealing that over two-thirds of views believe that the Cuban population require some form of assistance (73.33%). Additionally, the ‘external’ element of this variable clarifies that this assistance is to be obtained from outside of Cuba, and hence, separate from the Cuban government. Before examining our next variable, which provides specific details to many of these forms of assistance, we must acknowledge the prevalence of concern for the Cuban population. This is largely due to Florida’s high Cuban population, in which the issue of concern for islanders appears to surpass many of the region’s ideological or political beliefs.

Furthermore, this concern appears to be underscored by identity-related themes, which corresponds to similar themes previously highlighted in the existing scholarly work. Primarily, this relates to how diasporic members have retained strong-ties to both the island and its people. These ties are a contributing factor, fuelling both interest and condemnation over Cuba’s leadership, as well as a profound concern for its population. This concern is clearly reflected in the previous variable, indicating that Cubans require assistance (V10). Yet, our subsequent variable illustrates in greater detail, how this concern manifests. Firstly, (V11) highlights the issue of remittances (n=6, 8%), registering the considerable desire to provide for family and friends on the island. The FIU (2016) explains that Cuban Americans from Miami-Dade County, send on average around $900 per person, which equates to an estimated $450 million per year (p.29). The newspaper data recognises the significance of this practice, which is seemingly advocated by all sides, despite the FUI’s (2016) assertion that “sending remittances is strongest among new arrivals” (p.29). Although the views in support of remittances, appear unaffected by political ideologies or generational differences. Moreover, these writings express soft power as they highlight the US’ contributions in sending remittances, as well as their involvement in foreign aid and assistance programmes. Thus, Nye (2004) outlines how this occurs when others look to an exemplar model: “admiring its values, emulating its examples,
aspiring to its levels of prosperity and openness - (and) want to follow it.” (p.5) Essentially, this presents the US in a positive light, illustrating its “openness” in regards to assisting Cubans, whilst also underscoring American prosperity.

Elaborating further on the findings from (V11), it is possible to analyse how the range of policies have garnered varying levels of support. Thus, many articles express a ‘pro-foreign aid’ agenda (n=3, 4%), whilst others are in favour of funding Cuban-based educational, artistic, and cultural programmes (n=5, 6.67%). These two figures are not remarkably high, yet their combined percentages reflect an interest in two sides of similarly-designed policies (i.e. financial contributions from the US to fund non-state operations in Cuba). Whitefield’s article for The Miami Herald typifies the first policy, explaining the effects of US’ foreign aid, which is issued through USAID⁹ to send

“donations of food to non-governmental organizations or individuals as well as other assistance to individuals and organizations...last year included $6 million in grants offered over a three-year period to organizations” (Whitfield, 2017b, p.4A).

Such examples illustrate how the US administers foreign aid to Cuba’s Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and religious groups on the island. These activities are portrayed in positive terms, whilst focusing on a need to maintain the US’ financial contributions to Cuba. Moreover, the second case of these similarly designed policies, focuses on the funding of specific programmes that foster greater cultural and social interactions between Cubans and Americans. Support for these types of programmes is reflected in the Sun Sentinel’s article, which portrays the achievements of Leugim Prado, who voluntarily left Cuba on a scholarship. Thus, the article details the Cuban’s experience in the Florida:

“Prado’s English is still improving but he’s managed to hold conversations, something he credits to Broward College’s Project RENEW, otherwise known as Refugees Entering New Enterprises and Workforce. The program helps refugees, asylees, and victims living in Broward County with free courses of English for speakers of other languages (ESOL). Students of RENEW also learn life skills while receiving citizenship and civics classes.” (Reyes, 2017, p.118)

These increased interactions occur through activities such as US-based internships, scholarships and cultural exchanges. Antwi-Boateng (2012) describes the positive attributes of such programmes, noting how their design ensures that “the average Liberian sees the educational and financial success of their US-based Liberian” (p.58). Thus, we can draw

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⁹ USAID is an independent agency of the US government, principally in charge of administering civilian foreign aid and development assistance.
parallels between both the Cuban and Liberian context, as the Whitfield article details how the US issued a “$754,000 program to bring Cuban young people to the United States for internships” (2017b, p.4A). This allows us to theorise that these programmes operate with similar intentions, in which the US epitomises “something worthy of aspiring to and thereby...affecting the behavior of their fellow compatriots at home.” (Antwi-Boateng, 2012, p.59) Therefore, the appeal of the US is enhanced to, fulfilling aspects of Nye’s soft power concept.

Finally, it should be acknowledged there are no recordings for the two categories that oppose the aforementioned policies. Hence, there were no values attributed to either ‘anti-foreign aid’ or ‘discontinuing programmes’. Closer analysis indicates that whether Cuba receives programme funding or foreign aid is not such as a concern for the wider diasporic members. Yet, these policies are well-received by the overtly politicised hardliners, who advocate the use of US funds in this way. This is evident as one of Florida’s notorious hardliners, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen10 criticised plans to cut funding for these types of programmes. Ros-Lehtinen argued that the programmes operate as ‘democracy funding’ as,

“This budget is very troubling when it comes to democracy funding for countries in Latin America. It is imperative for the United States to continue to support civil society and human rights activists in Cuba” (Whitefield, 2017, p.4b).

This illustrates how these programmes are entwined with underlying political motivations, yet these efforts do not appear to employ quite the same hard power tactics as previously undertaken by Florida Cubans.

**Legitimacy.**

The issue of legitimacy is quite similar to previously discussed themes on creditability and the appearance of credible action. This is also true of legitimacy, in which portrayals of the US government, its policies, and their corresponding support, must appear as legitimate, in order to serve as effective forms of soft power. This section will continue to discuss the policies advocated in the newspaper writings, and how they contain aspects of legitimacy, and therefore, convey expressions of soft power. Yet, other elements also play a crucial role in how these expressions materialise, and thus will be addressed accordingly. Firstly, the previous section noted the positive representations of the US government, and how this differed widely

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10 Florida’s most senior Republican Representative. Trump’s proposal to discontinue these measures angered Ros-Lehtinen as previous administrations have traditionally funded Cuban dissidents.
from the “repressive” images of the Cuban government. Yet, (V8) reveals that the US also registered a high quantity of views, deeming the government ‘problematic’ (n=9, 23.08%). This shows that the US are not entirely exempt from these more critical views, as the El Nuevo Herald addresses this topic when discussing the potential “damages” if the hardliners position is fully adopted. Thus, Bruno Rodríguez, Cuba’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, proclaimed that:

“Undoubtedly, President Trump’s policy marks a setback in bilateral relations... I anticipate that these measures will affect the relations of the United States Government with Latin America and the Caribbean and seriously damage the credibility of its foreign policy...They will bring economic damage not only to state-owned enterprises in Cuba, but also to cooperatives and will particularly harm self-employed or private workers.” (Gámez, 2017, n.p.)

Rodriguez’s statement addresses the Florida community’s concern over worsening relations, whilst highlighting the US’ need for legitimate policies and action. This enables us to apply the soft power framework to such examples, as the writings confirm how the US’ policies should reflect its customs and political values. Further, Szostek (2014) acknowledges that the “media shape foreign public sentiments, which in turn affect the acquiescence or resistance of foreign elites to particular foreign policy goals.” Thus, legitimate foreign policy appears more credible, requiring less justification, whilst enhancing its appeal to others (Nye 2004). Moreover, we can contrast the aforementioned figures with the noticeable mentions of the US government as ‘hypocritical’ (n=4, 10.26%). This appears rather frequently within the data, indicating a concern with the US’ perception, and the legitimacy of its policies and actions. An opinion piece from The Sun Sentinel typifies this concern, noting Trump’s hypocrisy in complimenting the Turkish and Egyptian regimes, yet reluctant to continue a process of normalisation with Cuba. Thus, the decision is derided as “this sudden awakening to human rights is almost offensively disingenuous.” (Schechter, 2017A, p.9A) In sum, expressions of soft power are present, as there is an awareness that legitimate policies and action must be undertaken so that the US operates in a justifiable manner (Nye, 2017, p.2).

5.4 Soft power and Diasporic Identity.

The research shows that the diaspora comprises of different factions, wherein the exile identity appears to characterise only a small section of the Florida Cubans. Girard and Grenier (2008) clarify these differences, explaining that only certain groups adhere to an ‘exile ideology’, which often supports the region’s enclave effect. The newspaper data further substantiates that this is a minority view, as articles highlight that much of the diaspora now hold views more in-
line with other American citizens. As opinion piece for the Sun Sentinel confirms this point, stressing that

“Eighty-one percent of Americans, 75% of Cuban-Americans, an virtually all Cubans support the freedom of U.S. citizens to travel to Cuba.” (Otazo, 2017, p.9A)

Similar figures appear throughout the data and denote an interest in Cuban engagement, whilst (V12) reiterates these findings, showing the majority of views support ‘strengthening ties’ with Cuba (n=20, 66.67%). Furthermore, both this issue, and that of our last variable: which gauged views about the US’ role, is clarified once applying certain aspects of our theoretical framework. Most notably, Anderson’s (2006) ‘imagined communities’, aids clarification about the presence of different diasporic-views. As this concept outlines the obvious impracticalities of meeting every member, yet argues there is a requirement for shared ideas of what a group’s national identity constitutes. Subsequently, the way in which these shared ideas are imagined, essentially defines these communities. Hence, Cuban Americans often feel an attachment to those on the island, and are seemingly concerned about their ‘desperate’ conditions (n=12, 29.27%). As previously mentioned, the majority of views advocate increased US-Cuban interactions, whilst favouring ways to allow American influence over the island’s conditions. Thus, the greatest frequencies in our penultimate variable, reveals that the US’ role is to ‘encourage democracy’ (n=8, 18.18%). This is captured in an article by The Miami Herald affirms, which stresses the popular desire “to promote nonviolent, democratic change in Cuba.” (Whitfield, 2017b, p.4A) This advocates non-coercive measures, yet it retains the diaspora’s long-running objective (Duany, 1999).

Furthermore, Anderson’s (2006) concept has been applied to the US-Cuban context when explaining the diaspora’s strong connection to the island. Eckstein and Berg (2009) exemplify this case, describing how the diaspora are a dispersed community, “who maintain links with co-ethnics and who identify with and remain committed to an actual or imagined homeland over time” (p.160). Thus, this importance of a shared identity is evident in their writings, as Cuba has remained a focal point throughout the Florida press (Lohmeier, 2014). Providing further explanation as to why the group remain so politically active, Eckstein and Berg (2009) note that their “imagined Cuba builds on the views their parents’ generation had inculcated in them since their childhood: views of a paradise lost, which they are committed to reclaiming.” (Eckstein & Berg, 2009, p.171) This indicates that regardless of any first-hand experience of the island’s current conditions, Cuban Americans are still committed to causes initiated be
previous generations. This would explain the interest in ways to assist the Cuban population, whilst underscoring the hardliner’s overtly conservative character.

Through applying Anderson’s concept, it is possible to understand the significance of this particular diasporic identity. As Woodward (1997) acknowledges that even if “the past which current identities reconstruct was only ever imagined, it is defined as offering some certainty in a climate of change” (p.18). Such notions help explain why some diasporic elements are more reluctant to support a different type of relationship with Cuba, which would entail moving away from these more coercive forms of engagement. Again, the past appears to play a key role as there is a sense of immense loss for Cuban Americans, a factor that continues to strengthen Cuban-American identity and fuel their desire to direct US policy towards Cuba (Duany, 1999). However, the data illustrates that the hardliner’s position is only minimally reflected in the newspaper writings, which essentially defies the diaspora’s characterisation as an overtly conservative monolithic-bloc.

6. Conclusion.

In conclusion, we can ascertain that the newspaper writings contain substantial levels of soft power, which are visible in expressions encouraging credible and legitimate policies. Further, in applying Nye’s (2004) theory, we can determine the many ways that diasporic-views operate in accordance with soft power’s “perception of events”. Thus, the US government must appear more favourably, whilst also representing the more credible side within this “contest”. Therefore, its interactions (i.e. policies or actions) should remain easily justifiable (Nye, 2004, p.106). As a result, the newspapers present far more positive images of the US, as views illustrate the US’ many favourable attributes, whilst deriding Cuba’s repressive regime, and emphasising how the Cuban people frequently struggle to contend with the island’s poor conditions that largely a result of government ineptitude.

It must be noted, that the thesis has not attempted to measure the impact of these views, instead it has focused on the actual presence of soft power expressions. These expressions emerged as: support for closer engagements, advocating different ways to assist Cubans, as well as a general desire to increase the presence of American business, finance, and people on the island. Furthermore, many of these views registered in rather high frequencies, indicating the diaspora’s interest in forging closer-ties, which is most-widely backed by encouraging American business opportunities in Cuba, (n=13, 17.33%) whilst also assisting Cuba’s own private sector (n=11, 14.67%). Therefore, we can deduce that the popularity of these policies is not merely to protect American interests, but largely motivated by concern over the islander’s
welfare; as over two-thirds of the articles (n=22) indicated that Cubans require external assistance. The data highlights the diaspora's concern for the islanders, which is substantiated by the vast levels of remittances, providing financial assistance to family and friends on the island (FIU, 2016). Whilst other sources indicate that there is a logical desire to assist Cubans, as diasporic-members have an enduring connection to their homeland, which largely directs their Cuban American identity (Eckstein & Berg, 2009). This notion is further reinforced by Lopez’s (2013) study, identifying that 63% of US-based Cubans, still consider themselves ‘Cuban’ rather than ‘American’. Consequently, soft power appears to be able to represent this ever-present concern over the islanders’ wellbeing, as well as illustrating the diaspora’s interest in US-Cuban relations. More importantly, their expressions largely avoid some of the more coercive forms of support, which notoriously characterised the diaspora’s previous interactions with the Florida media (Lohmeier, 2014).

The data is by no means homogeneous, as the writings reflect certain views that somewhat counter the presence of these soft power expressions. These contributions appear to represent the hardliner’s position, yet importantly, they appear to only foster minimal support. Those views that do appear, strongly indicate the presence of the hardliner’s agenda, which advocates stricter measures, such as curtailing interactions, enforcing travel restrictions and maintaining economic sanctions against Cuba. Again, this type of support is somewhat limited, and there are no mentions of involving the US military, a controversial practice previously favoured by the diaspora (Duany, 1999). Moreover, these views pale in comparison to the frequencies that adhere to our soft power framework. This suggests that the Florida community seemingly understands that their ‘hardline’ characterisation prohibits successful outcomes. Therefore, views contained in their writings overwhelmingly distance themselves from expressions of hard power, a practice undertaken by other US-based diasporas (Antwi-Boateng, 2012).

Such notions are confirmed by writings deriding the failure of past isolationist policies, in which, the Sun Sentinel encapsulates the view that “the new generation has moved on” as “two-thirds of Miami-Dade residents favoured a restoration of relations with Cuba” (Sun Sentinel Editorial Board, 2017, p.7A). Such notions are echoed throughout the data, reflecting the view that Cuban Americans now support an agenda more in-line with the rest of America. Moreover, this defies the overtly conservative characterisation of the diaspora, as the Sun Sentinel summarises the dynamic in an opinion piece, which proposes that US engagements should operate “not to isolate it, but to open it to more U.S. businesses and products, more US. tourists, more U.S. culture, more access to U.S. information” (Schechter, 2017, p.9A).
symbolising the prevalence of soft power within Florida’s diasporic newspapers, and the way in which these expressions are utilised to forward their agenda.

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**Appendix A. Codebook**

This section contains the Codebook and its corresponding instructions. All variables have been created deductively, using the aforementioned existing literature.

**V1 Article ID.** This code should follow the format: year/month/day/newspaper abbreviation/article page number. If two or more articles code 'a' or 'b' etc. (e.g. 20170101TMH1a).

**V2 Newspaper Name** This variable will need to be coded according to the newspaper you have selected:

1. The Miami Herald - The Miami Herald (TMH). The name of the newspaper is located at the top centre of each page.

2. The South Florida Sun-Sentinel - The South Florida Sun-Sentinel (SFSS). The name of the newspaper is located at the top centre or right-hand corner of each page.

3. El Nuevo Herald - El Nuevo Herald (EHN). The name of the newspaper is located at the top centre of each page.

**V3 Date.** Add the date in which the article was published. Use the following format: DD - month abbreviation - YYYY (e.g. 31-Jan-2017).

**V4 Author:**

1. Reporter -

2. National politician(s) -

3. Member of the public -

4. Executive director of a group/NGO -
A sentence clarifies the politician's position (i.e. Marco Rubio is the Rep. senator from Florida).

The name and location is included, indicating that the author is a member of the public.

The details of the group/organisation appear alongside the author's name. This is indicated by a small paragraph, providing details about the author and their group.

Information about the board is disclosed at the end of the article or under the title.

This was authored by a staff writer and an author from 14ymedio, which publishes its content in Cuba.

Unable to determine.

V5 Page number:
(Add the page numbers that are included: i.e. 1A/4A).

V6 Word Count:
(Select the appropriate category, only selecting one option).

V7 View of the Cuban government:
(Select all relevant categories that appear).

Cuba's government are considered to be corrupt, due to their control of the country's infrastructure and institutions. Indicators: "corrupt monopoly", "crooked government" or "government corruption".
Cuba's government are inept, in which they are unable to effectively govern the country. Indicators: "unable to govern", "ineptitude" or "incompetent".

The Cuban government are reasonable. Indicators: It is possible to engage with the Cuban government as they are "just" "reasonable" or "fair".

The Cuban government cannot be reasoned with. Indicators include: "unreasonable", "unjust", "unfair" or "closed off to working with the US".

The Cuban government are viewed as "repressive" towards the Cuban population. Indicators include: "tyranny", "dictatorship", "despotism" or the Cuban people are "brutally oppressed/repressed" by the government.

The Cuban government appear in positive terms. Indicators include: the government are "good" or "fine".

Not disclosed or unable to determine.

V8  View of the US government: (Select all relevant categories that appear).

1. Hypocritical - The US government are considered hypocritical, engaging with other regimes/non-democratic countries. Indicators: not engaging with Cuba for these reasons is "unjustifiable", this is "hypocritical" or "insincere".

2. Problematic - The US government are "problematic" in bilateral relations. Indicators: the US government are a "problem" in this dynamic, they make the situation more "challenging", they "set back" or "damage" engagements.

3. Liberators - The US government are liberating the Cuban people. Indicators include: the US government "liberate", "free" or "release" the Cuban people.

4. Reasonable - The US government are described as reasonable. Indicators: the government are "fair", "reasonable" or "just".

5. Repressive - The US government are a described as a repressive force. Indicators include: "repress/ion", "political bullying", "coerce/ive" or "oppress/ive".

6. Good - The US government are good. Indicators include: the government are "fine", "good", "positive" or "not bad".

7. Scapegoat - The government are unfairly condemned for Cuba's problems. Indicators: the US is a "scapegoat", its "unfairly blamed".

99. Can't tell - Not disclosed or unable to determine.

V9  View of current living conditions for island-based Cubans: (Select all applicable categories)
1. Desperate - Life for those on the island is difficult. Indicators: Cubans are "desperate"; they "suffer" or "struggle"; life is "hard" due to the island's impoverished conditions.

2. Unhappy - Cubans are "unhappy" living in Cuba. Indicators: "sad", "miserable", "despondent" due to their conditions.

3. Satisfied - Island-based Cubans are satisfied. Indicators: islanders are "satisfied" or "unperturbed" with their lives, or "unfazed" by conditions.

4. Happy - Cubans are happy on the island. Indicators: islanders are "happy", "content" with conditions in Cuba.

5. Dissatisfied - Cubans are dissatisfied about their current conditions. Indicators include: Cubans are "disgruntled", "dissatisfied", "frustrated" or "want more".

6. Withheld rights/abused The Cuban government violate human rights. Indicators: "Cubans have their rights violated", "Cuba commits human rights violations", "Cubans are abused on the island".

99. Can't tell - Not disclosed or unable to determine.

**V10 Are island-based Cubans in need of assistance:** (Select only one option).

1. Yes - Cubans need "assistance", "help" or "support".

2. No - Cubans do not require "assistance", "help" or "support".

99. Can't tell - Not disclosed or unable to determine.

**V11 What policies or action is supported:** (Select all policies or actions advocated).

1. Remittances -

2. First-hand exposure to US values -

4. Anti-Business -

5. Private sector -

3. Business opportunities-
6. Pro-tourism -

Support for sending remittances to island-based Cubans. These views advocate the US' participation in this practice, noting the need for Americans to send money to those on the island. Indicators: "send remittances" or "send money to family and friends" etc.

Support for using US values to influence island-based Cubans. This view stresses that Cubans can be persuaded to seek values more reminiscent of those in the US. Thus, Cuban opinions can be successfully influenced through 'first-hand' exposure to US values. Indicators include: Cuban opinions can be altered by exposure to "US freedom", "liberty" and other "US values" etc.

Support for encouraging and maintaining the presence of American companies in Cuba. This view stresses that the presence of American businesses help island-based Cubans, who can now benefit from the vast range of commodities or services available to them.

7. Anti-tourism -

Indicators: "US commodities help Cubans", "Cubans gain from/enjoy American services" or "Cubans benefit from internet providers/fast food chains" etc.

8. Economic pressure -

Support for stopping US businesses operating in Cuba. Indicators: i.e. America should "not do business with Cuba" or "US businesses/companies should not operate in Cuba" etc.

9. US culture -

Support for encouraging the growth of Cuba's private sector. Indicators include: Americans should be "pro-private sector", support Cuba's small "family-run businesses" or "deal directly with Cubans" etc.

10. Military pressure -

Support for encouraging American tourism to Cuba. This includes advocating Cuba as a tourist or holiday destination for Americans. Indicators: insisting that Cubans "benefit from American travellers" or "gain from meeting American tourists".

11. Pro-foreign aid -

12. Anti-foreign aid -
Support is shown for the use of American culture in Cuba. Indicators include: "American cultural values/culture can change opinions", or "American culture can influence minds" etc.

13. Programmes -

Support for policies that involve the US military. This view advocates the presence of the American military in Cuba. For example, it could claim that military pressure on the Cuban government would prove beneficial. Indicators: "the US military should be present", "military intervention is favoured" or "military force is required" etc.

14. Discontinuing aid programmes -

Support for discontinuing/not providing Cuba with financial aid. This view argues against the US' policy of providing foreign aid packages to Cuba. Indicators: "the US should discontinue its aid packages", "US aid should stop/cease" or "the US should not provide aid" etc.

99. Other -

Support for stopping Americans using Cuba as a holiday or tourist destination. Indicators: "Cuba is not a tourist destination", "Americans should not vacation on the island" or Americans should "not copy celebrities who vacation there" etc.

Support is expressed for the US' trade embargo against Cuba. Indicators include: the "embargo should continue"; the "embargo is supported"; it should be "reinstated" or needs to be "strengthened" etc.

Support for the US' funding of educational and cultural exchange programmes. This view argues in favour of funding programmes that encourage various types of exchanges. Indicators: "the US should support educational/linguistic/artistic/cultural exchanges", "these exchange programmes are beneficial for Cubans" or "these programmes expose Cubans to US values/ show Cubans how life is in the US" etc.

Support for not participating in or funding these educational exchange programmes. Indicators: "funding should cease", the US should "not fund" or "should not pay for" these programmes.

Other policy or action not stated above.

V12 What is America's role in this engagement: (Select all relevant categories).

1. Encourage democracy -

3. Protect interests -

2. Stop socialism -
4. Change regime - The US' role is to stop the spread of socialism. Indicators: the US should "prevent socialism in the region" or "stop socialism's presence" or "halt socialism" etc.

5. Highlight regime - The US' role is to protect its interests in the region. Indicators: the US needs to "prevent losing out to other countries" or "protect its interests" "secure American interests on the island" etc.

The US' role is to encourage democracy in Cuba. Indicators: the US can "encourage Cuba/ns to move towards democracy", "promote democracy/US values" or "push for democracy", etc.

The US' role is to change the Cuban regime. Indicators: the US can "change how Cuba is governed", the US can "alter the regime" or can "impact the way it governs" etc.

The US' role is to highlight that the Cuban government operates as a regime. Indicators: the US should "bring attention to/have others acknowledge" Cuba's regime status, or "highlight how Cuba is governed" to the international community.

99. Can't tell - Not disclosed or unable to determine.

V13 How should the US engage with Cuba: (Only one category is required).

1. Strengthen ties - The view that supports strengthening ties with Cuba. Indicators: The US should "strengthen" its relations, move towards "greater levels" of engagement or form "closer ties", etc.

2. No engagement - The view that America should not engage with Cuba. Indicators include: rapprochement or normalisation of relations is "unwelcomed", "wrong" or "bad" etc.

3. Limited engagement - The view that the US should have limited or restricted interactions with Cuba under its current conditions. Indicators: the US needs to "limit its interactions", "not fully engage", "restrictions are needed" etc.

99. Can't tell - Not disclosed or unable to determine.

Appendix B.

Results from the QCA.

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<tr>
<th>V4 Author</th>
<th>TMH</th>
<th>SFSS</th>
<th>ENH</th>
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42
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<td>%</td>
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<td>n=</td>
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43
3. Liberators 7 70 4 40 3 30 14 35.90
4. Reasonable 1 10 0 0 0 0 1 2.56
5. Repressive 0 0 1 10 0 0 1 2.56
6. Good 0 0 0 0 5 50 5 12.82
7. Scapegoat 1 10 1 10 1 10 3 7.69
99. Can't tell 1 10 1 10 0 0 2 5.12

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<tr>
<th>V9 View of current living conditions for island-based Cubans:</th>
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<td>1. Desperate</td>
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<td>3 30</td>
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<td>7 70</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>1 10</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>2 20</td>
<td>4</td>
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<table>
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<th>SFSS n=</th>
<th>ENH n=</th>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>SFSS n=</td>
<td>ENH n=</td>
<td>Total Frequency</td>
<td>Total %</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>4</td>
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**V12 What is the US' Role:**

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<th>SFSS n=</th>
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<td>1. Encourage democracy</td>
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<td>2. Stop socialism</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>3. Protect interests</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>4. Change regime</td>
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**V13 How should the US engage with Cuba:**

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**Newspaper Articles.**

*The Miami Herald.*


**The South Florida Sun Sentinel.**


