Dual Citizenship; a Divided Loyalty

(A Case Study of Immigrants with Dual Citizenship in Malmo, Sweden)

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ABSTRACT

In the recent decades we have seen a continuous rise of dual citizenship; many states are now officially accepting it and many people are making use of this opportunity. In other states, however, dual citizenship is (still) forbidden and much contested. It is especially feared that ‘one cannot serve two masters’, that loyalty towards the nation state and thus national cohesion and democracy are undermined. Whereas, others see dual citizenship as vanguard of citizenship identities and practices above and across states, and as an important source for democratizing a globalizing world order. However, these fears and hopes regarding dual citizenship are usually built upon speculations. The actual consequences (here, especially in terms of loyalty issues) of such a dual status are not well understood due to lack of empirical data on this specific group. Thus, the case of immigrants with dual citizenship in Malmö, Sweden is used as an illustration to show how this issue of loyalty of dual citizens manifest itself in reality. This is done by analyzing and interpreting the data gathered on first generation immigrants with dual citizenship through survey and interviews (follow up); hence explanatory mixed methods. Based on the analysis, this paper offers empirical evidence on the loyalty of the immigrants with dual citizenship in Malmö to their country of residence (Sweden) and that of their country of descent.

Keywords: Dual Citizenship, Loyalty, Country, Malmö, Sweden

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

EU – European Union

MOC – Ministry of Culture, Sweden

US – United States

UK – United Kingdom
CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Before the cold war, most countries in the world did not accept or even tolerate dual citizenship. There were international norms and state regulations to ensure that every individual has just one citizenship. For instance, one brief statement by the League of Nations (Hague Convention) in 1930 summarizes the dominant international perspective throughout most of the 20th century: ‘All persons are entitled to possess one nationality, but one nationality only’ (Faist and Gerdes 2008: 5; Faist 2007: 13). Thus, migrants were expected to renounce their former citizenships for them to naturalize in the receiving country. This was to avoid the problems associated with dual citizenship such as difficulties concerning diplomatic assistance and military service, the risk of divided loyalties, and the problem of dual voting rights (Faist 2007: 106). These problems will be discussed in chapter two.

But after the cold war, the trend changed dramatically. Thus, attitudes towards dual citizenship liberalized. This was mainly as a result of continuous increase in international migration around the globe and gender equality (citizenship via mother). An increasing number of countries in the world permit and even promote dual or multiple citizenship and many people use the chance to formalize their multiple affiliations. Even those countries that officially do not permit it tolerate it somehow (Brond-Sejersen 2008; Vink and De Groot 2010). For instance, liberal democratic states, even when adhering to the principle of avoidance of dual citizenship as far as possible, are compelled to grant at least certain exceptions; when renunciation of former citizenship is impossible or costly and through gender equality (citizenship through the mother) (Faist and Gerdes 2008: 8). These countries permitting dual citizenship are of the view that dual citizenship encourages migrants’ integration in the host country, and as well strengthens the link between the migrants and the country of origin. It is also a necessity considering the current globalization. In addition, they see dual citizens ‘as vanguard and bearers of citizenship identities and practices across and above nation states, and thus as an important source for democratizing a globalizing world order’ (Schlenker 2013: 3).

Sweden, as the case study, is the one of the immigration countries in Europe that presently allows dual citizenship. At this point, it is important to briefly look at the Swedish Citizenship Act that officially allows dual citizenship. But before dual citizenship gained legal acceptance, *ius sanguinis* (citizenship by birth) had been predominant principle for citizenship
under the Swedish Citizenship Acts of 1894, 1924 and 1950. These Citizenship Acts, despite some changes, had something in common, which was upholding the principle of avoiding dual citizenship (Benitz 2012: 2 - 4). For instance, according to the Act of 1950, immigrants living in Sweden had to give up their former citizenship in order to become Swedish citizens, and any Swedish citizenship, for whatever reason, who acquired citizenship of another country automatically, lost his or her Swedish citizenship. However, one of the exceptions that existed, in 1979, was children with parents from different nationalities obtained both parents’ citizenship, but the general principle was that dual citizenship should be avoided (Gustafson 2006: 9). Even those children were required by law to choose citizenship upon reaching maturity (Faist 2007: 105).

Considering the social change and internationalisation as a result of migration, the then government of Sweden considered it necessary to review the existing legislation on citizenship. In 1997, a committee was established to thoroughly assess the issues relating to current citizenship regulation (Act of 1950). Also, in 1998, the committee was given additional instructions to look at issue concerning dual citizenship, and in its final report, the committee recommended that dual citizenship should be fully accepted (Gustafson 2006: 9; Midtboen 2015: 3). After due consultations and necessary opinions from different agencies or authorities are being heard, the government followed the recommendations of the committee and proposed a new citizenship regulation which completely removed all previous hindrances to dual citizenship (Gustafson 2006: 9). Swedish government (including the political majority in parliament) considered that cons arising from dual citizenship are relatively limited and that they are outweighed by the pros to the individual, for instance, it enhances opportunity to maintain contact with the sending country and as well facilitates integration into the receiving country (MOC 2000; Midtboen 2015: 3; Benitz 2012: 8, 11; Faist 2007: 108 - 109).

Furthermore, when this proposal (bill) was presented to the Swedish parliament, all the political parties in the parliament sponsored the proposed Citizenship Act except on the issue of dual citizenship (Benitz 2012: 8). The parliament was divided into two directions on the subject (dual citizenship) – those against and the ones in support of the proposal. There were series of arguments from both factions in the debate, and the proposal was finally signed into law because the members of the parliament (mostly) and the Swedish population (via opinion poll) in support of the bill are more than the ones against it (Gustafson 2006: 9). The New Citizenship Act entered into force on July 1, 2001 – the official beginning of dual citizenship era in Sweden. According to the Act, a Swedish who acquires citizenship of another country
does not lose his or her Swedish citizenship. In the same vein, a foreigner who applies for Swedish citizenship may retain his or her citizenship if the other country allows it. Also, a person who has lost his or her citizenship through the acquisition of another country’s citizenship may regain the Swedish citizenship by notification. Such notification can be made within the two years after the New Citizenship Act came into force (MOC 2000; Gustafson 2006: 9; Benitz 2012: 10-11).

1.1 Statement of problem

Citizenship was supposed to be the basic contract between the government and the governed. Similarly put, it was also expected to be a binding pact showing one’s political loyalty to a nation state. Thus, citizenship and political loyalty to the state were considered inseparable, hence allowing dual citizenship would undermine the ‘liberal democratic ideals of undivided political loyalty’ (Leitner and Ehrkamp 2006: 1628). Drawing on this, a dual citizen would be disloyal because of competing allegiances (Gallagher-Teske and Giesing 2017: 43). The issue of lack of loyalty to a nation state has been one of the major arguments against dual citizenship; the ultimate loyalty required from a citizen to the state cannot be guaranteed in dual citizen situation. This is to say that the loyalty towards the state and thus national cohesion and democracy are undermined. In this regard, dual citizenship may leave a state in a worry about lack of loyalty (Gallagher-Teske and Giesing 2017: 44).

Furthermore, it has been feared that dual citizens would not integrate into the receiving country but rather maintain ultimate loyalty to the sending country (Faist and Gerdes 2008: 3). In the same vein, some policymakers considered dual citizenship as a degrading or devaluing to the concept of citizenship, and that immigrants are increasingly becoming citizens for purely opportunistic reasons, without showing commitment and loyalty to their country of residence (Leitner and Ehrkamp 2006: 1616). Based on the existing literatures, as shown above, one can say that immigrants with dual citizenship usually lack loyalty to the country of residence which they are also citizens of.

However, some literatures have shown that it is very possible for a dual citizen to be committed and attached to the country of residence as well as to the country of descent, which entails loving both countries. Schlenker (2013: 28), in his research, concluded that dual citizens seem to be involved politically in their country of residence as well as in the country of descent and even on supranational levels. Following the same line of thought, proponents of dual citizenship argued that even though individuals feel attached to several places this
does not reduce the personal commitment to each one of those places (Faist 2007: 113, 190; Gustafson 2006: 12, 16). However, these assertions do not really deal with or talk about the issue of loyalty as regards to immigrants with dual citizenship, rather emphasize on the commitment and attachment the immigrants with dual citizenship have to both country of residence and country of descent.

1.2 Research Purpose

Having no existing empirical data on the issue of loyalty of immigrants with dual citizenship is one of the major reasons for embarking on this research. Although there have been some researches in this field of study but none of them really focused on the issue concerning the loyalty of immigrants with dual citizenship. In this respect, Schlenker, in his research, concluded that the fears about divided loyalty are not backed by data obtained from their research (Schlenker 2013: 28). However, some literatures, as said earlier, have it that immigrants are increasingly becoming citizens for purely opportunistic reasons, without showing commitment and loyalty to their country of residence. To this end, the major aim of this empirical study is to find out whether the immigrants with dual citizenship are loyal to the country of residence. This is done by using the case of immigrants with dual citizenship in Malmö, Sweden. In order to achieve this, primary data was used. This gave a true picture of how fragmented the loyalty of dual citizens is. The use of primary data gives us an account of what actually is obtainable in current time in line with the subject matter, therefore adding on to the existing body of knowledge.

1.3 Research Question

Having stated above the main aim of this research, research question(s) will be needed for the actualization of this aim. The question(s) will guide the whole processes involved in this research. To this end, the relevant research question to explore this area of study is as follows:

Are immigrants with dual citizenship loyal to the country of residence?

1.4 Delimitations

The research aims at the immigrants with dual citizenship living in the city of Malmö, Sweden. In order to keep up the stated aim of this research, the research does not consider all the immigrants with dual citizenship resident in Malmö. Rather, it focuses only on the immigrants who have Swedish citizenship and that of their former or original citizenship.
Consequently, this research does not aim to explore all the immigrants with Swedish citizenship and citizenship of other country. Instead, it explores the first generation immigrants; who have experienced how the both systems work, and as well have established national ties or belonging to both countries.

Furthermore, the research focuses mainly on finding out whether the immigrants with dual citizenship are loyal to the receiving country. This can be discovered by exploring into the daily lives of the immigrants, for instance, their economic, political and social activities. Hence, this research does not attempt to look at the role other factors and actors outside the immigrants play in influencing the immigrants’ loyalty to the state, such as government policies, supranational (e.g. EU), discrimination, etc. Although, they could be relevant, an engagement with all of these factors and actors will be too much for the scope of this research.
CHAPTER 2

Literature Review

There have been various definitions and contributions given by different scholars in the dual citizenship literature. Hence, this chapter reviews the literature on various conceptualizations of dual citizenship or nationality. Furthermore, it discusses in details scholars’ debates surrounding dual citizenship, and as such bringing to light the gap in the literature which this thesis hope to fill.

2.1 Dual Citizenship

The concept of ‘dual citizenship’ can be simply regarded as when one has or possesses passports of two different countries at the same time. This entails having dual allegiance to two different countries. In this respect, De Castro sees dual citizenship as a condition or status where an individual has dual allegiance to two different countries at the same time (De Castro 2006: 870). Similarly put, dual citizenship means that individuals combine citizenship of two nation-states (Lace 2015: 2). It can also be seen as involving the holding of more than one citizenship or nationality simultaneously (Renshon 2001: 6; Faist 2007: 3; Nielsen 2008: 4). Looking at the last definition, dual citizenship can also be referred to as multiple citizenship, which means having citizenship of more than two different countries at the same time. However, the arguments as well as issues prominent in the debate of dual citizenship are discussed under the following sub-headings below.

2.1.1 Dual citizenship as a Tool to Promote Naturalization and Integration

Firstly, dual citizenship has been considered as a tool for promoting naturalization in the countries of the world, more especially immigration countries. Not all immigrants who are eligible to acquire citizenship actually submit applications because of various reasons. Thus, there are strong indications that the requirement to denounce their previous citizenship is one of the most important obstacles. However, immigrants are most likely to naturalize if they are allowed to retain their former citizenships (Nielson 2018: 6; Faist 2007: 16, Faist et al., 2004: 5). In line with this, Faist and Gerdes (2008: 8, 9) gave various examples to back up this claim; such as, the naturalisation rates of Turkish immigrants in the Netherland rose sharply between 1992 and 1997 (the periods when dual citizenship was tolerated without exceptions), and in Germany (as a general rule, did not accept dual citizenship), an equivalent group of Turkish immigrants had much lower naturalisation rates. Again, in Netherland, when the
renunciation requirement was reintroduced in late 1997, it led to decrease in naturalisation rates among some immigrant groups (Lace 2015: 11). Furthermore, based on the data from the 1990 and 2000 U.S. censuses, immigrants recently granted dual nationality rights are more likely to naturalize (Mazzolari 2007:1). In addition, most studies which empirically test the impact of dual citizenship focus on immigrants in the United States, and the result that the acceptance of dual citizenship increases naturalization rates is well established (Schlenker 2013: 5).

Secondly, proponents of dual citizenship argue that it is a mechanism for immigrants’ integration into the society, and as well gives them political and cultural rights same as native citizens. These political rights (right to vote and be voted for) will enhance their full political participation in all levels. In other words, acknowledging dual citizenship more persons would be able to participate in politics. However, allowing dual citizenship would definitely make the immigrants willing and ready to integrate into the society, whereas renunciation requirement for naturalisation can hinder immigrants’ integration (Faist 2007: 109). In fact, dual citizenship would facilitate political participation and integration process in general (Faist et al., 2004; MOC, 2000; Lace 2015; Faist and Gerdes, 2008; Schlenker, 2013). Drawing on this argument, citizenship may be seen as a tool facilitating integration of immigrants.

In contrary, the opponents, in their arguments, doubt that dual citizenship would facilitate integration of immigrants, but rather renunciation of one’s old citizenship shows commitment and willingness to become integrated. They argue that it may instead make immigrants more prone to uphold and strengthen their ties to their former home countries and, such attitude is not conducive for integration. They also argue that it is important that integration should be complete before persons become citizens (Faist 2007: 114; Nielson 2018: 6; Midthoen 2015: 5). In a nutshell, citizenship or naturalization should be the acknowledgement or prize at the end of successful process of integration rather than facilitating it.

2.1.2 Dual Citizenship as a Mechanism for Diversity Management

Dual citizenship, in proponents’ argument, can be seen as a tool for diversity management in the era of transnationalism. Migration and globalisation had led to the emergence of multicultural society. In such society more and more individuals have genuine and deep feelings of attachment to more than one country. Hence, allowing dual citizenship would be a means of acknowledging these overlapping attachments or recognition of multiple affiliations.
of individuals (Faist et. al., 2004; Faist, 2007; Lace, 2015; Faist and Gerdes, 2008). Thus, dual citizenship can be seen as a response to increasing transnational movements and claims for political, social and economic rights in the era of transnationalism. Hence, it is a mechanism used by nation states to manage diversity (culture pluralism or multiculturalism) among its residents within the country and among its citizenry across state borders (Lace 2015: 2). This entails that allowing dual citizenship is a way of encouraging and managing multicultural by the state. Although, this approach of using dual citizenship for diversity management in the era of transnationalism differs from country to country.

On the one hand, in an immigration country such as Sweden, several persons that argued against allowing dual citizenship saw it as a privilege for immigrants (Faist 2007: 112). Even though the proponents stressed that it is also to maintain links with Swedish nationals abroad, the acceptance of dual citizenship focused more on the incorporation or integration of immigrants. On the other hand, Turkey, as an emigration country, allowing dual citizenship focused basically on Turkish nationals abroad mostly in Germany in order to maintain the links or ties with emigrants (Faist and Gerdes 2008: 7; Faist 2001: 14). In Turkey, dual citizenship was given to selective groups especially immigrants with Turkish origin (Faist, 2007; Lace, 2015). In sum, dual citizenship, in either case, is a mechanism for diversity management in the era of transnationalism.

However, in Sweden for example, the opponents thought that the proponents exaggerated or over-interpreted the changes in attachment. They argued that although people have attachments to more than one place does not change the fact that citizenship is a binding pact that shows the connection between individual and state (Faist 2007: 113). Drawing on this argument, diversity management can still take place in the era of transnationalism without allowing dual citizenship which violates the basic principle of citizenship (Lace 2015: 7). For instance, in Sweden, before dual citizenship gained legal acceptance, multiculturalism (cultural pluralism) has been enshrined in the immigrants’ integration policy, which was a way of diversity management.

2.1.3 Dual Citizenship as a Human Right

The growing importance of human rights norms has also enhanced the rise of dual citizenship (Faist, 2007). Theses norms have limited state discretion, and as well influenced its citizenship regulations. Thus, the 1997 European Convention on Nationality expands the discretion of the contracting states to tolerate dual citizenship via certain ways; such as
allowing dual citizenship when renunciation or loss is not possible or cannot reasonably be required. Based on this, the 1997 Convention, together with other developments in international law, illustrate an increasing trend towards recognizing citizenship as a human right, including the right to citizenship of the state in which persons permanently live (Faist and Gerdes 2008: 7; Nielson 2018: 6; Gallagher-Teske and Giesing 2017: 43). Similarly, the UN Declaration of Human Rights stipulates that every person has the right to nationality. However, dual citizenship can be seen as an avenue to avoid statelessness and to protect nationality as a human right as well as an important part of peoples’ identity (Vink and de Groot, 2010; Gallagher-Teske and Giesing, 2017). Mona Sahlin, one of the proponents of dual citizenship in Sweden, argued that ‘dual citizenship was not foremost a question of immigrants integration, but a matter of rights and decency that has a general character’ (Faist 2007: 113).

Furthermore, Spiro, in his own contribution, argues that the right to have dual citizenship is a human right. Therefore, in the world in which human rights paradigm is getting stronger dual citizenship should be normalized and widely accepted (Spiro 2010). He goes on by saying that the right to dual or even multiple citizenships is justified “through the optics of freedom of association and liberal autonomy values” (Spiro 2010: 111). Also, it has been argued that dual citizenship is a part of the individual freedoms and an important political right which means it is situated in a human rights framework. In this regard, Spiro concludes that ‘it is now possible to frame acquisition and maintenance of the status as a right, to the extent that plural citizenship implicates individual autonomy and self-governance values’ (Spiro 2010: 130). On the contrary, opponents of dual citizenship argue that interpretation of citizenship as a human right does not necessarily have to lead to dual or multiple citizenship, but rather to avoid statelessness in which becoming citizenship of one country secures that (Lace 2015: 7).

2.1.4 Dual Citizenship as a Legal Paradox

Dual citizenship, according to the opponents, can be seen as a legal paradox. In this regard, dual citizenship is embedded with several traditional problems, such as difficulties concerning diplomatic assistance and military service, the risk of lack or divided loyalties and the principled problem of dual voting rights. However, this membership overlapping nation-states, as a result of dual citizenship, threatens societal solidarity and reciprocity among citizens and in civil society, and may even threaten state security and authority (Faist, 2007). Dual citizenship most times represents dual allegiance that can lead to divided loyalties which
violates the basic principle of undivided loyalty, via citizenship, to the nation-state (Ostergaard-Nielson, 2008: 7). In addition, it can also threaten national identity (including devaluation of national citizenship), and as well violate the principle of equality of citizenship; through dual voting rights (de Castro, 2007; Renshon, 2001; Fonte, 2005; Faist et al., 2004). For Governments, the most pressing problem regarding loyalty concerns those permanent residents (eligible for citizenship) who are not willing to renounce their former citizenship (Faist and Gerdes 1008: 13). In sum, dual citizenship, even in the era of increasing acceptance, has been regarded as an abomination by some.

Moreover, the proponents address these traditional problems associated with dual citizenship as put forward by the opponents. The 1997 Swedish citizenship commission noted that diplomatic assistance was not completely neglected, but that it would depend on the goodwill of the nation-state in question. The commission thought that it was crucial that individuals becoming dual citizens also be notified in the future about the potential problems in this respect (Faist 2007: 109). Also, proponents of dual citizenship argue that dual nationals do not have multiple votes in one polity but only one in each polity of which they are full members (Faist 2007: 10). Similarly, Spiro noted that a dual citizen does not have extra political rights within either polity; as Bauböck asserts that as long as these votes are not aggregated at a higher level, the principle of one man one vote has not been infringed (Spiro 2010: 125). The 1997 citizenship commission in Sweden noted that, based on earlier investigation, dual voting rights were less of a problem in practice for the fact that few persons actually voted in more than one country (Faist 2007: 109).

The absence of war between democratic states may have led state authorities to view citizens’ loyalties as less of a security problem (Faist 2007: 173; Faist and Gerdes 2008: 8). Nevertheless, regarding the possible divided loyalties and the security problems this might involve, proponents argue that this would not be much of a problem since most countries recognize that persons should have to serve in the military in only one country (Faist 2007: 109). And for those states that still have conscription, the dominant principle is that dual citizens are obliged to perform military service in the country of residence and are exempted from military service in the country of their other citizenship (Faist and Gerdes 2008: 7).

Furthermore, both the 1985 and 1997 Swedish citizenship commissions gave a general positive account of dual citizenship, thereby playing down the traditional problems of divided loyalties and so on, and emphasizing its probable positive effects on integration and political
participation (Faist 2007: 107, 109). The 1997 citizenship commission went further to argue that the *de facto* tolerance (which was in existence) had so far not led to any major problems (Faist 2007: 109). Also, dual nationals have never posed any particular security threat. In this regard, Spiro argues that there were no notable cases of dual nationals committing espionage or constituting a problem even in the context of war between alternate nation-states. Persons in that situation (for instance, many Japanese and German nationals who held U.S. citizenship at the outbreak of World War II) had to choose between the two (Spiro 2010:115). Contributing to this argument, Lace (2015: 5) posits that the increasing doubts concerning loyalty of dual citizens are countered by the argument that it is better to include them as citizens rather than foster a growing number of noncitizens.

However, the arguments for and against dual citizenship have been discussed above, and these arguments are mostly what is obtainable in most of the countries. It can be seen that these so called traditional problems associated with dual citizenship are not usually visible or rather the chances of them happening are very little. For this, the researcher argues that the advantages of allowing dual citizenship outweigh its disadvantages. But, the fact still remains that lack of loyalty or divided loyalties can occur as a result of dual citizenship, even though there is no existing empirical data on this respect. To this end, this research will fill the gap in the literature of dual citizenship as it regards to the issue of lack of loyalty or divided loyalties.
CHAPTER 3

Theoretical Framework

This chapter provides a discussion on the theoretical foundation of citizenship which this research builds on. The aim here is not to provide a detailed historical or comprehensive theoretical discussion on the approach. Rather, a brief summary of the key assumptions from the approach is presented to set the basis for the argument made in the paper. Since this thesis is concerned with citizenship (in its dual form) and tries to identify whether the immigrants with dual citizenship are loyal to the country of residence, the citizenship theory proved relevant. The approach is chosen here because citizenship theory provides the context within which equity can be assured among individuals irrespective of age, gender or race.

3.1 Approaches to Citizenship

Delanty argues that citizenship encompasses a relationship between duties, rights, identity and participation; these are seen as the basic characteristics of citizenship (Lister and Pia 2008: 8). In the same way, Leca posits that the modern citizenship consists of three features; ‘a judicial status which confers rights and obligations vis-a-vis a political collectivity, a group of social roles for making choices in the political arena (political competence), and an ensemble of moral qualities required for the character of the good citizen’ (Kartal 2002: 1). Thus, there are various theories of citizenship, and some of them include liberal, republican and communitarian theories of citizenship. However, each of these theories aforementioned emphasizes more on one of the Delanty’s or Leca’s basic characteristics of citizenship over others. For instance, liberal concept of citizenship focuses more on individual rights, while the republican model stresses more on civic participation, whereas the communitarian perspective pays more attention to belonging and identity. But in the course of this research, the republican concept of citizenship will be adapted because it is relevant to the topic under study.

3.1.1 Republican Concept of Citizenship

For republicans, citizenship is constituted as both legal status and intersubjective recognition of equality, and entails participation in collective decision-making which is the fundamental political duty of every citizen. In other words, citizenship is created through the process of participation in public or political realm (Lister and Pia 2008: 22). As opposed to liberal emphasis on rights, civic republican approach stresses the promotion of a common good
through active participation and commitment (politically) in public affairs which is the only way to be free (Lister and Pia 2008: 22; Kartal 2002: 101; Honohan 2017: 2). However, republicanism stresses on individual liberty which ensures freedom from domination. In this vein, Lister and Pia posit that republican citizenship seeks to foster a positive freedom (non-domination) and to create conditions where individuals are self-governing. And that both freedom and membership are created and sustained through participation (Lister and Pia 2008: 22, 23); as Honohan puts it ‘freedom is politically realised’ (Honohan 2017: 7). Thus, some republicans see freedom more in terms of the status of secure non-domination while others as participation in decision-making, but in each case freedom is related to self-government and concern for the common or broader good (Honohan 2017: 2).

Furthermore, for republicans, freedom can only be secured through interaction with others in order to shape our lives in political decisions (Kartal 2002: 121, 125). In other words, it is necessary that the individuals or different social groups in a particular polity be active in pressing for their concerns, for in so doing, they create a kind of condition which prevents one group from dominating the other. That is to say that the law which ensures the freedom of the citizenry is dependent upon the participation of the citizenry (Lister and Pia 2008: 24). More so, when citizens participate in public life they encounter and integrate with other members of the community, which in turn has educative effects; as Honohan simply puts it ‘education is central to citizenship’ (Honohan 2017: 12). Participation, as cornerstone of membership, is seen to have integrative and educative effects. The argument is that participation in political affairs integrates citizens, bringing them closer together and also helps them to use talents and abilities that may otherwise lie dormant. Through the process of participation, individuals become more likely to trust and cooperate with one another which as well increase their social capital. A more trusting citizenry simply means that the society functions more effectively as when cooperation is more effective, then society is more efficient (Kartal 2002: 122; Lister and Pia 2008: 28).

Republican concept of citizenship has it that different individuals rather social groups (such as migrant group) in a nation-state be active in political or public affairs in order to prevent one group from dominating the other. Drawing on this assumption, one can conclude that the republican approach can be a response to the challenges of multiculturalism. In this line of thought, David Miller (2000) claims that republican citizenship is better able to respond to cultural pluralism than liberal alternative, and the approach can be adapted to deal with the heterogeneous structure of contemporary states (Kartal 2002: 124). His argument is based on
a model of democratic decision-making, so called ‘deliberative democracy’; a deliberative system which indicates that groups with differing opinions enter into an open discussion, listen to the opinions and interests of others, and revise their own views. This is a way to arrive at compromise solutions to political issues that members of each group can accept.

Applying this approach to the topic under study, Sweden is a multicultural society involving the natives and other migrant groups, and that makes republican approach more relevant to this study (see above). However, when immigrants with dual citizenship (Swedish and other nationalities) resident in Malmö participate in Swedish political affairs they secure their freedom and self-government. In so doing, they will participate or involve in the decision-making, thereby ensuring that the laws reflect their interests. In addition, through the process of participation the immigrants would integrate into the Swedish society, learn Swedish culture and values and enhance their skills. In this vein, Lister and Pia concludes, in republican perspective, that participation is the means through which we secure our freedom, develop our relationships with our fellow citizens and improve our individual capacities and skills (Lister and Pia 2008: 29). Furthermore, active participation (via voting or being voted for) in public affairs, which also involves participating in decision-making, would make immigrants to see themselves as part and parcel of Swedish society, as well as ready to obey and defend the laws in which they participated in the making. More so, seeing themselves as part and parcel of Swedish society would go a long way to make the immigrants always ready and eager to politically defend Sweden against external enemies or forces. In sum, immigrants with dual citizenship are more likely to be loyal to the country of residence if they actively participate in the politics of that nation.-state.
CHAPTER 4

Methodological Framework

The main research concerns of methodology centres on asking questions about how we obtain knowledge, the means and methods that can provide us with legitimate knowledge of the political world ((Halperin and Heath 2012: 26). In a nutshell, methodology outlines the principles that guide research practices. Therefore, this chapter provides a discussion on the methodological framing of this research, to assist the reader comprehend the design and production of the essay. Additionally, the method of data collection, and the strengths and limitations of the method are presented here.

4.1 Mixed Method Research

Mixed method involves mixing or using both qualitative and quantitative data in a single study or a set of related studies. By mixing qualitative and quantitative data, the researcher provides a better understanding of a research problem or issue than if either dataset had been used alone (Newman and Ridenour 1998: 11), and its value seems to outweigh the potential difficulty of this approach (Creswell and Plano Clark 2011). The mixing can occur in different stages in research processes according to various definitions; it can occur in the data collection stage, or at the data collection and data analysis stages, or at all of the stages of research (Johnson et al 2007: 122). However, in this research, the mixing occurs at the data collection and data analysis stages. Thus, Tashakkori and Creswell (2007) see mixed methods as ‘research in which the investigator collects and analyses data, integrates the findings and draws inferences using qualitative and quantitative approaches in a single study’ (Doyle et al 2009: 176). More so, there are different types of mixed methods given by Leech and Onwuegbuzie (2007) (see Doyle et al 2009: 182; Johnson et al 2007: 122), and Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) (see Almalki 2016: 292; Doyle et al 2009: 181). However, in this research, Creswell and Plano Clark explanatory mixed method, which they also refer to as ‘follow up’, will be used because it is most relevant to this study.

4.1.1 Explanatory Mixed Methods Design

Creswell, et al., (2003) described explanatory mixed method as a method involving two stages, starting with the quantitative stage and then the qualitative stage, which aims to explain the quantitative responses, data or results (Doyle et al 2009: 181). Similarly put, explanatory designs are described as a two phase design which sees quantitative data being
used as the basis on which qualitative data are built (Almalki 2016: 293). This entails that the quantitative data informs the qualitative data selection process. Under this premise, this research will use qualitative approach as a follow up to quantitative approach; qualitative data will be based on quantitative data or results. This is to say that the quantitative responses or results will inform qualitative data, which in turn will explain quantitative results more for deeper or comprehensive understanding. The researcher will collect data using a quantitative survey instrument and follows up with interviews with a few individuals (randomly chosen) who participated in the survey to have more deeper understanding about the survey responses. In other words, the researcher will be able to know the reason(s) for a specific response. In addition, the questionnaire (quantitative) will comprise loyalty related questions in order to ascertain whether the immigrants with dual citizenship in Malmö are loyal to Sweden or not. Also, the interviews (qualitative) will be conducted to know the reasons for the participants’ responses.

4.2 Data Collection Method

Considering the aim of this research, the primary sources of data collection will be used. This entails dealing directly with the targeted population in order to get first hand information. These primary sources will comprise survey (questionnaire) and follow up interviews in order to gather comprehensive information needed for this research. In addition, primary data is factual, original and is collected with an aim for getting solution to the problem, which most times cannot be got through secondary data, because it might has been collected for other purposes. More so, primary data are data that are gathered for the specific research problem at hand, using processes that fit the research problem best (Hox and Boeije 2005: 593). In a nutshell, primary data offers first hand information about the research problem than secondary data whose information might not represent the current situation; hence, information changes over time.

Furthermore, the sample frame is immigrants with dual citizenship (Swedish citizenship and other citizenship) in Malmö. A sample size of hundred (100) will be chosen. This sample size consists of friends, friends’ references and other persons that will be met in public places such as schools, libraries, work places, etc. Questionnaires will be designed and follow up interviews will be conducted with a few individuals (randomly chosen) who participated in the survey. However, when retrieving the answered questionnaires from the participants, the researcher will ask a few participants some questions base on their responses. This means that
the researcher starts with quantitative method and ends with qualitative method. In order to limit biases, the interviewee will be given the assurance of anonymity and also, their confidentiality will be guaranteed. The purpose of the research will be given to all the participants. These will then increase the rate of responses. During the analysis, some articles or literature relating to the topic under review will be analyzed.

4.3 Strengths and Limitations of the Method

Using the above method for data collection is relevant for the scope of this research, because it will provide much more detailed information that would not have been possible to collect through secondary data. Secondary data may not meet the researcher’s needs. In this regard, primary data source offers the opportunity for the researcher to collect data according to the research methodology, scope of project and project goals. The researcher will also have greater flexibility and control of selecting subjects as well as monitor issues related to the quality of the data. The strong point about primary data is that it can provide information about subjective and objective features of a population (Hox and Boeije 2005: 594).

Nevertheless, using primary sources of data collection as done here, could also raise some issues such as time consuming, may require more resources (thereby higher spending for data collection), biased information and low response rates. This issue of low response rates could affect the quality of the data, which in turn would create a problematic issue concerning the validity of the research. In addition, both respondent and questions characteristics can affect the response (Hox and Boeije 2005: 595). To avert such shortcoming, the researcher has carefully designed, evaluated and tested the survey and interview questions in order to ensure valid responses.
CHAPTER 5

Data Analysis

In this chapter, the data or information gathered through the survey and interviews are analyzed and interpreted. In addition, other articles or literature that relate to the topic under review are also analyzed. The researcher was able to retrieve eighty-eight (88) questionnaires out of the total of hundred (100) that were given to the participants. Also, in the follow up interviews, thirty-three (33) participants who participated in the survey were randomly selected but two (2) of them declined the interviews. That is to say, interviews were conducted with thirty-one (31) participants. The follow up interviews were basically on the responses to the survey questions that are relevant to the aim of the research. At this point, the researcher will be interpreting the information gathered through the questionnaires as well as outcomes of the follow up interviews.

5.1 Results and Interpretations

The first question on the survey tends to inquire into the gender distribution of the participants. Fig. 1 below shows that 53 (60.3%) of the participants were male, whereas 35 (39.7%) of them turned out to be female. First and foremost, this reveals the wrong perception of huge male dominance in number when the issue of dual citizenship arises. For the researcher, the difference in the male dominance in this case is marginal and that it is not of great significant. The gender difference could be as a result of the researcher who happens to be male; it was easier to initiate and make contacts with people of the same sex than the opposite sex.

![Gender distribution of the participants](image-url)

Fig. 1. Gender distribution of the participants
Fig. 2. Age distribution of the participants

The fig. 2 above discloses the ages of the participants. Looking at the fig. 2, it shows that immigrants with dual citizenship in Malmö are heavily skewed towards the working class. All most ninety per cent (90 %) of the participants turned out to be immigrants (dual citizens) in their prime age. This can also indicate that Sweden, in terms of immigration country, is new when compared with the likes of Germany and UK.

Fig. 3. Other citizenship of the participants before Swedish citizenship

The other nationalities of the participants are shown in fig. 3 above. It reveals that the highest number (36.4%) of immigrants with dual citizenship in Malmö comes from Iraq and Somalia.
This could be as result of the political instabilities that have occurred in both countries, which have caused lots of people to move as refugees to Sweden. Also, when these refugees have settled and established, they bring their family members through family unification. In addition, it can be said that immigrants (first generation) with dual citizenship in Malmö came to Sweden mostly as refugees. Whereas, the lowest number (6.8%) of immigrants with dual citizenship comes from US and Australia. This could be an indication that immigrants from developed countries are not more likely to take Swedish citizenship.

![Fig. 4. Number of years of stay in Sweden by Participants before becoming eligible for Swedish Citizenship](image)

The research unveils how quickly immigrants send their applications for Swedish citizenship immediately after the required years of eligibility. In Sweden, an immigrant is eligible for Swedish citizenship after two years of marriage with a Swede spouse. Other than that, the immigrants are required to stay legal in the country for five (5) continuous years before they are considered eligible for Swedish citizenship. From fig. 4 above, it shows that majority of the participants (53.4%) applied for Swedish citizenship immediately they became eligible. When asked why, majority of them said that they were not reluctant to apply for Swedish citizenship especially because there was no renunciation rule, and also for them to enjoy same rights as Swedish natives. This indicates that immigrants are most likely to naturalize if they are allowed to retain their former citizenships (Nielson 2018: 6). Also, it shows that those participants that stayed very longer time after the eligibility period before applying for
Swedish citizenship are mostly from developed countries (such as US). However, when a few of them were asked why, they said that they finally decided to naturalize in Sweden for easy and free movement within the EU due to the free movement agreement among EU member states. Some of them even gave examples of difficulties they encountered during their visits to other EU member states when they have not acquired Swedish citizenship. This is in line with Leitner and Ehrkamp (2006) assertion that immigrants are becoming citizens of their country of residence because of the benefits attached to the citizenship.

![Figure 5. Country mostly residing by the Participants](image)

**Fig. 5. Country mostly residing by the Participants**

The large number (86.4%) of the participants resides in Malmö almost all the time as shown in *fig. 5* above. In as much as it is obvious that most of the immigrants with dual citizenship will be mostly residing in the receiving country, this rate is overwhelming. Due to this, it can be said that the information gathered from these participants with regards to their loyalty towards the country of residence will indeed depict the true picture of this research. This is simply because these immigrants (participants) have had experiences on how the both countries’ systems (social, cultural, economic or political) work which as well, have shaped their ideologies and thinking. Therefore, they stand in the right position to reveal to the researcher how fragmented their loyalty is.
Fig. 6. Employment Status of the Participants

The fig. 6 above shows the employment statues of the participants which somehow reveal how active they are in the Swedish labour market. It indicates that 64.8% of these participants are employed or have a well-established source of income. While, 35.2% are students and unemployed persons. The question about their experiences in the labour market was asked some of the participants in working class. The majority of them said that granting them Swedish citizenship gave them confident and made them more active in the labour market. This confidence encourages them to explore any business opportunity or search for employment in certain sectors in which employees are mostly native Swedes. Because they (immigrants) are now part and parcel of Swedish society. This is in line with the assumptions of republican concept of citizenship that membership is created and maintained through active participation. For immigrants (dual citizens) in Malmö to sustain or maintain their memberships (thereby ensuring their freedom and self-government) as Swedish citizenship they should be active in public affairs (for instance, here, political economy).

However, the question of which national team would the participants be in favour of when the Swedish team plays football against the country of descent national team was asked. In responding to this question, sixty-seven (67) persons representing 76.1% of the total participants said that they would be in favour of the country of descent. The reason majority of them gave was that the country of descent is where they are naturally belong and will always want the country to succeed in everything it does. But 6 people representing 6.8% said
that they will be in favour of the country of residence mostly because it is where they are living at the moment and as well, full members of the society. They also went further to say that Sweden made them what they are today and that they appreciate that. While, 13 individuals representing 14.8% said that they will be in favour of both teams because they belong to both societies which have impacted a lot in their lives. They have interests of both societies at hearts and therefore, would be happy and celebrate if any of the teams wins. Finally, 2 participants representing 2.3% said that they do not know because they do not have interests in football. It is important to note that fans might also have reasons (such as emotions) to support specific sports teams other than feelings of national belonging.

The question of which of the countries are you politically involved was asked to the participants. The majority (62.5%) of the participants responded that they are politically involved in the both countries. They said that they became fully involved in politics even at the national level when Swedish citizenships were granted to them. They are now full members of both political communities. They also said that they are mostly involved in the politics in both countries through voting at the elections and other political activities such as political demonstrations and information (via media), rallies and so on. While, 14.8% of the participants said that they are politically involved only in the country of residence. They said that becoming full members of the Swedish society as well as living here at the moment is more reason why they should take part in making policies that affect them. They (mostly from third world countries) also said that the politicians in their home countries are more corrupt and deceitful than the ones in the country of residence. This is one of the reasons why they are not interested in the politics of the country of descent. Other participants representing 10.2% said that they are politically involved only in the country of descent. It was noticed that this group of participants come mostly from US and Australia. They said that they always vote in every election even through E-voting when they are not present. Whereas, 12.5% of the total participants responded that they are not politically involved in either of the country because they are not interested in politics and as such do not participate in politics.

Furthermore, when the question of whether they have equal loyalty for the both countries was asked, 53 participants representing 60.2% said ‘NO’, 20 persons representing 22.7% said ‘YES’, and 15 individuals representing 17.1% said ‘DONT KNOW’. The majority (39.7%) of the respondents that answered ‘NO’ said that they are more loyal to the country of origin because that is where they are originally from and have their families, relatives and most of their investments there. They went on to say that though they are Swedish citizens, the
Swedish natives do not see them (immigrants) as part of them (Swedes). Because of this reason, they (immigrants) do not feel Swedish and will never do. While, remaining respondents (20.5%) that ticked ‘NO’ said that they are more loyal to the country of residence because Sweden has done a lot of good to their lives. And that this is ensured through their active participations in Swedish politics as well as participations in decision-making; the laws reflect their interests. As a result of this, they owe their lives to Sweden. In line with the above views, Spiro (2015: 128) asserts that dual citizenship will almost always involve one citizenship that is dearer than the other. Those that said ‘YES’ were of the view that since they are part and parcel of both societies and as well have civic, social and political rights in both societies, and for this, they have equal loyalty and respect for both societies.

In addition, the question of to which of the countries would your loyalty lies if there should be a political conflict between the two countries was asked. The majority (66) representing 75% of the participants said that they will be loyal and support the country of origin because they have ancestral ties and will always put the interests of the home country first before their own. While, 7 (7.9%) of them responded that they will be loyal and support the country (Sweden) of residence because it made them what they are today; what their country of descent could not do for them. They went further to say that being active in Swedish politics, and participating in the decision-making have made them fully part and parcel of Swedish polity. Because of this, they will always respect, and defend Swedish laws against both internal and external forces. Whereas, ten (10) representing 11.4% said that since they are attached to both countries, therefore, will only be loyal and support the country that is fighting for justice or stand on the right ground in the conflict. But 5 (5.7%) of the participants said they don’t know because they regarded the question as a sensitive one.

More so, the participants’ responses regarding the (political) loyalty questions above are in line with the assumption of republican approach to citizenship. In republican view, membership is created and sustained or maintained through active participation in public affairs. Thus, through this participation, people (here, immigrants) take part in the creation of rules and regulations that would guide them. In so doing, they would be ready at all times to obey, respect and even defend the laws in which they participated in the making. This entails that the citizens are tend to be loyal to their nation-state if they actively participate (especially voting or being voted for) in the political affairs of that nation-state. This is applicable to the immigrants with dual citizenship in Malmö which was also shown through their responses to the loyalty questions. According to the some of the migrants in Malmö (see above), taking
part in the decision-making through active political participation (voting or being voted for)
makes them complete part and parcel of Swedish society, and as well ready to defend Sweden
at all times.

In the last question, the participants were asked if being forced to give up one passport, which
one they would prefer to keep. Overall, a clear majority of the participant dual citizens
(63.6%) would like to keep their Swedish passport, only 10.2% would rather choose the
passport of their country of descent, and 26.1% could not decide.

![Fig. 7. Decision on identity by the Participants (giving up a passport)](image)

Some of the participants that would choose Swedish passport were of the view that the
Swedish passport has lots of opportunity than the passport of their country of descent. In this
regard, Leitner and Ehrkamp (2006), in their research, found out that most immigrants are
becoming the citizens of the country of residence basically for opportunistic reasons without
showing strong commitment and loyalty to the country. It was noticed that the other group
that would choose the passport of the country of origin is made up of mostly people from the
US and Australia. They say that the country of origin is their roots and it is where they will
return to should they decide to go back home. Thus, when forced to choose their official
status, apparently being a full member in the country of residence is more important for most
dual citizens than the citizenship of their country of descent.
CHAPTER 6

Conclusion

In this chapter, the researcher provides a conclusion drawn from the analysis and interpretation of the data gathered from dual citizens in Malmö as regards to their loyalty. Also, the researcher makes suggestions for further research that could compliment this thesis or fill the gaps in areas where it came short.

6.1 Conclusions

As the analysis showed, it can be said that the most first generation immigrants came to Sweden as refugees, and that Sweden, when compared to UK and Germany, can be regarded as new in terms of immigration country. It can also be said that allowing for dual citizenship promotes naturalization rates and as well, encourages immigrants (dual citizens) to integrate fully into the Swedish society. In other words, immigrants apply for Swedish citizenship immediately they become eligible mainly because they are not required to renounce their former citizenship. For this reason, immigrants (dual citizens) see it as respect to their former citizenship which in turn encourages them to integrate fully into the Swedish society. In addition, allowing dual citizenship enhances economic, political, social and cultural participation of immigrants (dual citizens) at all levels in the Swedish society.

Furthermore, dual citizens in Malmö are politically involved in both the country of residence (Sweden) and the country of descent. But those that are politically involved only in the country of descent are less than those that are politically involved only in the country of residence (Sweden). However, unlike the existing literatures (see page 3 and 4), the research shows that immigrants with dual citizenship in Malmö are loyal to Sweden (country of residence). It was also found out that if asked to renounce one of the citizenships, dual citizens would prefer to keep the Swedish passport and renounce the citizenship of the country of descent. In sum, the researcher concludes that immigrants with dual citizenship in Malmö are loyal to Sweden. This means that immigrants are not only loyal to the country of descent but also to the country of residence.

6.2 Suggestions for further Research

This thesis did not aim to make any empirical comparative study on dual citizens in two or more countries. Also, second generation immigrants were not included in this research and the
influence government immigration policies or other factors has on dual citizens was not looked at. However, looking at these areas mentioned above could provide useful information for further research in the literature on loyalty of dual citizens.
References

Primary Sources


Secondary Sources/ Literature


