A response to populism?

European citizenship as a valid political instrument opposing populist challenges

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Abstract

Ideological populism has long made it on the political stages in the European Union and its member states, continuing to gain greater influence. Yet, not everybody is aware of the significant implications populist rule entails for the European society. Particularly the right-wing dimension of populism involves serious malign aspects against the liberal, democratic values and norms, threatening the European concept’s fundamentals. Furthermore, researchers and policy makers have been slow to come up with efficient answers addressing the populist phenomenon. This thesis aims to provide an alternative opposition to the populist concept by constructing an ideal type of European citizenship in a theoretical-normative sense, based on a summary of recent, high-quality literature data of a systematic review. Operationalizing European citizenship’s characteristic properties against populist beliefs and outlining its constructive and transformative potentials in the fields of rights, duties, participation and identity shows that protection from, as well as objections and opposition towards populism can be identified in a qualified sense, ultimately transforming European citizenship into a possible political instrument, offering tangible approaches to EU policies.

Keywords: Citizenship, European citizenship, populism, democracy, European Union, Euroscepticism, pluralism

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List of Abbreviations

CFR        Charta of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
CJEU       Court of Justice of the European Union
EP         European Parliament
EU         European Union
FPÖ        Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs
PRR        Populist radical right
RN         Rassemblement National
TCN        Third country national
TEU        Treaty on European Union
1. Introduction

1.1 Research puzzle

Since the mid 1990s, populism has become increasingly common in the field of political science in Europe. Especially the salient topics of European integration and immigration, but also the various crises the European Union (EU) and its member states had to face, pushed the notion of populism into the foreground and shaped the debates on the political stages, although the concept’s idea has not exactly been new (Kneuer 2019). Historically, the emergence of the populist phenomenon is generally traced back to the late nineteenth century with the formation of the Russian Narodniki and the Peoples Party in the United States, which introduced the discourse on a rhetoric of the ‘appeals of the people’ (Canovan 2004: 243). In Western Europe however, the concept comprehensively advanced much later at the end of the last century with the emergence of a new radical right movement with strong anti-immigration sentiments and major efforts in mobilizing against the traditional, authoritarian and corrupt elites who, through a robust party system, have been the leading powers in post-war Western Europe (Chryssogelos 2013: 76). After right-wing populist parties like the former French National Front (Front National, FN; now National Rally, Rassemblement National, RN), the Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) and others have become increasingly successful until the 2000s, mainstream parties aligned their core concepts, leading to a further focus for populists, particularly expressed with the cleavage of globalization winners and losers, which also provoked parties of the left wing of the political spectrum to employ populist characteristics (Ibid.: 77-78). Furthermore, a wide-ranging Euroscepticism has jumped onto the scene of European populist parties with partly clear anti-European stances, benefitting from the European debt crisis and the European migrant crisis (Kneuer 2019).

What is apparent at this point is that it is difficult to identify a clear understanding and usage of the term populism, due to its very broad range. Despite its increasing relevance, contemporary research restrains itself with a distinct and common definition or classification of populism, which makes it especially hard to grasp the concept’s implications and conclusions for society (Tormey 2018: 260-261). What has been widely agreed upon is that populism entails positive but also considerable negative aspects, which both primarily affect democratic foundations (Kaltwasser 2012). Cas Mudde expresses the populism debate in more radical terms, declaring that within the politics of western democracies, we find
ourselves in a populist era, what he phrased a ‘populist Zeitgeist’, in which society is divided into two groups, ‘the corrupt elite’ and ‘the pure people’, calling for politics that is expressed only by the will of the people (2004: 542-543). In case of the extreme right-wing populists, this will is above all, based on moral beliefs in the cultural purity of nationhood and the importance of the preservation of national identity as a highly exclusive community but also based on the rejection of pluralistic societies, modern values of globalism, multicultural tolerance and openness for recognition of difference (Ding and Hlavac 2017: 429; Bang and Marsh 2018: 353). Others equate populism with ‘manipulative, dishonest’ and ‘divisive’ politics by ‘amoral narcissists’, who create ‘isolation, discrimination and authoritarianism’ which ultimately leads to what history has already taught us (Lent 2016). Moreover and perhaps most importantly with regard to the meaning for the EU, the majority of political science researchers considers populism as a basic problem, if not a threat, to democracy that challenges the political foundations and core values of the European idea, creating a deep conflict with the European society who worries about its essential principles of community (Bang and Marsh 2018: 355; Grabbe and Groot 2014).

As European citizens, to a great extent have opposed populist demands, particularly those of the extreme right-wing dimension, which is, for instance, expressed with civil resistance like the growing Pulse of Europe movement, the EU and its member states itself have not managed to provide a convincing response to the growing development of populist dangers in Europe (Sombatpoonsiri 2018; Mussler 2017). In Addition, because of the clear definition problem and the placement of the populism concept, the research that has been done on how to effectively tackle and diminish it and to identify what may or may not be the right instrument to resist and counteract right-wing populism is insufficient (Wolkenstein 2015; Tormey 2018: 260-261). Yet, one of the few regulatory arguments has been identified in the field of citizenship on the domestic nation-state level, as it has been discovered that changes in the policies and the application of citizenship vice versa brought significant change towards an inclusive identity and a pluralistic, multicultural society that upholds human rights, respect for minorities and the value of democracy, ultimately dismantling right-wing populist demands (Dobbernack 2017; Zapato-Berrero 2016). Within mainstream literature, this national citizenship is often described with civic or ethnic constructions and the relation of an individual to a state as a form of belonging or membership to a community, in which the citizens carry certain rights and responsibilities (Kastoryano 2010) Interestingly, with the implementation of European citizenship, a new model of postnational citizenship that is based on considerably different criteria, offers a new potential as a sustainable opposition to
populism (Delanty 1997). But what would be the key arguments and how then should an ideal European citizenship be formulated in order to address the perceived threats? What values and norms should be protected and how can it contribute to create more resilient citizens? Although European citizenship reaches far beyond a formal understanding, few have challenged the full potential of the concept and its accompanying elements towards external threats to the liberal democratic order of the EU.

1.2 Purpose and Objective

As populist movements, parties and their influences are growing across the European continent, so is the interest in observing this emerging phenomenon from a political science perspective. This thesis intends to provide a clearer understanding of how the idea’s main claims, particularly those of the right-wing dimension and its far-reaching meanings and consequences for the European society can be effectively addressed by using the concept of citizenship, namely the citizenship of the EU. In more simple terms, this study aims to answer the following research question: How can a European citizenship be designed as an effective political instrument in order to oppose increasing right-wing populism in Europe?

Studying and summarizing the multifaceted contribution contemporary literature has made in constituting what European citizenship is capable of, will lay the foundations on how to deal with populism and most importantly what to hold against its implications as a society. Based on Gerard Delanty’s four models of citizenship\(^1\), which have been put on the European level, I assert that protection, objection and resistance can be identified in all dimensions of membership of a political community: rights, duties, participation and identity. My goal is not to develop European citizenship as the explicit overall strategy to approach populism; rather I want to outline it in a philosophical manner as one of the key alternatives of opposition to it. What’s more, this study differs from traditional research and may rather be understood as a political idea conceptualization, normatively developing an ideal type European citizenship format. In this context, my argument that European citizenship can be held as a valid political instrument, will draw on existing research, make use of the substantially involved theories of populism and European citizenship and lastly catch up on a research gap that hasn’t been approached adequately. Moreover this thesis aims to further enrich the debates on populism in regard to its uncertain definition and layout towards liberal democracy and its fundamental values.

\(^1\) Gerard Delanty calls it the four ‘models’; however I will hereinafter refer to ‘dimensions’ of citizenship as they outline individual focus areas rather than an entire model.
1.3 Structure of the thesis
After introducing the main topic with a brief overview of the underlying research problem and a clear outline of the aim and the purpose of the study, this thesis will be structured into four additional chapters. Chapter two will present the principle analytical framework by including the core concepts of populism and European citizenship, indicating where the theme of this thesis is situated. In the first part of this chapter, it will more specifically present the most commonly used definitions of populism, reveal the existing research and essential arguments, discuss possible limitations and introduce its central harmful aspects. The second part then explains the general citizenship conception and incorporates Gerard Delanty’s four models idea, which will be the overarching framework used throughout the thesis. Lastly, European citizenship will be defined with regard to its two main understandings of postnationalism and identity. The method section is set in the third chapter, illustrating the chosen qualitative research method and explaining where and how relevant data has been conducted. The data is analyzed in the fourth chapter, which is grouped into four study areas: rights, duties, participation and identity, each individually mapping a research subject with a different alignment. Finally the thesis concludes in chapter six with a summary of the key findings made in the analysis, an indication of the significant contribution to the field of political science, a clear proposal for an application to a specific EU policy and recommendations for further potential investigation in relation to the elements of populism.
2. Analytical Framework

As noted previously, this section will develop the analytical frame the research problem finds itself in. With the inclusion of the central concepts of populism and European citizenship, the elementary ideas, definitions and renowned perspectives are introduced, all contributing to a clear overview about what populist implications look like, what has already been achieved in studying European citizenship as a potential instrument and how does it help to apply it to this thesis. More importantly, this section will also present and clarify the ‘four models of citizenship by Delanty as the basic structure for the analysis

2.1 Defining Populism

When discussing how to effectively tackle populism and its extensive impacts and influences on the basic values of the European society, it is absolutely vital to first present a clear understanding of the concepts main ideas and dimensions, and second illustrate the distinct aspects that constitute the problems with populism as the study’s main objective. For this reason, and due to populism’s various interpretive approaches, this section will introduce the most common definitions, point out some of their individual malign aspects for society and finally conclude with an overview of the general problems and grievances with populism.

2.1.1 Populism as an ideology

Populism, as already mentioned, does not denote a new phenomenon. Its origin is deeply entrenched with the demand of politics made by the will of the people in the second half of the nineteenth century (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012: 3). Yet, until today and despite decades of studying the concept, a clear definition is still missing. However, one of the most dominant positions, particularly among European political scientists, is to perceive populism as an ideology (Moffitt and Tormey 2014: 383). In Cas Mudde’s prevalent definition of populism as ‘a thin-centred ideology’, he emphasizes the essential meanings of ‘the elite’ and ‘the people’ within the theory by arguing that populism requires politics to be a reflection of the views of the moral elite instead of the corrupt power seekers and people as a homogenous society that rejects the individuality of the people with different views and wishes (Mudde 2004: 543-544). Populism, in his discussion though, is not recognized as a ‘full’ ideology because it only presents a restrictive element of other political concepts and can also easily be combined with other ideologies (Ibid.: 544). In that regard, it is also fairly uncontested that populism can appear across the ideological spectrum from a scope of the far left to the far right, incorporating partly different discourses (Moffitt and Tormey 2014: 381). Today, populism in Europe is mainly related with the (radical) right, often portrayed with parties like
the FPÖ, RN or UKIP (UK Independence Party), even though the concept can also be identified on the left wing for instance Chavismo in Venezuela, the Spanish party Podemos or the Greek Syriza (Mudde 2004: 549).

Nevertheless, the populist ideology does contain its very own dimensions. Most importantly, it can be described as having a moralistic, rather than a programmatic character, in which the normative distinction between ‘the elite’ and ‘the people’ is more significant than the empirical difference in behavior or attitudes (Ibid.: 544). The term ‘the people’ though, often remains somewhat vague, as some argue that the term is simply used as a rhetoric instrument, that doesn’t refer to any specific group of people, yet others claim, it relates to a certain class segment (Ibid.: 545; Di Tella 1997). Paul Taggert offers a different approach to the people argument by equating the people with his alternative term: ‘the heartland’, a place in which, from an ideal populist perspective, a virtuous and unified population resides (Taggert 2000: 95). Although heartland helps to understand that within populist rhetoric, the people are neither real nor all-inclusive, ultimately constructing it as a mythical part of the entire population, it still does not overcome the term’s unclear meaning, as in some cases ‘the people’ are even seen differently by populist parties of the same country (Mudde 2004: 546). Especially within the scope of right-wing populist ideology though, ‘the people’ can be understood in more ethno-cultural terms, in which they represent a homogeneous and exclusive entity or in other words ‘insiders’ who are in essence under constant threat by all those who are not part of the people and are therefore the foreign ‘other’ or ‘outsiders’ which may also be impersonal forces or institutions like globalization, the EU or radical Islam (Brubaker 2017: 2). This insight reveals the exclusivist shape of populism in which pluralism of any kind cannot exist because there is only one view of the people that doesn’t acknowledge the diversity of the political system with more than one center of power, making it a fundamental danger for democracy and western societies (Sombatpoonsiri 2018: 8; Müller 2014: 487). As these examples illustrate the ‘thinness’ of the ideology concept, others criticize it more general:

Whilst many prominent ideologies have ‘left record’ of themselves in the shape of philosophical-political institutions that transcend individual parties, movements or leaders, there is little evidence of institutional elements indicating a common purpose or unity amongst populists: there is no Populist International; no canon of key populist texts or calendar of significant moments; and the icons of populism are of local rather than universal appeal. (Stanley 2008: 100)
Defining populism as an ideology remains controversial but offers a very clear and systematic schemata that structures the populist worldview and even more importantly provides a succinct and basic description of how populist actors can be identified and who is not considered a populist (Weyland 2017: 52; Moffitt 2016: 19).

2.1.2 Populism as a strategy
What the ideology conception of populism does not provide is the often used definition on the basis of organization and leadership, which according to Mudde are only features that facilitate rather than define populism (2004: 545). Then again, other scholars like Kurt Weyland (2001) stress the importance of ‘power capabilities’, as they form a strategic principle for the political leaders in populism. These individual, personalistic leaders seek or exercise government power and base their rule on a vast amount of uninstitutionalized people (Ibid.: 18). In order to collect and sustain this support, it is absolutely essential that the rulers are very charismatic and have clear leadership skills demonstrating their unity and identification with the people, which is mostly attained with direct interaction, face-to-face contacts and different media on the one hand and with high authenticity and dominance on the other hand (Ibid.: 13-14). As this relationship of the powerful charismatic leader and the unorganized people then eventually builds a form of organization, typically a political party, the leader then is only able to maintain his power by keeping a very low institutionalization of the party, since clear organizational party structures would turn him into a functionary, lastly loosing the populist essence (Ibid. 14). The main criticisms of this approach is that first, despite the fact of the etymological roots of the term, ‘the people’ only play a subordinate role and second, certain populist parties like Geert Wilder’s Partij voor de Vrijheid or Marine Le Pen’s Front National do show clear institutional or organizational characteristics (Moffitt 2016: 20).

Clearly malign for western values is the leadership cult coming from an intentionally unorganized group of people who claim to represent the putative will of everyone and transfer all power to the leader who then obtains the freedom to rule outside principle regulations. In other words: ‘This direct, quasi-personal relationship bypasses established intermediary organizations or deinstitutionalizes and subordinates them to the leader's personal will’ (Weyland 2001: 14). Besides, populist leadership is often described as a non-democratic or authoritarian political style (Tormey 2018) that may even share some of the operational modes of totalitarianism (Sanders 2019). When coming to power, populists tend to continuously test their limits in the democratic order by making changes in the elections laws
Table 1. Number of seats in European parliaments held by democratic or anti-democratic populist parties
Source: Johansson 2017 (Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index)

2.1.3 Populism as a political logic

As much as Cas Mudde has shaped populism’s definition as an ideology, so has Ernesto Laclau (2005) shaped its design as political logic. According to him, populism should be understood as a structuring logic of political life, a way of formulating demands by the people, whereas ideology on the contrary requires certain beliefs (Laclau 2005: 117). He insists on the idea that populism should not necessarily be seen as something dangerous or abnormal, rather it is simply part of the political culture, in which the construction of the people is a ‘radical one’ (Laclau 2005). Moffitt picked up Laclau’s demand aspect of the people and simplified it by arguing:

[W]hen a demand is unsatisfied within any system, and then comes into contact with other unsatisfied demands, they can form an equivalential chain with one another, as they share the common antagonism/enemy of the system. (Moffitt 2016: 22)

Looking at populism as political logic with conceiving social demands then also links to the often-suggested emotion-laden expression of disappointment over frustrated economic expectations, discontent with unfair rules and interest, and fear of external threats that challenge the peoples’ physical and cultural security (Galston 2018: 11). Although this may relatively accurately describe the focus on the political in Laclau’s logic conception of
populism, it also demonstrates one of the dangers of populist claims, which are not always being based on the truth, but on emotions or assertions without substance.

2.1.4 Populism as a discourse

Within this approach, authors highlight the discourse on the cleavage of ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ as a major indication for populism (Hawkins 2009). Hawkins himself defines populism ‘as a Manichaean discourse that identifies Good with a unified will of the people and Evil with a conspiring elite’ (2009: 1042). Here, populism is perceived as a form of political expression, in which evidence is found in speech or text (Moffitt 2016: 21). Inevitably, this also means that, depending on what kind of rhetoric they make use of, political actors can be more or less populist, running contrary to the other approaches to populism in which a measurable level of populism cannot serve as a definition of the concept itself and one is or is not declared a populist (Ibid.). The limits of this approach can clearly be found in its narrow focus on just the linguistic and text-based materials, ignoring other visual, performative and aesthetic features, which, according to Laclau (2005) and Stavrakakis (2004) are important stylistic elements of populist appeal, (Ibid.: 385-386). Although the discourse theory therefore lacks a bit of the basic structure on populism, it still provides some key elements of the concepts framework.

What is dangerous according to this definition is the simple and distinct differentiation of ‘the good’ and ‘the evil’ because first of all, in populism there is no in between or grey area, meaning everyone who is not considered as the ‘the people is an automatic threat, that must by fought by all means (Zaccaria 2018). Second, it is ‘the evil’ that is blamed for the frustration over economic imbalances and exploitation, which is in right-wing populism, next to the corrupt elite, often addressed to other ethcnical, political, or sexual minorities, e.g. foreign citizens or immigrants (Hawkins 2009: 1063; Almeida 2010: 238-239).

2.2 Harmful aspects of populism

Regardless of the different forms, varieties and interpretations of the populism concept, one of the most prominent perceptions is to view populism as a negative force, a threat to democracy and a problem to society (Moffitt 2016: 85; Grabbe and Groot 2014). While others like Laclau (2005) and Kaltwasser (2012) stress the ambiguity of the positivist/negativist approach and argue that the possible democratic corrective and other positive effects may not be overlooked in emerging populism, many have outlined their concerns. For instance, Mudde (2004) indicates the unsolved problem of the meaning and the representation of ‘the people’. The condition that splitting the population into the sovereign people, who claims self-
governance and into the others who due to differences are excluded from equal citizenship, violates the principle of inclusion, which is fundamental to democracy (Galston 2018: 12). Populism challenges liberal democracy on many levels. On the one hand it is deeply skeptical about constitutionalism in a sense that political bodies (e.g. judiciary, central banks) and their practices hinder ‘the people’ from enforcing their will and on the other hand it ignores and threatens the basic democratic values and norms such as freedom, equality and justice, but also human rights, free uncensored distribution of news and more (Ibid.: 11; Mudde 2004: 561) In their 2018 world report, Human Rights Watch urgently warned the democracies of the world against the populist challenges which reject the principles of human rights, women’s rights and gender equality and demonize unpopular minorities (Roth 2018). The disregard for a fundamental democratic order is again identified by Mudde, who stated that ‘populism is inherently hostile to the idea and institutions of liberal democracy’ and maybe put on a level with ‘democratic extremism’ (2004: 561). In this context, Bang and Marsh add:

[I]t is anti-modern and divisive at heart, having problems with recognizing difference, which surely is a prerequisite of antagonistic deliberation, or indeed any other democratic innovation. (2018: 454)

The difficulty for populists to recognize differences is often seen in the concepts right-wing dimension, which shall also be one of the main objectives of this thesis. Populist radical right (PRR) parties and other extreme right-wing populist movements are mostly considered to be nationalist, anti pluralist, anti-immigration and xenophobic, if not openly racist or anti-Semitic, rejecting individual or social equality and any approach of diversity and multiculturalism (Betz 1994; Akkerman et al. 2016; Stavrakakis et al. 2017). Cas Mudde (2007) puts in more general terms naming it ‘nativist’, ‘authoritarian’ and populist. In addition, Rooduijn (2015) and Kneuer (2018) determined the correlation of populism and Euroscepticism, as especially the PRR parties follow a clear anti-European stance, rejecting the European unification process, any further integration and its whole idea as a community of shared values. However, a few European populist parties such as the Swedendemocrats (Sverigedemokraterna, SD) or the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) have recently changed their attitudes towards the EU, withdrawing from exit plans and discovering a new reformist role (Hermann 2019; Mittermeier 2019). Yet, this only reveals that the European Union and the European society as a stronghold of liberal democracy are facing definite populist challenges and threats. As it might be that the negative view on populism is indeed Eurocentric to some extent, right-wing populism in Europe shows hardly any signs of stagnation and PPR parties gaining increasing influence in European politics
giving reasonable cause for growing concern for the European citizens (Rooduijn 2015; Stavrakakis et al. 2017: 421) The concern and fear then trigger new ways of confrontation and opposition to populism in order to curb the populist progress, because the implications are yet to be estimated. To put it in other words:

But when populism, growing within the institutions and obtaining the majority in a democratic society, does not find in the rights of minorities an obstacle capable of slowing down its growth, there are no sufficient guarantees against a tyrannical use of the people, as Tocqueville assumed. (Zaccaria 2018: 42)

2.3 Constructing Citizenship

After determining the larger picture of populism and its entailing features and problems, the concept of citizenship in a European context as the main focus of study comes into play. On the nation-state level, citizenship is always debated around nationhood and territorialized notions of formal belonging to a certain community with a collective identity (Brubaker 1990; Smith 2001). The community then, is to a certain extent a cultural, a political and a social one, in which membership entails rights, privileges and responsibilities and is generally granted through birth, descent or naturalization (Delanty 1997; Benhabib 1999; Bellamy 2008a). In
the light of the common interpretations of the citizenship concept, one author has been particularly well received.

2.3.1 Gerard Delanty and citizenship research

Whereas many scholars have acknowledged the traditional idea of formal citizenship based on a variety of rights, Delanty strongly argues for a substantive dimension of citizenship that goes beyond a ‘rights’ understanding, including values, active citizenship and the involvement of polities (Delanty 1997: 285-286). Moreover, as his conceptions move away from the classic nation-state framework, considering the implications of globalization and transnationalism, he significantly influenced the assessment of European citizenship, contributing to the postnational and cosmopolitan dimensions, lastly making him a relevant researcher in the field of citizenship (Delanty 2007). His work has been widely used by scholars investigating citizenship rights (Morano-Foadi 2010; van den Brink 2017); aspects of civil society and participation (Rumford 2003); but also the cosmopolitan spheres of European citizenship (Kostakopoulou 2007). A key contribution to citizenship research on the national and European level has most notably been his ‘four models of citizenship’.

2.3.2 ‘Four models of citizenship’

Drawing upon rights and responsibility components of citizenship, which he outlined as a ‘rights model’ and a ‘communitarian model’, Delanty (1997) further developed his prominent proposal of the ‘four models of citizenship’ that also included a ‘conservative model’ and a ‘participatory model’. All models illustrate essential dimensions of citizenship and go hand in hand with the theoretical and ideological traditions of: ‘liberalism, conservatism, democratic radicalism and communitarianism’ (Ibid.: 288). In order to go beyond the historical and legal framework and to overcome the classic civic and ethnic constructions of citizenship, he argues that the concept must be studied on those different dimensions, which he further describes in detail as rights, duties, participation and identity, each contributing to the membership of the political community (Ibid.).

In strict accordance with T.H. Marshall’s (1992) typical rights citizens hold against the state, the ‘rights dimension’ of Delanty’s approach includes civil rights (e.g. free movement, free speech, assembly), political rights (on the basis of democracy), social rights (access to social goods like health, education and social security) and a social justice aspect that adds a social democratic perspective to the otherwise so liberal conception (Delanty 1997: 289). In his view, these rights are the property of each individual citizen and must be protected by state (Ibid.). As these rights rather contribute to aspects of equality and not so much to
membership of the political community, Delanty introduced participatory dimensions (Ibid.). Duties are primarily defined in the conservative theory of citizenship and focus on the citizen-state relationship, in which a responsible citizen is active in favor of the state, consenting to taxation, military service and education while the state provides services but also passive in a sense that the citizen doesn’t get involved in critical discourse (Ibid.: 290). In contemporary research, the duties of citizens are often regarded within the scope of rights and justice, as citizens shall exercise certain duties and responsibilities for the state in return for the allocated rights (Ibid.). Yet, here they are outlined as exclusive formal duties, constituting an own substantive form (Ibid.). The participatory dimension is a radical idea of citizenship that emphasizes the participation as an active process of involvement and society-building that cannot be reduced to the duties, as it suggests a politically motivated oppositional conceptualization, rather than the dutiful citizen who ‘does not fundamentally question the status quo’ in this state (Ibid.). Lastly, the fourth dimension describes the linkage of citizenship to culture and (national) identity, as cultural ties and historical traditions have existed prior the state (Ibid.: 291). Identification issues in citizenship are particularly important for the formation of community and cultural cohesiveness because in this dimension, the state is only the direct expression of a cultural community and the political community represents civil society, which determines who belongs to the polity and therefore who qualifies to the rights and privileges (Ibid.).

With the condition that ‘an adequate model of citizenship must involve all four dimensions’, Delanty further argues that his approach must also be theorized beyond the nation-state understanding of citizenship (Ibid.: 292).

2.3.3 European citizenship

Apart from the conceptual framework of national citizenship, with the Maastricht Treaty (TEU) of 1992 coming into force, a new form of citizenship emerged. A European citizenship that cannot be as easily defined on the above terms of the national citizenship or as an alternative to it; rather it is a derivative of nationality (Kostakopoulou 2007: 626). First and foremost, it is officially designed to be a supplementary citizenship as an addition to the existing national citizenships of the member states and hence implies a certain formal reality, which is giving citizens a legal status that entails a large set of additional rights (e.g. free movement and residence in all member states, voting and standing in EU elections, the right to petition the European Parliament (EP), diplomatic and consular protection, etc.) (Mindus 2017: 7). Still, European citizenship is embedded in much more diverse and complex dimensions that reach far beyond a simple formal understanding.
With the implementation of European citizenship scholars and commentators have started to argue whether it can be based on a truly postnational model, beyond traditional values of citizenship connected to the nation-states or on identification with a European cultural community or transformed nationality as a result of Europeanization (Bellamy 2008b: 597). Clearly, the European project adds to our view that nationality and national sovereignty is eroding in the EU but it is important to understand that the European tradition relies on the wide diversity of nationality and citizenship and therefore has been shaped by a certain legal pluralism (Delany 2007: 65). For instance, the entitlement to grant and control Union citizenship remains a function of the member states in their sovereignty over national citizenship (Kostakopoulou 2007: 626). On the other hand, there is no doubt that the EU is one of the few examples in which at least a cosmopolitan citizenship has been achieved on the transnational level, contributing to the idea of postnationalism (Delany 2007: 65). Yet, this cosmopolitan citizenship is also a polity that is exclusively based on rights and until today, lacks substantial civic engagement (Ibid.: 65-66). However, in the cosmopolitan European citizenship, universal rights have been given priority over national rights, making the EU a strong and successful actor in promoting human rights inside and outside of the EU, ultimately pushing democratization processes, which for example has been accomplished in Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey (Ibid.: 68).

The assumption that European citizenship is based on identity is also a contentious issue. Some scholars like Francis Fukuyama (2012) argue that there has never really been a successful attempt in establishing a distinct European understanding of identity and that the present idea of European identity is failing due to a large lack of solidarity. He claims that the obligations, responsibilities, duties and rights deriving from a European sense of citizenship have never been developed beyond the wording of the different signed treaties (Ibid.). Lehning (2001) and Delany (1997) however, have early on developed a European citizenship understanding that could at least partially be connected to a common identity. Yet, in order to establish an inclusive shared citizenship identity, further institutionalization on the European level with active citizenship and participation is needed (Delany 1997: 296; Lehning 2001: 263). The possibility to overcome the classical national identity with its geographical and legal borders and have citizens adapt double (or multiple) identities would in return create a strong sense of tolerance and solidarity and can therefore be one of the great strengths of European citizenship (Lehning 2001: 267).

Notwithstanding what European citizenship is based on, it is important to see that European citizenship is not static, rather it is dynamic and thrives on the variety of
perceptions, influences and policy changes (Kostakopoulou 2007: 638). The different dimensions outline what will make up the main subject of this thesis: The potential of European citizenship against the ever-increasing populist challenges for the European society. Scholars like Wiener (1999) and Kostakopoulou (2008) have indicated the constructive or transformative potential of European Citizenship that has incorrectly been underestimated for a long time. In consequence of initial institutional change of European citizenship, its capabilities and strengths towards a more inclusive political community came to light (Kostakopoulou 2008: 286). Integration, non-discrimination and equal treatment, strengthening of citizens’ rights and simplified directives for EU-citizens are only a few out of many amenities that the EU citizenship can provide to contribute to an open, pluralistic and multicultural society (Kostakopoulou 2008). These resources of citizenship then can also be operationalized against the claims and implications of populism.

2.4 Summary
Disentangling the main definitions of the concept of populism has shown how we can perceive populist ideas, demands and processes, but also what serious consequences for the European society result from it. For the following analysis however, I will in principle stick with the ideology conception of populism as it is used relatively unproblematic throughout the literature on populism and by and large includes all other approaches (Moffitt and Tormey 2014: 383). Moreover, the particular malign aspects coming from the right-wing dimension, but also the basic illiberal and directly undemocratic understanding are important as they make up the main target to be engaged. The scope of European Citizenship with its considerable potential on the other hand constitutes the following research. Making use of Gerard Delanty’s (1997) four dimensions of citizenship including the fields of rights, duties, participation and identity will help to address and counter populism as well as to design an ideal type European citizenship that is capable to effectively oppose it.
3. Methodology

This chapter outlines the methodological approach to the research issue, on how European citizenship can be utilized to be an efficient political instrument opposing right-wing populism. In three steps, it will first introduce the particular research design used and discuss possible limitations. Secondly, it will identify the ontological and epistemological position of the thesis and thirdly clarify how and where specific data has been collected, indicate data restrictions and explain how the data material has been conducted in the analysis.

3.1 Research design

Reflecting on populism and its explicit harmful aspects for liberal democracy and subsequently for the central concept of the European Union with its extensive understanding for rights, freedoms and diversity, the following analysis builds on the contributions to European citizenship by making use of a rather unorthodox qualitative research methodology that encounters different techniques of selecting recent, high-quality academic texts on Union citizenship, systematically reviewing and summarizing this scientific literature and lastly formulating a normative political theory approach. As noted earlier, the research work deviates from traditional research, by reviewing and summarizing existing secondary literature, giving a comprehensive overview about EU citizenship potentials against populism and therefore outlining what might be an ideal citizenship format that creates more vigilant, resilient and protective citizens of the EU towards populist threats. In this respect, this study aims to be understood as a normative theoretical approach, in which the empirical-analytical method focuses on existing knowledge and data of concepts of citizenship and populism and particularly includes Gerard Delanty’s four models of citizenship, which lays the basis on how the research will be carried out. Limitations of the chosen method to this particular subject however can be manifested in the large data resources, which may lead to a different research outcome.

3.2 Ontology and epistemology

When talking about such contentious concepts like populism and European citizenship, it is indispensable to formulate an ontological and epistemological position in your research in order to inform about the set of assumptions the author has about the nature of the context in which knowledge is acquired and lastly created (Hay 2006: 8). This thesis follows an interpretivist approach with the premise that reality is socially constructed and knowledge is strongly influenced by values, interests and beliefs of the researcher (Willis 2007: 96). Although the adaption of interpretivism significantly limits the ability to develop any
generalization of the research outcome, it clearly provides a more comprehensive understanding and a great level of depth (Pulla and Carter 2018: 11). This is especially relevant in the study of European citizenship as this research is interpreted to create in-depth knowledge for an ideal citizenship used against emerging populism.

3.3 Data allocation

One of the essential parts of this analytical literature review is the assembly of high-quality literature, in which only scholarly journal articles of specially selected journals have been used. With the help of the *Norwegian Register for Scientific Journals, Series and Publishers* (see Appendix A), an online journal database of the Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD) that lists all common journals on a global basis and annually rates their scientific level with indicators from ‘0’ (others, not rated), ‘level 1’ and ‘level 2’, only quality journals of level 2 have been chosen for the methodology. The specific data collected from the literature, is grouped into four different main sections, equivalent to the four dimensions of citizenship: rights, duties, participation and identity.

In the first ‘rights section’, different data is analyzed to provide distinct evidence in the legal aspects of European citizenship, namely social rights, political rights and civil rights, identifying what legal conditions serve to oppose populism. The legal section contains qualitative data of literature that has been found in journal articles within the *European Law Journal, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, Ratio Juris, Political Studies, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Philosophy and Social Criticism, Journal of European Public Policy, Cultural Studies* and *Political Research Quarterly*.

The ‘duties section’ illustrates the commitments to the principles of democratic legitimacy citizens must share in order to form the inclusive community or thick identity that helps to deprive populist fundaments (Mindus 2014: 740). In this context duties can also be understood as responsibilities, in a sense of what a good citizen can provide towards the authority that in exchange ensures welfare, safety and peace. The most common aspects concerning duties and responsibilities are found in citizen services (i.e. taxation, military services, loyalty, etc.), but also in education and more abstract even in obedience, for which papers of the *European Law Journal, European Law Review, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, Political Studies, British Educational Research Journal, Acta Sociologica, Studies in Philosophy and Education, Philosophy and Social Criticism, The Public Opinion Quarterly, European Journal of Social Theory*, and the *Journal of European Public Policy* have been analyzed.
In the third section, data has been searched for the participative element of European citizenship that emphasizes the politically active dimension of citizenship and differs significantly from the duty dimension, in which the citizens obey the laws of the state and in general do not question the status quo (Delanty 1997: 290). Here, literature focuses above all on the political involvement of European citizens, who should have the right to participate in the process of making the laws that they are asked to obey (Wolkenstein 2015: 121). Especially journal articles of the *European Journal of Social Theory, European Law Journal, Political Studies* and *Philosophy and Social Criticism* have been selected.

The last and perhaps most important section is the ‘identity section’, in which literature material with qualitative and quantitative data on the multicultural political, and social community as the body of the citizens is analyzed. Particularly aspects of common values of solidarity, tolerance, openness and pluralism within articles of *Party Politics, International Journal for Cultural Policy, Law and Philosophy, Political Studies, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Journal of European Public Policy, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, European Law Journal, European Journal of Social Theory, European Journal of Education, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law* and *European Societies* are used.

Although not specifically necessary, statistical data as part of the reviewed literature has been included in only a few places.

The associated secondary literature from the journals has been mainly searched in the Malmö University library service but also in the following online journal databases of Sage Publications (www.sagepub.com), Wiley Online Library (www.onlinelibrary.wiley.com), Taylor and Francis Online (www.tandfonline.com), Google Scholar, SpringerLink (www.link.springer.com) and JSTOR (www.jstor.org).

Next to the literature quality conditions noted above, in order to have a topical overview, only literature published from the year 2000 onwards has been chosen. At this stage, it is also important to draw a clear line on what subjects are not included in the literature search. Articles and papers that oppose left-wing populism are not being considered, as the concept’s role is rather marginal in European politics and their ideas are not as exclusivist (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013). Conversely, as right-wing populism is increasing and their parties making up the clear majority among European populist parties in 2017, they are especially addressed (Eiermann et al. 2017). Also nationality matters will be neglected, as the argument focuses to a large extent on a rather postnational European perspective of citizenship.
4. Analysis

Subject of the investigation is the potential of European citizenship in relation to the compiled harmful aspects and threats populism implies for the European society. Against this backdrop, every section of the analysis begins with a brief examination on how populists or right-wing populists interpret the different fields of the four dimensions and then argues how current European citizenship offers countermeasures. The next step of the analysis is then bringing together normative aspects of European citizenship dimensions, portraying more effective and ideal forms of opposition to populism and designing a new understanding of the concept.

4.1 Rights

Citizen rights in a simplified manner describe the rights and privileges a citizen holds as a co-participant of social, economic and political cooperation, constituting the social contract with the state (Bellamy and Lacey 2018: 1406). Under the populist account however, the rights of citizens are perceived as a tool of political action, classifying the rights bearers as doers and actors who, with the help of the people, challenge the supposedly unjust enemies for the common good (Aitchison 2017: 352). This underlines again that the populist ideology in way that the rights of the majority cannot be ignored (Zaccaria 2018: 35). On the downside, this means that to some extent, minorities have to fear their basic human rights. Moreover, pluralism and diversity in all respects are pushed back with the mere justification of opportunistic selected signifiers like freedom, transparency, honesty and justice, which then ironically lose their meaning (Ibid.: 42). In particular, material rights, i.e. social rights are reserved exclusively for the people as outsiders are seen as exploiters of important resources (Wolkenstein 2015: 113). Regarding political rights, populists often aim to suppress political opposition in the name of the people and act against any further extension of voting rights for all those who are not conserved as the people (Ibid.). Yet, for populists themselves, as they seek to be disengaged from daily politics, they still stress the importance of voting, since it gives them the mandatory power to select their leaders (Stoker and Hay 2017: 8).

Looking now at the rights of the European citizens, it is important to understand that those rights are additional rights to the rights and constitutions of the member states. Since the ratification of the European citizenship, the European Union has granted the following citizen rights: Free movement and residence, voting and standing in European and municipal elections, consular protection, right to petition, access to information via the EU institutions and the right to non discrimination. (Schrauwen 2008: 60-61). These rights alone already entail great potential against populist claims. However, by looking at T.H. Marshall’s
perception of citizen rights, included in Gerard Delanty’s four models of citizenship revealed even more opportunities. In other words, European citizenship can also more generally be understood as a source of rights, which EU citizens can take ownership of (Reich 2001).

4.1.1 Social rights

Social rights, as they depict the social dimension of citizenship, are particularly related to the provision of welfare, social security and social justice for members within a certain community and can therefore be operationalized as a tool for inclusion and solidarity (de Witte 2011: 90). Within the EU, social rights are sustained by structures of generalized reciprocity and thick solidarity, which are specifically tied to and dependent on the national institutional structures of the member states, since there is no transnational European social model, although highly debated (Ibid.: 87). Hence, the social rights of the European citizenship consist of the access to the national welfare systems but are subject to the regulative political authority of the EU, which confers such rights and thus produces a new legal right for the citizens who exercise their right to free movement and residence by allowing them to participate in the social arrangement of the member state they choose to work and live in (Ferrera 2016: 801). Therefore, it is the European legal framework of free movements and residence that determines the application of social rights. This mobility aspect, that EU citizens can enjoy a certain social and financial solidarity is based on the legislation and its subsequent interpretation by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which through various cases ruled that social rights must be granted to mobile citizens in the host member state, even though the groups of mobile citizens do underlie certain criteria, depending on the level of economic engagement, as economically inactive citizens are entitled to fewer rights than economically active citizens (Mantu and Minderhoud 2017: 704-705). Regardless, one of the major demands of populist parties is the so called ‘welfare chauvinism’ that refers to the belief that access to social benefits should be strictly limited to the people of the nation state, calling for an exclusionary reorientation of existing welfare state structures and a greater separation of nationals and foreign EU nationals as well as nationals and third-country nationals (TCNs) (Wolkenstein 2015: 113; Ferrera 2016: 799). In that matter, immigrants who are seeking access to healthcare or unemployment benefits are perceived as abusively exploiting resources that are exclusively reserved for ‘the people’ (Wolkenstein 2015: 113). In this context, especially right-wing populist parties are associated with spreading terms like ‘welfare tourism’ or ‘benefit tourism’ regarding intra-EU migration (Ferrera 2016). These demands in regard to the social rights of Union citizenship can be contradicted in many ways. First of all, the populist Eurosceptic perspective often erroneously
associates intra-EU mobility with migration from outside the EU (Ibid.: 799). Then, in 2016 only 14 million EU citizens legally resided in a different member state, making it about 2.8 percent of the total EU population, from which economically inactive citizens only represent between 0.7 and 1 percent (Ibid.: 797-798). On the contrary, mobile EU citizens are to a large extent important net contributors to the host country’s welfare system, paying in more tax and social security contributions than they receive in social benefits, ultimately invalidating any accusations of being a burden to the nation states’ welfare systems (Ibid.: 798). Besides, in order to not undermine national social structures, the Court requires EU citizens who assert their welfare claims to be able to reproduce the demands of solidarity that underlie any particular entitlement (de Witte 2011: 87).

What’s more, social European citizenship must also be discussed in terms of equality, which the EU tries to establish through the CJEU with its ‘rules for rights’ by setting the rules on the member state level where the governments have to define the social citizenship rights of their citizens, accepting the inequality and diversity between states but making it more transparent for the citizens (Greer and Sokol 2014: 85). However, as the ‘rules for rights’ only represent a framework for member state social citizenship, a more equal, inclusive and solidary social dimension can according to Greer and Sokol only be created with a larger and more redistributive EU budget (2014: 87). For Ferrera, the problems lie within the intra-EU migration, which can be made more politically sustainable by setting constraints for the guest and the host, yet strongly adhere to the non-discrimination principle (2016: 802-804).

As a bearer of social rights, European citizenship offers the opportunity to create a pan-EU more equal, more solidary and more unified society that resists populist claims of a divided people. With the current EU citizenship regime that can be partly seen as a contemporary version of the ius hospitii, mobile citizens should be treated as hospites (guests) in a thick sense, receiving equal treatment in terms of access to civil and social rights (Ibid.: 796-797).

4.1.2 Political rights

On the European level, the EU has early on offered its citizens a set of political rights that includes greater justice and entitles them access to political participation. What stands out most in terms of justice is the principle of non-discrimination, which of course also applies to the political rights (de Witte 2011: 87). This is especially important for all mobile EU citizens who, next to the nationals of a member state are equipped with the rights to vote for and stand as a candidate in European elections, as well as in municipal elections within the country of residence (Bellamy and Lacey 2018: 1414). With the TEU of 2007 (Treaty of Lisbon), further
political rights have been added to Union citizenship under the Title II ‘Provisions on democratic principles’, integrating EU citizens in political representation and participation in democratic life with the use of the citizens’ initiative (Schrauwen 2007: 61). As populists often sharply criticize any extension of political rights for non-nationals or those who are not considered as ‘the people’, the Court on the contrary, rightfully protects these right and empowers the citizens in consideration of non-discrimination (de Witte 2011: 92). Another guardian and supporter of political rights in conjunction with the unity of social and civil rights can be found in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR) (Fredman 2006: 55). Yet, as much as European citizenship provides supplementary political rights that are promoted and protected, many authors have indicated weak representation and participation resulting in a structural democracy deficit the EU is facing (Saurugger 2007; Rumford 2003). A lack of identification with the EU’s democratic processes, an independent public sphere and accountability mechanisms is calling for a deeper EU integration with the extension of political rights by creating more ownership of the political process by citizens (Tsakatika 2007: 877-879). Furthermore, despite large concerns about constraints of national sovereignty, scholars like White (2005) and Bellamy and Lacy (2018) argue that an extension of the right to vote in national elections and the right to contest political decisions can be possible for foreign EU nationals under the genuine provision of equal treatment or with the achievement of permanent resident status after having established as a stakeholder in the political community.

At this point it must also be argued that through the right to petition the EP or the right to participate in the citizens’ initiative, EU citizens have the great opportunity to stand up for their liberal democratic values and beliefs against such challenges as the populist one. A good example is the already mentioned European movement ‘The Pulse of Europe’, that embraces the European idea. In addition, what European citizenship should contribute in order to overcome the democratic deficit, as it often led to populist success, is a fully featured citizenship, with political rights and a public space that allow citizens to more actively engage and participate (Kostakopoulou 2007; Rumford 2003). This aspect will be carried out more detailed in the participation section.

4.1.3 Civil rights

Civil rights are closely linked to political rights and particularly focus on the rights of the people who hold the status of a citizen and the commitment to the community (Sanchez 2014: 465). In this light, Greer and Sokol (2014: 66) argue that European citizenship fits neatly into the civil rights framework as the four fundamental freedoms of movement, services, capital
and people are to a large proportion civil rights, enshrined by formal EU citizenship. Yet in particular, civil rights within the European Union are above all defined through the six main chapters of the CFR, structured in Dignity; Freedoms; Equality; Solidarity; Citizens’ rights and Justice, thus outlining the cornerstones of liberty, democracy and the rule of law in the EU (Morano-Foadi 2010: 429). As these rights often serve and protect minorities, they are absolutely vital against populist claims and ensure democracy, multicultural diversity and pluralism in the EU. A distinct example would be the often, by right-wing populist emphasized Christian identity of Europe, which is embraced not as a religion but as a civilizational identity, considered as the antithetical opposition to Islam (Brubaker 2017: 4).

Although campaigning for secularism, right-wing populists make use of Christianity in order to minimize the visibility of Islam in public realms by invoking the Christian liberal values and referring to the illiberalism that is represented as inherent in Islam (Ibid.). A second example refers to the freedom of speech as a pillar of democracy and absolutely crucial against eroding effects of press freedom and freedom of expression under populist rule (Kenny 2019).

As EU civil rights, formulated in the Charter, already meet high standards fundamentally protecting and supporting European citizens but also enabling them to active citizenship, little has to be improved on a civil rights basis in order to better oppose populist threats. There might only be a lack of execution of these rights towards populism, particularly in regard to the assembly right and free speech as a form of civil resistance, which although existing pan-EU wide creating greater awareness, has not slowed down populism’s growth, particularly not the PPR parties (Marchart 2002; Immerzeel and Pickup 2015). Yet in order to further uphold European civil rights and to allow all citizens to choose their civic home, member states must remove ‘any obstacles to the exercise of the fundamental freedoms’ and also abolish constraints that might make it ineffective or less attractive and thus contribute to change our understanding of a European community, in which the boundaries of membership are more open, transparent and flexible (Kostokopoulou 2007: 628).

4.2 Duties

Duties of citizens are generally not clearly formulated by populists and their parties. As populists do not seek to get too much engaged with daily politics, rather addressing and delegating the important concerns directly, their obligations may rather be limited (Abts and Rummens 2007: 408). However, when looking at the ideological populism conception and the distinct antagonism between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ (elsewhere referred to ‘the others’), it becomes apparent that it is ‘the people’s’ or their leader’s responsibility to form the
homogenous entity by defining those who are not part of the people (Wolkenstein 2015: 113). This necessity must be maintained at all times. Moreover, ‘the people’ must to some degree commit to the common good of all by always directly reporting to the leader (Abts and Rummens 2007: 407). The leader, in exchange, has the responsibility to always rule and perform according to the will of the people (Moffitt and Tormey 2014: 389).

On the contrary, apart from the EU budget contribution funded through taxes, the European citizenship does not entail any legal based duties or responsibilities for citizens towards the EU as a whole (Davis 2002; Greer and Sokol 2014: 67; Kochenov 2014).

However, as European citizenship derives from nationality and supplements national citizenship of the member states, it has been argued that there do exist certain political obligations to the EU, although they are primarily found on the national level (Bellamy 2015). These obligations then can be utilized against the implications of the rise of the populists. In this context, Bellamy (2015: 558) argues that: “A ‘thicker’ form of EU level citizenship could only arise by creating civic obligations at the EU level […]”. Theoretically, given that there are certain ‘circumstances of justice’, which lead to a need for rights but in turn create conflicts and disagreement forming the ‘circumstances of politics’, constitute a fundamental rights-based reason to consider political obligations and to obey and participate in democratic structures (Ibid.: 560). Furthermore, once you have chosen to belong to a certain community, whether it is your original national community or the one of the host member state, then you automatically accept duties to cooperate and be part of that community’s scheme of rights that holds it together by obeying the law, paying taxes, educating yourself or educating others (Ibid.: 563). The crux again is the EU’s right to free movement and residence that determines how those duties are carried out.

One of the potential aspects of European citizenship duties that might be utilized against populism is the aspect of education. The EU has early on realized the potential in education as a tool towards more inclusion and tolerance and against xenophobia and inequality (Faas et al. 2014: 306). Particularly the Erasmus student mobility program that allows young European citizens to spend a period abroad has skyrocketed with over 3 million students having taken part in it, contributing not just to the development of a European identity but also to mutual cultural exchange and to greater awareness and understanding (Van Mol 2019: 1-2). Moreover, Tonge et al. (2012: 599) pointed out that receiving citizenship education consistently constitutes an important positive factor regardless of age, gender, ethnicity or social class and can make significant impact upon political understanding and engagement,
leading to more civic activism and a healthier polity. The role of education as a citizenship duty can thus be described as follows:

Out of this framing, the educational task of providing for the formation of European citizenship becomes a matter of serving as an instant disrupting corrective to ongoing societal, political, cultural or economic rhetoric and other social and material practices of citizenship in Europe at all levels. (Olson 2012: 86)

These crucial features would most likely work towards greater awareness and responsibility in regard to populism and may also represent a general method of resolution for it.

At this time, because of the absence of uniform European forces, a European military service cannot be discussed, even though calls for a combat unit under the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) keep the debate active (Eichenberg 2003). Regardless, despite further integration effects and the demonstration of greater cohesion and unity to the outside of the EU, a common military service would be difficult to transform into an effective tool against populism. Yet, as the EU is often labeled as a civilian power, a European civilian service or a civil defense force as proposed by former EU commissioner Michel Barnier could be seen as an alternative (Biebuyck and Rumford 2012: 4).

Going back to the social rights, social redistribution can also be understood as a duty towards the others. The ongoing European cosmopolitanism has been identified as a substantial driver of support for redistribution towards the EU, an aspects that would most certainly have important implications for more international solidarity in the Union (Kuhn et al. 2018).

What’s more, in the case of populism outlining a problem that creates a societal challenge, by putting the basic rights of the community under pressure, this could then be the basis of European citizen’s responsibility to engage in political action that opposes these challenges. On the other hand, within the citizen-state relation on the EU level, duties may not just be identified at the individual citizen, it is also duties or services, which in an abstract form, must be carried out by the EU itself. This is above all the provision of security and protection of its citizens, an indication that may lead to a debate in which the EU institutions with strict compliance of the legal democratic framework must take action against populist threats. Juxtaposing the scope of social, political and civil rights of European citizenship with a duty dimension could lead to profound implications against the increase of populism. As Schrauwen points out:

Whereas Union citizenship so far has been rights-based and not duties-oriented, the developments in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice can arguably change that. Direct representation is a corollary of a more duty-oriented citizenship, and the more
explicit bond between EU citizens and the European Parliament can be seen as supporting a development towards a rights and duties oriented Union citizenship. (2008: 58)

4.3 Participation

The participatory approach underlines the active dimension of European citizenship and refers to any political involvement in civic life and public debates with a more radical approach compared to citizenship duties.

For populists, citizenship participation is pivotal to the extent that ‘social groups and classes mobilize directly outside constitutional structures’, challenging the regime’s legitimacy and formulating claims to new rights (Aitchison 2017: 341). Yet, on the other hand, in the populist logic as they aim for immediate democracy, in which the designated leader works directly in the name of the will of the people, ‘there is no need for empowerment or active citizenship’ (Abts and Rummens 2007: 417). Populist participation therefore also rests on direct political engagement. However, participating in democratic political processes is a paradoxical situation for populist movements as their parties, which are organized in the electoral system of representative democracies, “have to manifest themselves within a system they ultimately reject as ‘undemocratic’“ (Ibid.: 420). Hence, representative democracy could be seen as an ‘outlet for populist resentments’ with the ability to ‘neutralize the threat of populism’ (Ibid.).

To begin with, civic participation of EU citizens is relatively low and limited because firstly, the EU in general is an enormous, complex political system, that is based on the balance of power, held by various institutions, which diffuse responsibility and contain many different channels of representation and secondly, civic participation in the EU is observed as a role of rather elitist organized groups, leaving ordinary citizens behind (Magnette 2003: 150-152). Yet, it has to be acknowledged that despite low involvement, citizenship participation is a key contribution to the democratization of the EU, as any political action may benefit the whole citizenry, meaning its potential should not be underestimated (Ibid.: 148). Now going back to the fact that populism, despite claiming the opposite, aims at illiberal and undemocratic practices, which are seen as a major threat to the European idea, it is the EU’s representative democracy with a necessary bottom-up civic participation that advocates the hard-won rights and values that could outline the right response to populism. On that basis, Fabio Wolkenstein proposed the ‘principle of procedure’, which is supposed to safeguard populism by including the full diversity of perspectives of a polity into decision making processes, getting all citizens to participate (2015: 121). Moreover he argues that the principle builds on deliberative democracy by emphasizing that citizens’ preferences and
values undergo certain changes, making ‘the populist ideal of a static and homogenous will of the people’ unsustainable (Ibid.: 122). With this strategy, the political elites are equally addressed, as they have to contribute by providing citizens with inclusive ways of participation but, perhaps even more relevant, adequately respond to the public’s views and opinions (Ibid.).

The principle of procedure effectively undermines this core tenet of populism and likewise works against actual democratic deficits that form a crucial supporting condition for populism’s success. (Wolkenstein 2015: 123)

Although Wolkenstein doesn’t explicitly refer to participation on the European level, his principle could unquestionably be applicable with regard to European citizenship.

Another main argument for a greater civic participation in the EU, is a further politicization and a clear deliberation of European issues, which would generate greater public interest and give rise to active citizenship not just to the elites, but also to the ‘average’ citizens (Magnette 2003: 157). As a federal constitution for the EU might be a radical idea for more citizen participation as this point, different types of politicization could be reached with the current or slightly modified treaties (Ibid.).

Looking at civic participation within the EU, one also has to take the role of civil society into account, which was also identified as a key solution to the democratic deficit and promising approach to link European citizens to the decision-making processes (Saurugger 2007: 384). Article 11 of the TEU is regulating civil society participation in the EU by mainly addressing the institutions for more transparency, exchange and communication towards the citizens but also by including the citizens’ initiative (which has already been discussed in the political rights section), altogether making it a key constitutional norm that contributes to good governance and more participatory democracy (Kutay 2015: 806-807). With the ability to create a transnational public space, in which the European society rises as a ‘third force’ next to state and the economy, European citizenship can contribute to multi-level governance and ‘its aspirations for greater democracy, social inclusion, and participatory citizenship’ (Rumford 2003: 32-33). Although the normative construction of civil society participation in the EU looks very promising, in reality it does not reach any farther than consultations and providing information to the Commission because first of all participation practices can only be understood in relation the representative model of the EU, limiting its capabilities and secondly, participation cannot be seen as an ‘autonomous form of legitimation’, not only because of the above but also because of the influence of ‘dominant managerial and technocratic styles of policy-making’ (Kutay 2015: 818). Not only does this impede access
for citizens to active engagement with issues of the public opinion, it also discourages them to make a difference when participating, which outlines a crucial aspect concerning populists’ view on the role of the people.

Recapitulating, it can be said that European citizenship participation can counter populism through greater politicization and further institutionalization. It would deprive populisms’ key basis of giving back power to the people and it would allow European citizens to more actively engage with populism through profound democratic mechanism and involvement in multi-level governance.

4.4 Identity

So far I have shown that there is evidence in European citizenship rights, duties and participation that holds considerable potential to oppose the ideology of populism, or more specifically, some distinct populist threats. Yet, the last section of identity offers a very contentious aspect of citizenship that adds another crucial dimension to the opposition to populism as it highlights the importance of the individual people of the EU and their community.

Within populist ideology, identity delineates a central element. ‘The people’ initially constitutes a collective, homogenous political identity within a national territory that carries the same anti-establishment stance (Abts and Rummens 2007: 407; Meléndez and Kaltwasser 2017: 2). They are ‘united and indivisible, fully formed, self aware and identifiable by the majority of the numbers’ (Abts and Rummens 2007: 408). Right-wing populists then always refer to their national community and the Christian origin as their civilizational identity (Brubaker 2017). Moreover, with the aim to establish a new political identity, they strictly follow identity politics mechanisms (Börzel and Risse 2018). For instance, right-wing Eurosceptic populist parties and movements exploited and mobilized ‘pre-existing attitudes among minorities of Europeans’ (Ibid.: 97). Furthermore, regional identities matter for populists, as they are stronger and more outspoken, more responsive to deterioration of their regional economic environment and more distant from national and European capital elites, creating more populist potential (Van Hauwaert et al. 2019: 317-318). However, having outlined the importance of the populist identity formed by the homogenous body of the people, it still remains uncertain what this substantive identity should be, raising the question: Who is ‘the people’ really? (Abts and Rummens 2007: 409).

Identity in citizenship, especially in European citizenship is not easy to locate either. According to Kastoryano, ‘citizenship has become an identity developed through direct or indirect participation, in the name of shared interests, for the common good’ (2010: 86). As
this explanation is certainly valid on the European level, until now scholars argue whether a common European identity exists or not and what kind of contribution European citizenship makes (Lehning 2001; Stråth 2002). It is clear that a European demos cannot be based on an ethno-cultural understanding as there is no distinct European ethnicity that would make up a common identity (Lehning 2001: 274-275). Regardless, it is uncontested that the EU has shown its intentions towards a European identity with the introduction of the European citizenship, aspects of free movement within the Union, a common burgundy red passport, common border controls, a set of common rights for its citizens and a common currency for many member states, lastly allowing the individual European to identify with the European Union next to their identification with the member state (Ross 2007: 289). Having a secondary– or multiple identities is an emerging phenomenon among EU citizens, creating the first insight of what for now at least partial European identity is capable of, particularly with regard to increasing populism.

In the first place we need to understand that “[t]he European citizenship concept redefines a polity in which the ‘us’ may no longer be Germans or Italians but would become European and the ‘them’ non-European” (Morano-Foadi 2010: 418). Although this directly entails exclusion of those not regarded as European citizens, it also offers direct opposition to populism, as the ‘us’ is considered a cultural and political entity beyond regional or national borders, which is more or less united in a community of rights and values that is capable of holding back the populist antagonism of ‘we, the people’ and ‘the evil’ within a society. Pivotal is the extent of how qualified the ‘unity’ and ‘cohesiveness’ of the polity with its collective identity is. According to Kantner, the citizenry of the EU shares both, a strong and a weak collective identity: ‘weak’ in a sense that individual citizens share common beliefs but do not have the same ethical convictions as everyone follows his or her own desires and intentions, and ‘strong’, where a shared ethical self-understanding is inherent (2007: 516). Kantner further argues that in order to take on the challenges of the broader public, the EU needs to enhance the collective identity by openly discussing policy alternatives regarding constitutionalization, redistribution and social politics, security and defense, immigration and internal security, as they outline the most common ethical problems of the EU’s agenda (Ibid.). Moreover, a stronger or ‘thick’ identity dimension of European citizenship cannot be purely based on a political understanding, rather, it must be further developed through active promotion of European cultural identity, which is founded on the obvious diversity in Europe, yet including several shared elements of common cultural heritage that unites the people and raises their awareness of belonging (Lähdesmäki 2011). Emphasizing history, architecture,
monuments and heritage sites as well as the EU’s cultural policy ‘European Capital of Culture program helps to contribute to a sense of ‘Europeanness’ and solidarity (Ibid.: 72). Coping with the challenges of right-wing populism, European citizens must demonstrate the spirit of political, cultural and social unity without ignoring the sheer diversity. In other words:

The European ideal of social cohesion through democratic citizenship — which is fundamental for any society — should build upon a common sense of belonging and a shared identity without denial of diversity among its constituent elements — both Member States and European citizens. (Milana 2008: 214).

Others like de Witte add that the sense of belonging, solidarity and entitlements that binds Europeans can only be fostered by the’ interaction between overlapping social structures’ (2011: 108). What becomes apparent regardless, is that the formation of European identity can entail far-reaching positive implications for European society, promoting inclusion, building togetherness, reducing intolerance and social division, manifest unity and building a social and responsible continent (Lehning 2001: 246; Eder 2009: 433). Civis europeus sum may therefore outline the EU’s most powerful argument against populism.
5. Closing discussion and future outlook

Utilizing Gerard Delantys’s four models of citizenship as the basic analytical framework to indicate European citizenship’s potential to oppose increasing populism in Europe has shown that protection, objection and counterarguments are present in a variety of citizenship dimensions. Beginning with a clear overview of populism’s malign aspects to the European Union and its society stimulated the necessity of appropriate response in the form of an in-depth look into European citizenship rights, duties, participation and identity, each section individually outlining a field of opposition. In a second step this also inevitably revealed the limits and restrictions of every dimension expressing the sobering reality of the current Union citizenship regime. Yet, with regard to answering the initial research question, this instantly helped to create a rather normative understanding of European citizenship as an ideal type construction.

The ‘rights section’ has demonstrated that European citizens are endowed with a large set of mainly civil rights that particularly serve to ensure the security and safety of society against internal and external threats but also allows limited engagement in political activity. Especially important is the non-discrimination principle for foreign EU citizens and the protection of any sort of minority through the Charter, as they are directly at risk under populist rule. At the same time, going hand in hand with the political rights, European citizens are entitled to active political citizenship in form of voting and standing in European and municipal elections, the citizen’ initiative and the right to petition the parliament, offering solid ground to either make citizen participation count and diminish the populist antagonism of ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ or allowing counter-movements to oppose the populist ideology directly. Nonetheless, political rights for European citizens should be further extended to a degree that voting in national elections is not restricted to those holding the national citizenship of the member state and residing in it. On the same subject, it is also necessary to discuss participation rights of TCN’s. In conjunction with more legal opportunities to engage in European politics civil and political rights would thus contribute to the integration in the democratic order. Although constituting great potential towards a more solidary, united and equal Union leading to more immune citizens concerning populist issues, social rights of European citizenship remain underdeveloped, as they are differently set on the nation level with the EU just regulating access to them. Due to this absence of an overarching European institution and a common social welfare system with a common pot in which every member state pays into, European citizens experience a severe lack of social solidarity (Mantu and Minderhoud 2017: 719-720) A European social model with extensive social rights following
the principle of reciprocity must be established on the European level in order to build strong solidarity among European citizens, which overcomes populist plans of welfare chauvinism. Furthermore, in order to hold back populism, all rights of the citizens must be materialized and grow beyond the formal wording.

European citizenship duties has been the most complex dimension of the analysis as there is no legal basis of civil duties in the EU creating distinct opposition to populism. However, looking at the theoretical fundamentals of civil duties revealed that an important aspect of opposition to populism could be found in education, which can be utilized in three ways. First, education can work as a tool for a healthier polity, implementing inclusion and tolerance, fighting xenophobia and contributing to more mutual cultural understanding in the EU. An important factor remains intra-European student mobility with the Erasmus student mobility program in particular that also presents a fruitful approach towards greater commitment and identification with the EU. Second, education can significantly impact citizens’ awareness regarding societal challenges, e.g. forces that are pressuring their freedoms and values and third, it can lead to encouragement of greater civic activism. At this point it is absolutely vital, that the EU seriously considers to develop a Union citizenship regime that is not simply based on a formal understanding of rights, rather use its potential towards a more vivid, dynamic and active citizenship, incorporating responsibilities and participatory elements (Bellamy 2015). Outlining rather radical forms of duties in the EU at this time, a European military service or a civilian service could be a future prospect.

Participation has presented the most substantive and promising dimension because it has the potential to take away one of the essential elements of populism by giving individual citizens further empowerment to direct democracy mechanisms, which has particularly been achieved with EU policies used to tackle the supposed democratic deficit. With the ability to create a transnational European public space, participatory European citizenship can facilitate and accelerate political engagement in the Union and lead towards greater deliberative democracy that is capable to subvert ideological populism. Direct co-determination rights in certain decision making processes and multi-level governance, as well as far reaching politicization of societal issues under the inclusion of the European civil society would entirely remove ideological populisms’ basis of direct democracy through a center of power within the citizens. Besides, European citizenship should be something that encourages people to participate through various channels. Particularly young European citizens must find greater recognition, as their participation and voting turnout remain rather low (Fieldhouse et al 2007).
The ‘identity section’ focused explicitly on European society and the individual citizens of the EU who are beginning to develop a sense of belonging to a unique European community, adapting a secondary – or multiple identity next to their national and regional ones. Although European citizenship initiated its potential towards European identity, it has not taken full advantage of it, especially not as a mean against increasing populist challenges for society, dividing the people, calling for exclusion and creating displeasure and anger (Tsaliki 2007: 176). The EU crucially needs a stronger collective identity that generates a more vigilant and resilient citizenry that is able to uphold and protect the common rights and values, turning citizenship into something they can make effectively make use of. Moreover, it requires a ‘thick European identity’ that on the one hand builds up trust amongst the citizens sharing the same commitments, but on the other hand also creates political loyalty towards the own state and the overarching European institutions (Mindus 2014: 740-741).

One of the major shortcomings of this analysis is direct and indirect exclusion European citizenship entails in a number of ways, thereby rather generating considerable contribution to the populist conception (de Witte 2011: 87). Moreover, possible positive effects of populism on democracy within the EU also in regard to European citizenship have been ignored. Being aware of the rather marginal empirical findings, this thesis contributes to refresh the understanding of populism in European society and raises awareness of the distinctive opportunities European citizenship offers as a mean not per se against specific right-wing populist threats but as an alternative opposition by taking away the fundament of populist ideology through an increasingly inclusive active dimension of a stronger European community. Yet, in order to be a valid tool, Union citizenship needs more institutional integration overall, to an extent in which the national attachments of citizens are still guaranteed but the needs and preferences on the European level are also fulfilled (Kostakopoulou 2007: 646).

Designing European citizenship as an effective political instrument on the basis of a variety of high quality literature ensured a more universal contribution of its potential that can easily be applied on current EU policies. Particularly the European Commissions’ policy ‘Europe for Citizens programme’, would be a suitable model, as it aims to encourage democratic participation and to foster a better citizens’ understanding of the EU drawing upon its history and cultural diversity (European Commission 2019). The first supported theme ‘European remembrance’ currently reflects on the historic challenges the continent had to face with regard to totalitarian regimes, including their anti-Semitism, xenophobia and other forms of intolerance, which links to the right-wing populist challenges of European society today.
(Ibid.). The second theme ‘Democratic engagement & civic participation’ then refers to the resources of European civil society, in which the 2019/2020 priorities aim for ‘promoting solidarity’, ‘debating the future of Europe and challenging Euroscepticism’ and ‘fostering intercultural dialogue and mutual understanding’ that opposes the ‘stigmatization of migrants and minority groups’ (Ibid.)

Lastly, this thesis relates to a wider field of research on democracy and citizenship and stirred up further interest in the elements of populism, raising questions about the compatibility of populist claims and normative democratic processes but also populist visions on increasing postnational structures especially in Europe. What is clear concerning European citizenship, it ‘should not be regarded as a finished institution’, holding potential for a more extensive use (Kostakopoulou 2007: 638). Particularly after the challenges of the European crises and Brexit, the EU should carefully consider its political opportunities against the rise of the populists.
6. Bibliography


Bellamy, Richard, 2008b: Evaluating Union citizenship: belonging, rights and participation within the EU. Citizenship Studies, Vol. 12, No. 6, pp. 597-611.


Appendix

Appendix A: Norwegian Register for Scientific Journals, Series and Publishers

The journals, series and publishers are marked with their current level (1 or 2 for admitted journals/series/publishers, - for others.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scientific</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>European Journal of Comparative Law and Governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>International and comparative corporate law journal</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Electronic Journal of Comparative Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The American Journal of Comparative Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>African Journal of International and Comparative Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Georgia Journal International Comparative Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaften</td>
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<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>The European Journal of Comparative Economics</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The Korean Journal of International and Comparative Law</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>European State Aid Law Quarterly</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Casost: 2003</td>
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<td>European Law Journal</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht – The Rezal Journal of Comparative and International Private Law (RezalZ)</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>The Comparatist: Journal of the Southern Comparative Literature Association</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations</td>
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