The Securitization of Migration

A case study of discursive threat construction in Hungary during the European Migration Crisis

By Fatih Güler
Supervisor: Gunnhildur Lily Magnusdottir

Fatih Güler
Abstract

This study looks at the discursive threat constructions of political elites in Hungary during a time span corresponding to the European Migration Crisis. Securitization theory is used in conjunction with a Critical Discourse Analysis to analyse the communicated threat perceptions that led to the extraordinary security measures of building fences. Analysis finds that there was a clear grammar of security in all discourses – on both the state and the regional level - in identifying migration as a possible threat. Characteristics of the discourses varied between the state agents in different contexts in terms of wording, the referent objects they focused on and the utterance of speech acts. The study demonstrates that securitization did successfully happen, but argues that it was likely the result of securitization not happening on a regional level prior. In the study, the European Migration Crisis, the migration-security nexus, and the Copenhagen School’s earlier work: Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe are also explored. The latter work is incorporated in the analysis by testing its correspondence with the communicated threat constructions in Hungary. The study finds strong correlations between the theorized security landscape and the communicated threat perceptions.

Key words: Migration, Security, Hungary, Copenhagen School, Securitization,

Words: 19407
# Table of contents

1 **Introduction** ............................................................................................................. 1  
   1.1 The Problem ....................................................................................................... 2  
   1.2 The Aim and Purpose ......................................................................................... 4  
   1.3 The Research Question and the Approach ......................................................... 6  
   1.4 Relevance to International Relations .................................................................. 7  
   1.5 Thesis Outline .................................................................................................... 8  

2 **Background** ........................................................................................................... 10  
   2.1 The Global Challenges of Migration and Displacement .................................. 10  
   2.2 The European Migration Crisis and Hungary .................................................. 11  

3 **Literature Review** ................................................................................................. 14  
   3.1 The Broadening of the Security Field .............................................................. 14  
   3.2 The Copenhagen School in the Field of Security Studies ................................ 15  
   3.3 Identity Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe ........................... 17  
   3.4 The Definitions and Linkages of Migration and Security ............................... 21  

4 **Theoretical Framework** ........................................................................................ 26  
   4.1 Overview .......................................................................................................... 26  
   4.2 Economic Security ........................................................................................... 27  
   4.3 Political Security .............................................................................................. 27  
   4.4 Societal Security............................................................................................... 28  
   4.5 Securitization .................................................................................................... 31  
   4.6 Applying the theoretical framework ................................................................ 33  

5 **Methodology** .......................................................................................................... 35  
   5.1 Discourse Analysis as a Research Method ....................................................... 35  
   5.2 Discourse Analysis as an Analytical Framework ............................................. 37  
   5.3 Research Design and Case Selection ............................................................... 38  
   5.4 The Selection and Collection of Material ......................................................... 40  
   5.5 Limitations and Delimitation ........................................................................... 41  

6 **Analysis** .................................................................................................................. 44  
   6.1 Identifying Threats and Security ...................................................................... 44
List of Abbreviations

CDA  Critical Discourse Analysis
CS Copenhagen School
CEE – Central-Eastern Europe
CS – Copenhagen School
EC – European Community
ECJ – European Court of Justice
EP – European Parliament
EU – European Union
JHA – Justice and Home Affairs Council
1 Introduction

The European migration crisis\(^1\) in the year 2015 posed unprecedented challenges to the European Union (EU) and its member states (MS). The constantly increasing, irregular flow of people from mostly destabilized areas of Africa and Asia, amplified particularly by the situation in Syria, intensified into a crisis situation whereby, hundreds of thousands risked their lives taking perilous journeys towards entering the EU (UNHCR 2015: 3). As media outlets provided daily coverage of the ongoing dramatic scenes, governments found themselves under increasing pressure, both locally and internationally, to respond. National governments resorted to increased security measures such as Hungary constructing a fence on its southern border with Serbia in an attempt to regain control of its borders (Bienvenu & Lyman 2015a). Ultimately, in the absence of expeditious, EU-wide solutions thousands of lives were lost at the Mediterranean Sea and migration gained prominence in political discourses (UNHCR 2015: 4-5 see also Consilium 2018).

Based on this brief background information presenting the political and social importance of this topic, the research is developed to look at the emerging political discourses on migration in the Hungarian context. Being one of the hotspots under significant pressures, Hungary was the first country to introduce security measures in the form of erecting fences on its green border with Serbia. Prior to that very act; however, there was a process of computing, perceiving and communicating the implicative elements of migration, which eventually culminated in resorting to such security actions. The Copenhagen School (CS) refers to that gradual process i.e. the transformation of mere subjects into matters of security, as ‘securitization’. Together with the theoretical framework of the CS, namely; securitization theory, the research utilizes a critical discourse analysis (CDA) to examine political speeches and statements on migration made by leading political actors in Hungary. That is to understand how migration in this

\(^1\) The study will apply the word ‘migrant’ to refer to any people on the move in the outlined time frame of the research. The period starting with the year 2015, will be referred to either as the migrant crisis or the migration crisis or simply as the crisis. The logic behind the terminology is discussed in scrutiny under Literature Review: 3.4.
specific context has been perceived and communicated by political elites leading to the act of securitization. Inevitably, the research also delves into exploring the nexus between migration and security on a theoretical level and furthermore demonstrates how this relationship with relevant security implications may be comprehended, communicated and countered by powerful political actors in a local context. An additional element of the analysis is a critical reference made between the findings of the analysis and the theorization of the emerging security landscape in Europe that is enshrined in one of the earlier collaborations of the CS: Identity Migration and the new Security Agenda in Europe.

Considering the socio-political application of the research; first, it has to be noted that migration has long been included within the security logic of the policies of the EU and its MS, as will be presented in the literature review (3,3), but it has grown into being a key issue (EPRSB 2018a see also EPRS 2018b). One of the main reasons for that is due to the new form and intensity of migration that erupted in year 2015, which in character, was largely an irregular flow, from different regions, and for varying reasons, presenting a new nature of this phenomenon (Eurostat 2016). Migration continues to be of great importance in European politics even if the irregular flows of migrants to the EU affect countries disproportionally and the numbers have significantly decreased during the writing of this study. However, as migratory pressures may potentially intensify again with ongoing or emerging instabilities in the periphery of the European continent - particularly noting here the issue of climate refugees - migration and the study of how its security implications can be perceived by possible host societies is of great relevance to contemporary politics and their studies (European Parliament 2017, Frontex 2018).

1.1 The Problem

The goal of articulating a research problem is to identify an interesting puzzle; an area of concern or a troubling question necessitating a deeper scholarly investigation to establish a more meaningful understanding (Halperin & Heath 2012:2-3). The research problem here can be most clearly defined as the securitizing act itself i.e. migration being placed in the security frame in the local context of Hungary. Migration has emerged as a major political issue in Europe and therefore understanding why and how migration is being securitized in a specific local context can aid the understanding of how states can
potentially react to this phenomenon, what the perceived security implication may be and how to possibly manage it better. A problem that emerges in understanding specific issues in security terms, which drives the research of this paper, stems from the CS’ theoretical framework coined by Ole Waever, Barry Buzan and Jaap De Wilde. Security is a highly social construct according to the CS, which relates to the problematique that; security threats can be either objectively assessable or, subjectively and politically perceptible, and hence; securitization itself can be either a counter action to objective threats posed in a specific context or, an act with political motives (Waever 1993 43). This short introduction to securitization theory is mentioned as this problematique is an underlying, thematic focus of the research, to which, each body of this paper is related to (to varying degrees), or contributes to in the sense; that the different sections discuss either relevant concepts or establish important background knowledge, from which the discussion can move onto the analysis.

The framing of particular issues as security matters regardless of the validity of objective security implications is not a new phenomenon. Perhaps the most notorious example is the public pronouncements of political motives given by the Bush administration prior to invading Iraq, which they contended by Iraq developing weapons of mass destruction. Since then, it has become conspicuous that the reasoning for going to war on such grounds was ill-founded, yet successfully justified and legitimized prior to the invasion. That example showcases how the act of securitization can be a highly problematic process and is exposed to being used as a political tool (Hughes 2007: 98, 101-102). Having said that, it has to be clarified though, that the research in no way tries to delve into possible political motives or propose a hypothesis for securitization having been exploited for political gains in this context. Such considerations fall outside the scope of this research, but the example is provided to demonstrate the apparent subjectivity surrounding the understanding of security according to the ontology of this research.

It is often extremely difficult to assess whether a threat can be characterized as objectively assessable or merely politically perceived or propagated. It is particularly true when discussing the security implications of such a complex phenomenon as migration. Considering this paper’s ontological grounds, which considers security threats being constructed through speeches, there is an inherent subjective perceptibility involved in talking about security. For this reason, the research will not aim to make clear distinctions between objective or subjective threats, but rather focus primarily on
analysing how the threats have been perceived in a local context and secondly; demonstrate how these perceptions, embedded in discourses, correspond to the theory.

1.2 The Aim and Purpose

Considering the above-expressed problematique the aim has different dimensions. First it can be articulated as a will to understand how migration was securitized in the local context of Hungary during the crisis and how it was embedded in political speeches. Hungary is chosen as it has been one of the prime examples in Europe for a country that positioned migration on top of its security agenda and has introduced a variety of security measures\(^2\) (COPM 2018). The aim is also comprised of additional elements such as wish to understand some of the contemporary characteristics and challenges of migration, its relation to security and how it is theorized in academia. In order to do that, the study employs a qualitative research using CDA, by looking at the emerging political discourses in Hungary prior to building the fence on the green border with Serbia. Since

security, securitization, migration and the problematique that entangles these concepts are central components of this research, the very foci can be reduced to, in a rather trivialized manner to; first critically analysing discourses on migration in the local context of Hungary, relating to three outlined security areas (political, economic and societal) and then, demonstrating if and how the communicated threat perceptions correspond to outlined literature. The aim here is not to say or determine what is universally true or false regarding the security implications of migration, but instead explore the local perceptions in the case and look at how these perceptions are discursively produced. According to Foucault one can never break away from discourse, and thus, one can never reach ‘truth’, but instead ‘truth’ is constructed through the promotion of narratives in the social world (Foucault 1972 cited in Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). The analysis of local discourses enables one to showcase the perceptions on what is considered to be true or false in a specific context, independent of universal objective truths. The communicated threat perceptions, embedded in the analyzed discourses, can then be assessed in terms of how

\(^2\) Case selection is further discussed in the methodology chapter under sub-section 5.3
they correspo nd to the migration-security nexus theorized by the CS, in order to go beyond a mere ultra-subjective approach suggested by the methodological tool employed. The CS can obviously be subjected to criticism for its neo-realist method to understanding security and it has been3. However, acknowledging and accounting for the arguments of a well-recognized theoretical framework4, enables the research to bring in a relatively wider narrative than the individual normative argumentation of the analysis and hence mitigate possible bias.

The previously mentioned, simplified understanding of the aim inevitably overlooks some of the complexities involved in the overall research process, but on the other hand it provides a guiding tool to the reader and hence; it is worth keeping it in mind. The research could be seen dependent on being able to identify and assess threats on an objective basis, that; however, is not the aim and such a distinction in itself is a contentious area within Security Studies. Securitization is a rather intersubjective approach, which does not offer adequate tools to be able to clearly separate objective threats and subjective perceptions. It is instead the audience, according to the school, that legitimizes an issue becoming a matter of security (see Buzan 1998). To provide some explanation to that epistemological weakness, the theoretical framework lays down the Post-Cold War security landscape in Europe in accordance to the CS, which explores the changing dynamics and new developments in European security, pointing to a shift of new concerns and threats. Consequently that chapter provides the ground for the concept discussions and the security areas. The CS delivers its own perspective on security through its theoretical framework. The analysed political discourses are assessed in terms of correspondence to that theoretical framework. Since the nature and characteristics of different threats are described in accordance with the CS’ theorization and security areas, this sole narrative could be a source of criticism. However, to mitigate that problem the research provides a critique to the theory as well as an account of the rivalling theoretical camps in the literature review. The argumentation in favour of this theory’s strength is given in sub-section 3.2. Furthermore, despite pointing out how the CS has been a widely accredited theoretical model for academic works with similar characteristics; the evaluation will still consider the applicability of that theoretical approach to this research

---

3 As presented in sub-section 3.2 (Copenhagen School and Securitization)
4 Demonstrated in sub-section 3.1 (The Broadening of the Security Field)
upon having completed the analysis. My personal interest and purpose in this research stems from a concern in seeking an objective understanding of migration as a contemporary phenomenon. There is also a critical view on how migration may be perceived locally and how the dominating voices of local political discourses, embedded in political power structures, aim to securitize migration and employ specific methods of signalling and speeches to the audience (for instance the citizens or the parliament) to be able to treat migration as an existential security threat. While considering the legal framework, vis-à-vis each MS of the EU currently still uphold a sovereign right to shaping its migration laws (TEU 2010), it is important to acknowledge and understand the implicative dynamics of how issues like migration become subjects of the security frame within the local contexts. In the political domains, where securitization happens, laws instrumented with security purposes are highly by-products of powerful political actors being able to construct and treat certain issues, like migration in this case, as security threats. This is done by employing specific and deliberate “speech acts” to portray migration to the mandating audience as an existentially important threat; to which extraordinary measures are to be taken and which, as a process, can stand independently from the objective security implications of the matter (Buzan 1998: 25,33).

1.3 The Research Question and the Approach

Considering the above stated problem formulation and aim of the research, the thesis will consider three research questions. The first two questions concern the analysis of the communicated threat perceptions, while the last one; assesses how the findings correspond to one of the earlier theorization of the Copenhagen school on the European security landscape.

- Considering the discourses of the securitizing actors, what are the characteristics of the threat construction and what are the referent objects supposing that they are identifiable?

- Considering the elapse of time during the crisis and the corresponding time-frame outlined, how does the grammar of security change?

- Considering the Copenhagen School’s earlier work; Identity, Migration and the new Security Agenda in Europe, how do the communicated threat constructions in Hungary relate to the outlined security implications of migration?
Firstly, the proposed RQs necessitate the analysis of the discursive practices of political power elites in the local context of Hungary to understand what the perceptions and the implicative dynamics of securitization have been. Secondly, upon having critically analysed the discourses, the analysis looks into how communicated threat perceptions correspond to the security implications of migration according to the CS. In doing that the applicability of the CS’ Securitization framework is also briefly discussed in order to assess if this theoretical framework is suitable to provide adequate explanatory powers to analyse migration and its security implications within the scope and limitation of this research. Since these tasks are closely interconnected based on their theory-driven character, the RQs, as presented above are formulated accordingly. To answer the RQs, the method will utilize a qualitative research by the usage of CDA following the theoretical model of securitization in order to analyse discursive strategies employed to securitize migration in a context-specific case. The analysed product itself will be then sieved through the theoretical framework of the Copenhagen School in regards to the different security areas to explore both the correspondence and the explanatory power of that academic tool. While clarifying the questions asked, and the approach taken to answer it, it is also important to explain the time frame this research looks at within which the outlined process of securitization took place. That limitation is mentioned in this sub-section already and not merely in the later, methodological chapter as it provides the reader a more direct and complete picture of the retrospective aspect of the research in greater detail. For that consideration, the analysed discourses will be taken from the beginning of the year 2015 until the 15th of September 2018, which represents the gradually increasing pressure of the crisis until the point that the government resorted to taking the extraordinary measures of erecting fences around the green border with Serbia; exemplifying the act of securitization.

1.4 Relevance to International Relations

First of all, the ontological grounds of the research places the line of argumentation into a theoretical disposition in the hearth of IR studies namely constructivism. The constructivist argument is that the importance of decision-making processes are given a new understanding, whereby states could no longer be perceived as orderly black boxes
in that their identities in an international context, would at least partially be a product of
domestic norms and practises (Hopf, 1998). In line with this philosophy, the research
seeks to explore how communicated threat perceptions by political elites influence state
behaviour.

The nexus of migration and security, which is core to this research, also has
evident connections to the discipline of IR. The research contributes knowledge to a
central field and concept of IR which is; security. In IR studies, the primary unit or actor
has been dominantly considered to be the state, even though the discipline itself has
moved far from being purely state-centric by the broadening of the security framework
and the emergence of new approaches. Nevertheless, much of the literature produced still
revolves around the security of states (see Buzan et al, 1998, Buzan, Hansen 2007). The
following research focuses on the discursive strategies of powerful political actors who
constitute the government of a state (Hungary) and hence the paper provides an
examination of the practical manifestation of political culture, relevant to understanding
a key actor; the state itself. Migration as a global phenomenon, has received substantial
literary work and its security implications are not only a commonly discussed topic in the
real life political realms, but academia too (see European Parliament 2019 and also
Weaver et al, 1993). The research delves into these security implications in the outlined
fields of societal, economic and political security and hence contributes to knowledge
production on how well security implications in these areas correlate to the outlined case.

Lastly, it is also worth noting that migration is of high contemporary
relevance to European politics. Despite of the relative thaws of the current migration
crisis, the question of migration and a unified European solution to it continues to be a
source of major political debates (EPRS 2018c). For instance, infringement procedures
against Hungary have been undergoing concerning the conformity with the Justice and
Home Affairs Council ruling on the compulsory migrant quotas, and in the year 2018,
new procedures have been taken by the European Commission regarding domestic laws
on asylum and return registration. Clearly, there is high political sensitivity and conflict
involved in the matter of migration management and the security implications intertwined
with it (European Commission 2017 see also European Commission 2018).

1.5 Thesis Outline
Henceforth, the research will follow the structure explained in the following subheading. Chapter two provides relevant background information about the multifaceted character of the contemporary challenges of migration and the reasons behind it. Then, a historical account of the beginning of the migration crisis of 2015 is given in conjunction with Hungary’s role in it.

Chapter three, the literature review is divided into four parts. First, it gives an account of the broadening of the security field and then demonstrates where the chosen theoretical frame fit in to that development. Critical discussions on securitization theory (sub-section 3.2) are included in this chapter due to its direct relevance to the surrounding literary content and making the thread of the paper to be more fluid. The third element of the literature review introduces one of the earlier works of the Copenhagen School; Identity Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, which lays down the background for the security areas discussed in the later theoretical framework and used for the analysis. The fourth part of the literature review defines both security and migration and looks at the linkages in between them according to different academic perspectives. The chapter overall, establishes the literary relevance of the research, forming the background for the consequent theory utilized and the later analysis.

Chapter four, the theoretical framework explains securitization theory and elucidates the security areas (political, economic and societal), which the analysis uses for analysing the perceived security implications of migration embedded in the elite political discourse in Hungary.

Chapter five explains and clarifies how methodology is utilized, namely; critical discourse analysis. The chapter also describes why it is an applicable tool for addressing the stated RQ and possible weaknesses. Case selection and collection of the material are further covered. The chapter finishes by addressing limitations and delimitations.

Chapter six provides the analysis which is divided into five parts plus the concluding remarks on the findings. Chapter 7 includes the concluding and evaluating remarks as well as some considerations for further research.
2 Background

This chapter offers a brief background information on the contemporary global characteristics of migration, the European Migration Crisis and Hungary. These themes are essential to be explored if one is to holistically understand the relevant social and historical background to the problem. Even though the research is limited a country specific case, I believe demonstrating the global and regional relevance of migration challenges is necessary to build a complete picture upon which an adequate analysis can be carried out.

2.1 The Global Challenges of Migration and Displacement

One of the most pressing contemporary, humanitarian and global challenges of our time continues to stem from that an unprecedented number of about 65.5 million people have been forced to flee their homes and of whom, about 22 million are refugees (UNHCR Yearbook, 2016). States are disproportionately affected, but as instability factors multiply in number, nature and continue in severity, so does the number of displaced people gradually grow each year, forcing the persons affected, to pursue safety in other regions. Conflicts themselves; however, are not the only causes for people migrating. Socio-economic reasons largely, and political ramifications too, in both the developing and developed world, contribute to migration.

According to the United Nations, in the year 2015 there were an estimated number of 244 million migrants in the world that constitute about 3.3% of the world’s population (IOM 2015). The actual causes and individual motives behind migrating; however, is a complicated matter to quantify, yet alone to specify on an international level and for that reason there is a lack of reliable data that could explain the reasons and motives (divided into calculated categories) why people migrate. Generally speaking, it has to be acknowledged that there are both push and pull factors (asylum seekers generally fall into the ‘push’ category) and some of the main reasons can be named as
conflicts, natural disasters, environmental degradation, political insecurities, economic insecurities and poverty (Eurostat 2018).

2.2 The European Migration Crisis and Hungary

The EU has been one of the main destinations for people migrating (UN 2017: 3-5) and since the European Migration Crisis, migration emerged as a major European challenge, gaining prominence in political discourses (Consilium 2018).

Increased migratory pressures particularly amplified by the Syrian situation, reached a pinnacle in year 2015, with what has become known as the European Migrant Crisis (Geddes 2016). Particularly noteworthy is Syria, as it was one of the main driving forces of the migration due to having produced the largest number of displaced people (UNHCR 2016). What commenced as a peaceful uprising, as part of a wider wave of the Arab spring protests, soon grew out of proportion and escalated into a full-scale war, producing some 13.5 million refugees estimated by the United Nations (Sakbani 2015 see also OCHA, 2016). While an increasing number of people were taking perilous journey of crossing the Mediterranean Sea towards the Western Balkan route (as the fastest way to reach the most desired destinations inside the EU like Germany or Sweden) countries located on that particular route were under significant pressure (Geddes 2016: 155). One of the most sensitive migratory pressure points on the Western Balkan route developed inside and on the border of Hungary, as it was the first land connected entry to the rest of the Schengen Area. Several hundreds of migrants were entering Hungary through the green border from Serbia on a daily basis and as the numbers peaked to the thousands, Hungary changed gear to speed up the construction of its border fence which they announced on the 17th of June 2015. The border with Serbia was sealed on the 15th of September 2015 followed by clashes between police and migrants, who tried to break through the physical barrier (Bienvenu & Lyman 2015b). Hungary since then completed another border fence along the Croatian border, have introduced stricter controls and continued to extend the state of emergency caused by migration COPM 2018) Such measures have been the subject of much criticism by other EU member states, especially as it complicated the ongoing migratory strategy advocated by the German leadership (Dragostinova 2016). After the deal with Turkey in 2016, the irregular flow of migrant crossing from Turkey to Greece plummeted (Consilium 2016a). However, due to the
relocation scheme proposed by the Council of the EU, migration continued to be the centre of political debates and conflicts remained stark (Bamberg Valsells, & De Somer 2018 see also Geddes 2016).

Interstate dialogues ignited political clashes and strong ideological oppositions emerged, in which Hungary was an outspoken actor. Increased anti-migratory rhetoric surfaced across the political sphere of the continent and a new dynamics of political alliances and oppositions starkened based on the migratory policies states advocated for (Szijjarto 2018b see also Geddes 2016). The main political discourses dominating the Central-Eastern European political dialogue in relation to migration, were comprised of a German and a collectivised Visegrad Four standpoint, indicating two diametrically opposing positions, in which the latter operated and continues to operate within a stringent, defensive, anti-migratory strategic outlook, emphasizing the importance of its security and national identity, while the latter, has been supportive from the grounds of moral accountabilities and legal obligations to conform to international asylum laws and its binding responsibilities on nation states (Bamberg, Valsells, & De Somer 2018). Germany emerged as a leading advocate for a position that sought to tolerate migration being in a less controlled and securitized frame and pursued remedies to its challenges by advocating for an EU managed relocation scheme long before to the ruling of the Council (Huggler, Marszal 2015 see also Geddes 2016). Several months after the Commission proposed the triggering of the emergency response system envisaged under Article 78(3) and upon the Council’s decision (EU 2015/1601), MSs were mandated to a temporary distribution scheme, sparking much controversy from the opposing adjacent, Visegrad partners (European Commission 2015a, see also Huggler 2015). In this debate, Hungary has been clearly acting as an amplifying force for an anti-migratory standpoint and for securitizing migration to curb the irregular flows of migrants (Geddes 2016: 85-88, 195, Spiegel 2015b).

Hungary’s rhetoric on migration has continued to be stringent and clear in its anti-migratory nature (Szijjarto 2018a). The government under the governance of Viktor Orbán resorted to what many European politicians have reportedly considered hard handed measures (see Spiegel 2015b, Politico 2015). Nevertheless, other states did actually begin introducing similar methods of securitizations like reinstating border controls in Germany and Sweden or enacting fences in Austria, which as an act has further problematized the functionality of European agreements such as Schengen (Geddes 2016: 115-116, see also Consilium 2016b).

Migratory pressures have shaken
the union as divisions among nation states surfaced in the absence of a unified cooperation based, and unanimously approved policy. Consequently, thousands of lives were lost in the Mediterranean Sea and it may be argued, that Europe was unsuccessful to live up to its capacities as a main global actor in being a concerted and civilized entity to present swift, but viable and humane solutions to the crisis (Geddes 2016 149).

Migration receives great amount of attention in European political discourses, as it is evident when looking at the main issues discussed in the leading institution of the EU (EPRSB 2018, Council of Europe 2018a, see also Council of Europe 2018b). The socio-political relevance of this research derives from that over-appropriation of the matter on both the national level and regional level. When discussing the migration as a phenomenon, it is useful to take a brief look beyond the domestic context of Hungary and try to identify some of the root causes for people fleeing their home, which shows that the reason behind migration are indeed highly varied in nature and that they are present globally, but disproportionately pressing regionally
3 Literature Review

Scholarly literature demonstrates conflicting viewpoints on the conceptualization of security and its linkages between migrations. The first sub-heading provides a review of the literature within IR theory regarding security. Then through a very short introduction on how the field evolved over the years; the discussion moves onto reviewing securitization as a theoretical frame in part two. That thematic order is a minor, but evident structural mixture of what otherwise could constitute two separate bodies discussing; one literature review and one theoretical framework. The intent however, is that by revising the position and the critiques of securitization theory in conjunction with the evolution of the security field - including the rivalling theoretical camps - the paper will allow for better synergizing the two separate structural bodies of texts - literature review and theoretical framework - and make the thread of the thesis to be more fluid while still providing a wide variety of critical perspectives. The third part presents one of the earlier collaborations off Buzan and Weaver called Identity Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe. This work introduced what they prescribed the emerging security landscape to be in the 90s, which also gave birth to the security areas that are used in this research and securitization theory. For such reasons this sub-section is considered auxiliary to the analysis as it offers a source of conceptual reference for the analytical discussions.

The fourth and last part of this chapter proceeds with literature focused on giving a more specific definition of migration and security, and outlining their linkages according to different perspectives.

3.1 The Broadening of the Security Field

Within the field of IR, there is a wide variety of different positions on what can be considered a security threat and who or what is susceptible. Positions differ based on their ontological and epistemological standpoints and while this chapter does not aim to list all the different
theoretical approaches, a brief account still provides an examination of the historical development of the field and the main theories from which the discussion can move on to discussing the Copenhagen School securitization theory.

The field of International Security Studies (ISS), a subfield of IR had recourses largely to the writings of the older discipline of political theory, combining both classical realist and liberalist writings like the ones of classical Greece, Machiavelli, Hobbes, John Stuart Mill and Montesquieu. Since, the concept of the state and military power are located in the very centre of Security Studies; Realism has been a dominant paradigm. It suffices to say, that, it is far from uncontested, particularly with the broadening of the field after the Cold War (Buzan, Hansen 2007). The fall of the Soviet Union initiated a major intellectual change, challenging conventional realist understandings. Criticism pointed out the inability of traditional theories to predict the end of the Cold War and hence, having a too narrow definition of security issues mostly focusing on bipolarity and nuclear deterrence (Buzan, Hansen 2007). Critiques of the traditional security school advocated for a change from the state-centric, top-down approach, contending that traditional paradigm is not fulfilling its main aim, which is to protect people. “Millions a year are killed by communicable disease, civil war, environmental disaster and famine, none of which fall within the mandate of current security thinking” (Owen, 2004, 374-375). That emphasis on human security (attributed to the Paris School, drawing from post-modernism) demonstrates one of the consequent broadenings that characterized the field of security studies, which resulted in something of an ‘institutional crisis’ for mainstream ISS. Alternative theories such as post-structuralism, feminism, critical theories (Frankfurt School) and constructivism emerged alike with the broadening of the field (see Buzan 2007).

3.2 The Copenhagen School in the Field of Security Studies

Drawing on constructivist ontology, the Copenhagen School is credited with producing one of the most capturing theoretical products for the ISS mainstream, by both reworking and broadening the definition of security (McSweeney 1996, Huysmans 1998 cited in Buzan 2007). Societal security was a ‘conceptual innovation’ developed by Ole Waever about the collective identities (national, ethnical, racial, religious) to gap the widening between the traditional understanding of national (state) security and post-realist
conceptions of individual and global security by equipping a theoretical tool on how to collectively decide and prioritize individual insecurities (Waever 1995 cited in Buzan 2007). According to Waever’s logic, individuals are a part of society and not isolated, but their security is not the same as of the primary agent; the state. Societal groups are here the referent objects of being threatened through the principal actor responsible for ensuring security; the state and great emphasis is laid on the concepts of societal cohesion and identity. Steve Smith has described the CS theoretical model as a “sophisticated neorealist account of security” (2000: 83)

Another major theoretical stepping stone of the Copenhagen School, was Waever’s ‘securitization theory’, refined by the CS’s leading literary work; Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998), which argued that security is ‘speech acts’ with a ‘particular rhetorical and semiotic structure’ that portrayed something as ‘an existential threat’ with a specific ‘priority and urgency’ permitting ‘the securitizing actor’ ‘to break free of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by’ (1998: 25).

Yet, while the Copenhagen School’s focus on speech acts and extraordinary means can be seen as an analytical strength, it is also one of the school’s biggest weaknesses and most critiqued points. The framework has been criticized for its level of analysis and not being able to take into consideration alternative forms of securities, like human security (see Owen, 2004, 374-375). Overall, the Copenhagen School has attracted great academic attention and has received positive perceptions by the academic community; however it is not free of criticism (Buzan et al, 2007). One of the major critiques is outlined by Bill McSweeney, who is credited with formulating the term ‘Copenhagen School’. He critiqued the ontological grounds of the securitization framework for considering societal security being distinct from the state. He argued that threats to societies are also socially constructed through inter-subjective understandings within societal groups and hence; are not fixed, but changing (1996: 89).

Other criticisms focused mostly on the ‘speech acts’ facet of the theory. According to the CS, a securitizing move is initiated by discursive practises, mostly from political elites to adumbrate the presence of threats to the audience, which then has to be accepted by the mandating audience, whoever it might be (depending on the systems of governance). Once issues are labelled or dramatized as security, there is a claim from the agent making the speech for needing to and having a right to; employing ‘extraordinary measures’ (Buzan, et al, 1998: 26). According to that logic, speech acts are ‘utterances’ or declarations that overlook the persuasive intentions and discursive strategies employed to
influence the consensus of the audience. Focusing only on security speeches can be problematic in the sense that everything could become a security matter if someone calls it so (Trombetta 2010: 137). That someone; however, as Waever argues; is commonly the political elite that have the ability to raise a security concern through an “institutional voice” (1995: 97). Hansen’s feminist critique articulated by an analogy to Andersen’s original tale on the Little Mermaid’s also criticises the silence of non-elite perspectives in security discourses (2000: 285-286).

Lastly, further critiques have mostly concentrated on the contexts in which the act of securitizations happens. McDonald argued; whether securitization successfully happens or not, is largely dependent on the socio-political and historical context, not merely on the “utterance” of an existentially important security threat (2008: 572-573). This holds particular relevance in countries where state control over the media is strict and freedom of expression is limited so the securitizing discourses are presented to the audience in an uncritical fashion.

Despite of such apparent criticisms, the theoretical framework of the Copenhagen School is still regarded as one of the leading schools and theoretical tools on the field of security studies for having been able to accommodate for the differences between traditional and modern approaches. The framework provides particularly adequate tools to examine security implications within a local context as it problematizes how issues of security interact with domestic politics. Furthermore, considering migration, which is a central topic of this research, the Copenhagen School is applicable for having been able to provide a variety of security areas, where actors within a local context may speak of security, but societal security is particularly related to the challenges of migration (see Waever 1993). Stivachtis for instance contends that the Copenhagen School offers the most comprehensive epistemological approach to examining the nexus of migration and security (2008: 2).

3.3 Identity Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe
With the end of the Cold War, the bipolarity of the international system came to an end ushering the development of new political dynamics, while simultaneously necessitating the reconceptualization of security challenges, which the CS has become renowned for theorizing (Buzan, Hansen 2007). Barry Buzan outlined four significant political forces, which have increasingly influenced Europe’s security agenda since the middle of the 1980s. First; the political stagnation, and economic failure of the Soviet Union, second; the revival of Western European integration, third; the widening acceptance that; political pluralism and markets were indispensable ingredients for the prosperity of modern societies, and fourth; the renewal of nationalism and xenophobia (Buzan 1993: 1-2).

Today, more than 25 years later, the European security landscape can still very much be understood in light of the developments of these political forces outlined by one of the earlier collaborations of Buzan and Weaver. To put it into contemporary perspective; the traditional fears of military revival have plummeted, although still lurking in the background, particularly by revived Russian aggression in Ukraine (EEAS 2017). European integration spearheaded by the EU, has extended towards the former socialist states of Central-Eastern Europe, including Hungary, and talks of further integrating the Western Balkans are currently in talk (EEAS 2018). Democratic systems of governments and capitalist market structures characterize the basics of European political and economic rudiments (see Eur-Lex 2019: Article 101-109, while the nationalistic tendencies evidently continue to have a strong foothold across the political sphere of the EU, as shown in latest national elections (Aisch, Pierce and Rousseau 2016)

According to the early works of the Copenhagen School, the principal focus of new insecurities in the post-Cold War era was increasingly society itself rather than the state (Buzan 1993: 1). This shift from state centrism questions the traditional functions of the state in relation to society and argues that this relation changes fundamentally, where cultural peculiarities long defended by states come under pressure from processes of homogenization and standardisation required for a single market and developing a European entity. Regional integration is erecting a new macro level transcending the states, reducing the former guardianship of state boundaries by states relinquishing parts of their sovereignty to enjoy the benefits of belonging to a larger political union. In such a process, societies become more exposed to the increased movements of people and this problematizes notions like; national identity and the fusion of state and society (Buzan 1993: 1-2). As Pierre Hassner’s, noted in relation to Western Europe:
“The perception of a threat to national identity coming, on the one hand, from the cosmopolitanism and standardisation of mass culture and consumption (often seen as Americanization) and, on the other hand, the influx of immigrants who, for racial or religious reasons are often seen as alien or hostile. Individual, social and national security, the preoccupation with law and order, jobs and the nation are thus; combined into one complex syndrome in which, external threats and internal doubts are hard to disentangle” (Buzan 1993: 2-3)

According to Buzan, prior to the EU admission of many CEE states, which greatly liberalized the movement of citizens of the European Community (EC), under the banner of extensive regional integration processes, societal insecurity concerns were much perceived in a Western-Eastern European divide, as noted by the former French Interior Minister, Philip Marchand; “France’s external borders has more to do with Germany’s borders with Poland and Italy’s with Yugoslavia” (1993: 3). A politically important implication stemming from this division as Buzan noted, was that if the EC will not be able to provide sufficient defence to societal security in light of the challenges that migration and the homogenising forces of Europeanisation can pose, then the Community itself could become politically vulnerable to nationalistic animosity. For that reason, societal security issues may be of crucial importance in defining not only the pace and scope, but also to a large extent, the triumph or fall of the European integration process (Buzan 1993: 3-4). Evidently, European integration falls outside the scope of this research, Buzan’s argument; however, offers a highly interesting perspective on how this study provides a puzzle to a broader political question, which the next paragraph will demonstrate.

The reconstructing of state-society relations along national lines was not an entirely new challenge for post-socialist East-Central Europe, encompassing the Visegrad states, including Hungary. Contrary to much of Eastern Europe that had little or no history of independent statehood or democracy, the problem in Eastern-Central Europe, including Hungary, has been rather to produce acceptable forms of governments that adhere to structures of modern statehood and liberal democracy, incorporating the development of civil societies (Buzan 1993 3-4). Today; patterns of understanding societal insecurities has transcended a mere inter European divide, where the relationship of the EC and its southern periphery in the Middle East reproduces former challenges to societal security, but now excluding a shared European
identity, which has been a connecting feature of the Western-Eastern divide. Now; as the author notes; this centre-periphery split is indeed exacerbated by a strong cultural division between Islam and the West (Buzan 1993: 5). While relationships between Eastern and Western Europe fall within a framework of a single security complex, that in between Europe and the Middle East represents two traditionally separate security complexes, with Turkey and the Mediterranean being the insulators in between. Based on this understanding, the question they proposed in the 1990s was; what kind of security concerns and how much of it will cross this boundary between the two security complexes in the future (Buzan 1993: 5-6)?

Matters related to political and economic security also experience changes as a result of migration. The international division of labour continues to give incentives to people from marginalised or less affluent economies to seek better opportunities in most fluent and developed countries. Historic migration to Europe from the third world provides possibilities for chain migration and considering the economic, demographic and social conditions on the periphery, particularly in North Africa, Egypt and Turkey, Heisler projected that pressures for large scale migration will be enormous in Europe in the coming decades. (Heisler cited in Waever 1993: 152). The relevance of migration in relation to political and economic terms has been mostly understood in terms of the entitlements and the broadened securities for the citizens, that have built up over several decades and have become an integral part of the national identity and one’s security (Heisler, Zig cited in Waever 1993: 153). Collective labour rights, universal suffrage, constitutionally assured civil liberties, access to education and healthcare, income support for families as such constitute some of these economic and political rights. Following Heisler’s argument; the developments and provision of these social goods, positioned people into new social contracts to the state, but in effect some citizens of migratory background in Western Europe were “less comprehensively and effectively able to integrate to which few or no normative or legal justifications could provide explanation” (Heisler, Zig cited in Waever 1993: 153). With economically driven social changes, largely aggravated by the effects of globalism, there is a tendency to view immigrants as scapegoats. While it is difficult to empirically demonstrate if immigrants contribute to the financial strains on the welfare state, the weakening efficiency of public institutions or increased criminality, the belief that they do, can easily grab a hold in host societies and then be exploited by political opportunists. (Heisler, Zig cited in Waever 1993: 157). According to Barry Buzan; if it is truly societies that are the primary focus of this new security problematique, then it is the matters of identity and migration that will drive the primary perceptions on threats and vulnerabilities.
Societies in this sense is conceptualised as something closely related to identity and how groups identify themselves as “us” and distinguish between the other i.e. “them” (Buzan 1993 5).

### 3.4 The Definitions and Linkages of Migration and Security

Since the theory draws on constructivist ontology, arguing that the structure of social reality is comprised of objectively computable and subjectively perceivable characteristics (see Waever 1993), security itself can be an ambiguous term to understand, particularly when associating it with different concepts and in different contexts. Before delving into outlining the actual linkages between security and migration, it is paramount that the definitions of this study should be better clarified. Both security and migration have been mentioned several times up until that stage of the study; nonetheless, their concise meaning is elusive and hence; arguable.

Security is a politically powerful concept, yet it lacks a universal definition. By the broadening of security studies in recent decades, the theories and definitions on security have varied. Due to the constructivist character of this research, it is palpable that the definition best suited for the ontological considerations of the research must be compatible with that philosophy. If security is defined according to a universal spectrum, it has to be able accommodate for the theoretical differences between opposing schools. Considering this criterion, Baldwin’s argumentation provides the initial line of thought, which argues that security fundamentally entails state survival; a militaristic threat conception, largely influenced by the conventional paradigms that dominated the literature of the security field during the Cold War. However, if one intends to acknowledge the broadened dimensions of the security field, which have not changed in their natural state of being, but have only been specified and delineated differently in their substance, then the definition is to differ from what it was during the Cold War i.e. “Economic security, environmental security, identity security, social security and military security are different forms of security, not fundamentally different concepts” (1997 9-10). “Therefore security is not necessarily linked to only survival, but rather, to the possibility of freely pursuing independence or protecting basic internal interests” (Baldwin 1997: 23-24). Buzan’s definition is identical to that; “the pursuit of freedom from threat” (2007:
50) Baldwin; however goes further by stating that security, for this reason entails not only the protection against military threats, but the management of a wide variety of different risks that have implications to the political, economic and social well-being of states and their peoples (Baldwin 1997: 24). Following Baldwin’s argumentation; defining security as a ‘low probability of damage to acquired values’ provides an intact delineation that mitigates the problematic realist emphasis on survival, and leaves a possibility for specifying the values meant to be protected when survival is guaranteed (1997: 13). As Wallace argued; upon survival being ensured; states will still strive to protect specific values and interests that they consider vital, which may be; “unwanted foreign intrusion: defence of physical and psychological security, of economic interests of language and cultures” (Wallace 2002).

Upon having defined security, the task of defining a migrants and migration is present. Using the United Nation’s definition; migrant is a person that has resided in a foreign country for over a year irrespective of the causes (IOM, 2015). That; however, does not account for the different reasons to why people become migrants. In a security sense, migration, which is a collective term referring to people moving and becoming migrants, is not a single-dimensional or fixed concept, but a multifaceted phenomenon and hence the people that migrate can pose varying forms of security implications or none at all (Lohrmann 2000 6). Migration may be an individual choice that is in respect to residence and settlement rights and which is wholly documented, but can also be for reasons that force people to migrate and hence, could fall under the legal definition of asylum seekers or refugees.

Considering one’s desire to value-neutral, objective working, which Max Weber was a strong advocate of (Halperin & Heath 2012), the usage of words and terminologies in the research have to be elucidated. During the crisis, countries across Europe employed varying forms of strategies in terms of the sources journalists referred to, the language used, the reasons given for the crisis, and the solutions proposed (UNHCR 2015). One main terminological difference for instance was between the words ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’ which legally entails two different statuses for people, yet were often used interchangeably or arbitrarily (BBC 2015). The word migrant in this research is utilized as a collective category to refer to any people that had been or still are on the move in the context of the European migration crisis. That terminological definition includes people who were to (under the crisis) or are still to undergo the legal process of requesting asylum and be granted the status of being a refugee and regular economic migrants as well. It also has to be acknowledged, that this diction inevitably includes people who are highly likely to be permitted refugee status if claimed or people who have been (since the crisis) given such protection, but for the sake of operational clarity of this academic
study, which focuses on the discourses aimed at securitizing migration and not on analysing the social implications of diffusing differing legal concepts, the above-explained terminology is employed.

To begin with discussing the linkages between migration and security it has to be noted that contemporary studies and policy fields find it increasingly difficult to overlook the nexus between migration and security in a greatly interconnected, constantly globalizing world (Adamson 2006: 165-166). Several studies have been dedicated to understanding the security logic of EU policies on migration and asylum (See Huysmans 2000; Ceyhan & Tsoukala 2002), but the act of securitizing migration is not purely a European phenomenon nor it is easy to make the argument that some of the major securitizing developments are solely European products (See Tirman 2006). While some scholars accentuate the role of the EU in securitizing migration, (See Huysmans 2000), many others have sought to look at it from a global perspective and pointed out major events like the 9/11, which aggravated or reinforced securitizing strategies (Tirman 2006).

The EU has historically, since the 80s had politicized migration, due to the disintegration of major, neighbouring states such as the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia and also due to the continuous expansions (new MS) and developments of EU integration (Schengen) (Huysmans 2000; Ceyhan & Tsoukala 2002). The new wave of migration that reached a crisis point in the year 2015, regardless of previous policy, brought unprecedented challenges to the EU in regards to migration management and border control, raising questions of possible security implications.

From a literary perspective, it is not only the nature of migration, but the institutions and the capacities of the receiving country that have an impact on whether migration is treated within the security frame (Couchri 2002: 117). The better equipped and more resilient the institutions of a country are, the less likely it is that migration will be treated as a security threat Couchri argues (Ibid). Waever also argued in a similar fashion by stating that a threat of migration is primarily dependent on how the relative numbers of inwards migration interact with the “absorptive and adaptive capacities of society” (1993: 43). Weiner’s argument on how host societies react to migration, pointed towards the possible differences on ethnic and cultural aspects (1993 105). He also emphasized how specific categories of migration can be a threat to the autonomy, sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and even be a potential source for disputes or conflicts.

“States that are capable of defending themselves against missile, tank, and infantry attacks are often unable to defend themselves against the intrusion
of thousands of illegals infiltrating across a border in search of employment or safety. Governments want to control the entry of people and regard their inability to do so as a threat to sovereignty” (1993, p.97).

Controlling borders and being able to monitor migration is hence a fundamental concern that delves into the realist concept of state sovereignty. Unregulated migration flows for these reasons are particularly sensitive to being treated in a security frame (Ibid).

Other realist approaches also pointed out the possibility of increased crime rates or powerful organized criminal networks formulating, which may challenge the control and authority of the state (Adamson 2006: 178).

Critiques on such state-centric, positivist approaches have appraised and problematized the act of considering the state, both the agent and the referent object of security, as according to Doty; such approaches necessitate strategic, securitizing moves along the lines of protecting national security, while simultaneously failing to see security as a social construct (Doty 1999: 77). The Copenhagen School’s approach to this linkage can be located in somewhat between the opposing schools, as it acknowledges possible risks such as; not being able to control borders or the possibility for inter-state tensions in the face of large scale migration, while on the other hand, also looking at the domestic context and the socially constructed values that are to be protected; particularly in relation to the concept of societal security (1993: 42-43, 149). The approach concurs with the previously outlined definition of; ‘low probability of risk to acquired values’ and is therefore rather inclusive in considering different security implications. Waever argues that “societal security is about situations when societies perceive a threat in identity terms” (see 1993, p.23), proposing that migration brings in different cultural, ethnical, and linguistic characteristics to societies and can consequently transform host societies. Heiner has also argued that migration poses a long-term challenge for governments to manage cultural and political change (Heiner cited in Waever 1993: 149).

Others have challenged such propositions on the grounds of whether migrants have the capacity at all to transform societies as it is largely dependent on various factors like the volume and the intensity of migration, the duration of the stay and the class composition of migrants (see Portes 2010). Lohrmann for instance even challenged if societal security implications can be made other than political constructs and have argued that migration can actually be beneficial for host societies by enriching their social and cultural compositions (2000: 8-
9). Literature again demonstrates plurality in how connections between migration and security can be made on ontological and epistemological grounds. There is also an evident ambiguity involved in being able to categorize specific aspects of the migration-security nexus as either objectively threatening or merely politicized. The Copenhagen School; however, does account with this problem; “Real threats may not be accurately seen. Perceived threats may not be real, and yet still have real effects” (Waever, 1993: 42-43). Waever argues that reasons to why specific issues become political and are hence treated as security, is dependent on the conditions of individual societies (1993: 43). With such considerations, if one aims to understand how migration is actually being securitized in a domestic context, then the political mechanisms embedded in discourses have to be dissected and analysed.
4 Theoretical Framework

4.1 Overview

As the research is largely theory driven, it is imperative to give a short overview of the theoretical framework and how the different parts come into play. First, the three security areas are discussed in the aim of clarifying how they can be understood according to the CS and complimentary critiques. These discussions assist the identification of the different security concerns i.e. the referent objects correlating to the outlined areas. Societal security is given a larger body of text contrary to economic and political security as it is a more contentious and complex security area that has not only been a unique feature of the theory, but the concept is also highly related to notions such as identity, society, nation and the state as well as migration; which are primary subjects of the discursive elements in the Hungarian political domain and hence are germane to building the conceptual discussions. Societal security has also been an ambiguous concept, for which the CS has been criticized for, further necessitating greater devotion to it (see Theiler, 2003: 249-268, Mc Sweeney, 1996: 81-83). After that, sub-section 4.5 covers securitization, the act of transforming issues into matters of security through ‘speech acts’. This theoretical model provides the framework by which the analysis can identify the ‘securitizing actor’, the ‘referent object’, the ‘audience’ and the ‘extraordinary measures’ taken to counter the identified threat. Detailed account of the strengths, weaknesses and critiques to the theory can be found in the literature review as explained previously.

Lastly (in sub-section 4.6), the operationalization of the framework is explained, which sets the next analytical body of the research in motion.


### 4.2 Economic Security

Some of the contentious academic areas, discussing the linkages between migration and security have largely focused on whether migration poses an economic strain or a gain on host countries in regards to wage depressions, net contributions to the economy, and welfare pressures, further illustrating how academia is divided on the linkages of that nexus (Castles and Miller 2009, see also Waever 1993 150-152). According to the CS, genuine economic threats are rare; however the increasing interdependency of states and their economies, caused by the liberal economic rudiments globally may put strain on the notion of self-reliance and develops a need for countries to import foreign labour force to meet the needs of the industries and the sustainability of social welfare system built upon. Relating to social-welfare, the line of argumentation of the CS stands in line with Karl Polanyi, emphasizing the importance of state intervention in liberal free-market economies to care for social inequalities that the market generates or fails to support (Waever 1993 152-53).

According to Stivachtis, large scale irregular immigration on the other hand, may strain the financial capacities of host countries in terms of housing, education or welfare provision. (2008, 16).

### 4.3 Political Security

According to the CS “political security is about the organizational stability of social orders” and “the heart of the political sector is made up of threats to state sovereignty” (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, 1998, p.141). Similar to conventional realist understandings, the authors emphasize the importance of state sovereignty. The state being here a principal agent holds responsibility over the institutions and the political organization of a country and hence these are the referent objects of political security. The state can be considered sovereign in that there is no higher authority that has the power to govern over the territory on behalf of the people. Threats in this sense can be understood in terms of external forces supporting opposition groups for instance or influencing matters related to domestic decision making. Pressures to conform to international conventions or norms that are incompatible with the governing political order may also
be perceived as security threats (Buzan 1998: 151-153). As contested in the CS earlier work; Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, one non-traditional form of security threat can stem from migration.

“Migration and refugee issues, no longer the sole concern of ministries of labour or of immigration, are now matters of high international politics, engaging the attention of heads of states, cabinets, and key ministries involved in defence, internal security, and external relations” (Weiner, 1993, p. 91)

As previously mentioned, the general term ‘migrant’ may entail very different types of migration i.e.: documented, undocumented, pushed-pulled, permanent or transient and hence the consequent security implications may differ to a large extent too. While refugees for instance that are forced to migrate for reasons such as war or persecution may pose a threat on the hosting state’s capacity to control its borders. Political refugees for instance may ignite bilateral tensions between the host and the sending nation. While communities of Diasporas can feel marginalized or isolated from the host society and consequently undermine the political regimes by supporting opposition groups, insurgence or separatist movements. This argument is shared by other scholars too, who for instance argue that migrants can be alienated in host countries from the majority society and government policies and therefore loose agency in being politically active (Castles and Miller 2009: 280). In extreme instances, direct oppositions to state authorities can develop in disenfranchised communities, which in more violent forms can manifest in terrorist attacks being, perpetrated (Weiner 1993: 109-110).

4.4 Societal Security

Upon having previously explored the regional context of historical and contemporary security challenges in Europe (and in doing so; outlining societal security as a principal form of security, the question arises; what really is societal security in conceptual terms and what relevance does it have in understanding European security? To answer this question, let’s first look at what it is in the fabric of societies that requires the guardiancy of understanding and
pursuing security.

As previously presented, the Copenhagen School is accredited with broadening the spectrum of security studies while also providing a theorization of the European security framework. In this broadened understanding, whether security is looked at in relation to military, politics, economics or environment and whether it is institutions, infrastructure, businesses, legal rights or the rule of law, that is the subject of security, the fundamentals of interests and values of European social life, ultimately can be traced back to the security of citizens, in European societies (Waever 1993: 20). The argument here is that these components are all ingrained in the same European, societal commonalities in which, the shared emblem for security acts is the society itself. Ultimately, it is the products of the society; its values, legal and economic institutions, and cultures that enable things to come into being in the first place and hence are to be protected. That argument emphasizing the importance of society being connecting point of all security arenas simultaneously necessitates an actual definition of the concept.

In their earlier work of The Copenhagen School societal security is defined as the “ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats” (Weaver 1993: 23). That definition; however, is rather abstract in the sense that it does not provide a concise enough tool for a point of deeper examinations. Waever has considered the unit of analysis for societal security being “politically significant ethno-national and religious identities” (1993: 22-23). According to Waever, social identity at its most basic is what enables the word “we” to be used, ranging from a small number of closely tied people like a family to communities or civilizations or religious identities. For instance; “we the Smith family, we Berliners, we Hungarians, we Europeans, or we Muslims” (1993: 23). The emphasis on national and religious identities; however, does not mean that other social groups within societies, with differing characteristics are not important elements of society. Rather, as Waever argues, societies are comprised of a myriad of social groups, each equipped with its own identity, but what enables societal identity to be used is its “robustness in construction, comprehensiveness in its following and the broad enough quality of identity that can accommodate for each of the social groups to compete with the territorial state as a political organizing principle” (1993: 23). Societal identity; therefore, is “able to reproduce itself independently of the state even if opposed by it” (1993: 23) A main point here, according to Waever is that the members of a society cannot have only some attributes in common, but they have to have a feeling of ‘togetherness’ forming an entity, which most often is an implicit act and does not necessarily entail 'social contract'. Despite, there has to be a
subjective dimension to the community, a feeling that we are 'x' and that there are particular thing of value to this this entity that require guardianship (1993: 17-18).

Considering that societal security primarily needs to be operationalized in the analysis, it is important to describe what the author means by that. That does not; however, necessitate delving into the theory of knowledge behind the development of the concept, such as Rousseau’s definitional philosophy on society, or Tönnies’ classical distinction between Gemeinschaft (community) or Gessellschaft (society or association), which Waever uses to define societal security. What is important is that, Waever, by drawing from Durkheim; does not perceive society merely as a rational contract with individuals as the basic unit, but argues that society is to be conceived both as something more than the sum of its parts and something that is not reducible to individuals (1993: 17-19). For that reason, issues that matter to societies and have the potential to be placed in the security frame cannot be reduced purely to individuals and their individual rationales, but the construction of security is done socially. Criticisms directed to societal security have largely focused on the ambiguity of the concept and how societies are rather abstract collectives made up of many components. Yet, when discussing societies, there is a tendency to treat them as independent social agents (Theiler 2003: 249-268). Some of the disadvantages using societal security as an analytical tool, acknowledged by the authors are; that society per se is an ambiguous referent object for security particularly when considering how society speaks and deciding who it is that speaks on behalf of society. That also raises the question if societal security can be misused by extremists, legitimizing violence and vigilantism which clearly stands outside the bounds of governments and destabilizes public order (Waever 1993: 187-188). It can also be difficult to differentiate between ‘societal security’ and ‘social security’, which stems largely from how society itself is understood. The very aim of developing the concept, as articulated by the authors; however, is that it sets a precondition for understanding how to either avoid issues being securitized as societal security in the first place or fail to account for them moderately. The argument hereby is that the dynamics of societal security and the fear factors involved can be better managed if understood correctly rather than ignored, which otherwise would serve no sound basis for security strategies (Waever 1993: 188).

Looking at the self-prescribed advantages of using the concept of societal security as an analytical tool in relevance to this research; one can outline how it provides insights to the perceived security challenges present in a European country in the post-Cold War era enabling one to discuss issues such as identity and migration into the broadened theoretical framework of security studies. As Waever contests; the concept of societal security serves an extension to security theories offering a
social collective that is located in between the unrealistic extremes of individual and global security, while still adhering to both alternative and conventional state centric approaches by elevating society to the statues of a referent object. (1993: 186).

The scholars acknowledge that societal security just as the framework itself is Eurocentric; and the work “Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe” (1993) focuses on and stems from a Western perspective. The contextual focus of the research, which is Hungary, still arguably falls within this context, considering that the former security cleavage between the East-West lines in Europe has lost its significance with the integration of the entire Eastern-Central European region into the EU over 15 years ago. Consequently, MS of the EU share much of the security concerns through their common institutions and strategic partnerships.

4.5 Securitization

Securitization theory in short - with its core concepts - refers to a process in which an actor makes a claim that a ‘referent object’, deemed worthy of survival is existentially threatened. If successfully communicated to the ‘audience’ in that the validity of the threat is accepted, the use of ‘extraordinary measures’ are then legitimizted to counter the threat. That transformation called securitization, is; therefore, a by-product of deliberate ‘speech acts’ from mainly powerful political actors with ‘particular rhetorical and semiotic language structures’ to allow the securitizing actor to bypass certain rules or procedures that he or she would otherwise need to abide by (Buzan 1998: 25). Security issues can be categorized into five security realms; economic, political, societal military and environmental security. This study considers the first three in its analysis. According to Buzan, technically any issue can move from being non-politicized to politicized and then securitized. They theorized this process as happening within a spectrum depending on the reaction of actors within societies like the public, policy makers or government agencies for instance (Buzan 1998: 32-33).
Important to note a major element of this process that is the audience. The theory states that, “discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object, does not itself create securitization. This is a securitizing move itself, but the issue is securitized only when and if the audience accepts it as such” (Buzan et al, 1998, p.25-26).

According to Buzan; “a successful speech act is a combination of language and society, comprised of both intrinsic features of speech and the group that authorizes and recognizes that speech” (Buzan et al. 1998:32). In the new Framework for Analysis (see Buzan 1998: 33) the following conditions are laid down for a successful securitizing move to take place:

1. The grammar of the speech act has to accentuate the notion of security by pointing out an existential threat, point of no return, and a possible way out.
2. The securitizing actor needs to be in a position of authority recognized by the audience.
3. The issue in hand poses can be considered generally threatening.

The proposition of the CS is that there is a high price involved in securitizing by on the one hand prioritizing an important issue and gaining the ability and urgency to deal with it directly and by extraordinary measures, but at the same de-democratizing the problem and mentally freezing it as something given that has to be treated by security measures. There is a speech construction inclined to communicate that there is a problem out there and we (the securitizing actor) are the solution and hence security is; as Waver called it; at best a ‘necessary evil’ (Buzan 1998: 33-35) It is contested by the CS’s theoretical framework that security is an exceptional form of politics and hence it is not necessarily desirable to constitute an issue for instance migration in this case, as an existentially important security problem, as it will result in placing the issue outside the scope of normal politics and into the security frame, which is a particular, exceptional form of politics. For that
reason, not only political, but ethical considerations need to be taken into account by looking at; how discourses aimed at securitizing certain issues articulate threats and in what policy results such acts culminate in (Buzan, 1998: 25). The CS views securitization as a possible indicator of failure to treat something within ‘normal politics’ and hence; the authors have called for “less security and more politics” (Waever, 1995).

4.6 Applying the theoretical framework

1. The securitizing actor needs to be in a position of authority accepted by the relevant audience. For that reason only the discourses of the members of the ruling governments like the ministers will be considered.

2. The discourses will be analysed according to order of when they were said during the outlined time frame of the crisis. In other words, they will be listed retrospectively, starting with the earliest statements, following the gradual elapse of time until the end of the said time frame.

3. Securitization moves are rooted in social mechanisms initiated by knowledge claims on the existence of a threat to a referent object (Buzan 1998: 26). For that reason, the analyses will pay particular attention to knowledge claims by the securitizing actors.

4. Referent objects (e.g. national identity) professed to be existentially threatened (e.g. by mass migration) by the securitizing actors will be outlined according to the CS description (Buzan 1998: 24)

5. Based on the declared referent object, the analysis will directly allocate the analyses of the discourses to either of the three security areas.

6. The speech acts must emphasize the notion of security by accentuating existential threats, point of no return, or no possible way out.

7. As mentioned, the focus is not on determining the objective computability of threats (e.g. whether migration poses a terrorist threat or if it is a threat to national identity), but demonstrating how knowledge claims are intersubjectively produced and how the findings correspond to literature.
5 Methodology

The following chapter provides a discussion on the methodological choice, methods used, the case selection, the gathered data and lastly the limitations and delimitations. The chapter will first provide a discussion on discourse analysis as a research method. After that, a sub-section on the chosen discourse analysis explains what it entails and why it is a relevant methodological approach. The third part will elaborate on the case selection and why Hungary is the contextual focus of the paper. The fourth sub-section presents the means of selecting and collecting the material, while the last part discusses limitations and delimitations of the research.

5.1 Discourse Analysis as a Research Method

Research within the social sciences, including IR has gradually grown in its dependence on the analysis of language and discourse. As Halperin and Heath notes; discourse analysis has become a basic component of IR research (2012: 278). Within the field of constructivism, discourse analysis is one of the most commonly used approach (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002).

Discourse analysis can be considered both interpretive and constructivist in nature. It is interpretive because “it assumes that people act on the basis of beliefs, values, or ideology that gives meaning to their action” and thus, we need to study the meaning that people attach to their actions (Halperin and Heath 2012: 310-311). Discourse analysis is also constructivist as “it assumes that people act on the basis of beliefs, values, or ideology that give meaning to their action” and therefore, actions have to be studied in terms of the meanings attached (Halperin and Heath 2012: 310-311) This methodological tool synergizes well with the outlined theoretical framework based on their common ontological grounds as both try to understand “the relationship between discourse and reality in a particular context”, i.e. the practical implications of understanding security and rhetoric around it (Halperin and Heath 2012: 310-311). Discourse analysis is considered a qualitative subcategory of
textual analysis which otherwise can be differentiated into quantitative and qualitative research. Discourse analysis is basically the qualitative direction of textual analysis which looks at texts to find discursive meanings and by doing so it is not merely the texts itself that are analysed, but the relationship between the text and its context and the relevant power and authority influencing the context (Halperin & Heath 2012: 82). The aim is, to explore the intentions that the political world has to agents and hence giving them reasons for acting in a certain way (Halperin & Heath 2012:310-311) Other types of qualitative textual analysis such as a narrative analysis operate within the epistemology of methodological individualism by carrying out individual interviews, or using journals or field notes. That on the other hand, does not synergize well with the methodological collectivist aspect stipulated by the theoretical framework, particularly the concept of societal security. For that reason, discourse analysis is the chosen tool for this research which helps to analyse systemic processes and their effects on individuals in a given society (Halperin & Heath 2012: 82-83). The method of data collection that comes with a discourse analysis may also assists in reducing bias in a way, relative to other individualist approaches, by avoiding „interview effect” for instance. This enables the conduct of analysis without the interference of someone else’s interpretation (Halperin and Heath 2012: 318-319) Discourse analysis can be differentiated into three different types; speech act theory, poststructuralism and critical discourse analysis (Halperin & Heath 2012:311-313). The following research utilizes CDA, which considers language a social practise that constitutes and is constituted by social reality. Consequently the approach suggests that discourse is not simply descriptive, but action oriented and not impartial. The critical aspect seeks to accentuate how structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and authority manifest in language (Wodak 2001: 2) According to Dijk, CDA is an analytical tool to study the way social power, abuse, dominance and inequality are created, maintained and resisted in discourse in both the social and political context (2001: 352).

Since the analysis is concerned with looking at how the security implications of migration are comprehended and consequently how discourses aimed at securitizing migration have been framed, CDA enables the research to identify if possible grounds of dominance, inequality or discrimination can be found, which could raise questions whether the acts of securitization were primarily driven on the basis of objectively computable threats.
5.2 Discourse Analysis as an Analytical Framework

Focusing on political speeches and statements made by leading political actors, makes discourse analysis a well-suited tool to understand how the nexus of migration and security is comprehended within the local context and what the consequent securitizing acts are. Fairclough’s discourse analysis (CDA) is well-suited with the theoretical considerations of securitization in the sense that the research focuses both on the discursive practices which construct representations of the world, and the role that these practices play in the maintenance of the social world (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002:64). Another explanation for choosing Fairclough’s method is that he drew from the field of linguistics and the interpretative characteristics of sociology to make his defined methodological tool viable for systemic textual analysis (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002:65). According to Fairclough; the researcher should take into account two dimensions when carrying out the analysis; first, the communicative event, which, considering the study’s theoretical framework of securitization, can be called the speech act, and the order of discourse. The argument here is that the structure or the context in which the speech act is located needs to be considered in conjunction with other surrounding discourses in order to see how these influence and inform each other (Ibid. 65-66. For this reason, the analysis will account with the context and the background of the discourses retrieved. Although this study does not aim to carry out a qualitative content analysis, specific themes and codes e.g. threat, emergency, urgency will be sought in order to identify speech acts with securitizing motives, while codes such as; security, identity, borders will help allocate the security area for the speeches. Fairclough also emphasizes the importance of uncovering tools or figures of speech such as comparisons, exaggerations or multivocality, while carrying out an empirical study (Ibid.).

Due to the different approaches by which CDA has historically been utilized in academia, it has attracted some criticism that is not to be ignored. The selection bias, which Philips and Hardy points out, accentuates how one may never be able to study all aspects of discourse and hence, research only focuses on selected materials for the sake of manageability (2002 4). For that reason, one has to carefully explain and justify the selection of texts, which will be done in sub-section 5.3 of this chapter. Widdowson have also argued that CDA is interpretative in nature and therefore, selective attention to certain textual features is often alluring. The appeal; however, is manifested by the justness of the cause the writer seeks to promote, rather than the analytical precision of the case made in support of it (2004: 166). In other words, researchers using CDA may be criticized on the grounds of meeting
their own political agendas and ideals. To counter such possible bias, the research argues in favour of reflexive awareness, meaning that I demonstrate my position explicitly on the issue and argue that as a normative approach such research should be inherently political to a degree, with transformational objectives. Upon having said that, my previously mentioned position and aim is stated here again. This is that I seek to objectively understand the political threat perceptions and the consequent forms of signalling in a local context. I possess no dogmatic, ideological preferences to different standpoints on migration, but since migration is an important and complex contemporary phenomenon, I wish to understand how and why it may be securitized in a specific context and what explanation theory provides for it. As presented, there are different perspectives on the linkages outlined in the migration-security nexus, part of which I can recognize or accede to, but the act of securitization can also be susceptible to political opportunist as said. These dynamics combined with the high contemporary relevance of migration drive the research of this study.

Furthermore, I believe that the fourth research question of the paper, necessitating a complimentary method of assessing correspondence to theory, helps to mitigate personal bias by going beyond a mere subjective argumentation and presenting; whether the communicated threat constructions have grounds accounted for in shown theory. Such an approach goes beyond the general scope of discourse studies; however the underlying philosophy or intention is in line with Marx Weber’s previously mentioned ‘value neutral’ criteria, which contends that it is the duty of researchers to identify and account for their own values, which helps them to overcome possible bias in the conduct of their research (Halperin & Heath 2012: 55-56).

5.3 Research Design and Case Selection

Considering that the design of the research is focused on a single case, the generalizability of the findings is obviously limited to this case. The approach however, may be replicated, with minor changes in other researches with similar characteristics, particularly related to securitization in the local contexts or in studying the migration-security nexus.
The reason behind the choice of case is explained by the fact that it was one of the main migratory stress points during the crisis, due to being the first Schengen country directly connected to the rest of Schengen Area by land (unlike Greece) and as a result, it was one of the main migratory ‘hot spots’ where securitizing migration quickly took hold. Hungary was a focal point of events from a securitization perspective of the migration crisis stemming from the West Balkan route, which at the time saw the highest number of people migrating (Frontex 2015). Events of the migration crisis had several stages of developments and there is a plurality of political discourses, which could be the focus of study. The chosen country; however was an area of significant developments of events in the timeline of the crisis and thus, it provides an interesting subject of study. As acts of securitization began with the construction of border fences and political acts with securitizing motives have continued to be reinforced since (see COPM 2018), the scope of the research is justified in focusing on an actor that have positioned migration on top of the national security agenda. Hungary may be viewed as a radical example of securitizing migration by certain norms, but that makes the case selection only more just.

Considering the currently ruling government’s self-described position on aspiring to build a model of an illiberal democracy (see DW 2018), critique to the case selection may be pointed out following McDonald’s argument (see McDonald 2008: 70) saying that the CS’s framework of securitization has proven useful in studying discursive threat production within liberal democratic states. The Copenhagen School however, has accounted with this critique and it does actually consider securitization theory relevant for different form of democracies or non-democratic states as the ‘audience’ can vary depending on the context.

Considering the time frame of the research, the case is limited to the beginning of the year 2015 until the 15th of September when the border fence was completed (BBC 2015b). Infringement procedures against Hungary have also been undergoing concerning the conformity with the Justice and Home Affairs Council ruling on the compulsory migrant quotas. During the writing of this research, new legal proceedings have been initiated by the European Commission regarding domestic laws on asylum and return registration, demonstrating Hungary’s stringent position on the European migration debate and the political sensitivity and relevance involved (European Commission 2017 see also European Commission 2018).
That dimension further gives possibly grounds for other research related to European integration processes.

5.4 The Selection and Collection of Material

The following section provides an overview about how and which materials have been chosen and, why they are relevant. All materials are openly accessible on the web through the respective links attached. Before outlining the gathered data a number of criteria by which the materials are selected, are clarified.

Firstly, since the theory stipulates that “speech acts” are made by powerful political elites with a securitizing motive (Buzan 1998:26-27), the data gathered must focus on the discourses of the government agents. The government has been both the securitizing actor making the “speech acts” and the primary state actor with the capacities to carry out counter actions to the perceived threats of migration. Discourses from political oppositions are not taken into account for the reason that they do not meet the requirement of exercising thus making the ‘speech acts’, which necessitated the securitizing acts.

The gathered data is also limited to and analysed according to the outlined time frame of the analysis which starts from the beginning of year 2015 until the 15th of September. That time frame symbolizes the gradually growing pressure of migration to the point of completing the securitizing move i.e. the completion of the fence. Data gathered has been selected based on its availability and aim at a relevant audience. Calculating the aspect of whether speeches are truly directed to specific audiences or if they are merely informative in nature is a highly speculative task, without appropriate analytical tools. The contexts of the speeches do; however, give a hint about the speech’s wide-availability i.e. if they are given in media outlets, like in interviews, or in radio, television or public speeches during important national holidays or events and consequently what the possible audience may be e.g. the citizens, fellow party members, local or international media outlets or the European Civil Service encompassing the staff serving in the European institutions.

The languages of many sources are in English provided by the official website of the Hungarian government, while others are direct translations from media outlets or recognized institutions. Evidently, it may be different agencies or news sources online that produce the translation of these direct quotations. To
exercise a degree of caution regarding the accuracy of the translation, which otherwise seems correct based on my ability of being fluent in Hungarian – the discourse analysis will still treat these quotes in a general manner to find correspondence with articulating ‘speech acts’ related to security. In one case of speech, it is me, the author, who translated the speech and for such reasons the analysis employs an even more generalist approach.

To consider the value neutrality aspect of selected data, the chosen materials have been retrieved after semi-manually monitoring about 500 state documents titled as news from the website of the Hungarian government and about a hundred different media sources. Such documents have been selected based on whether they have relevance to migration and to any of the three security areas which the theoretical framework laid out. It was also only materials with direct quotations from representatives of the government in high positions that have been considered. Politicians who have been quoted include; the Prime Minister (PM), the Foreign Minister, the Government spokesperson and the Minister of Justice.

5.5 Limitations and Delimitation

Apart from already mentioned limitations and delimitations an evident boundary of the study is that there is no criterion of objective justifiability for raising something from normal politics and placing it in the security frame as an existentially important security problem as explained earlier. That effect can however, be mitigated I believe, by acknowledging the ‘art of the fields, i.e. addressing and thoroughly defining core concepts and issues within different security areas, like societal security or economic or political security and outlining what issues may pose security threats according to shown theory. In light of that argument, the research excludes trying to answer the underlying motives of why issues are perceived as security threats i.e. if securitization is propagated for political gains. Secondly, security considerations are limited to the three said areas as the two other (military and environmental), which the CS outlines as realms where securitization may take place are significantly less relevant and less frequent considering the context of discourses to be analyzed.

Thirdly, another delimitation is evidently the scope and generalizability of the findings which are limited to the case. It is also obviously not possible to analyze all discourses made during the outlined
time frame due to the length of the research. The focus is rather limited to the gradual securitizing process embedded in the speeches and texts.

A limitation in reference to the previous chapter is that the ‘audience’ could naturally imply many things. For instance, both the Hungarian citizens and the members of the parliament as Hungary is a parliamentary, representative democracy. It could also be fellow European politicians or civil servants in the EU that partake in plenary sessions and influence EU level decisions making processes related to issues on migration. The legal legitimatization for constructing the fence was voted upon by the members of the Hungarian Parliament and approved by the government, which clearly falls within the MS competence, but the ‘speech acts’ themselves were mainly aimed at the citizens quite possibly on the basis that they are principally and theoretically the ones that possess the democratic voice authorizing the government and the Members of the Parliament (MPs). Further considering that no social upheavals occurred in the face of securitizing actions and that people overwhelmingly voted against compulsory migrant quotas in a referendum of 2016 (see BBC 2016b), the proposition of the research for considering the citizens as the primary ‘audience’ on the basis of a democratic system can be justified. The research is also mainly focused on the securitizing actor and not the audience i.e. it is ‘speech acts’ that are the subjects of the analytical focus. Considering MPS as the audience and presupposing that they may have varying attitudes to the idea of securitization is further problematic due to the former composition of the representatives in the parliament, which is made up of a two-third majority of the current government (see Deloy 2014). For the same reason, discourses from the political opposition are also not included in the analysis.

The research also cannot measure if and to what degree societal consensus was influenced by political speech acts, as the research does not take a methodological individualist approach i.e. investigate the citizens themselves by carrying out interviews. Based on time and space limitation, that argument is considered irrelevant for this research as it is more engaged with the content of the political discourses made.

Another aspect that has to be mentioned, is that based on the CS’ theoretical framework the research focuses on the representation of threats constructed by the discourse of political prerogative elites and thus, possible critical, non-elite voices are not represented. The theory accounts for this (see Buzan 1998), but that is still worth mentioning.

Lastly, it may be argued that the securitization of migration tends to take place irrelevant of the security area. Migration as a phenomenon or issue can be securitized due to different threat implications - relating to different security areas – but securitization happens not necessarily because migration has negative implication on a specific area, but
because such implication are perceived to exists in the first place. Once migration is raised beyond normal politics, it is treated with urgency and extraordinary measures that can make it difficult to de-securitize the issue. Securitization is a de-democratizing process that freezes an issue mentally as something given that has to be treated outside the bounds of normal politics (see Buzan 1998).
Social science researches are generally understood in terms of casual relationships. This relationship in this analytical part culminates in the identification of grammar relating to security using explained method. As mentioned, the analysis follows a retrospective order of retrieved data, starting with the earliest date. The sub-sections are organized accordingly.

### 6.1 Identifying Threats and Security

On January 11th 2015, Prime Minister Viktor Orban gave an interview to a Hungarian public television channel while in Paris to attend the Republican Marches against terrorism. He started off by saying that “Economic immigration is a bad thing in Europe. It shouldn’t be seen as something that is of any use at all, because it just brings difficulty and danger to the European person. This is why immigration must be stopped. This is the Hungarian viewpoint” (Index 2015a). First of all the context is very important here as it is on one of the Republican marches honouring the victims of the Charlie Hebdo shootings. The event is attended by around 40 world leaders and an estimated 3.7 million French citizens (BBC 2015a). The speech of the Prime Minister here connects a specific type of immigration; namely economic, that has been present in Western Europe since at least 20th century, to the words ‘difficulty’ and ‘danger’. No distinction is made between other types of migration or migrants. The two main perpetrators of the terrorist attack were French nationals born and raised France, with a migratory background. The speech here has characteristics of multivocality as the background here is evidently implied in the speech with grammar of threats by connecting economic migration to the words ‘difficulty’ and ‘danger’. The identifiable referent object is the European person that is used in a singular form of the word, which may suggest an understanding of the European people as a homogenous entity that is in danger. The audience can be considered the Hungarian public as the interview is given in Hungarian to one of the largest public television channels in Hungary. The danger is clearly perceived as being posed by migration, regardless of its form, and for that
reason urgency is raised to imminently stop immigration. In the last sentence, the speech contends that his argument represents the Hungarian view, which can be connected, to this entity of ‘the European person’ further emphasizing a connecting line between the French and the Hungarians both belonging to the group of ‘the European person’.

During the same interview, Orban continues connect the relevance of the happenings to Hungary. “At the same time, one must make it very definitely clear that we will not permit—at least as long as I am the prime minister and as long this government exists—it will not happen that Hungary becomes the target of immigrants” (Ibid.). Hungary here is referred to with the word ‘target’ implying that the country could be the aim of an attack,, most likely a similar one; hence Hungary is the referent object under threat, which he vows to defend. In this discourse, the primary state actor, the government, including him as the Prime Minister is the self-portrayed guardian against the outlined threat. Despite that the speech mentions economic migration and refers to dangers with a grammar of military tones such as ‘target’, the perceived threat identified can be classified as political security as the terrorist threat challenges the organizational stability of social orders (Buzan 1998, p.141). The state in this sense possesses the highest authority and responsibility to guard this stability and from the interview it is clear that the Prime Minister vows to do that. The speech plainly dismisses migration being a viable solution to challenges related to economic security, which is in contrast to the literature by CS (see Waever 1993 150-152).

In the last part of the interview, Orban talks about culture “We do not want to see among us significant minorities that possess different cultural characteristics and background than us. We would like to preserve Hungary as Hungary.” The underlying source of a threat here is constructed to be ‘significant minorities’ with cultural differences from the host society, which falls within the security area of societal security. The referent object here is ‘we’ the ‘Hungarians’ so there is an apparent construction in the speech referring to ‘we’ and ‘them’ being the source of possible danger and difficulty. During this interview the crisis was in the stage of intensification, still not full-blown, the speech however already accentuates a strong position on not permitting that “Hungary becomes the target of immigrants” (Index 2015a).

In relation to the emerging security landscape theorized by the early works of the CS (see literature review 3.3); both similarities and differences can be outlined. While the literature does not discuss migration being caused by an increasing number of displaced people globally, Heisler; however, argues that the international division of labour; keeps giving incentives to people from marginalised or less affluent economies to seek better opportunities in most fluent and developed countries.
creating a tendency in host societies to view immigrants as scapegoats (Heisler cited in Waever 1993: 152). That combined with economically driven social changes, largely fuelled by globalism; and the lack of reliable empirical data demonstrating whether immigrants pose financial strains on the welfare state, the weakening of public institutions or increased criminality, the belief that that they do can easily grab a hold in host societies and then be exploited by political opportunists (Heisler, Zig cited in Waver 1993: 157). While there is an observable correlation between the speeches and the literature in migrants being perceived as a source of trouble, the causality of whether the speech is constructed as an act of opportunism is outside the scope of this research as mentioned; therefore the analysis strictly distances itself here from deciding upon that. The speeches were made in light of a terrorist attack claiming the life of 12 people and a further 11 injured, raising international attention, so there is an apparent sensitivity involved in the context where the speech was made. While it is obvious from the attack that the assailants had a migratory background, raising questions about the possible failure of integration and a serious security dilemma involved with this, the speeches made by the Prime Minister exclusively focused on different and negative dimensions on migration with a grammar of threat construction and the possibility of danger.

While there is an observable correlation between the speeches and the literature in terms of migrants being portrayed as a source of threat and danger, the causality i.e. determining whether the speech is constructed as an act of opportunism is outside the scope of this research, the findings however do raise this question.

6.2 Call for Urgency on European Level

Following a meeting of EU Ministers in charge of EU Affairs on the 11th of February, Szabolcs Takács told journalists in Brussels - corresponding to various news sources, including Hungarian - that “The issue of terrorism cannot be separated from that of illegal migration” (PMO 2015a). The source is available from the official website of the Hungarian government; there however the word ‘illegal’ is not used, but only migration, which clearly creates a degree of ambiguity for the audience (see ibid.). Here, the Hungarian Minister of EU Affairs connects the phenomenon of illegal migration to the dangers of terrorism, but proceeds to state that “I have informed my partners that Hungary (...) faces extremely serious problems in the field of
illegal migration” (Ibid.). While the word ‘extremely’ emphasizes urgency, the exact problems that Hungary faces on the other hand is not stated explicitly, but used in the same context with the threat of terrorism, creating an assumption that the reader may make. The minister continues by emphasizing the importance of the EU borders; “The greatest challenge for us is to reinforce and protect the external borders of the European Union and the Schengen area.” (Ibid.) While borders are emphasized as a referent object and increased border protection as a possible extraordinary measure to be taken, the discourse further hints to security challenges but referent objects are not stated explicitly, creating a degree of multivocality. Border protection is a political security area, but in case of the EU, much of its protection is shared unequally burdening for member states. Hungary for instance as the first land connected country to the rest of the Schengen Zone, obviously faces significant migration pressures coming from the West-Balkan route. Controlling borders is a well-discussed security concern highlighted by the CS, which falls within the notion of state sovereignty. The literature also outlines the possibility for disenfranchised communities to develop as a result of migration which in extreme cases can challenge state authorities or even pose terrorist threats (Weiner 1993: 109-110). The discursive threat construction and the literature again show correlations inferring that the security concerns are acknowledged by theory; however, the wording of the ‘speech act’ definitely raises urgency while inhibiting a degree of multivocality implying a strong motive for securitization.

6.3 Solidifying a Position of Security on European Level

The next speech is made by the Prime Minister Viktor Orban on a plenary session in the European Parliament on ‘Issues in Hungary’ on the 19th of May 2015 in Strasbourg (see EPTV 2015). In this session several issues were raised including the rule of law in Hungary, the notion of illiberal democracy, capital punishment, migration and the possibility of relocation and resettlement schemes. Note here that the Ministers of the Justice and Home Affairs Council only later agreed on the quotas schemes based on a qualified majority voting, which Hungary rejected, despite it being one of the three countries –together with Italy and Greece – where migrants would have been relocated from (European Commission 2015a). Note also that the speech is made in Hungarian and
since no official translation is available, I, the author have translated the speech. For that reason, the analysis takes a more generic approach as outlined in the methodology (see sub-section 5.4). Furthermore, despite of the many issues raised in the session, only matters related to migration are analysed in the relevant context.

In the presence of the Parliament and European civil servant Orban started speaking about Hungary’s devotion to the EU, the country’s positive economic performance and characterising Hungarians as people who prefer straight talk, He went on by criticising the politically correct discourse ‘agenda’ in Europe (EPTV 2015). In this context he proceeded by talking about migration and started off with “We Hungarians would like if Europe remained for the Europeans” and “We want to preserve Hungary as a Hungarian country” (EPTV 2015). A recurring identification of “we” can be noticed here. The identification also involves a characterizing standpoint i.e. ‘we want’ and there is also a connection made to Europe and Europeans. The wording obviously implies a process of change in which the characteristics upon which the identification is made are referent objects i.e. Europe and the Europeans, Hungary and Hungarians. There are also two identifiable levels on which threats are constructed; the state level and the regional level. Considering the literature; Heiner has argued that migration poses a long-term challenge for governments to manage cultural and political change (see Heiner cited in Waever 1993: 149) which is an obvious correspondence here within the discourse relating to both societal and political security.

Orban continued by saying “We Hungarians want to decide if we want migrants in Hungary. We are a Christian, national government; we have mercy in our hearts, and the refugees, the real refugees, we have always welcomed. We will do so in the future as well” (Ibid.). In this speech there is again an identification of “we” the “Hungarians”, but now ‘they’ are also identified as being either the “refugees” or the “real refugees”. While the word refugee is a legal term, ‘real refugees’ are not and hence it lacks definition and is ambiguous in this speech. The PM, proceeds to emphasize the distinction between refugees and ‘subsistence immigrants’, which now demonstrate that the word ‘refugee’ in the previous sentence referred to economic migrants, while ‘real refugee’ relates to the actual refugees in the legal sense. From the discourse it is obvious that there is a discrepancy between different European standpoints on who constitutes being a refugee, despite existing legal definition, which Orban criticises. In his next sentences there is again an identification of “we” the “Hungarians” and that Hungary is a referent object to the threat of illegal immigration. Following the line of argumentation in his speech, economic migrants in the context of
insufficient border protection constitute as illegals which he perceives as a threat. “*We do not want Hungary to become the destination of illegal immigration*” (Ibid.).

Orban was further not supportive of the relocation schemes on grounds of state sovereignty and said he would not support it even if it was ‘reasonable’ as such a scheme would bypass the competence of the member state. He called for member state competence in deciding who the country wants to let in. That obviously falls within the political security area, but despite of a communicated threat and referent objects, there is an absence of extraordinary security measure proposed. The speech follows a discourse of security and importance to deal with the matter; however, there is also a lack of urgency in discourse. Orban emphasized the pressure that Hungary is facing at the moment, the importance of border protection and cooperation with the Western-Balkan states, but no reference or proposition was made to introducing extraordinary measures such as building fences. For such reasons the speech can be characterised as more defensive in nature that informs of a standpoint, rather than being a clear ‘speech act’. That may be explained by the fact that the primary audience in this case was the European politicians, present in the Parliament. On the other hand, all European citizens, including Hungarians have access to these recordings in translated versions, and the speech was also available in public media in Hungary. Regardless of the mixture of the audience, there is definitely a different power dynamic in this context that explains the more defensive grammar of discourse. Concerning the relevance to literature, the CS does theorize an increasing tendency for an ‘us’ and ‘them’ construction upon increasing migration. According to Barry Buzan; if it is indeed societies that are the primary focus of this new security problematique, then it is the matters of identity and migration that will drive the primary perceptions on threats and vulnerabilities. Societies in this sense is conceptualised as something closely related to identity and how groups identify themselves as “us” and distinguish between the other i.e. “them” (Buzan 1993 5).

### 6.4 Need for Extraordinary Measures

In an interview given to a Hungarian public service television on the 23rd of June 2015, the Government Spokesperson Zoltán Kovács announced that “*We are full*” (PMO 2015b). He
stated that 600-800 people arrive to Hungary on a daily basis through the green border with Serbia, completely exhausting the Hungarian asylum system. The spokespersons, Mr Kovács clearly sends a signal of urgency out and that the country has no control over the border nor can the institutions handle the pressure. A clear articulation of a ‘speech act’ is observable by the threat of an overwhelming level of migration, the referent object however, could be considered both the state’s ability to control its borders and the state institutions responsible for handling asylum. In either case, political security is the relevant security area. Upon being questioned, if Hungary has the right to withdraw from the Dublin Regulation, Kovács said that “realistically Hungary has no other option as the Hungarian asylum system is not prepared for a flood of refugees”. In this speech a form of objectification is observable by using the word ‘flood’ to the migrants, but on the other hand, it could also describe a phenomenon in a general sense. The term ‘refugee’ however, is used to refer the incoming people which have a more positive tone than previously mentioned discourses. It may be argued that it stems from the condition in which one needs external help or a form of imminent solution to handle the pressing situation. Since Mr Kovács is also the spokesperson for the government, his personal traits of more diplomatic wording could provide some explanation. In light of the previous discourses, it is apparent in this situation that securitizing migration on a regional level did not successfully happen as no extraordinary measures were introduced that could mitigate the pressure.

6.5 Introducing Extraordinary Measures

On the 6th of July the Hungarian Parliament passed a law granting the Hungarian state the ‘right of use out of public interest in respect of the border sections which do not come under the Schengen Agreement to take these sections under extraordinary protection and to build a temporary security fence thereon’. The official announcement on the government’s website was published on the 16th of July by the Minister of Interior, Sándor Pintér. From the text, it is clearly observable that the extraordinary measure taken is the building of the fence in order to protect the external borders of the Schengen Area which can be considered in this case the referent object. Very interestingly the content of the quoted text is nearly identical to the theoretical explanation of securitization. The state is being granted the ‘right’ to introduce ‘extraordinary measures’ and construct a fence and for such reason, securitization can be
considered to have successfully taken place. A ‘speech act’ in call for a securitizing move is no longer present as the text is more informative in its elements about the decision having been made. An argument; however, is made that “Hungary does not only patrol its borders for itself but also with a view to the best interests of the rest of the Schengen countries”, giving a reinforcing note of justification to other MS of the EU. Considering that successful securitization have not taken place on the regional level by this time, it could very well be argued that the message may be seeking support, approval or a following example outside the boundaries of the state level. The wording of the announcement noticeably pays attention to conformity with regulations by for instance saying that “poles are installed at a distance of between 2.5 and 10 metres from the state border” implying that the fence does not violate Serbian territory. Further information is also provided that this model section, which they started building, will be complimented with further fences on multiple locations on the green border to the South.

6.6 Concluding Remarks on Findings

The analysis has shed light on the discursive threat construction of migration by Hungarian political elites. The discourses took place at different times, in different locations and by different state agents. The level of threat construction however, is observable in each case on both a state level and a regional level. Considering that the crisis emerged as a European issue, it is not surprising. The order of the analysed discourses follows the progress of how the crisis was unfolding from the perspective of the chosen state agents and what the corresponding reactions have been in discourse. Throughout the discourses, the threat has been consistently named as migration but ‘speech acts’ with securitizing motives like emphasizing urgency, were identified inconsistently, which is explained by the different contexts. The referent objects varied alike; hence different security areas applied. This is also explained by the different contexts in which the discourses were present e.g. The Prime Minister focusing on threats related to cultural values in the Charlie Hebdo marches while the Government’s Spokesperson emphasizing state capacities related to border protection, asylum processing and conformity with the Dublin regulation. Matters related to political security have been named the most; 6 times exactly, with a recurring theme of border protection,
which is logical considering that the introduced extraordinary measure was the fence, which has been clear from the beginning of the research. The thesis devoted more explanation to societal security in the theoretical framework to be able to better clarify it and based on the assumption that it will be a more commonly recurring theme. In the analysed discourses it was only relevant twice, but then again due to space limitations the analysis could not consider other retrieved data sources where they were present. Specific question proposed to the securitizing agents or the dynamics of the dialogues in which the discourses were produced were not clearly identifiable in most cases. The context on the other hand was clarified in every case and obviously had an impact on the wording and the grammar of the discourses.
7 Conclusion

Considering the characteristics of the threat construction, it can be described as exogenous, as in each case, the identified threat was migration, an external source of threat. Referent objects varied as mentioned, but discourses were static as the identified threat remained the same and continuously fuelled local identity formations e.g. “we” the “Hungarians”. The prevalence and the utterance of the securitizing speech acts differed, but discourses remained exclusive in accentuating an identification and an interest of the ‘we’, divisional in describing the ‘them’ and preservative wanting to protect the status-quo i.e. state sovereignty in terms of border protection, declining the relocation scheme and not wanting migration.

The grammar of security remains present and relatively high from the beginning in all discourses, but cannot be considered to be gradually growing in the sense of accentuated urgencies.Outlined security implications also differ based on the referent objects outlined. Such differences are explained by the variances of the contexts.

While ‘speech acts’ with security motives were made on both the state and the regional level, successful securitization only happened in Hungary during the outlined time frame of the research. The explanation to that can be the absence of securitization on the regional level. After Mr Kovacs’ statement that the state capacities are completely exhausted and cannot cope with further pressure, 14 days passed by before the Hungarian Parliament voted on the construction of the fence, which was completed in September.

In relation to the literature ‘Identity Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe’ there were several corresponding notions; they however, were not consistent in every case e.g. economic security, which the CS considered as possibly necessary for European countries while Orban clearly dismissed this idea. Political and societal security implications provided most of the corresponding features. Findings for instance accentuate Hassner’s previously quoted point in relation to individual, social and national security in the context of globalization. “The challenges that the influx of migration pose and the consequent effects on nation state make external threats and internal doubts are hard to disentangle” (Buzan 1993: 2-3). The analysis, in light of its correspondence to the theorized security landscape provides an interesting insight into the contemporary validity to the CS’ earlier work. Since the same work
also discusses regional integrational processes to a large degree, the work may also possess strong explanatory powers to understand European integration, which could be an interesting source of further study apart from the previously mentioned ones. In terms of evaluating the study, a possible weakness of the paper may stem from the limited number of discourses that have been analysed, but on the other hand, the research has already exceeded its desired length. The findings may also not be generalizable in many other contexts because whether securitization successfully happens or not, is dependent on the socio-political and historical context, and not merely on the “utterance” of an existentially important security threat.

Some of the major strengths of the research lie in its holistic, explanatory nature. It delves into a complex issue and tackles an important contemporary challenge; migration. By focusing on a country-specific case it gives an insight into how the security implications of migration may be perceived and treated locally, which ultimately can have an impact on the general migration management regionally as well. Despite that the analysis is case specific and that the discourses in the chosen context shared a lot of similarities; the study does provide complimentary critical perspectives throughout its thread. While migration remains a global humanitarian challenge and a commonly discussed political issue, it is imperative to continuously develop academic discussions around it to further better, more impartial and more fruitful understandings. Perchance this study contributes to this ideal and offers a starting point for further research with similar characteristics like securitization in other local contexts or research related to the nexus of security and migration.
8 Bibliography

8.1 Written and Electronic Sources


• Buzan, B. 2007, People, states & fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era, Colchester, UK: ECPR Press, cop. 2007; 2


• Dragostinova, Theodora (2016) Origins: Refugees or Immigrants? The Migration Crisis in Europe in Historical Perspective. Published by the History Departments at The Ohio State University and Miami University. Retrieved 29.08.2018. Available at: http://origins.osu.edu/article/refugees-or-immigrants-migration-crisis-europe-historical-perspective


• Hobolt, Sara B (2016) The Brexit Vote: A divided Nation a Divided Continent, Journal of European Public Policy, Volume 23, Issue 9, pg.:1259-1277,


- Sachs, David Jeffrey (2012) From Millennium Development Goals to Sustainable Development Goals, Earth Institute Columbia University, New Yorks

- Sakbani, Michael (2015) Contemporary Arab Affairs: The spring that has not flowered: what went wrong with the Arab Spring, Volume 8 Issue 2, pg.:239-251


- Spiegel (2015b) Interview with the Austrian Chancellor Werner Faymann. Retrieved 2018.03.27. Available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/austrian-
• Stiglitz, Eugene Joseph (2016) The EURO: How a common currency threatens the future of Europe, Published by W.W. Norton & Company, pp.: 1-34


- Waever, Ole [OpenLearn from The Open University] (2004)


8.2 Retrieved Data


